STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES SEELEY(SC 19790)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson, Js.*

Syllabus

Convicted of the crime of forgery in the second degree, the defendantappealed. The defendant, who had been responsible for the dally opera-tions of a company, M Co., sought to purchase a vehicle in the nameof the company. Because the defendant did not wholly own M Co., thedealership selling the vehicle required a certified resolution signed byat least two different corporate officers. The defendant subsequentlysent a certified resolution to the dealership purporting to contain thesignature of a second corporate officer, B, through a fax machine locatedin the home of the defendant’s father. Following a review of corporatebank records, B discovered certain unauthorized charges connected tothe dealership. During a subsequent meeting of M Co.’s shareholders,the defendant referred to the purchase as a mistake and was visiblyupset. B then pursued a criminal complaint against the defendant, claim-ing that B’s signature was forged on the certified resolution. Followingpresentation of the state’s case-in-chief during a trial to the court, thedefendant filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal, which the courtdenied. Following the defendant’s presentation of his case and the closeof evidence, the trial court found the defendant guilty and renderedjudgment of conviction. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia,that this court should exercise its supervisory authority over the adminis-tration of justice to abandon the waiver rule, which provides that acriminal defendant may secure appellate review of a trial court’s denialof a motion for a judgment of acquittal following the state’s case-in-chief only by forgoing the right to put on evidence, in the context ofbench trials. The defendant also claimed, in the alternative, that thestate’s evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Held:

1. This court declined to consider whether to abandon the waiver rule inthe context of bench trials, the evidence presented by the state duringits case-in-chief having been sufficient to establish the defendant’s guiltbeyond a reasonable doubt.

2. The state’s evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictionof forgery in the second degree: the state presented sufficient evidenceto prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant forged B’s signa-ture on the certified resolution in light of, inter alia, B’s repeated denialof authorship of the signature in question, testimony from the state’shandwriting experts, the fact that only the defendant stood to benefitfrom the forged signature, and the defendant’s demeanor when con-fronted at the meeting of M Co.’s shareholders; moreover, the statepresented sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant acted withan intent to deceive the dealership, the defendant having been awareof the requirement of a second signature and having faxed the certifiedresolution rather than delivering it to the dealership in person to circum-vent the dealership’s policy of requiring in person proof of identificationfor business purchases.

Argued January 26—officially released June 27, 2017

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant withthe crime of forgery in the second degree, brought tothe Superior Court in the judicial district of Danburygeographical area number three, and tried to the court,Russo, J., which denied the defendant’s motion for ajudgment of acquittal and rendered judgment of guilty,from which the defendant appealed. Affirmed.

Norman A. Pattis, with whom were Christopher LaTronica and, on the brief, Kevin Smith, for the appel-

lant (defendant).

Matthew A. Weiner, assistant state’s attorney, withwhom were Deborah P. Mabbett, senior assistant state’sattorney, and, on the brief, Stephen J. Sedensky III,state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

ROBINSON, J. The principal issue in this appeal iswhether, in a trial to the court, the state presentedsufficient evidence in its case-in-chief to support theconviction of the defendant, James Seeley, of forgeryin the second degree in violation of General Statutes§ 53a-139 (a) (1)1 in connection with a document cre-ated to facilitate the purchase of a vehicle on behalf ofa corporation.2 In challenging the sufficiency of theevidence presented, the defendant claims that weshould exercise our supervisory authority over theadministration of justice to abandon the waiver rule3

in the context of court trials, and review the trial court’sdenial of his motion for judgment of acquittal followingthe state’s case-in-chief, despite the fact that he electedto introduce evidence of his own. We need not reachthe defendant’s claim regarding the waiver rule becausewe conclude that there was sufficient evidence in thestate’s case-in-chief to support the defendant’s convic-tion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trialcourt.

