Spotlight Safety Magazine RAAF

5/24/2018 Spotlight Safety Magazine RAAF

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AVIATION SAFETY

02 2011

INSIDE GULF CFIT HEARING PROTECTION WHEN GOOD FORECASTS GO BAD


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2Aviation Safety Spotlight 02 2

ForewordT

he US National Transportationand Safety Board says holdingpilots and air traffic controllers

accountable for their mistakes will

increase professionalism in theirranks. Their investigation into

increased number of errors from

pilots and air traffic controllers, and

the sacking of several controllers

for sleeping on the job, has resulted

in the NTSB adding unprofessional

behaviour as one of the top 10 critical

changes required to improve safety.

The NTSB went on to say: When

pilots and controllers depart from

their training, procedures and best

practices, safety margins erode, which

can lead to tragedy. I would like totake this statement further and say

it obviously applies to everyone, not

just pilots and air traffic controllers. As

we are all involved in the profession

of arms we must all approach our

job with a professional attitude.

We must be focused on continual

improvement in everything we do.

If we accept near enough is good

enough, undoubtedly one day it wontbe and we will either hurt ourselves,

a mate, or an innocent bystander.

Recent accidents and incidents

throughout the ADF have

demonstrated that an action yesterday

was good enough, however on the

day it was not. A generative safety

culture is one that always believes

the next accident is just around the

corner. By being pro-active, striving

for excellence, and not accepting good

enough, we can go a long way towards

maintaining our professionalismand hence prevent accidents.

GPCAPT Alan Clements

Director Defence Aviation Safety


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Director Defence Aviation

& Air Force Safety

GPCAPT Alan Clements

Ph: (02) 6128 7284

email: [email protected]

Rotary Wing & Systems Aviation Safety

WGCDR Peter Johnson

Ph: (02) 6128 7495


Fixed Wing Aviation Safety

WGCDR Alf Jonas

Ph: (02) 6128 7693


Human & Systems Performance

WGCDR Ben Cook

Ph: (02) 6128 7694


Deputy Director Safety Communication

Paul Cross

Ph: (02) 6128 7470


Editor

Rebecca Codey

Ph: (02) 6128 7485


Design

Philip Crowther

Ph: (02) 6128 7481


Sally Huckel

Ph: (02) 6128 7071


DDAAFS Facsimile

(02) 6128 7720

August 2011

Cover photo

Caption: Flight Lieutenant Benjamin

Monaghan of 75 Squadron in front of a

FA-18 prior to going flying for the day

missions.

Photo by: CPL Casey Smith

Aviation SafetySpotlightis produced in the interests ofpromoting aviation safety in the Australian Defence Force(ADF) by the Directorate of Defence Aviation and Air ForceSafety (DDAAFS). Opinions expressed in Spotlight do not

necessarily express the views of DDAAFS or the ADF.While every care is taken to examine all material publishedno responsibility is accepted by the ADF, Spotlightorthe editor for the accuracy of any statement, opinion oradvice contained in the text of any material submitted bya contributor. Readers should rely on their own enquiriesin making any decision premised upon any information oropinions contained in any material that such information isaccurate or free from error.

With the exception of occasional articles published forwhich specific and/or one-time permission has beengranted for reproduction, and for which an appropriatecaveat is included in the text, organisations may reproduce

articles with appropriate acknowledgment to DDAAFSandAviation Safety Spotlightmagazine and/or article(s)originator, as appropriate.

The contents do not necessarily reflect Service policyand, unless stated otherwise, should not be construedas orders, instructions or directives. All photographs andgraphics are for illustrative purposes only and do notrepresent actual incident aircraft unless specifically stated.Comments, contributions etc are invited from readers inthe interests of promoting aviation safety as widely aspossible throughout the ADF.

Correspondence, or enquiries regarding magazinedistribution, may be addressed to:The Editor,Aviation Safety Spotlight, DDAAFSF4-1-047, Defence Establishment Fairbairn24 Fairbairn Ave, Canberra ACT 2600

Contributions by way of articles and photographs are invited from readers across the ADF and the retiredcommunity in the interest of promoting Aviation and Air Force Safety. Both RAAFsafeand Spotlightmagazinesreserve the right to edit all articles submitted for content, length or format. Contributions should be sent toDeputy Director Safety Communications, Paul Cross by email: [email protected]

04 Gulf CFIT

08 Foam earplugs

13 Fighting fit: Bright spots & fighter pilots

18 Say amend to that

20 Capital turbulence

22 When good forecasts go bad

27 Safety analysis why do we do it?

27 Managing DAHRTS at your unit

29 Good Show Awards

30 Aviation safety training courses

CONTENTS

AVIATION SAFETY

the aviation safety magazine of the Australian Defence Force


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By Paul Cross

At 6.45pm on 23 March 2004,an Era Aviation SikorskyS-76A took off from Scholes

International Airport in Galveston,

Texas, for what should be been a

routine flight to the drilling shipDiscoverer Spirit. The captain, co-pilot

and eight passengers took off on a

visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan in

night visual meteorological conditions

(VMC) for the 180-mile flight to the

ship. At about 7.18pm the aircraft flew

into the sea, killing all on board.

It was an experienced crew flying

the Sikorsky that evening. The captain,

a former army and coastguard pilot

had more than 7288 hours flying

time, including 5323 hours as pilot-in-

command of multi-engine helicoptersand 1489 hours on the Sikorsky S-76A.

He had also logged more than 1000

hours of night flying and was familiar

with the region.

The co-pilot had accumulated 1941

hours flying time, including 1371 hours

as pilot-in-command and 438 hours

on type, and had logged 63 hours in

night operations. This was the first time

the captain and co-pilot had worked

together.

It was a dark night, with only 8 percent of the moon showing and starlightaffected by a scattered-to-broken layerof stratiform cloud at 2800 feet. Thewind was from the southeast at 17 to 21knots and satellite imagery showed no

cumulonimbus or thunderstorms overthe region.

At 6.58pm, a radar return showedthe aircraft descending from 1800 feetat a rate of 300 feet per minute, twominutes later the return showed it at1100 feet and descending at 250 feetper minute and 35 nautical miles south-southeast of Galveston. Had the aircraftcontinued at this rate, it is estimatedthat it would have hit the water in fiveminutes; however, it continued to fly fora further 18 minutes, beyond the rangeof the ASR-9 radar coverage.

The initial flight plan included arefuelling stop at High Island A557, arefuelling platform located about 80nautical miles from Galveston; however,during the location check-in a 7.14pm,the co-pilot informed the dispatcherthat they had enough fuel on board toreach the rendezvous and would flydirect to the Discoverer Spiritand askedfor updated co-ordinates.

This was the last communicationwith the aircraft. No distress or

emergency calls were received from

the helicopter. During the search-

and-rescue operation, the wreckage

was found 70 nm south-southeast of

Galveston and 10 nm northwest of Hig

Island A557 in 186 feet of water.

Investigation

About 95 per cent of the wreckage

was recovered from the sea floor.

Analysis of the wreckage discovered

severe accordion-like crushing on the

fuselage, which was considered to be

consistent with a water impact at high

and upward compression fractures foun

on the lower fuselage were consistent

with a level or very shallow bank-attitud

at impact. Investigators determined tha

the lack of damage to the lower part of

the tail boom was to be consistent with

shallow descent angle and pitch attitud

at impact.

The structure showed no evidence

of bird strike, fatigue fractures or

any other anomalies. Continuity of

the cyclic, collective and tail-rotor

pedal control system could not be

established by investigators because o

breaks in the systems. However, when

all of the breaks had been examined,

no evidence of malfunction or failure

could be found.

The ADFs rotary-wing assets, particularly Navy, spend a lot of

time operating over water. In many instances they are carrying

passengers and the crew. It is done in all weather conditions and at

all times of the day and night. With this in mind it is, perhaps, timelyto take a look at the events surrounding a rotary-wing accident tha

occurred in the Gulf of Mexico in 2004.

Gulf CFIT


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The aircraft was equipped witha cockpit voice recorder (CVR) butthis has been incorrectly installed,which resulted in a lack of audioinput to the CVR channels and thefunctional test after installation didnot detect the fault. The cockpit areamicrophone was the only source ofaudio information recorded from theflight but because of the high levels

of ambient noise in the cockpit, itwas mostly unintelligible. This lackof audio evidence severely hinderedinvestigators.

