STABILITY OF ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS STRUCTURES*

Morris Zelditch, Jr. Joseph Berger Bernard P. Cohen

This is an expanded version of a paper read at the National Joint Conference of The Institute for Management Science and the Operations Research Society of America at Minneapolis, Minnesota, October 8, 1964. Research for this paper was conducted with the support of NSF grant #G-23990 for investigation of authority and evaluation structures, and a Ford Foundation grant to the Stanford Graduate School of Business for investigation of conflict in Staff- Line structures. The three authors bear equal responsibility for the ideas expressed here, the order of names on various reports of the two projects having been determined by a random device. We would like gratefully to acknowledge the help given us by Bo Anderson, Sanford M. Dornbusch, and W. Richard Scott.

May, 1965Technical Report No. 10 (Revised)

STABILITY OF ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS STRUCTURES

1. Introduction

Sixteen years ago, Hughes could say that

Jobs and departments in an industry are rated by everyone concerned.We expect that. Less attention has been given to the fact that the kind of people hired for a given job determines to some extent the job's prestige. (Hughes, 1949, 120)

He would not have said the same thing in 1965. By "the kind of people

hired" he meant particularly their sex, age, race, and ethnicity. We shall

call such factors external status-characteristics. Partly because of his

own work, partly because of the pervasiveness of the process, there now is

a fairly large, fairly consistent body of knowledge about the wajs in which

external status-characteristics invest washrooms with invidious significance,

or determine sponsorship, career, and the price of labor, or activate ex­

pectations, the violation of which creates upheavals in organization.*

The principal kind of finding is that

...if women are hired for a job that only men have done, the men may take the hiring of women, not as proof that women are rising in status, but as proof that the job's status is threatened. We have heard of one industry in which Italians, who had been limited to poorer jobs, were annoyed when Negroes were hired to work along­side them; not because they disliked Negroes particularly, but on the ground that--since they knew what people thoughtof Negroes־■ the hiring of them was additional evidence that management had a low opinion of the Italians (Hughes, 1949, 120-121).

Among the earliest contributions were Collins, 1946 and Hughes, 1946. Since then we have had Dalton, 1950, 1951, 1959; Gardner and Moore, 1955; Hall, 1946, 1948; Homans, 1953; and Hughes, 1949. Related problems are considered by Becker and Geer, 1960, and Gouldner, 1957, 1958.

As a consequence, organizational functions become "segregated" (Hughes,

1949) by age, or sex, or ethnicity; to maintain this structure, discri­

mination is practiced in both recruitment and advancement, made possible be­

cause both depend on a process of sponsorship largely controlled by the

"inner fraternity" of an organization (Collins, 1946; Dalton, 1951; Hall,

1946, 1948). If the "wrong" people do happen to enter or advance into segre­

gated positions, informal rejection restores the system to its usual segre­

gated state (Collins, 1946). Sometimes contradictions in status are un­

recognized or ineradicable; in that case, one observes conflict and tension

(Dalton, 1950; Whyte, 1948).

Collins' paper (1946) is fairly typical of this literature. He reported

that in a New England factory the managerial jobs were mainly held by Yankees,

first-line supervisors were mainly Irish, and workers were mainly south and

east European . Employees tended to regard this as normal and right. Trouble

threatened when management wanted to appoint a Yankee as foreman of a newly

reorganized janitorial service, trouble not only from Yankees, but from fore­

men and workers. It was averted by upgrading the job, calling it "sanitation

engineer" and defining it as managerial.

Behavior of the kind Hughes observed is explained if we assume two

properties of status structures: a balance property, a tendency for two or

more evaluated states to tend to have the same value, as when the executive

washroom is more highly evaluated than the worker's washroom; and a diffuse

property, a tendency for at least some characteristics to be relevant in very

many contexts, as when sex or ethnicity tend to order behavior in many social

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situations. We propose to construct a model of status structures having

these two properties, and apply it to problems of the status structures of

organizations.

The model we will construct is a balance model, in which the central

problems are, first, to decide what entities and relations are sufficient

to describe a given system, and second, to decide what states of the system

should be classified as balanced. These decisions are made in such a way

that one may relate the balance of a system to its stability and the imbalance

of a system to its tensions and pressures to change. A final task is to de­

fine the scope of the theory; that is, to define the situations in which it

may be applied.

In applying the model to the status structures of organizations, we

must identify observables of the model with some empirical events, determine

the value of its underived parameters, and determine typical initial and

boundary conditions of the field of application. The most difficult part

of this task commonly derives from the complexity of the world as compared

to the model. What the task really comes to is that concrete empirical

things such as jobs must be analyzed into more simple notions, notions that

permit "jobs" to be coordinated with concepts in the model. Thus in organizing

the presentation of the material, we first formulate the balance property in

a highly general way and, before developing the model further, show its ap­

plication to a simple and well-known example which does not yet involve the

diffuse property. Our purpose is both to illustrate the balance idea and to

introduce those new notions necessary to apply it to organizational status

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structures. We then formulate the diffuse property, after which we show

its applications to a problem which does not yet involve the external status-

characteristics with which Hughes was most concerned. This both illustrates

the diffuse property and introduces some new ideas required for applications.

Returning to the empirical uniformity from which we started, the com­

monly observed influence of external status-characteristics on the structure

of organizations, our problem is not only to use the model to explain what

is already well-known but also to show that it explains exceptions. Put

another way, the model provides knowledge of how organizations can be con­

structed that are not influenced so much by external status-characteristics.

It is easy to find existing organiz ations that satisfy the required con­

ditions, though none of them are industrial organizations. But it will turn

out that the conditions are rather extreme. Finally, in summarizing the

model an opportunity arises to show the entire set of conditions it yields

for stability of the structure of an organization.

2. The Balance Property

Consider two actors, p and o, to whom we attribute any number of charac­

teristics (such as red hair, energy, insight into human character, or mechani­

cal ability) and who desire any number of goal-objects (such as the esteem

of others, money, or a key to the executive washroom). A characteristic will

ordinarily be denoted by the letter C, or, when necessary to distinguish among

two or more of the, by C^, C^...; and a goal-object by GO, or GO^,GO^..,,

where necessary. We look at characteristics and goal-objects from p's point

of view and o, in fact, is not properly an actor at all; o is solely a

referent, an object of p's orientation. Characteristics and goal-objects

are said to have states (such as high and low in the case of mechaoical

ability, or black, brown, blonde, red in the case of hair color; or, if the

type of washroom in an organization is one of its goal-objects, "executive"

and "not-executive" might be its states) . States of characteristics will be

noted by C(x), x =• a, or b, a and b being the different states of a single

characteristic; states of goal-objects by GO(x), In this paper we limit

our discussion to characteristics and goal-objects with only two states; for

example, hair color, the states of which are black, brown, red, blonde,

would be treated as if the states were black and not-black, or red and not-

red.

