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st. Anselm51. Anselm (1033-1109) was one 01 the greatest 01CMstian philosophical theologians. His subtle and prolound ontological argumentfor the existence of God is still a subject of keen debate.

3The Ontological Argumentfor the Existence ofGodThe Proslogion, Chaps. II-WCHAPTERllTHAT GOD TRULY ISo Lord, you who give understanding to faith, so far as you know it to

be beneficial, give me to understand that you are as we believe, and that youare what we believe.

We believe that you are something than which nothing greater can beconceived.But is there any such nature , since "the fool has said in his heart: God isnot"?However, when this same fool hears what I say, when he hears of thissomething than which nothing greater can be conceived, he at least under-

stands what he hears.Whathe understands stands in relation to his understanding, even f hedoes no t understand that it exists. For it is one thing for a thing to stand in .

relation to our understanding; it is another thing for us to understand that itreally exists. For instance, when a painter imagines what he is about to paint,he has it in relation to his understanding. However, he does not yet under-stand that it exists, because he has not yet made it. After he paints it, then heboth has it in relation to his understanding and Understands that it exists.Therefore even the fool is convinced that something than which nothing

Reprinted by permissionof Macmillan Publishing Company from Anselm, The Proslogion,from Chapters II-IV;Gaunilo, On Behalfof he Fool; Anselm, Reply; translatedby Arthur C.

The Ontological Argument for the Existence ofGod 29greater can be conceived at least stands in relation to his understanding,because when he hears of it he understands it, and whatever he understandsstands in relation to his understanding.!However, that than which a greater cannot be conceived can certainlyno t stand only in relation to the understanding. For if t at least stood only inrelation to the understanding, it could be conceived to be also in reality, andthis would be something greater. Therefore, if that than which a greatercannot be conceived only stood in relation to the understanding, then thatthan which a greater cannot be conceived would be something than which agreate r can be conceived. Obviously this is impossible.Therefore, something than which a greater cannot be conceived un-doubtedly both stan ds in relation to the understanding and exists in reality.

CHAPTERIDTHAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO CONCEIVE THAT GOD IS NOTThis so truly is that it is impOSSible to think of it as not existing.It can be conceived to be something such that we cannot conceive of it

as not existing.This is greater than something which we can conceive of as no t existing.Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot be conceived could beconceived not to be, we would have an impossible contradiction: that thanwhich a greater cannot be conceived would not be that than which a greatercannot be conceived.Therefore something than which a greater canno t be conceived 50 trulyis that it is impossible even to conceive of it as not existing.This is you, 0 Lord our God. You so truly are thatynu cannotbe thoughtno t to be. And rightly so.For if some mind could conceive of something better than you, thecreature would become superior to its Creator and would judge its Creator.This is obviously absurd. Indeed, whatever else thereis, except for youalone, can be conceived not to be.

lThe meaning ofAnselm's phraseesse in intellectu has been thesubjectofmuch discussion.I have found little evidence that the word intellectus ever suggested to Anselm, as it does to us,an organ (such as the mind) or a faculty (such as the intellect). It was chiefly the noun fonn of theverb intelligere, and signified the act of understanding. "To be in intelIectu" therefore does notmean to be located "in the intellect," inside the human head, as if this were a place, but to belocated in relationto human thinking, tobe present to the human act of understanding. SeeAdolfKolping, Anselm's Proslogion-Beweis der Exislenz GoUes (Bonn, 1939), pp. 114f. In fromintelligere to esse in intellectu, Anselm is simply shifting the focus from the human actiVlty, asrelated to someobject, to the presence of that object to the human activity, still without prejudicingthe question of the objecrs actual existence one way or the other. To avoid the peculiar modemovertones associated with the phrase "to be in the understanding':' esse in intellectu is hereUto TRANSLATOR

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30 St. AnselmTherefore you alone, of all things, exist in the truest and greate t( .. t . ) L swayv:nss ,me e maXlme , ,or nothing else so truly exists and therefore eve _thing eIse has less bemg. ry

. Why, then, .did fool say in his heart: "God is not," since it is soobvIOUS to the rational mm d that you exist supremely above all thin ? Whbecause he is a dim-witt ed fool. gs. y,

CHAPTER IVHOW THE FOOL SAID IN HIS HEARTWHATCANNOT BE CONCEIVED

was the able to "say in his heart" what he was unable toc o n c e 1 ~ e . ~ how,was 1t he could not conceive what he said in hisheart?For to say m s heart and to "conceive" are the same thing.. . H . o w ~ v e r , i f -o r rather because-he really did conceive of it (since hesald 1t m his heart) and yet did not really say it in his heart (since he wasunable ~ o n c e i ; e of it), then there must be more than one way for somethinto be Sald m one s heart, or to be conceived. g. Indee?' a thing is conceived of in one way when the word signifying itthought; m another way when the very thing itself is understood. Accordmgly God can be conceived not to be in the first way, but not at all in thsecond. e

[For no one who understands what fire and water areJ2 can think thatthe reality of fire is the reality of water. At the level of the words howeverthis confusion is possible. ' ,one: therefore, wh o understands what God is can think that God isnot. It 15 poss1ble, howe ver, for him to say this word in hisheart while oi .'t th . , o-vmg1 e1 er no meanmg at all or some alien meaning. God is that than which agreater cannot be conceived. Whoever understands this correctly at least

~ d e r s t a n d s that he exists in such a way that even for thought he cannot noteXlSt.T h ~ r e f o r e whoever understands that God is so cannot even conceivethat He 15 not.

. My.than ksgiving to you, good Lord, my thanksgiving to you. For whatI tu:st believed through ~ v i n g I now understand through your illumination, so that now, even if I d1d not want to believe that you exist, I wouldbe unable not to understand it.

were : ~ e c e : : t r:scnlm"'pt i n v e s b t i g a t i o ~ have established that these words in square bracketspa 0 s texti ut were mterpolated.later.-TRANSLATOR

The Ont%g;"'/ Argument for the Existence ofGod 31Gaunilo and Anselm-Criticism and ReplyOf the nineteen extant manuscripts which give us Chapters II-IV of thePros/ogion, almost half also contain a criticism of Anselm's argument writtenby one of his contemporaries, and his own reply. Two of the manuscripts

attribute the criticism to a monk Gaunilo of the French cloister atMarmoutiere, but nothing is known about him.According to Gaunilo, Anselm's argument consists of two points. First,anyone who denies God at least understands the phrase "that than whichnothing greater can be conceived," so that this stands in relation to hisunderstanding. Secondly, r easoning will show him that this cannot standonly in relation to his understanding but must also exist in reality, forotherwise it would not be "that han which nothing greate r can be conceived."Gaunilo attacks each of these steps in turn, speaJcing in the first person "onbehalf of the fool."Anselm's reply is not a sustained discussion, especially in its laterchapters, bu t has the appearance of a series of notes, each in answer to aparticular point made by Gaunilo. The reply is therefore easier to understa ndwhen each section ofit is placed beside the appropri ate passages in Gaunilo' scriticism. The translation be low follows this arrangement. The page references below refer to Dom Schmitt's Latin edition.

Against the Reasoning that if "That Than Which Nothing Greater CanBe Conceived" Is Unders tood It Must Also Exist.

