Spoilers in the Somali Peace Process

Since the 1997 publication by Stedman of his article on spoilers, the importance of identifying and dealing with potential spoilers in a peace process has been recognised as fundamental to building peace agreements less vulnerable to collapse. Below, I will apply the accumulated insights that the spoiler literature has provided to the specific situation of Somalia, particularly during the period following the creation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) since 2004, although I will consider other examples, such as from the 2000-2003 Transitional National Government (TNG) period where appropriate. First I will make some general points with regard to Somalia that should be kept in mind when considering the role of spoilers in the peace process. Next I will discuss the position, type and locus of spoilers in Somalia. I will then consider reasons for the existence of spoilers in Somalia, particularly with reference to the political economy of war theory, and the respective roles of greed and grievances. I conclude that economic incentives and risk-aversion on behalf of Somali elites have been the most important contributing factor leading to spoiler activity in the Somali peace process that has led the failure to produce a long-lasting and credible central government in Somalia in recent years.

General PointsOne of the notable dynamics of state collapse in Somalia is the conflation of peace-building and state-building. The conflation of these two different, although not mutually exclusive, attempts has tended to obscure distinctions between different types of spoilers in Somalia[footnoteRef:1]. Moreover, there has been a failure of the international community to recognise that Somalia has never been a fully functioning state in the Weberian sense. Even during military rule, the authority of the central government has never extended to the whole of the country. Thus, the attempt to create a central government in Somalia must be tempered by the fact that Somalia has never been a nation-state in the Western sense of the word[footnoteRef:2]. Third, the state that did exist previous to the collapse of the military state was predatory. This has left Somalis with an inherent distrust of centralised forms of government (although attempts to establish regional or clan-based governance have met with less opposition)[footnoteRef:3]. Finally, the gradual erosion of the power of warlords throughout the 1995-2006 period has made them far less capable of spoiling the peace process than previously[footnoteRef:4]. This is salient because it is warlords who often have the greatest financial incentive to prolong war in order to receive rents from unofficial taxation, food aid, and plunder. [1: Ken Menkhaus, Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping, International Security, Vol. 31, No. 3, Winter 2006/07, p. 76.] [2: Ibid. p. 80.] [3: Seth Kaplan, Rethinking State-building in a Failed State, The Washington Quarterly, January 2010, p. 83.] [4: Ken Menkhaus, Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping, p. 88.]

SpoilersSpoilers are individual actors or groups that act to undermine a peace process. In his seminal work on spoilers, Stedman notes that peace creates spoilers because it is rare in civil wars for all leaders and factions to see peace as beneficial[footnoteRef:5]. Thus, those who may fail to benefit from peace will attempt to sabotage the process. [5: Stephen John Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2, Fall 1997, p. 7.]

Stedman discusses three dimensions of spoilers relevant to the Somali conflict: position; type; and locus[footnoteRef:6]. I will consider each of these in turn below. However, Stedman limits his definition of spoilers to encompass internal actors only. I on the other hand, following Menkhaus[footnoteRef:7], I will widen the scope of potential spoilers to include both internal (domestic) and external (international) spoilers, the latter being made up mostly of foreign salafi groups[footnoteRef:8] and nation-states opposed to the re-creation of a central state in Somalia. [6: Stephen John Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, p. 8-12.] [7: Ken Menkhaus, Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping, p. 77.] [8: For a discussion of the role of foreign groups see Ted Dagne, Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace, Congressional Research Service, December 16, 2010, p. 6-7; and International Crisis Group, Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State, Africa Report N147, 23 December, 2008, p. 14-16.]

