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Metalogicon (2000) XIII, 1

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Spinoza and Martinez De Ripalda: Nature and Miracle

Piero Di Vona

There is no doubt that a close connection exists between Spinoza’s doctrine of the production of the modes on the part of God and the Spinoza’s conception of God or Nature; and that an equally close connection arises between the conception of God or Nature and Spinoza’s criticism of the miracle, whose principal foundation is the theory of the immutability and eternity of divine nature and its infinite laws, which express its infinite power. Consequently, we shall treat together in the same study our research on God or Nature and on the doctrine of the supernatural and of the miracle asserted by Spinoza. It will not be useless to remind the eventual reader of some necessary premises for the treatment of the subject, even if they are part of the common cognitions possessed by those who, in whatever way, deal with Spinoza. In chapter I of part I of the Korte Verhandeling the idea that infinite attributes belong to nature already appears. In chapter II Spinoza affirms the identity of God with nature. Only after having treated the attributes and properties of God, does Spinoza state in chapters VIII and IX of Part I his doctrine of natura naturans and naturata. This theory is more complete than that of the Ethica because Spinoza distinguishes between the universal natura naturata, including the immediate modes of God, and the particular natura naturata which includes all the particular things. The Ethica lacks any mention of the “Thomisten”, which is found in Chapter VIII of the Korte Verhandeling cited above. Spinoza affirms that even the Thomists have considered God in the same way as he had, namely as a being ( “een wezen” ) that we conceive through Himself with clarity and distinction without needing other than


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He Himself, as in the case of all the attributes. The Natura Naturans is God for Spinoza and for the Thomists. The latter, however, call the Natura Naturans a being outside of all the substances (“buyten alle zelfstandigheden”). These are the the ideas of Spinoza on God and nature in the Korte Verhandeling.1 In the Ethica only after having demonstrated the derivation and the dependence of all the modes on God, and after having negated that in nature contingencies occur, and having affirmed that everything is determined by the necessity of divine nature, Spinoza distinguishes in the scholium of proposition 29 of Part I the natura naturans and the natura naturata. The first consists of all the attributes of God; the second of all the consequences of the attributes, namely all the modes without distinction, which are considered as res that are in God, and that without God can neither be nor be conceived. In the Praefatio of Part IV we find the famous expression “Deus, seu Natura” that is repeated in the demonstration of proposition 4 of the same part of the Ethica. The meaning of this expression is established by the same above-mentioned Praefatio. Spinoza declares to have shown in the Appendix of Part I that nature does not act in view of an end, and continues affirming that that eternal and infinite being that we call “Deum, seu Naturam” acts with the same necessity for which it exists. Spinoza confirms that he has proved in proposition 16 of Part I that the being that we call God or Nature acts with the same necessity of nature for which it exists. Consequently, according to Spinoza the “ratio, seu causa” for which “Deus, seu Natura” acts, and for which it exists, is “una, eademque.”2

1 Benedictus de Spinoza, Korte Verhandeling / Breve Trattato, ed. and trans. Filippo Mignini, L'Aquila: L.U. Japadre Editore 1986, text on pp. 7, 11, 34-36, corresponding to pp. 134, 142, 188-193. We shall cite this edition infra with the abbreviation KV, followed by the page indications. 2 Spinoza Opera, ed. Carl Gebhardt, 4 vols., Heidelberg: Carl Winter n.d., vol. II, pp. 71, 206, 213. We shall cite this edition infra with the abbreviation O, followed by the indication of the volume in Roman numerals, and of the pages in Arabic numerals.


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We do not believe that one can doubt the meaning of Spinoza’s expression “Deus, seu Natura.” Spinoza refers to God considered as existing by necessity of nature, and acting with this same necessity. God active, and not patient; God causing, and not as caused, even if by divine nature. Thus God understood as Natura Naturans is the “Deus, seu Natura” of Spinoza, the “causa libera” God, and not the God considered as effect, or Natura Naturata, and least of all the whole of Natura Naturans and of Natura Naturata. In the scholium of proposition 25 of Part I of the Ethica, on the foundation of proposition 16, Spinoza affirms the identity of God as “causa sui” and as “causa rerum.” God must be called “omnium rerum causa” just in the same sense in which He is called “causa sui.” In fact, given the divine nature, it follows from it that God is “causa sui”, and as much the essence as the existence of the res must necessarily be inferred from it. According to the corollary that follows the scholium, this means that the “res particulares” are nothing but affectiones of God’s attributes, namely modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a certain and determined way. The corollary goes back in turn to proposition 1 and to definition V of Part I. It recalls to the reader’s mind that for mode one must understand the affections of the substance, namely what is in the other and is conceived through the other, and recalls again the doctrine according to which everything exists in God, and nothing can exist, or be thought of without God.3 In the demonstration of proposition 34 of Part I of the Ethica Spinoza affirms that from the mere necessity of the essence of God follows that God is “causa sui, & omnium rerum” always in virtue of the above-cited proposition 16. There is no doubt that he always confims to us that he is speaking about God as free cause and Natura Naturans, and not about God considered as effect and Natura Naturata, when he makes all the affirmations examined by us. In this light of God as free cause, defined as the sole res libera and

3 O, II, pp. 45, 56-57, 60, 67-68.


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the sole free cause,4 we should consider both Spinoza’s “Deus, seu Natura”, and his doctrine of the miracle. In the Korte Verhandeling the miracle is mentioned to affirm that God makes Himself known to men only through Himself, and not (by) using words, miracles, or any other thing.5 In the same chapter XXIV of Part II, at the end of which Spinoza quickly mentions miracles, he develops his doctrine of the laws, and upholds that natural laws are eternal, immutable and universal. The laws of God are such that they cannot never, and in no way, be transgressed. Of this kind, for example, is the law that the weakest must yield to the strongest.6 Also in the Cogitata Metaphysica Spinoza asserts that the laws of nature are God’s immutable decrees revealed by natural light. To the objection that sometimes God destroys these natural laws to perform miracles, the Dutch philosopher responds by recalling the opinion of the most prudent theologians, who concede that God does not do anything against nature, but acts “supra naturam.” Spinoza interprets this doctrine affirming that God also has many “leges operandi” that He did not communicate to the human intellect. If these laws had been communicated to it, then “aeque naturales essent, quam caeterae.”7 In the same Cogitata Metaphysica Spinoza posits as an interpretive criterion of the Bible the Thomist principle that the truth does not contrast with the truth (“veritas veritati non repugnat”), using it, however, to affirm the pre-eminence of the natural light. In fact, he affirms that if we found in the Bible something in contradiction to the natural light, than we could reject it with the same freedom with which we reject the Koran or the Talmud. But Spinoza is far from thinking that there may be something in the Bible which contradicts the natural light.8

4 O, II, pp. 46, 61, 77. 5 KV, pp. 106-107 (332-335). 6 KV, pp. 103-105 (326-331). See the analysis of F. Mignini, pp. 728-735. 7 O, I, pp. 276-277. 8 O, I, p. 265. For the principle adopted here by Spinoza see S. Thomae de Aquino, Summa contra Gentiles, Torino-Roma: Marietti 1934, pp. 6-7 ( I, 7).


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There is no doubt that in the famous chapter VI of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus Spinoza criticises above all the idea of the miracle which is typical of the common people, and to this he opposes the immutability and eternity of the natural order. One must not forget that in his Praefatio Spinoza declares that the Tractatus was not written for the common people and for those of the common people who share their affects. This statement of the dispute is clear and open from the beginning, when Spinoza introduces the subject discussed by him in the chapter: “vulgus enim tum Dei potentiam & providentiam quam clarissime constare putat, cum aliquid in natura insolitum, & contra opinionem, quam ex consuetudine de natura habet, contingere videt; praesertim si id in ejus lucrum aut commodum cesserit.” For the common people, furthermore, nothing shows the existence of God more clearly than the fact that nature, as they believe, does not preserve her order. Those who explain with natural causes “res, & miracula” are judged by the common people as persons who get rid of God, or at least His providence. To the common people God appears idle, when nature acts “solito ordine”, and, on the contrary, nature and the natural causes appear idle, when God acts. By consequence, the common people imagine two powers numerically distinct one from the other: “scilicet, potentiam Dei, & potentiam rerum naturalium, a Deo tamen certo modo determinatam, vel (ut plerique magis hodierno tempore sentiunt) creatum.” What the common people then mean by God and nature, they themselves certainly do not know, except that they imagine the power of God as the empire of some regal majesty, and the power of nature “tanquam vim & impetum.” The conclusion of this analysis is clear: “Vulgus itaque opera naturae insolita vocat miracula, sive Dei opera.” It follows from this that the “vulgus”, partly out of devotion, and partly out of the cupidity of opposing those who cultivate the natural sciences, is led to ignore the natural causes, and prefers to only listen to that which “maxime ignorat” and that, for the same reason, “maxime admiratur.”9 9 O, III, pp. 12, 8I.