Among the elements of the theory there are two kinds of relations:

evaluation and relevance. States of characteristics and goal-objects are

evaluated by p if he thinks of some state as better and another as worse.

Observe that this is not the same as seeing some states as high and others

as low; it is possible to devalue the "higher" state of a characteristic, as

some people give a low value to high aggressiveness. Characteristics and

goal-objects are re levant to other characteristics and goal-objects when:

(1) given that p or o possess a state of one, he also possesses or expects

to possess one, but not both states of another; or (2) given that p or o

possesses a specific state of one, he also possesses or expects to possess

2To characterize a system of actors a transition must be made from this p-centric level of analysis. This is accomplished by taking each actor (or class of actors) as p, in turn, predicting the response of each one to the situation in which he and the others are found.

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a specific state of another. While we use "relevance" to cover both cases,

when there is reason to distinguish them we will call the second strict and

the first not-strict. Thus, where relevance is not strict, p merely under­

stands that there is some relationship established between elements, while

in strict relevance p understands also how the two elements are related,

what states are related to what other states. In this paper we deal largely

with strict relevance.

Taken together, these elements and relations form a status structure, S,

from p's point of view. It is completely described if we stipulate what

characteristics are evaluated, what values are given to their states, what

goal-objects are valued, what values are given to tbeir states, and, finally,

what elements are relevant to what other elements.

The most important property the structure exhibits is the balance property

(see Heider, 1946, 1958; and Cartwright and Harary, 1956). By balance we

mean

Definition 2.1. (Balance). Two relevant elements of a status structureare balanced if and only if they have the same evaluation.

Definition 2.2. (Balanced status structure). A status structure is balanced if and only if all sets of relevant elements in it are balanced.

Homans (1953), for example, reported that two positions in a telephone

company billing office, called the ledger clerk and the cash poster, were

differentially evaluated for the skill they required but are paid the same

wage. This example is developed in the next section. All we observe for

the moment is that the characteristic and goal-object are imbalanced (see

Figure 1).

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Figure 1. An imbalanced status structure. C(x), x = a, b, represents a state of a characteristic; GO(x), x * a, b, a state of a goal-object. Each straight line is an evaluation by p of a state. A "+" sign signifies a positive evaluation, a sign, a negative evaluation. Braces represent relevance as seen by p; that is, a brace from C(a) to GO(b) means that p sees C(a) as relevant to GO(b). Because relevance need not be symmetric, direction of relevance is shown by arrows. (Relevance bonds are always assumed to be positive and, since negative relevance is not defined in our theory, signs are omitted for the relevance relation.) In the status structure shown here, p positively evaluates C(a) and negatively evaluates C(b) and GO(b). Both states of the characteristic are seen as relevant to GO(b) [which would be the case, for example, if it were distri­buted equally to both]. Because the relevant states C(a) and GO(b) have different evaluations the status structure is imbalanced.

By the "balance property" we mean that balanced structures are stable,

while imbalanced structures create tension and pressures to change in the

direction of balance. Homans' ledger clerks, for example, ought to be up­

set and agitate for an increase in wages so as to create an appropriate wage

differential. But we must be given that the states are relevant and dif­

ferentially evaluated. Given such conditions,

Assumption 2.1. (Stability). A status structure is stable if and only if it is balanced.

By "stable" here, we mean that the status structure will not change as

a result of any pressures within the structure itself.

Assumption 2.2. (Tension), If it is imbalanced, there is strain generated within the status structure.

Assumption 2.3. (Path). If it is imbalanced, there are pressures from with­in the status structure to change it in the direction of balance.

The "pressures" referred to in 2.3 need not be understood by actors in

the system as explicit efforts to change the status structure; they are not

even necessarily conscious.

It is important not to misunderstand the implications of the balance

assumptions. We d£ not say that all or most or even any imbalanced status

structure eventually must be balanced. In many empirical systems other

processes often combine to prevent balance from developing. However, the

theory does say that tension will result in such systems as a consequence of

the imbalance.

Like other published balance theories, ours is indeterminate in at

least two ways. It does not predict which of several possible balanced

patterns will be the terminal structure, if any, after a process of change;

nor does it predict which of many possible paths will be the particular path

to that terminal structure.

Finally, note from the way balance is defined that only if elements of

S are relevant do we expect to observe the balance property. If e^ and e

are any two elements of S (where e stands for any sort of state or object)

that are differentially evaluated but not relevant, they may be either the

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the same or different in evaluation; in neither case would there be any

issue of balance or imbalance, hence no issue of stability or instability.

Perhaps e^ is a university professorship and e is high athletic ability;

both of which are presumably evaluated in a university community but not seen

as particularly relevant. Of course, if they can be made relevant; for ex­

ample, if in some university appointments come to depend on athletic ability;

then the situation is quite different. If high athletic ability and a pro­

fessorship are both positively evaluated to about the same degree in that

university, then they are balanced (Definition 2.1) and hence stable

(assumption 2.1); there will be no pressure from within S to change either

evaluations or relevance relations. If the states that become relevant have

different evaluations (as would be the case if the professorship were more

positively evaluated than high athletic ability), then they will be imbalanced

(Definition 2.1), there will be strain (assumption 2.2), and pressures will

develop to change the structure (assumption 2.3). That is, there will be

pressures from within 3 to change either evaluations or relevance relations.

But in the absence of any relevance relation no such pressures arise. In

the same way, the balance property is observed only if the states of each

of the relevant elements are differentially evaluated. If hair color is,

for some reason, supposed by actors in S to be relevant to handedness--per-

haps black hair is associated with being left-handed--both hair color and

handedness must be differentially evaluated. If either hair color states

or handedness states are not differentially evaluated, there is no reason

to think of the stability or instability of this relation in terms of the

balance theory.

Up to this point we have considered cases where the elements are al­

ready differentially evaluated in S and then made relevant to each other.

But what can we say of an element which is not already evaluated in S? What

can we say of an element that is initially not relevant?

First consider an element e. that is not evaliated, and some other ele-lments, e , e^..., that are; and suppose that e^ is made relevant to e , e^...,

Perhaps e^ is a key to an organization's washroom, e is executive status in

the organization, e^ is a high salary, and so on; and perhaps only executives

use the washroom and they all have high salaries. What can we eay about

such a case? Essentially we believe that e^ acquires the evaluations of e

and e, ; that, for example, the key to the executive washroom will become aКpositively evaluated goal-object (see Figure 2). We do not believe this

will happen, however, if to transfer evaluations to e^ would create imbalance.

For example, in imbalance would have been created if e and e^ were two

differentially evaluated status elements in S (e.g., if both executives and

workers had access to the same washroom. In this case we would not expect

e^ to become evaluated either positively or negatively; while it might have

other bonds of value, it would not acquire status value within S (see

Figure 2c).

