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State Size and Clientelism

A Comparative Case Study of Malta

Paper Prepared for the 2018 ECPR Joint Sessions

10-14 April, Nicosia, Cyprus

Workshop 15: Political Clientelism in the 21st Century: Theory and Practice

- Work in progress: please do not cite without permission from the author -

Dr. Wouter Veenendaal

Institute of Political Science, Leiden University

Wassenaarseweg 52, 2333 AK Leiden, The Netherlands

+31 (0)71 527 3392

w.p.veenendaal@fsw.leidenuniv.nl

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“Min mhux magħna, kontra tagħna”

(those who are not with us, are against us)

- Dom Mintoff1

Introduction: State Size and Patron-Client Linkages

While it has long been assumed that small societies are more prone to particularistic

relationships between citizens and politicians, so far hardly any studies have empirically

analyzed the relationship between state size and clientelism. When seeking to explain

the presence or absence of patron-client linkages, scholars usually point to factors like

economic development and modernization, cultural traditions, or political regimes

(Hicken, 2011; Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Stokes, 2005). State size is

rarely taken into account as a potential explanatory variable, one explanation for which

is the fact that clientelism can be observed in countries of all different shapes and sizes.

Yet, by making two original arguments, this paper aims to fill the theoretical and

analytical void concerning the relation between state size and clientelistic politics. In the

first place, it argues that clientelistic linkages are particularly likely to emerge and

persist in small societies, due to the direct, face-to-face contacts between citizens and

politicians, the blending of public and private relationships, and the increased value of

individual votes. Second, and as a result of these dynamics, the paper argues that the

manifestation and operation of clientelism in smaller settings is different from large

ones. While clientelism in large countries predominantly occurs on the basis of

hierarchical party organizations, intricate broker networks, and established institutional

channels, in small societies there is a direct, unfettered, and reciprocal relationship

between patron and client.

The paper develops these arguments on the basis of an in-depth case study of a

single country: the Republic of Malta. Located in the middle of the Mediterranean, Malta

has been the site of Jeremy Boissevain’s classic works on clientelism and patronage

(Boissevain, 1965, 1974), but due to its small size has not figured in many later

publications on clientelism or broader comparative politics. As an island country with a

population of approximately 420.000, subdivided into thirteen electoral districts with

roughly 25.000 registered voters each, Malta constitutes a perfect case for the purpose

1 Prime Minister of Malta (Labour Party), 1955-1958, 1971-1984.

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of this paper. Various publications have highlighted a number of peculiarities of Maltese

politics, among which its rare single transferable vote (STV) electoral system, record-

breaking voter turnout levels, and sharp polarization between political parties and their

supporters (Baldacchino, 2002; Cini, 2002; Hirczy, 1995; Mitchell, 2002; Zanella, 1990).

The analysis conducted in this article will highlight the relationship between these

phenomena and pervasive clientelism, and will also discuss how clientelism has

contributed to profound executive dominance and a legacy of corruption scandals in

Malta.

The paper starts off with a discussion of the relevant existing literature, paying

specific attention to studies addressing a) the causes of clientelism, b) the effects of

smallness on clientelism, and c) clientelism in small (island) states. Subsequently, the

case of Malta is introduced, and the research design and methodology of the analysis of

clientelism in Malta are outlined and motivated. In the ensuing analytical sections of the

article, the various ways in which smallness stimulates the establishment and

maintenance of patron-client linkages in Malta are discussed, and it will be shown how

clientelism can be linked to other features of Maltese politics. The paper concludes by

proposing a new framework for understanding the ways in which smallness mediates

and reinforces clientelistic networks. This conclusion also puts the Maltese case into

broader perspective, by making some brief comparisons with similar cases in Europe

(such as Cyprus and Iceland) and other small (island) states around the globe in which

similar trends may be observed.

Theory: The Existing Literature on Clientelism, Population Size, and Small (Island) States

While there has been quite some ambiguity and discussion about the terms ‘clientelism’,

‘patronage’, and ‘patron-client relations’ (or ‘linkages’), several recent studies have

sought to provide clear definitions of these terms (Hicken, 2011; Kitschelt & Wilkinson,

2007; Piattoni, 2001; Stokes, 2007). This paper adopts Simona Piattoni’s

conceptualization of clientelism, and hence defines it as “the trade of votes and other

types of partisan support in exchange for public decisions with divisible benefits” (2001,

p. 4). Whereas clientelism entails the exchange of political support for a wide array of

potential benefits, in the case of patronage the benefit provided by the patron is a job in

the (semi-) public sector. Clientelism and patronage can be grouped together with

phenomena such as nepotism, cronyism, and pork-barrel politics under the umbrella

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term of particularistic politics, which refers to any actions of politicians that cater to

specific (groups of) voters (Kitschelt, 2000; Piattoni, 2001). This can be contrasted with

universalistic politics, which entails political actions that apply to all members of society

and therefore do not discriminate between citizens.