Position of Spoilers in SomaliaStedman considers two types of spoilers in this regard, those that are within the peace process (internal spoilers) and those that are outside it (external spoilers). Both have played a significant role in the enduring failure to secure a long-lasting and effective agreement. In the case of Somalia, due to the multitude of factions, clans and sub-clans, tribal and religious leaders, and members of the criminal or business communities, numerous potential spoilers remain outside the peace process. Moreover, in some instances, the international community has attempted to sideline certain groups, most notably ash-Shabaab, from the process, meaning that these groups interests are unlikely to be met from a process they have been excluded from. Thus, it makes sense for these groups to sabotage the peace process[footnoteRef:9]. [9: It is possible that this strategy is rational on behalf of the international community if it identifies ash-Shabaab as a total spoiler (discussed below) whose interests cannot be incorporated into the peace process. However, whether this is the case requires a correct appraisal of whether ash-Shabaab is a total or limited spoiler. So far the international community has apparently failed to take into account various elements within the movement, relying too heavily on only the public statements of certain spokespersons, and foreigners, and without taking into account the fact that ash-Shabaabs support among the local population from which it recruits is based not on its salafist ideology or links to foreign terrorist groups, but rather its ability to provide a modicum of security in those areas under its control, and its important role in resisting the Ethiopian incursion. ]

Internal spoilers consist of individuals such as former President Abdullahi Yusuf, who continually undermined the Djibouti peace process between the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia-Djibouti faction (ARS-Djibouti) and the TFG, which he believed was a strategy to undermine him[footnoteRef:10]. Hassan Dahir Aweys has also been a consistent individual spoiler, both within and outside the peace process, creating or participating in various groups that have undermined the peace process, such as Union of Islamic Courts (ICU)[footnoteRef:11], Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia-Asmara faction (ARS-Asmara), Xisbul Islam, and Ash-Shabaab[footnoteRef:12]. Internal spoilers have also included some clans and minority groups, such as Rahanwayn clan, the Lelkase (Darood sub-clan), and the low-caste lineages and jereer, the latter being mostly Bantu-speaking groups[footnoteRef:13]. These groups have even greater reason to fear that a central government will be dominated by other groups, and will not protect them from predatory, numerically-superior rival clans. These groups tend to support strong regional governments, rather than a centralised state. [10: International Crisis Group, Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State, p. i, 4-5.] [11: Now known as the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC).] [12: Ted Dagne, Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace, p. 8. It is unclear whether Aweys created Ash-Shabaab, a movement he is now at odds with. It would seem he unintentionally initiated the group that would grow to become independent under the leadership of his protg Aadan Hashi Ayro. For a discussion see Roland Marchal, A tentative assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab, Journal of Eastern African Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3, November 2009, p. 388-390; International Crisis Group, Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State, p. 11; Ted Dagne, Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace, p. 4-6; David H. Shinn, Somalias New Government and the Challenge of Al-Shabab, CTC Sentinel, Combating Terrorism Centre, West Point, Vol. 2, Issue 3, March 2009, p. 2-3; Evan F. Kohlmann, Shabaab Al-Mujahideen: Migration and Jihad in the Horn of Africa, NEFA Association, May 2009, p. 15-27. ] [13: Afyare Abdi Elmi, & Abdullahi Barise, The Somali Conflict: Root causes, obstacles, and peace-building strategies, p. 34; Ken Menkhaus, Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping, p. 84-85.]