Assumptions 2.4. (Spread of Value). Let e. be a non-evaluated element of of S and e., e^..., be any evaluated elements of S. If e^ is made“* re levant to e j, e^,..., or e j , ej¿, ..., are made relevant to e¿, e acquires the evaluation of the evaluated elements if and only if ej, e^, ..., all have the same evaluation.

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o'

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p-

Figure 2b. Assumption 2.4 claims that C(a) will acquire the sign of the evaluated object to which it is relevant.

Figure 2a. A characteristic that is initially not evaluated may be made relevant to an evaluated goal■ object. (We use an 0 to represent the absence of evaluation.)

Figure 2d. Note also that if two apparently distinct states both become linked to the same evaluated state, they come to have the same evaluation in the status structure.

Figure 2c. If, however, the non­evaluated state becomes two states that are different in evaluation, it remains non-evaluated.

Now consider an element e^ that is relevant to a second, say e ,

but not to a third, e, . And suppose e. is relevant to e , though initiallyk j ke^ is not. Perhaps skin color is not initially relevant to income, but is

believed to be relevant to executive ability, and executive ability is

relevant to income. In this case, we can say that skin color will become

relevant to income; for we believe that relevance is transitive (see figure. 3)

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Third, consider a structure in which there was no evaluated element; or,

though there were evaluated elements, no element was relevant to any other

element. In neither of these cases would we want to talk of the balance

property; neither relevant non-evaluated elements nor evaluated non-relevant

elements can be said to be balanced or imbalanced.

One field of application of the balance theory is to the distribution

of a wage to positions within the organization. We will use a very simple

model as an illustration. The purpose is to exhibit the meaning of the

balance concepts. No new light on wage allocation is to be expected. Our

reason for choosing this particular illustration will be more evident as we

Assume that we are given the simplest possible organization, one that

Figure 3b. Assumption 2.5 claims that C.(a) will become relevant to GO(a).

Figure 3a. The characteristic state C\(a) is initially not relevant to the goal- object state GO(a), but is relevant to a second characteristic state C.(a) that is relevant to GO(a). ־*

3. Application: Simple model of organizational wage structure.

develop it

consists of only two positions that together work on the single task T.

Suppose that this task has just two outcomes, say T(a) and T(b) . Further­

more, which outcome occurs is determined by a single ability, C which has

only two states, C(a) and C(b). (We will say that C is instrumental to T if

possessing C(x) increases the likelihood of achieving one task-outcome and

decreases the likelihood of achieving the other.) Finally, performance in

this organization is rewarded by only one kind of goal-object, GO, having

only states GO(a) and GO(b). Observation of this organization shows us, say,

that the evaluation of C made by actors in S assigns a positive value to the a

state and a negative value to the b state; a similar evaluation is made of

GO, that is, the a state is positive and the b state negative; and, finally,3the state T(a) is the more valued outcome of the task. To summarize: (1)

Two positions form an organization S with a single task T; (2) the task T

has two outcomes, T(a) and T(b) , the outcome T(a) being more valued in S;

(3) which outcome is more likely to occur is determined by a single charac­

teristic, C, states of which are possessed by actors in the positions in S;

C has two states, C(a) and C(b), the former having the greater value in S;

(4) a single kind of goal-object, GO, is awarded actors in S, having only

the states a and b, the former of which is more valued in S.

Now suppose that one position is identified with state C(a) while the

other is identified with state C(b). We will compare three wage policies

3While it is convenient, in illustrations to let a always be the positively evaluated state, there is no reason in the theory for this always to be so; b could just as well be the positively evaluated state and a the negatively evaluated state.

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each of which is a way of assigning goal-objects to the two positions. The

first wage policy, called a uniform wage policy, is to award the same goal-

object, say GO(b), to actors in both positions. The second wage policy,

called differential-imbalanced, is to award the negative goal-object to the

positive state of the characteristic and the positive goal-object to the

negative state of the characteristic. The third wage policy, called dif-

ferential-balanced, is to award the positive goal-object to the positive state

of the characteristic, and the negative goal-object to the negative state

of the characteristic (see Figure 4).

C(a) GO(b) C(a) GO (a)

Figure 4c. Differ* ential-Balanced Wage Policy

Figure 4b. Differential- Imbalanced Wage Policy

Figure 4a. Uniform Wage Policy

If we adopt a uniform wage policy, we have by definition 2.1 an im­

balanced status structure. By assumptions 2.1-2.3 such a structure will

create tensions and conflict in the organization and if possible will change

in the direction of balance. The effect of a uniform wage policy will be

either to force states of the characteristic to be more equally evaluated,

or to convince actors in S that the characteristic is not relevant to allo­

cation of goal-objects. Managers will regard neither of these outcomes as

desirable ־־perhaps because they have a theory that if state C(a) is instru­

mental to outcome T(a), and T(a) is the desired task outcome, the positive

value of C(a) ought to be maintained; and perhaps also because they have a

theory that if GO is awarded for performance of the task, it ought to be

seen by actors in the system as given on the basis of just that characteristic

that determines outcome T(a). What the balance theory claims is that a uni- ״־i

form wage policy has only two stable states, neither of which is desirable

if a manager feels bound by these two constraints.

There is no point in showing that the differential imbalanced wage

policy is not desirable either. The only stable state that satisfies the

constraints we have introduced is found in a system with a differential

balanced wage policy.

Now let us take a further step and illustrate the wage model, in turn,

with a concrete case. Homans (1953) reported on the status structure of a

telephone billing company that had three jobs: ledger clerk, cash poster,

and address-file clerk. The three jobs differed in responsibility, skill,

seniority of the girls who held the jobs, autonomy, and variety. The ledger

clerk was most responsible, skilled, senior, and so on, the cash poster next,

and the address-file clerk least. The address-file clerk was the lowest paid

job, but cash poster and ledger clerk were paid the same wage. Ledger clerks

agitated in their union for a wage increase. Cash posters sometimes refused

what was regarded as a promotion to ledger clerk. Address-file clerks were

not too happy with their low-ranking job, but the other two kinds of clerks

were hostile to management and regarded their wage as unjust while the address-

file clerks did not.

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The illustration is well-known and the solution not in doubt. But

Homans1 billing office does suggest some new issues. The most important

is that organizations, or jobs in them, or the rewards they use, are much

too complex for our theoretical analysis. Though managers and workers may

think of concrete entities such as jobs, shops, or companies, even the sim­

plest job has many characteristics, the simplest shop many tasks, the simplest

company many status structures, and the simplest incentive system many kinds

of goal-objects. We must break such compound entities down into simpler

elements. This is illustrated, for example, in the way we have looked at a

"job." A job is seen here as a set of states of characteristics and goal-

objects. Not that there are not other aspects of a job, but they are neg­

lected in applications of our theory.

