The 2015 Local Elections in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts of Ukraine

Steffen Halling

December 2015

This report is prepared within the GIZ and EU-funded Action entitled «Providing consultations for civil society and local self-government

regarding the administrative reform and conduct of local elections in October 2015». The Action is implemented by the European Exchange

(Berlin, Germany) and Civil Network OPORA (Kyiv, Ukraine).

The publication contains general findings of a comprehensive analysis of local elections 2015 on the east of Ukraine. The report is intended for a

wide audience, including experts, policy makers and researchers.

The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission and GIZ.

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Content

Introduction .......................................................... 4

Election Legislation .............................................. 5

Specifics of Organizing Elections in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts .................................................. 7

Election Results .................................................... 10

Turnout of Voters ................................................. 13

Election Process .................................................... 16

Political Leverage on Certain Election Commissions ......................................................... 17

Conclusions ........................................................... 21

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Introduction

In October and November 2015, local elections were held in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, just as in the entire territory of Ukraine, on the background of the armed conflict in the east and constitutional reform along with simultaneous measures of decentralization.These processes in both oblasts deserve special attention: On the one hand, this region is directly affected by military actions. Approximately one-third of the total territory of the region is currently beyond the control of the Ukrainian government. On the other hand, decentralization process, especially in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, can be regarded as a tool that will prevent the creation of the grounds for externally provoked separatist sentiments by strengthening the principle of subsidiarity. However, these processes - depending on their interpretation – may also contribute to institutionalization of such sentiments. Local elections, which following the early parliamentary and presidential elections in Ukraine in 2014 can be generally viewed as a test for the ruling coalition after the Maidan events, are of key importance in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, especially in the so-called “liberated territories”. These territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts were directly affected by armed conflict over the last year and were temporarily beyond the control of the Ukrainian government. After the so-called “in-out referendum” on separation of eastern territories, commitment of the local population groups to the Ukrainian state was somewhat questioned. At the same time, we can state a certain lack of legitimacy of local governments due to the abolition of certain administrations and the establishment of temporary administrations.

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Election Legislation

The law on local elections1, adopted by the Parliament on July 14, 2015, and signed by the President on August 6, 2015, establishes a separate legislative framework for local elections. The law provides for three different electoral systems: local councils at the level of settlement and village, as well as mayors in towns with less than 90 000 voters are elected on the basis of a relative majority principle. In cities with more than 90 000 registered voters, the law provides for election of mayors according to the absolute majority principle. Elections of deputies to all other local councils (city, rayon, regional, and oblast councils) are based on the party-list proportional representation system.Such party lists are drawn up with the inclusion of the main candidate and, if available, other candidates from each of the parties all together in every constituency. If a party gets elected, the first mandate is awarded to the main candidate of the party. The distribution of additional seats in the council is based on the ratio of the results of the party in the constituencies.Proportional representation voting system based on party lists caused discontent and criticism during the pre-election period. Supporters of the new law on local elections regard the party lists, which form the basis for the proportional representation system, as “open lists”, and thus view them as fulfillment of basic requirements for reforming the electoral law set out by organizations of civil society and international organizations. Introduction of “Open Lists” was demanded in Ukraine primarily for the purpose of ensuring greater transparency, in order

1 «The Law of Ukraine on Local Elections»: http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/595-19/page.

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to give voters more influence on the selection of candidates, and thus prevent fraud practices in the process of allocation of places in the candidate lists. However, in reality the electoral system provides voters with no opportunity to influence the party lists and procedure for election of candidates. Therefore, such party lists can in no way be called “open lists”, because they are rather fixed or closed lists.2 Moreover, the specific structure of proportional representation system could subsequently lead to either excessive or insufficient representation of some constituencies. Although election constituencies vary greatly in size while the party is not obliged to form its own list of candidates for each constituency, the selection of mandate holders representing the party is still based on the distribution of votes in favor of the party or corresponding candidates per each constituency, for instance, two candidates representing one party in a smaller constituency can get into the list of elected deputies, meanwhile no candidate representing the same party in a larger constituency will be elected even in the event of getting a much larger number of votes.3