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Therefore, the object of the criticism that Spinoza directs towards the miracle is not only the common people, but it is especially the common people of his time, to whose feelings about the power of God and the power of nature the philosopher expressly refers. For him these people are not able to worship God, and are not able to relate everything to His empire and His will, without suppressing the natural causes and imagining res that are “extra naturae ordinem.” The people do not admire the power of God more than when they imagine the power of nature almost subjugated by Him.10 It is not reasonable to think that the common people, to whom Spinoza refers to here, are composed only of the Jews of his time and of the Hebrew community into which he was born. The philosopher speaks of the common people in general, and thus his discourse must be regarded as directed to the Christians of his time as well. On the other hand, the chapter on miracles refers also to miracles performed by Christ.11 One can have confimation of this both from chapter XI of theTractatus Theologico-Politicus, in which Spinoza speaks of the vocation of the Apostles, and many times refers to the signa with which they confirmed their preaching, and from chapter III of the Tractatus Politicus, in which Spinoza, discussing the propagation of the faith, refers to the power of working miracles received by the Apostles.12 We state this beforehand because Spinoza, immediately after mentioning men’s opinion on miracles, explains the origin of this belief affirming that it came from “primis Judeis”, who, to convince the Gentiles of their time, and to demonstrate to them that they were under an empire of an invisible God, narrated God’s miracles, and made every effort to show that the entire nature was directed by the command of the God worshipped by the Jews. This undertaking succeeded so well for them that until today men have not stopped imagining miracles, believing themselves more well-beloved by God than

10 O, III, p. 8l. 11 O, III, p. 90. 12 O, III, pp. 153, 155, 289. Cf. pp. 30-32.


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others, and considering themselves as the final cause for which God created all things and constantly directs them.13 At this point of the text, the polemic of the philosopher increases against the common people and their foolish arrogance: they have no sane conception of God nor of nature, confuse the decrees of God with human ones, and imagine nature so limited that they believe that men are the most important part of her. Following these objections is the conclusive phrase that confirms that the object of Spinoza’s polemic is the opinion of the vulgus: “His vulgi de Natura, & miraculis opiniones, & praejudicia satis prolixe enarravi.”14 Only after this polemic against the people’s opinions does Spinoza indicate the points that he intends to demonstrate. These are that nothing happens “contra naturam,” but that nature preserves an eternal, fixed and immutable order; that miracles do not let us know the essence, the existence and by consequence the providence of God, which can be known much better from the fixed and immutable order of nature; that the Bible by the decrees, volitions, and providence of God does not mean other than the same order of nature, which follows necessarily from His eternal laws. Finally, Spinoza will speak of the way in which miracles should be interpreted.15 These are Spinoza’s theses on the miracle. For all we intend to prove, the first of these is the most important. The philosopher refers us to chapter IV on the divine law, where he asserts to have shown that all that God wants and determines implies eternal necessity and truth, and that the intellect and will of God are the same thing. Therefore, it is exactly the same to say that God wants something and that God conceives something, and so with an identical necessity it follows from nature and from divine perfection that God conceives a thing “ut est,” and “ut est” he may want it. The universal laws of nature are decrees of God which follow from the necessity and

13 O, III, pp. 81-82. 14 O, III, p. 82. 15 O, III, P. 82.


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perfection of divine nature. Therefore, nothing can be contrary to the universal laws of nature without being contrary for this reason to the divine decree, the intellect and nature. God cannot act against natural laws without acting against His own nature.16 All that Spinoza has stated could be easily be demonstrated by this, that the power of nature is the same divine power, and that the latter is the “ipsissima Dei essentia.” But, leaving out this, our philosopher does not neglect to tell us what one must understand here for nature. He then states in a note: “Me hic per Naturam non intelligere solam materiam, ejusque affectiones, sed praeter materiam alia infinita.” From this idea of nature also present in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, it follows that in nature nothing happens that opposes her universal laws, is not consistent with them or does not proceed from them. In fact, everything that happens, occurs according to laws and rules which imply an eternal necessity and truth. Although not all of these laws may be known to us, nature always respects them, and through these preserves a fixed and immutable order. For Spinoza no “sana ratio” can persuade us to attribute to nature a limited power, and to establish that her laws are suitable “ad certa tantum, & non ad omnia.” In fact, for our philosopher the power of nature is the same power of God, the laws and rules of nature are decrees of God. Hence one must believe that the power of nature is infinite, and that her laws are so far-reaching that they are extended to all that which is conceived by the divine intellect.17 In chapter IV Spinoza had sustained his doctrine according to which “sine Deo nihil esse, neque concipi potest,” and by

16 O, III, pp. 82-83. Cf. chapter IV, pp. 57-68. On p. 57 Spinoza states: “Lex, quae a necessitate naturae dependet, illa est, quae ex ipsa rei natura sive definitione necessario sequitur.” On p. 65 the philosopher concludes that only “ex captu vulgi,” and only for lack of knowledge, God is represented as a law-maker and a prince, and called just and merciful. On the contrary, “Deumque revera ex solius suae naturae, & perfectionis necessitate agere, & omnia dirigere, & ejus denique decreta, & volitiones aeternas esse veritates, semperque necessitatem involvere.” 17 O, III, p. 83.


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consequence had deemed certain that all the natural things imply and express the concept of God “pro ratione suae essentiae suaeque perfectionis,” so the more we know the res naturales, the more we acquire a greater and more perfect knowledge of God.18 Now, in chapter VI, after having confirmed the concepts that nothing occurs in nature which does not follow from her laws, that the laws of nature extend to all that which is conceived by the divine intellect, and that finally nature preserves a fixed and immutable order, Spinoza tells us what we should understand by miracle. For him “nomen miraculi non nisi repective ad hominum opiniones posse intellegi.” Miracle means an event, of which we cannot explain the natural cause with the example of another thing known to us, or at least that cannot be explained by who writes or narrates it. Spinoza adds that he could also say “miraculum esse id, cujus causa ex principiis rerum naturalium lumine naturali notis explicari nequit.” Nevertheless, for him “miracula ad captum vulgi facta fuerunt.” The common people completely ignored the principles of natural things. Hence Spinoza retains that the Ancients considered as miracles the facts that they could not explain in the manner in which the common people explain the natural things, namely by resorting to the memory or to something similar. The common people, in fact, think that they know a thing when this does not give rise to admiration. The Ancients, and almost every one up to the time of Spinoza, did not have another norm of the miracle other than that typical of the common people.19 Expressing this conviction, our philosopher confirms most clearly that his polemic on the miracle is directed against the common people, and at the same time he manifests the reason for which he refers above all to the opinions of the masses when he treats the miracle. We can conclude that for Spinoza the miracle is never such with respect to God, because the intellections and volitions of

18 O, III, pp. 59-60. 19 O, III, pp. 83-84. Cf. p. 84: “Antiqui itaque, & omnes fere in hoc usque tempus nullam praeter hanc normam miraculi habuerunt.”


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God are one and the same thing, which implies necessity and eternity. By consequence, the miracle is such only in relation to something whose cause cannot be explained with the natural principles known to us. As we have seen, nature extends itself to everything that falls within the divine intellect. The laws and rules of nature imply rather eternal necessity and truth, but they are not all known to us. Spinoza underlines this point when he later affirms that the laws of nature “ad infinita se extendunt” and are conceived by us “sub quadam specie aeternitatis,” so they indicate to us the infinity, the eternity and the immutability of God.20 Nevertheless, Spinoza takes into consideration not so much this learned conception of the miracle, which he does not fail to reaffirm, discussing the knowledge of God that comes to us from the immutable order of nature, as much as the ideas on the miracle typical of the common people, and the way in which the miracles are narrated in the Bible for the use of the people.21 In this chapter of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus Spinoza’s polemic is addressed against the people relentlessly and without mitigation. He denounces not only the people’s imaginations and the opinions on miraculous events, but the same idea itself that they have of God, to which he opposes his own doctrines of God as “ens absolute infinitum,” and of the natura naturata as produced by God and suited to the infinite intellect of God, as also proposed by him in the Ethica.22 Discoursing upon the knowledge of God, Spinoza staunchly defends the idea that the miracle is never like this in respect to the eternal decrees and the eternal will of God, but only in repect to the human intelligence which is overcome by the miracle. For him, if something could happen in nature produced by whatever power contrary to nature, this power

20 O, III. p. 86. 21 O, III, p. 91. See the efficacious analysis of the formation of the idea of miracle in the mind of the masses by André Tosel, Spinoza ou le crépuscule de la servitude, Paris: Aubier 1984, pp. 213-214. 22 O, I, pp. 263-264; III, p. 93.


