STATE OF MAINE JOHN D. WILLIAMS HUMPHREY, J. [¶1] On …
Transcript of STATE OF MAINE JOHN D. WILLIAMS HUMPHREY, J. [¶1] On …
MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2020ME128Docket: Cum-19-399Argued September15,2020Decided: November3,2020Revised: December1,2020Panel: MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HUMPHREY,HORTON,andCONNORS,JJ.
STATEOFMAINE
v.
JOHND.WILLIAMSHUMPHREY,J.
[¶1] On an April night in 2018, a deputy sheriff attempted to arrest
JohnD.WilliamsondrugchargesoutsideahomeinNorridgewock.Earlythe
followingmorning, the deputy sheriff’s bodywas found on the lawn of that
home.Williamsnowappealsfromthejudgmentofconvictionenteredbythe
court (Cumberland County, Mullen, J.) after a jury found him guilty of
intentional or knowing murder of the deputy sheriff. See 17-A M.R.S.
§201(1)(A)(2020).Williamsraisesthreeissuesinthisappealchallengingthe
court’sadmissionofin-courtdemonstrationsofthepossiblecircumstancesof
theshooting,thecourt’spartialdenialofamotiontosuppressstatementshe
made to detectives after his arrest, and, finally, the court’s sentencing
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proceedingsandthelengthofthesentenceitimposed.Weaffirmthejudgment
andthesentence.
I.BACKGROUND
A. Facts
[¶2] Viewingtheevidence inthelightmostfavorabletotheState,the
juryrationallycouldhavefoundthefollowingfactsbeyondareasonabledoubt.
SeeStatev.Ouellette,2019ME75,¶11,208A.3d399.
[¶3]OnApril21,2018,SomersetCountyDeputySheriffCorporalEugene
ColeandanotherdeputystoppedWilliams’scarbecausetheysawthatitwas
being driven by his girlfriend, whose driving privileges they knew were
suspended.Williamswasapassengerinthevehicle.Williams’sgirlfriendwas
arrestedforoperatingavehiclewhileherlicensewassuspended.Thedeputies
determinedthatWilliamscouldnotdrivethevehiclefromthescenebecausehe
appeared tobeunder the influenceofdrugsand thevehicle’s insurancehad
lapsed.Williamsleftthescenewithafriendwhoarrivedtopickhimup.
[¶4]Arrangementsweremadeforthecartobetowedfromthescene.
When illegal drugswere found during a subsequent search of the vehicle, a
supervising officer authorized Corporal Cole and the other deputy to arrest
Williamsondrugcharges.
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[¶5]OnthenightofApril24,2018,Williamswasusingdrugsatafriend’s
housewhenheaskedanotherfriendtodrivehimtoahomeinNorridgewock
wherehehad lived foraperiodof timewhenhewasgrowingup. Williams
wanted to borrow the homeowner’s car to transport some of his guns to a
location in Old Town because he had to be in court in Massachusetts the
followingdayandhewantedtomakesurehisweaponsweresafe.Thefriend
agreedtodriveWilliamstoNorridgewock.
[¶6]WhileparkedatthehomeinNorridgewock,Williamsandhisfriend
sawCorporalCole’spolicetruckslowdownasitpassedthehouse.Williams
removedaduffelbagcontaininghisgunsfromthetrunkofhisfriend’scarand
placedthemnexttothevehicleheplannedtoborrow.Thefriendthenleft.
[¶7]Williamsclimbedthefrontstepsofthehomeandtriedtoenter,but
thedoorwaslocked. Atthatpoint,CorporalColeapproachedWilliamsfrom
behind and asked if he was John Williams. Once Williams confirmed his
identity,CorporalColetoldWilliamsthathewasunderarrestandattemptedto
grabhiswristtotakehimintocustody.Williamspulledawayanddrewa9mm
pistolfromhiswaistband.CorporalColesteppedbackandthenslippedandfell
onagrassyslope.WilliamsshotCorporalColeonceintherightsideoftheneck
atcloserange.
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[¶8]WilliamsfledinCorporalCole’spolicetruckanddrovetoanearby
Cumberland Farms store,where he stole a bottle ofwater, cigarettes, and a
lighter.Thestoreclerkcalled9-1-1,andthedispatchernotifiedanotherdeputy
torespondtothestore.
[¶9]AfterWilliamsleftthestore,hecalledafriendandtoldhimthathe
hadshotCorporalCole.WilliamsthenaskedhisfriendtomeethimonMartin
StreamRoad,whereWilliamshidthepolicetruckbehindahouse.Asthefriend
wasdrivingtomeetWilliams,hesawadeputysheriffatthenearbyCumberland
FarmsstoreandpulledovertotellhimthatthepersonwhoshotCorporalCole
wasonMartinStreamRoad.ThefriendthencontinuedontomeetWilliams.
[¶10] Whenthe friendarrived,Williamsasked ifhecouldusehiscar.
Thefriendrefused,andWilliamsaskedtoborrowhiscellphone,sayingthathe
wasgoingtogointothewoods,usethephonetomakeaconfession,andthen
killhimself.ThefriendletWilliamstakehisphoneandthendroppedhimoff
nearsometraintracksaboutahalf-mileawayonMartinStreamRoad.
[¶11]TheStatePoliceTacticalTeamwascalledintolocatebothCorporal
Cole and Williams. Based on the information that Williams’s friend had
provided, team members located Corporal Cole’s police truck. Law
enforcementalsosetupacommandpostatafirestationinNorridgewock.The
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firestationwasacrossthestreetfromthehousewhereCorporalColehadbeen
shot.