External spoilers consist mostly of groups, states or individuals that have not been incorporated into the peace process. Groups include ARS-Asmara, Xisbul Islam, and ash-Shabaab. These groups are generally considered to be too extreme to bring into the peace process. The most important states include Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the U.S. Ethiopia has been the most proactive external spoiler, providing both shelter and arms to Somali spoiler groups[footnoteRef:14], and by attempting to undermine the peace accords in Cairo 1997, and again in Arta 2000. It has pursued an ambivalent policy towards Somalia by both attempting to ensure it remains weak and divided, and thus not a military threat particularly to its ethnically Somali Ogaden region, whilst trying to stop Somalia becoming a sanctuary for irredentist (such as the Ogaden National Liberation Front) and Islamic extremist groups[footnoteRef:15]. Following its invasion of Somalia in December 2006, it has backed the TFG with both weapons and training, as well as in combat. As a result of the invasion, Eritrea has increased its support for domestic groups opposing Ethiopia[footnoteRef:16]. It has also encouraged more hardline elements of certain groups to spoil any agreements that might unite Somali faction to the TFG, as it did in backing the ARS-Asmara to break away from the ARS and boycott the Djibouti peace accords[footnoteRef:17]. Finally, the US has been a somewhat reluctant spoiler. Due to fears of terrorism, it has backed Ethiopian forces in Somalia, and used drone attacks and Special Forces to target jihadi groups, and those with links to al-Qaida, particularly ash-Shabaab[footnoteRef:18]. However, US intelligence has repeatedly failed to distinguish between more moderate Islamic elements and extremists[footnoteRef:19]. This occurred both with respect to the ICU[footnoteRef:20], and with the salafi verses anti-Ethiopian elements within ash-Shabaab, the former being composed mostly of the leadership who support international jihad, as opposed to the latter who comprise the bulk of the fighters in its battles against Ethiopian forces[footnoteRef:21]. [14: Ethiopia has in the past provided support for Somali National Alliance (also known as the Sodere Group, and controlled by Ali Mahdi Mohamed), Somali Salvation Alliance (chaired at the time by Hussein Mohamed Aydiid), Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) in Baidoa, the Somali National Front in Gedo, and the United Somali Congress in Mogadishu and Hiraan, as well as supporting then Col. Abdullahi Yusuf and Gen. Aadan Abdullahi Nur. See Afyare Abdi Elmi, & Abdullahi Barise, The Somali Conflict: Root causes, obstacles, and peace-building strategies, p. 39-43; International Crisis Group, Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State, p. 25-26.] [15: Ted Dagne, Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace, p. 27. ] [16: For instance, the Oromo Liberation Front and the ONLF. It has also reportedly provided shipments of weaponry, including surface-to-air missiles to the SCIC. Ken Menkhaus, Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping, p. 89.] [17: International Crisis Group, Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State, p. 25-26. For a discussion of Eritreas support for ash-Shabaab see MAJ Vincent G. Heinz, Eritrea and Al-Shabaab: Realpolitik on the Horn of Africa, Small Wars Journal, August 29, 2010. ] [18: For a discussion of the rather limited links between al-Qaida and ash-Shabaab see Leah Farrall, How Al-Qaeda works, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, no. 2, March/April 2011, p. 136-137.] [19: Roland Marchal, Warlordism and terrorism: How to obscure an already confusing crisis? The case of Somalia, International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 6, 2007, p. 1102-1104.] [20: Ted Dagne, Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace, p. 18-21.] [21: Ibid. p. 5. ]

Type of Spoilers Menkhaus has defined three types of spoilers specific to the Somali conflict. These are situational, intrinsic, and risk-averse. These broadly correspond to Stedmans three categories greedy, total, and limited spoilers, respectively[footnoteRef:22]. [22: Stephen John Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, p. 10.]

Situational (or greedy[footnoteRef:23]) spoilers hold goals that expand or contract based on calculations of risk and cost. They may hold legitimate grievances, though in most cases their motive is greed, and presumably can be brought into the peace agreement with appropriate concessions[footnoteRef:24]. In Somalia these include clans, factions and leaders that do not feel they have been adequately represented or rewarded with positions in the cabinet of the TFG, and so withdrew from the process[footnoteRef:25]. [23: Although he uses the term greedy, Stedman notes that this does not necessarily imply that the spoiler acts out of a motivation of greed. Stephen John Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, p. 11 (footnote 10).] [24: Ken Menkhaus, State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts, Review of African Political Economy, No. 97, 2003, p. 415. Mohamed Qanyere Afrah is an example of a warlord who despite being brutal and coercive towards his own clan, has also aired legitimate concerns felt by his clan to other Somali leaders and the international community; see Roland Marchal, Warlordism and terrorism: How to obscure an already confusing crisis? The case of Somalia, p. 1099.] [25: Ken Menkhaus, Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping, p. 96.]