The new law on elections has raised the electoral threshold from 3 to 5 percent which became a barrier for smaller parties. Furthermore, self-nomination of a formally independent candidate is now possible only at the level of village and settlement councils as well as at the elections of city mayors. While the independent candidates’ eligibility for public office was supposed to promote the development of Ukrainian party system, OSCE feels that such a restriction runs counter to Copenhagen

2 See also: Democracy also Reporting International: New Local Election Law: A Missed Opportunity, Briefing Paper 58, October 2015: http://democracy-reporting.org/files/briefing_paper_new_local_election_law_en.pdf3 See also the examples of awarding mandates to elected candidates for deputies on p.8 of this report.

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Document as of 1990 signed by all member states of the OSCE. 4

In addition to the complexity of the new electoral system as well as non-transparent and rushed development and adoption of the law on elections5, it is also criticized for its ambiguous and weak mechanism of dispute resolution, candidate registration, regulation and funding of election campaign, and media coverage of the election process.6

Specifics of Organizing Elections in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts

In the context of the armed conflict in the region, local elections in 4 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Election Observation Mission Ukraine, Local Elections, 25 October 2015: Interim Report:http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/191281?download=true5 In February 2015, the Ukrainian parliament appointed a commission of experts, which according to the coalition agreement should have worked on the development of reform of the law on local elections. This expert commission consisted of deputies of different factions and experts on election law, representatives of civil society organizations in the field of elections and representatives of international governmental and non-governmental organizations which consulted Ukraine on reforming the electoral system. One of the draft laws developed by the commission of experts was submitted for consideration to the parliament later on. At the same time, three other draft laws were also submitted to the parliament, but neither of these draft laws was presented and discussed publicly. Finally, on June 18 one of the aforesaid draft laws (proposed by deputies representing Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity”, Narodniy Front (Popular Front) and the Radical Party) was adopted in first reading by Parliament. Other draft laws, including the one developed by the commission of experts, were rejected. After registration of amendments to the law, the parliament finally adopted them one month later. The law was signed and promulgated on the 6th and 7th of August, 2015, respectively - less than a month before the election. Election observers of OSCE/ODIHR mission, with reference to the “Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters” of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, stated that the reform of local election legislation of Ukraine does not conform to internationally accepted standards due to the lack of public discussion and short-term development of the draft law. See also: Democracy Reporting International: New Local Election Law: A Missed Opportunity, Briefing Paper 58, October 2015: http://democracy-reporting.org/files/briefing_paper_new_local_election_law_en.pdf and OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Election Observation Mission Ukraine, Local Elections, 25 October 2015: Interim Report: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/191281?download=true6 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Election Observation Mission Ukraine, Local Elections, 25 October 2015: Interim Report:http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/191281?download=true

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Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts were held only in some parts of these oblasts. In Donetsk oblast, which has the largest number of registered voters among all regions of Ukraine, only one third of a total of 3,306,745 voters was invited to participate in local elections. In Luhansk oblast, which totals nearly 1,774,843 registered voters, only 450,000 people were able to participate in local elections.7

Since the elections were not held not in the entire territory of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, both regions, in contrast to all other oblasts of Ukraine8, had no representatives at oblast level and were only represented at the level of village, settlement, city and rayon councils as well as the corresponding heads of administrations (city mayors). Elections were not appointed by the Central Election Commission in those areas which are currently beyond the control of the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian parliament according to the law “On the special order of local self-government in separate regions of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts” as of March 17, 2015, and are recognized as temporarily occupied territories.9 In addition, the Central Election Commission adopted a decision as of August 29, 2015, which determined another 122 territorial communities, including 91 territorial communities in Donetsk oblast and 31 territorial communities in Luhansk oblast, 7 See also: The Central Election Commission: «Summarized information about the number of voters who received voting papers at the polling stations», 26.10.2015: http://www.cvk.gov.ua/vm_2015/yavka_po_reg_vm_2015.pdf 8 The exception is the Autonomous Republic of Crimea where the local elections didn’t take place due to annexation of this peninsula by Russian Federation. 9 See Concluding and Transitional provisions in Section XV of the Law on Elections:http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/595-19/page; and also Decision №189 (http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/acts/ShowCard2daa.html?id=41076, Donetsk Oblast) and Decision №190 (http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/acts/getdbfcb.html?id=41078&ptext, Luhansk Oblast) adopted by the Central Election Commission as of 28.08.2015. The conditions for holding local elections in these regions constitute an integral part of the package of measures developed by OSCE Tripartite Contact Group for the implementation of Minsk-II Agreement which was published on February 12, 2015. See also: http://www.osce.org/ru/cio/140221?download=true