The concept of patron-client linkages first arrived into political science through

the studies of anthropologists and sociologists, who observed these phenomena in

Southern European and Mediterranean societies, as well as developing countries in non-

Western parts of the world. As a result, initial publications in comparative politics

dealing with the concept focused on such societies as well (Eisenstadt & Lemarchand,

1981; Schmidt et al., 1977; Scott, 1972), and there still is a strong tendency to regard

clientelism as the antithesis to industrialized, modern, and Weberian democracy.

Various studies have indeed found empirical evidence of a link between economic

development and clientelism (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007), but the mechanisms by

which underdevelopment facilitates clientelism (or rather, development eradicates

clientelism) remain underspecified (Hicken, 2011, p. 299). Some studies have pointed to

interesting variations of this link, such as the finding that clientelistic exchanges appeal

primarily to poor instead of wealthy voters (Weitz-Shapiro, 2012).

The long-prevailing tendency to regard clientelistic exchanges as inefficient,

corrupt, or even dangerous (Hicken, 2011, p. 302) has traditionally induced academics

to regard clientelism as antithetical to democracy. However, the recent experience of

many “third wave” democracies, which have been found to combine democratic

institutions with pervasive patron-client networks and other ‘informal politics’ (Helmke

& Levitsky, 2004; cf. Van de Walle, 2003), has led scholars to reconsider the link

between democracy and clientelism (Kitschelt, 2000). As a result, recent scholarship

focuses more on the ways in which clientelism operates within the parameters of a

formally democratic framework (Aspinall, 2013; Grzymala-Busse, 2008; Stokes, 2005).

While there is some evidence that patron-client linkages are likely to disappear as

democracies consolidate and citizens gain trust in democratic institutions and

procedures (Keefer, 2007), the experience of longstanding democracies like India, Italy,

and Japan provides counterevidence to this assumption.2

2 Other scholars have highlighted variables such as state capacity (Bustikova & Corduneanu-Huci, 2017)

or control over public resources (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007) as important conditions facilitating

clientelism and patronage.

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State size does not figure among the classic explanatory variables of clientelism,

but various studies have argued that clientelism is more likely to emerge and persist in

smaller societies. In his classic volume The Social System (1951, p. 508), Talcott Parsons

argues that “[s]maller and simpler organizations are typically managed with a high

degree of particularism in the relations of persons in authority to their subordinates”. A

number of mechanisms can be imagined to explain this link. In the first place, small

settings have higher levels of social intimacy and cohesion, and politicians and citizens

are likely to know and interact with each other in multiple roles (Ott, 2000; Wood,

1967). This blurring of professional and private relationships means that politicians may

be more tempted to favor their personal relations, while constituents might exert

greater social pressures on politicians to provide them with material largesse. Whereas

the greater access of citizens to politicians in small societies has often been

hypothesized to facilitate political representation, constant face-to-face contacts also

enable citizens to directly ask their representatives for personal favors (Veenendaal,

2013).

Direct contact also means that clientelistic exchanges are more visible, making it

easier for both patrons and clients to monitor the extent to which clientelistic

obligations are met. According to Medina and Stokes, clientelistic agreements are easier

to monitor in smaller societies, as a result of which they have a greater impact (2007, pp.

76-77). A similar argument is made by Oppenheimer (1996), who shows that the

population size of US states has a strong impact on the representational link between

citizens and politicians. According to this study, smallness increases both the quality and

quantity of representational relationships, but also facilitates particularistic exchanges

between citizens and politicians (cf. Crespin & Finocchiaro, 2013).

Finally, the increased value of individual votes may provide a powerful incentive

for the establishment of patron-client linkages in small societies. In smaller districts, it is

statistically more likely that only one or a few votes will determine the results of an

election. This is not only an explanation for higher turnout levels in smaller

constituencies (Riker & Ordeshook, 1968), but also means that there are greater

incentives for politicians to allocate targeted benefits to individual voters. In small and

intimate societies the political preferences of individual citizens are generally known, as

a result of which politicians can quite accurately estimate the size of their political

support before an election. Consequently, they are aware of the extra number of votes

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they need in order to win, and likely also know which voters to target in order to achieve

this. Aware of the power and value of their vote, these citizens know that they can ask

for something in return for their support. As a result, both voters and politicians in small

settings have additional incentives and leverage to establish clientelistic exchanges.

Case study publications from small (island) jurisdictions around the globe

confirm the notion that smallness fosters clientelism. Initial publications listed the

tendency to clientelism and conflicts of interest as a major disadvantages of small

societies (Lowenthal, 1987; Wood, 1967), and widespread patronage has created

oversized, partisan, and ineffective bureaucracies in virtually all small island nations

(Chittoo, 2011; Sutton, 2007). In-depth studies of small states in Africa, the Caribbean,

Europe, and the Pacific indeed reveal that direct contacts between citizens and

politicians foster patron-client linkages in small settings across world regions (Corbett,

2015; Duncan & Woods, 2007; Seibert, 1999; Veenendaal, 2014). Yet most case studies

treat clientelism as an idiosyncratic element of politics in the case(s) under

investigation, and hardly link it to broader theoretical discussions about the political

repercussions of state size. Whereas the present analysis also focuses on a single case, it

does so with the explicit purpose to explore and examine how smallness may facilitate

patron-client linkages.