The record reveals the following relevant facts andprocedural history. In 2009, the defendant and JoshuaBennett formed a company, Miller & Stone, Inc., forthe purpose of manufacturing and selling dietary sup-plements. By May, 2010, the shareholders of Miller &Stone, Inc., were the defendant, Bennett, Sandra Scott,E. Duane Meyer, and Sean Macpherson. The defendantran the daily operations of Miller & Stone, Inc., whileBennett developed and designed its products. Althoughthe other shareholders did not actively participate inmanagement, their consent was required prior to anysubstantial expenditure of funds. Despite the efforts ofthe defendant and Bennett, Miller & Stone, Inc., neverbecame profitable and was valued at less than $100,000.

In June, 2010, the defendant went to BMW of Ridge-field (dealership) to purchase a vehicle in the name ofMiller & Stone, Inc. In order to do so, the defendant wasrequired to submit his driver’s license and numerousdocuments to the dealership, including a ‘‘Certified Res-olution for Business Entity’’ (certified resolution),which is the document at issue in the present case.Because the defendant sought to purchase a vehicle inthe name of Miller & Stone, Inc., a company he did notwholly own, the dealership required a certified resolu-tion signed by at least two different corporate officers.Generally, the dealership required the parties signing acertified resolution to provide identification upon sub-mission. The certified resolution in the present case,however, was sent through a fax machine located atthe home of the defendant’s father, Ian Seeley, and thedealership did not subsequently request identification.On June 28, 2010, the defendant completed the sale inthe name of Miller & Stone, Inc., and took possessionof a BMW M6 automobile (automobile).

Shortly thereafter, Bennett began receiving calls fromcustomers who were interested in products fromMiller & Stone, Inc., but who complained that the defen-dant was not following through on orders. A subsequentreview of corporate bank records, which previously hadbeen sent to the defendant’s home, revealed certainunauthorized charges and checks sent to the dealership.After seeing these expenditures, Bennett and SandraScott’s husband, Andrew Scott, drove to the dealership,where they discovered that the automobile had beenpurchased in the name of Miller & Stone, Inc. Theyinformed the dealership that the purchase was unau-thorized.

Bennett, Andrew Scott, Macpherson, Meyer, and thedefendant subsequently met to discuss the unautho-rized expenditures. During this meeting, the defendantwas ‘‘[v]ery upset,’’ ‘‘crying,’’ and ‘‘apologetic,’’ andreferred to the purchase of the automobile as ‘‘a mistake. . . .’’ The defendant was told that he needed eitherto return the automobile or list himself on the title. Thedefendant agreed and, on the following day, returnedthe automobile to the dealership. The automobile wassubsequently resold at auction for $18,000 less than theamount owed by Miller & Stone, Inc., on the loan.

In early 2011, Bennett met with George Bryce, a detec-tive with the Bethel Police Department, to review poten-tial evidence in connection with the defendant’spurchase of the automobile in the name of Miller &Stone, Inc. Convinced that one of the three signaturesthat appeared on the certified resolution purported tobe but was not actually his, Bennett pursued a crimi-nal complaint.

The state charged the defendant with forgery in thesecond degree in violation of § 53a-139 (a) (1). The casewas subsequently tried to the court, Russo, J. Followingthe presentation of the state’s case-in-chief, the defen-dant filed a motion seeking a judgment of acquittal,which was denied. Following the presentation of evi-dence by the defendant, the court found the defendantguilty as charged. The court subsequently rendered acorresponding judgment of conviction and sentencedthe defendant to five years incarceration, executionsuspended, and three years probation with special con-ditions. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant asks us to exercise oursupervisory powers over the administration of justiceto hold the waiver rule inapplicable to court trials, andto consider his claim that the trial court improperlydenied his motion for judgment of acquittal at the closeof the state’s case-in-chief. In the alternative, the defen-dant claims that the evidence, considered in its entirety,was insufficient to find him guilty of forgery in thesecond degree. Additional relevant facts and proceduralhistory will be set forth as necessary.

I

We initially address the defendant’s request that weabandon the waiver rule in the context of court trials.4

‘‘The so-called waiver rule provides that, when a motionfor [a judgment of] acquittal at the close of the state’scase is denied, a defendant may not secure appellatereview of the trial court’s ruling without [forgoing] theright to put on evidence in his or her own behalf. Thedefendant’s sole remedy is to remain silent and, if con-victed, to seek reversal of the conviction because ofinsufficiency of the state’s evidence. If the defendantelects to introduce evidence, the appellate reviewencompasses the evidence in toto.’’ (Internal quotationmarks omitted.) State v. Perkins, 271 Conn. 218, 220,856 A.2d 917 (2004); see also State v. Papandrea, 302Conn. 340, 350 and n.5, 26 A.3d 75 (2011); State v. Rutan,194 Conn. 438, 440, 479 A.2d 1209 (1984).

We need not, however, presently consider abandon-ing the waiver rule in the context of court trials because,‘‘[b]ased on a review of the state’s evidence only, thestate ha[s] proven beyond a reasonable doubt that thedefendant was guilty of [the crime charged]. On itsmerits, the defendant’s claim is a challenge to the suffi-ciency of the evidence at the end of the state’s case.Our review of the state’s evidence is limited to . . .whether [a finder of fact] could have reasonably con-cluded, upon the facts established and the inferencesreasonably drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effectof the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonabledoubt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.Calonico, 256 Conn. 135, 139–40, 770 A.2d 454 (2001);see also State v. Perkins, supra, 271 Conn. 230 andn.12. Accordingly, we leave for another day the issueof whether we should abandon the waiver rule in thecontext of court trials.

II

We turn next to the defendant’s claims regardingthe sufficiency of the state’s evidence. The defendantclaims that the evidence was insufficient to supporta conviction of forgery in the second degree for tworeasons. First, he contends that the state failed to pre-sent evidence from which a fact finder reasonably couldhave concluded that the defendant forged the signature,namely, because the handwriting evidence was incon-clusive and did not establish beyond a reasonable doubtthat the defendant committed a forgery. Second, heclaims that the state presented insufficient evidencefrom which a fact finder could have concluded that thedefendant forged with intent to deceive. We addresseach of these claims in turn.

‘‘The standard of review [that] we [ordinarily] applyto a claim of insufficient evidence is well established.In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to supporta criminal conviction we apply a two-part test. First,

we construe the evidence in the light most favorableto sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whetherupon the facts so construed and the inferences reason-ably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonablycould have concluded that the cumulative force of theevidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.. . . In evaluating evidence, the trier of fact is notrequired to accept as dispositive those inferences thatare consistent with the defendant’s innocence. . . .The trier may draw whatever inferences from the evi-dence or facts established by the evidence it deems tobe reasonable and logical. . . . This does not requirethat each subordinate conclusion established by orinferred from the evidence, or even from other infer-ences, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt . . .because this court has held that a [fact finder’s] factualinferences that support a guilty verdict need only bereasonable. . . .

‘‘[A]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonabledoubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt. . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt requireacceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed bythe defendant that, had it been found credible by thetrier, would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . [I]n[our] process of review, it does not diminish the proba-tive force of the evidence that it consists, in whole orin part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather thandirect. . . . It is not one fact . . . but the cumulativeimpact of a multitude of facts [that] establishes guilt ina case involving substantial circumstantial evidence.’’(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taylor, 306Conn. 426, 431–32, 50 A.3d 862 (2012); cf. State v. Bal-buena, 168 Conn. App. 194, 199, 144 A.3d 540 (standardof appellate review applicable to denial of motion forjudgment of acquittal), cert. denied, 323 Conn. 936, 151A.3d 384 (2016).

