-A178 365 FREEDOM OF SPEECH VERSUS GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE- 1/1ENFORCEABILITY OF THE BAR LETTER(U) AIR WAR COLLMAXWELL AFB AL J F BREITHAUPT MAR 86 AU-AWC-86-828

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AIR WAR COLLEGEa 4 RESEARCH REPORT

No. AU-AWC-86-028In

00FREEDOM OF SPEECH VS. GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE:

ENFORCEABILITY OF THE BAR LETTER

BY LT COL JAMES F. BREITHAUPT, USAFR

DIC,

'3 0 7

INNER Ld

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ROVEAEDIFTRIPBUIOMAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALUABAMAE

UNIMTE

AIR WAR COLLEGEAIR UNIVERSITY

FREEDOM OF SPEECH VS. GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE:ENFORCEABILITY OF THE BAR LETTER

by

James F. Breithaupt

Lieutenant Colonel, USAFR

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH

REQUIREMENT

Research Advisor: Lieutenant Colonel Donald E. Morrissey

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

March 1986

DISCLAIMER-ABSTAINER

This research report represents the views of the

author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion

of the Air War College or the Department of the Air Force.

This document is the property of the United States

government and is not to be reproduced in whole or in part

without permission of the commandant, Air War College,

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

NTIS GFRA.17.DTICA

U-1 oC ed C1

Justif icat i

By-

- .v Codes

PEi

Oii

AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Freedon of Speech vs. Good Order and Discipline:Enforceability of the Bar Letter

AUTHOR: James F. Breithaupt, Lieutenant Colonel, USAFR

Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions are

analyzed and discussed with respect to their treatment of the

balance between the citizen's right to freedom of speech

versus the commander's right to preserve good order and

discipline on the military installation. Special

considerations are given to the open house as a potential

public forum and the enforceability of the bar letter.

Recommendations provide guidance for the issuance of

enforceable bar letters.\

iii

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel James F. Breithaupt (J.D.,

Syracuse University) is a member of the USAF Judge Advocate

General Reserve. He is a member of the Florida and New York

bars and is attached to ESMC/JA, Patrick AFB, Florida. He

served on active duty as a Judge Advocate at MacDill AFB,

Florida and the Republic of Vietnam, and has performed

special active duty tours at Homestead APB, Florida; Hurlburt

Field, Florida, Patrick AFB, Florida; Charleston AFS, South

Carolina; Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Castle AFB, California;

Norton AFB, California, Travis AFB, California, and Dyess

AFB, Texas. He is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff

College, in residence, and the Air War College Correspondence

Program.

In his civilian career, he has been an assistant

professor at the University of Florida College of Law and

Auburn University at Montgomery, and an adjunct profpisor at

Santa Fe Community College and Alabama State University. He

has also practiced law with Cahill, Gordon, New York City,

served as a title attorney at the Florida state office of a

nationwide title insurance company, and founded A Florida

real estate brokerage. Lieutenant Colonel Breithaupt is a

graduate of the Air War College, Class of 1986.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

.DISCLAIMER-ABSTAINER ................... i

BIOGRAPHICAL. SKETCH . . . .... . ... . .. .. . . . ... iv

I INTRODUCTION........... . .. ............... 1

II UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT--THE TRILOGY .. 4

III FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS.............. 9

IV CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....... 13

NOTES ................ s..... ......... 16

BIBLIGRPHY* * ............ ... * 19

V

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

There are many cogent reasons for restricting access

to military installations located in the United States.

Closed bases and restricted areas have long been protected by

fences, military police, courts, and federal law. However,

various sectors of United States military installations are

readily accessible to military personnel, dependents,

contractors, workers, and visitors. Installation commanders

are encouraged to hold annual open houses to promote

relations with the civilian communities. Throughout all

this activity, the installation commander is charged with the

preservation of good order and discipline.2

Occasionally, good order and discipline may be

threatened by someone who enters upon a military

installation. Federal statute provides that anyone who goes

upon a military installation in the United States for any

purpose prohibited by law or lawful regulation may be tried

for a criminal misdemeanor. 3 Conviction thereof is

punishable by fine of not more than five hundred dollars

and/or imprisonment for not more than six months.