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where the local elections on 25 October 25, 2015, were not appointed.10 According to the CEC, this decision concerned 525,888 voters living in both oblasts.11 The above-mentioned territorial communities are considered as territories that are under the control of the Ukrainian government, but located in close proximity to the so-called delimitation line.The Central Election Commission adopted a decision on non-appointment of any elections in these territories upon the recommendations of Donetsk and Luhansk oblast civil-military administrations. These administrations appointed by the central government earlier claimed that they can’t guarantee adequate security of elections in these regions. The fact that the Central Election Commission accepted the recommendations of civil-military administrations without public discussion has been criticized by local election observers. In particular, the observers laid emphasis on the absence of transparent criteria which resulted from adoption of recommendations of the civil and military administrations.12 Since the decision either to hold or not to hold the elections does not necessarily correspond with the existing administrative boundaries, in some cases this also entails the lack of

10 Decision №207 and №208 of the Central Election Commission as of 29.08.2015:http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/acts/ShowCard7737.html?id=41109 and alsohttp://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/acts/ShowCard3f60.html?id=41111 11 Non-appointment of elections in the regions that are beyond the control of the Ukrainian Government concern 343,546 registered voters in Donetsk oblast and 182,342 voters in Luhansk oblast. This is nearly 10% of all registered voters in each of oblasts. 12 «Committee of Voters of Ukraine in Donetsk proposed to refrain from holding local elections in several populated areas of Donetsk region», 28.08.2015: http://cvu.dn.ua/ru/news/donecke-kvu-proponuie-ne-provoditi-miscevi-vibori-v-ryadi-naselenih-punktiv-na-donechchini?language=ru. Infographics for certain election constituencies where the local elections were either appointed or not appointed, prepared by the Ukrainian Center for Social Research: https://sites.google.com/site/socialdataua/home/Donbas-Elections-2015-ukr-rayons-full2.jpg see also https://sites.google.com/site/socialdataua/home/Donbas-Elections-2015-full.jpg

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legitimacy. For example, deputies of Kostyantyniv rayon council were elected in only 13 out of 20 constituencies.13

Other violations of the process of political participation in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts resulted from the fact that internal migrants, who moved from territories beyond the control of the Ukrainian government, were deprived of the right to participate in the elections pursuant to the law on local elections. This is the case of, primarily, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, since about half of the total of 1,500,000 registered internal migrants within Ukraine are located in these two oblasts according to the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine.14

Election Results

Local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts contributed to unusually high level of political competition in this region. In particular, government agencies at the local and regional level in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts were traditionally dominated by the Party of Regions. Thus, domination of the Party of Regions during the controversial elections in 201015, in particular, was expressed by the fact that the party of the former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych won 93.3% of Donetsk oblast council seats and 85.5% of Luhansk oblast 13 «Комитет избирателей сомневается в легитимности выборов в Константиновке VIDEO», 21.11.2015: http://novosti.dn.ua/details/264102/. 14 On September 15, 2015, the total number of officially registered refugees from the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, which are beyond the control of Ukrainian Government, reached 1,505,600 people. At that point in time there were 558,100 registered refugees in Donetsk oblast, and 223,100 refugees in Luhansk oblast. See.: http://unhcr.org.ua/attachments/article/1299/UNHCR%20UKRAINE%20Operational%20update%2006OCT15%20FINAL.pdf 15 For example, see the Report of European Parliament Delegation as of 10.11.2010:http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/afet/dv/201/201011/20101118_reportelecukr_en.pdf

