State of Local Democracy in ARMM

Building local democracy and good governance, delivering services and

protecting diversity in a security challenged context: The case of the

Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

ABSTRACT

This paper presents the State of Local Democracy Assessment conducted by PCID and UP-NCPAG, including the methodologies employed in the assessment and initial results of secondary data gathering, focus group discussions, key informant interviews and surveys conducted in the five provinces of the ARMM. The second part of the paper shows the socio-economic situation of the ARMM and gives an overview of how issues of service delivery and democratic/social accountability matter in the life of the citizens.

The third part of the paper attempts to give an overview of how

local democracy and good governance is being developed in the ARMM, and how these two elements interact with local democracy and democratic accountability, service delivery, local development and good governance. The fourth part provides an analysis of how diversity and conflict are managed in the ARMM.

I. Introduction: The State of Local Democracy Assessment in ARMM

The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created on 1

August 1989 through the Republic Act No. 6734, otherwise known as the Organic Act, and later amended in 2001 by RA 9054. The ARMM is part of the political solution to the war of independence waged by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) against the Philippine government from the late 1960s. Today, the region is still the most conflict-affected in the country, with complicated issues of governance, security and severe underdevelopment. It has been called the cheating capital of the country due to widely reported anomalies during elections. Governance and the rule of law in the ARMM have been poor; and the region is the center of the Philippine governments anti-terrorism program. These factors have resulted in the regions stagnation as the least-served and poorest region in the country.

While a number of studies have focused on Philippine democracy, there

has been no comprehensive assessment of the state of democracy in the ARMM, especially from the perspective of the citizens of the region. The reform of regional governance has been the agenda of government, however citizens assessments have not formed part of the development of policy recommendations. Hence, it is important to study the ARMM as a separate case and to identify the grassroots perceptions through systematic processes.

To provide a systematic assessment of the state of democracy in the ARMM, the Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy (PCID) and University of the Philippines - National College of Public Administration and Governance (NCPAG), in partnership with the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), commenced a comprehensive State of Local Democracy (SoLD) Assessment using an assessment framework developed by the International IDEA. The study aims to come up with a citizen-led assessment that will provide a holistic view of the situation of local democracy in the ARMM. The assessment is designed to systematically stimulate reflection by insiders (ARMM Regional Government) and civil society actors from academia, grassroots, traditional leaders, womens and religious groups. This assessment used participatory approach and employed validation and feedback from the community. Any knowledge gaps were covered off by drawing on secondary sources and data from focus group discussions, key informant interviews, and a specifically designed survey to capture the opinions of the most marginalized citizens of ARMM.

II. ARMM Situation Report: Results of the State of Local Democracy Assessment

A. Conflict and Poverty

The granting of autonomy has given the ARMM regional government (ARG)

some leeway to manage its own internal affairs, and some power and authority to administer initiatives in the interests of the people. However, the ARMM is the poorest and least-served region with the lowest human development indicators.

In the poverty index report by National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB)

for 2003, 2006, the ARMM was the poorest region in the country, posting higher poverty incidence than the nationals poverty index (Table 1). However, in 2009, ARMM was classified as the second poorest region, a category that is contested by some ARMM leaders. The ARMM is the most conflict affected and least served region in the country. It has the highest birthrate in the nation.

Table 1. Poverty Incidence Among Families1

Region 2003 2006 2009

Philippines 20 21.1 20.9

Caraga 37.6 36.9 39.8

ARMM 25 36.5 38.1

Region IX 40.5 34.2 36.6

Region V 38 36.1 36

Region VIII 30.2 31.1 33.2

Region X 32.4 32.7 32.8

Region VIII 32.1 33.5 30.2

Region XII 27.2 27.1 28.1

Region IV-B 29.8 34.3 27.6

Region XII 25.4 26.2 25.6

Region VIII 23.5 22.1 23.8

Region I 17.8 20.4 17.8

CAR 16.1 18.6 17.1

Region II 15.2 15.5 14.5

Region III 9.4 12 12

Region IV-A 9.2 9.4 10.3

NCR 2.1 3.4 2.6

The oppressive poverty in the ARMM is supported by the SoLD survey which showed that 47 per cent or almost half of the respondents perceived

1 Source: National Statistical Coordination Board

themselves to be poor based on their total monthly household income and daily consumption to meet basic human needs of shelter, food, and health. (Table 2)

Table 2. Poverty Perception Based on Income2

While the ARMMs economy is growing at a slower pace, the ARMM posted the

highest population growth rate from 2000-07 at 5.46 per cent, at least twice the rate of other regions in Mindanao (Table 3). (Note that in 2007, the ARMM registered a population of 4.1 million, however a revalidation was conducted by National Statistics Office in 2010 which reduced this figure to 3.2 million)

Table 3. Average Annual Growth Rate in Population (in percent)3

Census Years 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2007

Area 1980-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2007

Philippines 2.35 2.32 2.36 2.04

National Capital Region 2.98 3.3 1.06 2.11

Cordillera Administrative Region 2.28 1.71 1.83 1.5

Western Mindanao 2.23 2.42 2.12 1.83

Northern Mindanao 2.22 2.32 1.99 1.67

Southern Mindanao 3.04 2.72 2.41 1.71

Central Mindanao 3.32 2.66 2.69 2.41

ARMM 1/ 3.06 1.8 3.73 5.46

Caraga 2/ 2.55 1.82 1.63 1.25

1/ Created into a region under EO No. 429

2/ Created into a region under RA No. 7901 dated February 23, 1995, taken from Region 10 and Region 11.