[¶12] In the morning hours of April 25, 2018, the owner of the
Norridgewockhousewentoutsideandsawabodyonherlawn.Shescreamed
andcalledforhelp,attractingtheattentionofofficersatthefirestation,who
cameoverandsawCorporalCole’sbody,withanapparentgunshotwoundto
theneck. MembersoftheStatePoliceEvidenceResponseTeamarrivedand
foundabulletandcasingonthelawnandabulletproofvest,shotgun,holster,
andabackpackcontainingammunitioninacarontheproperty.
[¶13] CorporalCole’sbodywas taken to theStateMedicalExaminer’s
Office. An autopsy concluded that the cause of death was a close-contact
gunshotwoundtotherightsideoftheneckbelowtheear“whichperforated
thecervicalspinalcord.”
[¶14]Meanwhile,amanhuntforWilliamswasunderway.OnApril28,
2018,officerscameuponaremotecampintheareaofBearMountainRoadand
setupaperimeter.TheofficersheardabangingnoiseandsawWilliamscome
outofthecampshirtless,carryingaclearplastictote,andwearingonlyapair
of long johns. Officers quickly surroundedWilliams. He was taken to the
groundandplacedunderarrest.
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[¶15]WhileplacinghandcuffsonWilliams,oneoftheofficerspunched
Williamsinthehead“twoorthreetimes”whenitappearedthathewasrefusing
tomovehisrighthand.1OneofficerpulleddownWilliams’slongjohnstomake
surehedidnothaveaguninhiswaistbandand,observingthatWilliamshad
defecated, removed the long johns. A photo was taken showing an officer
pullingWilliams’sheadupbyhishairwhilehewaslyingonhisstomach.The
officersthenreportedtothecommandpostthattheyhadWilliamsincustody.
[¶16]Afterapproximatelytwentyminutes,atacticalteamarrivedand
walkedWilliamsoutof thewoods.2 Williams remainednaked andbarefoot
whilewaitingforthetacticalteamtoarriveandformostoftheten-minutewalk,
buthewaswrappedinablanketbeforeexitingthewoods.TwoMajorCrimes
UnitdetectiveswhometWilliamsneartheedgeofthewoodssaidtheywould
liketospeakwithhim,andWilliamsagreed.Thedetectives—whohadnotbeen
involvedinthearrest—tookcustodyofWilliamsfromthearrestingofficersand
walkedhimtotheircruiser.
1Williamsmayhavebeenunabletophysicallycomplywiththeofficer’srequestbecauseanother
officerwasstandingonWilliams’srighthand.
2 While Williamswas being escorted out of the woods, Evidence Response Team memberssearchedthecampandfounda9mmRugerhandgun,amachinepistol,andammunition.Althoughtesting of the bullets recovered from the crime scene was inconclusive, the casing found nearCorporalCole’sbodymatchedtheRugerrecoveredfromthecabin.
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[¶17] The detectives drove Williams to the Waterville Police
Department.Hewasalertandresponsivetothedetective’squestionsabouthis
physicalcondition,reportingthatwhilehewasnotinjured,3hewascoldand
hungry,andhishandshurt.
[¶18]ThedetectivesbroughtWilliamstoaninterrogationroomatthe
policedepartment,wherehewasexaminedbyemergencymedicalpersonnel
andmedicallycleared.ThedetectivestheninterviewedWilliamsandgavehim
food,water,fruitpunch,andclothing.Thedetectivesbegantheinterviewby
readingWilliamshisMirandarightsandconfirmedthatheunderstoodthem.
Approximately nine minutes after waiving his Miranda rights, Williams
confessedtokillingCorporalCole.Later,approximatelyninetyminutesintothe
interview, Williams described and participated in a reenactment of the
shootingwiththedetectivesandotherofficers.
B. ProceduralHistory
[¶19] On April 25, 2018, Williams was charged by complaint with
intentionalorknowingmurder,17-AM.R.S.§201(1)(A),andwiththeconsent
of theparties, thecourtordered that thecasebe transferred fromSomerset
3Atonepointduringthedrivetothepolicedepartment,Williamsstated,“Theydidanumberon
me,”anapparentreferencetotheofficerswhoarrestedhimattheremotecampsite.
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County to Cumberland County on April 30, 2018. M.R.U. Crim. P. 21(b)(2).
Later, on June7, 2018, theCumberlandCountyGrand Juryhandeddownan
indictmentchargingWilliamswithintentionalorknowingmurder,17-AM.R.S.
§201(1)(A).Williamspleadednotguilty.
[¶20] OnAugust27,2018,Williamsmovedtosuppresshisconfession
and other statements to the detectives, including the reenactment of the
shooting,arguingthattheywerenotvoluntarilygivenbecausehewasfatigued,
hungry,sufferingfromdrugwithdrawal,andfearfulforhissafetybecausehe
hadbeen“beat[en]andpummeled”byofficersduringhisarrest.Thecourtheld
hearings on Williams’s motion to suppress on February 28, March 1, and
April8, 2019. The court granted the motion in part, suppressing only
(1)statements made by Williams later in the interview, (2) Williams’s
participation in the reenactment of the shooting at the police station, and
(3)thestatementsWilliamsmadeduringthatreenactmentandafterward.4
[¶21]Asix-dayjurytrialtookplaceinJune2019.Duringthetrial,the
courtallowedtheStatetointroduceexperttestimonyfromInvestigatorLarry
4Specifically,thecourtsuppressedthereenactmentandallstatementsmadeafterthe1:28:47
markofthevideoadmittedatthesuppressionhearingasState’sExhibit2,butdeniedthemotiontosuppressastoWilliams’sstatementsmadeuptothe1:28:46mark.State’sExhibit84,admittedattrial,istheportionofthevideothatwasnotsuppressed.
