Statcon Chapter 11

8/10/2019 Statcon Chapter 11

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CHAPTER 11

In general

Primary purpose of constitutional construction

The primary task of constitutional construction is to ascertain the itent or purpose of theframers of the constitution as expressed in the language of the fundamental law, and thereafter

to assure its realization. As the court aptly said in a case: The fundamental principle of

constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and the

people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and

expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. It has also been said that the Philippine

Constitution has one fundamental purpose, which is to protect and enhance the peoples

interests, as a nation collectively and as persons individually. The interpretation of the

Constitution should be done with a view to realizing the fundamental objective.

Basic guidelines in the Interpretation and Construction of the Constitution:

1. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land

Constitution defined fundamental law which sets up a form of government and defines and delimits thepowers thereof and those of its officers, reserving to the people themselves plenarysovereignty written charter enacted and adopted by the people by which a government for them isestablished permanent in nature thus it does not only apply to existing conditions but also to futureneeds basically it is the fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation

absolute and unalterable except by amendments all other laws are expected to conform to it

2. The words in the constitution must be given their ordinary meaning

CASE: Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperativevs. La Trinidad Water District

In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevailsbecause the Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty of

the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not conform to it.

InSocial Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board,25the Court held that, "It is basic that if alaw or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and

void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no actshall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution."26InSabio v. Gordon,27the Court held that,"the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is the basic and paramount law to which allother laws must conform."28InAtty. Macalintal v. Commission on Elections,29the Court heldthat, "The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other
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laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and allpublic authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be strickendown for being unconstitutional."30InManila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance

System,31the Court held that:

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of

the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or bythe executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and

void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is thefundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written inevery statute and contract."32(Emphasis supplied)

CASE: Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council

Constitutional Interpretation

The argument that swayed the majority in this cases original decision was that if those whocrafted our Constitution intended that there be two representatives from Congress, it would nothave used the preposition "a" in Article VIII, Section 8 (1). However, beyond the number ofrepresentatives, the Constitution intends that in the Judicial and Bar Council, there will berepresentation from Congress and that it will be "ex officio", i.e., by virtue of their positions oroffices. We note that the provision did not provide for a number of members to the Judicial andBar Council. This is unlike the provisions creating many other bodies in the Constitution.12

In other words, we could privilege or start our interpretation only from the preposition "a" andfrom there provide a meaning that ensures a difficult and unworkable result -- one whichundermines the concept of a bicameral congress implied in all the other 114 other places in the

Constitution that uses the word "Congress".

Or, we could give the provision a reasonable interpretation that is within the expectations of thepeople who ratified the Constitution by also seeing and reading the words "representative ofCongress" and "ex officio."

This proposed interpretation does not violate the basic tenet regarding the authoritativeness ofthe text of the Constitution. It does not detract from the text. It follows the canonicalrequirement of verba legis. But in doing so, we encounter an ambiguity.

In Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal,13we said:

As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, it being essential for the rule of law toobtain that it should ever be present in the peoples consciousness, its language as much aspossible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according tothe text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courtsto alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thusthese are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.

However, where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words of the Constitution should be interpretedin accordance with the intent of its framers or ratio legis et anima. A doubtful provision must be
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examined in light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances surroundingthe framing of the Constitution. In following this guideline, courts should bear in mind theobject sought to be accomplished in adopting a doubtful constitutional provision, and the evilssought to be prevented or remedied. Consequently, the intent of the framers and the peopleratifying the constitution, and not the panderings of self-indulgent men, should be given effect.

Last, ut magis valeat quam pereat the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Weintoned thus in the landmark case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of theConstitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all theprovisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpretedas to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subjectshould be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of theConstitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonableconstruction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a

construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make thewords idle and nugatory. (Emphasis provided)

And in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,13we said:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provisionunder consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should

bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, soughtto be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history ofthe times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. Theobject is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact theparticular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe

the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.

The authoritativeness of text is no excuse to provide an unworkable result or one whichundermines the intended structure of government provided in the Constitution. Text isauthoritative, but it is not exhaustive of the entire universe of meaning.

There is no compelling reason why we should blind ourselves as to the meaning of"representative of Congress" and "ex officio." There is no compelling reason why there shouldonly be one representative of a bicameral Congress.

3. The application and interpretation of the constitutional provision shall be in

accordance with the intent of the framers of the people adopting it

CASE: Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC

The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V.Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution asculled from their deliberations.
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The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary sourcefrom which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself.The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched expressthe objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when themeaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids ofconstruction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or

Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provisionbeing construed.47

Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil LibertiesUnion v. Executive Secretary48that "the debates and proceedings of the constitutionalconvention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resultingConstitution x x x only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary theterms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention'are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason fortheir votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, muchless of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force offundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.'