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would be contrary to those first notions that make us sure of God’s existence. One cannot, then , mean by miracle an event that “ordini naturae repugnet,” because this, far from proving it, would make us doubt the existence of God. We can instead be absolutely sure of God’s existence when we know “omnia naturae certum atque immutabilem ordinem sequi.”23 Let us hypothesize that the miracle is that which cannot be explained with natural causes. This fact can be understood in two ways: either it has natural causes that cannot be investigated by the human intellect, or it does not have other cause than God and His will. But since all the causes that act in a natural way, also act for God’s mere power and will, one must necessarily conclude that the miracle, whether it may or may not have natural causes, is an event that cannot be explained with a cause, that is, it is an event that goes beyond human comprehension. Now, from such an event that exceeds our intelligence we cannot comprehend either the essence or the existence of God, or “absolute aliquid de Deo, & natura.” On the contrary, we know that every thing is determined and sanctioned by God, that the operations of nature follow from God’s essence, and that the laws of nature are eternal decrees and volitions of God. Therefore, we must conclude absolutely that the better we know God and His will, the more we know the res naturales, and how much more clearly we understand how they depend on their first cause, and how they operate according to nature’s eternal laws.24 Consequently Spinoza “ratione nostri intellectus” thinks that much more rightly those events that we understand clearly and distinctly must be called “Dei opera”, and must be referred to God’s will, and not those other events that we completely ignore, even if they strike the imagination, and lead men to admiration. In fact, for him only the works of nature that we comprehend with clarity and distinction, render sublime the knowledge of

23 O, III, pp. 84-85. 24 O, III, p. 85.


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God, and indicate in the clearest way the will and the decrees of God.25 Even from this text that we have analysed it results very clearly that for Spinoza there is no miracle for God, but be only in respect to the limited human intelligence. When he does not ascribe the miracle to the people’s pure ignorance and to the way in which certain facts are narrated, always for the consumption of the people from the Bible, Spinoza refers the miracle to those events that overcome human intelligence, or are believed to do so, but cannot nor can ever exceed the natural laws by infinite extension, which are simply identified with the eternal decrees and volitions of God who is Himself absolutely infinite. Hence, one cannot imagine that the miracle may destroy the order of nature, or interrupt it, or be contrary to its laws, because this would lead us to doubt “de Deo, & omnibus.” Precisely for this reason Spinoza states that he does not admit a difference between “opus contra naturam” and “opus supra naturam.” For him the miracle occurs in nature and not “extra naturam.” He reaffirms that the order of nature is fixed and immutable “ex Dei decreta.” Nothing, accordingly, can occur in nature that does not proceed from her laws, without contradicting that order which God “in aeternum per leges naturae universales in natura statuit.” If a similar contradictory event occurred, it would make us doubt everything and it would induce us to atheism.26 Only this refusal of Spinoza to believe that there may be miracles before God and for God, and not only for the limited human mind, can explain his concluding assertion: “miraculum sive contra naturam, sive supra naturam, merum esse absurdum.” Consequently, according to him, in the Bible miracle means nothing other than than a work of nature that surpasses or is believed to surpass human comprehension.27 As one sees, Spinoza retorts the accusation of atheism, that so many times will be leveled against him till the point where Bayle will see

25 O, III, pp. 85-86. 26 O, III, pp. 86-87. 27 O, III, p. 87.


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him as the systematic atheist,28 against the supporters of miracles. Always for these reasons Spinoza later endeavors to show that the Bible confirms that we cannot know God through the miracles and, always against the people’s opinions, demonstrates that the Bible intends to speak of the order of nature, when it treats God’s decrees and precepts, and His providence.29 Without dwelling on the circumstances in which the Bible refers to miracles, and on the way in which Spinoza explains some miracles narrated in it, we maintain that his conclusions, already known to us, are reconfirmed and reinforced: the decree, the command, the order and the word of God are nothing other than the action and the order of nature. Everything that is truly narrated in the Bible refers to events having occurred according to the order and laws of nature. But if by chance there were in the Bible something that could be in an apodictic way contrary to the laws of nature, or that could not be proved by these laws, then it would be necessary to believe firmly that the particular passage is an addition to the text due to sacriligious men, because what is against nature is against reason.30 Up to this point it was repugnant for Spinoza to admit that something could constitute a miracle for God Himself and for His will, and before God. As for the interpretation of miracles in the Bible, which is the last subject that Spinoza wanted to treat, besides the fact that to explain them it is necessary to know the opinions of those who narrate them, and the phraseology and the metaphors of the Hebrew language, it will be necessary to outline the difference between the way in which our philosopher has discussed prophecy and the way he has discussed miracles. For him prophecy is a question “mere Theologica”, while miracle “philosophicum plane est.” By consequence Spinoza has treated

28 Pierre Bayle, Dizionario Storico e Critico, Spinoza, Torino: Boringhieri 1958, p. 11. 29 O, III, pp. 87-91. 30 O, III, pp. 89, 91.


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prophecy using grounds revealed by the Bible, since prophecy surpasses human comprehension. On the contrary, the principles of natural light were sufficient to speak of miracles, even if he would have been able to explain them on the basis of the dogmas and grounds of the Bible itself, as he intends to prove with few scriptural citations which attribute to nature a fixed and immutable order.31 A last and truly important consideration is garnered from the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus: Spinoza, even if expounding what the teachings of the Bible mean to him, leaves the reader free to think of miracles as it seems best to him in order to receive with an integral spirit the cult of God and religion. He cites Flavius Josephus in support of this matter. For him, as for this ancient writer, faith in miracles does not seem necessary for salvation.32 The historians, even though identifying the God of Spinoza with nature, have been able to find for a long time both the scholastic and the modern sources of Spinoza’s distinction between Natura naturans and Natura naturata. All of the literature on this distinction is also referred to or quoted in the Italian commentaries of Spinoza’s works and in Italian writings dedicated to his thought.33 This literature has also been taken up again by Gueroult as well, who has examined it to maintain that Spinoza has used these two terms in order to explain his concept of absolute immanence that they had never meant previously. He thus admits that Spinoza is right to have differentiated

31 O, III, pp. 91-96, particularly pp. 94-96. 32 O, III, p. 96. 33 Benedicti de Spinoza, Ethica, Firenze: Sansoni 1963, pp. 713-714, note 90. Spinoza, Etica, Roma: Editori Riuniti 1988, p. 356, note 92. KV, p. 558, note 3. Piero Di Vona, “Contrasti di idee sull'essere nel pensiero di Spinoza,” ACME, vol. XVI, fasc. II-III, maggio-dicembre 1963, pp. 226-232. For the doctrine’s Hebrew tradition see Mino Chamla, Spinoza e il concetto della tradizione ebraica, Milano: F. Angeli 1996, pp. 179-180, and note 32.


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himself from the Thomists in the Korte Verhandeling, or at least from Saint Thomas.34 The interpretation of the two terms, owing to Gueroult, attributes to them a pantheistic and immanentist meaning that they, at least in our opinion, cannot have in Spinoza. For us the natura naturans nevertheless belongs to the order of the being in itself, and the natura naturata to the order of being in the other. This affirmation of Spinoza who, with the first proposition of the Ethica, has established by virtue of the same definitions of the substance and the mode, that “Substantia prior est natura suis affectionibus,” even if his critics very often and willingly neglect this proposition in discussing naturing nature and natured nature.35 It remains still true that for Spinoza God is substance, and that for this reason the natura naturans cannot be for him “buyten alle zelfstandigheden.” But many metaphysicians of his time, belonging to different religious creeds, were well convinced that God was a substance.36 When Spinoza was in full power of his intellectual activity, there had already occurred negative and scandalised reactions to 34 Martial Gueroult, Spinoza, Dieu, Paris, Aubier-Montaigne 1968, pp. 344-345, 564-568. A pantheistic interpretation of the relationship between the two natures is also found in Alexandre Matheron, Individu et Communauté chez Spinoza, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit 1969, p. 21. Jon Wetlesen in The Sage and the Way, Assen: van Gorcum 1979, pp. 20, 26, 36-41, 65, 97. On the one hand, he sees Natura naturans immanent to the Natura naturata considered as a whole; on the other, he sees the incommensurability by essence and existence between the two natures. In these same pages he gives a positive interpretation of the concept of causa sui: it is the power of God as active essence which allows that the essence of God may imply existence. 35 O, II, pp. 45, 47, 71. An interpretation of the two natures opposed to ours is found in A. Tosel, Spinoza, op. cit., pp. 216-217. For him “L'Infini de la puissance productive n'existe que dans les séries indéfinies des modes finis.” God or Nature is unity of the infinite and finite, self-determining and self-detemined power. 36 Piero Di Vona, Studi sull'ontologia di Spinoza, parte II, Firenze: La Nuova Italia 1969, capitolo IV. Let us remind the reader that, at least as a young man, St. Thomas had regarded God as substance. Cf. Le “De ente et essentia” de S. Thomas d'Aquin by M.-D. Roland-Gosselin O. P., Paris: Vrin 1948, p. 6: “substantia prima que Deus est.”


