10.1177/0096144205281626 ARTICLEJOURNAL OF URBAN HISTORY / March 2006van der Heijden / STATE FORMATION AND URBAN FINANCES IN HOLLANDSTATE FORMATION AND URBANFINANCES IN SIXTEENTH- ANDSEVENTEENTH-CENTURY HOLLANDMANON VAN DER HEIJDENVrije Universiteit AmsterdamThe governments of the Habsburg Empire (1477-1579) and the Dutch Republic (1579) depended largely ontaxes imposed on Hollands wealthy cities. The wealth of Hollands cities was used for the needs of the statebut only by the consent of the urban governments. Such negotiations benefited both town and ruler. Success-ful efforts of the province to impose control on urban finances involved the loss of urban financial autonomy,but it did not necessarily harmurban funds. Since it involved the restoration of urban credit as well, the greatcities of Holland profited by the increasing provincial control over excises.Keywords: state formation; urban, finances; Holland; annuitiesIn their volume Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, Charles Tilly andWim Blockmans noted that the comparative literature on state structure andchanges in premodern times offers little information on state-city relation-ships. Most studies concentrate on the period since 1800, because historianspresume that cities were relatively insignificant prior to 1800.ToidentifythegeographicpatterninearlymodernEurope, TillyandBlockmans distinguished between city systems and systems of states. In Hol-land, cities such as Dordrecht and Amsterdamdominated the Dutch systemofcities fromthe fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries. Fromthe fourteenth to theseventeenth centuries, the formation of states, such as the Burgundian monar-chy and the Habsburg Empire, affected the character and density of urban or-ganization. The overall aim of their volume was to examine how urbanizationand the transformation of states interacted in Europe after 1000 A.D., and howcities negotiated with the rulers of states. One of the main questions was Whatresponse did cities and their institutions make to the efforts of state makers tocontrol them, drawcapital fromthem, and tax them? The comparison of differ-ent periods in time and various European regions makes the efforts of the429AUTHORS NOTE: I am thankful to Marjolein t Hart for her useful comments on an earlier draft of thisarticle. An earlier version was presented at the Europeancience History Conference, Amsterdam, April 12-15, 2000, in a session on urban power and debt holders in the fourteenth through seventeenth centuries.JOURNAL OF URBAN HISTORY, Vol. 32 No. 3, March 2006429-450DOI: 10.1177/0096144205281626 2006 Sage Publications at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from editors and the authors even more valuable. This article is a Dutch contributionto the questions raised by Tilly and Blockmans.1In the context of state formation and urban organization, the making of theDutch state in the sixteenth century proves to be a very interesting case. Theperiod 1477-1650 is characterized by a changing governmental system afterthe Dutch Revolt against Spain, which resulted in international recognition ofthe Dutch Republic in 1648. Between 1477 and the Dutch Revolt in 1572, thenorthern parts of the Netherlands belonged to the Spanish Habsburg Empire ofCharles V (1515-1555) and his son Philip II (1555-1579). After the Dutchrevolt, the northern parts of the Netherlands became a decentralized republicin which the bureaucratic center (The Hague) was separate fromthe economicand financial center (Amsterdam). The traditional center was Dordrecht.2Inthe course of the formation of the Dutch state, Dordrecht began to lose its tradi-tionally favorable position to other cities in Holland. Even more important, inthis process the province of Holland strengthened its grip on urban finances byselling provincial annuities (renten) on the urban market, while starting andexpanding provincial taxes. The main question is What effect did the control ofthe Spanish ruler and the province of Holland have on urban finances, andwhat response did Dordrecht make on the efforts of central and provincial statemakers to control them? I will argue that the increasing control of state makersover urban taxes, which involved the reduction of urban financial autonomy,did not necessarily mean a disadvantage to the financial position of localcommunities.The findings presented in this article are based on the urban accounts of thecity of Dordrecht, the financial resolutions of the magistrates of Dordrecht,and the resolutions of the States of Holland. The use of such financial sourcesshows that financial and economic history is important for the more generalpolitical history in a crucial period, namely, when the Republic of the UnitedProvinces came into existence. Therefore, I aim to examine further the effectof the course of state formation on cities by discussing the urban rent sales ofDordrecht between 1550 and 1625. Those urban renten (bonds or annuities)are an indication of the pressure put by central governments on the finances aswell as the politics of the city. The application of rent sales as a financial tech-nique was forced on the cities by central states that needed instant funds. Themain questions are as follows: (1) in what ways did the sale of renten affect thepublic debt of Dordrecht; (2) how did state transformation influence the waysin which urban renten were sold, and, consequently, urban finances; and (3)how did Dordrecht negotiate these rent sales with the Habsburg rulers andDutch government? I first briefly discuss the changing position of Dordrechtin Holland fromthe fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries and the working ofurban rent sales during the same period. Second, I discuss howthe state trans-formationaffectedthefiscal system, and, therefore, theurbanrent sales.Finally, I analyze the effect of urban rent sales on the urban debt of Dordrecht430 JOURNAL OF URBAN HISTORY / March 2006 at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the ways in whichcity and supralocal governments negotiated.DORDRECHTFrom the fourteenth century on, Dordrecht played the most significant rolein Hollands network of trade, being the main river trade entrept. As the old-est and most powerful city in the northern part of the Netherlands, it had manyadvantages. Between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, its favorable geo-graphical situation became more profitable as the city obtained staple privi-leges on the river trade. Until 1581, Dordrecht was the only city in Holland thathad the right of minting.3In exchange for these privileges, Dordrecht used itsleading position in the Estates of Holland to back the interests of the sovereign.Dordrechts position as first city of Holland was symbolized in the voting ofthe Estates of Holland. In the decision making of this governmental structureof the province of Holland, the city had the first vote among the major cities ofHolland: Dordrecht, Amsterdam, Haarlem, Delft, Leiden, and Gouda. Beingthe first city, in 1572 Dordrecht offered one of its cloisters for the first officialmeeting of the rebellious cities of the revolt.4Although it still had the reputation of being Hollands first city and still heldits strong credit base, by the time of the Dutch Revolt, Dordrecht was losing itsdominant position as a trade center. It failed to obtain a significant position inthe maritime trade. Also, the other cities resented the favored positionofDordrecht in the times of the Burgundian monarchy and the Habsburg Empire.In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the sovereigns supported Dordrechtsclaims to important staple privileges in the river trade. Initiated by rivaling cit-ies, like Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Haarlem, there were numerous conflictsabout the staple right, often resulting in legal proceedings (Table 1).5The conflict of 1540, initiated by its geographically closest rival, Rotter-dam, marked a definite change in Dordrechts staple privileges. In this conflict,van der Heijden / STATE FORMATION AND URBAN FINANCES IN HOLLAND 431TABLE 1Number of Conflicts over the Staple Rights of Dordrecht, 1325-1540Year Number of Conflicts1325 91391-1394 191394 121431-1432 111505 131540 23SOURCE: JanvanHerwaarden, DickdeBoer, FredvanKan, andGerrit Verhoeven, eds.,Geschiedenis van Dordrecht tot 1572 (Hilversum, the Netherlands, 1996), 88. at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from Charles V still supported the city, but in the years after, he withdrew some ofDordrechts old staple rights to meet the wishes of the other cities. In doing so,Charles Vaimed at bettering the intercity relations in Holland.6Dordrecht waslosing its dominant position before the Dutch Revolt started, but the transfor-mation of the state system meant even further loss of influence. Traditionallyfavored by the sovereign, Dordrecht lost its influential supporter the momentthe northern parts of the Netherlands no longer recognized Philip II as theirruler. Consequently, Dordrecht hesitated to fully support William of Orangeand the rebellious cities in revolting against the Spanish sovereign. On June25, 1572, it finally decided to choose the side of the revolt.Its declining power was further reflected in the institutionalization of theadmiralties. Although claiming to house the admiralty of Holland as well, in1586 Dordrecht lost the fight to the growing city of Rotterdam.7In the six-teenth and seventeenth centuries, Amsterdamstarted to take over the dominantcommercial position of Dordrecht. Commercial dominance did not necessar-ily correspond with concentrations of capital and urban population. Neverthe-less, Dordrechts decline in population, as compared to the populations ofAmsterdamand Rotterdam(Table 2), was in line with its declining importanceas a network of trade.STATES AND CAPITAL: URBAN RENT SALESThe practice of issuing annuities was common among European cities fromthe twelfth and thirteenth centuries onward. The towns in the County of Hol-land began issuing renten only during the fourteenth century.8To remedy theirchronic shortage of funds, they often sold renten with either the citys collec-tive estate or parts of the provincial estate as collateral. The cities of the Neth-erlands especially needed money to fund the taxes collected for the centralgovernment (the quotas of the annual beden).9Rulers forced cities in the Neth-erlands to sell renten for two reasons.10First, it enabled the central governmentto have substantial means to pay for its abundant military operations. Second,rent sales directly connected the urban elite, who bought renten, to their poli-tics, since the rent buyers actually financed the central governments wars.11432 JOURNAL OF URBAN HISTORY / March 2006TABLE 2Population of Dordrecht, Amsterdam, and Rotterdam: 1514, 1622, 1795Year Dordrecht Rotterdam Amsterdam1514 11,200 5,300 13,5001622 18.270 19,532 104,9321795 18.014 53,200 221,000SOURCE: WillemFrijhoff, Hubert Nusteling, andMarijkeSpies, eds., GeschiedenisvanDordrecht, 1572-1813 (Hilversum, the Netherlands, 1998), 78-85. at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from When selling annuities, the city usually issued both life and redeemableannuities, which could be bought by citizens as well as by buyers fromoutsidethe city. The latter paid the city an amount of money and received an annualincome in return. The amount, the rate, the name of each buyer, and the namesof the beneficiaries were all written down in individual certificates. The sale ofannuities was an effective method of raising capital, providing the city withlarge amounts of money in a short time and offering rich citizens the opportu-nity to invest their money. Selling rents, however, merely resulted in an excessof funds for a very short time. It also affected an increasing and long-lastingurban debt to annuity purchasers. Therefore, annuities absorbed an essentialpart of both the total city revenues and the total city expenses.12DEFINING RENTENLife annuities and redeemable annuities may perhaps be regarded as obliga-tions, but there are two essential differences between an obligation and anannuity. First, whereas the renten contract was inscribed in the buyers name,the obligation was inscribed in the name of the bearer. Furthermore, the termobligations referred to loans with interest for which a brokerage(makelaardijgeld) was charged.13The city of Dordrecht, for example, fre-quently funded the extensive repairs of its dikes by capital borrowed withinterest fromits citizens. In these cases, brokers received a fee amounting to anannual percentage of the capital (usually, 0.05 percent).14When life annuitiesor redeemable annuities were sold, no brokerage fee was charged.Although it was very similar to an interest loan, contemporaries consideredthe rent transaction primarily as a regular sale. Therefore, the transaction con-sisted of a contract of sale in which the purchase price and the sumof the rentenwere described.15Purchasers bought an annual income, consisting of a fixedamount that was remitted once or twice a year. When issuing annuities, thefinancial administrators of Dordrecht always referred to a sale of renten andnever to interest loans.16Those who had bought renten did not have the right to breach the trans-action by claiming the original purchase price. When it concerned redeemableannuities, however, buyers were legally bound to end the transaction wheneverthe city wished to do so.17The latter had three options to end the transaction.First, it could simply reimburse the original purchase price. Second, it couldreduce (korting) the interest rate. Finally, the city could choose a somewhatcomplex procedure when using the method of conversion. In those cases, citiesforced rent holders to turn in their interest letters and obliged themto buy newannuities at less favorable rates.18When determining the nature of rent sales, itis, however, important to knowthat buyers could not demand the original pur-chase price in cases of nonobservance of the agreement. To distinguish interestvan der Heijden / STATE FORMATION AND URBAN FINANCES IN HOLLAND 433 at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from loans from rent sales, I use the word rente or annuity when referring to rentsales.STATE, CITIES, AND THE FISCAL SYSTEMThe most important revenue of the Habsburg rulers was the ordinary andextraordinary Bede, which referred to the taxes that had been approved andwere collected and distributed by the provincial estates. The Estates of Hol-land determined the quota, which had to be paid by each town in Holland.19Charles V and Philip II strongly depended on the provincial estates for threereasons. Firstly, they needed large sums of money to finance their continuingwars with France and its allies.20Secondly, the cooperation of the provincialestates was vital because of the decentralization of power in the Low Coun-tries. The provincial estates voted for the beden, and for each Bede, the rulerrequired the consent of the representatives of the estates. A council of noblesand the representatives of the six major cities of Holland (Dordrecht, Haarlem,Leiden, Amsterdam, Delft, and Gouda) represented the Estates of Holland.The procedure of the Bede involved a complex negotiation because in eachprovince several towns wished partial remission of the Bede quota: gratin.Because the six great cities enjoyed voting rights, they were actually tradingtheir consent to the Bede for rebates on their share. The gratin of the majorcities resulted fromstrictly private bargaining between the cities and the com-missioners sent by the ruler. The rebates seemto have fully corresponded withthe reputation of each city and the interests of the sovereign. Those differencesresulted in some cities being particularly successful in increasing their levelsof rebate. In 1520, Dordrecht managed to increase its rebate to 64 percent of itsshare of the Bede (Table 3).Undoubtedly, those profitable negotiations resulted from the traditionallygoodrelations between the Habsburg rulers and Dordrecht. Haarlem suc-ceeded in getting high reductions in its Bede share as well, probably because ofits continuing miserable financial situation resulting from its bankruptcy in434 JOURNAL OF URBAN HISTORY / March 2006TABLE 3Rebates, Holland Ordinaris Bede, 1550-1565(in Dutch Pounds/Guilders)Year Ordinaris Bede Rebate Percentage of Bede1550 100.000 36,042 361555 100.000 34,654 351560 50.000 16,594 331565 100.000 34,735 35SOURCE: J. D. Tracy, The Taxation Systemof the County of Holland