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MorrilloftheOfficeoftheStateFireMarshaldescribinghowtheshootingmay
haveoccurred.BasedonMorrill’stestimony,thecourtpermittedtheStateto
conduct a courtroom reenactment of the shooting. Before the reenactment
began, the court gave a limiting instruction to the jury stating that the
reenactmentonlyrepresents“theState’sversionoftheevents,”thatitshould
notbeseenas“anactualre-creationofthecrime,”andthatthejuryisfreeto
acceptorrejectit“inwholeorinpart.”
[¶22]Thejuryreturnedaverdictofguiltyonthesolecountofintentional
orknowingmurder.Thecourtimposedasentenceoflifeimprisonmentaftera
sentencing hearing and entered a judgment of conviction on September 12,
2019.
[¶23] Williams timely appealed from the judgment of conviction,
15M.R.S.§2115(2020);M.R.App.P.2B(b)(1),andalsoapplied for leave to
appeal his sentence, 15 M.R.S. §§ 2151, 2153 (2020); M.R. App. P. 20. The
SentenceReviewPanelgrantedWilliams’sapplicationfor leavetoappealhis
sentenceonNovember19,2019.Statev.Williams,No.SRP-19-398(Me.Sent.
Rev.PanelNov.19,2019);seealso15M.R.S.§2152(2020);M.R.App.P.20(g),
(h).
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II.DISCUSSION
A. In-CourtDemonstration
[¶24] Williams first argues that the court abused its discretion in
permittingtheStatetointroduceanin-courtphysicalreenactmentofhowthe
shootingmayhaveoccurredbasedonthetestimonyofInvestigatorMorrill.He
contends that Morrill was not qualified as an expert to give an opinion on
shooting reconstruction or bloodstain pattern analysis and that the opinion
itselfwasnotrelevant.SeeM.R.Evid.702,401.
1. ExpertOpinionandRelevance
[¶25]Wereview“acourt’sfoundationalfindingthatexperttestimonyis
sufficiently reliable for clear error” and its ultimate decision on the
admissibilityofexpertopiniontestimonyforanabuseofdiscretion. Statev.
Maine,2017ME25,¶16,155A.3d871(quotationmarksomitted).MaineRule
of Evidence 702 provides: “A witness who is qualified as an expert by
knowledge,skill,experience,training,oreducationmaytestifyintheformofan
opinionorotherwiseifsuchtestimonywillhelpthetrieroffacttounderstand
theevidenceortodetermineafactinissue.”TobeadmissibleunderRule702,
expert testimony must be relevant and must “assist the trier of fact in
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understandingtheevidenceordeterminingafactatissue.”Statev.Burbank,
2019ME37,¶8,204A.3d851(quotationmarksomitted).
[¶26] Expert testimony is relevant if the proponent, among other
requirements, “has presented a sufficient demonstration of reliability.” Id.
Commonindiciaofreliabilityinclude“whetheranexpert’sconclusionhasbeen
tailored to the facts of the case,” “whether any other experts attest to the
reliability of the testimony,” and “the nature of the expert’s qualifications.”
Maine,2017ME25,¶17,155A.3d871.
[¶27]InvestigatorMorrilltestifiedingreatdetailabouthisspecialized
training and experience in shooting reconstruction, trajectory analysis, and
bloodstain pattern analysis. He then testified as to his opinion of how the
shootingmayhaveoccurredandthoroughlyexplainedwhathedidatthescene
andthebasisforhisopinion.Hisconclusionsweredrawnfromthefactsofthis
case,andhisworkwaspeer-reviewedbylongstandingexpertsinthefield.See
id.Onthisrecord,weconcludethatthecourtdidnotclearlyerrinfindingthat
InvestigatorMorrill’squalificationsinshootingreconstructionweresufficient
forhimtotestifyonthematterandthathistestimonywassufficientlyreliable
andwouldbehelpfultothejury“tounderstandtheevidenceortodeterminea
factinissue.”M.R.Evid.702.Further,thecourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretionin
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admittingInvestigatorMorrill’stestimonyafterfindingitreliable.SeeMaine,
2017 ME 25, ¶¶ 16-17, 155 A.3d 871. Finally, there can be no doubt that
InvestigatorMorrill’sopinionwasrelevant.M.R.Evid.401.
2. UnfairSurprise
[¶28] Williams next argues that he was unfairly surprised, meaning
prejudiced,by the in-court reenactmentof the shootingbecausehewasnot
shown the actual demonstration until the voir dire of Investigator Morrill
duringtrial.SeeM.R.Evid.403.And,inlinewiththisargument,hecontends
that the trialcourtabused itsdiscretion indenyinghismotion foramistrial
basedonthatunfairsurprise.
[¶29] Wereviewatrialcourt’sadmissionofevidenceoveraRule403
objectionforanabuseofdiscretion.Statev.Michaud,2017ME170,¶8,168
A.3d802.Rule403providesthatevenrelevantevidencemaybeexcluded“if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair
prejudice,confusingtheissues,misleadingthejury,unduedelay,wastingtime,
orneedlesslypresentingcumulativeevidence.”M.R.Evid.403.
