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TITLE T e gultilateral disarmaient Piocess-t. Conference on .

the United Nations' of the Next Decade (16th, *Uptick, - .Beriuda, Jude' 21-26, WU- . ' '.. . .

INSTITUTION Stanley Foundatiori, Nuscatinei Iowa,PUB -DAVI July 81 . . ,

. NO:TIV 6n,.; For related; documents, see 'ED 1118 666-667.1Photographs throughout document )say not reproduceclearly from EDIS. in microfiche or paper copy.

AVAILABLE FROM Stanley Foundation-, 429 East' Third Street,scatine, Ili 52761 (free) qv .

iEDES PRICE MFO1 Plus Postage.. PC Not Available frOmEDRS...DESCRIPTORS *Disarmament; -International Re3oations; ,Nuclear

warfare% *Peace; World ProblemIDENTIFIERS pnited Nations

ABSTRACT..

This is a report of a conference held in Bermuda in1981 to discuss a'aultilateral fp froac 13 to distirmament- The .

conference was an informal, off-the-record exchange of ideas and .

optNions among 24 diplomats and scholars from 18 countries and twointernational agencies. Participants considered current disarmamentconcepts, assessed 'UN disarmament mechanisis and procedures, and '7

explored new approaches to this.issue. Significant highlights of the ..repott include the folloWing recommendatioka, .1 summit meeting,between the heads of. state of the United States and thi Soviet union -

should be' Organized as Soon as poisible, before the end of 19".Discussions. should include a wide range of politigalqssues butprincipal focus should be' on reaching general agreement on theframework of strategic arms limitation and reduction- in .

t.terne.ticinal group of expetts should be'ereated to, determlne, whgtherparity in force levels between the Soviet ,Union and 'the United Statesexists,. Nations should make stronger commitment to -regional arms

.,limitation and disatmament efforts.. Existing mtilateral disarmament

.maphinery, both deliberative and negotiating mechanisms, needs to be! streamlined and better coordinated, eteatly increased educational and-'.. phblic information efforts should be unlettaken tO4build a more

.effective. constituency for arms limitation and .disarmament" . .

itideperOeiut initintj.ves, and temporary confidence building messiiresshould be underiAken by nations to stimulate disarmament progress.4(Anihor/RN) . .

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The MUltilateralDisarmament Process

aU S DE PAETMENT OF NEACTE,

EOUCATtON WELFARENATIONAL IRSTITUTE OF

EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRO,DECEIT EXACTLY AS RECEIVE FROMTHE PERSON OR OROANIZATNNtoRIGIN.ATINO IT,POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS'STATED 00 NOT NECESSARILY REPRE.. -SENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OFfOUCATION Fost Tor" OR pOL.tcy

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HAS BEEN GRANTED BY I

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f.e'r-r4 . TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCESINFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

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, SixteenthConfernce on the.'

United Nations.of the

. Next DecadeWarwick, Bermuda June 21-26, 1981

Sponsore51,1V,The Stanlerfcitpdation'

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The'MultilateralDisarmament Pricess,

TheStanley FoundationReport of the Sixteenth

United Na tons iaf the Next DecadeConference

Convened June 21-26, 1981In Warimick, BermUda

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PURPOSE -1*t this conference, international experts examined theIsulLIliateral. apkoach to disarmament. Discussion-fo-

'..zubed on pTepara,tions for the 1982 UN Special Sea---sion ofi -Diehrmament. as well as the longer-range is-sues of arms liinitation and disarmament.Conference timing and agenda. were designed formaximum impiitt on UN planning. Partici ants con-sidered current disarmament concepts, (ssessed UNdisarmament mechanisms and procedures, and"Zt.ispfored- new approaches' to this issue. .

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PARTIQIPATION

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Twenty-four displomats and holars from 18coun- ,

tries and 2 international agencies,participated inthis five day conference. Each partiiipant ,had consider

able experience in the International organization orforeign service arena. Moreover, the grourrepre-sented varying areas of specialization in the armslimitation field. This fact, combined with the'informal

nature of the conference and the many opportunitiesfbr,personal conversatirn, produced new insights andperspectives.

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SIGNIFICANT HIGHLIGHTS OF RA15PORTEURS'REPORT

A summit meeting between the heads of stateiofthe United States and the Soviet Union should beorganized as deoh as possible and before end ,

of.1981, Discussions should include a wide ,rangeof political issues but principal.focusthlkild beon reaching general agreement on theof stiatesii arms limitation and reductio .

2. There Auld, be regular, continuing meetirgi4 between high -level policy makers:and military

leaders.of the Soviet Union and the United States,the first of which could be in 'preparation fo; theabove suggested summit.

3. An international group of experts should becreated co determine whether parity in force '

levels between the Soviet Union and the UnitedStates exists. w

4. All nations should prepare thoroughly for the t1982 Special Session of the UN General Assemblydeyited to disarmament (SSObII). The prepara-tory Committee should.create eeparate workinggroups, one dealing yith a Comprehensive Pro-gramme of Disarmament and others focusing ona few desatmament items which should receive

. high priority.

5. Urgent measures are needed to strengthen thenuclear nonproliferation regime includeing: earlyprogress by nuclear weapdh.states on strategicarms limitation and reduction and a comprehensivenuclear.test ban, guaranteed assurances of .supply of nuclear materials'for peaceful uses by

tOuntiries covered under internationa safe-.guards, an agreed formula for negative secu-rity guarantees for nonnuclear weapon states, --strengthening the International Atomic EnergyAgency- and its safeguards, and careful.prepara-tion by all natioas for,tte 1983 c6nfeience on thepeaceful uses of nuclear energy.

6. Nations should make stronger commitment to re-gional arms limitation and disarmament efforts:High priority should be given to Europdan armscontrol including king -range theatre nucleAr

forces, mutual.force reduCtions, and a furopeandisarmament conference. New nuclear-weapon-freezones and zones of peace should be explored inseveral regions including thd Middle east,

'Africa, and Southerti sia.

7. Existing mpltilatera disarmaient machinery,both deliberitve and negotiating mechanisms,needs to be Streamlined and better coordinated.The Committee on Disarmament .(CD) must improveits operation.'It will be especially helpful ifthe CD can achileve any specilic'arms controlagreement prior toSSOC II.

8. eGre41-y increased educational and public infor-. maion efforst should be undertaken to build a

e.). more effectivje constituency for arms limitation"',_and disarmament. Thel...Unitqd Nations, national .

governments, and nongovernmental organiza-tions should give greiter emphasisto dem-onstrating the contriButioK to arms limitationand disarmament to the security of.nations.

9. Independent initiatives and temporary. confidence-building measures should be under-

taken by nations to stimulate disarmamenr-prog-toss. Such measures (if initiated by the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union) could be especiallyvaluable under current intetnations,cir-cniastances.

lb. The UN's conciliation capability should be . #

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streagthened through creation df a handing con- .7,4:,..

ciliation commission or AA inforpal-Body of dis- -,...4 1

4pcC--. . anguished persons whe-whomid.be availatile on a' ',2

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REI'ORT..

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This conference Was an informal, off-the-record ex-chafige of ideas and opinions. From the discubiii

the rapporteUrs prepared:their report after rpl. confer-.lence. Participants neither reviewed, nor approy (14thereport, therefore, it should not be assumed 4i t every' Za1participant subscribes to all recommehdatioasi Ob-servations, and ccinclusions..

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The eapporteurs have,indicated participanisi nrsensus, or latR,ob consensus, and accpct full espon-sibility foe'content. The-views--c-ontairied- are not _necessarily those of the Stanley FouDdation. ,

The report i.e distrOuted iri the hOpe-that-itstimulate tudy, researcfl and education With

=1. to the Uni-' -interaction

'granted tomaterial somade. AdditioStanliy Foundatio

will'respect

ed Natione.and its vital role in ahieviing .

l'peace and a better yorldwPermissionisplicate or quote any ,part or' all of, theong as prOper acknow±edkement'is 4

copies are available free from the, 0

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Conference Summary, , Participants 6

Rapporteur ReportThe Multilateral Disarmament Process 9

Diiramiament Stalemati - 9 1I

. Second Special Session on Disimumment l(SSOD H) 13

., General Objectives of SSOD IIPriorities for SSOD IIRecondilation of road andSpedtic Approaches e

Ways to Increase the Likelihood of Succesb .of SSOD II

0 4 Nuclear Nonproliferation,and the Multilateral Process 21

Nonproliferation Principles *%

NIT and Second Review ConferenceStrengthening the Nonpioliferation Regimeinternational Atomic Energy Agency1983 Conferedce on the Peaceful Uses of

Nuclear Energy _

Regional Multilateral Disarmament WortsEuropean Anna ControlfibclearWeapon-Pree Zones and Zones of Peace

Multilateral Disarmament Mrhinery' Deliberative Bodies;Plegotlating Body: Committee on Disarmament

UN Disarmament Support Services

Expandingthe Disarmament Constituency 41.ifethods and Approach .National Disarmameht Maar:pat:IonsNongovernmental OrganizationsWorld Disarmament Campaign

*. OtherApproac.hes to Disarmamentand Security 4

In depdident Initiatives and MoratorihmsNonbinding Norms and informal RestraintsOther Confidence-But Ming Measuresimproved Mechanisms for Peaceful Resolution

of Controversies' UN and Regional Verification Processes

UN and Regional Security Capability 1

Opening Remarks , . - 50Chairman's Observations- 62

r Stanley R6undation information . 64'

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Conference Chairman -..,...i''

C. Maxwell Stanley, 'President The Stanley Foundtion

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Ahmed Esmat Abdet.Meguid, PermanentRepresehta-tive of ttje Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Pia-

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Olu. Adeniji, Permanent Representathit of Nigeria to. the tinitedNations in Geneva it

Valentin Berezhkov, first Secretary, Embassy of thejiSSR $ 0'

, Marshall Brement,' Deputy Representaike of theUnited States to the United Nations

William B. Buffum, Under-Secretary-General for Polit ,

ical and General Assembly Affairs, United NationsChou Nan, ,Deputy Permanent Representathiedi the

People's Republic of China to the United NationsDragomir D3oldc, Special Counsellor for Disarma-

ment, Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, Xugo:slaviq

James F. Dobbins, Director, Office of Theater MilitaryPolicy, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, US Depart-ment of State , , .

Richard H. tein, Perinanent Representative' of theto the.tinited Nations in Geneva; Head

of Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament

Partidpants!4

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Charles Conway Flowerree, US Representative to theCOmmittee on Disarmament .

I. Ben Fonseka, Permanent Representative of SriLanka to the United Nations

Antonio Gonzdiez-de-Ledn, Principal Ditettor of Mul ,tilateral Affairs/ Foreign Ministry of Mexico' ..

Viktor L. Issraeiyan, Member-9f the Collegium of eMinliryof Foreign Affairs of the USSR; Represetive to the Committee on Disarmament

tichwaja floiannieil Kaiser, Permanent Represents.:' tive of the People's Republic of aIngladesh to the

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Jacques .Leprette, Perinanent Representative ofFrance to the United Nations

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IMircea Malitza, Permanent Representative of Romaniato the United Nations in Geneva

Amrik Mehta, Special Adviser to the Director General,International Atomic energy Agency

Arthut enzies, Ambassador for Disarmament ofCanada, Department of External Affairs

Yoshla Olcawa, Anribassadoi-bf JRpan to the Commit-tee on Disarmament

likka Pastinen, Permanent Representative of Finlandto the United Nations *- -

Domingo Siazon. Permanent Repres entative of thePhilippines to the IAEA and UNIDO; Ambassador ofthe Philippines to Austria

Louis B. Sohn, Woodruff Professor of IntetnationalLaw, University of Georgia, United Stags

GiInther van Well, Permanent Representative of theFederal Republic of Germany to the United Nations

Alexander Yankov, Professor of International Law;Sof14 State University, Bulgaria .

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Roppcoteurs 1

'15aVidlif Stanley, Senior Partner, Stanley, tande,Coulter, and Pearce, Attorneys-at7Law

,John IL Redick, Research Dirictor, The Stanley Founddation -

. Stanley FounciatiO4 StaffJack Smith, eXjxukve DkrettorSusan Kaehrsen, Project Director4.eff Martin, Radio Project Director

.Affiliationiare listed fin indeatification purposesParticipants attend'as individuals'rather than as .1-resentatives of their gcniernment or orgyn4ation.