The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the peopleadopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof."

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clearterms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congressenacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list representation, we shouldtherefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use ofextraneous aids of construction be resorted to.

But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives

was designed to "enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-

defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment ofappropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole x x x." The criteria for participationis well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even tothe proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely express theirindividual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose ofthe constitution or statute.

Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not anissue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.

4. The constitution must be construed as a whole

CASE: Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr vs. House Of Representatives

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarilyturn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutionalconstruction.


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First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be giventheir ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co.,

Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36this Court, speaking through Chief Justice EnriqueFernando, declared:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning.

We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to beassumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couchedexpress the objective sought to be attained. They are to be giventheir ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in whichcase the significance thus attached to them prevails.As the Constitution is notprimarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that itshould ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possibleshould be understood in the sense they have in common use.What it says accordingto the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negatesthe power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the peoplemean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reducedto a minimum.37(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should beinterpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply thisprinciple in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying theprovision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing aConstitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will beexamined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstancesunder which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason

which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular

provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order toconstrue the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason andcalculated to effect that purpose.39(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As it did inNitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40where, speaking through MadameJustice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamentalprinciple of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of theorganic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect.The primarytask in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization ofthe purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may

also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution wereguided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.41(Emphasis andunderscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus,in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not havededicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one


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person without considering that it could also affect others. When theyadopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provisionshould function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itselfalone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that greatdocument.43(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no oneprovision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to beconsidered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particularsubject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuatethe great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particularsubject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the

whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed todefeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made tostand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor ofa construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may makethe words idle and nugatory.45(Emphasis supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids isavailable. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,this Courtexpounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings ofthe constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of theresulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail assaid proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when

the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value asshowing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their

votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk,much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrumentthe force of fundamental law.We think it safer to construe the constitution from

what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore dependsmore on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in theframers's understanding thereof.46(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

5. Constitution provisions are mandatory in character

RULE: constitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory unless a different

intention is manifested.

Why? Because in a constitution, the sovereign itself speaks and is laying down rules

which for the time being at least are to control alike the government and the governed.

failure of the legislature to enact the necessary required by the constitution does not

make the legislature is illegal.


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6. It is presumed that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing

ALL PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION ARE SELFEXECUTING; EXCEPTIONS

Some constitutions are merely declarations of policies. Their provisions command the

legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish anoutline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machineryand securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.

Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferredand the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself.

Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutionalmandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing.

In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing, unless the contrary is clearly intended.

Non-self-executing provisions would give the legislature discretion to determine when, orwhether, they shall be effective, subordinated to the will of the law-making body.

CASE: Manila Prince Hotelvs. Government Service Insurance System

We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance andadministration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by theauthority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount lawof the nation.[10]It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns tothe different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed

principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is thatit is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which allprivate rights must be determined and all public authority administered.[11]Under the doctrine ofconstitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law orcontract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into byprivate persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force andeffect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of thenation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Theirprovisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers whomerely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of thegovernmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights ofcitizens.[12]A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and

becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that whichsupplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the rightconferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can bedetermined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicatingthat the subject is referred to the legislature for action.[13]
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As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upona different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operatedirectly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function ofconstitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence,unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutionalmandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the

constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, thelegislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of thefundamental law.[14]This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always

been, that -

x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitutionshould be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion todetermine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated tothe will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusingto pass the needed implementing statute.[15]

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation tofacilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation ofsuch a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenientremedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonablesafeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement andadd to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision doesnot render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from aconstitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is notnecessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on thesubject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise ofconstitutional right and make it more available.[17]Subsequent legislation however does not

necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

CASE: Taada vs. Angara

Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and statepolicies. The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution[21]is called the basic politicalcreed of the nation by Dean Vicente Sinco.[22]These principles in Article II are not intended to

be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts.[23]They are used by thejudiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislaturein its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case ofKilosbayan, Incorporated vs.

Morato,[24]the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of ArticleXII are not self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action inthe courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines forlegislation.

In the same light, we held inBasco vs. Pagcor[25]that broad constitutional principles needlegislative enactments to implement them, thus:
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On petitioners allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12 (Family) and13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2(Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these aremerely statements of principles and policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing,meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.