2 SoLD Survey conducted by PCID, 2012

3 Source: National Statistics Office (NSO)

Pe

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ge

75%

50%

40%

30%

20%

On the other hand, it can be observed that even after the signing of the 1996 Final

Peace Agreement (FPA) between the Government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)4 an agreement that was supposed to jumpstart peace and development in Muslim Mindanao ARMM provinces have consistently been ranked in the bottom ten provinces in terms of the human development index (HDI) from 1997-2006 (Table 4).

Table 4. Human Development Index, by Rank, by Province5

1997 2000 2003 2006

Province HDI Province HDI Province HDI Province HDI

Sulu 0.34 Sulu 0.35 Sulu 0.31 Sulu 0.33

Lanao Sur 0.42 Tawi-Tawi 0.39 Maguindanao 0.36 Tawi-Tawi 0.33

Maguindanao 0.42 Basilan 0.43 Tawi-Tawi 0.36 Maguindanao 0.43

Tawi-Tawi 0.43 Maguindanao 0.46 Basilan 0.41 Basilan 0.43

Basilan 0.44 Lanao Sur 0.46 Masbate 0.44 Lanao Sur 0.45

Ifugao 0.45 Ifugao 0.46 Zambo Norte 0.45 Masbate 0.46

Lanao Norte 0.47 Agusan Sur 0.48 Sarangani 0.45 Sarangani 0.48

Agusan Sur 0.48 Samar 0.51 W. Samar 0.47 E. Samar 0.48

Samar 0.49 Lanao Norte 0.51 E. Samar 0.47 Zambo Norte 0.49

Saranggani 0.49 Sarangani 0.52 Lanao Sur 0.48 Romblon 0.49

The region is also beset by unstable peace and order and frequent outbreaks of

conflict, displacing around 985,412 persons in 2000-01 alone (Mindanao 2020: A Peace and Development Framework Plan for Mindanao, 2011, Per Institute for Autonomy and Governance).One of the major armed conflicts between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) occurred in 2008. Therefore, it can be seen in the data of the Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan for 2011, from 2008-10 more than 700,000 cases of internal displacement were reported.

Aside from the MILF, MNLF and MNLF break-away groups, there are other lines

of conflict that lead to violence such as the terrorism led by the Abu Sayyaf Group and clan feuds or the so-called rido (Mindanao 2020: A Peace and Development Framework Plan for Mindanao, 2011).

Despite the abovementioned negative indicators, the ARMM is a winner in terms

of agricultural resources. Predominantly agriculture, more than 58.4 per cent of the regions Regional Gross Domestic Product (GRDP) comes from the agriculture, fishery and forestry with an average of 8.1 per cent growth rate (2006-2007). More than 60 per cent of the countrys agri-products came from Mindanao. The ARMM contributes: 11.46 per cent in corn production; 11.43 per cent in coffee production, 8.09 per cent in coconut production; and 3.57 per cent in palay (unmilled rice) production.

4 See Annex B: Capsule History of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement

5Source: Philippine Human Development Report

Seaweed is mainly cultured in Mindanao, accounting for 56.33 per cent of national output between 2003-08, growing at a rate of 12.18 per cent in the same period. It is equally important to note that the ARMM accounts for 70 per cent of the national production, the highest among the six regions in ARMM.

Mindanao also accounts for 43 per cent of national fish production the highest

among the three island groups, with Luzon contributing 40 per cent and Visayas some 17 percent. The ARMM accounts for 30.54 per cent of national aquaculture production.

Since the ARMM has rich natural resources, why is economic activity stunted

and poverty endemic?

B. Service Delivery and Democratic/Social Accountability

Education

The ARMM shows the worst education statistics. For instance, the functional

literacy rate in the ARMM has always ranked the lowest of the six regions in Mindanao

between 2003-086.

Table 5. Functional Literacy in the Philippines and Mindanao, by Region

2003-08

Region Year

2003 2008

Philippines 84.1 86.5

Region IX 74.8 79.6

Region X 83.7 86.0

Region XI 77.8 81.8

Region XII 77.1 78.4

CAR 85.4 89.2

Caraga 81 85.8

ARMM 62.9 71.6

Health

While the ARMMs population is increasing, the delivery of basic social services is

doing so at a very slow pace. Based on Table 6, from 2000-05, only 5 barangay health

stations (BHS) were added to the ARMM as compared to 808 new BHS for Caraga.

6 Source: National Statistics Office (NSO), 2008 Functional Literacy, Education and Mass Media Survey

Table 6. Number of Barangay Health Stations in Mindanao, 2000 and 20057

Area 2000 2005 No. of brgys

Mindanao 3,732 4,913 10,050

Region IX 720 674 1,904

Region X 711 940 2,020

Region XI 649 656 1,160

Region XII 758 936 1,194

Caraga 500 1, 308 1,310

ARMM 394 399 2,462

In the specifically developed survey, 71.2 per cent of the 4,000 respondents said

that there are no private clinics operating in their area while 26 per cent responded that

there is no public health clinic operating in their area (Table 7 and Table 8). 66 per cent

however noted that there was one private health clinic in their area.