In addition, the installation commander may have a

person removed from the installation. 4 Such removal may be

accompanied with or followed by a bar letter which orders

1

such person not to reenter the installation withouti 5

permission of its commander. Subsequent reentry without

permission is also a federal crime punishable by fine of not

more than five hundred dollars, or imprisonment for not more6

than six months, or both.

On the surface it appears that federal legislation

and military regulations provide the commander with a viable

means for ensuring the preservation of good order and

discipline. The problem is that when the commander's action

violates an individual's protected right of freedom of

speech, the courts will not enforce the bar letter. The

enforceability of federal law has been seriously challenged

by intruders who assert that their presence and activities on

the installation are constitutionally protected exercises of

First Amendment rights.7

The right to freedom of speech is not absolute.

Three landmark Supreme Court decisions have examined the

circumstances surrounding unwanted intrusions on military

installations and sought to balance the interests involved.8

The key to understanding these cases ostensibly lies in the

ability to discern the presence of a public forum. Free

speech in a public forum is protected. Free speech in a

private forum may be reasonably restricted. The Supreme

Court addressed hIe public forum issue in the Flower 9 and

Spock1 0 cases. Although the Court reached different

conclusions in each case, distinctions between the cases are

2

elusive. This elusiveness prompted a dissenting judge in the

Spock case to write: ". . . if any significant distinction

remains between the cases, it is that in Flower the private

party was an innocuous leafleteer and here [Spock] the

private parties include one of this country's most vociferous

opponents of the exercise of military power."11

The free speech and public forum issues have been

further complicated by the concept of the temporary public

forum which arose in the Albertini case. 12 In this case, the

Supreme Court was confronted with a lower court holding that

a temporary public forum was created by open house

activities.

The purposes of this paper are to analyze and discuss

existing federal court cases in an attempt to reconcile these

decisions into guidance for the commander. This discussion

will provide a basis for recommendations which will enable

the commander to discern and create the proper circumstances

for the issuance of enforceable bar letters when good order

and discipline are threatened by intruders upon the

installation.

3

1--111 Q W 3

CHAPTER II

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT--THE TRILOGY

In Flower v. United States, 1 the Supreme Court

reversed the conviction of a leafleteer who had been

distributing "Town Meeting on the Vietnam War" leaflets on

New Braunfels Avenue within the limits of Fort Sam Houston.

The leafleteer had been previously barred from the post and

convicted for his reentry upon the military installation.2

The Court specifically found that First Amendment

freedom of speech protected Flower from application of the

federal reentry statute because the military had ".

abandoned any claim that it has special interests in who

walks, talks, or distributes leaflets on the avenue."3

The Court predicated its decision on its finding that

Fort Sam Houston was an open post and that New Braunfels

Avenue was a completely open street freely traversed by

military, public, and private vehicles, and military and

civilian pedestrians, at all hours of the day. 4 The

dissenting opinion of Judge Rehnquist noted the manner in

which this case affected the installation commander:

The Court's opinion leaves the base commander with aHobson's choice. He may close access to civiliantraffic on New Braunfels Avenue and other trafficarteries traversing the post, thereby rendering thepost once more subject to the authority that Congressintended him to have, but also causing substantialinconvenience to civilian residents of Bexar County

4

who presently use these arteries. Or, he maycontinue to accommodate the convenience of theresidents, but only at the cost of surrendering theauthority Congress conferred upon him under 18 U.S.C.[Section]5 ... 1382 to control access to the post hecommands.

In effect, the United States Supreme Court held in

Flower that a public thoroughfare was a public forum for

exercise of freedom of speech even though such byway crossed

and was part of an open military installation. Thus, the

installation commander could not properly bar the speaker

from this part of the installation because the commander had

lost his authority over the public byway.

Greer v. Spock 6 was a case which rose to the United

States Supreme Court from Fort Dix. This case involved a

political candidate who requested permission to enter Fort

Dix for the purpose of distributing campaign literature. The

installation commander denied the request. Suit was

commenced to enjoin enforcement of Fort Dix regulations which

governed political campaigning and literature distribution,

on the ground that these regulations violated the First

'imendment right to freedom of speech.

In Spock, the Court found that Fort Dix had not

J. become a public forum and that its regulations did not

unconstitutionally deny the right of freedom of speech.

Although the main entrances to Fort Dix were normally

unguarded and civilians were permit ed to freely visit

unrestricted areas of the post, 7 it was . . the business

of a military installation like Fort Dix to train soldiers,

5

... ..

not to provide a public forum. The Court specifically

pointed out that:

The fact that other civilian speakers andentertainers had sometimes been invited to appear atFort Dix did not of itself serve to convert Fort Dixinto a public forum or to confer upon politicalcandidates a First or Fifth Amendment right toconduct their campaigns there. The decision of themilitary authorities that a civilian lecture on drugabuse, a religious service by a visiting preacher atthe base chapel, or a rock concert would besupportive of the military mission of Fort Dixsurely did not leave the authorities powerlessthereafter to prevent any civilian from entering FortDix to speak on any subject whatever.

The Spock decision did not overrule the Flower case

even though the Court said: "There is nothing in the

Constitution that disables a military commander from acting

to avert what he perceives to be a clear danger to the

loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops on the base under

his command."1 0 Presumably, the installation commander at

Fort Sam Houston perceived such danger when he barred Flower

from the base. There was no allegation that his actions were

patently arbitrary or discriminatory.

It is suggested that the real distinction between

these cases is that Spock asked the commander to provide him

a forum and was denied. Denial of the request did not

violate constitutional rights. Flower assumed a forum on the

base. His conviction for reentry on the installation was

reversed because the Court found he had a constitutional

right to freedom of speech on the open street through the

post. Regulations which require permission to hand out

6

leaflets on a military installation have been subsequently

found to be facially constitutional.11

In the most recent Supreme Court consideration of

freedom of speech versus the commander's right to protect

discipline and good order, the defendant assumed a forum on12

Hickam Air Force Base. The Court reversed a lower court

decision and upheld a conviction under 18 U.S.C. Section

1382.

In the Albertini case, 13 the defendant reentered

Hickam Air Force Base during an open house. Nine years

earlier the defendant had been issued a bar letter which

provided that he was not to reenter Hickam Air Force Base

without written permission from the commander. Albertini was

escorted off the base and subsequently was tried and

convicted for his reentry.

The Court concluded that the open house activities

did not provide Albertini with permission to reenter. "The

fact that respondent had previously received a valid bar

letter distinguished him from the general public and provided

reasonable grounds for excluding him from the base." 14

The Court did not decide whether Hickam AFB had

become a temporary public forum, although it stated that:

"The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Hickam was ever

a public forum is dubious." 1 5 The Court -.esoned that the

public forum requirement was unnecessary because Albertini

had previously received a valid bar letter. The Court

7

concluded that: "Where a bar letter is issued on valid

grounds, a person may not claim immunity from its prohibition

on entry merely because the military has temporarily opened a

military facility to the public. " 16 The large number of

people present at the open house seemed to provide greater

justification for enforcement of the bar letter.

In rendering the Albertini decision, the Flower case

was said to be inapplicable because there had been no

military abandonment of any claim of special interest in

regulatory expression, or suggestion that the bar letter was

improperly predicated upon constitutionally protected

activity. While Spock was utilized to reiterate principles

for determining a public forum, the Court never decided this

issue in Albertini. The majority opinion rendered in each

decision found no inconsistencies in prior Court rulings.

