Sputniks = ICBMs

• 4 October 1957• 3 November 1957• Unspecified launcher

and site• 1120lbs to LEO equals

2000lb warhead to 5-6,000nm ballistic

• No surprise

Test Ranges

Imagery – but what else?

• HUMINT – Popov?• HUMINT – travellers• Open Sources• Extrapolation from US• IRBM part-testing• No radar or TELINT• SIGINT

A Dodgy Dossier?

• SNIE 11-10-57 dated 10 December 1957

• “IOC mid-1958 to mid-1959 with 10 prototypes”

• 20-50 flight tests needed…

• BUT fragmentary launch evidence admitted

• No idea of ICBM configuration

• “100 ICBMs one year after IOC”

• “500 ICBMs two-three years after IOC”

• BUT No knowledge of production facilities admitted

• (Guidance OK…Warheads OK…Economy OK)

1958

• No U-2 overflights

• Reduced countdown durations

• Sputnik 3 on 15 May 1958

• No more launches that year…

• …but three Luna 3-stage failures

• NIE 11-5-58 dated 19 August 1958

CIA Rethink

24 October 1958 by ORR for GMIC

• 2-3 million sq ft production plants x 2• Engine test facilities• 1,000 subcontractors• “A heavy flow of communications, travellers, material…

between factories, launch sites, and military organisations, and the central authority controlling the program”

• WHERE IS ALL THIS ?!

Where are the launch sites?

1959

• Plea for more U-2 flights

• First Luna success 2 January

• Khrushchev Feb59: “in serial production”

• Test-firings resumed in March

• US TELINT improvements

• Sverdlovsk? Kyubyshev? Dnepropetrovsk?

• Polyarnyy Ural launch site?

U-2 mission constraints

• illegal provocation• avoid radar detection• host countries• range v altitude• camera settings• cloud cover• 9 July 1959 mission• 6 Dec 1959 mission

Knowns + Unknowns

• Kerosene + LOX

• 5,500 nm range

• 6,000 lb warhead

• Not a ‘crash’ program

• Still no imagery of configuration

• Still no launch site(s) identified

• Ten prototypes have achieved IOC?

Nuclear Ransom?

• Symington, Alsop, JFK, 1960 election

• Latest NIE identified a window of opportunity for USSR in 1961

• Intel community consensus fell apart: - Army + Navy versus USAF

• But the Soviet Intent…

No more TALENT

• Two more missions…• …then 1 May 1960• Coverage 650,000 sq

miles BUT: - only 13.6% of Soviet territory

deemed suitable for ICBM deploy

- 3.6% of the eight priority areas

- 8.5% of railroads within them

CORONA

• 9009 18 Aug 1960• 9013 7 Dec 1960• 9017 16 Jun 1961• 9019 7 Jul 1961• 9023 30 Aug 1961• 9022 12 Sep 1961

PLUS• Col Oleg Penkovsky

1961 Estimates

• IOC of ‘a few’ missiles was January 1960

• Kerosene fuel is non-storable

• Five main engines, parallel-staged

• First production was Kaliningrad 88

• Too cumbersome for major deployment

• 10-25 launchers, five possible sites (three seen)

• threat to US is ‘limited’ – USAF still disagreed!

• Follow-on ICBM tests in progress; IOC late 1962

• 250-300 IRBM launchers in western USSR

And the Truth was…

• Orderly programme, space and ICBM launches interspersed

• IOC was late 1959/early 1960

• Only four R-7 launchers deployed – at Plesetsk

• Follow-on ICBM was R-16 from different design bureau

• 24 October 1960 disaster

• Slow progress in 1961

Concluding Thoughts

• Analyst’s experience of under-estimating the Soviet progress to A-bomb and H-bomb drove over-estimates of ICBM programme?

• Highest US estimates required USSR to produce ICBMs x5 faster than US

• US Atlas ICBM was an appropriate analogue to R-7• SIGINT role still not fully appreciated (classification)• Technical collection matured quickly, but…• …there’s no substitute for all-source analysis…• …including HUMINT, especially to understand Intent