Table 7. Private Health Center in the Community8

7 Source: Department of Health-BHFS, 2009 List of Hospitals and Other Facilities 8 SoLD Survey conducted by PCID

No. of Private Clinic

No. of respondents

Per centage

0 2846 71.2

1 643 16.1

2 222 5.6

3 69 1.7

4 36 .9

5 11 .3

6 26 .7

7 58 1.5

8 1 .0

10 5 .1

20 1 .0

Missing Values 82 2.1

TOTAL 4000 100.0

Table 8. Public Health Centres in the Community9

Utilities

In terms of other basic services like electricity (Table 9) and water (Table 10), the

ARMM again lags behind other regions in the country.

Table 9. Proportion of the Population with Access to Electricity, by Region, 1994-200610

Region Percentage of Population

1994 1997 2000 2003 2006

Philippines 66.4 70.7 75.9 77.0 82.0

NCR 98.6 99.6 99.3 99.3 97.7

Region IX - Zamboanga Peninsula 48.4 48.8 53.0 56.1 65.9

Region X - Northern Mindanao 59.6 64.5 69.9 68.0 76.2

Region XI - Davao 53.0 64.8 72.8 68.6 75.8

Region XII - SOCCSKSARGEN 50.9 61.3 66.2 64.6 69.2

Caraga 54.0 57.7 66.0 65.6 79.7

ARMM 25.2 35.4 39.7 36.7 49.9

9 SoLD Survey conducted by PCID

10 Source: Family Income and Expenditure Survey, National Statistics Office

No. of Public Health Centres

No. of respondents

Percentage

0 1035 25.9

1 2646 66.2

2 253 6.3

3 35 .9

4 6 .2

5 2 .0

7 1 .0

8 1 .0

10 2 .1

Missing Values 19 .5

TOTAL 4000 100.0

Table 10. Proportion of the Population with Access to Potable Water, by Region, 1994-200611

Region Percentage of Population

1994 1997 2000 2003 2006

Philippines 77.5 76.7 78.7 79.1 80.6

NCR 90.1 87.5 84.9 84.6 89.1

Region IX - Zamboanga Peninsula 58.8 61.3 62.5 62.3 65.5

Region X - Northern Mindanao 69.1 74 78.2 79 81.9

Region XI - Davao 69.8 70.6 70.6 73.8 80.1

Region XII - SOCCSKSARGEN 78.7 77.3 79.3 78 80.5

Caraga 76.2 78 80.8 78.9 83.1

ARMM 30.3 33.8 34.1 41.7 35.1

C. Problems of Autonomy:

The passage of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) was a milestone in furthering the objectives of decentralization in the Philippines, when certain powers, functions and resources were devolved to local government units (LGUs) to support their greater responsibilities to deliver public services to their constituents, . The Code has become a yardstick of LGUs performance. However, since its passage, there have been concerns that the objectives of local autonomy, through the devolution of functions to LGUs, have been achieved only partially. If this is true for the nation as a whole, it is even more marked in the ARMM.

Political decentralization goes hand in hand with fiscal decentralization. There

can be no meaningful decentralization if the central government retains direct supervision and control over the disbursement of public funds. Hence a meaningful decentralization project should not only deepen political accountability but foster efficiency in the delivery of public service. Effective decentralization also allows for the diffusing of social and political tension and ensuring local and political economy (Panadero, 2006, 37 cited in Revisiting Decentralization published by KAS, LOGODEF and GTZ). This process transforms the political project of decentralization into a conflict resolution tool that can be utilized to not only provide social services, but also to lay the foundation of long term peace.

In the Philippines, the principle of fiscal decentralization a major pillar of the

devolution from the central to the local governments - is imbedded in the 1987 Constitution. Under Article X, sections 5, 6 and 7 of the 1987 Constitution: Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments. In addition, Section 6

11

Source: Family Income and Expenditure Survey, National Statistics Office

provides that Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. Furthermore, Section 7 stipulates that Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner provided by law, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits12.

For the ARMM, the devolution of powers combined with the powers granted

under the Organic Act creating the autonomous regional government, should have resulted in effective autonomy. The ARMM theoretically speaking has a wide scope in legislating for the needs of its people. Besides having the local government code, the ARMM is supported by its own organic code that provides a wide range of powers, making the ARMM a unique example of regional government in the Philippines because no other local government units have such extensive powers. These unique powers range from taxation, education, environmental protection, economic development, natural resource management, human rights and the delivery of justice. All of these powers aim to bring the benefits of governance to the population of the ARMM.

Autonomy was promised by the 1996 Final Peace Agreement to be implemented

by the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) government. The major provisions, intended to strengthen autonomy of the Bangsamoro, included the following13:

Establishment of the Regional Economic and Development Planning Board to be chaired by the ARMM Governor. It stipulated that the Board shall prepare the economic development plans and programs for the Autonomous Government.

Provide broad powers to the ARMM Government pertaining to economic, financial, business, and commercial matters.

Devolution of development related offices/agencies under the ARMM, allowing for further devolution pursuant to ARMM Regional Assembly legislation.

Relative to natural resources, the MNLF and the GRP, with the positive contribution of the technical experts of the OIC, will mutually agree on the definition of strategic mines and minerals at a later date.

Creation of an integrated system of education that promotes Filipino and Islamic values. The Regional Autonomous Government is charged with managing the entire educational system in the ARMM in line with existing laws and national policies. The Regional Autonomous Government supervises the Madaris (Islamic colleges). Religious instruction in public schools is optional.