Intrinsic spoilers are actors with a vested interest in maintaining a state of lawlessness, state collapse, and/or armed conflict[footnoteRef:26]. These include war criminals, merchants of war, paid fighters of warring factions and their counterparts in the security services employed by businessmen, and individuals or groups holding valuable assets[footnoteRef:27]. Stedman would also include under this category those extremist Islamic groups that seek to make war with Ethiopia, and enforce a strict interpretation of sharia law[footnoteRef:28]. He asserts that such groups pursue total power and hold immutable preferences[footnoteRef:29]. [26: Ken Menkhaus, State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts, p. 415.] [27: Ibid.] [28: Stephen John Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, p. 10-11.] [29: Ibid. p. 10. For a criticism of the concept of total or intrinsic spoilers see Marie-Jolle Zahar, SRSG Mediation in Civil Wars: Revisiting the Spoiler Debate, Global Governance, Vol. 16, No. 2, April-June 2010, p. 266-268, who rejects the notion that spoilers are irrational and impervious to logic as the assumption of total spoilers would imply. For Stedmans rejoinder see Stephen John Stedman, Introduction, in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, & Elizabeth M. Cousens, Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 13-14.]

Finally, risk-averse spoilers are spoilers who could potentially benefit from peace, and the establishment of stability and the rule of law. However, high levels of uncertainty with regard to the effect it could have on their interests has led them to choose the sub-optimal but safe route of scuttling initiatives which might alter an operating environment which, while not ideal, is at least familiar and in which they find some benefit[footnoteRef:30]. This category is particularly associated with businessmen, as well as some clan elders, and perhaps even the majority of the Somali population[footnoteRef:31]. [30: Ken Menkhaus, State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts, p. 415.] [31: Menkhaus notes that the state in Somalia has historically been the primary source not only of power but of wealth-as the catchment point for foreign aid, the point of control of government contracts and parastatals, and as the coercive instrument with which empowered clans and coalitions have expropriated the assets of rivals. The repressive and predatory character of the Somali state under Siad Barre has left a legacy of deep distrust among Somalis toward the state as an institution. For that reason, although most Somalis understand the benefits that a revived central government brings, they are reluctant to see control of the state fall into the hands of rival clans or factions. Ken Menkhaus, Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping, p. 94.]

Despite the above categorisation of spoiler types, Zahar notes that these are far from immutable[footnoteRef:32]. Changing circumstances or interests can serve to change one type of spoiler into another. Even those designated by Menkhaus as intrinsic spoilers can be brought into the peace process with appropriate incentives. For instance, the hired gunmen or mooryaan have been largely demobilised in Somaliland, which spends most of its budget providing former fighters with an alternative source of income[footnoteRef:33]. Moreover, warlords have periodically acted in ways that could be considered as either greedy or total spoilers at different times. [32: Marie-Jolle Zahar, SRSG Mediation in Civil Wars: Revisiting the Spoiler Debate, p. 267.] [33: Ken Menkhaus, Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping, p. 91. However, a demonstration of the limits of this approach is the case of El Maan port. The current controllers of the port (north of Mogadishu) refused to back the TFG even after the TFG offered that they could retain control of the port (and therefore the vital customs fees that would serve as one of the governments few sources of funding). This decision was probably based on the calculation that stability in Mogadishu would result in the capital becoming the pre-eminent point for the transit of goods into the country and thus a threat to El Maan ports revenue. Andr Le Sage, Somalias Endless Transition: Breaking the Deadlock, p. 6.]

Locus of SpoilerFinally, Stedman considers the locus of spoiler behaviour, that is, whether it is the leader or the followers within a spoiling faction who are the main drivers behind the decision to spoil. If it is the leader who drives spoiling, than it is theoretically possible that the spoiler may be brought into the peace process following his removal, however, if it is the followers who are the spoilers than accommodation is far less likely. Overall, in Somalia the locus appears to be very much with the elites. This may be because elites tend to hold the purse strings. In those groups where religious convictions may play a part, leaders also appear to set the tone for the group, however, finding reliable information on the locus driving spoiler activities is particularly difficult[footnoteRef:34]. [34: Unfortunately, I have been unable to find any fieldwork that has been conducted that examines the locus of spoiling within spoiler groups in Somalia. I will thus avoid drawing any greater conclusions as these will be based on speculation only.]