Adding to the problems createdby the lack of audio evidence, thisaircraft was not fitted with a flightdata recorder (FDR). In June 2001,Era Aviation requested a temporaryexemption from the requirement fortwo of its Sikorsky S-76A helicopterson the grounds that it did not degradesafety. This request was granted by

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)the following August.

CFIT happens when a controlled,

serviceable aircraft is flown into terrain,

obstacles or water with no prior

awareness by the flight crew of the

impending collision. Most CFIT accidents

happen in poor visibility and during the

take-off and landing phases of flight.

A Flight Safety Foundation study

has shown that about 75 per cent of all

CFIT accidents in commercial aircraft

occurred in those not equipped with atraditional ground proximity warningsystem (GPWS), which uses a radaraltimeter to calculate the closurerate with terrain to predict a potentialcollision threat. Although a traditionalGPWS can help prevent CFIT, it doesnot provide a timely warning if theground rises steeply. Terrain awarenessand warning system (TAWS) has the

ability to look ahead of an aircraft todetermine obstacles along the flightpath and provide crews with a moretimely warning.

When used with helicopteroperations, TAWS can include aforward-looking terrain aware displaythat provides aural and visual alerts.The accident aircraft was not fittedwith TAWS, although FAA action hadmandated that it would have to befitted by 29 March 2005 just over ayear too late.

Most CFIT accidents

happen in poor

visibility and during the

take-off and landing

phases of flight.


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As part of the investigation, TAWS

manufacturer Honeywell was asked to

perform simulations of 150- and 250-

fpm descent into water to determine

what alerts could have been expected

had TAWS been installed on the

accident helicopter. For a descent rate

of 150fpm that simulation showed

a caution terrain alert would haveoccurred 97 seconds before impact

and a warning terrain alert 84 seconds

before impact.

At a descent rate of 250fps the

first alert would have given the crew

68 seconds before impact and the

warning, some 55 seconds before

impact.

Scenarios

Numerous scenarios were

examined to find out what may have

led the crew to inadvertantly fly into

water. Four scenarios were deemed tobe the most likely to have occurred.

Scenario 1. Pilot 2 maintained control

but did not select altitude mode.

The first scenario began with FD2

engaged and with NAV and VS selected

on the flight director mode selector.

Pilot 2, in the right seat, then pressed

SBY on the flight director mode

selector which cancelled the NAV and

VS modes and decoupled FD2. With

the HSI heading bug, pilot 2 changed

the aircrafts heading 10 degrees tothe right to reflect the flight crewsdecision not to refuel.

Pilot 2 then pressed HDG on the

flight director mode selector, coupling

FD2 again but did not press ALT.

Because the helicopters power setting

was not changed and ALT was not

selected on pilot 2s flight director

mode selector, the process of making

the 10-degree turn to the right led

to a 250-300 fmp descent that was

maintained after rollout.

Scenario 2. Pilot 1 coupled the flightdirector but did not select altitudemode.

The second scenario began withFD2 engaged and coupled; and withNAV and VS selected on the flightdirector mode selector. Pilot 2, in theright seat, transferred control of the

aircraft to pilot 1, who then selected FD1and the flight director mode selectorwas automatically set to SBY.

With the HSI heading bug, pilot1 changed the helicopters heading10 degrees to the right. Pilot 1 thenpressed HDG on the flight directormode selector, coupling FD1 but didnot press the ALT button. Becausethe helicopters power setting was notchanged and ALT was not selected onpilot 1s flight director mode selector,the turn to the right led to a 250-300

fmp descent that was maintained afterrollout.

Scenario 3. Pilot 1 selected altitudemode but did not couple the flightdirector.

This scenario began with FD2engaged and coupled, and with NAVand VS selected on the flight directormode selector. Pilot 2 transferredcontrol of the aircraft to pilot 1, whoselected FD1 and then selected CPLon the autopilot controller, whichdecoupled FD1.

With the HSI heading bug, pilot 1changed heading 10 degrees to theright. Pilot 1 also pressed HDG andthen ALT on the flight director modeselector. Becasue the power setter wasnot altered and FD1 was not coupled,the heading change led to a 250-300fmp descent that was maintained afterrollout.

Scenario 4. Pilot 1 selected altitudepreselect but did not couple the flightdirector.

The last scenario began with FD2engaged and coupled, and with NAVand VS selected on the flight directormode selector. Pilot 2 transferredcontrol of the helicopter to pilot 1 ,who selected FD1 and then CPL on theautopilot, which decoupled FD1.

With the heading bug, pilot onethen changed course 10 degrees tothe right. Pilot 1 pressed HDG and ALTPRE on the flight director selectormode and entered the desired altitude(900 feet) into the AL-300. Pilot 1

also pressed VS on the flight director

selector mode and entered the desired

rate of descent, 200 fpm, with the

collective. The helicopter descended

at that rate until reaching the selected

altitude. However, because the power

setting was not altered and FD1 was

not coupled, the heading change led

to a 250-300 fmp descent that wasmaintained after rollout.

Conclusion

The US National Transport Safety

Board investigation found that the

probable cause of the accident was

the flight crews failure to identify and

arrest the helicopters descent for

undetermined reasons, which resulted

in controlled flight into terrain.

Information in this article has been

taken from the National Transport

Safety board Aircraft Accident Report

NTSB/AAR-06/02

Investigation into the August 2005accident involving an S-76C thatcrashed into the Baltic Sea soon

after take-off demonstrated that

recorded flight data for helicopteroperations was critical for effectiveaccident and incident investigations.

This aircraft did have an flight

data recorder installed and the dataretrieved showed that its pitch androll movements were severe duringthe accident sequence and were not

consistent with the recorded cyclicinputs.

It is likely that the helicoptersmovement and the cyclics movementwould not have been known without

FDR data. As a result, investigatorsidentified airworthiness concerns aboutS-76 actuators because the data wasconsistent with a loss of control of the

forward actuator.

This was the first accident involving

a large helicopter for which FDR datawas available.

FDRbreakthrough

It is likely that the

helicopters movement

and the cyclics

movement would not

have been known

without FDR data.


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By Jessica Gehler and Dr Adrian Smith

Do you wear foam earplugs?Have you ever come home from

work with ringing in your ears

or difficulty hearing? This is a common

problem experienced by people who

wear earplugs, and may be a result of

something as simple as poor fitting.

We all know the aviation

environment whether inside an

aircraft, on the tarmac or airfield, or

in a hangar or workshop can be

very noisy. (Thats why aircrew and

aviation maintenance personnel need

to wear hearing protection). In many

workplaces, foam earplugs are the most

common form of hearing protection

worn, either by themselves, or insideear defenders or a flying helmet(so-called double hearing protection).Regrettably, some people might beat risk of developing hearing loss and

chronic tinnitus (a ringing in the ears)because they dont insert their foamearplugs the right way.

Noise-induced hearing loss

Work-related exposure tohazardous levels of noise is a significantoccupational threat around the world.Noise-induced hearing loss is the mostcommon occupational disease in theUS, and is the fourth most commonoccupational disease in Europe. TheAustralian Safety and CompensationCouncil estimates that as many as 28

to 32 per cent of Australian workers areexposed to potentially-hazardous levelsof noise in the workplace. Occupationalhearing loss is a significant conditionaffecting the Australian workforce,accounting for up to 24 per cent of alldisease-related claims over the last 10years. Hearing loss accounts for 19per cent of all claims for work-relateddiseases in Australia. Occupationalhearing loss costs more than AU$41million each year in compensation.Hearing loss costs the Australian

community as much as $6.7 billion ayear in lost productivity, a staggeringfigure when you consider estimatesthat as many as 37 per cent of hearingloss in Australia can be attributedto excessive noise exposure in theworkplace!

In the 2008/9 financial year,occupational noise injuries hearingloss and tinnitus were the twoconditions most frequently acceptedby the Department of VeteransAffairs, and sensorineural hearing

loss was the second most common

claim for compensation under the

Australian Military Rehabilitation and

Compensation Act.