Establishment of a Shariah court system for Muslims. Creation of the GRP-MNLF-OIC Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) to monitor

the implementation of Phase I. of the peace agreement. Unfortunately, 15 years after the signing of that historic document, the Muslim

communities are still the poorest of the poor and conflict-affected. Former ARMM Regional Governor Parouk Hussin, a leader of the MNLF, has

stated that the people of Mindanao are involved in a different kind of struggle: fighting

12

Source: Article X, Section 5,6, and 7, Local Government of the 1987 Constitution. 13

Source: 1996 GP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement

unjust political structures which prevented the Muslim and ethnic communities from participating equally in the governments democratic processes14.

The 1996 peace accord provided for genuine and meaningful autonomy for the

Moro nations of Mindanao. However, there have been strong disagreements between the government and the MNLF on the status of implementation of the FPA. Both sides have accused the other of not playing its part in the meaningful implementation of the agreement.

Autonomy must be accompanied by commensurate powers and funding to allow

for effective governance. Central to the controversy is the issue of funding. With genuine autonomy must come fiscal autonomy. Although the peace agreement provided for the ARMM to have control over economic and fiscal systems, RA 9054 (the amended Organic Act for ARMM) has taken away from the ARMM the right to self-determination in the use of its own natural resources, a valuable component in the quest for fiscal autonomy.

Fiscal Resources. An analysis of the comparative share of government

expenditure by region shows that the ARMM has not been given the funds promised under the 1996 FPA. The table below compares all Mindanao regions and the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR)15.

Table 10: Comparative Regional Share in Government's Expenditure (in %) Mindanao and CAR Regions16

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2004 2005

IX 4.55 4.42 4.96 4.48 4.68 4.73 4.71 4.74 4.32

X 6.19 6.13 4.35 4.06 4.19 4.19 4.05 4.64 4.95

XI 6.38 5.89 6.58 6.42 6.95 6.25 6.35 5.09 4.58

XII 3.60 3.66 3.54 3.38 3.91 3.79 4.02 4.61 4.32

CARAGA 0.00 0.13 2.58 3.27 3.28 4.18 3.98 3.44 4.24

CAR 2.97 3.22 3.40 3.27 3.30 3.83 3.21 3.16 3.10

ARMM 3.54% 3.08% 3.33% 3.49% 3.16% 4.02% 3.13% 3.32% 4.13%

It is important to note that the Caraga Region, created in 1997, overtook ARMM

in terms of allocation by fiscal year 2000. Caraga was not the subject of a peace agreement; neither was it conflict-affected. Yet, it received more government funding than the ARMM.

Since the ARMM has been devastated by decades of armed conflict, one could

have expected a significant increase in funding for the rehabilitation of conflict areas and pump-priming activities necessary to spur growth. Instead, its share of government expenditure is not as significant as the other regions of Mindanao.

14

Source: Broken Peace by Amina Rasul, BusinessWorld, 2011 15

CAR is the Cordillera Administrative Region is cited here because it is the other region which has a majority population of indigenous peoples, although Christianized 16

Source: Congressional Planning and Budget Department, House of Representatives

In terms of government expenditure per capita, the ARMM does not get an allocation commensurate to its needs. Again, given the development imperatives attendant with conflict-ridden areas, one would expect a massive infusion of funds to jump-start growth. Government has not been successful in providing for the needs of the conflict-affected communities. Funding, management and absorptive capacity of local governments, the peace and order situation, and corruption affect the delivery of public services issues that have appeared in the SoLD focus group discussions, the key informant interviews and the survey.

Corruption and mismanagement of resources has hounded governance in the

ARMM for decades. In a Special Audit conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) from 1 February to 20 December 2010, the Special Audit Team unearthed several anomalies by the Ampatuan administration in 2008-09:

P2.559 billion of regional funds were misallocated; P1.3334 million expenses

were un-liquidated; transactions amounting to P741.002 million were considered fictitious, supported by spurious receipts and invoices, among other irregularities.

This observation was widely noted by the respondents during focus group

discussions. Respondents were unanimous in their observation that there is no access to public information or public documents. Hence, graft and corruption is widespread in the region. Government mechanisms which are supposed to curb graft and corruption are perceived to be ineffective in the region, with local government executives treating government funds as personal funds.

At the local level, reports of moving barangay halls or municipal halls were

common: a newly elected barangay captain or municipal mayor orders the construction of new office, often as part of his house. When his term ends, the barangay hall becomes his property. The same thing happens with LGU documents and office supplies or equipment when the term of the incumbent ends, the officials and his or her staff take with them official documents and the office equipment.

Thus, unfortunately, the ARMM remains tied to the central government. First, the

Organic Act has created a middle layer of governance but has not efficiently established the relationships between the regional government, local government and the national government.

Clearly, the 1996 Final Peace Agreement has not been fully implemented. The

MNLF and government panels have been discussing amendments to Republic Act 9054 to address the many flaws which have impeded the implementation of full autonomy.

Finally, there is an unstable peace and order situation in the region and access to

justice is very weak. Generally, focus goup discussions and key informant interview respondents shared a negative perception of the access to justice in the region. Most have experienced or observed cases of violence, fraud and corruption, and most, therefore, have a general distrust of the justice system. Some of the respondents even said that traditional leaders are more important in resolving disputes, especially those that involve rido (family of clan disputes).