[¶30]In-courtdemonstrativeevidenceisespeciallypersuasive,andwe
have held that a trial court should “carefully” exercise its discretion before
allowing such evidence because it “may convey an impression of objective
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realitytothetrier[offact].”Statev.Philbrick,436A.2d844,859-60(Me.1981).
In Philbrick, we noted the dangers that demonstrative evidence, especially
evidencethatdoesnothaveaproperscientificfoundation,mayposetoajury:
Suchexperimentaldemonstrative evidence in the eyesof jurors,because of its asserted foundation in scientific principle ortechnique,carrie[s]suchaninherentobjectiveimpactthatitcouldundulyinfluencethejuryinitsfindingsoftheunderlyingnecessaryfacts at issue,without adequatebasic facts to sustain a scientificconclusion....
Id.at860.There,weconcludedthatthecourterroneouslyadmittedanalleged
expert’sdemonstrationoftheshootingbecauseithadnotbeenshownthatthe
demonstrationwas substantially similar to the actual eventsof the shooting
anditwasbasedonunreliablescientificmethods.Id.at859-60.
[¶31] Here, the court determined that the demonstration was not
unfairlyprejudicialanddidnotwaste timeorconfuse the issues. M.R.Evid.
403.Tothecontrary,thecourtreasonedthatInvestigatorMorrill’stestimony
andthedemonstrationhelpedclarifyandtietogetherthetestimonyofprevious
witnesses. Thecourtalso found thatunlike inPhilbrick, InvestigatorMorrill
wasqualifiedtopresenthisopinionandthereporthepreparedthatservedas
thebasisforthedemonstrationwasverifiableandscientificallyaccurate.
[¶32]Mostimportantly,beforeallowingthedemonstrationtoproceed,
thecourtinstructedthejurythatitrepresented“onlyare-creationoftheState’s
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versionoftheevents”that“shouldinnowaybeviewedasanactualre-creation
of the crime” and could “be accepted or rejected inwhole or in [p]art.” In
craftingthisinstruction,thecourtlookedtolanguagefoundinHarrisv.State,
13P.3d489,496(Okla.Crim.App.2000),which in turn, reliedona limiting
instructioncreatedinClarkv.Cantrell,529S.E.2d528,537(S.C.2000).
[¶33] We commend the court’suseof this language. With respect to
demonstrative or reenactment evidence, the court’s limiting instruction
addressed the major concern we expressed in Philbrick, namely that such
evidencetendstobehighlyprejudicialtoajuryby“convey[ing]animpression
of objective reality to the trier [of fact].” 436 A.2d at 859. The court’s
instruction alleviated this danger bymaking it clear that the demonstration
only represented theState’s versionof events and shouldnotbe seenas an
actualre-creationofthecrimeasitoccurred.Therefore,weconcludethatthe
trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the demonstration to be
presentedtothejuryoverWilliams’sRule403objection.
3. MotionforaMistrial
[¶34] Next,Williams contends—also based on his claim that he was
unfairly surprised by the State’s in-court demonstration because he had no
notice, until the fourth day of trial, that the State would be re-creating the
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shooting—that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a
mistrial.5 We review the denial of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of
discretion and “will overrule the denial of a mistrial only in the event of
exceptionally prejudicial circumstances or prosecutorial bad faith.” State v.
Logan,2014ME92,¶14,97A.3d121(quotationmarksomitted).“Amotion
foramistrialshouldbedeniedexceptintherarecircumstancethatthetrialis
unable to continue with a fair result and only a new trial will satisfy the
interestsofjustice.”Statev.Poblete,2010ME37,¶26,993A.2d1104(quoting
Statev.Bridges,2004ME102,¶11,854A.2d855).
[¶35]NotwithstandingWilliams’scontention,therecordindicatesthat,
althoughWilliamssawtheState’sphysicaldemonstrationoftheshootingfor
the first time on the fourth day of the trial, he had received a copy of
Investigator Morrill’s report approximately five months before trial. That
reportconcluded that therewere twopossiblescenariosorexplanations for
CorporalCole’spositioningatthetimehewasshot,whichwasconsistentwith
InvestigatorMorrill’stestimony6attrialandwiththedemonstrationitself.The
5 Williams’smotionforamistrialwaspromptedbyanovernightconversationthatWilliams’s
attorneyhadwithanexpertbetweenthefourthandfifthdaysoftrial.Duringthatconversation,theexpertpurportedlysaidthathebelievedthattheState’sdemonstrationwasinaccurate.Bythattime,WilliamshadbeeninpossessionofInvestigatorMorrill’sreportandconclusionsforfivemonths.
6 Inadditiontobeingconsistentwithhispretrial report, InvestigatorMorrill’stestimonywasconsistentwith,andtiedtogether,thealreadyoverwhelmingevidenceagainstWilliams,including
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recordalso suggests thatbefore trial, theStatehad informedWilliamsof its
intenttopresentanin-courtphysicaldemonstrationofInvestigatorMorrill’s
conclusionsregardingthepositionsoftheshooterandthevictim.
[¶36]Further,ifWilliamswantedtoofferexperttestimonytochallenge
the accuracy of the State’s demonstration, the State offered to join with
WilliamsinarequestthatthecourtholdtheevidenceopentoallowWilliams
to retain the expert with whom he had consulted after the State’s
demonstration. Williams declined this offer for strategic reasons, however,
becausealthoughWilliams’sexpertapparentlydisagreedwithportionsofthe
in-courtdemonstration,theexpertagreedwithmanyofInvestigatorMorrill’s
conclusions regarding the proximity of the gun to Corporal Cole’s neck and
CorporalCole’spositionontheground.