Foam earplugs

The aviation environment is known

to pose a high risk for noise-induced

hearing loss, and personnel who

work in and around ADF aircraft may

be required to wear foam earplugs

(either by themselves, or together with

earmuffs as double hearing protectionUnfortunately, many people think that

foam earplugs are easy to use so eas

that many people are never taught ho

to use them properly.

Foam earplugs might look simple

to use, but the reality is that untrained

users often insert them incorrectly,

and if not inserted correctly they migh

provide the wearer with little or no

protection from noise. On the other

hand, studies have shown that people

Foam earplugsAre the instructions falling on deaf ears?

Photo by LAC Philip Sharpe

Foam earplugs might

look simple to use,

but the reality is thatuntrained users often

insert them incorrectl

and if not inserted

correctly they might

provide the wearer wi

little or no protection

from noise.


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who are shown how to insert theirearplugs correctly get much better

protection from noise. Because of this,

it is important for aircrew and aviation

maintenance personnel in fact, all ADF

personnel who are exposed to noise

to know how to use foam earplugs

properly if they want to prevent noise-

induced hearing loss.

AVMED Project 10/2009

The importance of preventing noise-

induced hearing loss in aircrew, and the

importance of inserting foam earplugscorrectly, led the RAAF Institute of

Aviation Medicine to evaluate how well

aircrew were using foam earplugs.

AVMED Report 10/2009: Real-World

Attenuation of Foam Earplugsassessed

the real-world level of noise protection

provided by foam earplugs used by

typical aircrew, and compared this

to the level of noise protection the

earplugs are capable of providing

(according to the manufacturers

specifications). The project also looked

at the improvement in noise protectionafter aircrew were shown how to insert

their earplugs correctly.

Method

Forty-three aircrew (pilots and

non-pilot aircrew) volunteered to

participate in the study. Pilots ranged

in experienced from a few who had just

completed their basic flying training,

through to pilots with more than 3000flying hours of experience. They were

asked to insert foam earplugs as they

would normally. The earplugs usedwere capable of providing 25-32 dB of

protection if worn correctly. The study

recorded the technique used to insert

the earplugs and the level of noise

protection they provided before and

after the participants received a brief

one-on-one training session to insertthe earplugs correctly.

Most of the participants (62 per

cent) had taught themselves how to

insert the foam earplugs (either by trialand error or by watching how others

inserted them), and 7 per cent read themanufacturers instructions. Thirty-eight

percent of participants indicated a flying

instructor or senior aircrew member

in the squadron had shown them how

to insert the foam earplugs. These

figures are not surprising: typically,

Defence members would be given foam

earplugs and told to put these in your

ears when you are around loud noise,

and any other training is more likely to

be a soldiers five demonstration rather

than a structured training programme.

This might explain why 56 per cent ofparticipants reported their earplugs

became dislodged when flying, and 19

per cent reported temporary deafness

and ringing in their ears after flying

(even though they had been wearing

foam earplugs at the time).

Results

At the beginning of the study, most

participants did not observe the proper

technique to insert earplugs. Only 35

per cent rolled the earplugs into a

Photo by LAC Glen McCa


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narrow crease-free cylinder, and less

than 20 per cent straightened the ear

canal, or pushed the earplugs deep into

the ear canal, or held it in place while

the foam expanded.

The average level of noise

protection afforded by the earplugs

at the beginning of the study was

only 15 dB, with 12 per cent receiving

a level of protection less than 10 dB.

Of significant concern is that 7 per

cent received little or no protection

at all. Remember, these earplugs

are supposed to provide 25-32 dB of

protection.

Further analysis of the results

revealed interesting patterns. First,

there was no difference between

pilots and non-pilot aircrew in terms

of the technique used or the level

of protection from the earplugs

- both groups performed equally

poorly. Second, flying experience

did not determine who used the

correct technique or who achieved

good noise protection - experienced

aircrew (pilots and non-pilot aircrew)

performed just as poorly as newly-

qualified pilots and junior aircrew.

Finally, compared to those who had

taught themselves, aircrew who had

been shown how to use earplugs by

a flying instructor or senior aircrew

member in the squadron were more

confident they were using the right

technique and more confident they

were getting optimum protection

but they were no more likely to use

the proper technique or obtain a good

level of noise protection than those

who were self-taught. Not surprisingly,

aircrew who read the manufacturers

instructions achieved significantly

better noise protection.

After undergoing a brief one-on-

one training session, all participants

correctly followed the six-stepinsertion technique, and this wasaccompanied by a significantimprovement in the level of noiseprotection provided by the foamearplugs. On average, the level ofnoise protection experienced by thegroup increased by 11 dB 1. The averalevel of noise protection after traininwas 25 dB, meaning that most of thegroup were able to achieve a level of

noise protection as good as, or bettethan, the level advertised by themanufacturer of the earplugs. Beforetraining, only 28 per cent of the

1With noise measurements, a 3-dB change

in the noise level is a doubling of the noise

energy and it is the overall noise energy

that is the risk for noise-induced hearing

loss. So, an 11-dB increase in noise protectio

means that the amount of noise energy the

person is exposed has been reduced by a

factor of 16!

0

20

40

60

80

100

Roll earplugs Straighten ear

canal

Push earplugs

in deeply

Hold while

foam expands

Perc

entcorrectly

observing

step

Before training

After training

Figure 1. This graph shows the percentage of participants who correctly followed the steps to insert foam earplugs

properly, in accordance with the manufacturers instructions. At the beginning of the study, few people knew how to

insert their earplugs correctly.


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participants were able to achieve this

level of noise protection. The most

interesting observation was that the

level of hearing protection achieved

was directly proportional to how deep

the earplugs were pushed into the ear

canal the deeper they were inserted,

the more noise they blocked out.

The training given to the

participants of this project was simple.

Dr Smith, the AVMED researcher

who conducted this study, gave each

participant a one-on-one briefing

and then showed them a series of

30-second video clips supplied by an

earplug manufacturer. Even though the

training was simple, it was well-received

by the participants of the study. Most of

the participants (98 per cent) believed

the technique demonstrated to themduring the study was better than their

current technique, and they intended to

adopt and continue to use the newly-

taught technique rather than continuing

to insert earplugs the way they had

done before.

Conclusion

Even though Defence provides

foam earplugs to people working in

noisy work environments, people might

still be at risk of noise-induced hearing

loss if they dont use the earplugs

correctly.

Foam earplugs that are not

inserted correctly can offer little or

no protection from noise, and this

can increase the risk of developing

noise-induced hearing loss later in

life. However, following the basic steps

outlined in this article will ensure that

ADF personnel are able to insert their

earplugs correctly, enabling them toget optimum protection when they are

exposed to potentially hazardous levels

of noise in their workplace.

Hearing protection and the correct

use of foam earplugs is not just about

the workplace. Knowing how to insert

earplugs correctly is also important for

friends and family members who are

exposed to noise in other areas of their

life rock concerts, motor sport, or

operating power tools or machinery.

Noise-induced hearing loss is often

irreversible. Foam earplugs might seem

easy to use, but this study has shown

that they are easy to use badly. Give

yourself the best protection learn

how to use earplugs properly: roll, pull,

push, hold, and check.

Figure 2. Each x indicates how much noise was being blocked out by the earplugs inserted during this study. Note:

earplugs inserted correctly should be able to provide a level of protection of 25-32 dB (indicated by the two horizontal lines

across the middle of the graph). At the start of the study, very few people achieve a satisfactory level of hearing protection,

with many getting little or no protection from their earplugs.

Even though Defence

provides foam

earplugs to people

working in noisy work

environments, people

might still be at risk of

noise-induced hearing

loss if they dont use

the earplugs correctly.


12/32


Further information

For further information, contact:

Dr Adrian Smith

Specialist Aviation Medical Officer

ArmyRAAF Institute of Aviation Medicine

[email protected]

Ph: (08) 7383 3169

References

Australian Safety and CompensationCouncil (ASCC). Work-related noise-induced hearing loss in Australia.

Canberra:Australian Safety andCompensation Council; 2006

Australian Safety and CompensationCouncil (ASCC). National hazardexposure surveillance noise exposureand provision of noise control measures

in Australian workplaces.Canberra:Australian Safety and CompensationCouncil; 2009

Campbell J. Cost of veterans MilitaryRehabilitation and CompensationAct rises 280 per cent.The SundayMail(Qld), 21 February 2010.Viewed 1 April 2010, .