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'John R. RedickRapporteurs_ - , C

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' THE i4ULT 'LATERAL DISARMAMENT PROdESS .N

Disarmament StalemateThe participants generally agreed that progress to:ward arms control and disarmament 1s nefirlyynonexistent in the summer of 1981. The fabric Ofstrategidddiente,appears to be unraveling: the SALT II _

agreement is all but discarded, the Ann-Ballistic Mid-sile (ABM) Treaty is under attack, a destabilizingmilitarilzation of space' is beginning, and high-levelCast-West/discussions have yet fo commence.

On the\dultilateral front, progress is also, lacking:the nonproliferation regime is under challenge, in-cluding the nuclear flon.Proll(eration Treaty (NPT) and

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thee International Atomic Energy Agent; 'MCA). , safeduards, system; needed agreements oh a corii

prehensive nuclear test ban (C1'6) and chemicalweapons have not been achieved; stabilization: .ofcontentious areas in Europe. 'the Middle East, SouthAsia, and :Africa through regional arms limitationagreements has, not been accomplished; and thereare almost no limitations on trnsfers of ,conven-,tional-weapons. ,T

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. Since the United Nations' First Special Session onDliarmament (SSOD I) in 1978 the only substantial...achievements have been agreement on a treaty cleat-

. ing vAth inhumane and indiscriminate conyentionalweapons and the drafting of the main elements of aradiological weapons tr,eaty. ' -. -. .

Lack of disarmament progress is plualieled by vastincrease in conventional and nuclear armaments ofmany nations. The modernization and qualitative im-

. provements.in strategic weapons raise concerns of apre-emptive first strike and threaten deterrence. Byreliable estimates, nations are currently spendingovIr $600 billion annually on weapons and armedforces.

. .PartidPants observed that at no time since World

War II has there ever teen a greater need for rapiddisarmament progress. However, in the viewof some,there iSaIsoa strong disillusionment In many nations

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with the failure to 4chieue meaningful -disarmamentresults. Some perceive a great need, to reassess cur-rent approaches.

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Others emphasized that some very signilicarit armslimitation agreements have been achieved in the last20 years including the Limited Test Can AgreementTreaty of Tlateloico, the lIFT, and the SALT I agree- .rhents. Care °must be taken not to endanger theseagreements, but rather to build on their foundation inthe light of current realities.

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MOst Oartkipanti believed thy impasse in strategic-nudear arms control negotiations between the UnitedStates add the Soviet Union is the principal factorparalyzing, all disarmament progress. Views differed

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as to the causes of the current impasse and thesues needed to achieve new ,breakthroughs, Mostliartidpants supportedithe view thatneither country islikely to 'aptleve "Superloilty" in force levels over theother..and that "parity' is the only rational objectivegiven the magnitude of destruttivd power involveMprebver:, there 'will bvasymmetries in the &Irmo ,nents of each nation's military force levels, respond-

. ing to their Offering security Circumstances, althoughoverall foicelevels shoUld be at parity. .

Some partidpants' urged that attention be given to-.each nation's perception of parity anq the need to es-

tablish clear and mutually acceptable data on respec-,`-live force leveli. Only on this basis; it was believed,- ,could the current situation be Stabilized andcant progress initiated on nuclear arms limitatiokandreduction efforts. The creation of a respected inter-

.' national group of experts to study US and Soviet forceleers was suggested by some. The group's objectivewould be to determine whether parity in force levelsdoes exist. The results could possibly contribute tothe needed breakthrou gh of the current impasse. '

, The SovietUS disarmament stalemate has unfortu-.nately been projected into mutilateral disarmamenrfora and is prejudicing ' results. Many paiticipants.observed that. past progress in multilateral disarms'ment tora ,has come Ay a result of agreement be-

t tween- the- two' superpowers, and. that the 'cared,breakdown fri,the SALT process has paralysed manyother efforts. Moreover, the lack of bilateral progressis threatening to undercut areas where- significantmultilateral progress has been achieved,-Includingthe Law of the Sea and peaceful uses of outer space.Both thte near-term consequences and Ion Venn im-plicatioits.of superpower impasse grow more seriouswith prolbngation. ' .

Some partidpant argued that multilateral disar-mament efforts should not depend only on improveI ng relations between the two superpowers and urgedthat other efforts must continue, Howeveri the twomajor nuclear weapon states do create the 'primarynegotiating environment in which all other effort.must proceed.

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Most participants believed that the current impasseis So serious as to require dramatic. new initiatives.Four interrelated proposals received wide support:

1. A summit meeting between the hiads of state ofthe United 'States and the. Soviet Union. Partici-.pants appreciated the dangers of summit diplo.macy including exaggerated expectaTIons of suc-cess and over-reaction in the event of failure. *,

However, it was believed that with careful andcomplete preparations based on a, realistic as-sessment of natidnal security goals. the probabil-ity of useful results from Such a meeting is high. Itwas. suggested that discussions focus on a wide

, range a political issues, but that the principalfocus should be on reaching general agreement.on the framework of strategic armsfiniitation and

A reduction. Such a nieeting should occur as soon aspossible and preferably, before the end of 1981._Sdme participants suggested that "Ale summit'

eeting beheld in conjunction with a special Se-dirity Council meeting to be attended by heads ofstate. but others questioned whether this would bethe most effective forum at this. time. '

2. Regular meetings between high-level 'policy -mak-ergand military leaders Of the Soviet Union and theUnited States. The first of these meetings could bein preparation foram above suggested summit.

3. independent confidence - building measures andit(--initiatives by the United States and the Soviet

. Union. These measures might includes tempciarymoratorium on below-ground nuclear testing and

\temporary deferral of deployment of a major newweapons system such as 4rftisatellite or long:

4 ' range theatre,Weapons. Both governments shouldbe asked to consider all steps they could safelytake to improlie the climate, itirluding action be-fore the summit meeting.

4. Creation of an interbatiorial group of e)(petta. tiii' :study parity in ford levels of the Soviet Union andthg United States, as suggested above.

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Second Special Session on DisannameritiThe partiCipants discussed the UN General Assembly's'Second Special Session, on Disarmament (SSOD II) tobe held in 1982. After a brief review of preparationsfor the Second Special Session and the work of itsPreparatory Committee, particular attention was giventothe,oWctives and priorities of SSOD II and possibleways to-increase the likelihood of its success.

General Objectives of &SOD U 1 : t; 4''' : l'There wa,s broad agreement thdt SSOD U mustmovebeyond4hat Was done at the First Special SessiokonDisarnr;ameirt in 1978. Thetecond Special Sessibnshould set theotage for earirand oanstructive.action,rather than merely prodiming another document.

There waS apparent consensus that the SecondSpecial "Se.s:sion should be planned and conducttd inways that will het, to achieve these objectives; :t

A i1. To increase .awareness, both public and go*

ermriental, *of the need to halt and reversearms race and Si urgency of rirogiess toward d6-

,Many: participants emphasized That SSOD ft pro;

vides an opportunity to .break throudb present bhr- .riers and stimulate action toward disarmament, butthat the risk of failure is high. Some participants saidthat the Second Special Aession will have a major ef-fect in determining whether the United nations has acredible future role Is disarmament.

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armament. This should include showing why armscontrol and reduction are necessary to enable na-tions and their peoples to have greater securityand achieve their economic and developmentgoals.

2. To build active support, both public and gov-etnmental, for specific arms control and reductionmeasures, and for implementing the commitments already made in the Final Document of the.First Special Session.

3. Toenlarge the constituency for disarmament byactiftlyiinvolving more governmental' leaders, citi-zeris, and nongovernmental organizations (fiG0s).

4. To increase the number, intensity, and effective-ness of bilateral and multilateral negotiations onspecific agreements for armIcontrol and reduc-tion, both nuclear and cony tional.'

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5. -To improve the climate for prOgress towarci dinar-Moment. SOD II should seekivays to remove bat -ricks to the eded specific measures.

6. To encoura and stimulate the settlement of in-- ternational d sputes, taking into account national

security needs, tip, principles of the UN dhatter,and resokitions of the General Assembly.

Priorities for SSOD IIThere was not complete agreement on how the Sec-ond Special Session and its Preparatory Committee

_ should allocate, time among general review, disar-mament machinery, the. proposed ComprehensiveProgramme of Disarmament (CPD), and 'specific dis-armament measures.

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It was noted that the Final Vocument of the FirstSpeclai Session requires SSOD lf tO review implemen-

. WWII:progress, review the multilateral disarmaments machinery, and adopt a ay.\ , ,

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Some participants believed that the agenda forSSOD ll will necessarily be broad and general. Othersrecommended that SSOD 11 focus on a limited number'of specific disarmament measures in an effort to buildgreater support or find new approaches that will leadto action within the next few years.

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General ReviewMost participants agreed that SSOD II should reviewcompliance with the Filial Document of the First Spe-dal Session, and especial!), its Programme of Action,but should not attempt to revise that document. Thegoal of this review should be kdevelopideaathat willhelp the world move'forwardnot to findlault with g

past actions.

Some participants said that SSOD II should estab-lish baic principles of disarmament, identify the rootcauses of the lack of progress, and specify the re-sponsibilities or the various categories of states forfuture action. Others feared that some of these quei:lions would lead to polemic.s,and repetition of paststerile demotes. -

Many participants urged that the SecOnd SpecialSession minimize general debate and drafting of gen-eral statements, and concentrate on positive steps toget the disarmament process moving again..

Disarmament Machinery ,

# Participants made many suggestions for improve-ments in multilateral disarmament machinery or itsfunctioning. (See page 33, Multilateral Disarmament-Machinery.)-

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Some participants said that a review of the effec-tiveness of all UNrelated disarmament bodies and ac-tivities should be a high priority function of SSOD II.However, many participants believed that this reviewshould have a relatively low priority. Most participantsagreed that in view of the substantial work done in thisarea during the First Special Session; there should beless 'emphasis on disarmamept machinery during&SOD II. . 47 C

Comprehensive Programme of DisarmamentTwo distinct views were expressed cin the proposedVD which is being drafted by a waking group clothe .

Committee on Disarmament (CD).,

Some participants viewed the Cry as The center-plece of SSOD H, 'providing both a sound long-termplan'and a lime.schedule for future disarmament ef-forts. Others believed that the value of the CPD will be

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Somepartidpants, while agreeing on the need for anear.-term priority list, emphasized that it must be flex-

, . there must be a readiness to move, rapidlywhen any area becomes ripe for segOtiatiOns and

Agreement. . .

The priority list should include important measureswhich are realistically achievable in the next rely years.

. A measure may be important because it helps to limitor reverse the arms race: reduce ash of war, orimproves the climate for disarmament progress."Some measures should be on the priority list as hold-

4) tb.'cifig operations, ,to preserve an existing agreement_(e.g., the NIT or ABM treaty) or to prevent a situationfrom getting worse..!

" " Many participants urged that high priority be given' io preventing any irreversible escalation of the arms

race. Particular attention should bc given to newweapons systems which, after, being produced ordeveloped, could not be effectively controlled be-

' cause of the difficulty of adequate verification orsafeguards.

/ The participants, suggested various priority itemsfor SSOD111 The conference did not attempt to agreeon a list. floWever, most participants recommendedthe following measures as high priority items forSSOD II and for the first stage.of aCPD:

1. Strategic nuclear arms control, including quanta-Jive and quantitative limitationiSnd reductions of

. nuclear weapons. Some participants urged con-sideration of the bold proposal by George Kermanfor a 50 percent reduction in nuclear weapons, afreeze on introduction of new or improved nuclear,weapons, or other measures. There was broadagreekent .on the urgency orresuMing,` before-,SSOD II, both the bilateral strategic arms limita-tion "talks and the negotiations for.an,agreementlimiting long-range theatre hucjear forces (VIP) InEurope

2. .A comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement, aspart of the Strengthening of the nuclear nonpagEerafron .regigne. (See page 24, Strengthening7%Nonproliferation Regime, ppint,41),c.

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Somearticipants, while agreeing on the need for anear term priority list, emphasized that it must be flex-

. ,1131e.and there must be a readiness to move rapidly: when any area becomes ripe for megotiations andAlreerfient

, The priority list should include important measures, which are realistically achievable in the next few years.

. A measure may be important because it helps to limitor reverse. the arms race; reduces -tie risW of war, or'improves the climate for disarmament progress.Some measures should bq on the priority Oat as hold-

...lftg operations, ,to preserve an existing agreementthe RFT or ABM treaty) or to prevent a situation

from getting ,wore..

-" " Many participants urged that high priority be givenIto preventing any irreversible escalation of the armsrace. Particular attention should be given to newweapons systems which, after being produced or'developed, could not be effectively controlled be-

' cause of the difficulty of adequate verification orsafeguards.

A

The participants. suggested various. priority itemsfor SSODil: The conference did not attempt to agreeor) a list. hoWever, most participants recommendedthe following measures as high priority items forSSOD ll and for the first stage of Wall

1. Strategic nuclear arms control. including qualia-__tive and quantitative limitationi.and reductions of

nuclear weapons. Some participants urged con.slderation of the b9id proposal by George Kennanfor a 50 percent reduction [n nuclear weapons, afreeze on introduction of new or improved nuclearweaVns, or other measures. There was.broadagreelaent On the urgency of.iesuening,` before-,

. SSOD IL both the bilateral strategic arms limita-tion -Wks and the negotiations fman Agreementlimiting long-range theatre huclear forces (Mr) inEurope.

2. IA comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement, aspart of the strengthening of the nuclear none la eeratton.regime. (See page 24, Strengthening1n.Plonprolifitation Regime, point:).

o

-20

4

I17

4

3. Negative security guarantees by ,nuclear weapdnstates to nonnuclear wtpon states. (See page 24,Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime, pointS.).

. - .4. A radioiogical weapons treaty. (See page 36,

Radiological weapons.)

.5. A chemical weapons treaty. (See-page.35,Cheini-r cal weapons agteement.)

.6. Regional agreements lo control, limitand reduceconventional weapons, forces, and expenditures..

.. .Many partidpanit recommended additional mew.---. _-',. , sures for the priority list, though these were men- . .

....tiotieg less often for this purpose than the above six.- proposals; . . .-

r

. 1. Universal adherence to' and strengthening of, the-_ nonproliferation regime of which the NRT is aiPart. , _. (See page 21, Nuclear Nonproliferation and MI

Multilateral Process.) '''! ,. .

2, jAssurance that the ABM treaty"will continue in4 (OrCef 4 . I

s ,3. Cessation of production of nuclear weaponiot Of,

. . fissionable material suitable for weapons ptodut-_lion. - ...

r

ry

4. Additional_nuclear-weapon-free zones (Pi F2s),zones of peace, or similar zones, and Atter' then -

. ing the existing zones in Latin America and Antarctica. (See page 30. fiudear-ireipon-Free Zones;and Zones of Peace.)

f 4.-

2004 .0.....,-3.7Furthsetr measures to prevent militarization tut

space.:The Outer space Treaty of /967 pr hibilsnuclear and other weapons of;mass deabiuCtiali

411'from 1)eing placed in 'fixed orbit, but new space -weapon systems are being developed. As a first

si31 sfer many plurftidpants2 urged an anti tellite "_!-(ASAT) agreement prohibiting attacks on tellite.i" -and restricting Ike testing and develop "erit-0.---..!. °antisatellite weapons, - i ,

. -. r -O. Measure's Ito ensure compliance with and;verifi-4

cation of arms control *green:lents, Pdssilly in-eluding a ON verification' capability and agreed- ":"procedures to resolve ambiguities or diffekIrg jil- .

,. . .4 °N- '.-.. -. 2/* .

f

, 441

,vr

%

tetpret itions of agreements. .(See pade 45, OtherConfidence-Building Measures.)

7. Other confidencetuilding measures, such asshared information and.staalardized repbrting ofarnIs and force levels, military bagels, maneu-

N vers, troop movements, etc; (See page 1-5, OtherConfidence-Building Mtasures.)

4,7

Most participants believed that at least some prog-ress can and should be made on several of the priorityitems before ssorr II. Some said that final agree-ments on, one or more of these prioillies- can andshould' be reiched, before SSOD 11. "(See page. 35,N egotiating Body: Committeecti'Bisartnablent.r

..Reconciliation-of Broad and SpecilliApproaChes

...- The discussiong during the conference indicated -sev:eral ,ways in which some of the differing views re-ported above may be harmonized: .

1. SSW 11 peed not choose between a CPD and em-phasis on specific disarm'ament 'proposals. It was

0 suggested that both SSOD 11 and its PreparatoryCommittee should organize separate workinggroups: one for the CPD, and several to 'deaf withspecific_ measures on the priority list.

1.5-

2. There are similarities, between a short list,of high_priority disarmament measures and the first stageof a CPD. Many participants emphasized that thefirst stage, 'including priorities for the next few ,

... years, Is the most important part 'of the CPD and ..should ieceive the most time and effort.. ' it'

. .3, Target dates for disirmament progress are; Poore

likely to,be accepted and taken seriously if therateflexible anclirealistic. . . - ,

.

w . .- Wayi to Incriabe thetikelihdod of Success cifBA0D11 -

e .. .i Participants suggepted, several actions "Which would.4' -, -- help to,,make the Second SpeciafSession constructive. .

avd prbductive: .

a

..1

Completion of-any specific disarmament agree -ment before SSOD 11 would be of great benefit.llegative security guarantees an5ra radiological

e- weapons treaty were mentioned as possibilltiel.eAlso, any significant ,progress toward an agfe-

...- ,..

2 2

t0 e .

4

A

Wr-.40

4...., . .ment (e.g.,'CTI3 or chemical weapons) would behelpful. (See page 35, Negotiating Body: Commit-tee on Disarmament.)

2. Any new or resumed negotiations, bilateral or mul-tilateral, beginning before SSOD 11, would 'improvethe climate. Resumption of SALT and EuropeanTtIF negotiations, agreement to hold a Europeandisarmament conference, or creation of a CD work-

. ing group on a CTB to supplement the trilaterlnegotiations, were suggested as important steps.

.3: Adherence by additional nations to the l'IP and

other existing arms control treaties would be es-pecially helpful if announced before or duringSSOD II.

*4

4. Progrest toward settling any of the current inter na-tional disputes, or reduction of tension in any area, .

I ''

aim for SSOD 11 is

.would aid the work of SSOD

'5. Thorough and early preneeded-This preparation s uld include the Prep-'aratoiy Committee, many "UN agencies and or-gans, national governments, groups of states.1100s and research Institutes.' .

6. An expanded role for.fiGOs and.researc ,fi institutesin SSOD II and preparations for it would be helpl-,.......fu I.' -?"

7." Members 9f parliament from as many nations aspossible should be-involved in SSOD II. Inclusionof parliamentarians 4n national delegations, a Wwcurrent meeting of parliamentarians during SSOD .

II, and opportunities f,or 4her'n to make presenta-tions were suggested. '

1

8. The climate Within SSOD II is highly important. Allnations should instruct their representatives toavoid polemics, unrealistic exhortations, and un-necessary rhetoric. The attitudes of problem soh,-\ ing and seeking constructive new approaches were.very helpful;during this conference and are needed - ,

. e" rn SSOD II.

.

1--

4 20'

, . 4 -13...

----,.........L.,

.- .23

*t

r

41,11"4.

. Nuclear Nonproliferation and . .

the-Multilateral Process'Norqsrol iterat ion Principles .

llse 1 mat Us( 11111111( of 4111.1: first SI/Call Session 911UIS411 1100110114111978 statcd that *Non-prolif et aticAofnu( ic,11 weapons is a mattes Of urn% etsal concern' :,1%ley. shased 1-sy all pat tic in Illis conretencc.These is wide lines isalictttal consensus ill faN or of non

IPt 4 Jilt CI an4 nt, as tAidenced tsy stiOpost of internatiosuiacv enitts.. I Ilf li1(11119 i he .1011-PTOlittlatiOil .I 'Cat)011(1 the i Itildlik o 11 seat> Addttional nuclear %caponstates itiny*c..a( etbate segiotwl security issues, coin,isiscat the stsatectic nuclear picture, and iitctease theposssUltty of accidental of delibetate 11S1.! Of 1111(k:di1..1..opol1s A .S11 engtlicitc_A and el.f.ectii.e nottptolifeta,

.nevi segistie was theselose recommended as an im .- , --..zpostant 'stem lot consideration by the 1982 Second

Special Session on Disaimantent Certain getter:11principles v.t t w: identified by man5,parlicipailts as intportant to .1 silt (.(!SS1111 c111(1 .1W:pIabjC 110111)10111C1-Mita' letii1110. w

I Both N ethical vrollfesation tutalitathe and quan-'Oahu incroase m nuclear weapons by nucleart.eapon states and horizontal proliferatkm thespread of nuclear weapons to snore nations ateserious (handers 'Both problems must(' be resolved«stictirrently I2 nonproliferation progtss must not prejudice na-tional dei.elopment ("sf the peaceful uses of nuclear

24 21

energy or cooperation among nations kir peace-ful uses.

- S.' Nonproliferation progress can best be achieved.through multilateral cooperative efforts ratherthan unilateral or bilateral actions;

fin and nd Review ConferenceMost participants viewed the MPT as, he heart of thenonproliferation regime and one.of the most Impor-Cant international arms control agreements. Its im-portant attributes:Include widespread internationalsupport (currently 113 parties), the fact that ho partyhas violated its provisions or withdrawn, and We IAEAsafeguards which result from the agreeincnt... Thetreaty has also contributed to stabilizatioa of certainregional situations, partituiarly in Europe.

Many peirticippnts stressed the importance of MPTpartiet complying with all treaty obligations. These

. include Articles 1 -ill by whiCh all parties pledge to takeno action contrary to the gpal of nonproliferation,Article IV which provides for making the peaceful usesof nuclear energy availlble to all nations, and Article

. VI which requires 'nuclear weapon states to negotiateand make progreskon nuclear arms reduction. Therewere differences among participants as to the relativepriority of these treaty requirements, but a shared ap-.

predation that compliance with all of these interre-lated obligations is very important to the future.effi-cacy of therIPT..

A principal weakness of the MPT, in the view of someparticipants, is the fact that some 12 nations nearingthe ability to develop nuclear weapons have chbsennot to beeom parties. Amoig the disincentives toMPT adherenc'is the fact that notparties (nstcovered

4f by full-scope safeguards) have received equal or evenpreferential access to peaceful nuclear material and. equipment relative to MPT parties. Another reason

whereby, in practice, nuclear weapon statescited by some is the unequal nature of the require:menuHave been subject-to no restrictions while nonnuclearweapon state are asked Co abstain permanently froma weapons olition, in this view, tht IPT will 'not be adesirable agreement unless significant progress on

:

,s

25fr

e

,

, ..__./., ..

-

nuclear arms limitation and reducticsn is achieved and---" .

riff parties are placed in n equal pr advartageous,. position regarding access' to nuclear material and

equipmeht. :...

Some participants said that opposition to the riff In,.,,,, some nations is based on a variety of motives includ-

ing regional rivalries, prestige'factors, add a desire tomaintain the option to develop nuclear weapons. Itwas suggested that lack oCprpgreSs on Article IV andVI requirements 'provides a rationale* to avoid riffadherence. however, most participants believed nu-clear weapon states set the pace forthe nuclear arms-race and create an International environment whichcomplicates all nonproliferation efforts. The failure ofthe Second NT Reviei/ Conference (August 1980),which adjourned without an agreed final document,max-have further imderatined the riff. Most' partici-perste believed that the lack of progress on Article VI'and only minimal progress on Article IV requirements

.- were the principal reasons 93r the conference's failure.Lack o( progress in this area appears to be weaken-

. 'rig the support for Artjcles MIL Some participants, stressed the need to °remind nonnuclear weapon

states that the Nil' is in their own security interest andthis benefit should not be lost because of disappoint -"

- ment with the superpowers' lack of progress.

Strengthenilg the Nonproliferation RegimeParticipants observed that other recent evehts haveweakened the nonproliferation regime and threaten ..-the future Lit' the PIPE. The principal example was the

'-attack by Israel (a nonparty to the IIPT)-on sreactor inIraq (an rirr party) covered under IAEA safeguards. Asa result of this action, questions have been raised asto whether an riff party was sylternaticallyplanningto vlolatelts obligations, whether it was being assisted 'litby supplier nations committed tothe goats of the MT; ,

and whether IAEA safeguards were effective In thissituation. Publit statements by some riFT parties, _questioning the value of riff adherence as-a deterrentto nuclear weapons development, have futther under,:cut the agreement. ' , .. 1,

. .The following actions to help strengthen the non- -e

proliferation regime and assure the long-term Viability. .

-r, .--o

1 '

* ,P...

..

)

.

4.

24

0

of the lIPT were recommended by various partici-pants:

1. Significant and early progress by nuclear weaponstates on nuclear arms limitation and reduction.

2. Full assurance of uninterrupted supply of nuclearmaterials and equipment for peaceful use to allMPT parties. It was hoped that the IAEA's Commit-tee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) would makeearly progress on this point.