Causes of Spoiling in Somalia To explain the existence of spoilers within the Somali peace process commentators often rely on a combination of greed and grievances explanations[footnoteRef:35]. Collier and Hoeffler assert that greed plays a greater role than the existence of grievances in initiating a conflict[footnoteRef:36]. Two caveats exist when applying this case to Somalia. First, since the mid-1990s Somalia, with a few exceptions, has not been a continuous case of civil war, but one of state failure, where violence has been limited in scale and the result of lawlessness rather than of inter(or intra)-clan conflict[footnoteRef:37]. Second, rather than attempting to explain the initiation of the conflict or the collapse of the state, my aim is essentially to explain its perpetuation. [35: Afyare Abdi Elmi, & Abdullahi Barise, The Somali Conflict: Root causes, obstacles, and peace-building strategies, p. 38.] [36: However, they conclude that their integrated model, which includes some aspects of the grievance model into the greed model, provides the greatest explanatory power. Paul Collier, & Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, p. 2.] [37: Peter T. Leeson, Better off Stateless: Somalia before and after State collapse, Department of Economics, West Virginia University, unpublished paper, available at http://www.peterleeson.com/better_off_stateless.pdf, p. 10.]

Thus, we also need to consider the political economy of war theory[footnoteRef:38]. Collier notes that countries that have experienced civil war in the past are more likely to return to conflict. He suggests this may be the result of changes in the economy that war has wrought, with certain actors benefitting financially from the existence of conflict or the lack of centralised authority[footnoteRef:39]. With regard to Somalia, Abdi Elmi and Barise conclude that the most important factor that has created and sustained the clan-based militias conflicts is competition for power and resources[footnoteRef:40]. Moreover, despite the role that grievances against the government had in the toppling of Siyaad Barrs regime, the political factions who were originally important in this event[footnoteRef:41] have virtually disappeared. Likewise, the power of clan-based warlords has steadily declined, as these individuals failed to build an economic base on which to build their power[footnoteRef:42]. Having previously relied on pillage or roadblock taxes to pay their militias, the warlords have had much of their militias brought-out by businessmen, who hired these groups to protect their fixed assets and payed them to provide the level of law and order necessary to do business, after the failure of warlords to provide such services[footnoteRef:43]. The recent rise of a business elite engaged in quasi-legitimate business, has caused interests to shift towards efforts to promote local governance, in the absence of central authority. Furthermore, as wages have fallen for the mooryaan[footnoteRef:44], the declining social status, diminishing financial incentives to join these groups, and greater likelihood of prosecution for their crimes within their own clans[footnoteRef:45], has diminished the supply of recruits necessary to maintain private militias[footnoteRef:46]. [38: For a discussion of the political economy of war theory see Paul Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy, p. 197-218; Bertine Kamphuis, Economic Policy for Building Peace, p. 185-210; Susan Woodward, Economic Priorities of Successful Peace Implementation, p. 183-189. For a discussion of the post-state collapse Somali economy see Roland Marchal, Les frontires de la paix et de la guerre, p. 48-50; Peter T. Leeson, Better off Stateless: Somalia before and after State collapse.] [39: Peter T. Leeson, Better off Stateless: Somalia before and after State collapse, p. 2. ] [40: Afyare Abdi Elmi, & Abdullahi Barise, The Somali Conflict: Root causes, obstacles, and peace-building strategies, p. 33.] [41: For instance, the United Somali Congress, Somali National Front, and Somali National Alliance. ] [42: Ken Menkhaus, State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts, p. 414-415, 419-420.] [43: In this sense, the war economy differs from those conflicts most associated with fighting over resources such as Sierra Leone, Angola and the DRC. Ken Menkhaus, State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts, p. 416.] [44: For a discussion of the mooryaan see Roland Marchal, Les mooryaan de Mogadiscio. Formes de la violence dans un espace urbain en guerre, Cahiers dEtudes Africaines, Vol. 33, No. 22, 1993, p. 295-320.] [45: Ken Menkhaus, State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts, p. 417.] [46: Diaspora contributions to Islamic groups which are used to pay fighters (the average wage of approximately $200 per month is still around 4 times higher than the national average) have also significantly reduced due to greater policing of this financial aid by Western governments. Ted Dagne, Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace, p. 7; International Crisis Group, Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State, p. 11; Lauren Ploch, Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response, Congressional Research Service, November 3, 2010, p. 20-21. ]