Concha-Barrientos M, Campbell-Lendrum

D, Stennland K, editors. Occupational

noiseassessing the burden of diseasefrom work-related hearing impairment at

national and local levels. Geneva: World

Health Organization; 2004

Franks JR, Stephenson MR, Merry

CJ, editors. Preventing occupational

hearing loss a practical guide. NIOSH

Publication 96-110. Cincinnati, OH:

National Institute of Occupational Safety

and Health (NIOSH); 1996

National Institute for OccupationalSafety and Health (NIOSH). Noise andhearing loss prevention. Viewed 7 Apri2010,


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Story and photos by WGCDR Ben Cook

Who would think that a significant

highlight after 19 years militaryservice within the transport,

instructional and aviation safety world

by a guy who never wanted to fly fast

jets (largely due to a brain with a slow

processor) would be the opportunity

to live in close quarters with 20+ fighter

pilots and their support personnel fornine days; and the inclusion of early

morning starts and long days.

Recent field work by DDAAFS

Human and Systems Performance

section and AVMED Human Factors

specialist Mr Mark Corbett, using

contemporary fatigue science to better

monitor and manage human fatigue

for the fighter combat instructor (FCI)

course, provided a valuable insight into

the operational world, including an

ongoing habit of shooting my watch off1to describe the experience.

FCI course is run every two yearsand produces an average of five FCIs

each course. The experience helpedrefine what we already know aboutmaximising high performance in the

ADF. High performance comes aboutthrough a high level of trust, teamwork,

and professional discipline, even whenconfronted with higher levels of stressand fatigue.

The experience with 2OCUalso provided further practicalreinforcement of some contemporary

material regarding bright spots andtrust. The material is being reviewed

by DDAAFS HSP, with the aim ofincorporating these into existing andnew DDAAFS training courses. The

contemporary practices have thepotential to make improvements in

your own life, workplace and to improveefficiency across the broader ADF.

The nine days with the FCIs and theirsupport staff was one big bright spot.

So whats this bright-spot concept?Brothers, Chip and Dan Heath2in theirbook Switch: How to Change ThingsWhen Change is Hardincorporate

the search for bright spots as

essential steps for successful changemanagement.

The term bright spot stems fromJerry Sternin, who was working for

an international organisation thathelps children in need. In 1990, when

confronted with an almost impossibletask regarding a malnutrition problemin Vietnam, Jerry sought to find small

pockets of what was going right fromwhich he and his team built in orderto overcome significant obstacles. Six

months later 65 per cent of the children

Fighting fit:Bright spots & fighter pilots


14/32


were better nourished. (The full story isin Switch3.)

The broad aim is to avoid focusingon the negatives whats not working,whats not going well. Often, the reasonwe have trouble moving forward isbecause of a negative spiral that canquickly lead to discontent and a sense

of being overwhelmed and lost. Forexample, many of our safety managers(WASOs, ASOs, MASOs, BASOs4et cetera.) have at times becomeoverwhelmed because of excessiveworkload. This can lead to becomingstuck in the rut of continually seeing thenegatives to the detriment of makingpositive and pro-active improvements tothe safety system.

Take a more personal example ofhuman behaviour when confronted withyour childs school report card. What

would you do if your son or daughtercame home with one A, four Bs and oneF? Many of us would focus on the F andstart asking for answers. You may evenstart building up some unnecessaryemotion for little positive gain and goas far as grounding them for their poorresult. But, what if you recognised thishuman trait (that is a natural tendencyto focus on the negatives) and insteadfocused on the A. Asking your childabout the environment that enabledthe A to be achieved and why that

environment helped produce suchpositive outcomes? Now, its time tocompare what produced the A (brightspots) and ask whats different about

the environment and conditions thathave resulted in the F. The aim is toidentify the strengths (bright spots)and work out how to further build onthose strengths. Just as this appliesto our personal lives, experience hasshown that this process (focusing onbright spots) is particularly critical fororganisations that successfully managechange.

As many of you will be aware, theADF (like most large organisations)experiences change on a regular basis.

The Heath brothers said in Switch:

To pursue bright spots is to ask thequestion whats working, and how canwe do more of it. Yet, in the real world,

this obvious question is almost neverasked. Instead the question we ask ismore problem focused: whats brokenand how do we fix it?

Now getting back to the FCI courseand the tenacity and dedication of the

staff and trainees from 2OCU. Endurinlong hours of mission planning, briefinexecution and debriefing demonstrate

a strong culture of striving forperfection. I believe the nine days withthe FCIs was an opportunity to seemany bright spots.

It requires professional disciplineand tenacity to adhere to the typical

routine of 2OCU, particularly towardsthe end of FCI course, which for many

has involved 12+ hour days, six days peweek for the past six months; hence thmonitoring of human fatigue.

The final few days involved: an earmorning start (2am), frag drop5, manyhours of mission preparation, a two-hour mission brief (for example missio

commander overview, navigation,tanker flow, communications plan,range procedures, tactical and strikeflow), another early start (2am) the ne

morning to fly the mission, and finallya lengthy debrief, at times lasting up to

six hours.The reason 2OCU produces some

of the worlds best fighter pilots is

the hours of meticulous planning,execution and debriefs, while all thetime observing a strong culture of trusthat allows and encourages all involve

to critically analyse and learn from themistakes.

When I consider bright spots,

the precision and resilience of this

system to human error is the best

Ive seen. That is, the standard

operating procedures, high trainingstandards and shared mental models

allow the aircrew to maintain very

good situational awareness (SA) and

resilience to the consequences of

errors, even when errors occur. This

a dynamic system, at times 22 FA-18

aircraft operating between 500 and

41,000 feet, at speeds of 450+ knots

providing air-to-air combat, destroyin

targets while maintaining SA of the

bigger picture, what everyone else is

doing.

Ultimately, it comes

down to a desire to

continually improve

and to take some time

each day to debrief for

growth, regardless ofwhether youre flying

aircraft or sitting

behind a computer

screen in Canberra.


15/32


From a personal perspective,

spending extended periods of time

with high performers leads to higher

performance. I have found my owndesire to improve both personally and

professionally has been strengthened

simply by observing what these guys

do day after day. Its made some of

the challenges in my own workplaceappear more trivial and provided me an

enhanced vigour to tackle them.

It also has me questioning my ownsense of tenacity in the workplace with

a desire to improve my own resilience

and to treat activities that dont go so

well as great opportunities for growth.

Another key outcome from the

experience is the strong focus ondebriefing SA what was helping to

provide SA, and lessons to be learnt

when SA degraded. Ultimately, it

comes down to a desire to continuallyimprove and to take some time each

day to debrief for growth, regardless ofwhether youre flying aircraft or sitting

behind a computer screen in Canberra.

I have a thought for anyone

in a challenging job whos feeling

overwhelmed and having difficulty

seeing any positives, for example

a safety manager struggling to get

their head above water. Its time to

look for the bright spots. If you cant

see any within your own workplace

then find another workplace that you

believe is performing a similar role

well and spend some time with them

to discover why? The Heath brothersremind us this is particularly necessary

during times of change, given a larger

number of activities may not be going

as well as expected because of the

increased workload and additional

tasks needed to make change happen.

Focusing the team on the small but

gradual successes, particularly when

surrounded by multiple challenges,

becomes critical in winning the hearts and minds battle in managing changeto achieve desirable outcomes. Anyopportunity to find bright spots can reempower individuals or teams to bettertackle their own challenges.

So what about trust? StephenCovey6in his book The Speed of Trust:

The One Thing That Changes Everythinghighlights that society is in a crisis oftrust that always affects two outcomes speed and cost.

If we consider something criticalto sustained military capability suchas effective communication andlinking this back to trust, Covey says7In a high-trust relationship, youcan say the wrong thing, and peoplewill still get your meaning. In a low-trust relationship, you can be verymeasured, even precise, and theyll still

misinterpret you.Covey also cites numerous

examples of changes within societyand organisations, with research fromcompanies citing a sharp decline intrust8.