during the Reigns of CharlesV and Philip II, 1519-1555, Economisch- en Sociaal-Historisch Jaarboek 48 (1985): 108. at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from 1494, because it could not pay its long-standing debt to rent purchasers. Thatyear, almost all great cities, including Dordrecht and Amsterdam, faced bank-ruptcy for the same reason. In early modern legal concepts, citizens were liablefor the outstanding debts of their town, and for that reason, many citizens of themajor cities were arrested, while their merchandise was confiscated, whenstaying abroad. Obviously, these arrests obstructed national and internationaltrade, and further deterioration of the cities credit. By the end of the sixteenthcentury, Haarlem had, unlike the other cities, still not succeeded in getting itsfinances in order.21Without the collaboration of the provincial estates, the rulers would havehad great difficulty in raising these taxes.22Finally, the ruler depended on thecentral government because long-term debt was the only alternative to therates on loans demanded on the Antwerp exchange. Whereas interest loans tothe central government amounted to between 12 and 22 percent, the sales ofannuities generally came to 6.25 percent.23In 1579, the northern parts of the Netherlands were no longer subject to theHabsburg ruler.24Nevertheless, after the Revolt, the Dutch provincial quotasystem for financing the Republic mainly remained in existence. The Estatesof Holland had always collected and distributed the quota of the Bede for thecentral government, and it continued to do so after 1579. Now, however, thosefunds were destined to cover expenditures of the Estates General instead of theemperor.25The newDutch state needed the money raised by the quota as muchas the Habsburg rulers did. The Dutch governments war-making power wasmeasured by its ability to borrow funds against future receipts. It was chieflythe province of Holland, with its wealthy trading cities, that provided thefinancial means to back the Dutch military expenses (needed against Spain). Infact, Holland delivered 55 to 58 percent of the annual war budget of the Estatesof Holland.26Not so much the quota system but other features changed the Dutch fiscalsystem, affecting the local finances of each town significantly. Even thoughthe Dutch cities regularly sold life annuities and redeemable annuities to paytheir share of the Bede, those rent sales were strictly meant to pay the citiesown expenses. Yet, in the course of the sixteenth century, provincial financingcame to affect the cities debts due to rent sales in another way. Three develop-ments shaped a system of provincial long-term financing based on urban rentsales. First, as early as 1515, the central government succeeded in persuadingthe provincial estates to coordinate and control the sales of renten. Second, in1542, the central government induced the provincial estates to sell a newseriesof renten funded by newpermanent excises. In previous times, the future Bedequota had stood surety for an issue of renten, which resulted in the value of analready depleted Bede being diminished. Now, the government had found away to raise large sums of money in a short time without further diminishingthe value of the future ordinaris Bede. When the Habsburg government pro-posed this newtaxation method and way to fund renten, however, the provincesvan der Heijden / STATE FORMATION AND URBAN FINANCES IN HOLLAND 435 at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from only accepted the methods on an important condition: all cash collected, fromthe sale of renten and the provincial excises by which renten were funded,should not be collected by the emperors receiver of the beden but by thereceiver of the Common Territory. Finally, in 1553, the central governmentagreed to abandon the custom of forced buying.27Tracy has marked these developments as a financial revolution becausefrom that moment on, urban capital could flow freely into the refinancing ofthe central state. Backed by stable city excises, the provincial estates were ableto mobilize future revenues for present needs by successfully selling annuitieson urban markets in Holland.28These developments are relevant for our pur-poses as well, since the provincial issuing of life and redeemable annuities alsoinfluenced the finances of Hollands cities. The Estates of Holland raised theirfunds by acting as a collective guarantor for the annuities, issuing in the nameof the common territory (t gemeene land), but the cities acted as a body (cor-pus) to place the annuities on their markets.29Merchants from all cities whosecured the provincial annuity issues were subjected to reprisals in case ofnonpayment. Consequently, (provincial) rent holders could recover damagesby seizing the goods of any burgher of the city in which the renten wereactually sold.Even though the Estates of Holland were responsible for all annuities soldby individual cities for the needs of the province, the cities suffered the mostfrom defaults. Because the provincial annuities were guaranteed by urbanfunds, the citys creditworthiness and the freedom of its citizens were at stakeinstantly.30Theshift intheresponsibilityfor managingtaxrevenues asdemanded by the estates proved to be significant in the decades following1542. In contrast to the former renten secured by the future Bede, the newpro-vincial renten were fully redeemed by the provincial taxes after 1547. Theassurance that the provinces would indeed annually pay the interest in combi-nation with higher interest rates in the 1550s made investors more inclined tobuy provincial renten. From 1553 on, purchasers were no longer constrainedto buy renten, but the provinces managed to sell even larger amounts to fundthe wars (against France, 1552-1559).31By successfully managing the renten sales and taxes by which they werefunded, the provinces succeeded in paying their renten creditors, and, as weshall see, in lifting the interest burden of Hollands cities. The shifting powerbalance from sovereign to province, however, also resulted in the provincialcontrol of (old and new) excises that had previously been under the control ofurban governments. Thus, excises that had been urban became provincialexcises in 1542. Those new taxes, on income from real property, land taxes,and newprovincial excise (common means), remained in use in Holland. Con-sequently, with the new system, Dordrecht and other cities of the province ofHolland lost their financial autonomy as a result of the provincial control of themost important means of income: excises (Table 4). Furthermore, after 1574,the receivers of the provincial excises were no longer appointed by the city436 JOURNAL OF URBAN HISTORY / March 2006 at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from governments, as had been the case before. They were now appointed by theStates of Holland and received their instructions from the provincial authori-ties only.32Just recently, an interesting survey by Wantje Fritschy has revealed that thefinancial revolution of Tracy turned out to have been the first step in a taxrevolution.33Fritschy convincingly states that the revenues from provincialexcises introduced in the 1540s really expanded only after 1574. Furthermore,until 1600 the spectacular rise of provincial revenues resulted not fromthe saleof renten but fromtaxation (common means). The dramatic increase in tax rev-enues was not only due to the expansion of the new taxes but also a result ofpopulation expansion and economic growth.34RENT SALES AND PUBLIC DEBT IN DORDRECHTDuring the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century,Dordrecht issued renten sales for three reasons only, each of which was con-nected with the central governments war politics and its need for large sums ofmoney to fund those wars. In the first examined period after 1550, Dordrechtwas forced to sell bonds to pay the Bede quota of Charles Vand his son PhilipII. Second, after 1579, renten were brought on the market for a similar reason,but nowto pay the quota to the Estates of Holland. Third, the selling of rentenwas necessary to fund the various costs of disturbances with regard to theDutch Revolt, starting with the beeldenstorm in 1566.35It must be noted that some of Dordrechts