III. How is Local Democracy and Good Governance being Developed and Practiced in the ARMM?

Given the above situation, how is local democracy and good governance being developed and practiced in the ARMM?

Most respondents have a general understanding of what democracy is. However,

some focus group participants would jokingly (using a pun) define democracy as being government OFF the people, BUY the people, POOR the people. Though participants believe that democracy is a process by which people have a voice in decision-making through their elected representatives, some think that this does not happen in reality. Some participants view democracy as a privilege only for the influential few, and say that participatory democracy only happens during election times because leaders are only visible during these periods. During the Lanao del Sur focus group discussion, municipal and barangay participants were unable to define democracy; but instead gave their definition of what democracy is not? and what democracy should be. Meanwhile, Lanao del Sur provincial focus group participants jokingly said there is no democracy but what exists instead in their community is DEMO-CRAZY.

When asked for concrete explanation of how democracy is directly experienced

by them, their responses were varied. According to some respondents, democracy only gives politicians impunity to pursue corrupt practices rather than providing the opportunity to serve their constituents: democracy gave them freedom to do evil.

Meanwhile, some provincial stakeholders, especially those who live near the

capitals, said that democracy is widely practiced in their community. They considered participation in government processes and the accessibility of provincial leaders to be manifestations of democracy in their area. The analysis of SoLD Project Team is that because provincial governments are usually located in town centers where services are readily available and accessible, officials tend to be more careful of their actions and services.

On the other hand, participants coming from the barangays and municipalities

shared negative observations about the practice of democracy in their area because most of their local leaders are not visible in their community. During the Sulu focus group discussion, one participant expressed his observation that leaders do not consult due to a wait and see attitude (i.e. the only time leaders conduct consultation is if the people demand it) or they would only consult the citizens if the need arises.

Meanwhile, one of the key informants also argued that "Poverty can cause

democracy not to work properly because poor people are more vulnerable to influences by politicians and susceptible to sell their votes to the highest bidder. Poor people rarely participate in decision making because they are less educated and ill informed about what's happening in their particular area."

For survey respondents, 36.7 per cent percent said that they somewhat agree

that democracy is being promoted in the ARMM (Table 12) and 38.2 per cent said that they somewhat agree that democracy is being practiced in the region (Table 13).

Table 12. Perception of Survey Respondents on the Promotion of Democracy in ARMM17

Table 13. Perception of Survey Respondents on the Practice of Democracy in ARMM18

When participants were asked about the relationship between Islam and

democracy in their communities, more than 50 per cent of the respondents said that they

17

SoLD Survey conducted by PCID 18

SoLD Survey conducted by PCID

Pe

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nta

ge

50%

40%

25%

10%

40%

25%

10%

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tage

strongly agree and somewhat agree that Islam and Democracy are compatible (Table 14).

However, differences in responses are revealed in the focus group discussions

and key informant interviews. Participants who had the benefit of a secular education and who later acquired higher Islamic education said that there is no conflict between Islam and democracy. According to them, some manifestations of democracy are also present in Islamic values and are deeply rooted in the Islamic principles of shura (consultation) and ijma (consensus). On the other hand, conservative Muslim religious leaders argue that Islam and democracy are incompatible. According to these groups, in Islam, the law is divinely sourced; hence, the revelation from the Holy Quran and the divine teachings of Prophet Muhammad (SAW); whereas in western democracy, the law is legislated. They also argued that under democracy, sovereignty resides in the people, while in Islam, God (and not the people) is sovereign.

Table 15. Perception of Survey Respondents on the Compatibility of Islam and

Democracy19

The participants were then specifically asked if the ARMM government

encourages citizens participation in the planning and implementation of policies in their communities. The majority gave a negative response. However the response varies depending on the location and role of the respondents. For those belonging to the government or an active CSO member agreed that there is a certain level of participation promoted by the regional government. This view especially applied to CSO leaders who are part of the coalition supporting the incumbent. For some of the respondents, CSO leaders who are critical of the current local government leaders in the ARMM believe that participation is only for those associated with government. Those participants coming from the municipalities and barangays considered that participation is only minimal. That is, either participation barely happens once a year or, even worse, only during the election campaign when people are asked for opinions on issues. After election is held the process of participation is over.

In a similar vein, local government was seen to encourage participation for their

supporters only and for documentation purposes. The process is only meant to legitimize decision-making and to make it appear that participatory democracy is practiced in the community. More often than not, participation is merely pro-forma.

19


Response Frequency Percent Strongly Agree 1174 29.4

Somewhat Agree 1171 29.3

Undecided whether Agree or Disagree

780 19.5

Disagree 520 13

Strongly Disagree 344 8.6


Total 4000 100.0

The response to this question supports the overall view that both representative

and participatory democracy is weak in the ARMM. All the respondents reported an observation of vote buying or electoral fraud at all levels--provincial, municipal and barangay level. SoLD survey shows that 51.5 per cent of the 4,000 respondents witnessed vote-buying (Table 16) and 37.1 per cent said that during elections politicians use flying-voters (Table 17).

Table 16. Percentage of Survey Respondents Who Witnessed Vote-Buying20

Table 17. Percentage of Survey Respondents Who Witnessed Flying Voters21

20



Pe

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ge

75%

50%

30%

20%

10%

Pe

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tage

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

Survey respondents were also asked if they ever reported the above instances in elections to the authorities. 40 per cent said they did not report the incidents they had witnessed (Table 18). There is also a general perception that the COMELEC lacks the power to stop electoral fraud like vote buying, intimidation, voters list padding and ensuring adequate voting materials.