8

J1

CHAPTER III

FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS

Several lower federal courts have considered the

balance between the interests of commander and the consti-

tutional right of freedom of speech. The ninth circuit court

of appeals in the Albertini case, which was subsequently

reversed by the Supreme Court, discussed the effects of the

creation of a public forum on a military installation:

If the government creates such a forum, even thoughunder no duty to do so, its power to excludeexpression is severely limited . . . . Although thegovernment is not required to maintain indefinitelythe open character of the facility, as long as itdoes so it is bound by the sate standards as apply inthe traditional public forum.

It is evident that the potential danger of creating a public

forum on a military installation is increased through this

allusion to the effects of the temporary public forum.2

In United States v. Gourley, the tenth circuit

federal court of appeals found that the grass outside the Air

Force Academy chapel during visiting hours and the Academy

stadium before and during a football game were public forums.

Thus, activities of the defendants in kneeling in silent

protest to the Vietnam War and passing out anti-war pamphlets

were proper exercises of First Amendment rights and could not

legally predicate bar letters. Therefore, convictions for

subsequent reentries were reversed and dismissed.

9

The seventh circuit federal court of appeals also

examined the predicate to the bar letters in determining

whether to affirm convictions for reentry in United States v.

Quilty.3 In this case, convictions were upheld because bar

letters had been predicated upon a prior anti-nuclear

demonstration on the Rock Island Arsenal.

In the Quilty4 case, the defendants ingeniously

raised the defense of necessity by asserting that their

criminal conduct in reentry was necessary to avoid a more

serious harm--nuclear war. The court found that there were

reasonable alternatives to their actions which negated their

defense. The court stated: "There are thousands of

opportunities for the propagation of the anti-nuclear

message: in the nation's electoral process; by speech on

public streets, in parks, in auditoriums, in churches and

lecture halls . . . to name only a few."5 Rock Island

Arsenal was not such a forum.

In United States v. Bowers,6 a federal district court

held that where the parties had stipulated that Griffiss Air

Force Base was a restricted or "closed base," 7 the

8defendant's motive for reentry was irrelevant. The

defendant had been given a debarment letter when he refused

to leave the base after permission to distribute a leaflet

had been denied by the commander. The iourt stated that:

"Nothing in Greer [9 ] or Brown [10 supports the proposition

that the failure of the Air Force to review a publication

10

permits its distribution."11 The defendant was convicted for

reentry upon the installation following the receipt of a bar

letter.

In United States v. Jelinski, 12 the fifth circuit

federal court of appeals held that the basis for issuance of

the bar letter was irrelevant to a prosecution for subsequent13

reentry. The court said: "We do not doubt the Commander's

historically recognized authority to summarily bar civilians

from a military establishment in the exercise of his

discretion in managing the internal operations of themilitary facility."14 In Weissman v. United States, 15the

tenth circuit federal court of appeals stated: "As a matter

of law, there may be no challenge to the General's statement

of the reason for the bar order."16

The somewhat arbitrary approach of the Jelinski and

Weissman cases was tempered in the Bowers case 1 7 in its

assertion that:

In this court's view the best rule is to allow adefendant charged with a violation of [Section] ...1382 to inquire into whether the commanding officeracted in an arbitrary or capricious manner whenissuing the bar letter. ...This standard strikes a balance between allowing theaccused an opportunity to have a court review theactions of the commanding officer while preventingthe court from meddling in the daygto-day affairs ofoperating a military installation.

To overcome the risk that the predicate for a bar

letter may not receive court review, there is authority that

a bar letter may be challenged in federal court prior to19 20

receipt. 19 It is noted that in one case, a civilian bar

"11

letter recipient was entitled to a hearing relative to her

bar letter because the bar letter effectively denied her any

employment opportunities on the Fort Sheridan Military

Reservation.