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council seats. After the collapse of the Party of Regions during Maidan protests and the resulting loss of influence and power by the former ruling party, the political spectrum in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts is currently shaped by several competing political forces. These political forces include, in particular, “Opposition bloc” party16, “Nash Krai” party17, “Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity”18, and “Batkivschyna” party19. These parties, some of which were proactively involved in local elections throughout the country (“Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” and “Batkivschyna” party) while the others were proactive only in the southeastern (Opposition Bloc) or eastern (Nash Krai) regions of Ukraine, have the largest resources.None of these parties had political monopoly over the region prior to the elections, and also none of these parties managed to gain such monopoly power during local elections. Although, Opposition bloc party obtained the best result in the elections, as was expected. This party managed to win an absolute majority of council seats in five cities 16 The so-called Opposition bloc appeared publicly in the form of a party for the first time during parliamentary election in 2015. The party consists of former members of the Party of Regions and can be de facto considered as its successor.17 The Nash Krai party was initially established as a bloc party in 2011 and was renamed later on in July 2015. The same as in the case of Opposition Bloc, it mostly consists of former members of the Party of Regions. On the contrary to the Opposition Bloc, Nash Krai party is regarded as a political force which is loyal to the incumbent President Petro Poroshenko. There is a lot of evidence which points to the fact that this party is a political project of local celebrities supported by the administration of President Poroshenko and is aimed at providing political competition in those southeastern regions which in the past were considered to be the base of support for the Party of Regions. See also: «Как бы мне, рябине, к дубу перебраться...», 21.08.2015: http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/kak-by-mne-ryabine-k-dubu-perebratsya-_.html18 “Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” was established in August 2015 after the merger of Petro Poroshenko Bloc and UDAR party (Vitaliy Klichko). 19 Batkivschyna party is a member of ruling coalition and is headed by former Prime-minister Yulia Tymoshenko.

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of oblast subordination in Donetsk oblast (Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, Dymytrov, Dobropillya, and Mariupol) and in two cities of oblast subordination in Luhansk oblast (Lysychansk and Rubizhne). However, local councils in other cities of oblast subordination in Donetsk oblast (Selydove, Novogrodivka, Druzhkivka and Vugledar) and Luhansk oblast (Severodonetsk) will have to form a coalition of different parties in the future in order to reach a majority of votes. The only exception in Donetsk oblast is the city of Krasnoarmiis’k. Preliminary election results in this city show that Vidrodzhennya20 party has won an absolute majority of seats in the council.21

The achieved level of political competition was reflected in the election results and also in the fact that second round of voting was appointed for November 15, 2015, in every third city in Donetsk oblast and in every second city in Luhansk oblast where due to the presence of more than 90,000 registered voters candidates for city mayor must receive an absolute majority of votes in order to be elected in the first round. In Kramatorsk, which is the current administrative center of Donetsk oblast, Andriy Pankov received 52.6% of votes and defeated Maxym Yefimov in the second round of mayoral election. Despite the fact that both candidates were officially registered as independent candidates, Andriy Pankov is clearly connected to the Opposition bloc party, while Maxym Yefimov is supported by Nash Krai party. In Severodonetsk, 20 Vidrodzhennya party, founded in 2004, didn’t play any significant role until the local elections in 2015. Primarily, the party is managed by former members of the Party of Regions originating from Dnipropetrovsk region. It is recognized that this party is in the sphere of influence of oligarch Ihor Kolomoiskiy. Compare: “Oct. 25 Local elections highlight battle under way to fill eastern Ukraine power vacuum”, 14.10.2015: http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/oct-25-local-elections-highlight-battle-under-way-to-fill-eastern-ukraine-power-vacuum-399940.html. 21 Compare: http://results.vybir.info/result_election_info.jsp?city=krasnoarmiisk&hq_id=18