1. Gaunilo argues that for something to stand in relation to the understandingcannot establish its real existence, if that something is doubted.GAUNIWPara. 5 (p. 127.25-p. 128.13)

That this exists necessarily in reality is proved to me in this way: if thisdoes not exist, whatever is in realitywill be greater than it, in which case thatwhich has just been proved at least to stand in relation to my understandingwill not be greater than all things.To this I reply. !fit s said thatthis stands in relation to the underst andingas something which cannot be conceived on the basis of the tru th of any realthing, I do not deny that it does stand in relation to the understa nding in thisway. However, because it cannot possess real existence simply by standing

in relation to the understanding, I certainly do not concede that it reallyexists-at least not until it is proved to me by an indubitable argument.He who says that this exists because otherwise that which is greater thanall would not be greater than all, does not sufficiently attend to what is being

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32 St. Anselmsaid. I do not yet. say-on the o n ~ a r y I deny or ~ u b t - t h a t this is greaterthan any real thing. I concede to It no other reality (i f this can be called"reality") than of something which is absolutely unknown to the mind, butwhich the m i n ~ ~ e s to conceive of on .the basis of a word merely heard.

T h e r e f o ~ e , . h o w 15 It proved to me that this "great er" exists in reality, simply?ecause It 15 held to be greater than all things, when I deny or doub t that this15 ~ o , ? " held all? I deny r ~ o u b t it.so completely, in fact, thalin my view~ greater' does no t stand m relation to my understanding or to conception, except in the way in which many doubtful and uncertain things standthere.

It first must be made certain to me that this "greater" is actuallysomewhere, an d only then, from the fact that t s greater t han all thin ,willthere be no doubt that it subsists in itself. gsANSELM

I said that, if t only in relation to the understanding, it could!east be c o n c e ~ v e d to also m reality, and that this is greater. Therefore,i f It only stood m relation to the understanding, then "that than which ag r e a t ~ r cannot be conceived" would be that than which a greater can beconceIved. What, I ask, could be more logical? For if t only stood in relationto the understanding, could it no t be conceived to be in reality also? And i fso, then no tanyonewhoconceives of his existing also in reality conceiveof o ~ e t h i n g greater than that which only stands in relation to the understanding? What therefore could be more logical than this: if "that than whicha g r e ~ t ~ cannot be o ~ c e i v e d " only stands in relation to the understanding,the? It 15 that than which a r ~ a t e r , : = a n be conceived? But certainly "that thanw h i ~ a g r e ~ t e r can be CO?Celved does not stand in relation to any understanding as that than which a greater cannot be conceiVed."? ~ } t no t h ~ r e f o r e . follow that i f "that than which a greater cannot be

C o n C ~ I V e d stands m relation to any understanding, it does not only stand inr e l a t i ~ n to the d e r s t a n d i n g ? For i f it only stood in relation to the under"s t a t . ' ~ g alone, It : " o ~ d then be that than which a greater can be conceived,which 15 a contradiction (Chap. II, p, 132.22-133.2).

' ~ a t which cannot possibly no t be" is obviously something that canbe. conceIved an d understood. He who conceives of this conceives of someuu.ng greater than he who conceives of that which h as the possibility ofno t

bang. e r e f ~ ; ~ , while he is conCeiving of "that than which a greater cannotbe c.oncelved, i f he conceives that it has the possibility of not being, he isobvlOusly no t conceivi?g of that than whic h a gre ater cannot be conceived.However, the same thing cannot be conceived and not be conceived at the

The Ontological Argument or the Existence of God 33same time. Therefore he who conceives of "that than which a greater cannotbe conceived" is not conceiving of what can, but of what cannot possibly notbe. For that reason what he is conceiving of must necessarily exist, becausewhatever is able not to exist is not that of which he is conceiving (Chap. IX,p.138.19-27).

2. Gauniloargues that if n the case of God "to be the best conceivable" entails"to exist," then it can also be demonstrated that the best conceivable island mustexist.GAUNll.OPara. 6 (p. 128.14-32)