We do not intend to suggest that, with this particular way of looking

at complex entities like jobs, application of our theory always becomes

straight-forward and simple. For one thing, characteristics, particularly

performance characteristics, are typically not directly observable, so that

identification of the characteristics of which a job consists is not at all

straight-forward. Nor is interviewing actors in the system an infallible

method of identifying them. The dimensions usually obtained in such inter­

viewing are often themselves compounds, not only of several characteristics

but also sometimes of both characteristics and goal-objects. For example,

in Homans' billing office, autonomy and variety are probably partly goal-

object, partly characteristic. The only fact that eases the problem of

application a little is that such compounds appear (and can be shown to

do so from the balance theory) to behave like simple characteristics.

S'

4. Diffuse Status-Characteristics

Sex, race, ethnicity, or social class are often called status־•

characteristics by sociologists. In this section we will define that term

and attribute to it certain important properties.

We want our definition to accord with what most sociologists mean by a

status-characteristic, though this may be difficult to accomplish since they

have often meant so much. Whatever a status-characteristic is, it is not

something intrinsic to the characteristic itself. An exceptionally light­

skinned Negro known to be Negro is treated like a Negro; if he passes he

will be treated very differently, though physicially he may be no different.

That he is a Negro, we conclude, is a matter of beliefs about him, not skin

color itself. But if he i¿ believed to be a Negro, many other beliefs are

often held of him for no other reason than that he is Negro. Some white

employers, for example, believe Negro employees learn more slowly, are less

industrious, less dependable, less intelligent, but better able to stand the

heat, than white employees (Wilson and Gilmore, 1943). Apparently one can

activate this set of beliefs simply by identifying an actor as Negro, with­

out direct knowledge of his behavior. The comparison, furthermore, is al­

ways invidious; that is, the belief that one is Negro or white, and also all

the beliefs associated with this characteristic, are evaluations as well as

beliefs. It is better to be white, better to be industrious and dependable,

and so on.^

^ Typical discussions of the subject of course see many other correlates of a status-characteristic, such as differential legal privilege, differential reward, differential life-chances, and so on (Cf Hughes and Hughes, 1952). We propose to define a status-characteristic more narrowly and account for these other features of status structures as consequences of our theory about the balance of status-characteristics with other status elements.

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But not only do actors associate specific beliefs and evaluations with

the status-characteristic; often they also generalize from them to judge

actors as wholes. The status-characteristic, we will say, becomes diffuse--

a synonym for global, indefinite, or generalized. Instead of thinking of

"whites" specifically as careful about time, careful about money, industrious,

or whatever is to be associated with this status term, actors within the

system come to think of "whites" as "able", or "moral", or just "superior."

The particular respects in which they are able, or moral, or superior be­

comes indefinite; what is paramount is that, if "white," the actor as a whole

is thought of as good. Status terms such as "gentleman" or "peasant," or

similar terms that occur in many status languages, are examples of labels

that tend to carry such diffuse connotations. What we have in mind here has

often been called a "halo" effect.

Formulating these ideas more explicitly: First, let C be any fairly

specific characteristic, such as thrift, or mechanical ability. We assume

that its states are differentially evaluated; that is, one is positively

evaluated while the other is negatively evaluated. A state C(x) may be

attributed to o directly or because he possesses a state of a second charac­

teristic, say, D(x) Here we are interested in the latter case. What is

meant is that if D(x) is attributed to o, then an associated state C(x) is

also attributed to o independent of any knowledge of o personally. The

We speak here of p attributing states to o. P also may attribute states to himself, since he is not only an actor in the theory but also a possible object of orientation to himself. To distinguish p as actor and p as object, if it becomes necessary, we may denote the former as p and the latter as p 1 .

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distinction is between the situation in which, knowing o, others say "o is

musical" and that in which, knowing that o is Negro, actors say, "o is Negro,

Negroes are musical, therefore o is musical." Second, we must consider the

fact that there are probably many specific states associated with D(x). Let

be a set of such states. It seems reasonable to require that if one

state of a given characteristic is in the set ) f &t then the other state of

that characteristic is in f (We will say that D(x) is relevant to

meaning that D(x) is strictly relevant to all elements in ^ f •) Third, we

have the idea that some features of f t* * f°r example the evaluations of its

elements, come to be generalized; so that, associated with each state of D

is one of two general expectation states, GES(x), which are attributed to p1

or o on the basis of their state of D. GES(x) might be "competent," "in­

competent" or "superior," "inferior," or "gentleman," "peasant," or some­

thing of the sort.

Now we define a diffuse status characteristic in S in terms of the ideas,

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Definition 4.1. A characteristic D is a diffuse status characteristic in S if and only if

(1) The states of D are differentially evaluated, and

(2) to each state x of D there corresponds a set } f states of characteristics specifically associated withD(x), such that if C(x) is in y its complement is in¿ V and 6 &

(3) to each state x of D there corresponds a different general expectation state GES(x).

The expression "in S" is important. If S^ is the status structure of

a factory located in a community with status structure S^, it is possible for

D to be a diffuse status characteristic within S. but not in S.. Perhapsi J

within the factory a marked difference is seen between sales and research di­

visions, one which generalizes to many apparently non-relevant characteristics

of members of the two divisions, without the distinction becoming significant

in the same way in the community. Many distinctions within organizations do

become the basis of diffuse status characteristics in the community, but how

this comes about must be explained by some explicit assumption.

A common property that we do not want to attribute to D is that it must

be ascribed. Sex, ethnicity, race, the most common examples we have used,

happen all to be ascribed, but status-characteristics need not be in general.

Any status^ will have attached to it some beliefs about actors and these may

be attributed to the status-occupants as characteristics which are activated

in other situations. Coates and Pellegrin (1957), for example show that the

occupational statuses "executive" and "supervisor" are associated, in the minds

of both, with a very long list of specific differentiating characteristics,

such as energy, altertness, aggressiveness, ability to manipulate people,

magnetism, tact, determiniation, and so on. Investigations such as Strodtbeck's

mock jury studies show that such beliefs tend to be attributed to actors not

only in the occupational setting, but also in non־occupational settings

(Strodtbeck, James, and Hawkins, 1957; see the discussion in Berger, Cohen,

Zelditch, 1965).

A status, as distinct from a status-characteristic, is a position in a social system, such as "President of General Motors", rather than a charac­teristic attributed to persons.