3. More adequate support (if the IAEA from membernations to assure that it meets its dual responsi-bility of application of effective internationalsafeguards and assistance in the peaceful uses of'nuclear energy.

°

4. Early agreement on a comprehensive nuclmtestban treaty. Many participants believed thina bethe most important action to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Trilateral discussionsamong the United States, the Soviet Union, andGreat Britain in the context of the Committee onDisatinament.have made little progress in themost recent meetings. it was suggested by someparticipants that the three nuclear weapon statesgive, full attention to reaching early interim

. agreement on a cm. and thereafter bring It tothe attention of the other two nuclear weaponstates and the full CD. Some participants believedthat other measures should be considered tt,Supplement and encourage trilateral movementtoward an agreement. One suggestion was crea-tion of an ad hoc working group of the CO tofocus on financial and administrative arrange-ments for a seismic detection system. /

5. A common formula for negative security asstir-,.antes. perhaps included in a Security Council"resolution. This guarantee could include assur-ances by nuclear weapian states not to use orthreaten to use- nuclear weapons against anynonnuclear weapon state that has committed it-self' not to manufacture. or receive nuclearweapons or explosive devices or to acquire con-trol over them, so long as the state.does not un-dertake or cooperate in an attack upon a nuclear

44

274 %

O

411.

41

weapon state or its allies with the support ofanother nuclear weapon state. Some participantsalso noted that negative assurances could be in-

. cluded In a protocol to the NM,

6. New measures to deal with regional security con-,

cems of countries, either by strengthening ex-isting security arrangements or developing newregional security agreements. This may includecreation of new nuclear-weapon-free zones aswell as' the strengthening,of the existing zonein Latin America.-

7. An additional protocol to the NPT, strengtheningArticle W and VI requirements,Some participantsgtrongky Oppotsed any revision of the NPT,

8. A speciii.convention to protect peaceful nuclearfacilities and provide procedures for awardingdamages and reparations. :

9. Sanctions againstnations which may violate thegoals of the NPT and develop nutlear weapons.

I0, A voluntary code of conduct between nuclearsu2plier and consurher countries regarding thetranfer of nuclear material and eqdipment. Sucha an egreement should include a requirement ofeither de jure or de facto full-scope IAEAsafeguards.

InternationaliktOMiC Energy AgencyMost partitipanti strongly supported the work of theIAEA and believed that it must expand its respon-sibilities' In the future, both in the peaceful andsafeguard aspects of nuclear energy, Among theareas entioneti by some participants as very impor-tant were nuclear plant safety and expanded technicalassistan e to developing countries. The agency's rolemay. al expand in assurances of supply as the work

.of the, mmittee on Assurances of Supply, which re-

++ the IAEA's Board of Governors, increases inthe yea ahead. -An extremely important future rolefor the a ncy will be in connettion with managementand storage of plutonium and spent fuels. This may

I extend tp IAEA management of regional or iutreg-lonal nutlearfcenters involving sensitive portions bfthe ktel Ode.. .

,.

b 25

284.9

Most particlpsnts also believed that the IAEA muststrengthen and rationalize its safeguard proceduresto remove doubts which have deieloped as the resultof the Israeli attack .on Iraq's reactor. In Ulla regard it.was noted that the IAEA administers non-MITsafeguards on specific facilities of member nations aswell as de jure full-scope safeguards on rim parties.Both kinds of safeguards are systems of accountingwhich detect diVersion and therefore can serve as animportant deterrent. The question as to whether theexisting safeguard system provides sufficient advancetvaiLdiag, of possible militarily significant of

"rhifeiiiifirieliiitkApontroversial and unresolved. Con-tinued emphasis shoUld be given- to enhancing theeffectiveness of safeguards end that the IAEA shouldbe supported and strengthened.

1983 Conference on thePoiceful Uses of Nuclear EnergyPartidpantslIrew'attention .to the decision of the 35thUN General Assembly for the convening of the UN Con-ference for the Promotion of International Coopera-tion in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy In 1983.The conference will be political rather than technical.It will focus primarily on problems of assurances of

' supply of nuclear material with consideration ggfen toother related issues-including cooperative efforts inthe nuclear fuel cycle, nonproliferation, and futureof the Non- Proliferation Trealy. Most partici nts be-

() lieved the 1983 conference will be highly i portant tothe future of the nonproliferation regime

The 198.3 confer flee is in part a It of the Inter-national' Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (lrIFCE) whichconcluded in Februaty'1980. INFCE ltd to better un-derstanding between nuclear supplier and consumernations and provided an important breathing spacefor reflection on contentious nudear issues. IMFCE'sconclusions did lend support to the view that non-, proliferation Is basically a political rather than a techni-

,t, cal probleni and that In the long run a thuldlateralrather than unilateril or bilateral approach to theproblem will be most productive. Rime led to the cre-ation of CAS which will serve as an interim body for

.

26

C.

29_

/-1O

'Mr

artlaMm.A..11.ammoMpit

postMlfCE supplier-consumer diFussions until the1983 conference. The Preparatory Committee for theconference, composed of 70 countries and assistedby tbte46EA, will hold Its foimt!latiVe session in August1981 in Vienna. The 1AM, through CAS, will providetechnical information and assist in preparations forthe conference. It was also noted that the IAEA willhoSt in the autumn of 1982. an international confer-ence on-technical. safety. and economic aspects ofnuclear power which will provide useful input for the1983 conferenCe:

Participants urged that carefdl preparation be un-dertaken to assure full participation by all nations inthe 1983 conference which is considered so vital to.the fututg of the nonproliferation regime.

, NEC- -'11

if

Regional Multilateral Disarmament EffortiParticipants believed regional arms limitation anddisarmament efforts.are an important and promisingarea. Regional endeavors are more manageable dueto the smaller (lumber of states involved. Throughcooperative regional efforts the area can be.isolatedfrom external entanglements, and issues can be re-solved or managed, Approaches need to be tailored tofit the particular regional situation. There are manyopportunities for indigenous tegiGral efforts andsome lessons can be drawn from. approaches alreadysuccessfully utilized.

Many participants emphasized the need for regionalagreements in which nations would commit them-selves to consult on a regular, periodic basis and toavoid destabilizing acts.

Some participants cautioned that regional' effortswill be hindered by the lack of superpower progress inresolving East-West issues. Most participants, how-ever, believed that superpower inaction on nucleararms control should not be allowed to delay regional.initiatives and that all opportunities should beexplored. lt was also observed that progress in certainregional areas could contribute to / resolution ofEast-West conflict. Some pakticipan0 also stressed

. the vital contribution of countries outside a region,particularly militarily significant and nuclear weaponstates, in supporting regional efforts.

European Arms Control\--Europe was viewed as the highest priority for regional'

arms control efforts, because of the high concentri-don of nuclear and conventional weapons and troopsand the possibility of East -West conflict originating inthe region. ,

The Vienna-based talks on mutual (and balanced)force reductions have proceeded for many years withthe objective of reducing forces In central &hope. Par,ticipants noted that there has been signifidant prowress,-Includ)ng agreements onhases for force with,,drawals. However, a number of issues remain, includ-ing questions of data (force levets), current political

31, .

...e.

.

.

) <

problems in central Europe and the fact that one #'major European nation (France) has not been part ofthe discussions. Most participants emphasized the `need RN both sides to undertake confidence-buildingmeasures to facilitate early progress.. ,

Participants also noted the concern of many coun-tries regarding long-range theatre nuclear forces inEurope. The* forcesbrae a significant threat of nu-clear war and destruction. Participants welcomed theannouncement by the United States that bilateraloclis-cussions on limiting and reduting these weaponsshould begin in late 1981. -

_ . 4 r

Participants also expressed stro1i siIpport forfurther implementation and assessment of the Hel- _At'sink! Acfards which resulted from the Conference on r-Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and whichare being discussed at the current Madrid Conference.Some achievements have been made in bridginggaps between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries onsuch issues as reunification of families and,economkexcpanges, The importance of avoiding polemical at-

-......0.'tacks and focusing on early progress toward _Euro-pean peace and securit was emphasized by many ;participants. /

.,.There is a major remaining disagreement on pro-

posals for a post-Madrid conference on Europeandisarmament:France, with the support of NATO allies,has proposed a conference on disarmament inEurope which.would have the objective of agreeing onobligatory and verifiable notifications of military ma-neuvers in Europe. The emphasis would be 'onconfidence-building measures, an approach Whichconceptually converges th the mutual (and bal-

. anced) force reduction a proach. The french prchpobal would apply to all of urope including the Euro-pean portion of the Soviet ion. Poland, on behalf ofthe Warsaw Pact, has pro a conference on mili-tary détente and disarmam nt in Europewhich wouldexclude European Russta. Several nonaligned coun-tries have offered proposalaseeking to bridge the gapbetWeen the approaches of the two military blocs.Mrat participant emphasized that early agreement ,

before the Second Special Session on Disarm:Vent, ,

32 29,

(

.

^on the frarneworkor a post - Madrid European confer-ence would be an important contribution to interna-tional peace and security.

Nuclear-Weapon-free Zones and Ione.; of PeaceMost participants viewed nuclear-weapon-free zonesand zones of peace as a promising area fbr regionalarms control, worthy of further study and support.The Latin American nuclear weapon -free' zone estab-

4 fished through the Treaty of Tiateloko in 1967 Is theonly successful zone in a major populatedvarea.sTwenty-two Latin American states are parties r6 theagreement and members of the Agency for the Prohi-bition of nuclear Weapons in LatinAnierica (OPANAL).All nuclear weapon states bailie signed and ratifiedProtocol II by which they. agree not to use or threatento use nuclear weapons against parties to the agreement. The United States and France have signed, butnot yet completed, ratification of Protocol 'I designedfor states having territorial interests in the Americas.

In evaluating the success of the Latin Americanzone. parpclpants noted the importance of a carefurpreparatoly effort involving negotiations agiong allstates in the region and consultation with all relevantnonreglonal countries with the objective of gainingtheir eventual support. Another attribute Of the LatinAmerican zone is its requirement of full-scope IAEAsafeguards for nuclear activities of parties.

1

The Mcrae East was considered by Many partici-pants as a region which could uniquely benefit fromcreation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. A resolutionof the 35th UN General Asset-id:kik urged all parties inthe region to take practical, steps for implementingsuch a zone. All states in the region, Inciudlhg Israel,supported the resolution although that nation's recentattack on a nuaear installation may hay imperiledthe zone's creation. Somepartldpants r -ommendedas a first stekthat each Middle Eastern Ountry make aunilateral'. declaration not to pr uce nuclearweapons.

Participants tdentMed other regi ns including theNordic area South Asia, Afyica, a el East Asia as .pos-

30 33

sible nuclear-weapon-free zones.' Each region facescomplex obstacles which many felt would preventearly progress-toward creation of a zont. However,several participints, emphasized the importance ofleadership by countries in the proposed region in emphasizing that a nuclear-weSponfreezone will prom-ote national security.

An- other approacti discussed was the creation ofzones of peace with the objective of limiting the milit-ary activities and forces of external states in the area.Primary attention has been focusedon an IndianOcean zone of peace, and some ,paricipants 'urgedthe United States Soviet Union to resume discus-sions toward limn ing their growing militarypresence in ttie region. Some partiapants.nOted thediffering views among countries participating in theUN Adttoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, which hasbeen undertaking preparatory wakTor a proposed in-ternational ctifference in 1981 in Sri Lanka.

Other areas which have been discussed as possiblezones of peace are the Mediterranean and SoutheastAsia (which has been supported by the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations [AsEARD.7

Some participants also urged greater internationalattention to the limitation of conventional weaponsdevelopment and transfers on a regional basis. Thepreliminary efforts undertaken in Latin America4hrough the 1974 Deckration of Ayacucho, Supple-mented by further disMsions in 1978 and 1979, area hopeful beginning, illustrating the need for initia-tives'originating in the region, Some participants alsoSuggested that the Soviet Lien and the United States'should resume bilateral discuSsIons, which mightlater include other arms producers, designed to con-

,trol conventional arms to specific regions.

4,.

31

a

so"

Multilateral Disarknament MachineryMost paiticipants believed that the current mu itilateialdisarmament machinery, much of which is the resultof the First Special Session, is adequate' and shouldnot be supplemehted by additional bodies. However,some suggested the current multilateral disarmamentmachinery includeS too many meetings, documents,and procedures which may be impeding real disarmament progress. In order to, streamline and simplify'the multilateral disarmament process, better utiliza-tion'and coordination of existing mechanisms were.recommended. It was also suggested that Maximumprogress is .often achteved through informal ratherthan formal discus ions.