Research Design: A Comparative Case Study of Malta

The Maltese archipelago consists of three inhabited islands (Malta island, Gozo, and

Comino) located in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, with a total population of

approximately 420,000. Since the territorial size of Malta is only 316 square kilometers,

the country is very densely populated. After having been ruled by a series of foreign

powers, among which Phoenicians, Moors, Normans, and Sicilians, in 1530 the islands

were bequeathed to the Catholic Order of Saint John, and were ruled as a theocratic

oligarchy for the next 250 years. Following a brief French occupation between 1798 and

1800, the islands became part of the British empire and were ruled as a crown colony

until independence came in 1964. Catholic rule and British colonialism have both left a

strong mark on Maltese politics, and language, religion, and sovereignty questions have

historically acted as political fault lines. The first political parties were formed around

these cleavages (Boissevain, 1965, pp. 8-11; Frendo, 1991), and the two parties that

contemporarily dominate Maltese politics, the Labour Party (PL – Partit Laburista) and

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the Nationalist Party (PN – Partit Nazzjonalista) also have their origins in these identity-

related questions. The Church historically plays a very dominant role in Maltese society

and politics, and in the 1920s and 1960s openly clashed with elected politicians in a

fierce power struggle, almost acting as a political party in its own right (Fenech, 2012;

Koster, 1984).

Contemporary Malta is governed as a unitary parliamentary republic with a

largely ceremonial president as head of state. There is a high degree of political

centralization, and the state has historically assumed a very dominant role in the

economy and society of the archipelago. Elections are held once every five years under

the rare Single Transferable Vote (STV) system, for which the country is divided into

thirteen electoral districts that each elect five members of parliament (MPs).3 While STV

is a proportional system, in practice Malta has always had a strong inclination towards a

two-party system and single party governments, and in recent decades only the PL and

PN gained parliamentary seats.4 Elections in Malta are traditionally very competitive, in

the sense that only a few thousand votes determine which party is elected into the

government. This competitiveness is one of the reasons for record-breaking turnout

levels (usually around 95%), without compulsory voting laws (Hirczy, 1995). A final

characteristic of Maltese politics is the strong polarization between parties, which in the

1960s and 1980s briefly turned into open violence, posing a threat to the stability of the

country (Baldacchino, 2002, pp. 197-198; Howe, 1987; Zanella, 1990, p. 208).

In the following analysis, Malta is employed as a single representative or typical

case, with the aim to probe the theorized causal mechanism between smallness and

clientelistic politics (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, pp. 297-299). The aim of this study and

other typical case studies is to examine specific processes within the case that may

explain the hypothesized causal link. The present analysis of politics in Malta is based on

one month of field research conducted in November 2017, during which two types of

data were gathered. In the first place, twenty-three semi-structured interviews were

held with politicians, journalists, academic, and NGO representatives, who were selected

3 Single Transferable Vote works on the basis of electoral quotas. Voters rank candidates in order of

preference, and those candidates with a number of first-order preferences meeting or exceeding the quota

are elected. Any ‘surplus’ votes for these candidates are then allocated to other candidates on the basis of

second-order preferences, until all available seats have been filled. 4 In the most recent elections (2017), the PN formed an electoral coalition with the Democratic Party (PD –

Partit Demokratiku), as part of which the latter party also won two parliamentary seats.

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with the aim to obtain variation in professional and political views.5 Second, I joined two

individual Maltese MPs (one from each party) during several events at which they

engaged with voters in their districts, among which house visits and consultation hours.

The ‘shadowing’ of these politicians (cf. Fenno, 1978) has given me great insights into

the content, dynamics, and nature of interactions between politicians and citizens.6

Finally, a content analysis of secondary literature, (online) newspaper articles, and

official documents was carried out for the purposes of triangulation.

In the following sections of this paper, I will use fragments of the data that I

collected in Malta to illustrate or support my analytical narrative. While respondents

obviously have different opinions, perspectives, and political convictions, all of the

presented findings reflect the information I received from a (wide) majority of

informants, cross-checked with other data sources.

Analysis: How Smallness Stimulates Patron-Client Linkages in Malta

Combined with the high population density, the smallness of Malta has created a

strongly interconnected society, in which people constantly meet and engage with each

other in various social roles (Sultana & Baldacchino, 1994, p. 16). As Baldacchino argues,

“amongst themselves, the Maltese develop an intricate knowledge of the partisan

affiliations and loyalties of friends, family, and acquaintances, effectively mapping a

network of potential influence, patronage, and obligation” (2002, p. 198). Within this

densely networked society, politicians are in constant and direct contact with their

constituents, with whom they frequently also have a personal relationship. Voters and

politicians constantly meet and communicate with each other in a remarkable variety of

settings, meaning that private and professional relationships easily become blurred,

permitting citizens to use their personal relationship with a politician to raise any

political questions or requests that they might have. As a Maltese minister indicated

during an interview:

I mean when you are with your family, even walking or going to a restaurant, at times there are

people who come to you and would like to talk to you, not just to say hello, but also to maybe

point some issues or problems that they have.