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his doctrine of the miracle, reactions which saw quite well the close relationship between this and his conception of nature. Lambert van Velthuysen’s letter to Jacob Ostens bears witness to it, and then the correspondence of Spinoza with Oldenburg on the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Lambert van Velthuysen pointed out that for Spinoza the nature of things and the natural order were not less necessary than the nature of God and and of his eternal truth, and that therefore miracles for the philosopher were subject to the common laws of nature which are immutable. Spinoza does not admit another power of God than the “ordinariam” which is exercised according to natural laws.37 Oldenburg, at the request of Spinoza himself, points out among the motives of scandal caused by the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (“crucem Lectoribus fixere”), the fact that he seems to deny authority and value to miracles, on which, for almost all Christians, the certitude of the revelation is based. Spinoza tries to explain to have maintained the doctrine of immanence precisely in the sense of Saint Paul, and to have asserted the identity of God and nature without confusing the latter with bodily matter, and, furthermore, to base the certitude of revelation “sola doctrinae sapientia.” and not on miracles which are synonomous with ignorance. But Oldenburg insists on asking the explanation of this last point, and links the miracle with the resurrection of Christ. Spinoza replies that who wants to found the existence of God and religion on miracles, tries to prove an obscure thing with another even more obscure. The discussion between the two men of learning drags on, but does not conclude with an agreement on the controversial question.38 In any case, Spinoza’s doctrine of the miracle, while he was alive, was already scandalous, and there is no need to enter into the later history of Spinozism to know this.39 37 O, IV, pp. 210-211. 38 O, IV, pp. 299, 304, 307-308, 310, 313, 325, 328, 330. 39 From Pierre Bayle, Spinoza, op. cit., pp. 16, 116-118, it emerges that the miracle was a matter of polemics between supporters and adversaries of Spinozism. Paul Vernière in his Spinoza et la pensée française avant la Révolution, Paris: PUF 1954, tome I, pp. 163-165, has noted both the scandal


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Nevertheless, what the polemists and the historians rarely observe, is that, notwithstanding chapter VI of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, in several points of his work Spinoza seems to give to a more prudent opinion on the miracle, avoiding to discuss its value. Thus in the same Treatise Spinoza states that only he who has received a revelation from God and a help as sure as that of the three youths who refused obedience to Nebuchadnezzar, is able to revolt against the tyrant. In the Tractatus Politicus, then, our philosopher lets us understand that in order to spread religion in places where it is banned, it is necessary to have received, like the Apostles, the power of expelling the demons and of performing miracles.40 Spinoza’s opponents, on the other hand, have immediately noted that he ascribes miracles to the ignorance of the common people, and that his polemic on this subject is directed against them. It is possible to understand this from what the same Lambert van Velthuysen writes in the letter already mentioned.41 But according to us, what escaped them, is that if Spinoza’s doctrine clashed with common opinions, it agreed on many points with the deeper theology of the time. The theological and Biblical discussions that occurred in Holland in Spinoza’s time, were contemporary to the conceiving of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, and today contribute to its understanding because they are better known than in the past.42 But we speak of the high theology of the seventeenth century, with which a philosophy such as that of Spinoza cannot avoid being compared

caused by Spinoza’s doctrine of the miracle, and the disaffection towards this instrument of seventeenth-century apologetics, and has observed apropos of Spinoza: “Avec lui, le problème du miracle passait du stade philosophique au stade polémique.” 40 O, III, pp. 200, 289. 41 O, III, p. 211. 42 We refer to the book by Roberto Bordoli, Ragione e Scrittura tra Descartes e Spinoza, saggio sulla “Philosophia S. Scripturae Interpres” di Lodewijk Meyer, e sulla sua reazione, Milano: F. Angeli 1997. For the complex relationship of Spinoza with the Hebrew tradition we refer to the above-cited book by Mino Chamla, Spinoza e il concetto della tradizione ebraica.


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to from the speculative and historical point of view, if it must be truly understood. We are not speaking here of the theological ideas debated in this or that -- however illustrious -- religious faith, or in this or that group of dissidence. We took on this fundamental confrontation in our book Spinoza e i trascendentali (Morano, Napoli 1977), reasoning upon the one, the transcendental true and the good. Consequently, now, speaking about Spinoza’s doctrines on nature and on the miracle, we shall turn to the great treatise dedicated to the supernatural being by Juan Martinez de Ripalda, who unifies and discusses in a systematic and encyclopaedic way the whole subject of the supernatural. For those readers -- lovers of philosophy -- who are not familiar with works of theology, especially of the seventeenth century, it will be opportune to give some biographical and bibliographical information. Juan Martinez de Ripalda was born in Pamplona in 1609. He was professor of philosophy and theology at Salamanca and Madrid, where he died in 1648. His principal work is the De Ente Supernaturali Disputationes. But among his printed works there is also a Brevis Expositio Litterae Magistri Sententiarum, and theological treatises on the virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Theological manuscripts conserved in Salamanca are mentioned. The De Ente Supernaturali had several editions in in the seventeenth century beginning in 1634, and one in the nineteenth century, issued at Paris in seven volumes by the publisher Vivès in 1871. Nevertheless, (just) in the De Ente Supernaturali Martinez de Ripalda, regarding the subject of his work, refers to the proems of his Dialectica and of his future (“ostendemusque”) Metaphysica.43 Another author of

43 R. P. Ioan. Martinez De Ripalda and S. J., De Ente Supernaturali Disputationes Theologicae Tomus Prior, Lugduni, sumptibus Horatii Boissart & Georgii Remeus, 1663, p. 7, col. 2. We shall refer to this edition below with the abbreviaton De Ente Supernatuali, followed by page and column numbers. Spinoza was acquainted with the great Spanish literature of the “siglo de oro”; Cervantes, Gongora, Quevedo, Gracián were in his library, and also plays. Therefore it is quite natural, and not at all unreasonable, to compare Spinoza’s philosophy with the great Spanish theology ofd the “siglo de oro”.


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the Society of Jesus, Ignacio Peinado, refers to the manuscripts of Padre Ripalda in his Logica.44 It remains for us to note that in his De Ente Supernaturali Ripalda professes himself a devoted disciple of Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza.45 Let us remind the reader that the preceding treatment has shown that for Spinoza God, an absolutely infinite being and one and only substance endowed with infinite attributes, is identical with Natura naturans, from which natura naturata necessarily follows, “infinita infinitis modis,” together with the infinite laws that are her expression. Ripalda, in the first book of his De Ente Supernaturali, in order to establish the excellence of the supernatural being on nature, begins precisely by setting out first a treatment of the concept of nature. He reproaches the theologians for not having explained in what sense one should understand nature. The philosophers have explained in various ways the meaning of nature and natural being. The theologians, instead, all agree in stating that the supernatural being is “supra naturam,” but hardly consider what may be the nature with which the supernatural being should be compared. Before starting a dispute on the excellence of the supernatural being, Ripalda retains that he must discuss the various meanings of nature.46 He enumerates a good eight meanings of nature, and in agreement with these specifies eight meanings of natural being. Among these meanings of nature and the natural being the Spanish theologian also considers the meaning which will be

44 Disputationes in universam Aristotelis Logicam, Authore R. P. M. Ignatio Francisco Peinado, Argandensi e S. J., sumptibus Collegii Complutensis S. J., apud Josephum Espartosa, 1721, p. 101, col. 1. 45 De Ente Supernaturali, Tomus I, p. 10, col. 2: “Ideo Pater Hurtado, quem semper magistrum veneratus sum....” For bibliographical and biographical information concerning Ripalda see Aug. et al. Carayon, Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus, n. éd. par C. Sommervogel, Bruxelles-Paris: 1890-1909. 46 De Ente Supernaturali, Tomus I, p. 1, col. 1, where he says of theologians: “Ponunt quidem omnes, ens supernaturale supra naturam esse. Quaenam autem natura sit, cum qua ens supernaturale conferatur, vix considerazione, nedum disputatione attingunt.”