When the recipient of a bar letter reenters the

military installation and is prosecuted, his motive or intent

for reentry is not a component of his offense. 2 1 In

Holdridge, the eighth circuit federal court of appeals

rejected a defense to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. Section

1382 which sought to show that the defendants climbed the

fence and reentered the Mead Ordnance Depot because they were

motivated by religious beliefs concerning the immorality of

war. Predictably, the court in Holdridge found no violations

of First Amendment guarantees. 22

12

-.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The trilogy of Supreme Court decisions involving

freedom of speech and the commander's right to preserve good

order and discipline on the military installation may be

reconciled. Flower says that when a bar letter is improperly

predicated on constitutionally protected activity, it may not

be enforced against a person exercising the right of free

speech in a public forum. Spock says that ordinarily a

military installation is not a public forum. Therefore, a

commander may refuse a request to provide a forum for

political activity when his base is not a public forum.

Albertini says that whether a military installation is a

public forum, or a temporary public forum, is not relevant to

the enforcement of a bar letter against its recipient when

the bar letter has been properly predicated upon unprotected

activity which has created a perceived threat to good order

and discipline on a military installation.

The decisions of lower federal courts provide

additional guidance. For the most part, these cases suggest

that the constitutional issue may be raised collaterally in

an attack upon the bar letter itself or raised defensively

against criminal prosecutions for reentry.

13

Analysis of federal case law indicates that the

courts will uphold the commander who carefully follows the

directive of the federal regulation which provides that he

may deny access to his installation to preserve order and

safeguard persons and property provided that he does not act

in an arbitrary or capricious manner. 1 Therefore, it is

recommended that the commander should temper his actions in

order to avoid any appearances that he may be acting

arbitrarily or capriciously.

The public forum issue creates a danger to the

enforcement of the bar letter. Therefore, it is recommended

that the commander should avoid favoring one group over

*another in the conduct of open house activities.

The basic thrust of these cases is to limitregulation to that which proscribes expression thatis "basically incompatible with the normal activityof a particular place at a particular time" .Put succinctly, to permit the use of a military baseas a public forum is fundamentally incompatible withthe purpose of the base. Those who would urge suchuse would no doubt be among the first to decry themilitary's "entanglement with partisan politicalcampaigns of any kind . . A A" Yet their promptings,if yielded to, inescapably jould tend to bring aboutprecisely that entanglement.

Finally, with respect to any contemplated bar letter

action, it is recommended that the commander review the

circumstances giving rise to his contemplated action with his

Staff Judge Advocate. Such review should consider the

physical location of the objectionable action or presence of

the intruder, and the possibility that such place may have

the trappings of a public forum. If such trappings exist,

14

the commander should refrain from bar letter issuance where

free speech rights are being exercised. It is suggested that

bar letters should be conservatively issued in order to

preserve their effectiveness in the preservation of good

order and discipline.

15

NOTES

CHAPTER I (Pages 1-3)

1. AFR 190-1(C3), para. 4-29 (15 Apr. 1985).

2. 32 C.F.R. Section 809 (1972); United States v.

Hall, 742 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1984).

3. 18 U.S.C. Section 1382 (1948).

4. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy,367 U.S. 886 (1960).

5. AFR 355-11, para. 3.b. (10 Sept. 1971).

6. 18 U.S.C. Section 1382 (1948).

7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

8. Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972)(percuriam); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), and UnitedStates v. Albertini, U.S. , 53 U.S.L.W. 4844 (June25, 1985).

9. r'lower, 407 U.S. 197 (1972).

10. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).

11. Spock, 424 U.S. at 869.

12. United States v. Albertini, U.S. , 53U.S.L.W. 4844 (June 24, 1985).

CHAPTER II (Pages 4-8)

1. Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972)(percuriam).

2. 18 U.S.C. Section 1382 (1948).

3. Flower, 407 U.S. at 198.

4. Flower, 407 U.S. at 198.

16

5. Flower, 407 U.S. at 201.

6. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1975).