-21־

When q and GES(x) are attributed to actors who possess the state D(x)

in some specific situation, we will say that D is activated in that situation

If D is activated, and C is some characteristic instrumental to whatever task

outcome is required in that situation, we note that there are four possible

ways in which C may be related to D (our purpose here is to fix terminology)

(1) Either states of C are specifically associated with states of D [if D(a)

is "comptroller of a corporation" and D(b) is "shop foreman in a factory",

both probably believe that higher ability at keeping books is associated with

D(a) than D(b)j, (2) Or states of C are similar to states of some other

characteristic that is specifically associated with states of D [if the

comptroller and shop foreman must solve a problem in abstract algebra, they

probably associate the higher state of C with D(a) and the lower state with

D(b) since bookkeeping too is "mathematical'!. (3) Or states of C are

specifically dissociated from states of D--that is, they are explicitly under

stood, as part of beliefs already established about D, to be irrelevant to

its states [if both the comptroller and the shop foreman are on the company

bowling team, probably they understand as part of well-established social

conventions that C is independent of D]. (4) Or, finally, states of C are

not previously associated with states of D, in the sense that no social be­

liefs have yet been formed about the relation of C to D [if the comptroller

and shop foreman must write a joint projective story about an ambiguous

stimulus, probably no beliefs about how C is related to D exist at all].

It is important to distinguish cases 3 and 4, for in the former, a system of

specific beliefs does exist about how D and C are related while in the latter

no social beliefs have yet formed about C in relation to D. On the other

hand, in the following sections, cases 1 and 2 will be treated as essentially

the same; we will refer to both of them as specifically associated.

-23־

5. Status classes in organizations

As preparation for the task of relating external status-characteristics

to organizational status structures, we must first consider how jobs are

assigned to levels within an organization. We observe first that Dot only

are particular jobs rated by everyone within organizations, but jobs tend

to be grouped into rather broad classes. Of a small ship for example, Homans

observes:

Like other societies, large and small, the crew of a ship does not consist of an undifferentiated mass of men, but is segmented, largely on the basis of rank and job. In the class structure, if we may call it that, there are three main levels: the com­missioned officers, the chief petty officers,...and the rest of the sailors, with a less important distinction among these others between the 1,rated" and the ,,nonrated11 men (Homans, 1962, p. 52).

These classes can be regarded as status classes; that is, as classes

of actors who have the same state of a diffuse status characteristic D.

That these classes are diffuse has been observed, for example, by Gardner

and Moore (1955, pp. 103-116). In organizations, the term "superior," they

have argued, has two senses. One is the chain of command sense, in which a

specific foreman, say, gives orders to a specific worker. The other has to

do with a general extension of the rank of superior, "that does not involve

the right of command," but that "intrudes itself into all sorts of situations

and in innumerable guises," and that makes "all foremen considered superior

to all workers," just as in an army, officers are assumed to be in most

-24-

contexts superior to enlisted men. Furthermore, Gardner and Moore observed ,

there are other such characteristics in an organization, such as the shop-

dffice distinction. How the shop-office distinction functions they illustrated

with the following typical quotation:

Isn't it funny the way office people treat factory people? I don't see any difference between them myself, but the office people think they are so much better than the girls who work in the factories....They seem tothink that factory girls are loud and rough.,.,It just seems that having an office job makes them feel that they're better than we are (Gardner and Moore, 1955, p. 27).

Now, suppose that we have an organization with an already well-developed,

stable, status structure S, in which there are two status classes A and B

[corresponding to the states D(a) and D(b)]. We will consider only organi­

zations in which there is a non-empty subset of goal-objects, x^, uniquely

associated with the status class X. By "uniquely associated" we mean that:

in S it is understood that if p1 is in status class X, the goal-objects he

possesses are in the set U"x» a״d, conversely, if p has goal-objects that

are i n V , he is in status class X. In other words, D(x) and ״UT are sym- x *־־* xmetrically relevant. For example, salaries generally reflect the levels

within the organization fairly uniquely. Often the method of payment (hourly

wage, weekly wage, yearly salary) will also reflect them. On the other hand,

the organization may have a system of bonuses that is not associated with

its status classes.

And suppose that a new position is created in S, requiring the ability-

state C(x) in order to perform the task T. Ordinarily the organization will

offer in payment some goal-object already significant in the status structure

S; let us assume that the goal-object awarded for performance of the job is

GO(x) and that GO(x) belongs to which is uniquely associated with the X

class.

How will the new position fit into the existing structure of status

classes? What we will show first is that

5.1. The state of a new characteristic C(x) becomes relevant to a state D(x) of a diffuse status characteristic in S if

(1) a goal-object state GO(x) is allocated to actors possessing state C(x), and

(2) goal-object state GO(x) is a member of a set "UT of goal- object states that is uniquely associated with $(x).

That C(x) is relevant to GO(x) is given. Furthermore GO(x) is a member of

X*/׳x 0^ hypothesis) and w is relevant to D(x) (because they are uniquely ״

associated). Therefore GO(x) is relevant to D(x). If C(x) is relevant to

GO(x) and GO(x) is relevant to D(x), C(x) is relevant to D(x) (2.5).

There are now two possible cases to consider. First, C(x) may be anA . . .element initially not evaluated in S (in which case we will denote it C(x)).

Second, C(x) may be an element that has already acquired status-value by some

process external to and independent of S, so that it is initially evaluated.

In the first case, what status-value (x) acquires will depend solely

on its relations to other elements of S. And the most important of these

will be GO(x), to which the organization itself has established its relevance,

and D(x), to which it is relevant because GO(x) is (5.1 above). Now observe

that the GO(x), D(x) unit is itself balanced (by hypothesis --see above).ATherefore, if C(x) is assigned to a state of D that is opposite in value to

-25-

its relevant state of GO, it acquires no status-value in S (by assumption 2.4)

If it is assigned to a state of D that is the same in value as its relevant

state of GO, it acquires the common value of D(x) and GO(x) (2.4). Hence,

we may say

5.2. C(x) will acquire status-value in S if and only if it is associatedwith that state of D which is balanced with its relevant state of GO.

In the second case, where C(x) has already acquired some status-value,

from the definition of balance and assumption 2.1 we have

5.3. If the state of a characteristic C(x) is associated with a state D(x) of a diffuse status characteristic in S in a balanced manaer, the D,C structure is stable in S.

By the association of the states C(x) and D(x) we mean the individuals

who possess the state C(x) also possess the state D(x) in S, and thus are

members of status class X;^the D,C structure refers to the evaluations

attached to each state x of D and C and the relevance relations between states

and stable means tba t no pressures arise from within the structure itself to

change evaluations attached to states or the relevance bonds which hold

^While the relevance of D(x) and W is symmetric, relevance of C(x) to D(x) is not. Possessing C(x) may imply ihat one possesses D(x) without the converse being true. If two distinct task-roles in S require two distinct characteristics Ci and , we can say that the positive state of each is associated with the positive state of D; we can even say that, if p possesses the positive state of D he will possess the positive state of either C! or Cj, whichever characteristic is instrumental to his particular task-role; but we cannot predict from D alone which characteristic is his, C¿ or Cj. In general associated with each state of D will be a number of distinct characteristic states Ci(x), Cj(x),..., each with the same evaluation, and the relation of D(x) to such states will be one of many.

between states.

If for some reason C(x) becomes associated with a state D(x)v that is its

opposite in value, the states are imbalanced (definition 2.1) and from

assumptions 2.2 and 2.3, we have

5.4. If the state of a characteristic C(x) is associated with the stateD(x) of a diffuse status characteristic in S in an imbalanced manner, there is tension in S and the D, C structure in S is unstable.

Finally: if the D, C structure is imbalanced, one way to restore balance

would be to break the relevance bonds between D(x) and C(x), that is, to

dissociate them. But to accomplish this requires that we also dissociate the

GO(x) state allocated to C(x) from the goal-object states in the set

For if GO(x) is allocated to C(x), and at the same time remains in W - »

attempted dissociation of C(x) and D(x) cannot be stable. C(x) will continue

to be relevant to D(x) because it is linked to a goal-object state G0(x) that

is uniquely associated in S with D(x) (5.1). Hence to become and remain dis­

sociated from D(x), it must also be dissociated from all those other elements

in S through which it might remain linked to D.

A good illustration of the process of allocating a new position to a

diffuse status class is a study of marine radiomen by Record (1957). In

1910, while radio was still in its infancy, the United States government re­

quired it as equipment on all passenger liners. At first there was great

variation in the way radiomen were treated. On some ships they were treated

as officers, on others as deck crew. This was shown by the kinds of privileges

granted or withheld from them, such as their mess and quarters. The radio­

man could not find his proper niche, becoming a "kind of seagoing platypus,

-28-

straddling the great divide between officers and crewmen..." (Record, 1957,

p. 354). But by the 1930's the radiomen had a union capable of winning them

officer status. The union's first effort was devoted to building officer

status into contracts negotiated with employers, in clauses such as:

Each Radio Officer shall receive the same courtesies, privileges, and food uniformly accorded Licensed Watch Officers.

On cargo vessels, the Radio Officers shall eat in the Officers' mess. On passenger vessels, when separate Officers' mess is not provided, the Radio Officers shall be accorded the same privilege of eating in the Salon as is accorded Licensed Watch Officers.

The rooms, facilities maintained therein, the painting and general appearance, condition, and comfort of the room shall be maintained at a level comparable with the quarters of Licensed Watch Officers..." (Record, 1957, pp. 354-355).

Such clauses appear superficially to be allocations of goal-objects to a

characteristic, rather than of characteristics to a status-class. But ob­

taining the goal-objects, which were, in any case, largely symbolic, was not

sufficient for the radiomen. They were still legally no better than the

unlicensed common deck sailors, firemen, or stewards. Therefore, they turned

their efforts to lobbying in Congress. From 1937 to 1948, when they were

finally successful, the union sought a bill that would license them as line

officers and would accept nothing less, no matter what compromises were

offered. Since 1948 the status class to which the radioman has been assigned

has remained relatively stable, though Masters and Engineers have not

necessarily accepted the radioman as fully an officer yet.

6. External Status-Characteristics

Organizations are typically part of larger systems (communities, societies)

which themselves have status structures. We will say that, if two systems, g

and Sj have some actors in common, is a subsystem of if and only

if: (1) members of differentially evaluate the states of , a status

characteristic in S^, in the same manner as members of S.; (2) members of

differentially evaluate the states of lj^ of goal-objects associated

with Dj in the same manner as members of S^; (3) at least one goal-object

differentially evaluated in Sj is allocated in S^. The average industrial

concern that pays a wage is an example of a subsystem within a community.

It is not sufficient that be contained ecologically in S , since it might

still carry a wholly deviant culture or have a wholly independent reward

system. A status characteristic in is, from the point of view of its

subsystems, called an external status characteristic. How can one account

for the fact that external status characteristics seem often to be significant

elements in the status structures of subsystems? Is it possible to con­

struct.a status structure that is independent of the effect of external status

characteristics?

A . Utilitarian Organizations

First, let us consider an organization in which: (1) Goal-object

GO(such as money) differentially evaluated and allocated in S , is differ­

entially evaluated in some larger system of which is a subsystem.

(2) There is a diffuse status characteristic (such as white collar, blue

collar) within S^, states of which are uniquely associated with sets of

goal-object states V", that are differentially evalua ted in S., (3)1 j X X

Members of also hold beliefs about a diffuse status characteristic gSince their status structures are the only relevant features of social

systems analyzed in this paper, we will let the same symbol stand for both systems and their status structures.

־29־

(such as color or sex), significant in the larger system Sj, states of which

are associated with sets of goal-object statesVf. that are differentiallyJ >xevaluated in S . And let us suppose that (4) goal-object state G0(x), dif­

ferentially evaluated and allocated in S., is an element in both TJT andX 3. j X

This seems to us a plausible description of the typical organi­

zation that pays a wage. Following Clark and Wilson (1961) and Etzioni (1961)

we will call such organizations utilitarian.

Now suppose that in there are individuals who differ in their states

of D^, the status characteristic significant in the larger system. (In such

cases we will say that discriminates between p' and some o in S^.) How

will their differences in states of D. be related to their differences inJstates of D^?

It would seem most straightforward to assume that: if S. employs an

actor p who has the state (a) of an external diffuse status characteristic,

and if in Sj everyone believes that superior intelligence, industry, or

what have you is associated with (a) ; and if, finally, within the organi­

zation the members of the A class as supposed by everyone to be superior in

intelligence, industry, and so on; then it will be natural to assign p to

the organization's A class. For, by hypothesis, actors within the organi­

zation have the same beliefs about D^.

But we are not given that the various specific characteristics in

are already specifically associated with the external status characteristic,

and for the sake of greater generality we will suppose that initially they

are not. Nevertheless, in terms of our theoretical formulation it can be

shown that

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6.1. An external status state Dj (x) becomes relevant to a status state D^x) in every subsystem of Sj in which

(1) states of Dj discriminate between p1 and o in S , and

(2) GO(x) belongs to U*". x, where x is a set of goal-object states in St that is’uniquely associated with D^(x), and

*(3) GO(x) belongs to U~. , where Tjj~ is a set of goal-objectstates in S. that is,associated with D.(x),J j

Essentially, what 6.1 asserts is that, given different states of Dj for p1

and o, the fact that there are states of GO associated with the different

states of Dj that are at the same time uniquely associated with the different

states of D^, makes the external status characteristic relevant to the states

of the status structure within the organization. For, by hypothesis, Dj(x)

is relevant to a set of goal-object states Xj/I > of which GO(x) is a member.J >xTherefore D.(x) is relevant to GO(x) . But GO(x) is a member also of ,j 1 ,XandXt/^ x is relevant to D^x). Therefore GO(x) is relevant to D^Cx). If

Dj(x) is relevant to GO(x) and GO(x) is relevant to D^(x), then Dj(x) is

relevant to D^x) (2.5).

Furthermore, we have from the definition of balance and assumption 2.1

that,

6.2. If the state of the external status characteristic, Dj (x) is associated with the state of the internal status characteristic, D^(x) in a balanced manner in S , then the D^(x), Dj(x) unit in is stable.

and from the definition of balance and assumptions 2.2 and 2.3 that,

-31-

6.3. If the state of the external status characteristic, D.(x) isassociated with the state of the internal status characteristic,

D^(x), in an imbalanced manner in S , the D.(x), D^(x) unit in is imbalanced, there is tension associated with this unit in

S^, and there will be pressures to change it in the direction of balance.

In other words, if p״ or o, possessing given states of D., come also to

possess given states of D, in S , such that the evaluations of their

and states are the same, there will be no pressures from within the ,

structure itself to change either the evaluations or relevance bonds of

that structure. If p' or o come to possess states of such that the

evaluations of their and states are different, they will experience

strains arising from the D ^ s t r u c t u r e and there will be pressures to

change either its evaluations or relevance bonds.

From the point of view of the organization, perhaps the most important

implication of this argument is that a subsystem cannot entirely control the

conditions of its own stability. It will be vulnerable to imbalance in the

larger system, which very often will be contagious. If, for example, the

status distinctions between Dj(a) and (b) are undergoing change in

while they are being maintained in S^, the D ^ s t r u c t u r e will come in

time to be imbalanced and will continue imbalanced until the status structure

also changes. For example, we might have an organization that allocates

all Negroes to the least valued jobs. But it might be located in a community

that is undergoing great change in race relations, in the process of which

there are all sorts of discrepancies in the way income, residence, style of

life, and so forth are related to being Negro, If indeed the result of this

process is a change in the status structure of the community, the organization

will eventually be imbalanced with the larger status structure. As a result

־32־

there is likely to be agitation for change in the organization itself.

B. Insulation of Organizational Status Structures

־33־

What struck Hughes most about external status characteristics was their

pervasive capacity to penetrate almost everywhere in organizations. Dis­

tinctions of sex, color, class, and ethnicity became part of daily inter­

action; were embodied in basic status structures; and were part of the funda­

mental dynamics of recruitment and career. But there will be many organi­

zations in which such a result is highly undesirable; they will want to in­

sulate themselves from the effects of a community's stereotypes. Is there

no way in which this can be done?

In our formulation there are three sets of conditions that determine

the relevance of D to Di• The first is simply that

I. (a) there is a status characteristic D. and sets of goal-object states Wj differentially evaluate¿ in S^, and

(b) there is a status characteristic D. and sets of goal-object states ur\ differentially evaluates in S .

In other words S^ and S each have status structures. The second set of

conditions determine that S is a subsystem of Sj, namely

II. (a) the members of S. differentially evaluate the states of D in the same manner as the menbers of S^, and ^

(b) the members of S^ differentially evaluate the sets of goal- object states i j / ' . in the same manner as the members of S., and J J

(c) S allocates at least one goal-object state valued in S .

Finally, a third set of conditions determines the way in which D becomes

related to D^, and is simply the set of conditions set out in 6.1,

III. (a) D. discriminates p and o in S^, and

(b) there is a set of goal-object states ~i>f: x that is uniquely associated with D^(x), and ,x

(c) there is a set of goal-object states t¿ that is associated with Dj (x) , and ־* ,x

(d) there is a goal-object state GO(x) that is a member of both^ l.x and WJ.x•

Now suppose that the first set of conditions is given, namely that there

are status structures in and [1(a) and 1(b)], but that we want to in­

sulate the status structure of from that of S^. Four possible policies

suggest themselves. The first two involve fairly revolutionary changes in

the character of the subsystem's relations to the larger system. For one

policy is to simply change in such a way that It is no longer a subsystem

of Sj. This could be accomplished by constructing a deviant subculture in

which 11(a) and 11(b) were not true. The members of would hold different

evaluations of and than other actors who were members of Sj , but not

S^. For example, one might find in a Communist Party cell that race, sex,

and occupation were not significant in its internal status structure-־pro-

viding, that is, that the Party was in fact successful in maintaining deviant

values. A second fairly revolutionary policy would be to alter the basic

status conditions of the organization or the larger system. This could be

accomplished by constructing an independent goal-object strocture, one in

which either 111(b) or III(c), or both, would be untrue. For example, while

the members of would differentially evaluate the sets of the goal-object

states , they would not see them as uniquely associated with ; or per­

haps 1׳- could be made independent of D .

-34-

But suppose we wish to insulate without developing a deviant sub­

culture and under fairly typical status conditions. We would like, that is,

to break the bond of relevance between and D ,, while nevertheless it is

true that: and UJ־ have status value in [1(a)] ;D and ־ZuT have status

value in S^Iib)]; Si is a subsystem of [11(a) , 11(b), 11(c)], Our result

6.1 asserts that if it is not true that (x) is relevant to D^ix), then either:

(1) there is not a set of goal-object states icK associated with D.(x) inj *x J

S.; or (2) there is not a set of goal-object states ’U /'. uniquely associated J •*־ *xwith D. (x) in S ; or (3) D. does not discriminate p and o in S.; or (4) there* 1 Jis not a goal-object state GO(x) that is in fact a member of both U ~ andJ >xZjJ ' . . But conditions (1) and (2) are common status conditions that we wouldi ,Xnormally expect to obtain in and S^. And if we rule them out; if we assume

that there i¿ a set of goal-object states associated with (x) and a set of

goal-object states uniquely associated with D^(x), then where (x) is not

relevant to D^x), either (3) or (4), or both, must hold. In either

does not discriminate between p and o or there is no goal-object state allo­

cated in S. that is a member of both Z j * . and TaT . . If we look at insulated i j,x i,xsubsystems is this in fact true?

One kind of organization that commonly insulates itself is the organization

that socializes, where the principal purpose is to train actors in new norms

and values. Every organization socializes to some extent, but where new norms

and values differ׳ greatly from old norms and values, norms and values into

which everyone is socialized by the everyday operation of family and school,

it often requires a specialized organization to accomplish value change.

-35-

Such organizations include professional schools, rehabilitating prisons,

military training installations (basic training, boot-training, etc.)» a°d

one may add mental institutions, where the purpose is more resocialization

to old conventions than the creation of new ones.