[¶37] In short, on this record, there is no evidence of “exceptionally
prejudicial circumstances or prosecutorial bad faith” that would provide
grounds foroverruling thecourt’sdenialofWilliams’smotion for amistrial.
Logan,2014ME92,¶14,97A.3d121(quotationmarksomitted). Although
Williamsdidnotseethephysicaldemonstrationoftheshootinguntilthefourth
thephysicalevidenceandWilliams’sownconfession.Itisthereforeunlikelythattheverdictwouldhavebeendifferentifthedemonstrationhadbeenexcluded.
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day of trial, the State had informed Williams of its intent to re-create the
shootingduringtrial,andthedemonstrationitselfcloselytrackedInvestigator
Morrill’stestimonyaswellashisreport.
[¶38] Under these circumstances, the State’s demonstration did not
undulyprejudiceWilliamsorpreventhimfromreceivingafairandjusttrial.
SeeBridges,2004ME102,¶10,854A.2d855(“Thecourt'sdeterminationof
whether exposure to potentially prejudicial extraneous evidence would
incurably taint the jury verdict or whether a curative instruction would
adequatelyprotect against considerationof thematter standsunless clearly
erroneous.”(quotationmarksomitted));seealsoStatev.Frisbee,2016ME83,
¶ 29, 140 A.3d 1230 (“Ultimately, the decision on whether to grant a
defendant'smotionforamistrialcomesbacktothecoreprinciplesoffairness
andjustice;therelevantquestionforthetrialcourtiswhetherthetrialcourtis
confidentthatthetrialcanproceedtoafairandjustverdictinthecontextof
theproceedingsbeforeit.”).Weconcludethatthetrialcourtdidnotabuseits
discretionindenyingWilliams’smotionforamistrial.
B. MotiontoSuppress
[¶39] The court concluded that all of Williams’s statements to the
interviewingdetectivesuptothe1:28:46markontheinterrogationvideowere
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voluntaryanddeniedthemotiontosuppresshisstatementsuptothatpoint.
The court granted the motion to suppress his statements made after the
1:28:46markalongwithWilliams’ssubsequentreenactmentoftheshooting.
[¶40]Williamscontendsthatallofhisstatementstothedetectiveswere
involuntary and should have been excluded. Williams’s voluntariness
argumentisintwoparts:First,hecontendsthatthecourt“completelyignored
and dodged [his] argument regarding his reasonable fear based on his
interactionswiththearrestandtransportteams.”Morespecifically,heargues
thathistreatmentbythearrestingofficerscausedhimtofearforhissafetyand
led him to believe that if he did not cooperate with police, including the
detectives,hewouldfacephysicalretaliation.Second,Williamscontendsthat
hisfatigue,hunger,anddrugwithdrawalaffectedhisabilitytoknowinglyand
voluntarilywaivehisrighttoremainsilentorprovidevoluntarystatements.
[¶41]“Wereviewthedenialofamotiontosuppressforclearerrorasto
factualissuesanddenovoastoissuesoflaw,andwillupholdthecourt’sdenial
ofamotiontosuppressifanyreasonableviewoftheevidencesupportsthetrial
court’sdecision.” Statev.Ormsby, 2013ME88,¶9,81A.3d336 (quotation
marksomitted).
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[¶42] “A confession is admissible in evidence only if it was given
voluntarily, and the State has the burden to prove voluntariness beyond a
reasonabledoubt.”Statev.Wiley,2013ME30,¶15,61A.3d750;seealsoState
v.Rees,2000ME55,¶6,748A.2d976.“Thevoluntarinessrequirementgives
effecttothreeoverlappingbutconceptuallydistinctvalues:(1)itdiscourages
objectionable police practices; (2) it protects the mental freedom of the
individual;and(3)itpreservesaqualityoffundamentalfairnessinthecriminal
justicesystem.”Wiley,2013ME30,¶16,61A.3d750(quotingStatev.Sawyer,
2001ME88,¶8,772A.2d1173).
[¶43]Avoluntaryconfessionisonethat“resultsfromthefreechoiceof
arationalmind,ifitisnotaproductofcoercivepoliceconduct,andifunderall
ofthecircumstancesitsadmissionwouldbefundamentallyfair.”Wiley,2013
ME30,¶16,61A.3d750(quotationmarksomitted).Indeterminingwhether
aconfessionisvoluntary,weexaminethetotalityofthecircumstances,which
includesbothexternalandinternalfactors,suchas
the details of the interrogation; duration of the interrogation;location of the interrogation; whether the interrogation wascustodial; the recitation of Miranda warnings; the number ofofficers involved; the persistence of the officers; police trickery;threats,promisesorinducementsmadetothedefendant;andthedefendant’s age, physical andmental health, emotional stability,andconduct.
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Statev.Sawyer,2001ME88,¶9,772A.2d1173;see,e.g.,Statev.Mikulewicz,
462A.2d497,501(Me.1983).
[¶44]Williamsfirstarguesthathisconfessionwasnotvoluntarybecause
theuseof forceby thearrestingofficerscausedhimtobe in “fearof further
beating”ifhedidnotcooperatewiththedetectiveswhentheyinterviewedhim.