To establish that a person is guilty of forgery in thesecond degree in violation of § 53a-139 (a), the statemust prove that the defendant (1) forged a writteninstrument or issues or possesses a forged instrumentknowing it to be forged, and (2) did so with the intentto deceive another. See, e.g., State v. DeCaro, 252 Conn.229, 240–41, 745 A.2d 900 (2000); State v. Etienne, 103Conn. App. 544, 558, 930 A.2d 726 (2007); State v. Hen-derson, 47 Conn. App. 542, 551, 706 A.2d 480, cert.denied, 244 Conn. 908, 713 A.2d 829 (1998).

A

We begin with the defendant’s claim that the evidencewas insufficient with respect to the act element of forg-ery in the second degree, namely, that he forged a writ-ten instrument or ‘‘possesse[d] any written instrumentwhich he knows to be forged . . . .’’ General Statutes§ 53a-139 (a). The defendant contends that the state’sevidence with respect to this element was inconclusive,at best, in that (1) the sum of the two experts’ testimony

cannot be said to have reasonably contributed to afinding of guilt, (2) Bennett’s testimony was purely spec-ulative, and (3) the employees of the dealership couldnot testify about how the documents had been preparedor signed, rendering their testimony inconclusive as tohis guilt. In response, the state contends that the factfinder reasonably could have concluded that Bennett’ssignature was forged in light of the testimony fromBennett, Bryce, and the state’s two handwriting experts.The state also claims that the fact finder reasonablycould have concluded that it was the defendant whoforged Bennett’s signature. We agree with the state andconclude that there was sufficient evidence to provebeyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant forgedBennett’s signature on the certified resolution.

First, the fact finder reasonably could have concludedthat the third signature on the certified resolution thatpurported to belong to Bennett was forged in light ofthe testimony from Bennett, Bryce, and the state’s hand-writing experts. During Bennett’s testimony, he categor-ically denied that the third signature was his.Specifically, although Bennett conceded that it was pos-sible that two of the signatures on the certified resolu-tion were his because he often signed documents for thedefendant under a time constraint without first readingthem, when asked, Bennett repeatedly denied author-ship of the third signature on the certified resolution.In its decision, the trial court credited Bennett asremaining consistent, with a demeanor that wasemphatic when he stated that the signature under per-sonal guarantor was not his and that he did not remem-ber signing it.

Second, Bryce, the lead police investigator withrespect to the allegations against the defendant, testi-fied. During the investigation, Bryce called Bennett toask him about the certified resolution that containedhis purported signatures. Bryce testified that Bennettstated that ‘‘he did not recall ever signing any paperworkputting that purchase on the company.’’ As to that con-versation, Bryce testified that he ‘‘believe[d] that [Ben-nett] did not knowingly have anything to do with thepurchase of the [automobile] in the company’s name.’’Further, Bryce met with Bennett and showed him thesignatures on the certified resolution. Although Bennettdid not recall providing any of the signatures, he specifi-cally pointed to the third signature and stated that itdefinitely was not his.

Third, the state’s two handwriting experts testifiedthat the third signature on the document did not matchthe handwriting provided on Bennett’s exemplars. Thefirst expert, Greg Kettering, reviewed the signaturescontained in the certified resolution. He did so by com-paring the signatures to handwriting exemplars pro-vided by Bennett. When examining the faxed copy,Kettering was unable to determine whether the third

signature belonged to Bennett because it had been ren-dered illegible by the fax process. Once granted accessto the original document, Kettering concluded, how-ever, that the first two signatures shared a commonauthorship, but the third signature did not share a com-mon authorship with the other two signatures. He alsodetermined that the third signature did not share acommon authorship with Bennett’s exemplars, whereasthe first two did. Finally, Lisa Ragaza, a forensic exam-iner responsible for the technical review of Kettering’swork, reached the same conclusions as had Kettering.

