TAKE HOME FINAL EXAM IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 103

TAKE HOME FINAL EXAM IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 103 Instructions: Please read carefully before you proceed1. For identification, write only your student number in your answer sheet

2. Answer sheets are to be typewritten in a standard 8.5x11 sheet, properly numbered according to the question.

3. BE RESPONSIVE TO THE QUESTIONS. It is mandatory that you write your answers in sentence form. When a question asks you to explain, you must explain with basis. When a question calls for your opinion, reason out with basis.

4. The deadline for submission of answers is May 18, 2015 (Monday) at the Department of Political Science. Absolutely no extension.

Questions (20 pts each)

For the five questions, please use the dataset provided in your email.

1. The dataset contains local government (cities and provinces) financial data from 2001 to 2013, as well as election related information pertaining to each local government.

a. In the dataset what is the oldest LGU and when was it chartered? What is the most recently created LGU and when did it acquire legal personality?b. What is the modal number of legislative district? Is it the same in both cities and provinces?

c. It is said that legitimacy is established by the number of votes an incumbent received during the election. What is the average proportion of votes in the data? What LGU had the most number of candidates in an election and during which election?

d. Elections are said to be competitive if there are at least two candidates vying for the post. In the Philippines, however, elections are not always competitive and on numerous occasions incumbents run unopposed. Using the number of candidates as gauge, can we say that elections are more competitive in cities than in provinces?2. Scholars of public management argue that a local executives administrative competence can be seen in the efficient and productive use of money. Sound fiscal governance, in the context of the local government code, is usually determined based on an LGUs capacity to generate its own revenue. Local government units, after all, are expected to exercise fiscal autonomy and generate income independent of the national government.a. Is it possible to come up with a semi-elasticity model of local revenue earning capacity (tot_loc_src) as a function of the number of years an incumbent or his family had occupied the office unopposed (term) and the poverty incidence in the locale (isae)?

b. Regardless of your answer in 2a, come up with a semi elasticity model of local revenue earning capacity (tot_loc_src) and adjusting for the LGUs who reported no locally sourced income (tot_loc_src=0). Write the equation in the usual form. How much does this model explain about the variance in local revenue generation capacity?

c. Interpret the effect of a familys persistence to office (term)? What is your explanation for this relationship?

d. Interpret the effect of poverty incidence (isae)? How do you explain this relationship?

3. Unlike economists, political analysts are more sophisticated and pragmatic in their analysis of fiscal governance and argue that local executives largely depend on networks for the institution of sound financial programs. In the context of a patron-client system, as we know, these networks also include families.a. Create a single categorical variable that identifies if an incumbent has a relative who is also currently a member of congress, a vice governor, a mayor or governor in another city or province, a representative and a vice governor, a representative and a mayor or a governor, and a mayor or governor and a vice-governor. Add this to your semi-elasticity model in no. 2. Is there anything surprising? Did it improve the models explanatory power?b. Include a squared function of term and test this squared form jointly with its simple form (term and term squared). Are they jointly significant? How do you interpret this quadratic term? Is there now basis to accept this term in the model?c. Say, instead of persistence (term), we use prior experience (yrsoffice) and its squared form as an independent variable, how do you interpret the relationship? What is the tipping point? Does this make sense? Explain.d. Create a regression table for the models you estimated in 2b (model 1), 3a (model 2), 3b (model 3), and 3c (model 4). Make sure to label the variables meaningfully (hint: describe the variables instead of just using the variable names in the dataset). Which is the best model? Why?

4. Sociologists believe there is need to take into account inherent personal characteristics as determinants of leadership qualities. Not to be left out, economists argue that in modelling fiscal governance analysts should look no farther than the fiscal indicators themselves.

a. What is the proportion of female over male local chief executives (hint: use gender, which is coded 1 if male and 0 otherwise)? If we add gender to the model in 2c, can we say that male local chief executives are more adept at generating local revenues for their local governments?b. What is the partial effect of experience (yrsoffice) if the incumbent is male? What is the partial effect if the incumbent is female?

c. This time include the log of IRA in the model, taking into account and adjusting for LGUs whose IRA is zero. What is its effect? Is this effect large?d. If instead of the zero adjusted logged form of IRA in 3c you used the level form of IRA but in millions as unit of measure (IRA divided by 1,000,000), would your answer be different?

5. Come up with a semi-elasticity model of local revenue generating capacity but this time with the following as independent variables: