State’s Obligation to Ensure Safety in Japan and Mutual Assistance as Its Supplement · 2018. 7....
Transcript of State’s Obligation to Ensure Safety in Japan and Mutual Assistance as Its Supplement · 2018. 7....
-
1
Journal of International Cooperation Studies, Vol.26, No.1(2018.7)
State’s Obligation to Ensure Safety in Japanand Mutual Assistance as Its Supplement
KANEKO Yuka*
1.Introduction
IthascometobequestionedhowmuchresponsibilitytheStatehasforensuring
thesafetyof itspeople. Japan’sBasicLawonDisasterCountermeasuresenacted in
1961setsforththeprotectionof“thenationalterritory,thelifeandlimbofthecitizens
andtheirproperty”initsobjectivesprovision(Art.1),andforthispurposetheState
hastheresponsibilityto“useallofitsorganizationsandfunctions”to“takeallpossible
measures”(Art.3).Theprefectures(Art.4)andthemunicipalities(Art.5)alsohave
thesameresponsibilities. It isanadministrativeresponsibilitycalledtheobligationto
ensuresafety(anzen kakuho gimu).
However, the rangeof theobligation toensure safetyhasbeen limited in the
revisionoftheBasicLawonDisasterCountermeasuresimplementedin2013following
thelessonslearnedfromthe2011GreatEastJapanEarthquake.Anew“fundamental
principles”provision(Art. 2-2)wasestablished,whichprovideda framework for
minimizing damage based on Japan’s natural characteristics and socioeconomic
conditions suchaspopulationand industry(no. 1),promotingdisasterprevention
activitiesconductedbyresidentsandvoluntarydisasterpreventionorganizations(no.
2), integrateddisastercountermeasures(no.3),prioritizingtheprotectionofhuman
lifeandlimb(no.4),andprovidingappropriateassistancewhilegivingconsiderationto
not impedingself-helpeffortsmadebydisastervictims(no.5).Theresponsibilitiesof
thenationalgovernment,prefecturesandmunicipalities(Art.3through5)werealso
revisedtoincludedetailedreferencestothese“fundamentalprinciples.”
Itcanbesaidthatanintentionofthisrevisionofthelawwastolimittherange
* Professor,KobeUniversityGraduateSchoolofInternationalCooperationStudiesandResearchCenterforUrbanSafetyandSecurity
-
2 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
of theobligation toensuresafety thathadbeenguidedby the interpretationof the
existingprovisions.Although the existing objectivesprovision(Art. 1)described
theprotectionof “thenational territory, the lifeand limbof thecitizensand their
property”astherangeoftheobligationtoensuresafety,thenewlyaddedfundamental
principles(Art.2-2)prioritizetheprotectionofhumanlifeandlimb(no.4)butthere
isnomentionof“property”.Further,theexistingprovisionsprovidedthatthenational
governmenthadtheresponsibilityto“useallofitsorganizationsandfunctions”to“take
allpossiblemeasures”(Art.3),but the fundamentalprinciples(Art.2-2)emphasize
“disasterreduction”byminimizingdamagebasedonJapan’snaturalcharacteristicsand
socioeconomicconditionssuchaspopulationandindustry(no.3),whichisnotaimedat
totaldisasterprevention.Emphasison“self-help”byresidentsand“mutualassistance”
throughvoluntarydisasterpreventionorganizations(no.2), indicatesanapproachof
narrowingthetargetof“publicassistance”tothosewhoarevulnerablebasedonfactors
suchasage,genderanddisability(no.5),avoidingamoralhazardthatimpedes“self-
help”.Further,itdoesemphasizetheintegrateddisastercountermeasures(no.3),with
animplicationtotheideaof“multi-leveldisasterprevention”thatincludesnotonlyhard
countermeasuresbutalsosoftcountermeasures,aswasemphasized in therecovery
planaftertheGreatEastJapanEarthquake, linkedtotheapproachof limitingsafety
standardsinhardcountermeasuresbasedonbudgetconstraints.
ThroughthesechangesintheBasicLawonDisasterCountermeasures, itseems
that, first, theeffectof limiting thesafetystandards that theStateowes toachieve
hasarisen.Second, the invigorationof self-helpandmutual assistance,which is to
compensate for theregressionof theState’sobligation toensuresafety, is tobean
issue. In thispaper, the firsthalfwill confirmhowtheState’sobligation toensure
safetyhasbeenlimited(Section2),andthe latterhalfwillretracethecircumstances
of thepost-disaster townrecoveryprocessesregardingthe institutional issuesaimed
towardsthecommunity-basedsafetymeasures tosupplement forsuchregressionby
theState(Section3).Additionally, institutionaldesigns towardscommunity-based
safetymeasureswillbeexploredbasedontheobservationofproceduralflowof land
readjustmentprojectsintheareasaffectedbytheGreatEastJapanEarthquake(Section
4).
-
3State’s Obligation to Ensure Safety in Japan and Mutual Assistance as Its Supplement
2.Regression of the State’s Obligation to Ensure Safety
(1)�Safety�Standards�as�an�Obligation�–�Compensation�Standards�for�Defects� in�the�
Establishment�and�Management�of�Public�Facilities
Thespecificationthat theprotectionof “lifeand limb” is thehighestpriorityof
theState’sobligationtoensuresafetyinthe2013revisionoftheBasicLawonDisaster
Countermeasures, or inotherwords, the limitationof theobligation toensure the
safetyof“property”,hasreceivedattention(Art.2-2,Para.4).Certainly,theideathat
defendingcitizens’privatepropertyfromdisastersisanissueofself-helpandnotwithin
therangeofpublicassistancewhichthestateshouldspendtaxesonisexplainedfrom
aneo-liberalpointofview,butitisalsothoughtthatinawelfarestate,attheveryleast
theprotectionof theminimumstandardsof living, suchashousingandthebasisof
livelihoods,isamatterofstateresponsibilitytosecuretherighttolife(Art.25ofthe
Constitution).iTheattitudethattheBasicLawonDisasterCountermeasureshasplaced
theprotectionof“property”behindthatof“lifeandlimb”shouldbeconsideredinthe
contextofdefiningthescopeof“publicassistance”basedontherighttolife.
However,regardingthestandardofsafetythattheStateshouldachieve,separate
fromaprogramprovisionthatislefttotheState’sdiscretioninthecontextoftheright
tolife,thereisalsothecontextoftheState’sliabilitytoprovidedamagecompensation
in timesofdisaster, as aminimumbasis of the safetymeasures that theState is
responsible forasanobligation.Forexample,even if theState is freetoplace limits
ontheamountof “publicassistance” itprovides in itsdiscretion, it is illegal toplace
a limitonthestate’s liabilitytoprovidedamagecompensation,which isa liability. It
ispossible toapproachbyplacingthestandard forStatedamagecompensationasa
minimumsafetystandard,andon topof thatamplifiedsafetystandardsbyadding
publicassistancebydiscretion.
Then,whatkindofstandardissuchminimumstandardfortheState’sobligation
toensuresafety?
In relation toStatedamagecompensation in timesofadisaster,Art. 2of the
StateRedressLawdefines the criterion aswhether therewas “a defect in the
placementoradministrationof a road, riverorotherpublic structure”.Thereare
various interpretationsof this “defect” inapublicstructure,andatendency is found
-
4 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
incourtprecedentstotreatman-madepublicstructuresandnaturalpublicstructures
separately.That is,withregard to theresponsibility toadministerroads,whichare
man-madepublicstructures, if there isanobjective “defect” thennegligencewillbe
presumedwithoutcloselyexaminingthe factorsofnegligence(i.e.breachofaduty
ofcarepremiseduponthe foreseeabilityandthepossibilityofavoidingtheoutcome),
inotherwordsstrict liabilityhasbeenapplied(SupremeCourt judgmentdated29
August1970,concerninga landslideonroads inKochiprefecture,MinshuVol.24,No.
9,p.1268).However,regardingrivermanagement,whichisanaturalpublicstructure,
thecourt’s stancehas requiredevidenceofnot just anobjective “defect”but also
subjectivenegligence(breachofdutyofcare).Prominent judgments includeacase
thatexcludedtheStateliabilityduetoanLawofgod(NagoyaDistrictCourtjudgment
dated22October1962regardingtheIseBayTyphoon,Hanrei Jihou, Issue313,p.4),
andthefamousDaitofloodcase,whichendorsedprovisionalsafetystandardsthatwere
acceptablebasedonsocialnorms inviewoffinancial, technicalandsocialconstraints
(SupremeCourtjudgmentdatedJanuary26,1984,MinshuVol.38,No.2,p.53).Inthis
way,theevidentiaryhurdlefornegligenceinrelationtonaturalpublicstructuressuch
asriver levees ishigher,making ithardertoclaimdamagecompensationagainstthe
State.
AthesisbyIchiroKato(Kato1953),leadingcivil lawscholar,providedatheory
that influencedthebinarystanceof treatingman-madepublicstructuresandnatural
publicstructuresseparately,makingtheevidentiaryrequirementsfor“defects”higher
inrelationtothelatter.Kato’spaperintroducedtheconceptof“plannedwaterlevels”
inrelation toriveradministration,andset forth theviewthat theState’s liability to
compensateextendedtothedamagecausedbythecollapseofleveesthatoccurredat
waterlevelsbelowtheplannedwaterlevel,butitdidnotextendtothedamagecaused
byflooding incircumstanceswhere leveesdidnotcollapse,nortothedamagewhere
leveescollapsedincircumstanceswherewaterlevelsexceededtheplannedwaterlevel.
Thisdisplaysthestanceofconsideringthe“defects”intheplacementoradministration
of natural public structures that arenotbaseduponobjective standards, but are
dependentuponsubjectiverequirements(breachofdutyofcare)thatarerequiredfor
theproofoftraditionalnegligence.It isassumedthat“plannedwater level”standards
arethebasisofjudgingsuchsubjectiverequirements.
-
5State’s Obligation to Ensure Safety in Japan and Mutual Assistance as Its Supplement
(2)Unscientific�“Design�Tsunami”
Therefore,how“plannedwater levels”aredeterminedbecomesaproblem.The
termgivesan impression that feels as if it is objective,but its substance isquite
ambiguous.IntheSupremeCourtjudgmentintheaboveDaitofloodcase,itwasfound
thatprovisionalsafetystandardsthatwereacceptablebasedonsocialnormsinviewof
financial, technicalandsocialconstraintsweresufficient.Sincethenationalfinancesof
Japan’sgovernmentarecurrentlyattheworstlevelofdeficitintheworld,ifthereason
offinancialconstraintsisgiven,itbecomespossibleforthe“plannedwaterlevels”tobe
loweredtosuitthecircumstancesoftheadministration.Towhatextentthislowering
canbestoppedbasedonthe“socialnorms”ofthepeoplecontinuestobequestionedin
eachindividualcase,andultimatelyitislefttobesettledinthenextcourtjudgment.
IntherecoveryaftertheGreatEastJapanEarthquake,settingof“plannedwater
levels” todetermine suchprovisional safety levels is considered tobe called into
question.WhiletheLawonSpecialZonesforRecoveryinResponsetotheGreatEast
JapanEarthquakewasenactedattheendof2011tofacilitatepublicly-financedrecovery
projectssuchasthedevelopmentofseawalls,disasterpreventioncollectiverelocation
projectsand landreadjustmentprojects,envisionedas“recoveryadjustmentprojects”
asawhole, tsunamisimulationshad tobecarriedout repeatedly todetermine the
scopeofapplicationofsuchprojects.AccordingtotheMinistryofLand,Infrastructure,
TransportandTourism’s“Guidelines for Tsunami-Resistant Design of Seawalls(MLIT2013),a
disasterpreventiongroupwasestablishedundertheportsandharbourssubcommittee
of the transportationpolicy council inMay2011, about amonth and ahalf after
theGreatEastJapanEarthquake,andaccording to itsreportof June2012,Forms of
Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures for Harbours,thestandardsofsafetyweredecided
accordingtotwolevelsoftsunamiwhichareassumedbasedonthescaleandfrequency
ofthetsunami.Namely,againsttheclassof“frequentlyoccurringtsunami,”thegoalof
safetywassetonthe“preventionofdisaster(bo-sai)”usingstructuresthatcanprotect
lifeandproperty,butagainsttheveryrarelyoccurring“maximumclasstsunami,”the
aimwas“mitigationofdisaster(gen-sai)“byprotectinghumanlifeattheminimum,yet
in thatcasealso “resilientconstruction”ofseawalls thatmightdeformbutcouldnot
collapsewereintended,whichestablishedanapproachofseekingtodelaythetimeit
wouldtakeforatsunamitoreachthehinterland.Thisguidelineintroducedtheconcept
-
6 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
of“designtsunami”thatformedthestandardsforthesafetydesignofseawalls,andthat
levelwassetasadesignexternalforcethatwastobedeterminedsomewherebetween
the“frequentlyoccurringtsunami”and“maximumclasstsunami”,whichseemedtobe
anapproachcorrespondingtothe“plannedwaterlevel”describedintheKato’sarticle
mentionedabove.
However, the basis for setting such “design tsunami” levels is extremely
ambiguous.Beforethat,theexpressions“frequentlyoccurringtsunami”and“maximum
classtsunami”thatarethepremiseofsuchsettingarealreadyambiguous.Regarding
themethodofdetermining“frequentlyoccurringtsunami”,basedonthereportMethods
of Determining Design Tsunami Water Levels issued jointlybytheMinistryofAgriculture,
ForestryandFisheriesandtheMinistryofLand,Infrastructure,TransportandTourism
onJuly8,2011, itwassaid that tsunamis that “occuronceeveryseveraldecades to
severalcenturies…canbeusedasareference”, taken fromsurveysof theheightof
marksleftbyprevioustsunamiandhistoricalrecordsandliterature,aswellastsunami
simulationdata(Guidelinep.6(1)).“Maximumclasstsunamis”weredeterminedfrom
asurveybasedonscientificknowledgesuchasanalysisofancientandotherhistorical
documents,investigationoftsunamisediments,andsurveysofcoastaltopography,with
thoseresults“organizedbroadlyandanalyzedfromtheviewpointofdisasterprevention
intheareassurroundingtherelevantport,withconsiderationgiventoallpossibilities”
(Guidelinep. 6(2)). “Design tsunamis”were thendecideddiscretionallybasedon
“frequentlyoccurring tsunami”heightsand“maximumclass tsunami”heights,which
weredetermined in thisambiguousmanner. Inotherwords, “design tsunami”were
generallydecidedatthelevelof“frequentlyoccurringtsunami”,butwhen“protecting
facilitiesofextremelyhighimportancesuchaspowerplants,orprotectingareaswith
ahighconcentrationofpeople,propertyandindustry” inthehinterland,heightswere
flexiblydecidedwithreferencetothe“maximumclasstsunami”height(Guidelinep.6
(2)).