Not all such socializing organizations are effective. Those that are

appear to have certain properties in common (Dornbusch, 1955; Goffman, 1957,

1962; Lifton, 1957; Merton, Reader, and Kendall, 1957; Schein, 1956). In

all of them there is an orderly sequence of statuses, each progressively

higher in rank than the earlier status in the sequence. The socializee enters

at the least valued status, progresses through the sequence, and his goal is

to reach the most valued status. This status corresponds to having learned

the new set of values, and his progress must depend solely on his acquiring

these and on nothing else. Measurement of his progress, furthermore, must

depend wholly on the decisions of an agent of the organization who is al­

ready socialized, whose approval the socializee must value. If more than

one socializee enters the system, all newcomers must start equally at the

bottom and any differentiation between them must be wholly with respect to

the norms and values which it is the purpose of the organization to transmit.

While from the point of view of the organization all socializees must

be alike except for differences that the organization itself creates by

training them, from the point of view of the actors themselves they often are

divided by distinctions of sex, race, color, or class. Furthermore, in the

very nature of the organization, what is important is the relevance of what

takes place in the organization to status in the larger society. The various

ways in which actors may be "graded" within S. will be relevant to the kind

of place they occupy outside the organization. We thus seem to have three

conditions that make relevant to D : (1) p' and o are discriminated by

Dj in S ; (2) a state D^(x) (such as "upperclassman" in a military academy)

is uniquely associated in with a goal-object state GO(x); and (3) a state

Dj(x) (such as being "white collar") is associated with the goal-object state

GO(x) in the larger system.

In facing this problem what socializing organizations typically do is

to suppress the external status characteristic, that is, prevent it from dis­

criminating among actors in S^. This is done in several ways. Partly it

is accomplished by actual physical isolation of S^, so that members of

will not react to, and hence activate, D^. Partly it is accomplished by a

disengagement, or stripping process, in which everything possible is done to

divest newcomers of any signs of their external status as early as possible.

All their clothes , possessions, even the beliefs that particularly identify

them are if possible taken away. Partly also new members are made uniform

literally, by giving them common clothing. Not all the relevant mechanisms

depend only on what agents of socialization do, incidentally, because often

taboos spontaneously develop among socializees against any discussion of one's

external status characteristic. In the case of indelible characteristics,

like race and sex, which are not so easily made invisible, segregation is used

if selection cannot eliminate differences in D^.

Instead of stripping p and o of their external status characteristics,

one might as an alternative reward them only with local goal-objects. Local

-37-

goal-objects are goal-objects differentially evaluated only within organi­

zations like S^. We cannot make the same argument about local goal-objects

that we have for, say, the "wage" in a utilitarian organization. We cannot,

as we have up to this point, say that if D^(x) is a basis within S. of allo­

cating GO(x), and Dj(x) is in the larger system associated with GO(x), then

imbalance of with will upset the sense of a "just" distribution of goal-

objects in the larger system. There would be no basis for regarding (x)

as relevant to a purely local goal-object. It is true that for S. to be a

subsystem of S^, it is necessary that at least one goal-object be differentially

evaluated in both. But it is certainly possible to allocate other, local

goal-objects in that are not relevant to D . Thus, in subsystems that

attempt to break the relevance bond between (x) and D^(x) we should find

that there is a particularly strong emphasis on local goal-objects and that

only local goal-objects are uniquely associated with states of D^.

For example: Suppose it is true, as Coleman has argued (1961), that the

adolescent society is distinct from the adult society in its activities and

values. This distinctive society is, Coleman argues, organized in and sym­

bolized by the high school. Though it does not symbolize the values of adult

society, as adults might ask it to, the school does symbolize the solidarity

of adolescents and therefore they are very identified with their schools. It

follows, Coleman claims, that athletics are important to adolescents, because

athletic competitions are the only distinctively school identified activities.

Now it seems plausible to suppose, though Coleman does not agrue it, that

athletic ability is dissociated from social class in the larger community;

-38-

and to suppose too, as Coleman apparently does, that interscholastic athletic

prizes are significant primarily to the pupil status system rather:than•the

adult status system. If these assumptions are plausible, then we should.find

that the more important athletic ability to the pupil status structure, the

less important social class in determining the pupil elite. If states of

the internal status characteristic are independent of states of the external

status characteristic,we should expect that goal-objects allocated in and

uniquely associated with are significant primarily in the sybsystem rather

than the larger system. Had interscholastic athletic prizes been among the

goal-objects associated with social class in the community, however, we should

have found (given the other status conditions of 6.1), that position in the9pupil status structure was correlated with class.

7. Summary and Conclusion

We have tried to formulate a set of assumptions that would account for

the relation of an organization's status structure to external status charac­

teristics, The two key assumptions in this theory are the balance property,

attributed to status structures generally, and the diffuse property, attributed

to certain status characteristics. What the theory really does is to summarize

the behavior of structures having these two properties. Vie have not tried

to develop many ideas of what mechanisms might restore balance, nor what

symptoms might express strain; but we have tried to state the conditions under

which the status structure of the organization might be expected to change.9In fact, Coleman's data (1961) appear to suggest that the more important

athletic ability to pupils, the less the pupil status structure is determined by social class; while the more important social skills and academic excellence to the pupil status structure, the more it is determined by class.

-39-

-40-

From the point of view of an organization what we have done amounts to

identifying three status structures which are relevant to its stability.

These are:

1. The structure of specific statuses, expressed in our theory by specific performance characteristics and specific goal-objects.

2. The structure of organizational levels or status-classes, expressed in our theory as a diffuse status characteristic operant within the organization..

3. The structure of external status characteristics, significant in the larger community or society of which the organization is a part.

We have seen that the problem of applying our theory to this rather complex

set of structures is one of showing when the various parts become relevant

to each other.

Investigating the behavior of structures which have the balance and dif­

fuse properties, our principal results are:

1. Stability of the organizational status structure is achieved only if each status element is balanced with every other relevant status element of the organization. The relevant status elements will typically include external status characteristics, as well as status-classes, specific characteristics, and goal-objects. If external status characteristics are relevant, the organizational status structure is vulnerable to imbalance in the community and society.

2. Only under very narrow conditions is it possible to make the status structure of the organization independent of that of the community and society, without deviating from the larger society or changing its status structure. One such condition is that either differ­entiation of the external status characteristic naturally does not occur or else is suppressed by the organization. Another such condition is that the rewards relevant to a specific characteristic be independent of those that are linked to the larger system. The latter condition would be difficult to realize in an organization that induces performance by awarding goal-objects valued in the larger society.

These results, of course, will be true only if the assumptions of our

theory are true. That is, we offer them as validly deduced from the balance

and diffuse properties, without comment at this time on their empirical

verification־־though obviously we regard them as consistent with results so

far obtained by empirical investigations. The more difficult problems of

the theory we expect will be resolved only by empirical investigations that

are specifically addressed to testing our theoretical formulations.

־41־

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