urban accounts are incompleteand somewhat unclear. The financial officers kept several administrations inwhich various rent sales and resulting interest payments were kept, and not allof those books are fully preserved. Surprisingly, the original issue and sale ofthose renten were repeatedly recorded in the principal accounts of the city,while the following payments were noted down in other accounts, and visavan der Heijden / STATE FORMATION AND URBAN FINANCES IN HOLLAND 437TABLE 4Dordrecht Revenues in Percentages, 1595-1596 and 16951595-1596 1695Excises 37.3 22.7Urban estate and estate agency 32.7 40.4Rents and leases 1.2 14.3Taxes 5.5Loans 7.1 1.3Other revenues 21.7 15.8Total 100.0 100.0In pounds/guilders 104,275 107,055SOURCE: WillemFrijhoff, Hubert Nusteling, andMarijkeSpies, eds., GeschiedenisvanDordrecht, 1572-1813 (Hilversum, the Netherlands, 1998), 123. at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from versa. Consequently, I was not able to retrieve the complete series of rent salesandthesubsequent interest paymentsinfollowingyears.36Theprincipalaccounts of the citys financial officeholder, however, offer a fairly accuratenotion of the annual renten sales and the interest payments in proportion to thetotal urban revenues and expenses.37It seems that most rent payments wererecorded in the major accounts, regardless of the original reasons for issuingthe annuities. Figure 1 is based on the examination of the principal accounts ofDordrecht and presents a sample of the percentage of renten sales and pay-ments during the period 1575 to 1650.38The public debt due to rent sales made up a substantial part of the total urbanexpenses in almost all of the years counted, while in 1625 the interest debtseven rose to 41 percent of Dordrechts total expenditure. In the same year, newrentenwereissued, whichaffectedtheproportional rentenincomeinDordrecht: thirty-one percent of its revenues was derived from life annuitiesand redeemable annuities. According to this sample, the revenues of rent salesexceeded the debt on interest payments in only one year: in 1605, 17 percent ofthe citys total income was derived fromannuity sales, while 13 percent of theexpenses were old interest debts. To summarize, Dordrechts urban debt due tointerest payments was at least 5 percent, but more often amounted to 20 per-cent of the total expenses.These figures offer only an indication of the long-term development of theproportional income and expenses resulting from Dordrechts rent sales andrent costs. Besides the difficulty of sources that have not been preserved, thereare two significant reasons for not basing final conclusions on the figures ofseparate years. First, as it concerns only a sample, several years in which thecity received large sums fromthe rent sales are not included in this picture. Theaccounts of 1576, 1598, and 1604 are not included, but we knowfromvariousdocuments that Dordrecht managed to raise huge amounts out of the sale ofbonds, because it needed to fund three different quotas of the Estates of Hol-land.39The precise sums of those quotas remain unknown (about 24,500 peryear), but we can tell from the resolutions of the Estates of Holland, from theannouncement of the magistrates, and from the interest payments during thefollowing years that the city must have received vast amounts of money on rentsales.40Second, the figures of interest payments sometimes give a distorted repre-sentation of the citys renten debts. At times, only part of the money owing wasactually disbursed. For example, in 1578, the financial officeholders paid onlyhalf of the rent holders they were indebted to. In this case, it concerned bothlife and redeemable annuities that were sold between 1457 and 1574.41When itfailed to pay debt holders, however, the city faced an even higher debt duringthe following years. Consequently, the city had to pay its outstanding debts aswell as its regular annuity disbursement.42Further interpretations of the ratio ofrent sales might be unreliable at this point, but clearly rent sales and their long-term consequences strongly affected urban long-term debt.438 JOURNAL OF URBAN HISTORY / March 2006 at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from 4390 510152025303540451575158015851590159516021605161016151620162516301635164016471650%rentsales%rentpaymentsFigure 1:Percentage Rent Sales and Rent Payments of Total Revenues and Expenses,Dordrecht,1575-1650SOURCE:Dordrecht Municipal Archive, city accounts of thegroot comptoir, 1575-1650. at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from There is no doubt that the interest payments, caused primarily by the rentensales for the taxation and the warfare of the central government, involved aheavy burden on the urban finances. We do not know, however, to what extentthe selling of bonds was initiated by the city itself. What was the process ofdecision making of the urban government in issuing renten and urging its citi-zens to purchase those renten? Is there evidence of local officials negotiatingthe renten sales, the interest rates, and the payment of interest debts? To exam-ine these questions, I take a further look at the urban renten sales and pay-ments, on one hand, and resolutions and writings of both the city and theEstates of Holland, on the other.DECISION MAKING IN SELLING RENTENUntil 1573, the city of Dordrecht primarily issued rent sales to pay a numberof beden to the sovereign and pay the debts that resulted from these rent sales.Various rent sales were also issued to pay for damages and fortifications withregard to the Dutch Revolt. These emissions were all officially authorized byeither Charles V or Philip II, and the Estates of Holland.43Financial historians of early modern debt argue that the central govern-ments control over urban rent sales was emphasized by the obliged authori-zation of rulers.44From the fifteenth century on, cities commonly required agovernment grant to start the issue of a renten sale.45Those authorizationsincluded the amounts being raised, various types of renten (either redeemableor life renten), the interest rates, and the period during which those renten werebeing sold. That way, the sovereigns precisely controlled one of the mostimportant means of urban income. In this respect, however, we must distin-guish between rent sales to fund the expenditure of the sovereign and rent salesto fund urban expenditure. Verloren van Themaat and colleagues suggestedthat Dordrecht required the counts permission only when it concerned theselling of renten for the direct benefit of the ruler. Apparently, not all urban rentsales required the central governments permission. Besides that, financial-economic circumstances affected power balances between city and ruler. Forinstance, thefinancial crisisof 1494enabledthecentral government toincrease its control over urban expenditure and revenues. That is, during theperiod of the financial crisis, the sovereign granted those cities that had notbeen able to pay their interest debts permission to issue urban rent sales purelyto cover their own expenses.46Apparently, it was presumed that new rentensales would pay for urban interest debts due to former renten sales (for theBede quota). Fortheexactoppositereason, after itsbankruptcyin1568,Haarlemwas rarely permitted to issue newrenten sales, and then only when ithad to fund the Bede for the sovereign.47From 1550 to 1650, the central government only granted permission to sellDordrecht renten when it concerned the financial affairs of either the sovereign440 JOURNAL OF URBAN HISTORY / March 2006 at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from or the Estates of Holland. In that period, Dordrecht hardly ever sold renten tocover the costs of its own urban needs. After the Dutch Revolt, the urban rentsales were dominated by the financial politics of the Estates of Holland. Asexpected, most sales were to pay the citys quota to the Estates of Holland(once to Leicester of England, who was temporarily appointed as governor in1586)48and to pay debts resulting fromthose issues. Whereas the city had beenselling renten to fund the wars and struggles of the Spanish ruler, it nowissuedannuities to fund Dutch expenditure resulting fromrevolting against its formersovereign.49In addition, at the