The approach of classifying level 1 tsunami(Meiji SanrikuTsunami class)
and level2 tsunami(GreatEastJapanEarthquakeclass)andgenerallyusing level
1 tsunamias the “design tsunami” for safetystandards in therecoveryadjustment
projectsafter theGreatEast JapanEarthquakewasalreadyshown in thenational
government’s “BasicRecoveryPolicy” thatwas published in July 2011, andwas
-
7State’s Obligation to Ensure Safety in Japan and Mutual Assistance as Its Supplement
finallysettledupon in the “Reportof theCommittee forTechnical Investigationon
CountermeasuresforEarthquakesandTsunamisBasedontheLessonsLearnedfrom
the2011PacificCoastofTohokuEarthquake”bytheCentralDisasterManagement
Councildated28September2011.Afterthat,thebasicrecoveryplansofeachaffected
municipalityfollowedthisnationalbasicpolicy.
However, although the “design tsunami”wasbasically supposed tocorrespond
to level1 tsunami(MeijiSanrikuTsunami),timeandefforthasbeenspentonsmall
modifications.Thevicinityof siteswhereseawallsare tobeconstructedhavebeen
established as “disaster risk areas” as defined inArt. 39 of theLawonBuilding
Standards, involving thepermanent restrictionofuseof the land fordwellings(in
IwatePrefecture, designationbased onmunicipal ordinancewasdelayed, sowas
initially implementedas theadministrativeguidance),andmanyofwhichhavebeen
subjecttopromotionofrelocationthroughthedisasterpreventioncollectiverelocation
projects.Regardingthereasonforestablishing“disasterriskareas”,itwasexplainedat
explanatorymeetings forresidentsthat ifa level2classtsunamioccurs, thetsunami
wouldpassover theseawallsandtherelevantareaswereexpectedtobesubject to
inundationexceeding2meters inheight.However, according toexpertswhowere
also involved in thepolicymaking, because the seawalls are intended for “design
tsunami”ofthelevel1tsunamiclass,andthereforeinalevel2tsunamieitheroverflow
willoccuranda tsunamipoolwill form inthehinterlandbehindtheseawallsor the
seawallswillcollapseandconcretepieceswilldamagethesurroundingarea,theareas
facingsuchriskshavebeen labelledas “disasterriskareas”or “relocationpromotion
area”subjecttorestrictionsonresidingandpromotionofrelocation.However,because
theestablishmentof large “disaster riskareas” or “relocationpromotionareas” in
commercialdistrictsordenselypopulatedareas isunrealisticorveryexpensive, it
seemsthattheoptionofrebuildingtheoriginallandthroughlandreadjustmentprojects
aftertheelevationofthelandhasbeenselected,andasaresult,atotalof3,600hectares
hasbeensubjecttolarge-scalelandreadjustmentprojects.
Ontheotherhand, inareaswheretheoppositionbyresidents isdeeplyrooted,
thereareareaswheretherehasbeensuccess in increasingthesafetystandardsby
raisingthe“designtsunami”heightof theseawalls tocloseto level2,orconversely,
byloweringthe“designtsunami”heighttobelowlevel1heightsandmakinganentire
-
8 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
communitysubjecttothe integratedcollectiverelocation(forexample, theAkahama
areaofOtsuchiTownandNebamaareaofKamaishicity).
Inthisway,the“designtsunami”thatarethesafetystandardsintheconstruction
of seawalls,which became a pillar of the recovery after theGreatEast Japan
Earthquake, havebeen set at the level of theMeiji SanrikuTsunami thatwas a
“frequently occurring tsunami”, but thebasis for suchdesignation isunclear, and
furthermore,havebeensubjecttounfoundedadjustmentsduetothecircumstancesof
thehinterlandandtheresistanceofresidents.
(3)The�Obligation�to�Ensure�Safety�and�State�Compensation
Given the fact that “design tsunami” are assumed tobe inundated in a level
2 tsunami, and furthermore that “disaster risk areas” have been established in
considerationofthecollapseofseawalls,itcanbethoughtthattheapproachto“planned
waterlevels”conceivedinIchiroKato’sthesishasbeenfollowedinrelationto“defects”
intheplacementandadministrationofpublicstructuresundertheStateRedressLaw.
However,whetherthe“designtsunami” that is theminimumstandardofsafety
whichdelineates the liabilityunder theStateRedressLawshouldbe identifiedas
beingthesameas therangeof theobligationtoensuresafetyundertheBasicLaw
onDisasterControlMeasuresisaseparateissue.Itisclearthatthis“designtsunami”
doesnotinvolvetaking“allpossiblemeasures”(Art.3)toprotectthe“life,andlimbof
thecitizensandtheirproperty”(Art.1)that is thestatedpurposeof theBasicLaw
onDisasterCountermeasures,butrather, theadditionof “disastermitigation”(Para.
1),multi-leveldisasterprevention(Para.3),andtheprioritizationoftheprotectionof
“lifeand limb”(Para.4)inthe“fundamentalprinciples”(Art.2-2)added inthe2013
revisionisinlinewiththeconversetrendofregressionfromtheprotectionof“property”.
The ideaof identifyingtheminimumstandardof theobligationtoensuresafety
asthesameastherangeof thestate’s liability toprovidedamagecompensationcan
beoneapproach.Thisapproachassumesthatensuringsafetyuniformlyto the level
of theState’s liability todamagecompensation is theminimumbasis, and that the
safetymeasuresbeyondthat linearenotnecessarily theobligationof thestate,but
discretionarypublicassistance in thesenseofwelfare,whichdependson thesocio-
economiccircumstancesinthehinterlandandnegotiationswithresidents.However,the
-
9State’s Obligation to Ensure Safety in Japan and Mutual Assistance as Its Supplement
thoughtof linkingtherelationshipbetweentheobligationtoensuresafety indisaster
countermeasures and the state’s liability to damage compensation leaves several
problems.
First, there is thequestionoffluctuatingsafetystandardstargetedbytheBasic
LawonDisasterCountermeasures,whichare thebasis for theavoidanceof liability
undertheStateRedressLaw.IntheaboveMinistryofLand,Infrastructure,Transport
andTourismguidelines, it issuggestedthatthe“designtsunami”height,whichisthe
criteria forresponsibilityunder theStateRedressLaw,willberaisedaccording to
theconcentrationofproperty inthehinterland,butthis isaconceptofraisingsafety
levelsinareasofhigheconomicvalueinadvancesoastoavoidthepossibilityofbeing
responsible fora largeamountof statecompensation.Asaresult, landwithhigher
economicvaluereceivesprotectionofnotonly“lifeandlimb”butalso“property”under
theBasicLawonDisasterCountermeasures,but landwith loweconomicvalue, it is
necessary topreserveonly “lifeand limb”,whichcangiverise tounequal treatment
undertheobligationtoensuresafety.
Secondly, if limitingthestate’sresponsibilitytoprovidecompensation isplanned
by restricting the obligation to ensure safety under theBasicLaw onDisaster
Countermeasures, it isgettingtheprioritiesbackwards.Theadministrativeobligation
to ensure the safetyhashad agoal of ensuring that “all possiblemeasures” are
exhausted to theextentpossible, as stated inArt. 3of theBasicLawonDisaster
Countermeasures. Although the fundamental principles added toArt. 2-2 in the
2013revisionof theLawhasgivenpriority to theprotectionof “lifeand limb”and
regressed theprotectionof “property”, there shouldbenodebateabout trying to
lowerthestandardofState’s liabilitytoprovidedamagecompensationforthisreason
bymanipulatingthe“designtsunami”heightsasthesafetystandard. “Defects” inthe
placementandadministrationofpublicstructuresundertheStateRedressLawshould
bedetermined through the accumulation of interpretive judicial precedents, on a
gradationthatshouldbejudgedaccordingtotheindividualcircumstancesofthecase,
asthe“designtsunami”heightwillnotsufficetohaveafirmbinaryclassificationthat
protects“lifeandlimb”butignores“property”.Regardingthescopeofthatgradation,it
seemsthatitisimpossibletodrawafirmlineasthereiscontinuousoverlapbetween
thepolicyelementsoftheobligatoryadministrativesafetymeasuresandothersafety
-
10 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
measuresaswelfareassistance.Especially indisaster-pronecountriessuchasJapan,
there istherealitythatthepoorhouseholdshavelivedinareaswith lowlandvalues
thatareatriskofdisaster,andthatdisasterpreventionmeasureshavehistoricallybeen
closelylinkedtowelfaresupport.