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precisely that of Spinoza with the consequences that it implies for the doctrine of the miracle. Let us list with due brevity the meanings of the term nature and of natural being reviewed by Ripalda, intending to treat adequately the meanings relating to our research. The theologian returns for all these meanings to the authors -- sacred and profane, philosophers and theologians -- in which they are present. Thus nature in its first sense indicates birth, and in its second quiddity and essence. Then, in a passive sense, nature means “rerum creatarum universitatem.” Precisely in this passive sense Saint Thomas Aquinas along with other theologians states that the miracle surpasses “totius naturae vim.” The term indicates then the congregations of all the natural causes acting according to their innate disposition. Ripalda observes: “Eo pacto naturam nihil frustra moliri, odisse superfluum, facere optimum quod potest, otiosam non esse, & alia id genus, docent cum Aristotele philosophi.” According to still another meaning nature refers “ad essentiam suppositi, prout a subsistentia distinguitur.” In addition to this theological sense of the word, a physical meaning is also specified that takes nature “pro ea collectione rerum, cum qua dona gratiae comparantur.” In this latter meaning nature’s order is separated from supernatural order. As we shall see, it will be exactly this meaning that Ripalda will put at the base of his dissertations on the supernatural. Ripalda advises us of having omitted several other senses of nature, and reduces to four the eight meanings mentioned by him. Therefore he tells us that in the logical sense nature denotes essence and quiddity, in the metaphysical sense complete substance, in the physical sense incomplete substance which has matter and form, and in the theological sense that aggregate of res which is apart from the order of grace. In accordance with the meanings of nature the Spanish theologian specifies the meanings of natural being. The first should be referred to the nativity and the origin, the second to what is consentaneous with the nature and the essence of each res, the fourth indicates what opposes “operi miraculoso”, the


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fifth everything that is not free, the sixth calls natural “ea quae supposito ratione naturae, & non ratione hypostasis convenire solent,” the seventh denotes things which lie within the province of the natural compound of matter and form, and the eighth what “absolute, & simpliciter” is not supernatural and is contained “intra naturae vires, & Exigentiam.” This latter meaning is quite distinct from the others, because it separates the supernatural from the natural beings, which in all the other meanings are embraced together. Also this time our theologian states that, although all the meanings mentioned were familiar to the ancient doctors, among the Scholastics of his time only four are the most used. The first of these divides the natural from the violent and the contrary to nature, the second the natural from the free, the third the natural from the transnatural, that is separates the meaning of the philosophers from that of the metaphysicians; the fourth, finally, divides the natural from the supernatural.47 In this ample treatment the consideration of the third meaning of the terms nature and supernatural is placed , which is the one directly pertinent to our subject. From the few clues that we have already given some precise indications can be inferred. The Spanish theologian identifies the unnatural with the violent, and distinguishes the transnatural and metaphysical from what is supernatural. It is clear that for him one can speak of the supernatural only by referring to a well-defined idea of nature and of the natural being and not just to a general idea of nature where the meanings of nature and the natural being, which for him must be kept well distinct, become confused. That being said, let us come to the point in question: the third meaning of the terms that we have considered. God is the beginning of every operation, and embraces “omne esse” or formaliter or eminenter. Precisely for this reason nature in its active meaning indicates the divine mind, artefice of everything. In this way Seneca, Plato, Cicero, Hugues de Saint-Victor, and Niceta understood nature. Lactantius, referring to Seneca, stated that “a natura, quae Deus est, omnia fiant.” Saint Augustine, in 47 De Ente Supernaturali, Tomus I, p. 1, col. 1 - p. 3, col. 2.


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turn, concluded in the De Civitate Dei that no created nature is contrary to God “qui summa, ac simpliciter natura est, ut summa, ac simpliciter essentia.” Hence, for our theologian, “apud Priscos Philosophos” the division of nature “in naturam naturantem, & naturam naturatam” had its origin and similarly “in naturam universalem, & in naturam particularem,” and, according to Saint Augustine, creator in nature and created nature. In this division the first element denotes God, and the second “omnia existentia infra Deum.” According to this meaning of the word nature, natural is called “quicquid fieri solet iuxta obedientiam, qua naturae creatae, creatrici, ac summae naturae Dei subiciuntur.” Ripalda quotes on this subject a passage from Saint Augustine’s Contra Faustum which says: “Deus creator, & conditor omnium naturarum, nihil contra naturam facit. Id enim erit cuique rei naturale, quod ille fecerit, a quo est omnis modus, numerus & ordo naturae.” The follower of Saint Augustine, Prosper Tiro (Prosper of Aquitaine), concluded from this doctrine: “Naturam conditor Deus nihil in miraculis contra Naturam facit. Nobis ergo videntur contra naturam insolita, quibus aliter naturae cursus innotuit, non autem Deo, cui hoc est natura, quod fecerit.” According to Ripalda for this very reason Saint Thomas of Aquinas conceded that it is natural “culibet creaturae transmutari a Deo secundum eius voluntatem.” For the same reason Saint Augustine asserted that it is not against nature what happens by God’s will “cum voluntas tanti Conditoris, conditae rei cuiusque natura sit.” Therefore God was still called “naturae naturam.” 48 Certainly not accidentally, but for a well meditated reflection, Spinoza based his polemic on the miracle above all on the opinions of the vulgus. His way of formulating the question had as its grounding a deep-seated and illustrious Augustinian tradition which is attested to us in respect to his time by the writings of Ripalda. Spinoza knew the doctrines of Saint

48 De Ente Supernaturali, Tomus I, p. 1, col. 2 - p. 2, col. 1; p. 2, col. 2 - p. 3, col. 1.


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Augustine, whose works he had, if no others, at least an Epitome among his books.49 Moreover, the high theology of his time, worthily represented by Ripalda, attests that the doctrine which distinguishes the natura naturans from the natura naturata, was worked out in a well-ordered treatment of the meanings of nature and the natural being, that was the necessary premise of every possible discussion concerning the supernatural being. When the distinction made famous by Spinoza in the modern period is seen in the light of that well-ordered theory of nature and of the natural being, then it is very clear that, from this point of view, not even for the most profound seventeenth-century theology does God do anything against nature. It is clear that there are no miracles before God, because for God it is natural to do everything that he does, and that nothing can go against mode, number and order established by God -- mode, number, and order of nature that have nothing to do with what for men is unknown and out of the ordinary. In Ripalda there also remained the fundamental reference to the free will of God, unknown to Spinoza. But this was not an obstacle to place Spinoza’s doctrine of the miracle in the theological treatment of the meanings of nature, and to link it to a very precise meaning of the idea of nature. In this sense, Spinoza’s conclusions on the miracle could be admitted and tolerated by the most profound theology of the seventeenth century, even if not by common theologians and by the flock of simple believers. In our view, when one discourses on Spinoza’s distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata it is necessary to go back to the theological elaboration of the doctrine of nature, carried out in the century in which Spinoza lived, and to the way in which this doctrine of nature was compared with the doctrine of the supernatural being, corresponding to it. In this connection

49 A.J. Servaas Van Rooijen, Inventaire des livres formant la bibliothèque de Bénédict Spinoza, La Haye-Paris: Tengeler- Monnerat 1888, p. 131 n° 17 in folio. See P. Pozzi, “La biblioteca di Spinoza” in Le vite di Spinoza, ed. R. Bordoli, Macerata: Quodlibet 1994, p. 160 n° 17.