7. Spock, 424 U.S. at 830.

8. Spock, 424 U.S. at 838.

9. Spock, 424 U.S. at 838, footnote 10.

10. Spock, 424 U.S. at 840.

11. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980).

12. United States v. Albertini, U.S. ,53

U.S.L.W. 4844 (June 24, 19-85).

13. Id.

14. Albertine, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4847.

15. Albertine, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4847.

16. Albertine, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4847.

CHAPTER III (Pages 9-12)

I. United States v. Albertini, 710 F.2d 1410, 1414(9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, U.S. ,53 U.S.L.W. 4844 (June24, 1985).

2. United States v._Gourley, 502 F.2d 785 (10th Cir.1974).

3. United States v. Qu3.lty, 741 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir.1984).

4. Id.

5. Quilty, 741 F.2d at 1033.

6. United States v. Bowers, 590 F.Supp. 307(N.D.N.Y. 1983).-

7. Id. at 309.

8. Bowers, 590 F. Supp. at 309; see also Hoidridge

v. United States, 28 .d32(8th Cir. 1960).

9. Greer v. Spock. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).

10. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 1980).

17

11. Bowers, 590 F. Supp. at 310.

12. United States v. Jelinski, 411 F.2d 476 (5thCir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 943 (1969).

13. Id. at 477 n. 6.

14. Jelinski, 411 F.2d at 478.

15. Weissman v. United States, 387 F.2d 271 (10thCir. 1967).

16. Id. at 274.

17. United States v. Bowers, 590 F. Supp. 307(N.D.N.Y. 1983).

18. Id. at 310-311.

19. Dash v. Commanding General, 429 F.2d 427 (4thCir. 1970)(mem.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 981 (1971); Kiiskilav. Nichols, 433 F.2d-7--145 (7th Cir. 1970).

20. Kiiskila, 433 F.2d at 747.

21. Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302 (8thCir. 1960).

22. Id. at 311.

CHAPTER IV (Pages 13-15)

1. 32 C.F.R. Section 809 a.1 (b)(1972); See alsoUnited States v. Hall, 742 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1984).

2. United States v. Douglass, 579 F.2d 545, 549 (9thCir. 1978).

18

BIBLIOGRAPHY

United States ConstitutionFirst Amendment, United States Constitution.

United States Supreme Court DecisionsBrown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980).Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367

U.S. 886 (1960).Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972)(per

curiam).Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).United States v. Albertini, __ U.S. , 53 U.S.L.W.

4844 (June 24, 1985).

Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals DecisionsDash v. Commanding General, (mem.) 429 F.2d 427 (4th

Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 981 (1971).HoldFl-ge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302 (8th Cir.

1960).Kiiskila v. Nichols, 433 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1970).Persons for Free Speech at SAC v. United States Air

Force, 675 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.1092 (1982).

United States v. Albertini, 710 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir.5".. 1983), rev'd.,_ U.S. , 53 U.S.L.W. 4844 (June 24, 1985).United States v. Douglass, 579 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.

1978).

United States v. Gourley, 502 F.2d 785 (10th Cir.1974).

United States v. Hall, 742 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1984).United States v. Jelinski, 411 F.2d 476 (5th Cir.

1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 943 (1969).United States v. Quilty, 741 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir.

1984).Weissman v. United States, 387 F.2d 271 (10th Cir.

1967).

Federal District Court DecisionUnited States v. Bowers, 590 F. Supp. 307 (N.D.N.Y.

1983).

Federal Statute18 U.S.C. Section 1382 (1948).

Federal Regulations32 C.F.R. Section 809 (1972).

19

-5 .

Air Force RegulationsAFR 190-1 (C3) (15 Apr. 1985).AFR 355-11 (10 Sept. 1971).

Legal PeriodicalMyers, Philip H., "Annotation, Validity,

Construction,. and Application of 18 USCS s 1382 ProhibitingTrespass on Military Installation," 12 A.L.R. Fed. 638(1972).

',p

20

'000)