It has also been noted that the likelihood of potential (legitimate) grievances as a reason for spoiling is doubtful. Living standards during the period following the collapse of the central government have improved considerably according to a range of indicators. Comparing 18 different social, economic and health indicators between the years 1985-1990 and 2000-2005, Leeson finds only adult literacy and school enrolment levels have fallen during the period, whilst life expectancy, access to medical treatment, infant mortality rates and a range other indicators have all shown improvement[footnoteRef:47]. Moreover, Leeson finds that, in general, Somalias improvements in its development indicators compare favourably to its neighbours between the 1990-2005 period[footnoteRef:48]. Leeson concludes these improvements are the result of greater economic freedom, and the absence of a rapacious state that utilised Somalias resources to maintain its military control over the state and client networks. He also notes the greater freedom of movement, speech and action of Somali people following the collapse of the state, and concludes that in opposition to the general assumption that state collapse is unequivocally bad, in the case of Somalia it has been an improvement compared to what existed before[footnoteRef:49]. This not only discounts the role that grievance plays in perpetuating state collapse in Somalia, but perhaps also helps to explain why many Somali elites tend to prefer the status quo rather the risk the recreation of a central government that could degenerate into something as predatory as the military dictatorship that devastated the country from 1969-1991. [47: Peter T. Leeson, Better off Stateless: Somalia before and after State collapse, p. 12.] [48: Ibid. p. 16.] [49: Ibid. p. 27-28.]

The perpetuation of state collapse resulting from spoilers rational calculations of self-interest appears to fail, however, to explain the lack of a paper state[footnoteRef:50]. Presumably, Somalias political and economic elite, if they were trying to maximise economic gains, would benefit more from creating a state that functions just well enough to achieve external recognition, thus benefitting from aid flows, development loans, and the influx of foreign diplomatic and NGO missions, whilst still not being strong enough to challenge their business dealings or take control of key infrastructure such as ports and roads that provide rents to those who control them. There are a number of explanations for this outcome. First, it is possible that Somali elites have learnt lessons from other states that attempted to profit from external aid flows, but which were ultimately forced to give their control due to conditional aid[footnoteRef:51]. Second, it is possible that Somali elites have indeed actually attempted to do this, but ultimately failed, as the distribution of the spoils were not adequately shared between all potential spoilers. Menkhaus argues that this was the motivation behind the creation of the TNG, which spent most of the Arta peace process focusing on the division of spoils (exemplified through cabinet seats) between clans, and which subsequent to its creation, spent the majority of its efforts seeking foreign aid rather than attempting to establish control of the country[footnoteRef:52]. A third possible explanation is that the failure to create a paper state is the result of risk-aversion (as discussed above) on behalf of Somalis economic and tribal elite. These actors stand to gain from capturing the potential rents that aid provides, however, due to risk aversion, they have determined that backing a central government risks creating not only a paper state, but an actual one, which could in the future threaten their economic interests or fall under the control of a rival clan. Under these considerations, the threat of a paper state turning into a real state is judged too risky, and has led a number of elites to prefer the status quo. [50: Ken Menkhaus, State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts, p. 418.] [51: For a discussion see Alex Thomson, An Introduction to African Politics, (Oxon: Routledge, 2004), chapter 9.] [52: Ken Menkhaus, State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts, p. 418-419; Roland Marchal, Warlordism and terrorism: How to obscure an already confusing crisis? The case of Somalia, p. 1098.]