5 A complete list of interview respondents can be found in the Appendix of this article. 6 Given the smallness and high levels of political sensitivity in Malta, I have decided not to disclose the

names of these politicians.

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The small dimensions of the Maltese society entail that direct contact is a

powerful norm in Maltese politics, and there is a strong expectation among citizens that

politicians will engage and interact with them. Citizens commonly approach politicians

whenever they see fit, sometimes putting a strain on the private life of politicians, who

will meet voters everywhere they go. On the other hand, politicians also offer various

opportunities for direct interaction to their constituents, for example through house

visits and consultation hours, or by attending specific public and private events. And in

addition to face-to-face contacts, digital tools like e-mail, Facebook, and WhatsApp have

offered new avenues of communication, that can be used by both politicians and voters.

It is important to emphasize, therefore, that the direct contact between citizens and

politicians is initiated from both sides. Asked about the most important ways of reaching

out to voters, a government minister answered:

Well, house visits, I think it’s still the most powerful. You have social media today and I think it’s

being more used by candidates and even by the political parties. Telephone calls also, you know.

You might send messages on mobile and e-mails.. I mean, in every possible way.

Interviews and discussions with Maltese politicians point to a strong perception that no

politician can be elected without personally reaching out to voters. In the words of

Wolfgang Hirczy, “[c]andidates go to great lengths in building their personal network of

supporters, ‘nursing’ prospective constituencies for months before the election, holding

public meetings, conducting house-to-house calls and seeking to establish themselves –

or to reemphasize an already established position – as local patron, doing favors and

trying to win friends” (1995, p. 263). Reaching out to voters and addressing their

concerns is generally not only seen as a necessity, but also as a virtue. As one politician

said:

I am a very accessible person – phone, Facebook, e-mail (…). If I can assist, why not. It’s not being

a politician, it’s being a human.

When asked about the content of these direct interactions, virtually all

interviewees indicated that personal issues and requests dominate. During the house

visits that I joined, the personal situation of constituents was the central topic of

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discussion, ranging from people’s housing, jobs, taxes, health care, and pensions to really

personal issues like loneliness, disease, or relations within the family. And during the

consultation hours (called ‘constituency clinic’) that I attended, voters queued outside

the building to talk to their MP about all types of personal quandaries that were on their

mind. While many of these issues obviously connect to broader policy debates, they

were almost invariably raised from the perspective of the individual. As a Maltese

journalist indicated:

These are very micro issues that are concerned with the individual. An individual does not speak

to you about the policy on building heights. An individual will be speaking to you about the fact

that they are trying to get a permit to build two floors on their roof.

And this is also the experience of Maltese politicians, as for instance a former prime

minister highlights:

is not about policy, it’s about personal needs. So, the family, the children, their jobs, their husband,

their wives, their grandfather, their elderly, who are unable to keep living on their own and they

need to be placed in some kind of government institution, all sorts of issues.

Because of the smallness, density, and interconnectedness, politicians are able to

obtain a great deal of information about individual voters, and often know precisely

where their supporters live. Political candidates need only between 3.000 and 4.000

votes to be elected, and they can quite accurately estimate the size of their support in

their district. Interviews revealed that both parties make use of so-called ‘street leaders’,

who keep track of political preferences of voters in each bloc or street (Boissevain, 1965,

p. 24; Hirczy, 1995, p. 258). According to an NGO spokesperson:

In villages that are very tight-knit, there are people on both sides of the parties – called street

leaders – who would know “ok, number 61 votes Labour, he votes Nationalist..”, and they have

databases. I used to campaign with one party when I was a student, and I remember there was

this computer. If someone called, they would ask “ok what’s your ID number?” And they would

put it in and generally you could see which party they vote for.

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The lack of political anonymity means that politicians are able to penetrate the private

lives of citizens to a great extent. According to Baldacchino, “the presence, if not control,

of the party is supreme and complete” (2002, p. 197).

On the other hand, it is clear that direct contacts and the blending of private and

professional relationships also enable citizens to exert great pressure on their

politicians. In the first place, while districts are small, politicians still have a hard time

meeting the voters’ expectation of face-to-face contact. While some politicians, especially

those that are in government, can afford to hire some staff members to deal with voters’

requests, some voters still expect to meet the politicians in person, as one minister says:

I have a twelve men and women team of customer care, and they are meeting dozens of people

every day. People sometimes are frustrated, and they are sms-ing me. I am telling them ‘’we will

set up a meeting’’. Customer care people are calling them. They come here they think they will

meet the minister, but they will meet the customer care team. They are annoyed, and say ‘’I vote

for you, I have to see you’’.