Third, there is theproblemofdueprocess fordetermining safety standards.
Local residentsarenotalwayssatisfiedwith themethodofdeciding the lowest line
of theStateobligation toensuresafetybasedon thestandardofState’s liability to
providedamagecompensation,which isdeterminedbythe“designtsunami”,which is
difficult tocallascientificmethod.Thedeterminationofsafetystandards is thebasis
fordetermining thescopeof recoveryadjustmentprojectssuchas theconstruction
ofseawallswhich involvethe land-takingsandotherrestrictionsonprivateproperty
rights, invitingconstitutionalquestions. It is a situationofpolice regulationby the
“publicwelfare” that is referred to inArt. 29,Para. 2of theConstitution. Inother
words,safetystandardsaretheverycriteria for interpreting“publicwelfare”,which
is essential to secure theconstitutionality ofplacing restrictionsonprivate rights
withoutcompensationunderpublicprojects. In today’sdemocraticsociety,unilateral
administrativedecisions inthedeterminationof thesesafetystandardsshouldnotbe
permitted.
To summarize theabovepoints, theobligation toensure safety,which is the
aimof theBasicLawonDisasterCountermeasures,can invoketheState’sminimum
responsibility to provide damage compensation as a baseline using a uniform
approach,whilealsoprovidingadditionalsafetyusing“allmeasures”basedonthelocal
circumstances.Duringthis,becauseadministrativedecisionsregardingStatedamage
compensationstandardsare lackingscientifically, it isnecessary for there tobea
supplementarystepusingparticipatorydecision-makingprocedures involving local
residents toprocedurallycorrectsubstantiveambiguities. Iwould liketodiscuss the
formofsuchparticipatoryproceduresinthenextsection.
-
11State’s Obligation to Ensure Safety in Japan and Mutual Assistance as Its Supplement
3.A Framework for Regional Participation in the Setting of Safety Standards
(1)�Experience� from� the�Hanshin-Awaji�Earthquake� –�Two-Stage�City�Planning�
Decisions
In the recoveryprocess after theGreatHanshin-AwajiEarthquake, building
restrictionswereput inplace immediatelyafter theearthquake(extending to two
monthsinaccordancewithArt.84oftheBuildingStandardsLaw),duringwhichtime
azoningmethodundertheEarthquakeRecoveryEmergencyMaintenanceOrdinance
wasused todesignate5,887haas “earthquakedisaster recoverypromotionareas”
subject tobuildingrestrictions(notificationrequirements,administrativeguidance),
ofwhich1,225haareawasdesignatedas “critical recoveryareas”subject tostricter
buildingrestrictions(notification,negotiations).Furthermore,onMarch17,twomonths
aftertheearthquake,cityplanningdecisionsweremadefor125haforlandreadjustment
projectsand26ha forredevelopmentprojects,andbuildingrestrictionsbasedonthe
CityPlanningLawcommenced.Thesezoningandcityplanningmethodsweresafety
measuresprimarily targetingdensely residential areaswhere fires causedby the
earthquakehadspread.
However,becauseofheavycriticismbyresidentsthatthedecisionregardingthe
scopeof suchsafetymeasureswascarriedoutby themunicipality’sadministration
aloneandinashortperiodoftwomonths,theGovernorofHyogoPrefectureimposed
additionalconditionsonthedeterminationof theurbanplans, inaccordancewithan
inquiryby theUrbanPlanningCouncil and requested that residents’ participation
proceduresbe taken intoaccount. In response to this,KobeCityapplied theKobe
CityDistrictPlanningandTownPlanningAgreementsOrdinance,whichwasenacted
in1981andhada recordof implementation, for thepurposeof inviting residents’
participationunder thephilosophyof “two-stageurbanplanningdecisions”.Although
itwaswithinthescopeofroughdesignsrestrictedbytheconditionsofbudgetaryaid
fromthenationalgovernment,aconsultativemethodbetweentheresidentsandthe
administrationdecidedthedesignoffine-leveltownplanningsuchastheplacementof
regionalroadsandparks.
In thisprocessofconsultationbetweentheadministrationandresidents, safety
considerations fromtheuniqueviewpointofcitizenswere incorporated, forexample,
-
12 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
increasing thenumberofNorth-Southevacuation routeswhichallowevacuees to
see the outline of themountainswhile evacuating,whichplacedemphasis on the
recollectionofresidentswhowereabletoevacuateusingtheoutlineofMountRokko
asalandmarkinthepre-dawndarkness,aswellasinstallingpumpsthatdrawground
water ineverypark,whichwasbasedonthebitterexperienceof thewatersupply
stoppingduetopoweroutagesfollowingtheearthquake.ii
Inthisway,intheexperienceofcreatingsafetymeasuresaftertheHanshin-Awaji
Earthquake,althoughtherewascriticismofadministrative-leddecisionmaking inthe
earlystage,throughtheconsiderationofsubsequentparticipatoryproceduresitbecame
anexampleofcooperationthatincorporatedsafetymeasuresforrebuildingcommunity
developmentthroughcooperationbetweentheadministrationandresidents.
(2)Attempts�at�Participatory�Processes�via�Ordinance
After theGreatHanshin-AwajiGreatEarthquake, inquiries intoordinancesthat
would formasystemic foundationaimedatcitizen-cooperativepre-disasterrecovery
tookplace.Theestablishmentofmunicipal-leveldisasterpreventionordinances, town
developmentpromotionordinances,aswellasmunicipalbasicordinancesandcitizen
participationpromotionordinancesprogressed,whichwasexpected toprovide the
systemicfoundationforparticipationbyresidents.
Asanexample, theTokyoMetropolitanGovernmentestablished theOrdinance
onEarthquakeDisasterCountermeasures in2000,whicheachof thespecialwards
furtherrefined.Forexample, takinga lookat thecaseofKatsushikaWard, through
theestablishmentofa seriesofordinances(suchas theKatsushikaWardDisaster
CountermeasuresOrdinance in2003, theWardResidents’ParticipatoryCommunity
PlanningPromotionOrdinance in2006,and theKatsushikaWardDisasterRecovery
MeasuresOrdinancein2010),KatsushikaWardformedamasterplanforparticipatory
urbanplanning, and attempts are beingmade to link thiswith the initiatives of
disasterpreventionmeasuresbyresidents, suchas floodhazardmappingandpre-
disaster recoveryplans.Among theseordinances, under theCommunityPlanning
PromotionOrdinance,residents’groupsthatrepresent themajorityof localresidents
arerecognizedas townplanninggroups throughadministrativeregistration,andthe
outcomesofagreementsbythegroupsarepubliclydeclaredandrespectedbytheward
-
13State’s Obligation to Ensure Safety in Japan and Mutual Assistance as Its Supplement
administration(OrdinanceArt.11),andbyusingthesystemforsubmittingproposals
fordistrictplansandurbanplansundertheUrbanPlanningLaw(Art.16Para.3,Art.
21-2Para.2,etc.),asystemdesignhasbeencreated thatcanmanifestadegreeof
bindingforceagainstthewardadministration’surbanplanning(obligationtorespond
withoutdelay,theprovisionofreasonsforrefusal)(OrdinanceArt.18,19).TheTokyo
metropolitangovernment respects these initiativesbywards to create their own
ordinancesanddoesnotimposeguidanceorcontrol.iii
Inthisway,itisnoteworthythatattemptsatinstitutionalinfrastructurebasedon
ordinanceswasdevelopingat the fundamental levelofmunicipalgovernment for the
purposeofcommunityplanningthatincorporatessafetymeasureswithparticipationby
residents.