I believe the ADF is sitting wellabove the average from this research,as indicated across various Defencesurveys; for example, the 2010 Air

So a thought for

anyone in a challenging

job whos feeling

overwhelmed and

having difficulty seeing

any positives ... is that

its time to look for the

bright spots.


16/32


Force Safety Culture Survey found 78per cent of personnel believe Air Forcehas a strong management commitmenttowards safety. This can only be achievedthrough a strong trust relationship.

Its a reminder that trust is hard,real, quantifiable, and measurable

and continues to provide significantenhancement to efficiency and costwithin systems. And if we link trust toleadership as Covey says leadershipis getting results in a way that inspirestrust. It also means that leaders mustprovide opportunities for personnel tolearn from their mistakes and to providea culture that makes it safe for thatto happen, similar to that achieved by2OCU. As a leader or supervisor, if you

havent considered trust as a key forcemultiplier, Coveys book is recommended

reading. Furthermore, how you establishtrust within your personal life has thepotential to improve your capacity tostrengthen trust within your workplace.

And you dont see stronger lines

of trust than a system (FCI course)

that requires meticulous attention

to detail from the life-support team,

maintainers and aircrew, all of which

result in the ability to authorise a

trainee FCI, with 600 hours on the

FA-18, to lead a 14-ship formation into a

simulated World War Three.

My experience with 2OCU also

highlighted the significant value of

retaining corporate experience, in this

case through the specialist aircrew

scheme; which has grown a training

system with a depth of experience

and knowledge through extensive use

of mentoring for improved training

outcomes.

Many of us in ADF support rolescontinue to work extremely hard tomove the broader ADF system forwardfor sustained and improved operationcapability. But, we must not forget

that the view from the operationalenvironment, those men and womenthat continue to serve their country inhostile environments and/or train todeliver military capability, those in thefront and back of aircraft, trucks, tank

ships and deployed bases, can be a littdifferent to ours.

In addition to seeking bright spots,we must make sure that we maximiseand grow our trust relationship tounlock the significant gains it affordsin both cost and speed across all areas

of the ADF. This includes a focus on allsystems (financial, logistics, projectset cetera) as even simple elementsof our system have the capacity toerode trust. For example, we mustensure that under SRP9we not onlyreview our organisational structure,but also our processes in all areas toensure we engender trust and henceimprovements in cost and speed.

Through overbearing process wecan erode trust to the detriment ofempowering individuals to take contro

In addition to seeking

bright spots, we

must make sure

that we maximise

and grow our trust

relationship to unlock

the significant gains it

affords with both cost

and speed across all

areas of the ADF.


17/32


1 Shooting your watch off is the use

of your hands when on the ground

to help describe various aircraft

manoeuvres and a core trait of fighter

pilots.

2 Chip Heath is Professor from the

Graduate School of Business at

Stanford University, Dan Heath is

Senior Fellow at Duke University

3 Heath, C & Heath, D 2010, Switch:

How to Change Things When Change

is Hard, Broadway Books, New York.

4 Wing Aviation Safety Officer (WASO);

Maintenance Aviation Safety Officer

(MASO); Aviation Safety Officer (ASO);

Base Aviation Safety Officer (BASO).

5

A frag drop is the term used todescribe the strategic tasking from

the commander, which forms the

basis for further mission planning and

tactics to achieve the commanders

intent.

6 Stephen Covey is co-founder and

CEO of CoveyLink and keynote

speaker, author and advisor on

trust, leadership, ethics and high

performance.

7 Covey, M 2006, The Speed of

Trust: The One Thing That Changes

Everything, Free Press, New York.8 Stephen Covey cites some research

within his book that found only 51

per cent of employees have trust and

confidence in senior management,

only 36 per cent of employees

believe their leaders act with honesty

and integrity, and over the past 12

months 76 per cent of employees

have observed illegal or unethical

conduct on the job conduct which,

if exposed, would seriously violate

public trust.9 Strategic Reform Program.

and to apply initiative and commonsensefor improved system efficiency.

As I watched a trainee FCI wage asimulated WW3, it crossed my mind thatwe may not have the trust balance quiteright. We trust this trainee to lead millionsof dollars of capability into a simulated warand when this same person moves into a

commanding-officer role we must ensurewe afford them the trust necessary tomanage all aspects of their squadron asthey transition into the senior leadershipand management phase of their militarycareer.

All jobs have their highs and lows butsometimes our recollection of the brightspots we once found can become a littletarnished through time and repetition. Itis worthwhile getting back into the fieldto observe some other bright spots. It ismotivating and refreshes our operational

understanding of what is expected fromfront-line people and how we can bettersupport their needs.

A personal thanks to 2OCU staff,trainees and the extended Aces Northteam for highlighting the practical benefitsof trust and the opportunity to experiencea bright spot in the ADF. Particular thanksto SQNLDR Andrew (Jacko) Jackson,who ran one of the most successfulFCI courses to date. And a final word ofcaution regarding fatigue management:be aware of the Friday-night card game,that is, a quiet night on base intended toimprove fatigue as anything that involvescompetition can finish far later thanoriginally planned.

References


18/32


By LCDR Al Byrne

Several months after thepromulgation of amendment

2 (AL2) to the aircrafts Flight

Reference Cards(FRCs) a squadron

aircrew member was incorporating a

subsequent amendment and discovere

the final pages (pages 23/24) of the

emergencies reference section were

missing from his checklist.

When he approached the

base technical library and sourcedappropriate replacement pages, he

was told library staff that three other

squadron aircrew had reported similar

discrepencies. This news prompted

squadron command staff to direct all

squadron aircrew operating the aircra

type to conduct an immediate full pag

by-page muster of their publications.

A further two (for a total of six) set

of FRCs exhibited the same discrepenc

while about 15 were correctly amende

Notably, the six offending sets of FRCs

were held by a broad cross-section ofunit aircrew, ranging from quite junior

aircrew to very senior. All six aircrew

had, on incorporation of AL2, signed o

as having incorporated the amendmen

and subsequently page checked the

publication in accordance with its list o

effective pages (LEP). The LEP supplie

with the amendment correctly listed

the full 24 pages of the emergencies

section.

DDAAFS comment

How did six trained aircrew (ofwidely varying experience) manage

to somehow lose the same page from

their FRCs? The units investigation

revealed that AL2s incorporation

instructions had called for the remova

and replacement of pages 1-22 of the

24-page emergencies section, with

pages 23/24 remaining effective at the

previous amendment status.

While it could not be positively

determined, it is likely that each

Photo by ABPH Evan Murphy

Say amend to that


19/32


member simply removed and destroyed

24 old pages and replaced them with

22 new pages. The control designed

into the amendment process to ensure

recovery from such errors is the

required subsequent page-by-page

muster of the publication. Its clear that

this control was ineffective.

This example lends itself to

consideration of contemporary error-management theory1, which lists three

tools or techniques to help individuals

ensure that they do not similarly slip:

D Detail

Attention to detail. Over time,

shortcuts, personal techniques and

an attitude of good enough erodes

our attention to detail. Eventually,

experience becomes our enemy. Fight

it by practicing precision in ALL routine

operations.

D Diligence

Every time, all the time. Diligence

is the detail work done with care and

concentration each and every time,

all the way until the last step is done,

the last parts stop moving, and the

handover, debrief and paperwork

are completed. Practice procedural

perfection and it WILL become second

nature.

D Discipline

Resist temptations to deviate. When

we ask someone to do the right thing,

this is an issue of professional ethics.

Without the discipline to resist the

temptation to deviate, a single act of

non-compliance can instantly remove

margins of safety provided by policies,

procedures and technical guidance.

If you have allowed yourself to fall

into a casual habit of non-compliance,

application of this 3D approach will

help re-establish the habits of a real

professional.

1Convergent Performance, LLC 2011

Photo by ABIS Andrew Dakin

This example lends

itself to consideration

of contemporary error

management theory1,

which lists three tools

or techniques to help

individuals ensure

that they do not

similarly slip.


20/32


Capital turbulence

In early 2010 a Grumman Travellerwas preparing to land in the national

capital following a short flight from

Temora in NSW. Runway 35 was in use

at the time with the wind at 20 degrees

magnetic at 10 knots and a temperature

of 30 C.

As there were other aircraft ahead

of the Traveller and air traffic control

considered Runway 12 to be useable,

this option was offered to the pilot. Thepilot considered Runway 12 suitable as

the crosswind was within his aircrafts

operating limitations.