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the numerous, even useful precedents, sought after by the historians, appear insufficient and inconclusive, even if they go back “to the highest Scholasticism,” as Giovanni Gentile observes in his notes to the Ethica, cited above. As we have seen, in the Korte Verhandeling Spinoza refers to the Thomisten and not directly to Saint Thomas Aquinas, and it is with them he discusses. He thus opens a vast field of conjecture, considering the vast fame and authority enjoyed in the seventeenth century by “Doctor Angelicus” not only among Catholics, but also among the reformers such as the Dutch Paul Voet.50 But, as we have said, we retain that we must go back not to lost and dispersed references in many authors, but to a doctrine quite otherwise elaborated, like the one we have found in Ripalda. Precisely for all the considerations that we have developed so far, it is necessary to complete our argument by treating as well -- even in a succinct and compendious way -- the counterpart of Martinez de Ripalda’s doctrine of nature, to wit, its conception of the supernatural. Furthermore, it is necessary to consider which among the many meanings attributed to nature our theologian chose to originate, in reference to it, his own doctrine of the supernatural. Other criteria of judgement and historical evaluation for Spinoza’s doctrine of the miracle and of the supernatural will arise from this examination. Like the idea of nature, the idea of the supernatural admits as well a multiplicity of meanings, whose concepts Ripalda has listed and defined. In the first place, the author notes that the vox “supernatural,” that indicates the “ens supra naturam,” is rarely used outside theological schools. Still, it is found also among the philosophers and the Church Fathers. The philosophers understand by it the being that is above the natural compound of matter and form, which for them is the philosophical meaning of nature. Precisely in this sense the metaphysical beings are called supernatural, and the same metaphysical science is called by custom “supernaturalium scientia, aut scientia supernaturalis,” as

50 See Piero Di Vona, Studi sull'ontologia di Spinoza, parte II, Firenze: La Nuova Italia 1969, pp. 58-61.


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Fonseca observed in the proem of his Commento alla Metafisica. According to this meaning, the “supernaturalitas entis” does not denote the excellence of perfection, but only the “superioritatem universalitatis a singulari materia praescindentis.” In fact, the “ratio entis,” which is subjected to metaphysical reflection, cannot exhibit other excellence than that of universality, since it is common to any miminim res. This observation of Ripalda is important, because it demonstrates his possession of a clear and sure doctrine in the field of ontology, and his having founded on this competence his doctrine of the supernatural. Furthermore, we maintain that this observation of Ripalda was turned against the Scotists of the seventeenth century, who thought that being was a concept “omnio praecisum, & distinctum ab inferioribus ante opus intellectus.”51 Distinct from that in use among the philosophers is the meaning of the word supernatural which is found among the Church Fathers, according to whom it means “operis, & perfectionis excellentiam, prout Theologis commune est.” Ripalda endeavours to show with appropriate citations that the vox “supernatural” is already found among the Fathers, unlike what certain recent writers think. He maintains, moreover, that this vox was not defined before the papal bulls of Gregory XIII and Pius V against Michael Baius. In any case, it is certain that the word was invented “ad donorum sublimitatem exponendam.” Other Fathers and other ecclesiastic writers make use of equivalent words to signify this “praestantiam donorum, & operum supernaturalium.” It results from Ripalda’s dissertation that with the name of supernatural being one must understand “ens sublime, & excedens naturam.” He immediately observes that the subject of all of his De Ente Supernaturali Disputationes Theologicae is to establish what is the nature which the supernatural being exceeds in sublimity, and how much is the excellence by which the supernatural being surpasses nature.

51 See Piero Di Vona, I concetti trascendenti in Sebastian Izquierdo e nella Scolastica del Seicento, Napoli: Loffredo 1994, pp. 97-137.


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Exactly “secondum excellentiam” the supernatural being distinguishes itself in supernaturale simpliciter and supernaturale secundum quid. The first is that supernatural which does not only exceed one or the other nature, but “naturam universam,” as it occurs in the case of the justifying grace, the beatific vision, and the hypostatic union. The second is the supernatural which surpasses only one or the other nature, as man surpasses stone, and stone air. After having made this division which, as he himself recognises, is frequent in his time, Ripalda continues to successively subdivide the members of the division already carried out. The supernatural being simpliciter is called like this or “excellentia dignitatis”, or “excellentia causalitatis, seu virtutis.” Gaetanus with many Thomists thus distinguishes the supernatural simpliciter, and considers only God supernatural simpliciter for the excellence of his dignity. In fact, only God surpasses in dignity every substance created or able to be created. To this kind of supernaturalness also God’s attribute called supersubstantial by the Pseudo Dionysius the Areopagite must be ascribed. The justifying grace, the “habitus luminis gloriae”, and similar things -- which, even though they may be equaled or vanquished in perfection by some natural substance, can never be surpassed in relation to causality or virture -- refer to the supernatural simpliciter par excellence of causality or virture. The distinction of the supernatural simpliciter is also very frequent according to the excellence of the causality or virtue in the supernatural as to substance and to mode. Supernatural as to the substance is that whose entity or substance “excedit omnem continentiam, & exigentiam naturae.” These are charity and grace. Supernatural as to mode is that which “secundum entitatem continetur intra vires aut exigentiam naturae, secundum modum vero, quo producitur, seu acquiritur, universam naturam excedit.” Such is the case of the recovery of


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lost sight, of the instantaneous recovery of health, and of other things of this type.52 Ripalda dedicates a particular treatment 53 to the supernaturals as to mode, distinct from those as to substance, of which we shall remember only some points useful for our discourse. He insists on demonstrating that the way of production necessary for the supernatural gifts as to the mode, must transcend not only the power of the subject that receives them, but also “totius universim naturae vires, & exigentiam.” Moreover, exactly in these first pages of his vast treatise our theologian affirms that “omnia vel in salutem praedestinatorum, vel in exaltationem Christi, vel in gloriam extrinsecam Dei creata sunt,” which is a doctrine very far from Spinoza, as the Appendix of part I of the Ethica demonstrates, in which the philosopher asserts that God has predetermined everything necessarily not by free will, but by His absolute nature and infinite power. Consequently, Spinoza denies that God does something for an end.54 Instead Ripalda’s doctrine implies that all the divine acts are intrinsically supernatural, that everything has been created for a supernatural end, and that everything is supernatural at least as far as the mode is concerned.55 And yet, as we have just begun to see, Ripalda’s theological doctrine permits circumscribing the place that Spinoza’s doctrine of nature and of God or Nature occupies in the wide panorama of the philosophies and theologies of the seventeenth century. Another point is worth-while drawing attention to is the argument (subiectum) which Ripalda assigns to his Treatise. The determination of the subject sheds new light on Spinoza’s doctrine of God or Nature, and permits specifying its position in respect to the thinking of the period. Our theologian intends to treat only the beings created “quidditative supernaturalia, secundum communem supernaturalitatis excellentiam.” To this

52 De Ente Supernaturali, Tomus I, p. 3, col. 2 - p. 4, col. 2. 53 De Ente Supernaturali, Tomus I, p. 5, col. 1 - p. 7, col. 1. 54 O, II, pp. 77-83 55 De Ente Supernaturali, Tomus I, p. 5, col. 2.


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end he separates his object from others that still are included in the category of the supernatural. It does not fall within the aims of Ripalda to treat the ratio of the common supernatural being common to the supernaturals secundum quid, nor the ratio supernatural simpliciter common to God. Neither is it part of his aim to explain the ratio common to the supernaturals according to the mode. His study is directed only to the supernaturals in respect to the substance included “sub ente creato supernaturali.” The reasons of the removals indicated concern our research only for some important aspects. Ripalda observes: “Item praetermitto, supernaturalia quoad substantiam, prout complectuntur Deum quia supernaturalitas entitativa communis creaturis cum Deo valde analoga est, apud Theologos parum constans.” In his judgement then, the supernaturalness that creatures have in common with God not only implies a very large analogy, but it is also too little well determined among the the theologians. Those, however, who have followed us thus far will not be able to doubt that for Ripalda the supernatural being is also a being implying the analogy of the being, since our theologian accepts all the divisions and subdivisions of the supernatural being recognised in his time, and above all that of the supernatural simpliciter and secundum quid, and then all the other divisions subordinate to this first distinction. For this as well we maintain that De Lubac reproaches Ripalda for having conceived the supernatural as a “super-nature”.56 But, apart from this dispute among theologians that hardly concerns us here, we have to point out that Ripalda derives from this observation the idea that the supernaturality of dignity belongs to God: “etenim Deo sola competit supernaturalitas dignitatis, omnem naturam nobilitate, ac perfectione excellens.” Instead, a sole 56 Henri De Lubac, Agostinismo e teologia moderna, Bologna: il Mulino, p. 294. Note that in his book Il mistero del sovrannaturale, Bologna: il Mulino 1967, pp. 42-43, 86-89, 117, De Lubac sustains the total transcendence of the supernatural, its perfect gratuitousness and its heterogeneity in respect to nature. For this theologian, between the natural and the supernatural, there is the same distance that there is between non-being and being.