end of the sixteenth century the city started sell-ing many provincial renten, funded by urban excises, to pay for the war againstSpain. Annuities were issued from1598 to 1601 especially for this purpose.50Only in 1604 did Dordrecht decide to vend annuities to solely pay forexpenses that were in no way related to the undertakings of the Estates of Hol-land. Fromthat year on, the city regularly funded expenditures on various civicworks (such as the storing of wood or the restoration of domain and dikes) byselling both life and redeemable annuities.51No permission or governmentgrant was necessary for these sales. Apparently, as long as it concerned purelyurban costs, no government grant was required. Thus, autonomy in the deci-sion making of issuing annuities was granted as long as it concerned localaffairs, not when it concerned the financial needs of the central government.COSTS AND BENEFITSDuring the reign of Charles Vand Philip II, the urban debts of Hollands cit-ies were increased to fund the war against France. Since it had to cope withdebts on renten sold prior to 1572, the Estates of Holland issued only a fewprovincial renten between 1572 and 1596. Apparently, there were vast arrears,since many cities had not been able to pay their interest debts for several years.For that reason, the Estates of Holland decided in 1575 to decree a temporarysuspension of urban renten payments (atterminatie).52The Estatesdeclarationdefinitely concerned Dordrecht, which had to deal with the effects of the rentsales of1554and1562(forthesovereign). ThefinancialofficeholderofDordrecht had been unable to disburse its debts to rent holders for at least fiveyears.53Since Dordrecht failed to reimburse its debts to annuity purchasers, Williamof Orange and the Estates of Holland again decided in 1581 to grant suspen-sionof payments. Accordingtothestatement of theEstates, Dordrechtclaimed to have been financially healthy until 1552, the year that newstrugglesagainst France had started. The city added that it only defaulted because it hadhad to sell newannuities to pay the Bede of 1554 to finance the emperors war.Furthermore, thecitys expenditures onmilitaryprotectionwerefurtherincreased, because it had to defend itself against the enemy. Finally, the cityvan der Heijden / STATE FORMATION AND URBAN FINANCES IN HOLLAND 441 at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from argued that a suspension of payment was necessary since the nonpayment ofdebt holders obstructed the free travel and trade of its merchants.54One may perhaps doubt the sincerity of the argument brought forward bythe magistrates of Dordrecht. When referring to the financial crisis of 1494,Ter Gouwsuggested that cities sometimes used those arguments as a means toget rebates on the Bede quota. For instance, during the year of bankruptcy,Amsterdam would have applied for a suspension of payments only to paint aless optimisticpictureofitsfinancialsituation. Bydoingso, Amsterdamwould have hoped to avoid heavy tax payments to the central government. Inother words, the city was not seriously bankrupt; it was merely attempting tobe placed lower on the scale of taxes. Ter Gouws reasoning has been debated,because others found that the financial situation of Amsterdam was indisput-ably deplorable because many merchants were arrested for their citys debts.55I leave the debate on Amsterdam aside and focus on the case of Dordrecht.In what ways did Dordrecht negotiate the costs and benefits of the issuing ofurban renten? Was it in any way able to use its privileges and its historicallyfavorable position?56I have noted that Dordrecht, having voting rights in theEstates of Holland, was often granted higher rebates. The city was particularlysuccessful in reducing its part of the taxes after 1524 and 1536, when it man-aged to increase its rebate to 64 percent (table 5).57Besides those tax rebates,Dordrecht had a favorable assessment in the tax quota of the Estates of Hol-land, and it had, as mentioned, important staple privileges in the river trade.58Dordrecht made use of those privileges to negotiate the urban rent sales thathad been imposed by the rulers. Compared to the other cities of Holland,Dordrecht appears to have had a strong bargaining position in consenting tothe Bede of the sovereign. At various times, local officials managed to obtainnewprivileges or to renewold ones in exchange for raising funds for the sover-eigns needs.59The growing pressure of rivaling towns in Holland affected theaims of those negotiations. For instance, in 1554, Charles Vdecided a conflictover the staple right in favor of Dordrecht in exchange for a considerable con-tribution to the aforementioned Bede.60Again, in 1558, the sovereign granted442 JOURNAL OF URBAN HISTORY / March 2006TABLE 5Rebates of the Bede of the Six Major Cities, 1520-1541City Percentage Rebates of BedeDordrecht 64Haarlem 64Leiden 17Delft 15Gouda 8Amsterdam 5SOURCE: J. D. Tracy, The Taxation Systemof the County of Holland during the Reigns of CharlesV and Philip II, 1519-1555, Economisch- en Sociaal-Historisch Jaarboek 48 (1985): 79, 110. at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from Dordrecht a number of privileges in exchange for raising large sums of money.Obviously, these sums were all raised by selling life and redeemable annuities,while being authorized by the central government.61In the course of the sixteenth century, Dordrecht began to lose its privilegesand profitable position, but it still profited from its remaining advantages,politically as well as economically. Did this mean that Dordrecht could copewith its long-term renten debts that were caused by previous renten sales forthe Bede and the provincial renten issues? I propose three arguments that rebutthis assumption. First, Dordrechts accounts on urban debt indicate that themagistrates were not exaggerating when they argued that the city was not abletopayits rentendebt holders. Accordingtonumerous debt letters(schuldbrieven) written by financial officials to debt holders of urban renten,the city clearly failed to pay the outstanding sums, sometimes even for sevenyears.62These letters all concerned purchasers who were not domiciled inDordrecht, and buyers from Keulen particularly.63Foreign rent holders werethe first in line to be paid, their pressure being a serious threat to urban citizensand commercial trade. Since outsiders were legally allowed to demand thearrest of merchants and their goods, as discussed above, Dordrechts trades-men and merchants were actually arrested.64To recover the damages of theirimprisonment, that of their employees, and the damages to their goods, thosecitizens claimed the costs fromthe urban government. Even though Dordrechtfearedreprisals fromforeignrent holders for obvious reasons, thecitysometimes defaulted for years.Second, the charters of the Estates of Holland demonstrate Dordrechtsinability to pay off the outstanding amounts to creditors. According to theordinance of 1581, Dordrecht had promised to at least disburse the outstandingamounts from1576 onward, while receiving a six-year suspension of paymentover the previous years.65The Estates of Holland were, however, asked threetimes to extend the suspension for another three years. In 1593, the Estates ofHolland agreed to grant a suspensionfor the fourthtime, also permittingDordrecht to reduce the interest rates.66Obviously, the city had not been able tocope with its debts to rent holders. The principal accounts of the city clearlyshowthis burden; in 1625, Dordrecht was still paying off both life and redeem-able bonds that had been sold to fund the beden in the sixteenth century.67Finally, Dordrecht tried to get rid of its long-term debts by using variousfinancial techniques. In the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,the city used three methods to reduce its indebtedness. As was noted before, itrequested suspension of payments several times. Besides that, Dordrechtsfinancial officeholders regularly used the method of conversion. This financialsolution implied selling old renten at lower rates while using the profit toredeem older, more expensive issues.68For instance, the rates of redeemableannuities sold in 1573 were converted in 1604 from 8.3 to 7.1 percent, and in1607 to a rate of 6.25 