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the incumbent mayor Valentyn Kazakov, who was elected back in 2010, defeated Volodymyr Grytsyshyn in the second round of mayoral election after receiving 62.4% of votes.Finally, it should be noted that despite the increase of the electoral threshold, small parties managed to achieve at least partial success in the region along with the parties having the largest resources. Samopomich party of Lviv Mayor Andriy Sadovy managed to win 3 out of 36 council seats in the cities of Slovyansk, Lysychansk, and Severodonetsk. Democratic Alliance party won 4 out of 26 council seats in the city of Novogrodivka by capitalizing on the wave of Maidan protests. A small party “Syla Lyudei” (Power of People) established in August 2014 also succeeded in overcoming the 5-percent barrier and winning 3 out of 34 council seats in the city of Dobropillya and 5 out of 54 council seats in the city of Mariupol.At the same time, it should be noted that the confirmed election results were accompanied by specific issues of proportional representation which were earlier criticized prior to the elections (see above). An illustrative example is the composition of Kramatorsk City Council where candidates for deputy didn’t win a single mandate in 10 out of 42 constituencies, while as many as two candidates received council seats in 6 constituencies. In the rest of 26 constituencies one candidate for deputy was elected to the city council.22

Turnout of Voters

Despite the strengthening political competition, voter turnout in Donetsk

22 Compare: «Розподіл територіальних виборчих округів м. Краматорська за кількістю кандидатів, закріплених за ними, що отримали право на місце у міській раді», 06.11.2015: https://sites.google.com/site/socialdataua/home/Kramatorsk_Districts_25.10.2015-01.jpg

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and Luhansk oblasts was lower than in other regions of Ukraine. While the nationwide voter turnout amounted to 46.6%, in Luhansk oblast only 35.3% of voters have exercised their right to vote on October 25, 2015. In Donetsk oblast the turnout figures were even lower still. Here only 31,7% of registered voters casted their votes on October 25.23 Considering the total number of voters in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, only about 8.3% of all registered voters in the region expressed their wish and/or were able to cast their votes on October 25, 2015.24

Turnout of voters in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts on October 25, 201525

* Except those voters who were registered in the territory of Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

23 According to observers, the turnout of voters in the second round of local elections on November 15 in Kramatorsk (Donetsk oblast) was 41.4% while in Severodonetsk (Luhansk) – 27.9%. See http://novosti.dn.ua/details/263670/та http://novosti.dn.ua/details/263668/ 24 264,716 out of 3,306,745 registered voters have casted their votes on 25.10.2015 in Donetsk oblast, while in Luhansk oblast 159,047 out of 1,774,843 registered voters have casted their votes. See: http://www.cvk.gov.ua/vm_2015/yavka_po_reg_vm_2015.pdf25 Author’s presentation. Compare https://www.drv.gov.ua/portal/!cm_core.cm_index?option=ext_num_voters&pdt=2 and http://www.cvk.gov.ua/vm_2015/yavka_po_reg_vm_2015.pdf

Registered persons who have the right to vote

Absolute voter turnout as of 25.10.2015 (%) [shown as percentage of total number of registered voters]

Total In areas beyond the control of the Ukrainian government

In areas controlled by the Ukrainian government where the elections were not appointed

Invited to vote at the elections

D o n e t s k oblast

3,306,745 1,875,088 343,546 1,088,111 2 6 4 , 7 1 6 ( 3 1 . 6 5 % ) [7.46%]

L u h a n s k oblast

1,774,843 1,414,511 182,342 450,990 1 5 9 , 0 4 7 ( 3 5 . 2 7 % ) [8.96%]

Throughout Ukraine

3,289,599* 525,888 29,808,774 1 3 , 7 7 7 , 1 8 2 (46.61%)