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supernaturality belongs to the creatures “exigentiae, ac virtutis” which is not common with God “cum deus nulla vitute producatur, & ab omnibus creaturis exigature.” Some very important consequences for our research proceed from this doctrine. When God is called supernatural for dignity, then He surpasses not only the natural things, but also the “supernaturalia creata.” But God can also be conceived by theologians as a natural being, and not even in this case is surpassed by the created supernatural beings: “cum vero ab exigentia naturae naturalis ponitur ab entibus creatis supernaturalibus non exceditur.” When God is confronted with the creatures, “aeque supernturalia, ac naturalia transcendit.” Ripalda observes in this connection that those who “deum adstruunt entitatem supernaturalem,” do not attribute to God a form of excellence on nature which they “qui entitatem naturalem praedicant” may not recognise in Him. Nor do the latter assert some “propinquitas” of God with nature that the former can deny. Ripalda concludes: “Ideo varie a plerisque Deus naturalis, & supernaturalis praedicatur: naturalis quidem, quia exigentiae naturae nihil naturalius est; supernaturalis vero, quia perfectionis excellentia nihil supernaturalius ac sublimius.” Therefore, in the seventeenth century there was also a place in theology for the conception of a natural God, because nothing more natural than God is required by the nature of things. Ripalda cites the authors who affirm both the idea of God or Nature, and the idea of God as supernatural. We think it opportune to quote at least the first: “Deo tribuunt esse naturale, Augustinus, Hugo Victorinus, Niceta, Lactantius, Plato, Seneca, Prosper, Damianus, Thomas.” Ripalda also mentions quite a few theologians, “praesertim recentiores”, among whom he includes Salas. It remains for us to note that among those who attribute to God a “esse supernaturale” Ripalda includes the Pseudo-Dionysius, and again Saint Thomas who thus is cited in favour of both doctrines. He then mentions Arrubal and other Neoterics.57 57 De Ente Supernaturali, Tomus I, p. 7, col. 2 - p. 8, col. 2.


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In the highest theology of the seventeenth century one consequently discussed if God had to be called natural or supernatural being, and in what sense was one or the other these beings. Spinoza could stir up scandal among theologians of scarce doctrine and among the common believers, but certainly not among the more profound and erudite theologians. The latter would have easily known to place his God or Nature among the other ideas of God, such as natural being, which were known in those times and were common to both Christian and pagan authors. A last question remains to be discussed: what is for Ripalda the nature “supra quam ens supernaturale constituitur.” Also in this connection we shall treat the subject with the due clarity and simplicity, limiting ourselves to the principal points. Let us say immediately that for our theologian nature, in the theological sense, is surpassed by the supernatural beings with which she is compared, is the “collectio substantiarum nunc existentium, earumque possibilium, quae existentibus annexae, & affines sunt.”58 Another way of explaining “Theologice” nature, easier for those who do not accept the preceding definition, is the following. Nature, above which the supernatural beings stand, “esse collectionem omnium substantiarum, & accidentium tam existentium quam possibilium, quae nullatenus cum gratia iustificante connexa sunt.” The supernatural being is always called “ab excellentia, quam habet supra naturam.” But the absolute excellence and the primary concept of the supernatural beings derives in any case from the order of grace: “assero proprium donorum supernaturalium conceptum, connexionem esse quidditativam cum gratia sanctificante physicam, intentionalem, immediatam, aut mediatam, antecedentem, aut consequentem.” 59 But, together with this theological concept of nature, also the ideas of nature that Ripalda considers that should not be compared to the supernatural being, and that consequently are

58 De Ente Supernaturali, Tomus I, p. 11, col. 1-2. 59 De Ente Supernaturali, Tomus I, p. 13, col. 1-2 - p.16, col. 2.


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excluded from the relationship with the supernatural are doubtlessly pertinent to our investigation. He enumerates and defines them at the beginning of the Dispute, in which one asks what is the nature above which is the supernatural being. In the first place, it is certain for him that this nature is not that which signifies the essence and the quiddity, since, in Ripalda’s judgement, also the supernatural being “essentia & quidditate gaudet.” Ripalda’s Treatise proposes to explain precisely this essence of the supernatural being. In the second place, “certum est, eam naturam non esse Deum.” In fact, there is no created reality that can exceed the might and excellence of God. In this connection we have to point out that the supernatural being, of which one speaks, must not to be compared with God understood as Nature, nor can it exceed it. The consideration of God or Nature is accordingly extraneous to this theologian and, by definition, to the treatment of the supernatural being. In the third place, nature, to which the supernatural being is superior, is not even “universitatem omnium rerum creatarum,” because among the created beings “plura accidentia sunt supernaturalia.” For our part we can conclude that the consideration of the supernatural being cannot concern even a nature that was conceived at the same time as naturans and naturata, in the manner of certain scholars of Spinoza, as the observations already made on the concept of nature also demonstrate. From all these exclusions of Ripalda it emerges clearly that nature, above which stands the supernatural being, is that which comprehends only the complete and incomplete substances, and is distinct from the order of grace. The question that one poses to our philosopher is if this nature includes the only existing substances and their accidents, or also the possible ones. We have already indicated which solution Ripalda preferred.60 We can conclude this brief examination by saying that Spinoza’s God or Nature -- for the high theology of his time -- was extraneous to all speculation on the supernatural intended to 60 De Ente Supernaturali, Tomus I, p. 9, col. 1.


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establish on which nature it was elevated. The idea of God as natural being was well-known and familiar to high theology, and it was by this theology taken into consideration in order to establish the question that asked to which nature the supernatural being must have referred for a necessary comparison. Consequently, as we have already seen, Spinoza’s negation of the miracle, sustained by the affirmation of God or Nature and of its infinite laws, did not say anything that was truly in contrast with the ideas of the high theology of his time, and that was incompatible with these. Because of this, it was not the idea of God or Nature that was opposed to the supernatural. In a word, it is above a nature conceived in Spinoza’s manner that the supernatural rises. As we have seen, in the seventeenth century the supernatural implied an entirely different concept of nature which connected it with the order of grace. On the other hand, only popular and common ideas of God and His miracles were struck by the ideas and the polemics of Spinoza. Having reached these conclusions, we must ask if really in his theological speculation Spinoza had excluded every idea of the supernatural. There is no doubt that in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus there are some passages in which Spinoza refuses the supernatural light. For him the “lumen supra rationem” is “longe infra rationem.” Moreover, as we have seen, there is no difference for him between “opus contra naturam” and “opus supra naturam.” 61 And yet can we in any case consider Spinoza’s peremptory negations as the sole and definitive manifestations of his thinking on the supernatural? At least in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus it does not seem so. In fact, when Spinoza enunciates in chapter XIV the “fidei universalis dogmata,” which, according to him, should make up all the controversies “in Ecclesia,” he accepts grace, admits that God does everything for grace, and admits the forgiveness of the repenters’ sins through the mercy and grace of God. In the measure that for Spinoza the dogmas of universal faith -- enunciated and proclaimed by him -- had a sense, in the same 61 O, III, pp. 80, 86, 112-113.


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measure the supernatural had a sense and was recognised among these dogmas. In fact, to recognise the grace of God is therefore to recognise the supernatural order, so much the more that Spinoza had set forth his dogmas of universal faith not only for the Hebrews but also for the Christians, and universally for all men. Consequently, there is also for Spinoza an order of grace, at least within the limits of knowledge of the first kind and in the order of the human imagination. But nothing forbids believing that the dogmas of universal faith -- just because they are destined to conciliate all the faiths and all the religions -- are therefore, insofar as they are universal, in conformity with reason and expressive of a knowledge of the second kind. After having established this, we can remind the reader that for Spinoza the “summa” and the foundation of the Bible are the love of God and of one’s neighbour, and that from this foundation the other “fundamentalia” proceed: the existence of God, His providence and omnipotence, and “quod nostra salus a sola ejus gratia pendeat.” Spinoza acknowledges the utility and the necessity of the Biblical revelation for having revealed what we cannot obtain by natural light and by reason alone; in other words, that simple obedience is the way to salvation “ex singulari Dei gratia.” Finally, in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus there is a passage which identifies the “vera libertas” with the “Dei gratia, & donum.” 62 Theologians like Ripalda compare the nature opposed to grace with the supernatural. When Spinoza treats the miracle, he always discusses the opinions of the common people, and their passions that lay claim to be the rule of the miraculous event, but he never speaks of grace. Spinoza’s polemic on the miracle is 62 O, III, pp. 41, 165, 177-178, 188. Alexandre Matheron in his book Le Christ et le salut des ignorants chez Spinoza, Paris: Aubier Montaigne 1971, pp. 102, 138, 143, even if considering grace as an improper image of divine liberty, thinks that the knowledge of Spinoza’s seven articles of faith belongs to the first kind of knowledge, but is not false. On pp. 97-114 he maintains that the seven articles, besides being useful, are true and are in agreement with Spinoza’s moral doctrine.