The pilot reported that at about

4.30 pm just past the threshold

markings on approach to Runway 12 and

at an altitude of 150 feet above ground

level (AGL), the aircraft encountered

severe turbulence that resulted in an

uncommanded roll to the right of about

60 degrees from the horizontal. The

pilot quickly used full-left aileron to

restore control before landing slightly

past the marked touchdown zone.

Meteorological information

On the day of the incident, the

conditions at the airfield were suitable

for visual flight and the Automatic

Terminal Information Service (ATIS)

juliet was current for the arrival and

accessed by the pilot. There was

no indication in ATIS of turbulenceaffecting the airfield at that time,

including that resulting from thermal

activity relating to the ambient

temperature. ATIS kilo was reported

15 minutes later with no change to the

wind conditions or duty runway.

The Bureau of Meteorology (BoM)

Manual of Aviation Meteorology(second

edition) states that any obstruction

to the wind flow at the time, including

buildings and trees would produce

disturbed air, manifested as wind shea

and mechanical turbulence.

An examination of the conditions

during the occurrence and the possibl

effect on the aircrafts approach and

landing was request by the ATSB. In its

report, the BoM advised that barriers t

wind flow have the potential to induce

downstream turbulent conditions that

can be particularly hazardous to low-

flying aircraft.Turbulence induces in-flight

bumpiness without necessarily

influencing an aircrafts flight path

significantly, unless of extreme intensit

The intensity of any turbulence is

specified by the BoM according to the

perceived effect on the aircraft and

occupants and is classified as being

light, moderate, severe or extreme.

While light-to-moderate turbulence

may make a flight uncomfortable,

The effect of obstructions on wind flow and aviation operation


21/32


severe turbulence could cause an

aircraft to roll and pitch violently and

may lead to a loss of control.

The combination of surface wind

and obstacles to the wind flow that

are situated upwind of an approach or

departure path, such as large buildings,

low hills or close-planted stands of

tall trees can create localised areas

of low-level wind shear. The effect of

those upwind obstacles on the wind

flow depends on several factors, the

most important being wind speed and

orientation relative to the obstacle and

the size of the obstacle in relation to the

runway dimensions.

The most commonly encountered

wind shear and turbulence of this type,

particularly at smaller airfields, is that

caused by buildings in the vicinity of

a runway. The height of any buildingsis regulated in proportion to their

distance from the edge of the relevant

runway strip to ensure that they do

not constitute an obstacle to aircraft

during takeoff and landing.The lateral

dimensions of aerodrome buildings

tends to be large and, for commercial

and other reasons, the buildings may be

grouped together in the same area. This

means that while aerodrome buildings

(including commercial buildings,

passenger terminals, hangars and multi-storey car parks) are of comparatively

low height, they present a wide and solid

barrier to the surface wind flow.

In such circumstances, the wind

flow is diverted around and over the

buildings causing the surface wind

to vary along the runway. Horizontal

wind shear, which is normally localised,

shallow and turbulent, is of particular

concern to light aircraft but has also

been known to affect larger aircraft.

In the case of low-flying aircraft, any

significant eddies and gusts experiencedduring takeoff and landing may place

the aircraft in a dangerous and possibly

irrecoverable position.

In its report into the conditions that

affected the aircrafts arrival, the BoM

estimated that for smaller impermeable

barriers such as trees and buildings,

turbulence is estimated to occur up to

twice the height of the barrier vertically

and an equivalent distance downwind of

up to 15 times the height of the barrier.

Note: Information in this article has been

sourced fromATSB Transport Safety Report

AO-2010-008 Turbulence Event Canberra

Aerodrome, ACT 31 January 2010 VH-ERP

Grumman Traveller AA-5.

Unexpected low-level windshear

constitutes a significant hazardto aircraft during takeoff and

landing. It is identified as a change in

wind speed and/or direction over a

relatively short distance. These changes

occur with height (vertical windshear) or

lateral distance (horizontal windshear).

The conditions cause changes in

airspeed and flight path with occasional

disastrous consequences.

Meteorological conditions

Hazardous low-level windshear canbe associated with a wide variety of

meteorological phenomena, including

mountain lee waves and eddies,

nocturnal, boundary-layer jetstreams,

sea breezes and cold frontal systems,

thunderstorms and other precipitating

convective storm systems and large

amplitude solitary wave disturbances.

Meteorological conditions

commonly associated with windshear

conditions include terrain-induced

downdrafts at Nowra, Perth and Pearce

and thunderstorm situations at Sydney

and Brisbane.

For aircraft at low level on approach

to land, safety margins in height, speed

and time are relatively small. If the

wind change is rapid enough to exceed

the aircrafts acceleration capacity and

is large enough to match its airspeed

margin over the minimum approach

speed for the given configuration, then

a potential hazard exists.For an aircraft making a stable

approach on the required glidepath,

if a rapid reduction in headwind is

encountered then the initial effects are

those of a rapid reduction of airspeed

and a deviation below glide path,

resulting in an undershot effect. This

requires a power increase to regain

airspeed and return to glidepath.

However, once restabilised with the

reduced wind magnitude, the power

setting will be less that originally used

before the windshear encounter.

An aircraft taking off into the same

wind structure will experience a rapid

increase in airspeed and increased

climb performance with deviation above

the expected climb path. Conversely, if

an aircraft on approach encounters a

rapid increase in headwind, the initial

effects are a rapid increase in airspeed

and deviation above glidepath that is,

an overshoot effect.

A secondary hazard can arise if

the aircraft has a high rate of descent,

reduced power and decaying airspeed

while close to the ground. In addition to

changes of wind flow in the horizontal

plane, vertical wind flow causes

windshear. Downdrafts caused by

lee-side eddies and thunderstorms are

examples of this effect.

Wind shear

While light-to-moderate

turbulence may make

a flight uncomfortable,

severe turbulence

could cause an aircraftto roll and pitch

violently and may lead

to a loss of control.


22/32


By Ed Brotak

Accurate weather forecastsare crucial to the aviationindustry. The greatest concern

is, of course, the safety of flight crews,

passengers and the aircraft they are in

The economic implications are also

enormous. Knowing weather conditionat the departure and arrival locations

and along the flight route is critical

to an industry in which, literally, time

is money. From the meteorological

point of view, the needs of the aviation

community have often driven advance

in weather forecasting for everybody.

Aviation interests are mainly

concerned with forecasts for the next

day or so, the realm of the terminal

aerodrome forecasts (TAFs). In terms o

standard forecasting, this is considere

a short-range forecast. Also, there are

more weather elements of concern

to pilots than those in the forecasts

produced for the general population.

A standard public forecast includes sky

condition, precipitation, temperatures,

and wind. TAFs include wind and

precipitation forecasts, but also visibilit

and specific cloud and/or ceiling

heights, and they have much greater

detail.

Overall, aviation weather forecasts

are very accurate. The most recentstatistics for the United States show

that critical instrument flight rules (IFR

conditions are correctly forecast 64 pe

cent of the time, with a false alarm rat

of 36 per cent.

But the old meteorologists adage

is: The forecasts you miss are the one

they remember.

To understand why some forecasts

are incorrect, we must examine how

weather forecasts are made.

Why good forecasts

go badEvery now and then even the best toolsresult in little more than a guess

Photo by SGT Daniel Cividin


23/32


To forecast tomorrows weather, we

must know the state of the atmosphere

now. The better we can depict the

current weather, the more accurate the

forecast will be. Surface observations of

temperature, humidity, winds, pressure,

current weather, et cetera, are taken

at thousands of stations around the

world. Some observations are done by

automated sensors, others are done by

people. Surface aviation observations

meteorological terminal aviation routine

weather reports (METARs) are taken

at least every hour and more frequently

in the form of special reports (SPECIs)

if dictated by adverse or changing

weather conditions. The official

meteorological surface observations are

taken every three hours at designated

government stations.

Upper-level observations are

done twice-a-day from far fewer sites.

Balloon-borne instrument packs, or

radiosondes, send back information

about temperature, humidity andpressure at different heights in the

atmosphere. In addition, tracking of

the radiosondes provides data on wind

direction and speed at various levels.