(3)� The�Special�Zones�Method�under�the�Large-Scale�Disaster�Recovery�Law
The2013Large-ScaleDisasterRecoveryLaw introducednationalgovernment-
leddisasterrecovery.However,where localgovernmentshavecommunityplanning
ordinances thatdefineprocedures forresidents’participation,orwherepre-disaster
recoveryplanshavealreadybeendeterminedbasedonordinances,isthereanintention
toexcludesuch localmeasuresand imposethenationalgovernment’spolicy?Art.94
of theConstitutionofJapanrecognizesautonomousordinancesby localgovernments
“withinthescopeof law”,whichposesaproblemof interpretation.Here,becausethe
Large-ScaleDisasterRecoveryLaw(Art.12,Para.8)referstoexamplesofprocedures
fromtheUrbanPlanningLawandotherlawsandordinancesinrelationtodetermining
andamendingurbanplans,itseemsthatcommunityplanningordinancescanbeargued
asbeingintheformofdelegatedordinancesundertheUrbanPlanningLaw.
However,itseemsthat,usingtheGreatEastJapanEarthquakeasanopportunity,
the trend of selecting safety standardswith citizenparticipationmet resistance.
TheDecember2011LawonSpecialZones forRecovery inResponse to theGreat
East JapanEarthquake(hereinafter “SpecialZonesLaw”)wasadoptedwith three
pillars,namely “recoverypromotionplans” thatencourageeconomicand industrial
recoverythroughderegulationandpreferentialmeasures,“recoveryadjustmentplans”
procedurestospeedupdisasterpreventionplanningbasedpredominantlyuponurban
planningmethods, and “recoverygrant fundedprojectplans” that supplements the
-
14 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
regionalgovernment’s fiscalburdenarising from theseplans throughallocationof
regionalrecoverytaxationmeasures.Ontheproceduralside,aconsolidateddecision-
makingmethodbasedonone-stop “consultationmeetings” forconsultationbetween
relevant national and regional administrative departmentswas propagated as a
deregulationmeasuretorationalizethevariousrelatedadministrativedecision-making
procedures.Thismethodwasthereappearanceof the“specialzoning”methodwhich
wasamethodofderegulationpolicyadoptedbytheKoizumigovernment’sstructural
reforms in the2000s(Ando2012). In theprocessof formulating“landrestructuring
plans”,planningdecisionsandprojectdecisionproceduresforrecovery-relatedprojects
suchasurbandevelopment,integratedrecoveryprojects,collectiverelocation,tsunami
protectionfacilitiesandfishingportrecoveryprojectswereconsolidated(Art.46(2),
Para. 4), agreementproceduresvia the recoveryadjustment council composedof
administrativedepartmentsfromthenationalandregionalgovernmentswereadded,iv
andthepublishingoftheresultsofsuchagreementsgaveautomaticeffecttothemas
administrativedecisions(Art.50).
Theeffect of this consolidateddecision-makingprocedurecanbe seenas the
intentiontospeedupadministrativedecisionsbyavoidingparticipationbyresidents.
Only opportunity available for participation by residents envisioned by the law
wasa soleprovision that effort shouldbemade to takemeasures that reflect the
opinionsofresidentssuchasbyholdingapublichearing(Art.46(5)).Participatory
provisionsthathavebeenaccumulatedstepbystepthroughrepeatedreformstothe
urbanplanning legislation inrecentyearswerenotclearlyreferredto,vwithonlyan
ambiguousmentionof“proceduresshallbefollowed”fromtheUrbanPlanningLawand
otherlawsandordinances(Art.48(8)).
Furthermore,inJune2013,the“Large-ScaleDisasterRecoveryLaw”appearedas
apermanentlawgoverningrecoveryafterlarge-scaledisastersandfollowedtheabove
“specialzone”method.Arecoverycouncilcomposedofmayorsandgovernorsof the
affectedmunicipalitiesandrelatedministriesandagenciesisformed(Art.11)andwith
thepublicationof “recoveryplan”afterconsultationwith thecouncil, aconsolidated
decisiongiveseffecttoan integratedurbanplanandthederegulationofconservation
areasunder the relevantLaws(LawonEstablishmentofAgriculturalPromotion
Regions,ForestLaw,NaturalParksLawandLawonDevelopmentofFishingPorts
-
15State’s Obligation to Ensure Safety in Japan and Mutual Assistance as Its Supplement
andGroundsinArt.14(2)).Opportunitiesforparticipationbyresidentsareminimized
inthissimplifiedconsolidatedprocedure,withtheonlyprovision inplacereferringto
minimummeasuresforreflectingtheopinionsofresidentssuchasapublichearing(Art.
10(5)).
4. Resident Participation in Safety Measures in the Areas Affected by the Great
East Japan Earthquake – Comparison of Land Readjustment Projects
(1)Flow�of�the�Administrative-Led�Process�and�its�Result
InthevariouspartsofeasternJapanwheretheSpecialZonesLawwasapplied,
landreadjustmentprojectswere implementedassafetymeasuresover3,600hectares
oflandvialandrestructuringprojects,andtheabovementioned“specialzoning”method
wasapplied intheproceduralprocess.Howcouldresidents inanywayparticipate in
theselectionofregionalsafetymeasuresduringthis time?Theauthorhascontinued
tomonitorthisissueinthecoastalareaofIwatePrefecturesincethedisaster,vibutin
the2017fiscalyear,theseventhyearafterthedisasterandwhenthefinalstageofland
substitutiondecisionscommenced inmanyprojectsites, interviewswereconducted
withrecoveryauthorities,localchambersofcommerce,andresidents’groupsinMiyako
city,Yamadatown,OtsuchitownandKamaishicityandasaresult,severalvariations
werefoundintheinvolvementofresidentsinsafetymeasures.
Theproceduralflowofadministrativeenforcementof landreadjustmentprojects
isasfollows:(1)administrativedecisionontheurbanplan,(2)administrativedecision
on theprojectplan,(3)establishmentof a landreadjustmentcommittee,(4) land
substitutionplanning,(5)provisional landsubstitutiondesignation,(6)administrative
decisiononlandsubstitution,(7)collectionofpaymentforsettlementofgapsonland
valueorpaymentofcompensationforreducedlandvalue.
Theadministrativedecisionontheurbanplanunder(1)tookeffectaccordingto
thepublicationofthe“recoveryadjustmentplans”preparedusingtheabovementioned
“specialzones”methodfrommid-2012onwards,buttherewerenorepresentativesof
residentsat the“consultationmeetings”conductedat thisstage in themunicipalities
wheretheauthorconductedinterviews.Inthemiddleof2011,theyeartheearthquake
occurred, the local autonomous associations and the formation of new resident
-
16 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
representativeorganizationshadalreadyoccurred invariousplaces, andproposals
for recoveryplanning centered on safetymeasureswere repeatedly submitted to
theadministrativesidewithintheyear,viiyet theseresidents’proposalshadnotbeen
reflectedeven inthe“recoverybasicplans”whichhadalreadybeenadministratively
determined invariousplaces in theendof 2011,prior to thedeterminationof the
“recoveryadjustmentplans”from2012onwards.
Thestageofadministrativedecisiononprojectplanofabove(2)had involved
procedures forpublic inspectionand submissionsperformed inmid-2013, and the
prefecturalgovernormadeimmediatedeterminations.Inresponsetothis,theprocedure
quicklyprogressedwithabove(3)landreadjustmentcommitteesestablished,(4)land
substitutionplanningquickly implementedduring the2013 fiscalyear, and(5)the
designationofprovisionallandsubstitutionattheendofthefiscalyear.Inthisway,as
thecircumstancesquicklyevolvedundertheproceduralflowoftheLandReadjustment
Law, the extent towhich residentswere able to participate in the substantive
discussiononsafetymeasuresisofconcern.
Accordingtosurveysbytheauthor,differencesarefoundinthedevelopmentof
theseprojects invariousmunicipalitiesduring thisperiod. In the landreadjustment
projects in theTaro areaviii andKuwagasaki/Kouganji areaix ofMiyako city, an
explanatorysessionforresidentswasheldateachmilestoneintheprocedure,including
theprojectplanningstageandprovisional landsubstitutiondesignationstage, and
the city emphasized that it hadbeenattempting to achieve resident-ledplanning
decisions.xHowever,intheinterviewsconductedwithresidentsbytheauthor’sgroup,
itwasrevealed that thesesessionswereapretenseandthecitydidnotdisplayan
attitudeofwantingtoreceivesubstantiveopinions fromtheresidents,and fromthe
residents’positionalso,theywereatthestageofgivingup,assubmittinganyfurther
proposalswouldbepointlessdueto thepainfulexperienceof thecity ignoring their
submissionin2011.xiIntheKuwagasakidistrict,amovementinoppositiontoseawalls
was reignitedby some residents in the 2015 fiscal year, but itwaneddue to the
negativeopinionsamongthevictimsthattoopposeadecisionbytheadministrationat
thatstagewouldonly leadtodelay intherebuildingofhousing. Inaddition, the land
readjustmentcommitteewasconductedinsecretandithasbeensaidthatthedetails
of thecommittee’sdeliberationprocesswerenotdisclosedto theresidentsuntil the
-
17State’s Obligation to Ensure Safety in Japan and Mutual Assistance as Its Supplement
stageofprovisionallandsubstitutiondesignation.Accordingtoaquestionnairesurvey
conductedbytheauthor’sgroup,althoughmanyofresidentsintheseareaswereland
leaseholdersxii,therewasnoevidencethattheadministrationhadsufficientlyexplained
theprocedure fordeclaring leaseholds in the landreadjustmentproject(Art.19and
85), thepartiesperforming theprojectweregenerallyunawareof theexistenceof
the leaseholders, and therewasonlyaperfunctoryappointment of a leaseholders’
representativeto the landreadjustmentcommittee.xiii In thecaseof leaseholdersthe
author interviewed inTaro, theLegalAffairsBureauunder theMinistryof Justice
conducedtheexofficiocancellationofregistrationsofallbuildingslost inthetsunami
simultaneously inMarch2013, twoyearsafter theearthquakedisaster, andat the
sametimelandownerssoldtheir landtothecityadministrationwithoutauthorization
fromthe leaseholders;becausethe leaseholdrightsweretreatedasextinguisheddue
tothe lossofbuildingregistration(whichwasarequirement forraisinganobjection
under theLawonLandandHousingLease), the leaseholders’ participation in the
landreadjustmentprojectwasnotapproved.Inthiscase,leaseholdrightssatisfiedthe
requirementsthroughconservatoryregistrationofbuildingsonleasedland,butdueto
theexofficioregistrationof lossbytheLegalAffairsBureau,aswellastheabolition
oftheLawonTemporaryTreatmentofLandandHousingLeasesinDisasterStricken
Cities in2013,whichhadpreviouslyhelpedtoprotect leaseholders, itwasconsidered
that the protectionwas lost(Kaneko 2014,Kaneko 2017a).As a result of this
institutionalobstructionof leaseholderswhosuffereddamage, the landreadjustment
committeewasformedbyrepresentativesofsomeinfluentialabsenteelandownersand
couldnotbeaforumforextensivediscussionofregionalsafetymeasures.Asaresult,
residentssense that theoutflowofpopulationequated toapproximatelyhalfof the
populationinTaroandabouttwothirdsofthepopulationinKuwagasaki.xiv
InOtsuchi town’scaseof theMachikataarea landreadjustmentproject(30ha),
theprojectprogressedconsistentwiththeprocedure intheLandReadjustmentLaw,
beingledbytheadministrationatalltimes.Localrestorationcouncilsandcommunity
councilswereestablishedunderanordinance,butmeetingswereheldaboutonlytwice
ayear,andthattheycametobedescribedasperfunctoryisthesameasthescenario
inMiyakocitymentionedabove.However, it isnoteworthy that theadministration
persistently feltasenseofcrisisconcerning theoutflowofpopulation,andrepeated
-
18 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
considerationgiven tomeasures to avoid the scatteredvacant land areas as the
resultof the landreadjustmentproject.During the2016 fiscalyearareportonThe
Current Status of the Central Urban Area and the Direction of Efforts Towards Rehabilitation
(Otsuchitown,2016)waspublished,whichinitiatedindependentprogramssuchasthe
publicationof“visualization”maps,a“vacantlandbank”systemfortheadministration
tomatch landownersand landusers,andmeasures topromotehousingconstruction
that increasedsubsidiestohouseholdsthatrebuilt inMachikata.However, therewas
criticismof thepublicationofvacant landandadditionalsubsidies,withthereception
ofsuchbelatedprogramattemptsbytheadministrationmetwithwhatcanbecalled
indifferencebyresidentswhohadalreadybeenthroughawaitingperiodofseveral
years.xvAsofMarch2018,inafieldsurveybytheauthor’sgroup,acertainamountof
rebuildingofhouseswasseenintheMachikatadistrict,whichcouldbetheresultofthe
housingconstructionpromotionmeasures,butnoticeablechange in therebuildingof
commercialshopswashardlyseen.
�(2)�Governance�Issues�Concerning�Community�Development�Meetings
In theUnosumaidistrict land readjustmentproject inKamaishi city,xvi as the
onlyexamplewithin thedisaster-affectedareasofKamaishicitywherea resident-
led community recovery council was established, which gave an expectation
of incorporating resident participation into the procedural flowunder theLand
ReadjustmentLaw.Thatis,ineachdisaster-affectedareaofKamaishi,theCommunity
RecoveryDiscussionMeetingwasheldbetweenAprilandJuly2012,priortothe“Land
RestructuringPlan”,butat this timetherewasnodisclosureofspecific information
on the landreadjustmentproject, and insteadonlyencouraged theestablishmentof
community recovery councils and landownergroups.After thepublicationof the
“recoveryadjustmentplans”fromAugust2013onwards,communityrecoverycouncils
weregraduallyestablishedasamethodofobtainingresidents’agreement ledbythe
administration,butonly inUnosumai the residents launched theirowncommunity
recoverycouncil.Duetothis, theadministrationrespectedthecouncilmemberseven
moreandmaintainedeffortstodiligentlyconfirmits intentions.xviiHowever,according
tocontinual interviewswithresidents in theregionby theauthor’sgroup, it seems
thatduringtheprocessof implementingthe landreadjustmentproject, thecouncil’s
-
19State’s Obligation to Ensure Safety in Japan and Mutual Assistance as Its Supplement
informationdisclosure to thegeneralpopulationwas insufficientandhaddifficulty in
realizingawiderrangeofparticipation(Kaneko2017).It isacasethat is instructive
ongovernanceproblems for a community-led recovery, suchas the requirements
for internaldecision-makingandtheexternalrepresentation to fulfill the functionof
representingresidentswhilemaintainingasenseofdistancefromtheadministration.