percent.69During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,most redeemable bonds were converted to the rate of 6.25 percent. Also, fromvan der Heijden / STATE FORMATION AND URBAN FINANCES IN HOLLAND 443 at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from 1629 on, the city reduced life and redeemable annuities almost every year bytaxing annuities that until that time had not been liable to tax.70Such proce-dures resulted in an instant reduction of the annual interest debts. For the inves-tors in urban renten, however, such conversions meant a considerable loss oftheir interest profit. Besides that, cities would risk losing their creditworthi-ness when using such measures too often. Despite these suspensions, conver-sions, and reductions, Dordrecht still had great difficulty in paying for itsregular expenses at the beginning of the seventeenth century. In 1605, thebookkeeper of the civic works (reparatin) was forced to pay workmen andmaterials from his own pocket.71Clearly, the long-term debt of Dordrecht due to the efforts of the centralgovernment to draw capital from the city caused the urban budget great diffi-culties. The balance of dependency, however, lay not entirely on the side of thetown. The constant and desperate financial need of the central and provincialgovernment compelled the rulers to win the support of the cities they imposedtheir taxes on. The vital position of the provinces in the taxation systemof Hol-land entailed a better negotiation position for the urban governments. All greatcities of Holland made use of the financial dependency of the central and pro-vincial government, but Dordrecht was especially successful for a long time.REGAINING CONTROLAround the turn of the seventeenth century, Dordrecht regained control overits long-terminterest debts. These improvements were largely due to the finan-cial politics of the Estates of Holland and their attempts to reduce urban long-term debts that had resulted from provincial renten. Between 1572 and 1596,new issues of provincial renten were few, and the Estates of Holland focusedon the chief problem of how to make up debts on renten prior to 1572. Duringthe last two decades of the sixteenth century, the Estates guaranteed indemnityfor all debts on life and redeemable annuities from 1583 onward. In addition,the Estates of Holland started in 1586 to actually pay the interest on the com-mon territory.72The years after, the Estates paid all debts to the extent that waspossible while also assuming direct responsibility for all redeemable rententhat cities had sold for the needs of the province.73In 1605, Dordrecht receiveda letter of indemnity (akte van schadeloosstelling) in which the Estates of Hol-land assured the city that it would not be held responsible for provincial rentenplaced in 1599, 1600, and 1601 on Dordrechts market. These bonds were soldto fund the war expenditures of the Dutch Revolt and were backed by letters ofindemnity.74As the provincial attempts to disburse the renten debts on the common terri-tory succeeded, the interest burden of Hollands cities lifted. According to theresolution of the Estates of Holland, there had been no interest arrears after1589.75Indeed, Dordrechtsfinancesbenefitedfromthemeasuresof the444 JOURNAL OF URBAN HISTORY / March 2006 at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from Estates of Holland. During the last decades of the sixteenth century and thefirst years of the following century, the cities treasurer started to settle out-standing debts and began to redeem a portion of costly losrenten (with highinterest rates). In 1617, all accumulated arrears were settled, while in 1618 themost expensive losrenten were redeemed. From1605, no further references toletters of indemnity were made in the resolutions of Dordrechts town council.In the course of the seventeenth century, the city began selling bonds forreasons other than the financial needs of the central government. Obviously, itstill issued newrenten to pay the arrears of previous years and the annual quotaof the Estates of Holland. Besides that, it started selling renten solely for thefinancing of urban needs. By selling life and redeemable bonds, Dordrechtpaid for the costs of the deepening of its harbor, for the upkeep of its domains,and for various other public works during the first half of the seventeenth cen-tury. Thus, the financial policies of the provincial government had createdurban financial autonomy in another way. By raising and expanding provincialtaxes, and by demanding control over those funds, the province had increaseditscontrol overurbanfinances. Bycontrollingthosefunds, however, theEstates were able to regain control over provincial interest debts that wereplaced within the great cities walls. Since the reduction of provincial rentendebts gave urban finances more scope, urban communities benefited from thefinancial measures of the Estates. Consequently, by regaining control over itslong-term interest debts, Dordrecht was able to divert public debt for its ownuse.CONCLUSIONSThe effect of Dutch state formation on the urban rent sales in Dordrechtproves to be an interesting case in the context of state formation and urban or-ganization. Both the Habsburg Empire (1477-1579) and the Dutch Republic(1579)dependedintimesofwarlargelyontaxesimposedonHollandswealthy cities. These taxations were collected by selling renten on the urbanmarket. In the course of the sixteenth century, the Habsburg ruler succeeded inpersuading governments at a supralocal levelthe provincesto control andcoordinate the selling of renten funded by new permanent excises. The prov-inces agreed to do so in exchange for total control over all cash collectedthrough the sale of renten and the urban excises by which renten were funded.Consequently, Hollands cities lost an important part of their financial auton-omy. The managing of renten sales by the provinces, however, instead of bene-fitingtheemperor, benefitedthecities interest debtsinother ways. Bysuccessfully managing such renten sales, the province succeeded in lifting theinterest burden of Hollands cities.These processes were reflected in the public debt of the city that was tradi-tionally Hollands most powerful city: Dordrecht. Until the beginning of thevan der Heijden / STATE FORMATION AND URBAN FINANCES IN HOLLAND 445 at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from seventeenthcentury, Dordrechtsfinanceshadbeenlargelydominatedbyrenten debts due to the central governments war making. In some years, theinterest debts even rose to 41 percent of the citys total expenditure. By usingits favorable position, however, Dordrecht successfully negotiated the urbanrent sales that had been imposed by the rulers. The local government managedto obtain newprivileges or to renewold ones in exchange for raising funds forthe sovereigns needs. Losing its dominant trade position, in combination withthe growing pressure of rival towns and the abjuration of the sovereign by thenewrepublic, Dordrecht began to lose its powerful position in the course of thesixteenthcentury. Althoughstill profitingfromremainingprivileges,Dordrecht could not cope with its long-termdebts to rent holders and defaultedfor years. Consequently, the city used various methods to reduce its indebted-ness: suspension of payments, conversion, and taxation on previous renten.Only around the turn of the seventeenth century did Dordrecht regain con-trol over its long-term interest debts. These improvements largely resultedfromthe provincial attempts to disburse the renten debts on the common terri-tory. In the process of Dutch state formation, Dordrecht may have partially lostits financial autonomy by losing control over its excises and by its reduced bar-gaining position. By successfully managing the renten sales and excises bywhich they were funded, however, the provinces had lifted the burden of Hol-lands cities. These changes resulted in urban financial autonomy in otherways. First, Dordrecht regained control over its long-term interest debts. Sec-ond, these improvements enabled Dordrecht to sell new renten to fund theneeds of its own community.Finally, urban accounts are an example as to howinformation in the field offinancial history proves to be important for the more general