ThecourtfoundthatWilliamshadbeenpunchedbyanarrestingofficer“ata
timewhenhewashandcuffedandofferingnosignificantresistance,”7andthat
he had been held down, naked, on the ground for approximately twenty
minutes before being escorted out of the woods.8 Nevertheless, the court,
informedbyLeonv.State,410So.2d201(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982),andLyonsv.
Oklahoma,322U.S.596(1944),determinedthattheeffectonWilliamsofthe
“initialimproprietybylawenforcement”inthewoodsdidnotrenderhislater
confessioninvoluntary.
[¶45]InLyons,policeobtainedaninitial,involuntaryconfessionfroma
defendantusingcoerciveinterrogationtechniquesbeforeobtainingasecond,
7AlthoughWilliamssuggeststhathedefecatedonhimselfbecauseofthepunchesinflictedonhim
duringhisarrest,hisownexpertwitnesstestifiedthatitwasnotplausiblethatfearandstresscausedhimtodefecate;rather,theexperttestified,itwasfarmorelikelythathedidsobecauseofopiatewithdrawalandgastrointestinalsymptoms.
8 The court also rejectedtheassertionbyanarrestingofficerthatpullingWilliams’sheadupbyhishairhadbeennecessarytoconfirmhisidentity.
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voluntaryconfessionfromthedefendantlaterintheday.322U.S.at598-601.
The Court stated that “[t]he question of whether those confessions
subsequentlygivenarethemselvesvoluntarydependsontheinferencesasto
thecontinuingeffectofthecoercivepracticeswhichmayfairlybedrawnfrom
thesurroundingcircumstances.”Id.at602.Despitetheinitialimpropriety,the
Courtaffirmedthevoluntarinessofthedefendant’ssecondconfession. Id.at
605. Inreaching thatconclusion, theCourtnoted that twelvehourselapsed
between the two confessions and that the second confession was given to
individualswhohadnot engaged in the initial, coercive interrogation. Id.at
604-05.
[¶46]Similarly,inLeon,theDistrictCourtofAppealofFloridaconcluded
that“underappropriatecircumstances,theeffectofaninitialimpropriety,even
acoerciveone,insecuringaconfessionmayberemovedbyinterveningevents,
with the result that a subsequent statement is rendered freeof the primary
taint and thus admissible into evidence as the expression of a free and
voluntaryact.”Leon,410So.2dat203(quotationmarksomitted).Underthe
Floridacourt’sreasoning,themostsignificantfactorinitsanalysiswaswhether
forcewasorwasnotinflictedinordertosecurethedefendant’sconfession.Id.
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[¶47] Here, the court found that the arresting officers’ treatment of
Williamswasnotforthepurposeofobtaininghisconfession.Seeid.(collecting
cases).Williamswasnotaskedanyquestionsaboutthecrimeduringhisarrest
andtransportoutofthewoods,theinterrogationitselfwasconductedbytwo
detectiveswhowerenotpresentinthewoodsduringthearrest,thearresting
officershadnofurtherinteractionwithWilliamsafterhewashandedofftothe
detectives, and they were not present during the interrogation, which took
placeattheWatervillePoliceDepartmentawayfromthesceneofthearrest.
Further,theinterrogatingdetectivesdidnotthreaten,makeanypromises,or
offeranyinducementstoWilliams,seeWiley,2013ME30,¶¶18-30,61A.3d
750,andtheygaveWilliamsMirandawarningsbeforequestioninghim.
[¶48]Thus,weconcludethatthetrialcourtdidnoterrindetermining
that under the totality of the circumstances, the inappropriate force used
duringWilliams’s arrestdidnot render involuntaryhis later confession and
otherstatementstothedetectives.SeeSawyer,2001ME88,¶9,772A.2d1173;
People v. Richardson, 917 N.E.2d 501, 516-17 (Ill. 2009) (stating that in
determining whether incidental use of physical force renders a confession
involuntary,“[c]ourtslooktofactorssuchasgapsintimebetweentheuseof
force and the confession, changed interrogators or location, and renewed
23
Mirandawarnings”);seealsoLyons,322U.S.at602-05;UnitedStatesv.Denton,
246F.3d784,786-88(6thCir.2001).ButseeUnitedStatesv.Jenkins,938F.2d
934, 939-40 (9th Cir. 1991);United States v. Gonzalez, 719 F. Supp. 2d 167,
181-83(D.Mass.2010).
[¶49] Turning toWilliams’s second contention regarding his physical
condition at the time of the interrogation, the court did not clearly err in
determiningthat,atleastuptothe1:28:46markonthevideo,Williams’sprior
druguseorwithdrawaldidnotactuallyimpairhisphysicalormentalcondition.
Weandothercourtshaveheld thataddiction to,useof,orwithdrawal from
drugs does not automatically render an otherwise voluntary confession
involuntary.SeeStatev.Ashe,425A.2d191,193-94(Me.1981);seealsoUnited
Statesv.Palmer,203F.3d55,61-62(1stCir.2000);Peoplev.Johnson,168Misc.
2d 81, 89 (N.Y. 1995). Rather, as we stated in Ashe, “[t]he particular
circumstances of each case must be evaluated to determine whether a
defendant’sdrug-relatedconditionmadehimincapableofactingvoluntarily,
knowinglyandintelligently.”425A.2dat194.