During the consultation hours that I attended, some voters exerted pressure very

bluntly, and one of them stated for example: “I voted for [X], so now s/he has to do

something for me.”

In addition to the expectation of face-to-face meetings, politicians are also

expected to be able to deal with all kinds of issues that voters raise, ranging from public

concerns to really private matters. This means that the politician is expected to play

many different roles. As one politician remarks about his previous function in office:

I used to have around 3 nights dedicated for house visits (…) and throughout the weeks I used to

have dedicated slots for meetings with people. People being literally normal citizens, who come to

me with issues, with problems seeking help, from requests for jobs to guidance about things that

are deeply personal for them. And the politician has to be the confessor - the priest who listens,

the lawyer, the psychologist, the psychiatrist, the social worker. All things wrapped up into one.

These roles were also on display during the house visits and consultation hours that I

attended. The two politicians whom I joined generally assumed quite paternal postures,

providing a listening ear and seeking to comfort voters whenever necessary. Voters, on

the contrary, did not hold back in expressing their complaints, dissatisfaction, griefs, or

worries, apparently looking actively for the politician’s attention and care.

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In the end, therefore, direct contact mostly takes the shape of voters asking for

personal help, favors, and services from politicians. But because politicians know many

voters personally, the pressures to fulfill these requests can be formidable. As one

politician argued:

The danger of succumbing to that pressure in a small community like ours is enormous, because

remember, these are the people you meet every Sunday when you go to church, whom your wife

meets if she goes shopping in a supermarket. And you’re constantly bombarded by all of this, so

this is a downside that creates enormous risks.

The secondary literature and the data I gathered indicate that most politicians are

willing to fulfill requests of individual voters, thereby establishing a clientelistic

relationship. This analysis therefore corroborates Mitchell’s conclusion that “clientelistic

practices and systems of patronage are what make Malta’s political system functional”

(2002, p. 43). While the benefits, favors, and services allocated to voters are very

diverse, my observations and interview material indicate that public sector jobs assume

a very prominent place in the patron-client link. Voters may approach ministers to ask

for a job in the civil service, but they also ask MPs to contact ministers or other

employers on their behalf. In addition to jobs, housing, building permits, and medical

treatments often become the subject of clientelistic exchanges. In the latter two cases,

voters may ask politicians to write letters or call on their behalf in order to see if they

can move up on the waiting list, or make sure that their case is adequately taken care of.

Because split-ticket voting is quite uncommon in Malta, the fiercest electoral

competition in districts occurs between candidates from the same party. In contrast to

other countries, this means that individual candidates rather than political parties act as

providers of patronage. In the words of one politician:

In the end you are not fighting to try and convince someone from the opposite party to vote for

you, but you try to convince people from your party not to vote for X but for you. So I can offer you

this, I can give you a fridge, a washing machine, and this is what’s happening.

While powerful party organizations and the use of street leaders as brokers might give

the impression of party-organized clientelism, the smallness and particularities of the

STV system in Malta entail that clientelistic linkages are in fact very person-oriented,

and most clientelistic exchanges occur directly between voters and politicians.

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Analysis: How Clientelism Relates to Other Aspects of Maltese Politics

Now that the influence of smallness on clientelism in Malta has been explained, this

section will discuss how clientelism informs or relates to several other aspects of

Maltese politics, among which 1) high levels of participation, 2) profound polarization,

3) executive dominance, and 4) a penchant for corruption.

Participation

While turnout figures have been dwindling somewhat in recent years, participation in

Maltese elections still commonly exceeds 90%, in the absence of compulsory voting.

Several studies have sought to explain these extraordinary turnout figures (Hirczy,

1995; Zanella, 1990), and have pointed to the STV system, power concentration,

partisanship, competitiveness, and closeness between citizens and politicians as drivers

of participation. This analysis corroborates these findings, but also adds and emphasizes

the influence of patron-client linkages. Due to the fact that personal connections with

politicians are such an important factor in obtaining benefits, goods, or services, it

matters a great deal to individual voters which politicians and parties win the elections.

Coupled with the lack of political anonymity, the prevalence of particularistic politics

means that the stakes of individual citizens in election results can be very high: a victory

of a favored politician or party can entail several years of (privileged) access to state

services, while a defeat can translate into years of exclusion, neglect, or – in the worst

case – victimization. As one prominent Maltese politician mentions:

At the end of the day you are determining your life for the next five years. So people feel the need

to go out to vote, even to keep their jobs in some cases. Because they were given a job by political

patronage.

The same sentiment was voiced in stronger terms by another politician:

Because it’s Russian Roulette, it’s do or die. If my party is in, I am going to get the favors. It is

easier for me to get what I need. If my party is not in, I am finished. So we have to vote.