In opposition to the model of spoilers proposed by Stedman, Greenhill & Major consider structural factors to be the determining dynamic in whether domestic actors engage or sabotage a peace process. Under this approach the focus is shifted from motivations to capabilities, with potential spoilers deciding to spoil a peace process based on their ability to do so[footnoteRef:53]. The greater the ability to sabotage the peace process, the more likely a potential spoiler will be to sabotage the process in order force the opposing side to concede concessions. Whereas Stedman views potential spoilers as deciding to engage or disrupt the peace process based on a consideration of their interests, Greenhill & Major conclude that any would-be spoiler with the power to unilaterally alter the precarious balance negotiated into the peace accords are likely to do so[footnoteRef:54] therefore every real or potential spoiler will be as greedy as he thinks he can afford to be[footnoteRef:55]. Moreover, they criticise Stedmans approach for failing to take into account latent spoilers, that is, those who are not considered important enough to warrant inclusion in the peace process are not subsequently considered in any deals made between the negotiating factions or individuals. This is particularly relevant in the case of Somalia where small groups that lack the ability to shape the process still possess the capacity to destroy it[footnoteRef:56], or may seek outside help in order to procure the resources necessary to become a spoiler[footnoteRef:57]. [53: Kelly M. Greenhill & Solomon Major, The Perils of Profiling: Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords, p. 8; also see Marie-Jolle Zahar, SRSG Mediation in Civil Wars: Revisiting the Spoiler Debate, p. 266. ] [54: Kelly M. Greenhill & Solomon Major, The Perils of Profiling: Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords, p. 9.] [55: Kelly M. Greenhill & Solomon Major, The Perils of Profiling: Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords, p. 11.] [56: Ken Menkhaus, State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts, p. 415.] [57: Ken Menkhaus, State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts, p. 419.]

Another cause of spoiling has been noted through utilising the internal contestation model. Whilst, the above rely on external utility models which assume that parties act to maximise gains vis--vis external adversaries, the internal contestation model assumes spoilers make decisions based on the balance of power within a faction or community[footnoteRef:58]. Thus, groups may compete with each other for domestic support by opposing what the public sees as an outside aggressor. Pearlman notes that where allegiances are flexible and influence is fungible, actors are likely to act in one sphere of politics to extract benefit in another[footnoteRef:59]. With the sheer profusion of actors in Somalia, and malleability of their interests and alliances, spoiling based on calculations of the internal balance of power are pertinent. For instance, the decision by Hassan Dahir Aweys to splinter from the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) in early 2008 to create the ARS-Asmara faction could be construed as such an action. Aweys was being marginalised within the ARS (partly due to US pressure facilitate a rapprochement between the TFG and ARS[footnoteRef:60]) thus it is possible that his actions where an attempt to gain the support of salafist elements within the ARS (as well as to garner resources from Eritrea which benefitted from conflict between the ARS and the Ethiopian-backed TFG). [58: Wendy Pearlman, Spoiling Inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace Process, p. 80.] [59: Ibid. p. 82.] [60: Roland Marchal, A tentative assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab, p. 396.]

Conclusion The above demonstrates that spoiling plays a considerable role in Somali politics, and is one of the direct causes of failure of Somalis to produce a stable and effective central government. Whilst different types of spoilers exist in Somali society, economic factors, rather than grievances, serve as the catalyst for the various groups and elites to continue to spoil the peace process. Moreover, a rational risk-aversion, based on the history of the Somalias predatory state, has led many to prefer the precarious status quo rather than risk creation of something even worse.

For many Somalis, the state is an instrument of accumulation and domination, enriching and empowering those who control it and exploiting and harassing the rest of the population[footnoteRef:61]. [61: Ken Menkhaus, Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping, p. 87.]

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