Some participants 'suggested that the existingmachinery would produce more results if all nationswould endeavor to accept Modest achievements asfirst steps, avoid.- unrealistic 'demands that mak%agreement impossible, use restraint in promoting cer-tain favored, proposals, and appoint negotiatorswhose personalities and skills enable them to be ef :

+6, fective in a negotiating situation.

To facilitate Success in multilateral disarmamentendeavors, .many participants suggested the need forgovernments to iltengthgn keir own disarmamentmachinery and 'correlate it with multilateral delibera ,

dye and negotiating mechanisms.

Dellberattwe BodlIs/. UiY Qenerat Ass;Pnbly

.The final DocuMent of the First Special Sessionaffirmed that the "General Asseinbly has beenand should remain ihe main deliberative organ ofthe United Nations in the field& disarmament".viewshared by participants. Since i978, the Genferal AssemblysFirst Committee, based on a dedsion of the first' Special- Session,' has dealtexclusively with disarmament d related security ,Ytmatters% Most participants vl this arrange:ment 'as desirabte and wou not -recoinmendfurther changes. Some pa pants, however;criticized the increased number nd repetitious na-ture of General Assembly disc meet resolutions

: 4

r

34

7

and urged that this trend be limited. The FirstCommittees focus, if was urged, should be °nano*annual review of disarmament and on stimulatingaction in areas ripe for progress.

2. my Disarmament Commission (UNDO-"The Mrst Special Session decided to -revitalize the

UN Disarmament Commission as a forum for de-liberation of disarmament proposals when the UNGeneral Assembly is not In session. The objectivewas to have a forum which might meet two times ayear to complement themork of the First Commit,tee and to Consider disarmament proposals ingreater depth. Participants observed that the UNDC

jos achieved some progress through adoption of' elements of a Comprehensive'Frogramme of Dis-

armament recommended to the CD and the ele-ments of a draft resolution on Declaration of the

. 19805 as tile Second Disarmament. Decade; ... ...

HoWe4, many participants were critical of re-* ,- cent lack 6f substantive progress by UNDC and its

tendency lb duplicate the work of the First Com=mittee.."Scime questioned the continued utility ofthe Conilission. Many urged that it focus on a fewspecific disarmament items. ,,§ome participantsalso observed that the current intervelional situa-don may have contributed to thA Commission's re-

' cent inadequate results. Most Urged a serious effort to make the Commission more effective andbetter coordinate ifs activities with the Mrst Com-mittee and the 1982 Special Session.

3 Other iThe possilAty of a World Disarmament Confer-ence (WDC) or further Special Sessions on Disar-mament was briefly discussed. it was observedthat- the Ad Hoc Committee on the 'World Disar-mament 'Conference continues to function and*submit. entitle' reports to the General Assembly.BaSed" on its recommendations. some participantsfavored convening a World Disarmament Confer-ence, following theSecond Special Session on Dis-armament and after careful preparations. Otherparticipants said that a World Disarmament Con-ference would exacerbate the existing prob-lem of an excessive number Of disarmament fora.

37.

Some participants also favored additioirrUN Gen-eral ly Special Sessions on Disarmament,AssemblyAlthough cautioning that they should not be in-stitutions ed as this would limit their impact. It wasproposed that future special Fessions be scheduled bythe General Assembly vhien and if a need becomesapparent: and should not be scheduled far in ad-vance. Some participants suggested that future Spe-cial Sessions might focus on review and ashwsmentof, implementation of stages of the ComprehensiveProgramme of Disarmament. These Special Sessionswould review CI% progress and also identify near- ,term priorities. , t

Negotiating Body: Committee on DisarmamentFollowing the recommendation of the FIrstSpecialSession, the Geneva Conference of the Committee onDisarmament (CCD) was transformed into the Com-mittee on Disarmament and the membership was In=creased from 31 to 35 nonnuclear weapon states plus

, t the live permanent members of the UN Security Coun-1 Cll. Chairmanship is now misted on a monthly basis.

Work is conducted by consensus in two regular ses-sions and through four ad hoc working groups.

Participants identified several prime disarmament° objectives for the CD prior to the Second Special Ses- 1

-, sion on Disarmament: -. J

4. .

..

1. Chemical weapons agreement. Most participantsP believed it -unlikely that the United States and

Soviet Union Would reach final agreement prior to1/4----SSOD 11..Considerabie progress has been achievedbut differences remain on the question of verificardon. It was recommended by some participantsthat the Soviet Union and United States prepareand submit a report to the Second Special Sessionon progress toward, and remaining obstacles tofinal Conclusion of a chemical weapons agree- .rent. Some participants also stressed that moreresponsibility and a broader mandate should begiven to thetErs ad hoc working group on cheiril-cal weapons, whict, is intended to play a role InaddEvIng a multilgteral agreement. It was sug-gested that the imian of the ad hoc workinggroup and other interested members might attend

.1

38 35

the bilateral. negotiation's and could poksibly behelpful.

'2. Negative security guarantees. Many participants

were hopeful that the CD cot* produce a commonformula acceptable to both: nuclear and nonnu-clear weapon states prior to "the Second Sped*Session. Participants believed this would be a sig-nificant achievement and could strengthen thgnonproliferation regime. (See page 23, Strength-ening the Nonproliferation Regime.) .;

31 Comprehensive test bin." Most participants em-phasized the importance of early agreement on acomprehensive nuclear test_ban treaty. The trilat-eral negotiators were-urged to- Make renewed ef-forts to reach agreement on the basic componentsof a CTIS before SSOD II. If this is not possible. they .were urged to prepare a complete report outliniareas of Pr.ogress toward. and obitades remainingto. final completion} Of a crB, Some participantsalso urged the establishment of a CD ad hoc work-big group on a CTB due to lack of progress,towardan agreement. (See page 23, Strengthening theNonproliferation Regime.)

4. Radiological weapons. AJoint draft convention wassubmitted by the United States and Soviet Union in '1979. The Cl has a working group, on radiologicalweapons. Some partilipants strongly believed the .

CD should be able to reach final agreement on a; radiological weapons treaty prior to SSOD H. A few

participants questioned the narrcr definitiongiven radiologrcal weapons and the raft that theagreement prohibits an' undeveloped weaponssystem. Other pardicipants stressed the impor-

, tance of reaching an agreement because it wouldprohibit an as yet undeveloped weapons system ,. -1:before the technology advances. In Additipn the .symbolic importance of achleving an East-West

' arms control agreement in the current interne-liana' climate was pointed out.

. I b 4 1

5, Comprehensive _Programme of Disarmament.Sothe participant tressed the imPortance.of theCDfs working groltIP achieving Its assigned §oal of

-the elaboration of a CPD in thin for considerationf .. ,

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36 39.t.

and adoption by SSOD II. The adoption of a CPD bySSOD Il would in this view, set an important pat-

,,tern for future progress. Other participants be:nieved the CPD is less important and that the CD:-

should emphasize the negotiation of specific dis-armament agreements. 5ee pages, 13, SecondSpecial Session on Disarmament.)

!- ,

Participants give particular emphasis to improvingthe output of the CD including dgration, quality andcharacter of work, and level of representation.

-Sorheltarticipants staled that the CD's average-an-

nual meeting time 9f 20 weeks Is insufficient time todiscuis and negotiate dharrnament agreements.Other negotiating bodies or special negotiations. in-volving fewer parties meet for significantly longerperiods of time. Some participants, while -agreeingthat increased duration could be usefal, qtrestionedwhether it would contribute to greater progress. A fewparticipants believed)there is genuine merit in shortCD meetings with adequate interith periods for Inter-,. nal consultation and development of positions.

Regarding the quality and' character of the CD's'work. many participants believed excessive time iswasted on proceduris; with an insufficient amountdedicated to substantial neg ations. In this respett;-..,athe achievements of the CC successfullynegotiated several treaties,yere comps to the lackof progress by the CD. It was suggested hat the CDsimplify pr ures, cut down on forma meetingsand documen on, and use informal negotiatingpapers.

Other participants pefended the emphasis on pp- tcedures as necessary in the early stages othe CD.Because the earlier MD. it was suggested, had Oeeclosely controlled by the two superpowers, the Icybroadly. acceptable rules and procedures are necsary to reflect its more representative membership.was believed that with the pvcedures now establis0the CD should be able to focus more effectively on ,future negVati&s.

Other ideas suggested by some participants for im-/rR, MT& quality of the CD's .output included in;

f' 4037

38

creasing the term of sendce for chairmen of the adhoc working groups (beyond the current one session).It was also suggested. that the CD was becoming toooriented, toward "grdup" operations (Group of 21,Socialist countries, Western countries) and that thiswas inhibiting progress. 4

Many participants recommended increasing , thelevel of representation to the CD. It was noted that less (-theme thircrof the representatives to the CD have am_bassadorial rank; the other members are representedby lower-level appointees. Many CD -representatives -also serve as ambassadors to other countries and or-ganiladons, limiting the amount of time whichiczin begiven to serious disarmament negotiations. Most-par-ticipants strongly urged all countries to appoInt,trigh:,level and exclusive representatives to the CD. It was*o suggested that countries send experts on the var *

lous items under consideration to attend the complete'. sessions of the.CD. '

Some participants mentioned therneedto enhanceinteraction between the CD (the nedotiating body)-andthe First Committee of the General Assembly (theprime deliberative body). Other participants, whilefavgrindbetter coordination between the two, pointedoudthat an existingproblem is the amount of tim-CDnegotiators must spend in flew York and Mgt methoe- 41'

must be .devised to prevent this becoming an evengrester difficulty. . .

-

,rinally, most parddpants; while supporting the en-hancement of the output and quality of CD wcirk, em=phasized that the real issue is the political vAllof thaw.;negotiating parties. Duratii., procedures, and level

. of. representation will be improved as the level of na-donal interest in the .CD's work is increased. The CD

. can function effectively and nations should utilized to:pursue serious negadations. r'

UN eat Support Seivices1 N Centre for Disarritl ment

The UN Centre for Disdnnament, part of the U46Secretariat (Depirtment of Political and SecurityCouncil AffaIrs).. was strengthened' and rear-ganizitd following the first Specipi Session' vth asmall increase in its budget. Most participants

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praised the work of the Centre and belleted itdeserves greaterafinancial support. Recomroendations by some partidpants included greater ent , ,phasis by>.the Centre on public information ondisarmament, including better coordination of ativities with the UN's Office of Public Information.This would permit the Centre to produce and di ,tribute more public" information on disarmamentin nations and particular regions. Some particlepants. also questioned wheth r excessive attentionwas being given to suppo services for .conferences and ongoing disc ment f'orums, giventhe limited personnel of the Centre.

.

2. UN Institute for Disarmament Research ,- Participants tlefly discussed the work of ke newly

deatedoUN Institute for Disarmament M-earch._Most believed it is doing useful.work. Some sug- gested that the current organiptional arrange.

ment, withkkhe Institute a part of the UN Institutefor Training4nd Research (t.INITAR), is not satis-

4 factory and should = be altered. Most partici-pants believed' that the future of the Institute, in--.cludinglts relationship with the Centre for Disar-Mament, should be carefully evRfuated at the timeof the Second Special Session.

'3. Expert Studies aki,Advisory BoardMost partidpan were strongly supportive of thedisarmament expert studies, many of which werestimulated as a result of the Firs Special Session.Many of the studies have alrea been productive,and participants suggested phasis should nowbe given to distributing r ults to the general

isEpublic in an understandab fashion. Most partici-pants recommended that continued emphasis begiven to carefully developed expert disarmamentstudies, employing the highest caliber interna-tional talent.

A,

Some participants questioned the further utilityof the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies setup by the Secretary-General to advise hint on van- 4

ous aspects of studie's to be made under UN au-spices. Other participants believed theAvisoryBoard can continue to play an important role inbetter coordinating and organizing disarmamentstudies.