As discussed above, the smallness of electoral districts enables politicians and

parties to assemble a great deal of information about individual voters. On election day,

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parties and candidates can actively monitor which voters have already cast their ballot,

and which ones haven’t. As one minister whom I interviewed explains:

Political parties in our electoral system are able, according to the law, to have the data of who

voted and who not. So when you go and vote, they are taking you off the list. In every polling

booth, all parties have a representative, and they can also take note, and they are taking note. So

all the political parties in Malta, that very same night when the election closes, know whether

[name] went out to vote or not.

While the two most recent elections have been less close, Maltese elections tend to be

highly competitive, meaning that at the district level only a few votes can make the

difference, while on the national level the difference is traditionally less than 10,000

votes. Because of this closeness, parties will go to great lengths to make sure that all

their supporters cast their ballot. According to one NGO spokesperson:

They will phone you up [sic], on the day of election, 12 o’clock, saying you haven’t voted yet. They

know; they have the list of the people who did not vote. They are inside, and they phone you up.

At 3 o’clock in the afternoon again; at 6 o’clock they phone you up again.

In his account of the 1987 elections, Stephen Howe describes how “Nationalists carried

the sick from hospital beds to the polling stations, encouraged emigrants to return home

for election day from as far away as Australia, and bused whole convents of nuns to the

polling places, while the Labour Party chartered planes to fly sympathizers from their

jobs in Libya and worked on a flock of 20,000 new voters, promising jobs for everyone”

(1987, p. 264).

While the vote is legally secret, some politicians and voters have found creative

ways to circumvent the law, and to give or obtain ‘proof’ of whether certain voters fulfil

their part of the clientelistic exchange. Various interviewees pointed to voters

requesting assistance when casting their ballot as the most typical strategy used in this

regard. As one interest group representative said:

For example, you can always say that you cannot read or write and that you need assistance in

filling out your vote. And there would be a representative of the electoral commission, which are

representatives from political parties, and they would help you to fill your vote. So they know how

you voted.

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Various studies assert that strong monitoring mechanisms increase the likelihood of

clientelistic voting (Medina & Stokes, 2007; Nichter, 2008), and the smallness of Malta

definitely strengthens politicians’ opportunities to monitor the participation of citizens.

And as the following quote from a journalist underscores, there is an awareness among

citizens and politicians that elections play an important role in sealing the clientelistic

connection:

People feel directly invested, because that’s when that transaction is completed, you know. The

transaction is happening, and therefore, personal stakes are very high (…). If it is so clientelistic,

and so transactional, people have a lot at stake in, for example what MP’s are elected.

Polarization

As mentioned above, Maltese politics has always been remarkably polarized, and in the

1920s, 1960s, and 1980s tensions occasionally turned into political violence.

Polarization has centered on issues like language, religion, and ideology, but some

scholars note that regardless of its specific content, Malta has a penchant for tribal

politics. Pika (hostility) and partiti (factions) are central to Boissevain’s analysis of

Maltese politics, and have remained so in later analyses (Cini, 2002; Howe, 1987). This

would explain why polarization has remained a core feature of politics in Malta, while

ideological or programmatic differences between the parties have gradually faded (Cini,

2002, pp. 12-14). Most interview respondents in fact struggled to name any major

differences between the contemporary PL and PN, but nevertheless stipulated that

levels of polarization remain quite high. As one journalist puts it:

Everything here is a zero-sum game. So there is essentially (…) almost no space for independent

critical thinking. You belong to one tribe and if you don’t belong to that tribe, it must be that you

are against it. You can’t be neutral, you cannot be neutral. There is no space for that, and if you

start behaving in a way that criticizes both political parties, for example, then you must be mad.

My fieldwork in Malta occurred just in the aftermath of the assassination of Daphne

Caruana Galizia, a prominent but also very divisive anticorruption journalist. Her killing

appeared to spark new levels of polarization, as the opposition held the government

responsible for creating the environment in which this murder could happen.

16

Smallness and clientelism may constitute another foundation of polarization and

tribal politics. Because patron-client linkages and other forms of particularistic politics

entail that the state does not treat all citizens on an equal basis, it matters a great deal to

individual voters which politician or political party is in power. As Hirczy argues, “[t]he

stakes in the election include not only the control of government and thus the power to

implement their policy agenda, but also the perquisites of office and patronage benefits”

(1995, p. 260). If so much is at stake, voters may come to see an election victory of the

opposition as an existential threat, that needs to be prevented at any cost. Moreover,

individual voters may reap benefits from exhibiting strong partisan affiliations, as

demonstrating loyalty to the party might increase their chance of obtaining favors.

Finally, tribal politics weakens the position of supposedly neutral or impartial

institutions, which face strong pressures to join a side, or are broadly seen as belonging

to one side, as evidenced by former prime minister Dom Mintoff’s famous stipulation

that “those who are not with us, are against us.” As will become clear in the next section,

polarization therefore also contributes to the superior position of the Maltese

government.