Data from weather radar have been

available since the 1950s. The first

weather satellite was launched in 1960.

Today we have many weather satellites

providing an abundance of data,

especially at upper levels and in remote

regions of the world.

The forecast tools or methods used

by meteorologists vary with the time

period being forecast. With forecasts

going out to six hours in the future, the

time period critical for many aviation

purposes, meteorologists rely heavily on

current observational data derived from

official site observations, satellites and,

when precipitation is involved, radar.

If there is little weather system

movement, a simple persistence

forecast may suffice. If a terminal issocked in with fog, most likely that

location will have fog in the next hour,

too. Often, when weather systems are

moving, continuity forecasts indicate

when clouds and/or precipitation will

move into or out of an area. Clouds are

tracked by satellite to determine speed

and direction of movement.

Weather radar can provide the same

information for precipitation. A simple

continuity forecast just assumes the

clouds or precipitation will continue

to move at the same speed and in thesame direction.

The most difficult situation for

forecasting clouds and/or precipitation

via the continuity method is one in

which clouds or precipitation form at

a location rather than being advected

that is, being transported by the

wind. Although not the norm, this does

happen, particularly where there are

orographic effects, or air flow disturbed

by topographic features.

For forecasts beyond six hours,

meteorologists rely heavily on

numerical and statistical models.

Numerical weather prediction has been

viable since 1960. Prior to that, weather

forecasting was more seat of the

pants, with meteorologists collecting as

much data about the current situation

as possible and making forecasts using

their own experience, knowledge and

intuition.

Meteorologists theorised that

the atmosphere must obey the basiclaws of physics. By stating these laws

as mathematical equations, real

observations from the atmosphere

could be used to generate a

mathematical model of the atmosphere.

By using time derivatives, the equations

could be solved for future times, thus

giving weather forecasts.

However, the inability to do all

the calculations required, especially

in a timely manner, made numerical

Knowing weather

conditions at the

departure and arrival

locations and along the

flight route is critical

to an industry in which,

literally, time is money.


24/32


weather prediction just a dream

until the development of computers

beginning in the 1940s. These ultimate

number crunchers were exactly what

were needed to make the dream a

reality. By 1960, some computer-

generated forecasts became superiorto anything that could be done by

hand. In time, numerical weather

prediction would become the norm,

with the meteorologists role relegated

to tweaking the computer guidance

to allow for variations that could not be

incorporated in the models.

Even though the numerical models

improved with time, they were still

limited in what weather elements they

could actually forecast. They were very

good at producing a picture of what

various layers of the atmosphere wouldlook like in the future, but they werent

designed to predict the parameters,

especially at the surface, that both

the general public and the aviation

community needed elements like

temperature, chances of precipitation

and visibility. Realising these model

shortcomings, meteorologists turned to

statistics.

By using regression analysis

establishing a relationship between

variables to allow the prediction of

one variable based on changes in the

other meteorologists could now relate

elements not predicted by the models

to ones that were.

For example, numerical models do

not predict the chance of rain or snow,the probability of precipitation (PoP).

But the models do forecast the amounts

of moisture at the standard cloud-level

of 10,000 ft. One can then statistically

relate the amount of moisture at this

level to the occurrence in the past of

precipitation at the surface. In that

way, computer-generated forecasts of

cloud level moisture could be used to

forecast the PoP. Statistical relationships

can be made with any variable as long

as there is a physical cause and effect.

In other words, computers could nowforecast anything. These forecasts were

called MOS model output statistics

developed in the late 1970s and a staple

of todays weather forecasts.

In simple terms, MOS is just a

memory system. The computer

remembers past weather situations.

It is an analog forecaster it relates a

situation it sees now to situations it has

seen in the past. It assumes a similar

situation will produce similar sensible

weather. Interestingly, many intuitive

meteorologists do the same thing in

making a forecast. They may not even

realise that they are subconsciously

remembering past analog situations

while making the current forecast.

But, like any statistical forecastingscheme, MOS has its limitations.

The forecast is only as good as the

relationship between the predicted

element and the predictor. There are n

perfect relationships in meteorology, n

correlation coefficients of 1.

For example, a particular moisture

value at 10,000 ft doesnt always

correspond with the same PoP. There

are a range of values possible, with

the distribution of possible variables

usually being normal that is, followin

the classic bell-shaped curve. In our

example, the forecast PoP produced

by MOS is the most likely outcome,

but there are no guarantees. Like any

statistical technique, the more origina

data you have to make the relationshi

the better the forecast.

There are a variety of potential

error sources for MOS forecasts. If

the numerical model that creates the

basic forecast is incorrect, then the

MOS it produces will also be inaccurate

Unusual or rare weather events willnot be forecast well since there are

very few analog situations to establish

the statistical relationships. In reality,

the relationship between two variables

can change depending on the time of

year. The statistical equations used are

modified several times a year, but not

often enough to catch all the changes

Overall, there are a few basic thing

that can be said about weather foreca

accuracy. In general, short-range

forecasts are more than 90 per cent

accurate. It is easier to forecast good

weather than bad weather. Fortunately

for most locations, fair weather

visual flight rules conditions is more

common. High-pressure areas which

usually bring fair weather tend to be

larger and are handled well by the

numerical models. Situations which

bring clouds and precipitation tend to

be dominated by smaller-scale weathe

features which are difficult for the

computer models to predict.


25/32


There are a number of other

reasons why weather forecasts can go

wrong. As stated before, to forecast

the future weather, we must know

the current state of the atmosphere.

Anything we miss can come up and bite

us later. Only North America and Europehave enough weather-reporting stations

to give an accurate depiction of current

weather. Much of the less-developed

regions of the world and the vast ocean

areas are underreported.

One of the original problems with

numerical weather forecasting remains

today: the time constraint. Forecasts

still have to be produced in a timely

fashion. Compromises have to be made

in the numerical models so they can be

run quickly by the computer. Whether

its in the size of the region covered,the span of the time steps used in the

calculations or changes in the basic

physics of the model itself, any and all of

these can influence forecast accuracy.

Some of the problems with weather

forecasts stem from the fact that,

frankly, we dont fully understand

everything that goes on in the

atmosphere. There is a wide variety

of factors that influence the weather.

Taken individually, most of these are

straightforward cause and effect. But,

in the real world, a wide variety offorces are in play at the same time. It is

difficult and sometimes impossible to

judge which factors will be dominant,

or which factors will cancel each other

out. Added to this are the myriad of

interactions possible. This is not like

performing experiments in a lab under

controlled conditions. The atmosphere

is our lab, and anything goes.

And for weather forecasting, as

well as most other things, we have to

allow for the implications of unforeseen

events. This is captured in the chaos

theory. In the early 1960s, pioneering

meteorologist Edward Lorenz applied

the chaos theory to weather. Poetically,

he described how a butterfly flapping

its wings could set up air currentsthat, under the right conditions, could

alter the weather many miles away.

And, as we all know, you cant forecast

butterflies.

Aviation forecasts are inherently

more difficult to prepare than standard

public forecasts. They have to be much

more precise. In terms of time periods,

standard forecasts for the public work

in 12-hour increments with general

references to events. Increasing

cloudiness during the day with a chance

of rain by the afternoon would be atypical forecast. Aviation forecasts often

need to be broken down by the hour

when conditions warrant. And pilots

need to know about specific cloud

heights and visibilities, elements which

are, by nature, very difficult to forecast.

Also, public forecasts cover a wide area.

TAFs are for particular sites.

Dan Miller and Jonathan Lamb, two

of my former students, have years of

experience as meteorologists, much of

Some of the problems

with weather forecasts

stem from the fact

that, frankly, we dontfully understand

everything that goes

on in the atmosphere.

There is a wide

variety of factors that

influence the weather.

Photo by CPL Andrew Eddie


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it as aviation forecasters, with the U.S.

National Weather Service. They break

down the standard aviation forecast

into three time periods. For the first six

hours, persistence and continuity are

the main forecast tools.

Regarding the six-hour forecast,

Lamb said, Sometimes the best

forecast tool is to put the [computers]

distance/speed tracker on the leading

edge of clouds or an area of rain. Miller

said, We concentrate most of our

effort in the short term when it matters

the most and when confidence can be

higher.