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There are several reasons for relatively low turnout figures registered in this region during the elections on October 25th: in Donetsk oblast, low turnout figures resulted from the fact that the elections in Krasnoarmiis’k (nearly 60,000 registered voters) and Mariupol (which has 340,000 registered voters and is the largest city in Donetsk oblast controlled by the Ukrainian government) were appointed on time, but took place only on November 29th.26 At the same time, low turnout of voters in this region as compared with the rest of the country can also indicate a high level of distrust in political parties and candidates among local population. The low turnout of voters at the local elections in this region should be viewed in the context of the fact that the election campaign and outreach activities aimed at attracting the voters in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts were less intensive than in other regions. Besides that, fewer parties took part in the elections in these two oblasts as compared with other regions. Furthermore, the political parties which participated in the elections nominated a smaller number of candidates than in other regions due to difficulties with recruiting candidates residing in territorial communities of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.27 In the settlement of Novoaydar (Luhansk oblast), the lack of local candidates resulted in the decision to recognize the local council election void. Based on the election results, only 20 out of 34 council

26 See below on p.11.27 International Election Observation Mission (IEOM). Ukraine – Local Elections, 25. October 2015: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, 26.10.2015, S. 9:http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/194406?download=true

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seats could be filled by eligible candidates - that is less than two-thirds of the total number of available seats, as prescribed by law.28

Election Process

In those areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts where local elections were appointed and held on October 25, election process parties faced problems similar to those witnessed in other regions. Typically, election process parties had to deal with technical or procedural issues based on the general shortcomings of the electoral law and at the same time resulting from the fact that the parties involved in the electoral process didn’t have enough time to thoroughly review the specifics of the new electoral law. Election process parties in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts were also unable to avoid the aforesaid misunderstandings and shortcomings in the electoral legislation related to dispute resolution, registration of candidates, regulation of election race, and control on campaign finance. Problems with registration of candidates occurred primarily in Lysychansk, city rayons in Novopskov and Kreminna (Luhansk oblast), as well as in Kramatorsk and Slovyansk (Donetsk oblast). In Slovyansk, the absence of temporary registration in the case of candidate for mayor Vadym Lyakh, who was nominated by Opposition Bloc party, resulted in the decision of Central Election Commission on early termination of office of territorial election commission in Slovyansk followed by the judgment of administrative court of competent jurisdiction which ruled as illegal the activity of 28 Nash Krai party won 14 council seats based on the election results having registered only two candidates. Furthermore, Batkivschyna had more council seats (9) than registered candidates (7). Compare.: «КВУ: в Новоайдарі 11 переможців відмовились від мандата, будуть довибори», 02.12.2015: http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/news/27331883.html. Повторні вибори тут призначені на 20.12.2015.

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territorial election commission.29 However, it should be noted that in general the violations of the election law that were recorded prior to the elections, as well as on the Election Day, were not of systematic nature. This general impression was confirmed once again during the Election Day in Mariupol and Krasnoarmiis’k on November 29, 2015.30

Political Leverage on Certain Election Commissions

Despite the fact that in general the local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts were held in accordance with the applicable law, it turned out that the existing political competition and the generally reported high level of mistrust between the parties to the electoral process were reflected in excessive politicization of some election commissions. This applies especially to Mariupol where the local elections did not take place on October 25, 2015, in accordance with the established procedure. The problems in the conduct of elections arose primarily not because of security issues, as predicted by Donetsk oblast

29 Competent election commission in the city of Slovyansk was unable to adopt a decision on registration of candidate Lyakh at the first attempt. After representatives of the Opposition Bloc filed a complaint against the Election Commission, the competent administrative court ruled as illegal the inactivity of the election commission regarding registration of candidate. The Central Election Commission thus adopted a decision on dismissal of territorial election commission in Slovyansk. Following the appointment of new members of the election commission candidate Lyakh was registered out-of-time. See.: OPORA: Report Nomination and Registration of Candidates: Key Issues and Tendencies, 08.10.2015: http://www.oporaua.org/en/news/40111-3191-1446983788-zvit-vysuvannja-i-rejestracija-kandydativ-kljuchovi-problemy-ta-tendenciji.30 Compare: “Statement on Observation Results of 29 November 2015 Regular Local Elections in Cities of Mariupol and Krasnoarmiisk, Donetsk Oblast”, 30.11.2105: http://www.oporaua.org/en/news/41843-statement-on-observation-results-of-29-november-2015-regular-local-elections-in-cities-of-mariupol-and-krasnoarmiisk-donetsk-oblast