Executive dominance

Various studies have shown that Malta is a very centralized state, in which power is

traditionally concentrated in the hands of government. Executive dominance is a feature

of most small island states, in which government typically controls a disproportionally

large section of the job market (Baldacchino, 1997). In the Maltese context, executive

dominance further raises the stakes of election outcomes, strengthening both

participation and polarization. Election victories translate into a party’s near-total

control of the state apparatus, while a defeat leaves the other party and its supporters

almost completely powerless. As a Maltese journalist phrased this notion:

Here you can see also that elections are perceived as a complete takeover of power. So in a normal

democracy, you’re choosing the prime minister or a powerful person, you’re choosing a cabinet,

you’re choosing members of parliament. But the civil service, for example, does provide

continuity. Local municipalities provide continuity, federal government provides continuity, the

police provide continuity. Here, the perception is that if a government is switching from Labour to

Nationalist, that everything is going to change.

17

Clientelism and patronage are linked to executive dominance, because partisan

appointments amplify the control of the party in power, weakening (semi-) public

institutions that are supposed to function in an impartial or neutral manner.

One result of this exacerbated winner-take-all context is that in Malta,

“the government of the day and the state are coterminous” (Mitchell, 2002, p. 57; cf.

Pirotta, 2012), in the sense that many state institutions are subjected to partisan

interests. As a spokesperson of an NGO remarked during an interview:

Our major concern is the influence government has on deciding bodies everywhere; on boards, on

every aspect of a citizen’s life, you know. I mean (…) you would need to apply for a planning

permit, but the people deciding are people the government put on the board (…). So it’s just like a

vicious circle, where people sometimes feel they can’t get out of. And for us that is really

worrying; I mean the fact that the system of governance (…) was ripe for abuse. If you really want

to abuse the system (…) it is extremely easy. And you get to a point where you look around and

you say “ok, the government controls everything.”

In addition to allocating public sector jobs as part of a strategy to satisfy political

supporters or recruit new ones, interviewees indicated that political appointments can

also be used as a tactic to weaken or subjugate institutions that may pose constraints on

executive power. Constitutionally, many high-profile public positions in Malta are either

directly or indirectly appointed by the government, among which for example also

judges. Several respondents indicated that frequent turnover of top positions may be

used as a strategy to curtail their independent functioning, as the following quote

underscores:

It’s our prime minister (…) or rather his government who appoints the new police commissioner.

And that commissioner gets changed nearly every year. We’ve had five commissioners in 4 years,

and it is not well for the institution. You have certain people being appointed as police

commissioner, and you question their credentials. The same applies with the judiciary, and it is

ultimately the whole institution that is going to be questioned.

In sum, the vast and virtually unchecked powers of the Maltese executive increase

people’s dependence on the government, further amplifying the position of the party in

power.

18

Corruption

While several recent corruption scandals related to the Panama Papers have received

ample attention even in international media, corruption has in fact always been a

feature of Maltese politics (Mercieca, 2012; Mitchell, 2002; Pirotta, 2012). This can be

related to executive dominance, and the relative weakness of the media and other

watchdog institutions that could inform voters about corruption cases and hold the

relevant politicians accountable. In addition, the smallness of Malta creates very close

connections between politicians and business elites, increasing the likelihood of

favoritism in matters like public tenders or procurement. Because establishing and

maintaining patron-client linkages is costly, politicians also run the risk of becoming

financially dependent on business elites, who might ask for concessions or favorable

treatment in return for their support. However, many Maltese politicians are themselves

also business owners, and revelations about the ownership of offshore shelf companies

by high-ranking politicians in the current administration sparked widespread outrage,

but has not resulted in the resignation of these officials.

If perhaps not a direct cause of corruption, this analysis suggests that clientelism

certainly constitutes an important explanation of the culture of impunity vis-à-vis

corrupt officials. By increasing people’s social and economic dependence on the

politicians in power, clientelism diminishes the ability and willingness of citizens to hold

politicians accountable. It might therefore be the case that people condone corruption as

long as it doesn’t affect their personal position, or actually improves their situation. As

one journalist expressed this sentiment:

The people don't care if the media say: listen we have a corrupt minister. You know, they would

tell you ‘’okay, fine, we have a corrupt minister, but we're fine, we’re happy.’’ And I think the

problem is that in Malta, we have not yet reached a situation where people can think freely.

In an extremely polarized environment in which neutral institutions are hard to find,

corruption scandals are likely to become just another flashing point of partisan

antagonism, especially if both parties have had their share of corruption scandals in the

past. Moreover, the smallness and interconnectedness of Maltese society may also stifle

people’s willingness to voice criticism of corrupt behavior, because of an awareness that

one might need connections sometime in the future (Mercieca, 2012, p. 126).