On review, we defer to the fact finder’s assessmentof a witness’ character and demeanor. See, e.g., Statev. Trine, 236 Conn. 216, 227, 673 A.2d 1098 (1996). Here,the trial court, sitting as the finder of fact, credited theemphatic and consistent nature of Bennett’s testimonythat the third signature was not his. Accordingly, fromthese facts, the trial court reasonably found that, withrespect to the question of authenticity of Bennett’s sig-nature, the state had ‘‘easily carried its burden of prov-ing beyond a reasonable doubt that someone other than. . . Bennett affixed the name Josh Bennett to the bot-tom of the [document].’’

An ample amount of circumstantial evidence alsosupported the trial court’s finding that it was the defen-dant who had forged Bennett’s signature, namely, testi-mony provided by Bennett, Katherine Ann Boehn andCynthia Cardinal-Palanzo, employees of the dealership,and Ian Seeley. ‘‘When evaluating the sufficiency of theevidence, [t]here is no distinction between direct andcircumstantial evidence so far as probative force isconcerned . . . . Indeed, [c]ircumstantial evidence. . . may be more certain, satisfying and persuasivethan direct evidence. . . . Therefore, the probativeforce of the evidence is not diminished because it con-sists, in whole or in part, of circumstantial evidencerather than direct evidence.’’ (Citation omitted; internalquotation marks omitted.) State v. Balbuena, supra, 168Conn. App. 200; see, e.g., State v. Jackson, 257 Conn.198, 206, 777 A.2d 591 (2001). First, the defendant drovethe automobile and was listed as the designated driverof the automobile on the document at issue. Thus, itwas only the defendant who stood to benefit from theforged signature. Also, Bennett testified about the meet-ing at which the defendant was confronted about theunauthorized purchase of the automobile. Bennettdescribed the defendant, as ‘‘upset,’’ ‘‘crying,’’ and‘‘apologetic,’’ during this meeting and testified that thedefendant referred to the purchase as a ‘‘mistake. . . .’’ From this, the fact finder reasonably could haveinferred a consciousness of guilt and concluded thatthe defendant was responsible for the forgery. Second,Boehn and Cardinal-Palanzo testified that a second sig-nature on the certified resolution was necessary to com-plete the purchase transaction so that the defendantcould purchase a vehicle. They also noted the dealer-

ship’s policy of alerting a customer to missing signa-tures on its documents, from which the trial courtreasonably could have inferred that the defendant wasaware that a second signature was needed on the docu-ments to complete the purchase. Third, Ian Seeley testi-fied that the fax number on the certified resolutionfaxed to the dealership matched the fax number fromthe machine at his home, a location at which the defen-dant frequently worked. Viewing this circumstantial evi-dence in the light most favorable to sustaining thecourt’s finding of guilt; see, e.g., State v. Taylor, supra,306 Conn. 432; we conclude that the fact finder reason-ably could have inferred that it was the defendant whohad forged Bennett’s signature on the certified resolu-tion, which he faxed to the dealership.

B

Having determined that the trial court reasonablycould have found beyond a reasonable doubt that thedefendant had forged the signature on the certified reso-lution, we turn to the defendant’s claim with respectto the second element, namely, that the state failedto prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he forgedBennett’s signature with the intent to deceive. Distin-guishing State v. Dickman, 119 Conn. App. 581, 989A.2d 613, cert. denied, 295 Conn. 923, 991 A.2d 569(2010), the defendant claims that that the record doesnot contain sufficient evidence to allow the finder offact to infer the requisite specific intent to sustain aconviction of forgery in the second degree. In response,the state contends that the fact finder reasonably couldhave found that the defendant acted with the intentto deceive the dealership in forging Bennett’s name.Additionally, the state contends that Dickman supportsthe trial court’s ruling. We agree with the state andconclude that the trial court reasonably could haveconcluded that, in forging Bennett’s signature, thedefendant acted with the intent to deceive the dealer-ship into believing that more than one member ofMiller & Stone, Inc., had consented to his purchase ofthe automobile.