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not founded on the relationship between nature and grace. Quite to the contrary, in the same Tractatus Theologico-Politicus in which Spinoza discusses the miracle, the Dutch philosopher includes the grace of God among the articles of universal faith. In Spinoza’s philosophy the Natura naturans and the Natura naturata are not the equivalent of that nature that is opposed to grace and to the supernatural order. These terms were not opposed for Ripalda, and neither are they for Spinoza. If anything, for Spinoza it is nature meant as emotional human nature of the passions which could be opposed to the supernatural order, considering that according to His articles of universal faith, God -- through grace -- forgives the sins of those who repent. We must make a quite different discourse if we turn to the Spinoza’s letters. In the last ones exchanged with Oldenburg, the Dutch philosopher first asserts that the resurection of Christ was “revera spiritualem,”and revealed to the believers “ad eorum captum” (Epistola 75); then, having been explicitly asked about it by Oldenburg (Epistola 77), he stated: “Caeterum Christi passionem, mortem, sepulturam, tecum literaliter accipio, ejus autem resurrectionem allegorice,” and he did not hesitate to recall that Saint Paul gloried in having known Christ not in the flesh but in the spirit (Epistola 78). For Oldenburg (Epistola 79) it was logical to respond to Spinoza that the whole Christian religion is based on the resurrection of Jesus, and that, having got rid of the resurrection, Christ’s whole mission and doctrine collapses.63 In turn we must point out that, having removed the resurrection, the whole supernatural order is therefore suppressed. Since we have compared Spinoza’s doctrine with that of Ripalda, we shall leave the last word on this point to Ripalda. Without going into Spinoza’s discussions on Christ and Christology,64 we shall recall only that in Epistola 73 to

63 O, IV, pp. 314, 325, 328, 330. 64 We refer to A. Matheron, Le Christ, op.cit., and to M. Chamla, Spinoza e il concetto della tradizione ebraica, op. cit., pp. 100-101, 187-188, note 55.


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Oldenburg Spinoza had denied that “Deum naturam humanam assumpserit.” This was inconceivable for him, because it was as if to say “quod circulum naturam quadrati induerit.” Despite how much Spinoza declares to Oldenburg in the correspondence, we must point out, however, that in the Ethica, retelling the story of Adam, Spinoza tells us that the latter, after having believed that the brutes were similar to him, took to imitate their affects and to lose his freedom. This was then recuperated by the Patriarchs “ducti Spiritu Christi, hoc est, Dei idea, a qua sola pendit, ut homo liber sit.” 65 This citation from the Ethica confirms to us that for Spinoza it is the emotional and passsionate human nature that can be opposed to liberty and to the attainment of beatitude, but not just the fact that God is to be conceived as Nature. Moreover, it shows us that, even though Spinoza in the epistolarium did not admit either the incarnation or the resurrection, he always attributed to the Spirit of Christ the recovery of human liberty, and thus of the condition itself that in his doctrine allows the attainment of beatitude. Now the great Treatise by Ripalda on the supernatural being is dedicated to the Crucified Christ “Supernaturalium actuum fonti unico.” Hence, it was not the lack of the idea of God’s grace -- explicitly admitted in Spinoza’s articles of the universal faith -- to create difficulties of comprehension which still recur today on Spinoza’s doctrine regarding the supernatural, but the particular, completely spiritual conception that Spinoza had of Christ. In this study we have not intended to establish if Spinoza’s doctrines on universal faith and on the miricale are coherent one with the other, and neither to penetrate the intimate convictions of Spinoza beyond his writings. It was not our purpose to establish if Spinoza’s determinism may imply the end of the

65 O, II, pp. 261-262; IV, p. 309. A. Matheron in his book Le Christ, op. cit., pp. 86-87, 258-260, thinks that Spinoza attributed to Christ to have attained personal eternity of the soul for his possession of knowledge of the third kind. In this sense Christ would be resurrected and would have his disciples resurrected.


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supernatural, and if his polemic on the miracle may imply the criticism of grace as historicity.66 Every possible judgement on Spinoza’s doctrines that assumes as a criterion the credo and the convictions of one of the Christian churches lies beyond our aims.67 Neither have we wanted to establish if it is true that Spinoza’s criticism of the miracle is valid only for those who accept the philosophy of Spinoza.68 As we have already done in our books dedicated to the study of Spinoza’s ontology, we have set ourselves to consider Spinoza’s doctine on the supernatural and on the miracle in all of its complexity, and to give a just acknowledgement to all of its components. This was possible for us by making a comparison between Spinoza’s doctrines of nature and the miracle and Ripalda’s doctrine of nature and the supernatural. Studying the idea that Spinoza had of the beings, we pointed out that he elaborated a concept of the real beings “sub specie aeternitatis,” and regarded God as the absolutely infinite being and the unique substance constituted by infinite attributes. Nevertheless, Spinoza did not elaborate in the Ethica a concept of the real being common to God and to the res that proceed from God, as the Scholastic metaphysics of his time had done. The concept of being, intended by him as a genus generalissimum, was for Spinoza only an auxiliary of the imagination which served to compare the natural individuals among each other to establish their relative perfection: for that reason it belongs to the knowledge of the first kind. The concept of the being, defined or described by Spinoza at the beginning of

66 A. Tosel, Spinoza, op.cit., pp. 207-232. 67 Carla Gallicet Calvetti in Spinoza i presupposti teoretici dell'irenismo etico, Milano: Vita e Pensiero 1968, pp. 79-90, 119-127, states that Spinoza abolishes every recourse to the supernatural, that for him a supernatural order is inexistent, and gives a speculative evaluation of the Spinozist articles of faith from the Catholic point of view. 68 See Sylvain Zac, Spinoza et l'interprétation de l'écriture, Paris: PUF 1965, pp. 199-207.


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the Cogitata Metaphysica is also pertinent to this same form of knowledge.69 Also apropos of the supernatural and of the miracle we have met a complex web of doctrines, similar to that present in the metaphysical and gnoseological doctrines of Spinoza. By way of simplification, we can say that on the question of the supernatural and of the miracle, Spinoza’s idea of nature opposes the ideas that the common people hold of God and of miracles. But at the same time Spinoza states the articles of a universal faith, conciliator of the contrast among the churches, in which a doctrine of grace finds a place. The Spirit of Christ guides man to the conquest of liberty, but, at least in the epistolarium, Spinoza denies the incarnation and the resurrection. For him, Christ’s resurrection has an exclusively spiritual sense. Even on the latter subject an abstract doctrinary coherence can be obtained only sacrificing, or underestimating, one or the other of the dominant ideas of Spinoza’s complex construction. Thus, one could suppose that with his articles of universal faith Spinoza had wanted to refer absolutely to the sole God the idea of grace, even if he rejected the Christian idea of the resurrection of Jesus. In this regard, however, one could observe that, at least in our knowledge, there is no passage in Spinoza’s works that unites in the same text the idea of God’s grace with the refusal of Jesus’ resurrection. One must say the same as far as Spinoza’s refusal of the incarnation is concerned. Not even is it united in a unique text with the idea of grace. Similarly, at least to our knowledge, there is not any text of Spinoza that opposes grace to nature, God of grace with God or Nature, thus giving a negative sense to the comparison between Spinoza and Ripalda’s doctrines, undertaken by us in these pages. On the contrary, even if for Spinoza God is always Nature, the absolutely infinite being and the unique substance endowed with infinite attributes,

69 O, I, p. 233; II, pp. 45-46, 207-208, 299.


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in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus God is Charity for Spinoza, and in the Ethica He is infinite intellectual Love.70 Some simplifying intellectual operations, permitted from a theoretical point of view, but abstract from the historical one, have been made many times in the centuries-old history of Spinozism. Without wishing to deny the seriousness of their speculative reasons, in our study we have proposed to always restore Spinoza’s philosophy to its essential complexity, which is in keeping with the spirit of the seventeenth century, and with the equally, if not more complex, constructions attributable to the Scholastics and the philosophers of Spinoza’s century.

70 O, II, pp. 45-46, 302; III, pp. 175-176; IV, p. 314 for the spiritual resurrection of Christ.

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