In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principlesready for enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to theexecutive and to the legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directivesof the article, the available remedy was not judicial but political. The electorate could expresstheir displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of the

ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2).

The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutionalprinciples are sourced from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authorityto wade into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. Mr. JusticeFlorentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.,[26]explained thesereasons as follows:

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legalright -- a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) ofthe Constitution -- that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to thepublic respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting allor part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the court should be understood as simply sayingthat such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering thegeneral policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the PhilippineEnvironment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effectiveopportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of

action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for atleast two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated ordisregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defendthemselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to thismatter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration -- where a specific violation of law or applicableregulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expandedconception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of theConstitution which reads:

Section 1. x x x

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involvingrights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has

been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of anybranch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphases supplied)

When substantive standards as general as the right to a balanced and healthy ecology and theright to health are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as a grave abuse of
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discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the result will be, it is respectfullysubmitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. Atleast in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts haveno claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Whereno specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy makingdepartments -- the legislative and executive departments -- must be given a real and effective

opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement thembefore the courts should intervene.

Examples of statutes and actual caes wherein the legislature in its enactment oflaws and the judiciary, in the exercise of its judicial review, have used theDeclaration of Principles and State Policies as their guide:

CASE: Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Commission on Audit

The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was created in

order to implement a State policy declared in Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution, which

reads:

ARTICLE II - DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism andnationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in

pursuit of a constitutional mandate, comes within the class of public corporations defined by

paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code and governed by the law which creates it, pursuant to

Article 45 of the same Code.

Commission on Audit; jurisdiction over Boy Scouts. The issue was whether or not the

Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.

The BSP contends that it is not a government-owned or controlled corporation; neither is it an

instrumentality, agency, or subdivision of the government. The Supreme Court, however, held

that not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be

considered private corporations as there exists another distinct class of corporations or

chartered institutions which are otherwise known as public corporations. These corporations

are treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to

the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to a different criteria relating to

their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and their administrative


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relationship to the government or any of its departments or offices. As presently constituted,

the BSP is a public corporation created by law for a public purpose, attached to the Department

of Education Culture and Sports pursuant to its Charter and the Administrative Code of 1987. It

is not a private corporation which is required to be owned or controlled by the government and

be economically viable to justify its existence under a special law. The economic viability test

would only apply if the corporation is engaged in some economic activity or business function

for the government, which is not the case for BSP. Therefore, being a public corporation, the

funds of the BSP fall under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. Boy Scouts of the

Philippines vs. Commission on Audit,G.R. No. 177131. June 7, 2011.

CASE: Espina vs. Zamora

Constitutionality; Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. The Court dismissed petitioners

argument that Republic Act No. 8762, known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 200,

violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution for the State to develop a self-reliant and

independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. The provisions of Article II of

the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-executing.

Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts.

Further, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self-

reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it

does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is

simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and

ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development. The 1987 Constitution

takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade policy

that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis

of equality and reciprocity; and speaks of industries which are competitive in both domestic and

foreign markets as well as of the protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign

competition and trade practices. Thus, while the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of

Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, it also recognizes the need for business exchange

with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of

Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In

other words, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods,

and services. While it does not encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not

prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity,

frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. The key, as in all economies in the world, is

to strike a balance between protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign
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investments and services. More important, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives

Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the

recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority and when the national

interest requires. Thus, Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it

depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into

certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress

has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of

reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The control and regulation of trade in the interest of the public welfare is of course an exercise of

the police power of the State. A persons right to property, whether he is a Filipino citizen or

foreign national, cannot be taken from him without due process of law. In 1954, Congress

enacted the Retail Trade Nationalization Act (RA 1180) that restricts the retail business to

Filipino citizens. In denying the petition assailing the validity of such Act for violation of the

foreigners right to substantive due process of law, the Supreme Court held that the law

constituted a valid exercise of police power. The State had an interest in preventing alien control

of the retail trade and R.A. 1180 was reasonably related to that purpose. That law is not

arbitrary. Here, to the extent that RA 8762 lessens the restraint on the foreigners right to

property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to

a denial of the Filipinos right to property and to due process of law. Filipinos continue to have

the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to which the law in question has permitted the

entry of foreign investors. Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the

wisdom of RA 8762 save when it blatantly violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said,there is no showing that the law has contravened any constitutional mandate. The Court is not

convinced that the implementation of RA 8762 would eventually lead to alien control of the

retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and strong argument to

support its thesis. The law itself has provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that

business. Representatives Gerardo S. Espina, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., et al. G.R.

No. 143855, September 21, 2010.