[¶50]Here,asthetrialcourtfound,Williams“appear[ed]toberational
andrespondedtoquestionswithappropriateanswers,”hedid“notdiscloseany
bizarre,psychotic,ordrug-inducedbehavior,”andhedidnot“exhibitanyfear
24
orresistancetospeaking.”LikethedefendantinAshe,Williams“appearedlucid
andrational,abletorespondcoherentlytoquestions,andabletoengageina
narrative account of the events in question” while being questioned by the
detectives.Seeid.Priortoquestioningatthepolicestation,Williamshadbeen
examined by emergency medical personnel who concluded that he was
“medicallyclear,”andWilliamsdeclinedtheiroffertobecheckedoutfurther.
[¶51] During the questioning, detectives provided Williams with a
blanket,clothing, food,water,and,atWilliams’sspecificrequest, fruitpunch,
because hewas cold, hungry, and thirsty. Cf. State v. Blank, 955 So. 2d 90,
106-08 (La. 2007); but seePeople v. Anderson, 364 N.E.2d 1318, 1321 (N.Y.
1977). Williams confessed early in the interview, and the unsuppressed
portionoftheinterviewwasnotparticularlylengthy,lastinglessthanninety
minutes.Cf.Berghuisv.Thompkins,560U.S.370,386-87(2010)(“Itistruethat
apparentlyhewas inastraight-backedchair for threehours,but there isno
authorityforthepropositionthataninterrogationofthislengthisinherently
coercive.”);Blank,955So.2dat105-06;Commonwealthv.Tucker,335A.2d704,
708 (Pa. 1975). The detectives treated Williams well and were calm and
respectful of him throughout the interview, which Williams himself
acknowledged.SeeBlank,955So.2dat106-08.
25
[¶52]Finally,upuntilthe1:28:46mark,whenherepeatedlyrequested
anap,Williamsdidnotasktostoptheinterviewatanypoint. Seeid.at107.
Williams did not tell the officers that he was tired or needed a nap until
approximately one hour and twenty-seven minutes into the interview. See
Statev.Timmendequas,737A.2d55,110(N.J.1999)(notingthatthe“defendant
neverindicatedtoofficersthathewastootiredorhungrytocontinue”). Up
until thatpoint,“therewasnoevidencethatauthoritiesexploitedanyslowly
mounting fatigue resulting fromprolonged questioning, or that such fatigue
occurred or played any role in defendant’s decision to confess.” People v.
Williams,233P.3d1000,1031(Cal.2010)(quotationmarksomitted).Butcf.
Spanov.NewYork,360U.S.315,321-24(1959)(concludingthatthesuspect’s
will was overborne by “slowly mounting fatigue” during an eight-hour
interrogation involving fifteen different questioners, during which the
questionerspersistedinthefaceofthesuspect’srefusaltoanswerontheadvice
ofhis attorneyand refusedhis requests to contacthis attorney). The court
correctly found, however, that after the one-hour-and-twenty-minute mark,
Williams’sfatigueandweaknessreachedapointwherehisstatementswereno
longervoluntary.SeeStatev.Kierstead,2015ME45,¶¶16-17,114A.3d984.
26
[¶53]Consideringthetotalityofthecircumstances,weconcludethatthe
trial court did not err in denying Williams’s motion to suppress as to his
confessionandotherstatementsmadeupuntilthe1:28:46markonthevideo.
Ormsby,2013ME88,¶29,81A.3d336;Sawyer,2001ME88,¶9,772A.2d
1173.
C. Sentencing
[¶54] Williams argues that “the sentencing courthadpre-determined
[his] sentence in this matter[] before the sentencing hearing” and that “the
[c]ourtdidnotconsideranyof[his]sentencingargumentsstronglymitigating
againstalifesentence,sincethe[c]ourthadclearlyalreadymadeitsdecision
beforethepartiesevenpresentedtheirarguments.”
[¶55] In sentencing a defendant after a conviction for murder, the
sentencingcourtemploysatwo-stepsentencingprocess.17-AM.R.S.§1602(2)
(2020). First, the court must “determine a basic term of imprisonment by
consideringtheparticularnatureandseriousnessoftheoffenseascommitted.”
17-AM.R.S.§1602(1)(A).Then,thecourtmust“determinethemaximumterm
of imprisonment tobe imposedby consideringall other relevant sentencing
27
factors, both aggravating and mitigating, appropriate to the case.” Id.
§1602(1)(B).
[¶56]We“reviewthecourt’sdeterminationofthebasicsentenceonthe
firststepoftheanalysisdenovoformisapplicationof law.” Statev.Holland,
2012 ME 2, ¶ 38, 34 A.3d 1130. We also review “the sentencing court’s
determination of the basic period of incarceration for misapplication of
sentencingprinciples”and“foranabuseofthecourt’ssentencingpower.”State
v.Nichols,2013ME71,¶13,72A.3d503.Themaximumsentencesetbythe
court isreviewedforanabuseofdiscretion. SeeStatev.Sweet,2000ME14,
¶15,745A.2d368.Finally,wereviewthesentenceimposedfor“disregardof
therelevantsentencingfactorsorabuseofthecourt’ssentencingpower.”State
v.Koehler,2012ME93,¶32,46A.3d1134.
[¶57]“Apersonconvictedofthecrimeofmurdermustbesentencedto
imprisonmentforlifeorforanytermsofyearsthatisnotlessthan25.”17-A
M.R.S.§1603(1)(2020).Themurderofalawenforcementofficerwhileinthe
performanceofhisorherdutiesisanaggravatingcircumstancethatmayjustify
theimpositionofa lifesentence. Statev.Shortsleeves,580A.2d145,149-50
(Me.1990).