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Expandatin4 the Disarmament ConstituenseThe participants agreed that broad, well informedsupport for prOgresa toward disarmament is,highlyimportant;

The potential constituency for -disarmament in-cludes all who would benefit fn both the public andprivate sectors of all countries. However, most cidzens and governmental leaders need more infomm-lion and motivation. Special efforts are needed toreach political and military decision makers and pro-fessional diplomats and to encourage them to usetheir influence and skills in the disarmament effort.....Methods and ApproachThere was general agreement that a substantial hi-crease in and information on disarmanientand Amy control is needed, and that this should-1'1edone tifrPugh all available channels: govemments,news metlia, universities, schools, 11(10s/etqlhariy,participants urged that all nations pent& an opentwo-wartlow, of informs n on all, aspects of disarmament.; r

_Theegas general agreement/titiepublicity and Iformation on disarmarhent ,Enust be accurate .acredible. Infonnation for the.generalpublic shouldpresented in intefestingignderstandable ways. UNexpert studies on disa rent and .4ther UNIdocri-ments should be summarized and simplified for pnb-licpresentation. I

Many pirilciparits stressed the need to present disent issues to each group in a way that shows

con r the problems of that groOp. ror example,in countries wheremany people want to reduce theirtaxes or increase their economic development theyshould be shown how arms limitation and reductionwill help achieve thweicktlectives. Recent studies onthe relationship between disarmament and develop-ment should be widely publicized.

Governmental :officlil¢ responsible for defenseplanning should be slhdivrr how 'arms control andreduction can solve some ()Itch problemswhile re.ducing both cost and 'risk Mastic and balanced

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disarmament measures will Increase natiohal se-curity. Governments concerned about-stability needinformation on the stabilizing effect of steps towarddIsatmament.

Several participants stressed the need to presentinformation In ways that persuade rather than

, frighten. While the very real danger of the arms raceand the need for prompt action must be presented an

A approach. that implies unilateral disarmament or ig-nores security needs should be avoided.

National Disarmament OrganizatiodsThere was Consensus on the need to strengthen gov-ernmental agencies dealing with disarmament midi()create them in.countries which do not yet have them.Their value in national policy formation and in re-search was pointed out.

. A recent study by the Stanley foundation Identified, five weaknesses in many national disarmament or-

r: gapizations and five corresponding steps whichshould be taken by governments to increase their er-rectivailess: ; r1. An Increase in Wained 'full-thre professional. dis-. <armament s '

2. Better integration of a disarmament perspective'into national policy formulation andclecisloh;mak-

, ing.

3. An increased and regular legislative input into as-armament negotiations and policyformulation. ,

4. An increase in internally or externally commis-' sionedtlisarmament research.

5. Improved disarmament information and edema-,tion activities.'

Several participants praised the WI piograrrt-01.loivships on disarmament which helps train personnelof national disarmament agencies and reported thatthey are helpful in increasing the expertise of nationalstaffs.

The importance of parliamentary involvement in na-tional disarmament policies and the value °tan active.

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national organization of parliamentarians concerned `

with this subject Were stressed. _

i.

Several partidpants recommended' More direct in-teraction between political leaders and defense offi-

. dais on disarmament issues. National commissioison .disannament, with broad representation of-thepublic and private sectors, were suggested. .

.4

Nongovernmental OrganizationsMany partidpants emphasized the impottantributions ofSIGOs and research institutes. However,there was since because of the limited nurtiber oforganizations a vely engaged in education or .re-search on disarmament. There is a need to Involvemore professional organizations and organizationswith broad membership, provide them with informs -doh, and motivate them. The need for scientific andmedical organizations to provide factual informationon the probable effects of a nuclear war was noted.

.Some partidpants suggested that NOOs should

make a long-term commitment of support for on- ..,,

going disarmament progress rather than losing kr-terest after one Important treaty is ratified. Another,recommendation was that 11003 should ponder theirapproach to be sure they are responding to thereal concems of the people and are not perceivedas fringe movements or as advocates of unilateraldisarmament.

1.

The usefulness of governmental grants for specificrow projects, such as sponsoring conferences; wasnoted. . 1

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. .World Disarthament Cattipaion . N

The proposed World Disarmament Campaign 'and-fund were .discussed briefly. The goal would be tomobilize public ppihion in atipport.of disarinament Iaction 'through informaticin and educotion. Some par-tidpants suggested that the campaign should be

, linked closely to the Uft Centre for Disarmament,other UN agencies, and regional organization*:Others pointed Out that the prpposed campaign wouldhave limited resources, and suggested; that the cams.paign be concentrated nations where military ex- .0pendittires.atehigh as *age of grow nationalproduct:

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Other Approaches to Disarmamentand Security .There was consensus that in addition lo the cantina -,Ing-efforf go move toward disarmament through bind-ing treaties and conventions, all other feasible ap-proaches should be considered.

.

It was suggested that some of these methods maybe usefulat longterm measures Ar as interim stepsor both. Less fqrmal approaches may be particularlyhelpful as holding actions or Stipp' ents to negotia-lions. e.g: in preventing- the p on or develop-merit' °Una weapons techir !I while a treaty isbeing-negogated. However, many of these ideat mayalso havg lohgenn value. pi*

= The, fv;Irtidpants' suggestions for US-Soviet sum:2rnit meeting; regulatigh-level ultations, and re-lated confidencearti ding 'm ures, are discussed

"ibove. (See page 9, Disa nt Stalemate.)

Independent initiatives and Moratoriums .1-' Independent. initlitives *could be taken by a nation or

group of nations. These initiatives would not becondittpned on reciprocal action, but some degree ofreciprocity would usually be necessary to keep theprocess going. For example, one small or temporarylimitation.or reduction of armaments could lead to atong series of reciprocal limitations cir reductions.

Most participants referred to these measures as "in-dependent "initiatives," tci`avold the Negative implica-odons of the word "unliaterar and to emphasize that,several nations cah take independent action, formally

4I or informally.

Some participants recommended that recent pro-posals for..Significant nuclear- anus reductions be

, implemented by a series of independent and recipro-cal initiatives, including voluntary verification prode-dures. It was suggested that this approach could alsobe extended to conventfonai weapons, perhaps on aregional basis

Moratoriums have sometimes been -Useful as in-1.* tulip steps. It was suggested that progress toward a

A16. CTB and a chemical warfare treaty might be aided bymoratoriums.

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.Plortbinding Norms and informal RestraintsTwo or more nations 'could informally accept anagreed set of nonbinding guidelines, without a. bind-Ina treaty or as ap interim measure while a treaty isbeing t negotiated. Adherence would be voluntary.However, the guidelines could Include a series ofperiodic repQrts on comPliance,"whidi would probe-bly be an incentive for continuing compliance. Par-ticipants me tried several situations in which thismethod has n used effectively, both within Europeandn UN bodies.

A suggested variation of this approach would be tomake a list of useful disarmament and confiderice-building measures and informally select one or moreof then} for a Speci d trial period (e.g., two years)with ..rft'lmal agr m rd. Success with one measurewould Kobably be foil ed by other trials, and someof them might lead to formal agreements. This ap-proach is flexible and could betisedion a global, re-gional, or bilateral basis.

Other Confidence-Building MeasuresSuggested confidence-building steps could includeadvance notification of planned military maneuversand troop movements. This would allow observationof these events, and exchange of information onleyeis or weapons, forces.. and military budgets. Thisapproach has been used with some degree of successhi Europe. Some participants suggested it is nownecessary to increase, "transparency" of nationalmilitary infonnatio'n, determine how to obtain mutu-ally acceptable data on weappris and forces,. andagree on standardized reporting of military budgets.Others suggested that the existing measures beapplied W a larger zone and to cither.regict

Another form or confidence-building, strongly re-, ommended by many participants, Is a formal plan for

regular, periodic, private dialogue or consultation.The'agreed purpose might be one or more of the fol-lowing: to discuss and ensure compliance with aspecific arms control agreement; *to resolve am-biguities or differing interpretations of an agieementto enable each party to inform the other ennythingthat party is doing that causes fear or insecurity, andwhat that pgrty could do to provide reaSurrance; or toprovide a f e g u l a r l y scheduled o p p o r t u n i t y f or infor-

4 845

mat dialogue on any subjects of mutual interest-.Some startidpants said that the Soviet-US continuingconsultative committee under the SALT. agreementshas worked reasonably well and noted that a similarmethod Is proposed for a chemical weapons treaty.

Many participants emphasized the need`to use es-tablished channels and fora even though their pur

' pose isinformal private discussion.-This would assureperiodic, scheduled opportunities for dialogue, andwould arid political problems, related to decidingwhether and when to meet.

Some participants pointed out the confldertge-buliding value of all forms of continuing cooperation,such as economic relations and cultural exchanges.

Improved Mechanibms for PeacefulResolution of ControversiesMany participants emphasized the vital importance ofconflict management and dispute settlement in creat-ing a .favorable climate for disarmament. Others

med that disamiatnent cannot wait until the manyinmational conflicts are settled, and that new dis-put continue to erupt. Most participant* acceptedthe view that disarmament and peaceful settleinent ofcontroversies are parallel processes, each Of whichaids the other, but that neither should be dependenton the others

46

Several participants urged better implem entation oftheeven methods of peaceful settlementprovided in "Article 33 'of the Charter. Others pointed`nut-thedif-flcuilles of obtaining Security Coundliction.

One proposal was to strengthen the fact-findingprocess through the Security. Coundl, so that a fact-finding mission could be sent quickly to the site of anyinternational dispute. It was suggested that fact-flailing should not be subject to the veto. Charterrevision is not necessary to deal with this problem,because the five permanent members of the Security.Council could bind themselves by agreement not toexercise the veto In this situation.

Two proposals to strengthen the UN's conciliationcapability were presented:

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-1.. A standing Conciliation. Cominission was pro- '"

posed. Various participahts suggested that thiscommission should report to thurity Council "but should have the authority to-act quickly on itsown initiative.

2. Another proposal would create an informal body of. distingdished persons who would be available on a

standby basis assontiliatord. There would be anopen liptof respected conciliators, available at therequest of the paities.

Some participants suggested that Tither or- bothmeth could be used, but that the 'structure andpr res sh` d be flexible and info:mat and theconciliators ld be selected on an ad hoc basis.

UN and onal Verification PromisesMost cipant4 believed tilayurther development ofWI regional verification capability for variouskin of agreerhentsewould be a positive step. Somep dpants said that Improvement of verification

ethods is vital to futtp disarmament itroitliiag"."' 1*. .

pro- Some participants posed' to establish averificadon unit within the JN Centre for Disarma-ment, to be used for primary or supplemental verifica-tion of many arms control and disarmament agree-ments. ,

tiff and Regional Security Capability -

Many participants emphasized the Close relationshipbetwiten disarmament and international machinery toprotect the sictaity of -nations as they reduce their

,armaments. Most participants agreed that disanna'merit, peaceftil settlement of disputes, and interna-tiona) security and peacekeeping measures are allneeded and shohldproceed on parallel tracks.

Some partidpand urged renewed, emphaila ohi "peacekeeping forces= both within the United Nation.* %*and In various regiohs. Many nations ham trained.some of their armed forces for peacekeephwkdOtyand it was proposed that more nations do so: Someotthe countries with experience in UN peacektiping areable and willing to work with the United Nations aregional organizatiops to provide staff and sup . 1.

personnel for peace pingorees. . , ".

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, -It was suggested that disarmament will necessarily

be a gradual process, and that process should Includethe transformation if national armed forces into In-

.ternations peacekeeping forces-

rootnotes"',

1. United PlatIoniSeCond Special Session on Disarmament.Jteport of the Twelfth United Mations Procedures Confer-ence, May 1-3, 198.1. sponsored by the Stanley founda-tion. Thb conference, considered SSOD II in greaterdetail.

2.' Ibid. This report includes many specific sZgeseions onpreparation for SSOD H and on the role of MOOS.

5. Ibid. . .-4. Nonproliferation: 19aok Vantage Conference Repiert.

January 29- February 3, 1986, sponsored by the Stanleyroundation.` rionproliferatlon is considered in much

. greater depth. .

5. See Alfonso. Garda Robles, The Latin AmericanNuclearWeapon-free Zone. Occasional rape!' 19. Stan-ley roundatlon, May 1979. -

. 6. William Epstein, A Nuclear -Weapon -eree ZOile in Africa?and Roderic Alley: IiirclearWeapon4Pree Zones; TheSouth Padfic Proposal. occasiorial Paper 14. Stanleyroundatlon. May 1977. I '. . ra

7. Ibid. , . 4 ..,. ,

..% 8., United Nations Secorg Special Sessionon Disarmament° includes other proposals for enlaMing the disarmament

constituency. x. .

9. LM. Ross and John R. Redick, National DisarmamentMediniSma: A Research' Studyof the Stanley Founda.t r

. lion, July 1080.