early modernpolitical history. Such sources reveal the mutual dependency of central author-ities and urban government in drawing capital from urban communities. Thewealth of Hollands great cities was used for the needs of the state but only bythe consent of the urban governments. Such negotiations benefited the finan-cial position of both town and ruler. Furthermore, successful efforts of statemakers(inthiscase, theprovince) toimposecontrol onurbanfinancesinvolved the loss of urban financial autonomy, but it did not necessarily harmurban funds. Since it involved the restoration of urban credit as well, the greatcities of Holland profited by the increasing provincial control over excises.1. Charles Tilly, Entanglements of EuropeanCities andStates, inCharles TillyandWimP. Blockmans,Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800 (Oxford, 1994), 1-27.2. For the formation of the Dutch state, see Marjolein C. t Hart, Intercity Rivalries and the Making ofthe Dutch State, in Tilly and Blockmans, Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, 196-217.3. H. E. van Gelder, De Nederlandse munten (Utrecht, 1965).446 JOURNAL OF URBAN HISTORY / March 2006 at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from 4. Jan van Herwaarden, Dick de Boer, Fred van Kan, and Gerrit Verhoeven, eds., Geschiedenis vanDordrecht tot 1572 (Hilversum, the Netherlands, 1996), 359-62.5. Ibid., 88.6. WillemFrijhoff, Hubert Nusteling, and Marijke Spies, eds., Geschiedenis van Dordrecht, 1572-1813(Hilversum, the Netherlands, 1998), 135.7. Arie van der Schoor, Stad in aanwas: geschiedenis van Rotterdamtot 1813 (Zwolle, the Netherlands,1999), 121-24, 157.8. James D. Tracy, A Financial Revolution in the Habsburg Netherlands: Renten and Renteniers in theCounty of Holland, 1515-1565 (London, 1985), 12-27.9. L. M. Verloren van Themaat, ed., H. W. Dokkum, E. C. Dijkhof, J. T. Roggen, and N. Sanderson, OudeDordtseLijfrenten. Stedelijkefinancieringindevijftiendeeeuw(Amsterdam, 1983), 7-15;andJ. H.Kernkamp, Vijftiende-eeuwse rentebrieven van Noordnederlandse steden, Fontes minores medii aevi, vol.13 (Groningen, the Netherlands, 1961), 6. Both authors refer to P. J. Blok, Een Hollandsche stad, vol. 1 (DenHaag, the Netherlands, 1910), 250; and J. W. Marsilje, Het financile beleid van Leiden inde laat-Beierse enBourgondische periode, 1390-1477 (Hilversum, the Netherlands, 1985), 285-88.10. Marc Boone, Plus dueil que joie. Renteverkopen door de stad Gent in de Bourgondische periode:tussen private belangen en publieke financin, Gemeentekrediet 45 (1991/1992): 176, 3-25; Marc Boone,Geld en macht. De Gentse stadsfinancin en de Bourgondische staatsvorming (1384-1453) (Ghent, 1990),63-67; and W. P. Blockmans, Le crdit public dans les Pays-Bas mridionaux au bas moyen ge, NinthInternational Economic History Congress Bern August 1986: Local and International Credit in the MiddleAges and the 16th Century, ed. H. Dubois (Bern, 1986).11. Boone, Plus dueil que joie, 7.12. Manon van der Heijden, Stadsrekeningen, stedelijke financin en historisch onderzoek, NEHA-Bulletin 14, NO. 2 (1999): 129-66.13. Dirk Houtzager, Hollands lijf- en losrenteleningen voor 1672 (Schiedam, 1950), 53, 27; Tracy, AFinancial Revolution, 206-7; and Marjolein C. t Hart, The Making of a Bourgeois State: War, Politics andFinance during the Dutch Revolt (Manchester, 1993), 162.14. MAD, archief 3, reparatin, inv.nr. 2964, 1590: lossingen van opgenomen penningen interestenende maeckelardijen vandien. See also, Houtzager, Hollands lijf- en losrenteleningen, 53; and Tracy, AFinancial Revolution, 207.15. Houtzager, Hollands lijf-en losrenten, 8-9; Kernkamp, Vijftiende-eeuwse rentebrieven, 6; andVerloren van Themaat et al., Oude Dordtse lijfrenten, 11.16. When paying the costs of the rent sales of 1572 to fund the tax (bede) of the emporor, the financialofficeholders noted down, Ander uuijtgeven van lijffrenten vercost inden jaere 1572; MAD, archief 3,inv.nr. 2597, 1574, fol. 50-52. JeremyBangs, however, argues that life annuities were describedas a sale aswell as a loan: JeremyD. Bangs, Hollands Civic Lijfrente Loans (XVth Century): Some Recurrent Prob-lems, Publication du Centre Europen dtude Burgondo-Mdianes 23 (1983): 75-82.17. Hugo de Groot, Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechtsgeleerdheid, vol. 3 (Leiden, 1952) 14, 17; andKernkamp, Vijftiende-eeuwse rentebrieven, 11-12.18. Kernkamp, Vijftiende-eeuwse rentebrieven, 11-12; Marsilje, Het financile beleid van Leiden, 281-83; and Tracy, A Financial Revolution, 96-99.19. Tracy, A Financial Revolution, 31-33; and J. D. Tracy, The Taxation System of the County of Hol-landduringthe Reigns of Charles VandPhilipII, 1519-1555, Economisch- en Sociaal-Historisch Jaarboek48 (1985): 71-117.20. Tracy, A Financial Revolution, 34-35; and Jonathan Isral, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness,and Fall, 1477-1806 (Oxford, 1995), 130-31.21. See Manon van der Heijden, Haarlemen de kosten van het beleg, 1572-1593 (Amsterdam, 2002);andIzakPrins, Het faillissement der Hollandse steden: Amsterdam, Dorrecht, HaarlemenLeideninhet jaar1494 (Amsterdam, 1922).22. Houtzager, Hollands lijf- en losrenteleningen, 28-29, 41-43; Tracy, A Financial Revolution, 33-36;Tracy, The Taxation System of the County of Holland, 78-81; Isral, The Dutch Republic, 134.23. Tracy, A Financial Revolution, 40-44; Tracy, The Taxation System of the County of Holland, 74-80; and Houtzager, Holland lijf- en losrenteleningen, 127.24. Unie van Utrecht, 1579: the northern provinces and the most important Flemish towns and towns ofBrabant sign a treaty in which they recognize the provinces independence in political and religious matters,Plakkaat van Verlatinghe, 1581: the official rejection of Philip II as ruler of the united provinces of the Neth-erlands (Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland, Overijssel, Groningen, and Friesland).van der Heijden / STATE FORMATION AND URBAN FINANCES IN HOLLAND 447 at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from 25. t Hart, The Making of a Bourgeois State, 74-89.26. James D. Tracy, Emigr and Ecclesiastical Property as the Sheet-Anchor of Holland Finance, 1572-1584, in Reformation, Revolt and Civil War in France and the Netherlands, 1555-1585, ed. Philip Benedict,Guido Marnef, Henk van Nierop, and Marc Venard (Amsterdam, 1999), 255-66 (proceedings of the collo-quium, October 29-31, 1997, Amsterdam).27. Tracy, The Taxation System of the County of Holland, 88.28. Ibid., 45-46, 60, 90-101, 110, 131-35, 221; t Hart, The Making of a Bourgeois State, 161-65; andIsral, The Dutch Republic, 132.29. The register of provincial life annuities sold in Dordrecht was called Register van de lijffrente die deStadt Dordrecht sprekende heeft opt gemeenlant van Hollandt ende Westvrieslandt: archief 3, inv.nr. 2446,for the years 1584, 1598, 1599, 1600, 1601, and 1613. See also Marjolein t Hart, Public Loans and Money-lenders in the Seventeenth Century Netherlands, in Economic and Social History of the Netherlands, vol. 1(Amsterdam, 1989), 119-39.30. Tracy, A Financial Revolution, 58-59; Tracy, The Taxation System of the County of Holland, 73-74; and Houtzager, Hollands lijf- en losrenteleningen, 45-49.31. Tracy, The Taxation System of the County of Holland, 87-88.32. Wantje Fritschy, A Financial Revolution Reconsidered: Public Finance in Holland during theDutch Revolt, 1568-1648, Economic History Review, 56, no. 1 (2003): 57-89.33. Fritschy, A Financial Revolution Reconsidered, 80.34. Ibid., 70-74.35. In English called iconoclastic fury by Jonathan Isral: Isral, The Dutch Republic, 148.36. For instance, the chief city accounts (groot comptoir and reparatin) indicate that there were specialwar accounts and harbor accounts. Unfortunately, none of these accounts are available.37. Sources for this informationare as follows: Municipal Archive Dordrecht, Rekeningenvan het GrootComptoir, 1550-1650, archief 1, inv.nrs. 447-456, archief 3, inv.nrs. 2596-657; RekeningenvandeReparatin, 1573-1650, archief 3, in.nrs. 2947-3014; Rekeningen van de verkoop van los- en lijfrenten op detol van de Gorinchem, archief 1, inv.nrs. 491-500, archief 3, inv.nrs. 2445-60; Voorrechten betreffendefinancin, archief 1, inv.nrs. 142-216, Stadsschulden, archief 3, inv.nr. 621-24a; andRegister