Consider this example. Certain people say that somewhere in the oceanthere is an island which they call the "Lost Island," because of the difficultyor, rather, the impossibility of finding what does not exist They say that it ismore abundantl y filled with inestimable riches an d delights than the Isles ofthe Blessed, and that although it has no owner or inhabitant, it excels all thelands that men inhabit taken together in the unceasing abundance of itsfertility.When someone tells me that there is such an island , I easily understandwhat is being said, for there is nothing difficult here. Suppose, however, as aconsequence of this, he then goes on to say: you cannotdoubt that this island,more excellent than all lands, actually exists somewhere in reality, because itundoubtedly stands in relation to your understanding. Since it is moreexcellent, not simply to stand in relation to the understanding, bu t to be inreality as well, therefore this island must necessarilybe in reality. Otherwiseany other land that exists in reality would be more excellent than this island,and this island, which you understood to be the most excellent of all lands,would then not be the m ost excellent.If, I repeat, someone should wish by this argument to demonstrate tome that this island truly existsand is no longer to be doubted, I would thinkhe were joking; or, if I accepted the argument, I do not know whom I wouldregard as the greater fool, me for accepting it or him for supposing that hehad proved the existence of this island with any kind of certainty. He shouldfirst show that this excellent island exists as a genuine and undeniably realthing, and not leave it standing in relation to my understanding as a false oruncertain something.

ANSELMMy reasoning, you claim, is as if someone should say that there is anisland in the ocean, which surpas ses the whole earth in its fertility, but whichis called a "Lost Island" because of the difficulty, or even impossibility, of

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.:u St. Anselmfinding something that does not exist, and as i f he should then argue that noone can doubt that it actually does exist because the words describing it areeasily understood.I can confidently say that i fanyone discovers for me something existingeither inEact or in thought alone, other than "that than which a greater cannotbe thought," and is able to apply the logic of my argument to it, I shall findthat lost island for him and shall give it to him as something which he willnever lose again (Chap. ill, p. 133.3--9).

3. Gaunilo argues that since the existence of "that than which nothing greatercan be conceived" has not been proved, it can be conceived not to exist.GAUNILOPara. 7 (p.129.1-1O)

When it is asserted to the fool [in Pros. ill1 that this "greater than allthings" is such that even to thought it cannot not be, and yet when this isproved to him on no other grounds than that otherwise this greater than allthings would not be greater than all things, he can give the same answer an dreply: When did I ever say that such a being, one that is "greater than allthings," exists in reality, so that f rom th is you could prove to me that it existsso fully in reality that it cannot be conceived not to be? First of all it shouldbe proved by some most certain argument that some superior reality, that is,a nature which is greater and better than everything that is, actually exists.From thiswe can then prove all the other qualities which must not be lackingfrom that which is greater and better than all things.

ANSEuilIt is now obvious, however , that "that than which a greater cannot be

conceived" cannot be conceived not to be, because its existing has suchmanifest truthfulness. Otherwise, it would not exist at all.Let us suppose that there is someone who says that he does conceivethat this does not exist. In my view, when he is conceiving in this way, he iseither conceiving of that than which a g reater cannot be conceived, or he isnot conceiving of it. If he is not conceiving of it, then it is not this which hethinks does not exist. On the other hand, if he is really conceiving of it, he atleast conceives of something which cannot be conceived not to be. For if itcould be conceived not to be, it could also be conceived to have a beginningand an end. But this is impossible [for "that than which a greater cannot be

3In the manuscripts, this passage immediately follows Anselm's remarks on the LostIsland, and in the view of some thinkers it a pplies to this objection. (See below, pp. 500-01.)

The Ontological Argument for tlte Existence of God 35. d"] Therefore whoeve r really conceives of this conceives of some-conceIve . . f .thing which cannot be conceived not to be. W h 0 7 v e ~ r e a l l ~ ~ ~ n c e l v e s .0. It,h does not in fact conceive that it s not.Othel'WlSe e wo eCOnCeIVIngt fen, thing which cannot be conceived. Therefore "that than which aa some . i llgreater cannot be conceived" cannot be conceIved not to be (Chap. ,p .

133.10-20).4. Gaunilo argues that it should be said that God's existence cannot be"understood," not that it cannot be "conceived."