;Stanley roundation publications are available free of chargeupon request. I

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Ms P 6011,,G. REMARKSSffik

C. well StanleyConference Chairman .

THE MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT PROCESSgo

Our purpose this week is to discuss the multilateral-approach to disarmament and to identify the waysthat nations of the world may cooperate riot just tolimit but, more importantly, to reduce national armarments and therebytto lessen the chances of war and

'enhance sectgrity.

The ever-escalating arms race jeopardizes ratherthan benefits participating nations and the worldcommunity. Neither the pyramiding arsenals of nu-clear warheads nor the expanding divisions, fleets,and squadrons armed with conventional weaponsprovide genuine security.

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0. tNearly $600 billion (US) are now expended annually,

on armaments; fundssorely needed for econoMic andsocial purposes. enormous scientific and technologi-cal resources are focused on the creation of weaponsto better exterminate people, devastate cities, threat-en human survival, and destroy dvilliacorr Mean- -while, research pertaining to serious issues affectingthe quality of life - food, energy, development and.environmental protection - suffers from inadequate -attention and:funding.

ATht ever-present threat and the frequent use of '

military force separate peoples by strengtheninglong-standing fears, prejudices, and hatreds, and 'thus undermine the cooperation that Ps essential todisarmament prbgress.

The national leaderskwho make the decisions, thataccelerate the arms raa do so in the name of peaceand security; they would not dare claim otherwise. But-the security provided by. the arms race is illusory andThe arms race itself is senseless and hazardous. Theurgency of.limitifig and reducing national armamentsis broadly 'recognized, as indicated by the, following'quotation from the final Document of.the First SpecialSessiokon Disarmament (SSOD 1) of the Uri GeneralAssembly:

Mankind is confronted with a choice:, we must haltthe arms race and proceed to disarmament or faceannihilation.

.

The arms race rolls on Cies pitethis recognition andthe numerous warnings from wise and far-seeingpeople abotit the futility of war fought with modemweapons. flow are we to put shackles on the armsrace, the gigantic, inanimate monster with at ownpowerful life thrust? Have we the wisdom and fhe de-termination to break with tradition and respond toGeorge. Kerman's recent call t9 preserve ourselvesfrom committing the supreme and final folly?

. The Multilateial Roletaause of the crucial importance' of checking and-reversing the nuclear alms race, tI7 world communityFor two decades has been tolerabl akireembielo place

54

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' primary qssirsibllity for arms reduction Stei major nutlear weapon powers the United 'S esand the Soviet Unldn ,*and tp urge them to get owith the task of limiting hand reducing nuclear

,

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weapons. This has resulted in an unhealthy domina-tiop of the world community's largely ineffective dis-armament efforts by these two countries.

,

. ,Begin in e early 1960s, the two stlPerPoivera

sparred *with other over disarmament, mattersand each -adopted Important arms control measuresainied at stabilizing mutual nuclear deterrence. In1967, Ufa began serious negotiations thlt led tothe 197 SALT I Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile -4Treaty. Subsequently, they negotiated the ill-fatedSALT It peaty. Their bilateral negotiations are nowat a stalemate

, , ;

from 1962 until 1979, the nuclear giants, as co-chainnim, dominated' the disarmament negotiationsof the Geileva-based Conference of Atte Commit* onDisarmament (CCD). Most of the treaties produced b4the CCD, partiailady the nuclear Ron-ProliferationTreaty awn reflect their Ideas. The European negoti-ations foemutual force reductions have likewise beendominated by the nuclear poirers. .

. .- .

More recently, the world community, urged by thenonaligned nations, has emphasized the multilateral

. approach to disarmament. In 1978, the First-SpecialSession on Disarmament qf the UN General Assembly,,the largest and highest level disarmament conferenceever convened. adopted a Final DoCument incorporat-ing important _principles or disarmament...a Pro-.grairime of Action, and proposals for revising UN dis-armament machinery. Subsequently,' the CCD wastransfornieci into a 40-nation' Committee on Disar-mament (CD) that now includes all nuclear weaptinMatta. The -Uri Disarmament Commission was reacts-

.vatect support for the UN Centre for Disarmament was."; 'Increelsed; a, UN institute for Disarmament Research

was established; and a (IN Plogranune Of Fellowships--.. on Disarmament was instituted.

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'Me 'multilateral approach to disarmament is the re-sultof a growinrecognttion that disarmament is too

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important to be left to the major nuclear powers"' Con-fidence in their coricept,of peace based on mutual

'terror mutual asiured4Flestructions is waningtflum'erous regional conventional arms races need tobe .curtailed. Despitt increasing multilateral em-phasis, however, the results so far have been onlydocumentation and rhetoric. Not a plane, a tank, noa ship has been deactivated. Hence, the timelihessofou r r.onference topic: The Multilateral DisarmamentProcess. 4

Second Social Session do Disarmament'At our rec eifth Unite Nations Procedures Con.krence, I made, the following observations Foncem-ing SSOD II:

1. SSOD II must advance beyon d SSOD I. There is noneed to repeat the rhetotc and debate related tothe disarmament principles of the final Document.

2. SSOD II should set the stage for early actionswhich advance the disarmanient process and re-

,. iult in the limitation or reductilln of both conven-tional and nuclear arrnameqls.

3, StOP il's success will be enhanced by stimulatingthe renewal and .expansion of bilateral negotia-tions to reduce nuclear armaments.

4, SSO,D Irs success will tie enhanced Kit develops astrongdr conceptual linkage between .,disarrrISmentpogress and national security.

441 .SSOD. 11 will judged partly by its success inexpanding the worldwide constituency support-ing disarmarnent.4

There is, I believe, a need to clarify SSOD ll's opjec-Wes. Undoubtedly, both near-term measures and acomprehensive program ofdisannament will be corn

" siderad, hear-term priority actions consistent with along-range plan are needed; It would seem, therefore,that a dual or two-track approach would be desirable.

X./by strengthening the linkage between arms

tion,and national security, SSOD II could debunk themyth that ever-Increasing armaments provide eatersecurity. (further challenge to SSOD plapni is to 4.

56fr

prqvide for greater input and partidpadon by non.governmental organizations (NO0s) and research in.stitutes. a

tionproilfesation and theMultilateral Process,Because anNeffective nonprofiferation regime is cm-dal to stop and reverse the nuclear arms race, it is anitem of importance to all nations, not just those pos-sessing or about to possess nuclear weapons.

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The objectives of the nuclear Non-ProlifecadonTreaty remain valid. More nuclear buttons within therezkOof. more hands Kirther destabilize the presentnuclear balance of tenpr. More sources of plutoniumwithout proper safeguards increase the probability ofnuclear theft and terrorisln, More nuclear installationsof whatever type multiply the potential for accidents."The multilateral Interest in an effective nonprolifer-ation regime Is understandably increasing.

"MPT, the brainchild of the SOviet Union and th eUnited States, is in jeopardy: 'Failure of the SecondNPT Revieiv Conference in 1980 to adopt the 'final

kistatement is indicative of the situation. Many nationswhich ratified, the NPT are challenging the SovietUnioln and the United States to live up to_their c,orn-

- mitments under Article,1 IV,and VI of the Treaty. TheInternational Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE)

. 'brought together representatives of over 50 nations tostudy technical aspects of the use, processing, andmanagemept of nudear fuels. This multilaterallive undoubtedly has contributed tq a better ,under-standing of the problems involved in develoFfing an

-effective nonproliferation regime.

A Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CIO)prohibiting all tests of nmdear explosives would helplimit ptoliferation and Is generally considered an.im-portant Biaannament priority. Multilateral pressure isneeded, to elc,o-dtgge the United Sikes, the aoAetUnion, and Gftt °Malt, to agreon the text of this

treaty and to submit it to the Committee on Disarma-ment for adoption and for reconithendaypn to theGeneral Assembly.

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Another, multilateral organization, the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA), needs to bestrengthened to undertake the increasingly importantroles of #pplying the safeguards that are an essentialpart of a viable, nonproliferation regime, as wellas providing assistance in the peaceful uses of atomicenergy. .

The 19133UN Conference on the Promotion of Inter-national Cooperation inhthe Peaceful Uses of NuclearEnergy will provide another opportunity for multi -

'lateral efforts to strengthen the nuclear nonprolifera-tion regime in the context of equitable sharing ofthebenefits of nuclear energy.

Regional Multilateral Efforts A s.

The opportunities for nations to Work together to-wards disarmament hds a regional as well as a globaldimension. The long - standing Mutual korce 'Reduc-tion (MPR) negotiation between the-NATO and WarsawPact nations is one such effort. Recently, neutral andnonalignbd countries at the Madrid meeting-of theConference on Security and .Cooperation in Europeproposed a conferencen confidence-building mea-

, sures and disarmament. Despite the regional natureof dr' negotiations to limit and reduce .the heavy ,Euron armaments, negotiations to date have beenheavily influenced by the US -USSR confrontation. *".

) i Nevertheless, the negoliations are multilateral,'thereby affording opportunities for input that have notbeen present in the Soviet;American nuclear neaotia-

. tions. iqreakthrough in the limitation and reductionof European armaments is crucial for the entire dis-armament effort. . .

4

1-One outstanding example of the regional approachis the Tlateiolco Treaty that prohibits the placement ofnuclear Weapons in Latin America. Contiguous' na-

. ,iions haye multilaterally agreed to make LatinAmerica a nuclear-weapon-free zone. By means of ok

protocols, duclear weapon states qutside the area ,covered by the Tlatelolco Treaty have agreed or. willhave when the United Statds and Prance ratify ProtocolNo. 1 .- to respect the terms of the treaty and to re= ,train (rodl testing, producing storing, or using nu; .

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( ,,.dear weapons within LathtAmerica and also to iral&from the use or threatened use of nuclear weaponsagainst parties to the treaty.

,riuclear-weaponfreeiones have been proposed f9r

many other areas, including sub-Saharan Aftica,Central Europe, the ,Middle East, the

Mediterranean, the South Pacifico Sotheast Asia, and 'South Asia.

(

nations of a region May also mudded: rani! negc4atenations:arrangements -to limit conventional -armaments, toreduce arms transfer, and to prohibit the placementcertain types of sophisticated military equipme*: .'Agreements of this type.would be most likely in areas \that have comparatively low levels of armaments andmilitary' standing and that are free from bitter on- >doing controversy. The 1974 Declaration ofAyacucaoby eight Latin American countries, followed by furtherdiscussions in 1978 and 1979, is a hopeful beginning.

Proposals for a-zone of peace in the Indian Ocean isanother example of a regional approach ib disarma-ment. Such' a zone would involve not only qdjacentnations but else the United States and thi Soviet.Union who would be asked to refrain from establish-ing bases in the area. Unfortunately, current events donot favor a zone ot peace in the Indian Ocean area.

Regional maldlateral disarmament efforts deservecareful study and encouragement. Wherever they can :-be develdped, they wit enhance security, reduce:military budgets, lessen tensions;and th us benefit thecountries involved. 4.

National officials should place the regional ap-Rroach high on/their disarmament agenda, Multilat-eral regiondl commissions are heeded for,ongoing de-liberation and negotiation. Statesmen within the arare needed/to provide strong leadership.

. Multilateral Disarinament CipabflityHow may theIworid community enhance the multilat-eral disarmament. process? One way is to improveexisting mechanisms, As a result of SSOD I, the de?

-fliberafte bodies of the United Nations now.consist of

e v '5-9

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the General Assembly, i uding its -First Committliteand the resurrected UN sannament Commission. Eyaction of SSOD I, th = Committee on Disarmament,which is related to e United nations but not anagency of it sery as the negotiating body. These .mechanisms p de an adequate framework forthe multilateral isarmarent process on the global

Utidoub ly, their procedures and methodsor operation be improved to entkance multilateralcapability. .

Tbe Uri Centre for Disarmament and the UN Institutetbr Disannanient Research, otganizations that sup-port the deliberative ald negotiating bodies, need tobe strengthened. Uncittestionably, their capability

would be .improVed by greater financial support. tVatwoulckpermit mere adequate staff. Flo doqbt, someprocedural changes would also be beneficial,

aThe multilateral process would be enhanced by

vastly increased research and study on the many' facets related' to disarmament. Expert stuslies by ap-

pOinted groups ate increasingly being used. Can theybe made more effective by recruiting more qtialifiedexperts 0:0; by modifying procedures? Would not a;substantial c9ntinuing 'effort to develop a ,Com-prehensive Programme of Disatinament be usefulnWould 'subsequent Special Sessions of Ole GeneralAssembly devoted to disarmament be Useful, orwould y tend to duplicate and overlap the work bf

sannament Commission? Are there other ways sin which'the world community's disarmament 40pabil-ity may be enhanced? -

. .Expanding Disarmament Constituency .