(3)Private�Sector-Led�Processes
In the case ofYamada area land readjustment project inYamada town, in
responsetotheadministration’srecoveryadjustmentplan,theconceptof“livingtown”
was initiatedasaguidingspiritofarea’srecoveryplanningbytheYamadaChamber
ofCommerceand Industry(YCCI).This “living town” conceptwas the result of
consciousnessof theYCCI leader that theflowofpeopleshouldnotstopwithmere
restorationtopre-disasterconditions,butshouldbedevelopedsuccessfullythroughthe
communitydevelopment.AccordingtothepresidentoftheYCCI,whatmadeitpossible
wasthevictoryof “TeamYamada”,whichwastheaxis forcooperationbetweenthe
YCCI’s consultantsof thecommerce sideand theUrbanRenaissanceAgency that
was theadministration’sconsultant.xviiiFollowingtheearthquake,bytheendof2011
theYCCIhadalreadycreated the “Commerceand IndustryRevivalVision”and in
2012whichwasdeveloped into the “Commerceand IndustryRecoveryPlan”which
wassuccessfully incorporatedaspartof theYamadaTownRecoveryPlan.ThePlan
centeredontheideaof“townscaperevitalizationplan”toconstructanewurbanareain
frontofJRYamadaStation,torealizewhich,amanagementcompanywasestablished
undertheYCCIChamberofCommerceforthepurposeofseekingthenationalsubsidy
for the reconstructionof commercial facilities,whichwassuccessfulas the second
behindOnagawa town inMiyagiprefecture. Inaddition,byarranging the location
ofparking lotsetc., the towncenterwas linked to theareasof landreadjustment
projectthatconsolidatedintegratedcommercial/residential facilities.Further,disaster-
assistancepublichousingwasplacedadjacent to thisshoppingdistrict,andcultural
facilitiessuchasachildren’slibrarywerebroughtnearby.Itwasaconceptofcreating
anew“livingtown”thatisnotmerelyarestorationofthepreviousshoppingprecinct.
Yamada towngovernmententrusted theconceptionof towncenter’s formationand
subsidyapplicationtotheYCCI’s leadership,xixandinasense, it isanexamplewhere
-
20 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
therecoveryadjustmentprojectdeveloped ina formthatdependedupontheprivate
sector.Asaresultof that,asofMarch1,2018, thepopulationofYamadatownwas
15,964,adecreaseofonly3,000fromthetimebeforethedisaster,anditcanbeseenas
havingstoppedthelargepopulationoutflowthathadbeenaconcern.
ThoughthecaseofYamadatown iseasyto interpretasmerely thesuccessful
recoveryof theshoppingdistrict, itwasaresultofachoiceof safetymeasuresby
privatesectoras the foundation for thisconceptualizationofcentralurbanarea. In
response to the town’ssafetymeasures that involved theconstructionofauniform
9.7-metre seawall, establishment of a 100-metrewide disaster risk areawhere
inhabitation isprohibitedbehindtheseawall,andraisingtheelevationof the landon
themountain-sideof thedisasterriskareaby3meters, the localprivatesectorused
itsutmostwisdomtoreachanunderstandingwith the towngovernment toseekan
optimalsolutionforsafetyandlivelihoods.
5.Conclusion – Towards A Community-Based Safety Measures
Thefirsthalfof thispaperretracedthetrendofregressionof theState’s legal
obligation toensuresafetyunder theBasicLawonDisasterCountermeasuresand
predicted that the role of “mutual assistance” in futuredisastermanagementwill
strengthen in response.Accordingly, itmust be recognized that there is a high
necessity for thecommunity tobe substantially involved in the selectionof safety
measures inrecoveryplanning insteadof leaving it to theadministration.However,
in the recoveryprocedural lawrepresentedby the2011LawonSpecialZones for
Recovery inResponse to theGreatEastJapanEarthquakeandthe2013Large-Scale
DisasterRecoveryLaw,aswellas theLandReadjustmentLawandother legislation
thatdefinesprojectproceduresundertheumbrellaoftheselaws,theadministrative-led
proceduralflowtypifiedbythe“specialzone”methodhasbeenstrengthened,andthere
isatrendwheretheopportunities forparticipationbyresidents insafetycommunity
planningthathadbeenaccumulated inearthquakedisasterrecoveryordinancessince
theGreatHanshin-AwajiEarthquakehavebeenabandoned.
Yet,despitebeingboundbythenational legal framework, there isstillroomfor
local,grass-rootsinitiativeforsafetymeasurestoprogress.Thesuccessfulexampleof
-
21State’s Obligation to Ensure Safety in Japan and Mutual Assistance as Its Supplement
ChamberofCommerceandIndustryleadershipinYamadatownwasintroducedasan
examplefromtheauthor’s interviewresearchinthecoastalareaofIwatePrefecture.
Localcommercial leadersemphasized thatwhatmadetheir leadershippossiblewas
people,notasystem,andthatthedecisivefactorwasinwhatwaypeoplecanhandle
thesystem.However, it isnotalwayspossible toobtain talentedpeople like “Team
Yamada”whohavetheknowledgeandmotivationtomasterthesystem.Itisnecessary
toelaborateonArt.10(5)oftheLarge-ScaleDisasterRecoveryLawthatcouldbethe
basisoflocalordinancesforresidents’participation.
Reference:-Abe,Y.(1998)Law and Policy on Large Disaster,Nihon-Hyoron-Sha(inJapanese)-Ii,T.(2016)“LawScholarsandLegalPractitioners inGrateEastJapanEarthquake,”Fukko (Recovery),No.18,p.6-13(inJapanese)
-IkutaN.(2010)Law n Disaster Prevention and Its Systems,Toshin-Do(inJapanese)-Ikeda,T.(2000)“AxisofDisasterResponseandRecoveryLawandtheIssuesofLegalStudiesofDisasterRecovery”inKaiM.GreatDisasterandLaw,KanseiGakuinUniversity(inJapanese)
-Kaneko,Y.(2013)“LawandCommunity inDisasterRecovery:Lessons from2011GreatEast JapanEarthquakeontheCivilRights,”JournalofInternationalCooperationStudies,KobeUniversity,Vol.21,No.1,p.23-51
-Kaneko,Y.(2014)”ConflictofStateandCivilProperties inDisasterRecovery:Lessons fromEastJapanEarthquakeandAsia,”inKoyanagi,S.eds.,Disaster and Law,p.23-48(inJapanese)
-Kaneko,Y.(2016a)“Issuesoftheprotectionofdisaster-affectedleaseholdersastheresultoftheabolitionofRisai-Hou,” Fukkou: Journal of Japan Society of Disaster Recovery Studies,No.18,p.47-56(inJapanese)
-Kaneko,U.(2016b)“LessonsfromPost-2011EastJapanEarthquakeRecovery:IssuesofParticipationandEarlyRecovery,” inKaneko,Matsuoka&Toyoda,eds.,Asian Law in Disasters: Toward a Human-Centered Recovery,Routledge,2016,p.15-46
-Kaneko,U.(2017a)“Community-BuildingSurveyofSafetyandLivingforaLivelyFuture,”inA.Hokugo&Y.Kaneko,eds.Community-Based Recovery of Society: University Involvement and Lessons from East Japan Compared with Those from Kobe, Aceh, and Sichuan,Springer,2017
-Kaneko,Y.(2017b)“Resultof theQuestionnaireonTown-RecoveryfortheFuture inTaro,Kuwagasaki,andUnosimaidistricts,” Report of Research Center for Urban Safety and Security,No. 21,pp. 250-275(inJapanese)
-MLIT:MinistryofLand, Infrastructure,TransportandTourism(2013)“Guidelines for Tsunami-Resistant Design of Seawalls,”MLIT
-Matsuoka,K.Kaneko,Y.&Ii,T.eds.,Law and Legal Policies in Disasters,Seibundo(inJapanese)-OtsuchiTown(2016)The Current Status of the Central Urban Area and the Direction of Efforts Towards
Rehabilitation, OtsuchiTown(inJapanese)-Ushida,H.(2000)”UrbanPlanning inKobe’sPost-DisasterRecovery,”Toshi-Keikaku (UrbanPlaning)Vol.50,No.6,p.13-18(inJapanese)
-Yasumoto,N.(2012)“IssuesforConsiderationontheLawonSpecialZonesforRecoveryafterGreatEastJapanEarthquake,”Meojyo Hougaku,Vol.61,No.4(inJapanese)
-Yamazaki,E.(2013)Natural Disaster and Disaster Relief,Nihon-HyoronSha,2013
Notesi Debates of legal scholarshavebeenaccumulated in Japanon the rangeof thepublic
assistance indisasterpreventionandrecoverysincetheHanshin-AwajiEarthquake.SeeAbe
-
22 国 際 協 力 論 集 第 26 巻 第 1 号
(1998),Ikeda(2000),Ikuta(2010),Yamazaki(2013),Ii(2016),etc.ii Asforthedetailsofthepost-Hanshin-AwajiEarthquakerecoveryinShin-NagataMatsumoto
AreaandRokkomichi-NorthKaze-no-satoParkArea,theauthorreferstotheinterviewswiththeleadersoflocalpost-disasterrecoverycouncilsasofJune2016throughDecember2016withaguidancebythepost-disasterrecoveryconsultantsMr.HisashiUchidaattheKobeInstituteofUrbanResearch.SeealsoUchida(2000).