For forecasts of weather 12 to 36

hours in the future, numerical guidance

is routinely used. Here, the forecasterslocal knowledge and skill can improve

upon the raw computer-generated

forecast. However, both Miller and

Lamb noted that the intermediate time

frame, 6 to 12 hours, can be challenging

to forecast. Its too far out to rely on

persistence or continuity, and the

standard mathematical models arent

designed for this either.

In weather and forecasting, time

and size are related. Near-term weather

conditions are dominated by smaller-

scale weather systems. These are not

handled well by the standard models.

The models were designed for larger-

scale systems, those measured inhundreds of miles. But Lamb says help

may be on the way for forecasters in

the United States.

After a number of years of trial and

refinement, the high resolution rapid

refresh (HRRR) model will become

fully operational later this year. With an

interior grid of 3 km (2 mi) length and a

one-hour update cycle, the HRRR should

provide numerical guidance that has

been lacking for the intermediate time

frame so critical for aviation.

The way forecast material is

presented is also changing. Rather than

standard text, more of the forecast

information is now displayed graphically.

This trend will likely continue.

Lamb and Miller say that one of

their greatest challenges in aviation

forecasting is dealing with summer

thunderstorms. It was common for

us to predominately [forecast] TSRA

(thunderstorms with rain), or include

it in tempo groups [forecasts of

temporary or possible events] for long

periods of time in the late afternoon

and evening in the warm season whenwe were expecting scattered diurnal

pulse thunderstorms, Miller said.

It turned out we were way over-

forecasting the occurrence of TSRA at

the airports.

At Lambs office, the aviation

industry made its feelings clear. Weve

heard over and over again that we

should not blanket TSRA in TAFs

unless confidence is high, because

it requires fuel for alternates and

gets very expensive for the airlines.Lamb said that, now, we dont include

thunderstorms in the TAF until [1200

universal co-ordinated time (UTC)] at

the earliest and usually with the [1800

UTC] issuance when we see where stu

is developing and where the cumulus

field is better developed. But on the

downside, he said, Since thunderstorm

have such a high impact on aviation

users, it stinks not being able to give

much of a heads-up.

Its similar at Millers office: Now,

we mention [thunderstorms] and

[cumulonimbus] sparingly, especially

in the later time periods. We include

it when we have high confidence of it

actually affecting the TAF sites, typica

in the near term.

Both Lamb and Miller agree that loc

knowledge and experience are critical

attributes of a good aviation forecaster.

As for the problems, Miller sums it up th

way: Aviation forecasting tends to be

quite difficult and tricky, and can be quit

frustrating at times. There is still much

room for improvement. Or, as Lamb pu

it: Just this morning, I was pulling my ha

out when doing the aviation forecast.

About the author:Edward Brotak,

Ph.D., retired in 2007 after 25 years a

a professor and program director in th

Department of Atmospheric Sciences

at the University of North Carolina,

Asheville.

Article courtesy ofAeroSafety World.


27/32


By SQNLDR Kate Thorne

I

n recent years, aviation accidents havebecome less common. Because of this,

we have become increasingly relianton learning from near misses in order

to maintain continuous improvement.However, even near misses do not

occur at a high frequency so we must

focus on information gathered fromoccurrences where there was a potential

for airworthiness to be degraded or therewas some minor degradation.

This is where safety analysis comesinto the picture, we use informationgained from previous occurrences tosearch for trends and hopefully prevent

the issues or holes in the defencesbecoming so large that an accidentoccurs.

Defences aviation safetymanagement system has been

continually improving from a point

where we were focussing on personnel

reporting occurrences to now, where

we are trying to get incidents accuratelyreported and recorded and fully

analysed in order to conduct safety-

analysis activities.

The areas of the incidents that

are most useful for trend analysis are

contributing factors and defences.

Contributing factors allow us to

understand where the safety culture

is heading, whether the organisation

has faults and where training may be

lacking. Looking at defences shows

us what is working and what is not.

Both of these trending tools enable usto strengthen arguments for further

funding to provide better personal

protective equipment, more personnel,

and better processes.

So where do you fit in? Everyone

within units, wings and FEGs have a role

in safety analysis. Reports come out of

the units, through the wings and FEGSto DDAAFS. If occurrences are being

recorded poorly then good analysis

is next-to-impossible, this can be

summed up by the old adage garbage

in garbage out. Thus, all Defence

personnel who have an interface to

aviation are key to ensuring quality

reports are entered into the reporting

system so that better analysis can be

carried out.

For more information and help on

entering quality reports please use the

DASM or contact your ASO-trainedpersonnel for help. DDAAFS provides

investigation and reporting support

through the DAHRTS helpdesk and your

DDAAFS desk officer.

Safety analysis why do we do it?

By FSGT Grant Wadley

The Defence Aviation HazardReporting and Tracking System(DAHRTS) is the ADF safety

database for all things aviation. The

system has been in place since 2004

and is still expanding its user groups.

During the past 18 months, the

Parachute Training School and multiple

contractors have begun using the system

and have seen the benefits of tracking

safety incidents through to completion. To

assist aviation safety officers (ASOs) with

managing Aviation Safety Occurrence

Reports (ASORs) at the unit, there are two

reports that provide great benefit.

Notification report

This report is linked directly to the

users DAHRTS profile, so there are no

selections required when using this

report. If you are a member of 3SQN

and select this report it will return all

ASORs that require input/processing by

personnel in 3SQN.

The report shows the followinginformation:

reference number,

date of hazard,

title of report,

personnel drafter/investigator and

supervisor/CO/OC, and

workow investigation status.

This report also gives visual

indications as to whether the ASOR has

met the seven-day release (red star)

or 21-day investigation (two blue stars)

time frames.

This report is always valuable, but

provides great benefit if run weekly and

compared to the last report.

Release via DISCON

This allows users to select any

unit and check how well the reports

have been processed over a specific

time period. When using the summary

report the following information is

shown:

reference number, date of hazard,

title of report,

aircraft,

status,

release dates of the report and if

the seven- and 21-day requirement

were achieved, and

personnel involved with the report,

that is, drafter/investigator/

supervisor/CO/OC/HTA investigator.

At the end of this report there is apercentage value showing how many

reports did not meet the seven- and 21-

day requirements.

This report is most effective over a

one- to four-month period.

By using both of these reports,

ASOs can monitor report progress and

health of the local safety process. These

reports may also identify areas within

the unit that require additional safety

training.

Managing DAHRTS at your unit


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GOODSHOWAWARDS

FLTLT Scott Hyland, ADF BFTS Tamworth

FLTLT Scott Hyland(left) is presentedwith a Good ShowAward by CO ADFBFTS WGCDRDennis Tan.

LSATV Luke Carter, HMAS Melbourne

While deployed on HMAS Melbournefor Operation SLIPPER(rotation 24) LSATV Luke Carter displayed an exceptionallevel of aviation safety awareness and vigilance in excess of

that expected for a person of his rank and experience.

LSATV Carter proactively identified several hazards and

implemented steps to prevent their impact on his colleagues. He

recognised the high levels of noise present in aviation workspacesand took action improve the working conditions of his maintenance

team in extreme temperature conditions. LSATV Carters initiatives

led to smarter work practices and the acquisition of fans and an air

conditioner, more suitable clothing, and personal cooling vests. His

high level of diligence with respect to FOD and RADHAZ onboard has

established a high standard within the rest of Flight 3 personnel.

The vigilance LSATV Carter displayed is commended and a credit

to the maintenance standards of both Flight 3 HMAS Melbourneand

the Fleet Air Arm. He can be justifiably proud of your contribution to

aviation safety in the Royal Australian Navy.LSATV Luke Carter receives a Good Show Awardfrom CMDR Shane Craig, CO 816 Squadron.

FLTLT Scott Hyland was awardedan aviation safety Good ShowAward for his dedicated and

enthusiastic work as one of the

assistant aviation safety officers at

the Australian Defence Force Basic

Flying Training School (ADF BFTS) in

Tamworth.

The highest standards of aviation

safety are paramount at ADF BFTS

because this is the point at which pilotsfrom the Navy, Army and Air Force are

first introduced to military aviation.

Because of nature of the BFTS operation

the work of the ASOs is pa

Spotlight Safety Magazine RAAF

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