Table 18. Percentage of Survey Respondents who Reported Elected-related

Incidents in ARMM22

Don't Know, 10%Refused, 9%

Did Not Witness,

34%

Reported, 6.6%

Did Not Report,

40%

Some even argued that the best way for the ARMM to function properly is to do

away with elections. Some common people viewed this as a peaceful way of selecting leaders for ARMM though experts saw the appointment of caretakers in the ARMM as a form of suppression of right to suffrage. Respondents generally agreed that ARMM elections have only brought violence and fraud in their communities. Some indicated that initially people participate religiously in the election process and are prepared to tolerate a level of electoral fraud; but as time passes by, these people end up engaging themselves in corrupting the electoral process.

When asked their opinion if those declared winners in the recent elections were

actually those for whom the people voted, more than half of the survey respondents responded in the affirmative (Table 19). For some focus group respondents, the act of voting during elections have been regarded as a mere formality because winners are pre-selected. They would say, If you dont vote, somebody will vote for you

22


Table 19. Percentage of Survey Respondents who believed that those who were proclaimed were the ones whom the people voted for23

This contradictory response can be analyzed from two perspectives. First: that

voters accepted the results because they sold their votes, hence justifying the unwritten rule that when you sell your vote the results must be accepted. (This observation came from the responses of some of the focus group and key informant interview participants.) Second, because of the extreme popularity of the current president, nobody disputed the results unlike the experiences of the past ten years when the previous administration which was perceived to be corrupt.

In general, compared to previous (manual) elections, the recent election

(computerized) is free and fair. Table 20 shows that 60.1 per cent of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi (BaSulTa) respondents say that the recent elections in the last three years in their communities have been free and fair, while almost 50 per cent of the respondents from Central Mindanao (Lanao del Sur, Marawi City and Maguindanao or LaMarMa) responded that the 2010 computerized election was free and fair (Table 20).

Table 20. Perception of Survey Respondents on the Fairness and Freeness of the 2010

Election24

Can you say that the recent elections in your community

have been free and fair?

AREA Yes No Dont Know

BaSulTa Islands 1437 541 415

Percentage 60.1% 22.6% 17.3%

LaMarMa (Central Mindanao)

748 490 281

23



Response Frequency Percent Yes 2330 58.3

No 818 20.5

Dont Know 842 21.1


Total 4000 100.0

Percentage 49.2% 32.3% 18.5%

On the one hand, elections may be perceived to be highly prone to cheating and

violence On the other hand a positive side to this exercise is the acceptance of women in politics. Table 21 shows that there is an increase in the number of female candidates and elected officials in 2010 election. There is a general acceptance of womens participation in the political process both as voters and elected public officials. There was no reported violence or discrimination against women who voted or ran for public office.

Table 21. Number of Candidates and Elected Candidates, by Gender

(during the 2004, 2007, and 2010 National and Local Elections25

Region/Province

Number of Candidates Number of Elected Candidates

2004 2007 2010 2004 2007

2010

Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female

ARMM 4,554 591 3,501 360 3,774 551 859 117 794 116 949 162

Basilan 394 28 411 547 64 64 8 111 12 117 16

Lanao del Sur

2,066 283 1,480 187 1,369 185 290 38 295 40 254 41

Maguindanao 627 77 311 35 887 129 250 23 40 3 325 51

Shariff Kabunsuan

312 38 92 11

Sulu 913 103 603 89 608 104 173 19 171 23 152 34

Tawi-tawi 554 100 384 11 363 69 82 29 85 27 101 20

Despite the negative perception of the community about the ARMM government,

all agreed that government employment is the biggest driver of economic growth. This reinforces the fact that economic activity in the region has remained low and that only the LGUs, the regional government and development community provide employment for the region.

Media, on other hand, remains a weak institution in the ARMM. A majority of

respondents indicated that there are many media groups operating in the region, however some of the networks are owned by politicians or controlled by certain political groups.

IV. Conflict Management

Another important dimension of local democracy in the ARMM is the impact of armed conflict. In the region there are at least three types of conflict: the conflict of the MILF-GPH, Abu Sayyaf and the rido between warring families.

25

Source: COMELEC Records and Statistics Division, 2011

The focus groups and key informant interviewees all agreed about the clear negative impact of armed conflict on elections, and all of them observed the detrimental impact fear and violence has on the willingness of the voters to vote.

This observation is more pronounced in areas where there is a strong occurrence

of rido or family feuds among different clans. This is true in Lanao del Sur, and it appears that the cases of rido often also coincide with the electoral process. Some even observed that increased resources and more elections in the ARMM have magnified the occurrence of the rido between different clans in the region.

Since they see public office as a form of economic enterprise, the rido takes on a

political and economic dimension. Making the rido more violent and longer lasting than violence caused by the rebellions and various criminal gangs roaming the ARMM. Taken together, all the respondents agreed that violence is major fact of life in the region. In addition to presence of violent conflict, the absence of real political parties in the ARMM has made policy differentiation between the contending factions vying for elected position negligible. Some respondents were aware of the distinctions between the various political parties in the ARMM. Most of them agreed that in terms of commanding respect and leadership, the traditional leaders and religious leaders command more loyalty and respect during elections. Even elected officials have to get the consent of the traditional leaders to implement their programs - such as delivery of basic services. In conflict resolution, the traditional leaders usually resolve conflict between warring clans. This signals a general distrust of elected leaders and especially to their political parties. Is there an alternative?

Results of the SoLD survey conducted in the region also showed about 67 per

cent of those polled indicated that they have much trust in their religious leaders, such as Ulama and Aleemat, compared to only 23 per cent having the same level of trust in the police; and other elected government officials such as congressman with only 18 per cent, governors with 22 per cent, and mayors with 33 per cent or barangay (village) captains with 40 per cent (Table 22). On the other hand, respondents also favoured other members of their communities the leaders came in with a high trust rating of 40per cent (Table 22).

Meanwhile, in terms of devising conflict resolution and management

mechanisms: the provincial government of Lanao del Sur, for example, allocated funds to provide compensation for the victims of rido. According to the participants, some local government units also divert public funds for development to pay blood money and dowry to help resolve violent clan conflicts. For example, the municipality of Sumisip in Basilan, for example, passed an ordinance pegging blood money at P120,000 (Torres III, 2007). In Tawi-Tawi, the provincial government is deliberating on a resolution concerning clan conflicts that stem from cases of elopement (Torres III, 2007).

The disbursement of this fund is dependent on the judgment rendered by the

traditional leader of a community. Even though this practice did not remove violence completely, it mitigated the consequences of such violent circumstances.

Table 22. Trust Rating of Key Actors26

PERSONS/ INSTITUTIONS

Very Much

% Somewhat Much

% Undecided If Much or

Little

% Somewhat Little

% Very Little

% Refused

% Not Aware

%

Religious Leaders

2672 67 880 22 269 7 121 3 30 0.8 11 0.3 4 0.3

Elders in the Area

1567 39 1505 38 490 12 223 5.6 106 2.7 40 1 28 0.7

Barangay Captain

1581 40 1246 31 468 12 345 8.6 250 6.3 48 1.2 27 0.7

Mayor 1316 33 1284 32 573 14 380 9.5 297 7.4 48 1.2 35 0.9

NGOs 1311 33 1182 30 725 18 316 7.9 149 3.7 88 2.2 206 5.2

Leaders of Voluntary Organizations

1089 27 1245 31 762 19 348 8.7 172 4.3 138 1.7 82 3.5

Police 928 23 1308 33 785 20 452 11 401 10 55 1.4 41 1

Governor 870 22 1321 33 789 20 462 12 329 8.2 62 1.6 42 1.1

Traditional Leaders

803 20 993 25 789 20 419 11 351 8.8 188 4.7 423 11

Congressman 713 18 1222 31 910 23 528 13 433 11 75 1.9 71 1.8

Business Associations

608 15 1048 26 999 25 544 14 425 11 130 3.3 186 4.7

26


ANNEXES

Annex A: METHODOLOGY

Initially, a team of five Assessors was created, with each Assessor equipped with sectoral expertise on the region, autonomy, governance, electoral reform, socio-economic issues. Assessors and the research team from UP-NCPAG were assigned to provide outsiders perspective of the state of local democracy in the ARMM.

The project team conducted preparatory meetings to design the assessment

methodologies, taking into consideration the distinct features of the ARMM. the team came up with a modified assessment tool to give the assessment guidelines a local flavour. A localized focus discussion group, key informant interview and survey manuals were drafted, and then translated into five local languages: Tausug, Sama, Yakan (for Sulu, Taw-tawi and Basilan), Maguindanaon (for Maguindanao), Maranao (for Lanao del Sur) and Tagalog (for non-Moros and migrants/members of the diaspora who do not speak the local language).

Focus group discussions were conducted from September 2011 to January

2012, consisting of one provincial, two municipal and two barangay level focus groups in each province. A total of 25 focus group discussions were conducted all over the ARMM. The project team ensured that participants were representative of various sectors, organizations and value principles, with special emphasis given to the participation of as many ordinary citizens as possible. The marginalized low income and non-literate groups were involved in the barangay focus group discussions.

On the other hand, key informant interviews were conducted to obtain the

insights of experts in the area of democracy, specifically in the field of democracy in the ARMM; leaders and lead players in the ARMM that greatly affect the quality of democracy in the region; and workers in various areas of economic and social rights, both government and nongovernment.

The major innovation of this study is the employment of survey methodology with

4,000 respondents composed of:

1.) Muslim Religious Leaders (MRLs) Ulama and imams (male) and aleemat and ustadzas (females)

2.) Adult illiterates and neo-literates those attending the three-year Literacy for Peace and Development Project classes as proxy for the most marginalized groups

3.) Professionals represented by the adult literacy teachers/facilitators and those working in public and private institutions

4.) Youth senior high school and college students of selected high school, colleges and universities in the Muslim communities as well as out of school youth.