‘‘As we frequently have observed, [i]ntent is generallyproven by circumstantial evidence because direct evi-dence of the accused’s state of mind is rarely available.. . . Therefore, intent is often inferred from conduct. . . and from the cumulative effect of the circumstan-tial evidence and the rational inferences drawn there-from.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.Nash, 316 Conn. 651, 672, 114 A.3d 128 (2015).

The record reveals ample circumstantial evidence tosupport the fact finder’s conclusion that, by forgingBennett’s name on the certified resolution, the defen-dant intended the dealership, as the recipient of theform, to believe that Bennett had, in fact, signed theform. First, Boehn testified that it was company policythat two signatures were required to make a purchase

in the name of a company when an individual does notown 100 percent of the shares. From this, the fact finderreasonably could have inferred that the defendant wasaware that a signature from another officer fromMiller & Stone, Inc., was required in order to completethe purchase of the automobile. Thus, his forgery ofthe certified resolution was done with the intent todeceive the dealership into believing that a second offi-cer had authorized the purchase of the automobile onbehalf of Miller & Stone, Inc.

We find State v. Dickman, supra, 119 Conn. App. 588,instructive on this point. In that case, the defendant,Priscilla C. Dickman, was charged with, inter alia, forg-ery in the third degree in violation of General Statutes§ 53a-1405 in connection with altered documents thatwere submitted to an insurance company with respectto a claim filed on behalf of her brother-in-law, forwhom her husband had been appointed conservator.Id., 582–84. Dickman attempted to obtain informationabout her brother-in-law’s insurance claim following anaccident in which he was struck by a motor vehicle.Id., 583. After the insurance company refused to releaseinformation, Dickman faxed the insurance company aprobate form, which she later admitted that she hadaltered by adding her name as a fiduciary and conserva-tor. Id., 583–84, 587. When that form was insufficient,Dickman sent a letter of designation purporting to havebeen signed by her brother-in-law, authorizing her andher husband to handle his claim with the insurancecompany. Id., 584. Dickman then presented the insur-ance company with false information regarding herbrother-in-law’s injuries and treatments, causing theinsurance company to believe it had been presentedwith a false claim and to pursue criminal proceedings,in which Dickman was subsequently convicted of onecount of forgery in the third degree. Id., 584–85.

On appeal, Dickman conceded that she had alteredthe probate document sent to the insurance company,but claimed that there was insufficient evidence thatshe had done so with the intent to deceive or defraud.Id., 587. The Appellate Court concluded, however, thatthere was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s find-ing that Dickman had intended to deceive the insurancecompany. Id., 588–89. The Appellate Court emphasizedthat Dickman sent an altered probate form listing her-self as her brother-in-law’s conservator only after learn-ing that a representative of the insurance company,consistent with corporate policy, would not speak toher unless authorized by the brother-in-law. Id. Fromthis fact, the Appellate Court determined that the ‘‘juryreasonably could have concluded that [Dickman] sentthe altered probate form to [the insurance company]to circumvent its policy of speaking only to third partiesauthorized to speak on behalf of claimants.’’ Id., 589.The Appellate Court stated further that the jury ‘‘reason-ably could have inferred that [Dickman] intended [the

insurance company] to believe that she was [herbrother-in-law’s] conservator, and, thus, an [insurance]representative could discuss his claim with her.Because [Dickman] was not [her brother-in-law’s] con-servator, the jury could have concluded, on the basisof the circumstantial evidence, that [Dickman] intendedto deceive [the insurance company] by causing it tobelieve that she was [her brother-in-law’s] conserva-tor.’’ Id.