Constitutionality; standing to sue. The long settled rule is that he who challenges the validity of

a law must have a standing to do so. Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party

to come to a court of justice and make such a challenge. More particularly, standing refers to his

personal and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer direct injury as a result of

the passage of that law. The party must show that he has been or is about to be denied some

right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some

burdens or penalties by reason of the law he complains of. In this case, there is no clear showing
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that the implementation of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000 prejudices petitioners or

inflicts damages on them, either as taxpayers or as legislators. Still the Court will resolve the

question they raise since the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like

ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when, as here, the public interest so requires or the

matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount

public interest.Representatives Gerardo S. Espina, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., et al.

G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010.

Notes:

National Economy and Patrimony; While Section 19, Article II of the 1987

Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and independent national

economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of

Filipino monopoly of the economic environment.As the Court explained in Taada v.Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997), the provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the

declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative failure to

pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts. The Court further

explained in Taada that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the ideals of

economic nationalism: (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the

grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony

and in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods; (2) by

mandating the State to adopt measures that help make them competitive; and (3) by

requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy

effectively controlled by Filipinos. In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987

Constitutionrequires the development of a self-reliant and independent nationaleconomy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of

Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit

foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that

Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.

7. The provisions of the constitution are prospective in application

RULE: constitution operates prospectively only unless the words employed are clear that it

applies retroactively

Magtoto v. Manguera

Sec 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution: no person shall be compelled to be a witness

against himself. x x x Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in

evidence

Court held that this specific portion of the mandate should be given a prospective application

Co v. Electric Tribunal
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Sec. 1(3) Art. 4 of the 1987 Constitution states that those born before January 17, 1973 of

Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are citizens

of the Philippines has a retroactive effect as shown to the clear intent of the framers through the

language used

8.

Aids in construing and interpreting the constitution.

Aids to construction, generally

apart from its language courts may refer to the following in construing the constitution:

o history

o proceedings of the convention

o prior laws and judicial decisions

o contemporaneous constructions

o consequences of alternative interpret-tations

these aids are called extraneous aids because though their effect is not in precise rulestheir influence describes the essentials of the process

Realities existing at time of adoption; object to be accomplished

History basically helps in making one understand as to how and why certain laws were

incorporated into the constitution.

In construing constitutional law, the history must be taken into consideration because

there are certain considerations rooted in the historical background of the environment

at the time of its adoption (Legaspi v.Minister of Finance)

Proceedings of the convention

RULE: If the language of the constitutional provision is plain it is not necessary to

resort to extrinsic aids

EXCEPTION: when the intent of the framer doesnt appear in the text or it has more

than one construction.

Intent of a constitutional convention member doesnt necessarily mean it is also the

peoples intent

The proceedings of the convention are usually inquired into because it sheds light into

what the framers of the constitution had in mind at that time. (refers to the debates,

interpretations and opinions concerning particular provisions)

Contemporaneous construction and writings

may be used to resolve but not to create ambiguities

In construing statutes, contemporaneous construction are entitled to great weight

however when it comes to the constitution it has no weight and will not be allowed to

change in any way its meaning.


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Writings of delegates has persuasive force but it depends on two things:

o if opinions are based on fact known to them and not established it is immaterial

o on legal hermeneutics, their conclusions may not be a shade better in the eyes of the

law.

Previous laws and judicial rulings

framers of the constitution is presumed to be aware of prevailing judicial doctrines

concerning the subject of constitutional provisions. THUS when courts adopt principles

different from prior decisions it is presumed that they did so to overrule said principle

Changes in phraseology

Before a constitution is ratified it undergoes a lot of revisions and changes in

phraseology (ex. deletion of words) and these changes may be inquired into to ascertain

the intent or purpose of the provision as approved

HOWEVER mere deletion, as negative guides, cannot prevail over the positiveprovisions nor is it determinative of any conclusion.

Certain provisions in our constitution (from 1935 to the present) are mere

reenactments of prior constitutions thus these changes may indicate an intent to modify

or change the meaning of the old provisions.

Consequences of alternative constructions

consequences that may follow from alternative construction of doubtful constitutional

provisions constitute an important factor to consider in construing them.

if a provision has more than one interpretation, that construction which would lead to

absurd, impossible or mischievous consequences must be rejected.

e.g. directory and mandatory interpretation: Art. 8 Sec 15(1) requires judges to render

decision within specific periods from date of submission for decision of cases (construed

as directory because if otherwise it will cause greater injury to the public)

Statcon Chapter 11

Documents

Transcript of Statcon Chapter 11