opdeordonnanties op de thesauriers, archief 3, inv.nr. 2012-13.38. MAD, archief 3, rekeningen van het groot comptoir, inv.nrs. 2598-657. Unfortunately, only from1574 on are the accounts of the groot comptoir complete enough to present figures. The accounts of 1554,1558, and 1562 are incomplete, but we know from the interest payments in the major accounts (grootcomptoir) and the resolutions of Charles V, Philip II, and the States of Holland that Dordrecht raised vastamounts on rent sales.39. The financial officeholders often recorded redemptions of annuities afterwards in the accounts inwhich rent sales were noted down. For example, accordingto the notes of sold annuities in 1556, the redeem-able annuity of Lijnken Arensdochter, amounting to 15 a year, seemed to have been redeemed in the waraccounts of 1618: MAD, Archief 1, inv.nr. 492, Rekening van de verkoop van los- en lijfrenten, 1555-1556,fol. 5 verso.40. MAD, 1576, 1598: archief 3, inv.nr. 2445 f, inv.nr. 2447: for instance, los- ende lijffrenten bij destadt verocht op het octroy van den heeren Staeten van Hollandt ende Westvrieslandt, daertoe gegeven vandate 10ejulyanno1595(verkocht in1596); in1604, rentenwere soldtofunda provincial taxof 200,000, inwhich Dordrechts quotum was 24,567: archief 3, inv.nr. 2449, inv.nr. 2619, fol. 59.41. MAD, archief 3, groot comptoir, inv.nr. 2601, 1578. Many rent holders bought several annuity con-tracts through the years, which were all paid separately by the officeholders. Therefore, in this example, allseparate rent agreements were counted as rent holders. It concerned 281 (50 percent) nonpaid rent holders,out of a total of 562 renteniers.42. According to the accounts of the groot comptoir, in 1586, regular rent payments as well as outstand-ing debts were paid: MAD, archief 3, inv.nr. 2608, 1586.43. MAD, Voorrechten betreffende financin, archief 1, inv.nrs. 142-216, Stadsschulden, archief 3,inv.nr. 621-24a; and Register op de ordonnanties op de thesauriers, archief 3, inv.nr. 2012-13. Partly based onthe list of Houtzager, Hollands lijf- en losrenten, 112-96; and MAD, Akten van de Staten van Hollandbetreffende los- en lijfrente, archief 3, inv.nrs. 2442-60.44. Boone, Plus dueil que joie, 3-5; and Verloren van Themaat et al., Oude Dordtse lijfrenten, 9.45. Boone, Plus dueil que joie, 3-5; Kernkamp, Vijftiende-eeuwse rentebrieven, 7; and WimDirksen,Stedelijke heffingenin Middelburg vr 1400, in Stedenen dorpenin last. Historische aspectenvanlokalebelastingen en financin, ed. TomPfeil, Beatrix Jacobs, Paul Brood, and Onno Ydema (Amsterdam, 1999),448 JOURNAL OF URBAN HISTORY / March 2006 at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from 11-40, 14. Dirksenbases his findings onBronnentot de geschiedenis vanMiddelburg in denLandsheerlijkentijd, ed. W. S. Unger, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatin 54, 61, 73, 3 vols. (Den Haag, the Netherlands,1923-1931) 2:428 (1508).46. Verloren van Themaat et al., Oude Dordtse lijfrenten, 9, 20.47. van der Heijden, Haarlem en de kosten van het beleg.48. MAD, archief 3, inv.nr. 2447, Register van renten van de capitale leeningen, fol. 13. See also, t Hart,The Making of a Bourgeois State, 77.49. For example, during1567-1569, Dordrecht sold annuities to payfor the damages caused by the rebel-lions andto buildfortified walls to defenditself. Beingin revolt itself, however, in 1595Dordrecht soldannu-ities to fortify the city against Spain: MAD, archief 3, inv.nr, 2601, 1578, fol. 17: omme die stadt tepreserveren vande groote troublen ende oproeringe inde Nederlanden geschiet anno 1566 also volgende deoctroije van de Co. Mat. in date den 3en julij anno 1567; and Inv.nr. 2447, 1595, fol. 1: bij consent endeoctroy vanden heeren Staeten van Hollandt ende Westvryeslandt van date den thyenden juny anno 1595 totvervallinge vande costen van de nyewe wercken, van fortificatien ende andere nootsaeceklijkheden dervoors stede.50. MAD, archief 3, inv.nr. 2446. This record contains payments of rent sales on the common territory in1584, 1598, 1599, 1600, 1601, and 1613. See also t Hart, The Making of a Bourgeois State , 161-65; andTracy, A Financial Revolution, 204-5.51. For instance, MAD, archief 3, inv.nr. 2619, 1604, fol. 65-68; inv.nr. 2621, 1606; inv.nr. 2623, 1609,fol. 91; and inv.nr. 2640, 1626, fol. 43.52. Tracy, A Financial Revolution, 204-5; and Houtzager, Hollands lijf- en losrenteleningen, 120.53. MAD, archief 3, 2445 c, Rekeningen en verantwoording van de inkomsten uit de verkoop vanlijfrentenen belastingenover de jaren 1572-1575: Register van de oude lijfrentendie vorde jaren twee, drie,vier, ende vijff ende tsevetich noch betaelt zijn, fol. 1.54. MAD, archief 3, inv.nr. 621, Stadsschulden, Akte waarbij door Willem van Oranje, de Staten vanHolland en van Zeeland uitstel van betaling voor zes jaar wordt verleend inzake onbetaalde schulden (April10, 1581).55. J. Ter Gouw, Geschiedenis van Amsterdam, 8 vols. (Amsterdam, 1879-1893), 2:252 (1881); andPrins, Het faillissement der Hollandsche steden, 11-12.56. Verloren van Themaat et al., Oude Dordtse lijfrenten, 30-35.57. Tracy, A Financial Revolution, 53-54.58. Van Herwaarden et al., Geschiedenis van Dordrecht, 45, 79-87; J. L. Van Dalen, Geschiedenis vanDordrecht, 2vols. (Dordrecht, 1933) 2:1093-1107; andFrijhoff et al., Geschiedenis vanDordrecht, 133-38.59. In the fifteenth century, the sovereign had also offered privileges to Haarlem, Leiden, Gouda, andAmsterdam in exchange for the payment of interest debts arising from sold life annuities: Houtzager,Hollands lijf- en losrenteleningen, 24.60. MAD, archief 1, Voorrechten betreffende financin, inv.nr. 142; archief 1, Rekeningen op de tol vanGorinchem, inv.nr. 491; and Van Dalen, Geschiedenis van Dordrecht, 2:1102-3.61. MAD, archief 1, Voorrechten betreffende finanicn, inv.nr. 143; and Van Dalen, Geschiedenis vanDordrecht, 2:1104.62. MAD, archief 3, 2445 c, Rekeningen en verantwoording van de inkomsten uit de verkoop vanlijfrenten en belastingen over de jaren 1572-1575, Schuldbrief April 18, 1579, fol. 248-49.63. The financial officeholders of Dordrecht kept eleven letters in their accounts of 1572-1575, all ofwhich concerned buyers fromoutside Dordrecht: three fromKeulen, and the others fromcities elsewhere inthe Netherlands. MAD, archief 3, 2445 c, Rekeningen en veranwoording van de inkomsten uit de verkoopvan lijfrenten en belastingen over de jaren 1572-1575, fol. 248 verso-249.64. MAD, archief 3, inv.nr. 2445g, Tolrekening1577, fol. 18-19; Houtzager, Hollandslijf- enlosrentelenigen, 26-27, 48; and Tracy, A Financial Revolution, 109.65. MAD, archief 3, Stadsschulden, inv.nr. 621, April 10, 1581.66. MAD, archief 3, Stadsschulden, inv.nr. 622, April 10, 1586; inv. nr. 623, November 3, 1589; andinv.nr. 624, January 8, 1593.67. MAD, archief 3, groot comptoir, inv.nr. 2639, 1625.68. Tracy, A Financial Revolution, 99; and Houtzager, Hollands lijf- en losrenteleningen, 123.69. MAD, archief 3, groot comptoir, inv.nr. 2596, 1573, fol. 14.70. MAD, archief 3, groot comptoir, inv.nr. 2642, 1629: Cortinghe van renten, fol. 33 verso.71. MAD, archief 3, reparatin, inv.nr. 2975, 1605, fol. 78 verso.72. Houtzager, Hollands lijf- en losrenteleningen, 122.van der Heijden / STATE FORMATION AND URBAN FINANCES IN HOLLAND 449 at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from 73. Tracy, A Financial Revolution, 205-6.74. MAD, archief 3, 2442, Akte an schadeloosstelling door de Staten van Holland aan het stadsbestuurvoor de verkochte los- en lijfrenten, 1588; inv.nr. 2445, Akte van schadeloosstelling door de Staten van Hol-land aan het stadsbestuur voor verkochte renten, 1605; and Houtzager, Hollands lijf- en losrenteleningen,122. See also Tracy, A Financial Revolution, 205-6.75. Houtager, Hollands lijf- en losrenteleningen, 52.Manon van der Heijden is a senior research fellowat Vrije Universiteit, Department ofHistory. She is member of the Advisory Board of Crime, History & Societies and edi-tor of Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis. She has published sev-eral books and many national and international articles on urban finances, criminality,family and marriage, and secular and ecclesiastical control.450 JOURNAL OF URBAN HISTORY / March 2006 at UNIV FED DO RIO DE JANEIRO on February 18, 2015 juh.sagepub.com Downloaded from