19

Conclusion: Towards a New Framework Linking Smallness and Clientelism

On the basis of an in-depth analysis of Maltese politics, his study has aimed to examine if

and how smallness informs clientelistic linkages. By pointing to effects of smallness such

as overlapping public and private roles, the constant direct contact between citizens and

politicians, increased opportunities for control and monitoring, and the increased value

of individual votes, the causal pathways from smallness to clientelism were exposed and

discussed. In addition to highlighting the link between smallness and clientelism, the

analysis has also connected clientelism to several other noteworthy features of Maltese

politics, among which high participation, polarization, executive dominance, and

corruption. In the end, the analysis portrays Malta as a very tribal political system, in

which two socio-political groups fiercely compete for control of a powerful state

apparatus. According to some scholars, competition and polarization are so strong that

they have impeded on the formation of a national Maltese identity (Baldacchino, 2002).

Yet despite its limitations, it should also be remarked that analogous to most other

(small) island nations, Malta has unquestionably remained democratic and politically

stable. Whereas polarization between parties (and the Church) have at several moments

brought the country on the brink of civil war, democratic institutions ultimately

survived. And as long as each party and its followers have a realistic chance to win back

the government, the system is likely to endure.

While idiosyncratic factors like population density and the STV system might

further enhance the likelihood of patron-client linkages in Malta, evidence from other

small island nations suggests that smallness has broadly similar effects in these cases. In

terms of population size, within Europe Cyprus and Iceland can be regarded as

comparable cases. In both countries, dense social networks, overlapping public and

private roles, and constant direct contact produce patron-client networks (Faustmann

2008; 2010, Kristinsson 2001). In addition, while perhaps less extreme than in Malta,

executive dominance and political polarization also characterize Cypriot and Icelandic

politics, with Baldur Thorhallsson for example finding that Iceland lacks the consensus

culture of other Nordic countries (2010). While more comparative research is needed to

study these similarities and differences in more detail, it certainly appears the case that

smallness, clientelism, and other features of the Maltese political model can also be

observed elsewhere.

20

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Appendix: List of Interview Respondents

Abela, Carmelo (16 November 2017, Valletta), Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Promotion for the Labour Party.

Attard, Rachel (14 November 2017, St. Julian’s), News Editor at The Independent, Daily

Newspaper.

Borg, Ian (6 November 2017, Floriana), Minister of Transport and Infrastructure for the

Labour Party.

Bugeja, Josef (3 November 2017, Valletta), Secretary General of the General Workers

Union, Malta’s largest trade union.

Bugeja, Ray (15 November 2017, Mriehel), Editor of the Times of Malta, Daily

Newspaper.

Busuttil, Simon (7 November 2017, Valletta), Former Leader of the Nationalist Party;

Member of Parliament; former Member of the European Parliament (MEP).

Camilleri, Carla (2 November 2017, Valletta), Assistant Director of the Aditus Foundation,

Human Rights Advocacy NGO.

Caruana, Justyne (22 November 2017, Rabat, Gozo), Minister of Gozo for the Labour

Party.

Cassola, Arnold (13 November 2017, Msida), Leader of the Alternattiva Demokratika

(AD), Associate Professor in Comparative Literature at the University of Malta.

Delia, Manuel (20 November 2017, Mqabba), Blogger about Maltese Politics.

De Marco, Mario (15 November 2017, Valletta), Member of Parliament for the

Nationalist Party; former Minister for Tourism, the Environment, and Culture.

Doublet, Nicholas (6 November 2017, Floriana), Diocesan Archivist and Historian at the

Catholic Church in Malta.

Falzon, Michael (14 November 2017, Valletta), Minister of Family and Children’s Rights

for the Labour Party.

Farrugia, Anglu (20 November 2017, Valletta), Speaker of the House of Representatives;

former Deputy Leader of the Labour Party.

Farrugia, Joseph (6 November 2017, Valletta), Director General of the Malta Employers’

Association.

Farrugia, Marlene (13 November 2017, Qrendi), Member of Parliament for the

Democratic Party; former Member of Parliament for the Labour Party and

Nationalist Party.

Farrugia, Michael (9 November 2017, Valletta), Minister of Home Affairs and National

Security for the Labour Party; former Minister for Family and Social Solidarity.

Gonzi, Lawrence (20 November 2017, Valletta), Former Prime Minister for the

Nationalist Party (2004-2013).

Mercieca, Ryan (22 November 2017, Rabat, Gozo), President of the Gozo Youth Council;

Candidate for the Nationalist Party.

Muscat, Joseph (21 November 2017, Valletta), Prime Minister of Malta for the Labour

Party; former Member of the European Parliament (MEP).

Pullicino Orlando, Jeffrey (9 November 2017, Kalkara), Executive Chairman of the Malta

Council for Science and Technology; former Member of Parliament for the

Nationalist Party.

24

Sant, Alfred (6 December 2017, Brussels, Belgium), Former Prime Minister for the

Labour Party (1996-1998), Member of the European Parliament (MEP).

Tabone, Anton (22 November 2017, Rabat., Gozo), Former Minister for Gozo for the

Nationalist Party; former Speaker of the House of Representatives.