iii According to theauthor’s interviewasofMarch2013with theDisasterManagementDivision,Department ofGeneralDisasterPrevention,Bureau ofGeneralAffairs,TokyoMetropolitanGovernment.
iv The recovery adjustment council is an internal consultationmechanism inside thegovernment, and lacks themeaningful opportunities forcivicparticipationby itsnature. Itis formedbytheprefecturalgovernorandthemunicipalmayor,andcapableof invitingthenational-levelministerinchargeaswellasthe“stakeholderswhohasstrongrelation”and“otherparties”recognizedbythelocalgovernment(art.47,para.3).Asfortheurbanplanning,thecouncilisnotobligedtoinvite“stakeholderswhohasstrongrelation”and“otherparties,”whiletheparticipationofexpertsandtheministerinchargeiscompulsory(art.47,para.4).
v UrbanPlanningLawof1968provides forcertainmomentsofcivicparticipationsuchasthepublichearings,publicreleaseandperusal,andpublicopinions(art.16and17), whichhasbeenincreasedbyaseriesoflawamendments,suchasthemunicipalordinanceondistrictplansaddedby1980amendment(art.16,para.2),civicproposalofdistrictplansbasedonordinance(art. 16, para. 3), stakeholders’ approvalprocedureon specifiedareas(art. 17,para. 3), additional procedures for civicparticipationby the local ordinances(art. 17-2),legalbindinglanduseplanbythedecisionofthelocalassembly(art.18-2),andtheproposalprocedureofurbanplansbylocaltown-planninginstitutions(art.21-2),whichareaddedbyaseriesoflawamendmentsduring2000s.
vi Forthedetails,seeKaneko(2013)(2014)(2016),(2017a)(2017b).vii IncaseofTaroareainMyakocity,localresidentsestablishedtheNGO“Standing-UpTaro!”
inJune2011,whichrepeatedlysentrecoveryproposalstothecitygovernment.Similarly,intheKuwagasakiareaofMiyakocity,avoluntaryassociation“KuwagasaiRecoveryCommittee”wasestablished inJune2011, incooperationwiththeassociationof localautonomousbodies,andsentarecoveryproposaltothecitygovernment inDecember2011.Noneoftheseproposals,however,werereflectedintherecoveryproposalinFebruary2012,norinthefinalRecoveryPlandecidedbythemayorinMarch2012.
viii TaroareausedbeanindependentmunicipalitybeforethemergertoMiyakoCityin2005,knownasafisherytown,withthemostofthehouseholdsbelongedtotheTaroFishermen’sAssociation.Thepopulationwasmaintained around 3,500. Torohasbeenknownas anadvanced tsunami-preventive town,with theworld’s largest seawalls of 10meterheightconstructedaftertheShowaSanrikuTsunamithatoccurredin1933.Residents’opiniononthesafetymeasuresafterthe2011GreatEastJapanEarthquakewasdividedonwhetherornottoreconstructtheseawallswhichweretotallydestructedbythetsunami in2011.Miyakocity’s“TaroAreaRecoveryPlan”(March2012)andtheMiyakoRecoveryAdjustmentProjectsthatfollowedthePlanenteredonthereconstructionoftheseawallswithanincreasedheight,whilepartiallyincorporatingarelocationprojectandlandreadjustmentproject.
ix Kuwagasaki area ofMiyako city is a historical fishery port city going back to theEdoperiod.The 2011 tsunami affected 800householdswhichhave lived in the area forseveralgenerations. “KuwagasakiAreaRecoveryPlan”(March2012)centeredon the landreadjustmentproject involvingtheconstructionofthe17meter-widthindustrialroadandthemarine industrialcomplex,whichwasonlypossibleafter thepublicpurchaseof largeareasfromthehistoricalland-owners.
-
23State’s Obligation to Ensure Safety in Japan and Mutual Assistance as Its Supplement
x Theauthor’sinterviewwiththeUrbanPlanningDivision,DepartmentofUrbanAdjustmentofMiyakoCityasofMarch2017.
xi Theauthor’sinterviewwithlocalresidentsinTaroareaasofJuly2015andKuwagasakiasofAugust2015duringtheworkshopsheldbytheKobeUniversityDisasterRecoveryPlatform.Forthedetails,seeKaneko(2017b).
xii InthequestionnairesurveyconductedbytheKobeUniversityDisasterRecoveryPlatformin January2015 in collaborationwithTohokuand IwateUniversities,whichobtained120answersfromtotal340householdsinKuwagasakiArea,20.8%ofthetotalanswersturnedouttobeleaseholders.Forthedetails,seeKaneko(2017b).
xiii Accordingtotheauthor’sinterviewasofAugust2016withtheon-siteofficeoftheUrbanRenaissanceAgencywhichwas inchargeof the implementationof the landreadjustmentproject,onlyonedeclarationofleaseholdwasmadeaccordingtotheLandReadjustmentLaw
(art.19,art.85)tothecity.AlthoughtheLawprovidesthataleaseholdcanbeautomaticallysucceededon the substituted landafter the completionof the land readjustmentproject
(art.99,para.1),theon-siteofficeonlynoticedonesuchcaseofleasehold.xiv Theauthor’sinterviewwithlocalresidentsasofAugust2017andMarch2018.xv The author’s interviewas ofAugust 2017with theDivision ofRecoveryPromotion,
DepartmentofRecoveryofOtuchiTownGovernment.xvi UnoshimaiareaofKamaishicityusedbean independentmunicipalityconsistingof four
fisheryvillages(Unosumai,Katagishi,HakozakiandRyoishi)beforethemergerwithKamaishicity in1955. Ithasturnedtoabedtownfortheemployeeshavingworks inKamaishicitycenter,while theratioof fisheryhouseholdshasdecreased to less than10%.TherecoveryadjustmentplanofUnosumaiwasstartedinAugust2013andonwards,whosecompletionwaspostponedtothefiscalyear2018astheresultofrevisionoftheplanin2014.
xvii Theauthor’sinterviewasofMarch2016withtheMainOfficeofRecoveryPromotionoftheKamaishiCityGovernment.
xviii Theauthor’s interviewas ofMarch2018with theChairmanofYamadaChamberofCommerceandIndustry.
xix Theauthor’sinterviewasofMarch2017withDivisionofRecoveryPromotionofYamadaTownGovernment.