Annex B: Capsule History of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement

Businessworld Surveil Column by Amina Rasul Politics of peace Fifteen years ago, on September 2, 1996, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front (GRP-MNLF) signed THE FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1976 TRIPOLI AGREEMENT. This was an historic act, the first peace agreement signed in South East Asia ending decades of armed conflict, earning for MNLF Chair Misuari and then President Fidel V. Ramos the UNESCO Felix Houphouet-Boigny Peace Prize. Why is the 1996 agreement described as the Final Peace Agreement? Because it provided the needed details to implement the agreement signed by Prof. Nur Misuari (for the MNLF) and GRP Defense Undersecretary Carmelo Barbero (for the GRP) in Tripoli in December 23, 1976. The 1976 agreement provided for autonomy in 13 provinces and nine cities in Mindanao. Let me give you a capsulized version of the events following the Tripoli agreement: Three months after, on March 25, 1977, President Marcos issued Proclamation 1628 declaring autonomy in 13 provinces. The MNLF objected, stating that this was a unilateral decision, violating the terms of the Tripoli Agreement. In spite of the MNLF objections, Marcos called for a plebiscite on April 17. 10 to 13 provinces voted for autonomy. Talks broke down. (That year, the group led by Salamat Hashim broke away from the MNLF, later establishing the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1984.)

In 1978, the Marcos government continued negotiations with the MNLF but chose to negotiate with Hashim instead of Misuari. However, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which had helped to facilitate the signing of the Tripoli Agreement, declared Misuari as chairman and spokesman for the MNLF during its 9th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM). Bouyed by the recognition given by the OIC to his leadership, Misuari reverted to his original position for secession in 1979. The situation in Muslim Mindanao deteriorating, Malaysia and Indonesia offered to help negotiate in 1980. In the meantime, the OIC during its 11th ICFM requested the Philippine government to implement the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. The OIC, however, did not support Misuaris secessionist move. In fact, the OIC reaffirmed its commitment to recognize the territorial integrity of the Philippines in 1984 during the 15th ICFM. The People Power Revolution of February 26, 1986 ousted Marcos and ushered in Corazon C. Aquino as the 11th President of the Philippines. The Supreme Court declared the Aquino government as the legitimate government (de jure), not merely a de facto government. President Aquino abolished the 1973 Constitution promulgated by Marcos during the Martial Law period and closed the Marcos Parliament, the Batasang Pambansa. At that time President Aquino was as powerful as Marcos, exercising both executive and legislative powers. She then organized the 1986 Constitutional Commission, led by the late Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma, to write the transitional Constitution, known as the Freedom Constitution.

Even as the MILF sent feelers to President Cory, she chose to visit Misuari in September to continue peace talks, affirming Misuaris leadership of the Muslim liberation movement. Desiring peace, she had provisions for autonomy in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras included in the Freedom Constitution. Critics, however, pointed out that she could have created the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao with the 13 provinces when she had the power to do so, instead of waiting for the Congress to enact the needed legislation. The 1986 Freedom Constitution was ratified by the people in 1987 and the new Congress elected. Congress later enacted RA 6734 creating the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, a watered down version of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. President Aquino signed it into law on August 1, 1989. A plebiscite was conducted on November 10 but only Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi chose autonomy. Basilan, the 5th Muslim dominated province, did not join. The MNLF boycotted the plebiscite, again stating that this was a unilateral move by government, violating the terms of the Tripoli Agreement. The MNLF went back to the hills. When Fidel V. Ramos assumed the Presidency in 1992, he jumpstarted the peace talks with the Muslim liberation fronts. The OIC supported the resumption of the peace talks. The first round was held in October 1992. Indonesia became the facilitator for the GRP-MNLF talks. Indonesia, under the late Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, was very effective in facilitating. By September 2, 1996, the Final Peace Agreement between the GRP and the MNLF was signed in Malacanang. The Agreement contained 81 points of consensus in defense, education, economic and financial systems, mines and minerals, Shariah courts, functions of a Legislative Assembly and Executive Council and representation in the national government and administrative system. The MILF, naturally, was not party to the agreement but did not complicate matters, opting to wait and see what would happen. Meanwhile, Misuari agreed to run for governor and was elected together with six MNLF leaders as Regional Legislative Assemblymen. Ramos issued Executive Order 371, criticized by the MNLF as a departure from the 1996 FPA. The Ramos government immediately started preparation for peace talks with the MILF (October). In December, the MILF, in a show of force, organized an assembly with thousands of participants clamoring for independence. Unfortunately, the 1996 FPA should just be called the 1996 PA (Peace Agreement). Final it wasn't. 15 years hence, here we are. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo threw Misuari in jail for treason, kept him for over 8 years then released him on the grounds that there was no evidence. The MNLF splintered like Humpty Dumpty. Government negotiations with the MILF was a dizzying roller-coaster ride ending with a huge crash, the fighting that broke over the non-signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOAAD) in August, 2008. Over 700,000 ordinary citizens were displaced in one month of fighting in Central Mindanao. Worse, autonomy gained a bad reputation with the ARMM regional government attaining notoriety as incompetent and corrupt (especially under the Ampatuans).

Today, we commemorate the 15th anniversary of the signing of the 1996 GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement. It has been a rocky, meandering path to peace many times leading nowhere. No visible economic or social progress is evident after 15 years. Armed conflict has continued. Muslims continue to live harsh lives, marked by the lowest human development indicators in the country: highest poverty rates, lowest literacy and education rates, poorest access to public services, and high mortality rates. The present is still bleak, especially for most young Muslims. Fortunately, there is a glimmer of hope with the focus of President Benigno Simeon Aquino III on delivering peace and progress with justice thru his daang matuwid or straight path. However, as former President Ramos said, a straight path can go up. Or it can go down.

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State of Local Democracy in ARMM

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