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civil-military administration back in August 2015,31 but due to tense political climate and relations between the representatives of certain forces within the city election commissions, for example: on October 17, seven members of Mariupol city election commission adopted a decision on printing ballot papers in “Priazovskiy robochiy” printing house, while four other members of the same election commission challenged the legality of this decision, pointing out that this decision should have been adopted by a majority of members of the commission in its initial composition consisting of 18 members. The day before the Central Election Commission dismissed the remaining seven members of Mariupol city election commission for improper performance of professional duties. These seven vacant commission seats were not filled prior to voting on the decision on October 17th. On October 21, the administrative court of competent jurisdiction delivered a judgment stating that the implementation of this dubious decision by Mariupol city election commission was a lawful action.32 However, the conflict around ballots printing location continued and ultimately the election commission refused to issue the ballot papers which were produced by “Priazovskiy robochiy” printing house.33 The basis of this conflict was formed by the fact that the printing house is owned by a corporate group of oligarch Rinat Akhmetov. Since Rinat Akhmetov is considered 31 «Жебривский аргументировал ЦИК невозможность местных выборов в Мариуполе», 26.08.2015: http://zn.ua/POLITICS/zhebrivskiy-argumentiroval-cik-nevozmozhnost-mestnyh-vyborov-v-mariupole-186645_.html32 “Preliminary Observation Summary of 25 October 2015 Local Elections by OPORA”, 23.10.2015: http://www.oporaua.org/en/news/40742-1475-1446984246-zvit-poperedni-vysnovky-opory-shchodo-vyborchogo-procesu-na-miscevyh-vyborah-25-zhovtnja-2015 33 «Избирком Мариуполя попросил перенести выборы в городе на 15 ноября», 24.10.2015: http://lb.ua/news/2015/10/24/319189_izbirkom_mariupolya_poprosil.html.

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to be a supporter of the Opposition Bloc party34 while the candidate for mayor Vadym Boychenko is also the current head of “Metinvest” holding company owned by Akhmetov, the so-called “Democratic forces” – which is an informal alliance of Batkivshchyna, UKROP,35 and Radical Party – became suspicious of preparation for systematic election fraud in the printing house. Representatives of Opposition bloc interpreted these suspicions as an attempt of political rivals to undermine the election.Although the law on local elections complies with the general rules for holding repeat elections, it does not make a provision for cancelling the election on the ground of absence of ballot papers.36 Therefore, repeat election in Mariupol was appointed only after the parliament adopted a corresponding law on November 10, and thus the election was scheduled for November 29. The Central Election Commission authorized one representative from each parliamentary party to monitor the process of production and distribution of ballot papers in order to ensure a flawless election process.37 At the same time, a new composition of territorial election commission was appointed. Meanwhile, the election process

34 See also.: “Oct. 25 local elections highlight battle under way to fill eastern Ukraine power vacuum”, 14.10.2015: http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/oct-25-local-elections-highlight-battle-under-way-to-fill-eastern-ukraine-power-vacuum-399940.html35 UKROP party („Ukrainian Association of Patriots“) was founded in summer 2015. It is headed by Henadiy Korban who is considered as a trustee of Kolomoiskiy. 36 The situation is different in Svatovo where a competent territorial election commission declared the invalidity of voting bulletins due to serious formal errors right on the Day of Election. Furthermore, in Novoaydar region the local election was recognized void by the territorial election commission (see above, on p. 9). Based on the Law on Elections, repeat election should have been appointed in Svatovo on 27.12.2015, and in Novoaydar region - on 20.12.2015.37 Decision № 573 of the Central Election Commission of Ukraine, as of 19.11.2015: http://195.230.157.53/pls/acts/ShowCard?id=41821&what=0

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as such was not re-appointed. Thus, the decision of Central Election Commission did not become a matter of further political debate prior to the election on November 29.38 According to the Central Election Commission, the election campaign stage has ended one day before the election held on 25 October, pursuant to the law on local elections. The fact that local elections were regulated by two different laws at the same time was sharply criticized by civil society observers.39