Similar to Dickman, in the present case, the defen-dant acted only after being informed that, to purchasethe automobile in the name of Miller & Stone, Inc., asecond signature was required. Thus, as in Dickman,the fact finder in the present case reasonably couldhave concluded that the defendant forged Bennett’sname and faxed the certified resolution to the dealer-ship, rather than bringing it in in person, to circumventthe policy of requiring a second signature with identifi-cation for business purchases. The fact finder also rea-sonably could have inferred that the defendant intendedthe dealership to believe that Bennett, as an officer ofMiller & Stone, Inc., authorized the purchase of theautomobile so that the dealership would sell a vehicleto the defendant. Because the signature on the formwas not Bennett’s, the fact finder could have concluded,on the basis of the circumstantial evidence, that thedefendant intended to deceive the dealership by causingit to believe that two separate officers from Miller &Stone, Inc., authorized the purchase of the automobile.Accordingly, we conclude that, considering only theevidence presented in the state’s case-in-chief, the statepresented sufficient evidence to support the defen-dant’s conviction of forgery in the second degreebeyond a reasonable doubt.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.* This case originally was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this

court consisting of Chief Justice Rogers and Justices Palmer, Eveleigh,McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson. Although Justice Palmer was not presentat oral argument, he has read the briefs and appendices, and has listenedto a recording of oral argument prior to participating in this decision.

1 General Statutes § 53a-139 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A person isguilty of forgery in the second degree when, with intent to defraud, deceiveor injure another, he falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrumentor issues or possesses any written instrument which he knows to be forged,which is or purports to be, or which is calculated to become or representif completed: (1) A deed, will, codicil, contract, assignment, commercialinstrument or other instrument which does or may evidence, create, transfer,terminate or otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation or status. . . .’’

2 The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to theAppellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant toGeneral Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

3 ‘‘The so-called waiver rule provides that, when a motion for [a judgmentof] acquittal at the close of the state’s case is denied, a defendant may notsecure appellate review of the trial court’s ruling without [forgoing] theright to put on evidence in his or her own behalf. The defendant’s soleremedy is to remain silent and, if convicted, to seek reversal of the convictionbecause of insufficiency of the state’s evidence. If the defendant elects tointroduce evidence, the appellate review encompasses the evidence in toto.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Perkins, 271 Conn. 218, 220,856 A.2d 917 (2004).

4 The defendant acknowledges that this court has upheld the constitution-ality of the waiver rule and reaffirmed our adherence to it in the contextof jury trials. See State v. Perkins, 271 Conn. 218, 231, 856 A.2d 917 (2004).Nevertheless, he claims that we should reject the waiver rule in the contextof court trials for two reasons. First, the defendant relies on the fact that,as observed in State v. Rutan, 194 Conn. 438, 440, 479 A.2d 1209 (1984),the denial of a defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal places thedefendant in a dilemma—he either must maintain his silence and presentno evidence, or expose himself to the waiver rule and present evidence,such that the judge’s denial of the initial motion for judgment of acquittalbecomes unreviewable. Turning to court trials specifically, the defendantemphasizes the trial judge’s role as fact finder, and the risk that the judge’sinitial denial of the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal may taintthe judge’s final deliberations with respect to the defendant’s guilt. Specifi-cally, the defendant questions whether a trial judge can disregard his or herprior decision when deciding the case at the close of all the evidence. Inresponse, the state contends that the waiver rule remains valid in the contextof court trials because ‘‘there is no reason to believe that a Superior Courtjudge cannot decide whether the evidentiary record, considered in itsentirety, supports the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, indepen-dent from a prior decision that evidence presented during the state’s case-in-chief, if construed in the light most favorable to the state, could supporteach element of the charged crime.’’ The state emphasizes that, ‘‘in thiscase, the trial court, in denying the defendant’s motion, frequently acknowl-edged the different standard applicable to an acquittal motion as comparedto a guilty verdict.’’

5 General Statutes § 53a-140 (a) provides that ‘‘[a] person is guilty of forgeryin the third degree when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another,he falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument, or issues orpossesses any written instrument which he knows to be forged.’’ (Emphasisadded.) The specific intent required here is identical to that of § 53a-139.