GAUN\lOPara. 7 (p. 129.10-19)When it is said that this supreme reality cannot be "conceived" (cogitan)

t to be it would probably be better to say that it cannot be "understood"~ ~ t e l l i g J } to be, or even that it canno t be "understood" to be capable ofno tbeing. this d " d t d" falsAccording to the proper meaning of war un ers ~ , . ematters cannot be understood, though they can certainly be conceIved, Justas the fool conceived that God is not. I "know" (seio) most certainly that I am,bt l also know nonetheless than I am capable of not being. I "understa nd"w ~ t h o u t any doubt that the greatest reality which is God both is andnot be. However, I do not know whether I can "conceive" of my not e.l

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36 St. Anselm

tainly exists can be "understood" not to be, in the same way other certainthings can also be "understood" no t to be.If one examines the matter closely, these objections cannot be madeagainst "conceiving." For even if there is nothing existing which can be

"understood" not to be, neverthelesseverything can be "conceived" not to be,except that which is the highest. In fact all those things-and only thosethings-can be conceived not to be which have a beginning, or an end, or acombination of parts, and, as I have already said, which do not exist completely everywhere an d always. But that alone cannot be conceived not to bewhich has neither beginning nor end nor combination of parts, and whichthought finds existing completely always and everywhere.You must realize that even though you know with complete certaintythat you exist, you can "conceive" of yourself as not existing. It surprises methat you say that yo u do not know this. For we "conceive" of the nonexistence of many things which we "kno w" to exist, and we "conceive" of theexistence of many things which we "know " not t o exist. We do this, not bymakinga real judgment,bu tby imagining hat these things are aswe conceiveof them. In this sense, we can "conceive" that something is not when we"know" that it is , because at one an d the same time we can "conceive" of theformer and "know" the latter. In another sense, we cannot "conceive" thatsomething s not when we "know" that it is, because we cannot conceive ofsomethingas both existing and no t existing at the same time.Therefore, i f anyone distinguishes between these two meanings [of"conceive" conceiving within th e limits of what he knows to be actual(meaning A), an d conceivingby his own imaginative effort (meaning B)], hewill understand that whenever something is "known" to be, it cannot be"conceived" not to be [in the sense of meaning A]; and yet that whatever is,except that than which a greater cannot be conceived, even if it is "known"to be, can still be "conceived" not to be [in the sense of meaning B]. Thereforeit is the peculiar property of God that he cannot be "conceived" not to be [inthe sense of meaning B], while many things so far as they exist, cannot be"conceived"notto be [in the senseof meaningA] (Chap. IV, p.133.21-134.19)..

st. Thomas Aquinas51. Thomas Aquinas (1224/5-1274). the great systematizer of Chris-tian thought in terms of Aristotelian philosophy. has long been re-garded by the Roman .Catholic ~ h u r c h as Its most a ~ t h o r i t a t i v e .theologian and by Christendom In general as one of Its most massiveand powerful minds.

4Five Ways to Provethe Existence of GodFIRST ARTICLEWHETHER THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IS SELF-EVIDENT?We proceed thus to the First Article:-Objection 1. It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. For thosethings are said to be self-eviden tto us the knowledgeof which exists naturallyin us, as we can see in regar d to first principles. But as Damascene says, "theknowledge of God is naturally implanted in all." Therefore the existence of

God is self-evident.Obj. 2. Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are knownas soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher [Aristotle] says is trueof the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole an dof a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole s greater than itspart. But as soon as the signification of the name God is understood, it is atonce seen that God exists. For by this name is signified that thing than whichnothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentallyis greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, s ince as soon as thenameGod is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually.Therefore the proposition God exists is self-evident.Obj. 3. Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever deniesthe existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and, if truth does notexist, then the proposition Truth does not exist is true: an d i f here is anything

From Basic Writings of St. 77tomas Aquinas, edited by Anton C. Pegis. Copyright 1945 byRandom House, Inc. Reprintedby permission of Random House, Inc. and Bums & OatesLtd.