Disarmament is too important to be left Solely to °

elected or self-appointed governMental Leaders. Themepeople who bear the burden of arrnarnent.costs andsuffer the casualties when anfts races result in war 'need to be involved. Governmental leaders at* more .

likely to develop the requisite will and determination' to make disarmament progress if supported.. by a_ b

substantial constituency. Unfortunately, the. world-wide constituenty supporting disarmatnentOs gross-

4

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,Strengthening the 'rn9Itilateral process, therefore,depends In part on a larger, better informed constit-

N.ttency within national governments and the generalpublic. Apathy neeciplo. be overcome. It-is not enoughto view diLarmament as a desirable objective; thecomplicatibps apd difficulties of achieving it must berecognized. The ki*slic needs disarmament informs-tion. The relationship ilehren disarmament and na-tional security needs to hccriplained; the 4onomicachianthges of smaller national bitcptets for militaryestablishments need to be publidfecTs.: Inteinationaland national disarmament organizations need tst do abetter ,job. of ptiblidzing disarmament mattersprogress as well as setbacks. The

be helpful. The disarma nN information seF-

vices can t organizationsof ost governments Must be panded andstr gtherred, not only to better cope with the manyc Plicated problems involved in disannamenebut

Ialso to bitter inform their ptiplic. .:

t. -)

Greater 1100 and research organization 'm e

a

e-ment is highly desiralle, both to build constit ciesand to make meaningful contributions to (Manna-meat deliberations. The privileges extended to-NGOsand research institutes at SSOD I should be repeatedand, In addition, agangernents.should be made to .provide them greater and earlier input. Beyond this,NGOs can do much to inform the public and 'thUsbroaden the disarmament constituency. .

,

The -World *Disan(ament Campaign now being. studied,by the United Nations is a potential vehicle for ..

enlarging the disarmament coristittiency. Disarma-ment progress would also be enhanced by moreadequate and accuratie Deporting by news media. Whatsteps might be taken to im rove media coverage?

corn t becomemay reporters and toatori beco betterinformed on disarmament mat rs? Are there other" 4

.1.vays in which the disarmament constitdencyfmaybk expanded? .

. i -.

.1 Other Approaches. . Early breaktttroughs and successes wo \ld improve

the climate for disarmament. Is it not desirAble, there;fore, to considef ways of brealdng away from\the con-. .

4.. /len tiOnal .approach to disarmament that channels_ minds into the traditional pattern of formal -r,tegotia-_,

58tibrr and ratification' ortreaties and conventions? 'Ts ,

,-

process is so slow andlaborious that weapons'technology, development, and deployment outpacesft by a wide margin. Some alternatives to this tradi-tional approach are

1. flonbindng.norms or codes in the areas of araces and security that could facilitate subsequtreaty negotiatidni or serve as guidelines fortional conduct.

2. Agreed short-term moratoriums such as = sedin negotiating the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treatyin 1963.

3. Independent initiatives undertaken by one nationor a group of nations in the expectation of recip-rocal action.

4! Voluntary acceptance of iriforinal restraints relatedto nonbinding norms or codes, or to unratifiedtreaties. .

'Confidence-building measures of various-types thatmight reduce tensions could do much to decreaselhedanger of war by miscalculation and to improve theclimate for disarmament. Development of improvedverification systems capable of detecting complianceor noncompliance with agreed -disarmament mea-sures would strengthen confidence. What other,confidence-building measures should be proposed?

Finally, it is..important to recognize that substantial. disarmament will not be achieved without simultarte-ous progress in the peaceful settlement of disPuteiand conflict management. Few nations will appre-dAblY reduce armaments untiLthey..are satisfied thatintematiorlal thechanBrniare adequate-in these twoareas. Mechapisms that will assure the peaceful resol-ution °lc° niroversie's that inevitably arise among na-tions and their nationals are needed. Also needed isthe international capacity to detfOniminent aggres-sion and to deal effectively with breaches ofthe peace.These mechanisms are -essential, even at the risk ofencroaching on national sovereignty. Procedures fcirthe peacefutsettlement of disputes and conflict man-airment; together with disarmament, are the threeinterlocking elements of a secuty system for a worldwithout war.. All threl depehd upon multilateralagkeement.

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ConclusionRecently, George P. Keenan, historian; .professciremeritus, and former US ambassador, addressed abold and startling challenge to the United States andthe Soviet Union to Make an immediate across-the-

.' board reduction of 50 percent of their nuclear arsen-als. As he accepted the AlbertEinstein Peace Prizehe Said:

,We have gone on piling weapon upon weapon, mis-sile upon missile, new levels of destructivenessupon old ones. We have done this helplessly, al-most InvOluntarilyi like the victim; of some sort ofhypnotism. like Men in a dream, like lemmingsheading for the-sea, like the children 4Hameinmarching blindly along behind their Pled ?Iper. Andthe result is . . . quantities of these weapons so

.vistly in ieces of any rational and demonstrablerequirements, redundancy of such grotesque di-.

mensions as to defy rational understanding.

Kerman went on to say:

What is it then . : . that has brought* to this pass?Thenswer, 1,thiiikt, is clear. It is primarily the innermomentum, the, independent momentum, of theweapons race itself the coMpulgions that ariseand take charge of great powers when they enterupon a competitiorlwith each other in the building

of majorjamiaments of any sort. .

"Is ft possible to kreak out of this charmed and vi-dot's circle? it is soberingto recognize that no one,at least to my knowledge, has yet done so. But noone, for that matter. has ever been faced with suchgreat, catastrophe, such inalterable catastrophe, atthe end of the line. Others, in earlier decades, couldbefuddle thentseives with dreams tof somethingcalled.nvictoty.' We, perhaps fortunately. are de- S

nied this seductive Rrospect. We have to break outof the drcte. We have no other choice.-

While Kennan's challenge is aimed at the United -Stales and the Soviet Union, it hits every nation thattrusts in the threat and use of force to assure peaceand security. The Aqorld must break out of the circle.We have no Other choice. 44114

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C-4410141.) 5 Y 0135.Gau glerrowS.

These observations were prepared by the chairman, ei .

C. Maxwell Stanley, following the conference. They r, fleet discGssion, not only at this conference, but

also at prior Stanley Foundation conferences.

KO

A well-organized conference, a fine group of able andconceniwd participants, and a good rapporteurs' report, but to.what end? Feelings of fear, frustration,and anger mingle as I reflect on our deliberations onthe multilateratapproach to disarmament.

. _

My fears grow as 1 contemplate the mounting dan-gers inherent in expanding arsenals of nuclearweaponst the proliferation of these means of massdestruction, and the burgeoning conventional militaryforces. These trends, together with the readintss ofnations to resort to armed conflict, constantly in-crease the probability of disaster. . J

My frustrationstdeepen as I reflect on the current

. disarmament stalemate. Our Bermuda participantsg.,. ,, know what must be done to check and reverse the

arms race; the rapporteurs' report provides a fullagenda of action. But disarmament deliberations con-tinue to focus on the procedural rather than the sub-stantive, on words and documents rather than on th'eactual limitation and reduction of armaments, thecreased use of peaceful settlement, and the ermeasures required to assure international peace andsecurity.

I become angry as I recognize the shortsightednessof the leaders Of nations, certainly including my own,who, ISelievin,0 that greater arsenals will assure peaceand security, relentlessly stimulate the arms race.When will the leaders of nations awaken to the senseless risks they take as they procrastinate on disarma-ment? When will they realiie the 'security andeconomic benefits to be gained by limiting and reduc-ing armaments? Wilk is needed to persuade a shockthem into action?

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Breakthr ghThere are n# easy answers to these queslions..Neltherthe forthcoming Second Special Sessiolit on IDisar-moment mar the laborious negotiations of the Com-mittee on Disarmament are likely soon to bring ap-preciable disarmament progress. Without stronanddetermined leadership, 55OD 11 will do little morethan produde additional documentation. The pace ofmultilateral negotiations will scarcely keep up with thedevelopment of new weaPans technology. Therefore,K is important to experiment with alternativ0 ap-proaches: independent initiatives, moratoriums,1 non-binding norms, and informal restraints allediscrissedin the rapporteurs' report. Accompanied by cold-

Aence-building measures and improved internationalmechanisms for peacefulsettlement of disputes andsecurity.measures, such approaches Just might allowbreakth roughs. .

There will be no breakthroughs, however, unlesstine leaders of nations bring them about. Multilateraldisarmament progress dept.nds on a coalition oflike-minded nations determined to achieve results. Acoalition lor survival, consisting of .nonaligned na-tions ancisome countries from the NATO and WarsawPact groups, covld stimulate disarmament action andexert strong pressure on the superpowers and otherholdouts.

The world impatienily awaits the example and lead-ership of the major nuclear powers; undoubtedly theyhold ,the key to disarmament progress. Next week isnone to soon to resume the bilateral ilegotng pro-cess. Next month is ncinoi, too soon pr identBrezhnev and President Reagan /to ,meet fo. discussbold objectives and through moratoriums or-joint in-itiatives, to make disarmament progret* a reality.Me4rnwhile, the world rushes pell-mell tovdniarge itscapacity to destroy itself. Survival is at stake.

6663

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5-1-pruLey Pou-Krt)A-'r loks InFolem crrio,J# ,Activities

The Stanley Foundation encourages study, research,and education in the field of international policy con-tributing to a secure peace with freedom and justice.Programming reflects founder and .President C. M.Stanley's long-time concern for global security, Stan-ley Foundation activities includthe following confer-ences and publications: .

Strategy for Peace Conference. Meeting in smalldiscussion groups, some =80 opinion - shapers anddecision-makers explore US foreign policy concernsand recommend actions and policies.

United Nations of the tiekt Decade Conference.Convened alternately in the United States and abroad,this annual conference brings togethee 25 ambas-sadors, secretariat officials, foreign ministry officials,and international experts from the private sector to

_ consIderVI problems and prospects.lUnited Nations Procedures Conference. Current Utl

concerns and organizational procedures areexamined by 25 diplomats, secretariat Officials, andacademic specialists at informal discussion sessions.

Vantage Conferences. A wide variety of multilateraland bilateral policy matters are frankly discussed byclosely involyed experts on an intermittent basis.

Occasional Papers. Policy-oriented essays by di-verse authors are published periodicalry as Occa-sional Papers. These papers concern impro*ment ofinternational organization or specific US foreign pol-icy Issues. Manuscript submissions are Invited.

i 4,World Press Review. This monthly, ,rnagazine ex-

ohpts and reprint's material from the press Outsidethe United States. Sold by subscription from WorldPress Review, 230 Park AvenUe, New York New York10169.

The Stanley Foundation, a private operating foutida'.tion, does not provide giants. Conference reports andOcca.ssional Papets are distributed free of charge. Apublications list is available. . .. ,

67 4 'a

Y

United Nations of the Next Decade

temational peace and securi .

M 1945, representatives of 50 nations signed the t*-7-

United Nations Charter in San Franc f "to reaffIrrnfaith.in fundamental. human ,riglits. to promote so- 1,

dal progress...to unite our sir to Maintain In-

Twenty years later delegates from 11 nations con-vened in San Frandsco to c.ommem to that event.

s Upon the eve of that symbolic 'Sim n, C. MaxwellStanley gathered respected indivi from 13 na-tions to diScuss the role' f the United nations in thenext Ilecade- t

Since 1967, similar United Mations of the liext De-cade conferences have assembled annually_ underStanley Foundation sponsorship. Conference conclu-sions and recommendations are presented In a conference report which is distributed worldwide.

The selection of confereeicopics and the highquality of partidpants have pftuced recoMmepda-tioriswhich have been of value to governments and totheynited Nations. .

Conference sites have been selected to reflect theinternational dinension of this conference series-andto promote personal relationships so important to.mutual understanding:

1965 San Frandsco, California, USA*1967 Burgenstock, Switzerland

1968-eDubrOvnik, YugoslaVia19691970197129721973197419751976

"19771.1978

197919801981

. t

Quebec, CanadaFredensborg, Denmark .

Simla, RomaniaSouth Egremont, Massgchusetts, USAAmalfi, ItalyVail, Colorado, USA 4 4

Baden bet Wien: AustriaCharlottesville, Virginia, USASan Juan del Rio, MexicoIowa City !owa, USAForvoo, Finland .

Woodstock Vermont, U06Warwick, Bermuda-

. 68

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