Local elections in the city of Krasnoarmiis’k were conducted on identical regulatory and legal basis on November 29, in the same way as in Mariupol. Territorial election commission in Krasnoarmiis’k also experienced problems with production of ballot papers prior to the election appointed for October 25. Members of TEC found a formal error in the voting bulletins just before sending them to the polling stations and adopted a decision to reprint the ballot papers. However, the decision of election commission to print ballot papers in a privately held printing house was invalidated by the Administrative Court of Donetsk oblast on the ground of the existing agreements with other printing houses. Consequently, the election commission voted against transferring the ballot papers, which were printed the night before in Kramatorsk, to the polling stations.Problems with the election process that occurred in the territorial election commissions were also observed during the second round of mayoral election held on November 15th in Kramatorsk. The same as during previous election, it appeared that the process of calculation of 38 Decision № 570 of the Central Election Commission of Ukraine, as of 19.11.2015: http://195.230.157.53/pls/acts/ShowCard?id=41817&what=0 39 See also: «Донецьке КВУ вважає абсурдом заборонуагітації на виборах в Маріуполі та Красноармійську», 20.11.2015: http://cvu.dn.ua/uk/news/donecke-kvu-vvazhaie-absurdom-zaboronu-agitaciyi-na-viborah-v-mariupoli-ta-krasnoarmiysku

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election results by means of acceptance of vote-counting protocols from individual polling stations was faced with strong bureaucratic obstacles and thus could be vulnerable to political influence and disputes. The aforesaid serious disputes, which arose in the process of acceptance of vote-counting protocols by the competent territorial election commissions after the polling stations were closed, finally came to an end when a candidate for mayor Maxym Yefimov officially admitted his defeat in political struggle against Andriy Pankov and made a public statement that he is not going to challenge the election results. Up to that moment, Kramatorsk city election commission was refusing to accept about half of all vote-counting protocols submitted by individual polling stations. To a certain degree such refusal was not justified by any means indicating that the work of the election commission was guided by political motives.40

Conclusions

Local elections in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts were marked by political competition and contributed to the diversification of the political spectrum in the region. Although the results of local elections clearly confirmed the dominance of Opposition Bloc, which is de facto successor to the Party of Regions, nevertheless, unlike in recent years, it doesn’t have political monopoly over the region as of today. The increasing political competition has resulted in tightening the mutual control of the parties to election process and thus helped to establish political balance to some extent. This is particularly noticeable in the

40 «Максим Єфімов визнав поразку в Краматорську», 17.11.2015: http://www.oporaua.org/novyny/41696-donechchyna-maksym-yefimov-vyznav-porazku-v-kramatorsku

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fact that systematic use of administrative resources and systematic violations of electoral law, generally speaking, were not a common practice. It remains to be seen whether such level of political competition has been established on a permanent basis and how will it evolve in the mid-term and long-term perspective in the course of everyday political life. The successful continuation of innovation-based development of civil society, which is not a long-established practice in this region as compared with the rest of the country, still plays an important role in the same way as before. In particular, in this case election observation by civil society is an important step towards meeting the high standards for democratic elections.Finally, although local elections in the so-called “Donbass” region can be considered as a step forward in comparison with previous elections, still they can’t be treated as a “reboot” of Ukraine’s political system and the specific political culture in this region. The law on local elections contains a number of shortcomings that affect the legal equality of political parties and candidates. In particular, parties and candidates that possess large financial resources still have better chances of winning, as compared with the smaller parties and independent candidates, due to the absence or the inadequacy of legal provisions regulating the process of election campaign and party finance. At the same time, such situation facilitates investment in political parties established in the form of “political projects” and allows such investors to influence the state policy through participation in elections. The problem of proper conduct of local elections arising from politicization of election commissions, which became most obvious in Mariupol, in this case can be regarded as a consequence of existing level of political competition. At the same time, the revealed problems also result from a high level of

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mistrust between the parties to the electoral process. This also highlights the general problem of merger of politics and business, as well as the dominant role of certain enterprises that can have a strong influence on political decision-making processes, particularly at local level.