28
[¶58] In determining the basic sentence at step one, the court was
mindful of itsduty to “consider theparticularnature and seriousnessof the
crime,”weighing“theconvictedperson’sconductagainstothermoreheinous
and less heinous possible ways of committing the crime.” The court also
articulatedthepurposesandgoalsofsentencingthatitconsideredappropriate
to the case. Finally, the court observed that the authorized range was
imprisonmentfortwenty-fiveyearstolife.Statev.Lord,2019ME82,¶25,208
A.3d781.Asforthenatureandseriousnessofthecrime,thecourtnotedthat
this was the murder of a police officer in the line of duty, an aggravating
circumstanceaccordingtoourprecedent,seeid.¶¶27-28,30,32;Shortsleeves,
580A.2dat149-50,andthatWilliamsdecidedto“eliminate”thedeputysheriff
andthenshotCorporalColeintheneckatcloserange.Afterlookingtothelaws
ofMaineandmanyotherjurisdictionstoaidinitsefforttoplacethiscrimein
contextand fashionabasicsentenceconsistentwith those imposed inother
jurisdictions,thecourtdeterminedthatthebasicsentenceshouldbesixty-five
years’imprisonment.9
[¶59]Thecourtthenproceededtosteptwoandconsideredaggravating
and mitigating factors to determine the maximum sentence. 17-A M.R.S.
9Williamsdoesnotarguethatthecourterredinsettingthebasicsentenceatsixty-fiveyears.
29
§1602(1)(B);Lord,2019ME82,¶¶31-32,208A.3d781.Thecourtconsidered
Williams’schildhoodupbringinganddrugabusebutdidnotfindthesetobe
significant mitigating factors. The court found that the aggravating factors
included theeffect onCorporalCole’s family and the community;Williams’s
criminal history; the need to protect the public;Williams’s “relative lack of
remorse”;andhisfailuretotakeresponsibilityandownershipforhisactions.
The court concluded that “the aggravating factors greatly outweigh any
mitigating factors”and“that the appropriatesentence in thiscaseshouldbe
andislifeinprison.”
[¶60]ContrarytoWilliams’scontention,nothingintherecordsuggests
that the court had pre-determined that Williams’s sentence would be life
imprisonment.Thecourtstatedthat“thequestionIhavegrappledwithsince
theverdictwaswhetheralifesentencewascalledforhere,”suggestingthatthe
courtdidnot imposea lifesentencelightlyandarrivedatthatsentenceonly
afterweighing the appropriate factors. AlthoughWilliams suggests that the
courtfailedto“listentoargumentsandstatementsfromwitnessesregarding
mitigatingcircumstances,”thecourtdid,infact,considertheinformationand
30
statements from Williams, his mother, and his aunt.10 There is simply no
supportintherecordforWilliams’scontentionthatthecourtdisregardedhis
argumentsinmitigation.11
[¶61]Thecourtobjectivelyconsideredandrationallyweighedallofthe
information and arguments and determined that in Williams’s case, the
aggravatingfactorsgreatlyoutweighedthoseinmitigation.SeeStatev.Basu,
2005ME74,¶24,875A.2d686(observingthatasentencingcourtisinabetter
positionforevaluatingtheoffender’scircumstancesandhaswidediscretionto
weighaggravatingandmitigatingfactors).Weconcludethatthecourtdidnot
abuseitsdiscretioninimposingasentenceoflifeimprisonment.12Sweet,2000
ME14, ¶ 15, 745A.2d 368 (stating that “the sentencing court is in a better
10 Thecourtstatedthatithadreviewedthesentencingmemorandaandstatementssubmitted
beforethehearingmorethanonce.
11Williamsappearstobelievethatthecourt’srejectionofhisargumentsinmitigationisthesameasfailingtoconsiderhisargumentsatall.
12 ThemostcloselyanalogousMainecasethatthecourtconsideredaspartofitsanalysiswasStatev.Burdick,2001ME143,¶¶1-2,6,782A.2d319,inwhichweupheldasentenceoffortyyears’imprisonmentforadefendantchargedwiththeattemptedmurderofapoliceofficer.Althoughtheforty-yearsentenceinBurdickissignificantlyshorterthanthelifesentenceimposedhere,Burdickwas fifty years old at the time of sentencing, rendering the forty-year sentence a “de facto lifesentence,”id.¶25,andalthoughheshotalawenforcementofficertwiceinthechestatcloserange,theofficerwaswearingabulletproofvestandsustainedonlyminorinjuries,id.¶6.Here,thevictimdiedastheresultofanactdescribedbythecourtasWilliams’sdecisionto“executeCorporalCole.”Takentogetherwithotheraggravating factors identifiedby thecourt, thecourtdidnotabuse itsdiscretioninimposingalifesentenceinsteadofasentenceforatermofyearsasinBurdick. SeeSweet,2000ME14,¶15,745A.2d368.
31
position to review aggravating andmitigating factors”); State v. Hewey, 622
A.2d1151,1155(Me.1993)(statingthatwe“accordgreaterdeferencetothe
weightandeffectgivenby thecourt to those factorspeculiar toaparticular
offender in its determination of the offender’s maximum period of
incarceration”).
Theentryis: Judgmentaffirmed. VerneE.Paradie,Jr.,Esq.(orally),Paradie&Rabasco,Lewiston,forappellantJohnD.WilliamsAaronM. Frey, AttorneyGeneral, andDonaldW.Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen.(orally),OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,Augusta,forappelleeStateofMaineCumberlandCountyUnifiedCriminalDocketdocketnumberCR-2018-2275FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY