Speech; Def Strat & Int Def Coop IDS

8/6/2019 Speech; Def Strat & Int Def Coop IDS

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INDIAS DEFENCE STRATEGY AND INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE COOPERATION

INTRODUCTION

1. The 20

th

Century has perhaps been one of the bloodiestcenturies in the history of mankind, wherein, the world has

witnessed conflicts across the entire spectrum of warfare from

low intensity to world wars including the use of nuclear weapons.

However, on the contrary, the latter half of the century also saw

a number of landmark events such as the end in a continent that

suffered two world wars in the space of three decades.

Increasingly states are getting into multi-lateral alliances for

security and economic reasons. The NATO continues to expand

and so does the EU.

2. It has been clear from the past two decades that a global power

shift from the Euro-Atlantic West to an Asia centered East has

been in progress. This has far reaching implications not only for

the nature of international order as it emerges in the coming

decades and great power relations, but also inevitably for the

security environment. It is reasonable to assume that there will

be a strong tendency towards polarization of the polycentric

international system over time leading to multipolarity. However,

any form of polarity in the international system intrinsically

contains an implicit phenomenon of areas of control and

influence and hegemonic framework of inter state relations.

Indias interest would be served well by perpetuation of non-

hegemonic polycentrism rather than any form of polarization inthe international order.

3. With this background, I would give an overview of Indias

Defence Strategy and International Defence Cooperation. I

would cover the topic under the following heads:-


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(a) Strategic Overview and defence Strategy

(i) Global Situation

(ii) Indias Core Values and National Aims

(iii) Favourable elements that can be identified for India

(iv) Some negative elements

(v) Our Security Challenges

(b) Defence Cooperation

(i) Means of engagement between nations

(ii) History of International Defence Cooperation in India

(iii) Definitions

(iv) Benefits of International Defence Cooperation

(v) Defence Diplomacy and Cooperation: MoD Point of view

(vi) Hurdles to Defence Cooperation

(vii) Avenues for Defence Cooperation

(viii) Framework for Defence Cooperation

(ix) Planning Considerations

(x) Mechanism for Defence Cooperation

(xi) Policy Guidelines

(c) Conclusion

STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

Global Situation

2. For much of the millennium gone by, Europe has been the

strategic heartland of the world. It gave birth to the concept of

the nation-state, it ruled the world, it was the arena for much of

the bloodshed and conflict of the 20th Century, and now, in a bold

experiment, it is evolving into the European Union, finally

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seeking peace within itself and with the world. The last decade

of the millennium and the first half of the first decade of this

millennium have witnessed significant events that have catalysed

a transformation of the existing world order and portend a new

distribution of power. These events included the rise of the East

Asian tigers, the rapid growth of the economies of China and

India, the end of the Cold War following the demise of the Soviet

Union, and, the continuing stagnation of Japan. The euphoria

that was generated at the dawn of the new Century was rudely

shattered by the catastrophic events that have become known as

9/11 and the reaction that followed, notably, the American

invasion of Iraq, the intervention in Afghanistan, and, the

polarisation of ideologies between Western (Christian) states

and radical Islamic ones, termed the Clash of Civilisations by

Samuel Huntington. All these events, when taken together, have

radically transformed the international geo-political balance of

the new millennium. The beginning of the 21st Century has fixed

the worlds spotlight onto South Asia and adjoining West Asia.

3. In this rapidly changing geo-political scenario, Europe appears to

have relinquished its centuries old eminence as the strategicheartland of the world. One suspects that it has no further

desire for maintaining such a position. We are witnessing a

fundamental geo-strategic alteration. South Asia (and adjoining

West Asia) is emerging as the arena for the big dogs of the 21 st

Century. In essence, the strategic heartland of the 21st

Century will be a triangle with its apex at the Caspian Sea,

and its base running across the Indian Ocean. India occupies

the central position in this triangle. Therefore, we may expect to

be drawn into or affected by the power struggles and the

conflicts of the 21st Century. Indias growing geo-political

eminence engendered by a robust economic growth and

democratic principles of governance urges us to espouse a

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foreign policy that is pro-active, rather than remaining chained to

the traditionally benign and reactive policy of yester-years.

Indias Core Values and National Aims

4. A countrys defence strategy cannot be evolved from the

vacuum. It has to be based on the national core values and aims

and the geo-political situation that prevails.

5. Our Core Values. Indias development as a nation has evolved

against the backdrop of Indias core values namely, democracy,

secularism and peaceful co-existence and the national goal of

social and economic development.

6. Our National Aim. The overall national aim can be deductedfrom the introductory paragraphs of the Annual Report of the

Ministry of External Affairs, To promote an environment of

peace and stability in the region and in the world, to enable

Indias accelerated Socio-economic development and to

safeguard its national security, maintaining autonomy of decision

making and equity in the conduct of international relations.

Favourable Elements that can be Identified for India

7. During the Cold War, the world order was characterised by a well

defined bipolarity separated by the symbolic Iron Curtain. This

has given way to a complicated and unpredictable, globalised

world, where many countries are seeking to leverage available

strengths, opportunities and advantages to gain desired

standings in the international pecking order. From Indias

viewpoint, many favourable elements can be identified. These

include:-

(a) Growing acknowledgement and expectation of India as a major player in Asia,

with a pronounced impact on global affairs.

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(b) Globalisation of the world economy, which is manifested by intense economic

engagement between major powers and is creating greater inter-dependency

and intricate linkages between nations.

(c) Due to the growing economic interdependencies and inter-linkages, the

spectre of conventional armed conflict between major nations is diminishing.

(d) The growing strategic ties with all the major countries, especially the US and

Japan, coupled with the rejuvenation of traditional ties with Russia and the increasing

engagement with China.

(e) The growing international support and belief in the rapid and sustained growth

of the Indian economy.

(f) The growing number of countries that want to do business with India.

(g) The growing and, at times grudging, acceptance of Indias presence as a

front-runner in international fora.

(h) A strong belief in the principles of democracy, a secular and pluralistic

societal fabric and a political outlook that is non-aligned and willing to engage all

nations in a constructive and mutually beneficial manner.

Some Negative Elements

8. There are also some negative elements that confront India.

These are :-

(a) The persisting adversarial attitude adopted by Pakistan against India, fuelled

by the ISI and the Pakistan Army.

(b) The continued and increasing reliance on the sea for almost all our mercantile

trade, as also resource and energy demands, which constitutes a vulnerability whose

mitigation mandates a more pronounced maritime orientation as an adjunct to the

dominant continental focus of our national security policy.

(c) Chinas South Asia policy, which remains inimical to Indias regional security

interests. This includes the continuing defence equipment support to Pakistan,

including the clandestine transfer of missile and nuclear technology. The String-of-

Pearls strategy of establishing bases across the IOR is supplemented by the supply

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of arms to Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, in a strategy that reflects the

Covert Encirclement of India.

(d) The growing circles of instability, internal conflict and political turmoil

surrounding India. These include Iraq, Afghanistan, and now, parts of Pakistan in the

west, Nepal in the north, Myanmar and Bangladesh in the east and Sri Lanka in thesouth.

(e) The aggressive policies and perpetual presence of major powers in the Indian

Ocean and Persian Gulf regions to safeguard energy interests.

(f) The growth of religious fundamentalism.

(g) The emergence of the non-state actor as a credible security challenge to the

nation state.

Our Security Challenges

9. In the 21st Century, India faces peculiar security challenges. We

live in a dangerous neighbourhood and need to bring into

perspective, our security deficit. Few other countries in the world

face the full spectrum of threats to their security as India does,

from low intensity conflict to an unfriendly nuclear weaponised

neighbourhood. Our response to such an environment has beenanything but militaristic or belligerent. This has led to growing

international respect, especially among the weaker nations. Our

security concerns are enumerated below: -

(a) To begin with, India is located at the centre of an arc of fundamentalist

activism, terrorism and political instability between North and East Africa and South

East Asia. Over the last decade, this region has witnessed some of the most

dramatic acts of terrorism, from the US Embassy bombings of Nairobi andMombassa, to incidents in Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Bali and Jakarta. In

India itself, the Mumbai blasts in 1993, the Parliament attack of 2001 and the most

recent 26/11 Mumbai carnage were, arguably, the original act of mass terrorism,

easily similar in modus operandi and targets to 9/11 in their synchronised, serial

character and targeting of state and economic symbols. India faces terror outrages

whose regularity of occurrence would have ripped the very fabric of any other nation

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on earth. That we continue to act with equanimity and do not allow these outrages to

deviate us from the path of economic growth and political stability, is proof of the

resilience of the Indian nation and the certitude of its eventual great power status.

(b) India has, since independence, faced aggression and conflict with its two

largest neighbours. At least one has been openly hostile and adventuristic throughthis entire period. The very survival of the political leadership of this neighbour is

predicated upon an avowed anti-India stand. There are unresolved territorial and

boundary issues with both neighbours. While one of them lays claim to an entire

state of India, both illegally occupy portions of our country. The maritime boundary

too is a contentious issue with one of the neighbours. Although we have well-

established dialogue mechanisms with both neighbours and talks, as also

Confidence Building Measures, we have made some progress, but we are still a long

way from being able to let our guard down.

(c) India faces an ongoing proxy war from across its borders through terrorism

and local insurgencies. There are also spill overs of internal conflicts in our

neighbouring countries and threats to internal security from extremist elements from

within.

(d) We have to contend with instability and failing states in our neighbourhood

providing the breeding ground for terrorists and other non state actors. The human

dimension of this problem is the huge and unaccounted ill-legal migration into our

border states, especially in the North East, and in Tamil Nadu.

(e) India is faced with an unfavourable nuclear and missile environment. Apart

from the two declared nuclear weapon states, both of whom have been

internationally implicated in illegal proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile

technology, we have to contend with the possibility of WMDs falling into the hands of

terrorists and non state actors in our vicinity.

(f) The surfeit of malignant vectors in the maritime domain poses a clear and

present danger to the safety of of our annual overseas trade currently valued at over

US$ 200 bn, our offshore installations worth over Rs.30,000 crores, and, could

potentially destabilise the entire region through illegitimate activities like WMD

proliferation, gun running, human trafficking, maritime terrorism, etc.

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(g) And last (though certainly not the least), we have to contend with our own

huge mass of poverty stricken people (230 million are estimated to live below the

Indian poverty line) high rate of illiteracy, inadequacies of infrastructure, and, gross

deficiencies in elements of basic human care, all of which, when combined together,

make for a fertile ground for sourcing human fodder for unrest and insurgency.

10.The primacy of economic growth in our political agenda, and the

increasing integration with the global economy that globalisation

demands, have set in motion an inexorable trend of integrating

foreign and defence policies to align with and support economic

policy. It is not possible to deal with any nation exclusively on a

diplomatic, or military, or even economic, front alone. Synergy

between economic, diplomatic and military cooperation is

required to achieve our objectives. The wide spectrum of

activities that fall under the rubric of defence diplomacy and

military cooperation lend themselves to effective and optimal

exploitation in furtherance of economic and foreign policy

objectives. It is, therefore, axiomatic that India with its second-

largest military in the world, an impressive naval capability, and,

a modest defence industry, would seek to leverage these

attributes to its advantage.

DEFENCE COOPERATION IN INDIA

Means of Engagement Between Nations

11.The four major means of engagement between nations are

diplomatic, economic, informational and military. As the chances

of direct military confrontation between nations reduces, military

diplomacy and defence cooperation gain increasing importance.

Apart from being merely an effective tool of foreign policy that

helps achieve strategic and economic objectives, calibrated

military engagement is, in many an instance, the only political

expedient available when every other form of diplomacy is held

hostage to international opinion and sanctions. Military

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engagement has always been regarded as the final frontier of

strategic partnership and its employment as a political overture

indicates a willingness to pursue broader cooperation, mutual

trust and commitment to overcome and manage differences. It

could also be used as a means of introducing transparency,

particularly with regard to a nations intention and capability and

for building or reinforcing perceptions of common interests.

Military engagement is also the only viable solution to dealing

with the myriad challenges that confront us in the vast expanse

of the IOR challenges that no nation can address with its

individual prowess. Thus, defence cooperation if properly

employed becomes an effective tool for the furtherance of

national interests and objectives.

History of International Defence Cooperation in India

12.General. Before moving on to the contours of an International

Defence and Military Cooperation Plan for India, a brief look at

history and some definitions relevant to International Defence

and Military Cooperation would be useful.

13.Brief Historical Background. The post-Independence historyof Indian Defence Cooperation is as follows :-

(a) Till 1962. Indias approach till 1962 was based on the

Nehruvian Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. Defence cooperation was restricted

largely to UK and Nepal. In Nepal, apart from joint check posts on the Nepal-Tibet

border, Indian training teams were functioning till 1970. An issue of considerable

significance, however, was the participation of the Navy in the Joint Exercises

Trincomalee (JET) series of combined exercises with other commonwealth nations.The advantages of combined exercises in terms of exposure to contemporary tactics

and the promotion of interoperability were evident even in those early times.

(b) 1962-1971. Following the 1962 Sino Indian, conflict

defence cooperation occurred initially in the form of material and training assistance

from USA. Cooperation also commenced with Bhutan and continues to date.

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Training assistance was provided to many African countries. The latter half of this

period gradually saw a cooling-off of defence relations with USA, mainly on account

of US assistance to Pakistan and Indias decision not to participate in US- led

regional military alliances.

(c) 1971-1991. The events leading to the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War and the Liberation of Bangladesh saw the Indo-Soviet Friendship

Treaty of 1971 and the availability of Soviet equipment at Rupee rates, making the

Indian Armed Forces major users of Soviet equipment. Cooperation with Nepal

reduced, with the withdrawal of Indian training teams and joint check posts. On the

other hand, military maritime cooperation, picked-up once again. After re-opening

the ports of Chittagong and those along the Pusur river in 1971, India effected the

transfer/sale (at friendship prices) of IN ships Akshay and Ajay in Apr 73 and Jul 74

respectively, as also of MVs Madhumati, Pasni and Anwar Baksh (Pakistani traders

captured in 1971) between Apr 73 and Nov 74. Maritime engagement was, obviously

not restricted to countries with whom India had common borders. Thus, in 1974,

India gifted an ex-IN Patrol Vessel (INS Amar) to Mauritius and set-up a professional

assistance programme involving the deputation of Indian Naval Officers to that

country a programme that is continuing to-date. Engagement with Sri Lanka too,

reached unprecedented heights as a consequence of the bilateral agreement of

1987, which saw the deployment of IPKF in Sri Lanka and training in India of largenumbers of Sri Lankan personnel. Overall, a large number of trainees from Africa and

Asia underwent training, especially pre-commission training and naval training at all

levels, in India. In 1988 India responded with military forces to prevent a coup in the

Maldives.

(d) 1991-1998. Subsequent to the disintegration of the

Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the re-aligned focus of the United States

heralded the onset of greater collaboration between the two countries. Service toService military cooperation was initiated as a result of the proposals of Gen Wayne

Kicklighter, C-in-C Central Command in 1991. The Executive Steering Group

meetings commenced in 1992 as did the MALABAR Series of bilateral naval

exercises. India reoriented its defence cooperation endeavours with the newly

carved out republics from the erstwhile Soviet Union and Eastern European

countries, driven mainly by the need to acquire defence equipment. It was also the

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period when Indian Foreign Policy was reframed and expanded through Narasimha

Raos Look East policy in 1993 and the Gujral Doctrine in 1997 for relations with

neighbours, resulting in some increase in defence cooperation. Even prior to the

enunciation of the Look East policy, the navy, in realisation of the importance of

engaging emerging South East Asian states, had commenced combined bilateral

naval exercises with the Republic of Singapore Navy, an annual feature that has

grown manifold in scope and intensity. Nor was maritime defence cooperation limited

to SE Asia alone. IN ships Jamuna and Sutlej carried out asurvey off the South

East Coast of Oman from 11 Aug 93 to 05 Feb 94, earning Rs.18.19 crs in foreign

exchange. These surveys were undertaken off the southeast coast of Oman, from

Ras Abu Daud to Sur. The surveys were aimed at collecting hydrographic data for

the development of fishing harbours and also for developing facilities for laying

offshore pipelines etc. India also transferred a second naval vessel, SDB T-61, to

Mauritius in Apr 93. Defence equipment related cooperation began to drive Indias

strategic relationships with Israel, France, South Africa and Russia.

(e) 1998-2001. As a result of the imposition of sanctions following the

Pokhran II tests in 1998, defence cooperation with USA, Australia and many other

countries stopped. However, it grew with France and some Asian countries. Our

defence cooperation with Israel also grew rapidly during this period. After Indias

mature handling of the Kargil conflict in 1999, many countries lifted their sanctions.Defence cooperation recommenced, albeit hesitatingly with USA, Australia and

others. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on America, in 2001, radically changed the global

security scenario. Suddenly, India was a much sought after partner for defence

cooperation. In Nov 2000, the IN effected its first large-platform transfer-that of INS

Saryu to Sri Lanka.

(f) 2001 Onwards. Self confidence arising from a glut of exploratory offers

received for defence cooperation in the aftermath of the Kargil conflict and 9/11,combined with a period of sustained economic growth, has led to a rapid increase in

Defence Cooperation, both in the number of countries being engaged and the range

and quantum of defence cooperation activities. In the area of defence equipment,

there has been a major shift from procurement- relationships to joint production and

transfer-of-technology (TOT) by the Indian defence industry. Capacity-building of the

smaller littorals in the IOR has remained a focus throughout and it was in pursuance

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of this that INS Tillanchang was transferred to Maldives in Apr 06 and INS Tarmugli

was transferred to Seychelles in Feb 05.

14.It may be concluded that while India has practiced International

Defence Cooperation, this was not entirely as per a well

coordinated plan, but had an element of adhocism. OurInternational Defence Cooperation Programme needs to be a

sustained effort and rigorously executed.

Definitions

15.There is a wide range of defence-centric terminologies used in

international relations. Some of these are explained below: -

(a) Defence Diplomacy. Defence diplomacy covers all defence-related

actions that further national aims and objectives. These actions may be unilateral,

bilateral or multilateral, within or outside ones national territory, and with or even

without the consent of other party/parties concerned. If unilateral armed action is

considered as being at one end of the spectrum of defence diplomacy, then bilateral

or multilateral defence cooperation in aid of civil power (HADR) would be the other

end.

(b) Security Cooperation. This would comprise those actions that are

undertaken after mutual consent. Thus Security Cooperation would provide the

overarching umbrella for all security-related cooperation. This would include bilateral

or multilateral security initiatives undertaken by defence and civilian security agencies

after mutual consent. It would include politico military areas such as the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; civilian security areas, such as actions to

curb/counter drug and arms smuggling; civilian intelligence cooperation, and;

defence cooperation.

(c) Defence Cooperation. Defence Cooperation would comprise actions

undertaken by the Defence Ministry and its agencies. This can be further sub

divided into strategic defence security cooperation, military to military cooperation

and defence industry and technology cooperation.

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(d) Military to Military Cooperation. Military to military cooperation would cover

cooperation involving uniformed armed forces, who share a unique bond universally.

It would be essentially focused on developing human or soft potential, related to the

man behind the weapon, through various facets of interaction such as weapon

platforms, tactical, strategic and doctrinal spheres, and a wide range of other

activities. It would also include exchange-visits, conduct of joint and/or combined

training exercises, assistance in defence training, participation in international and

regional security fora, arms and technology transfers, etc.

Benefits Of International Defence Cooperation

16.Defence Cooperation has been practiced since ancient times,

essentially in the form of alliances, both in pursuit of peace and

prosecution of hostilities. Even the two World Wars were fought

by two alliances the same is the case during the more recently

fought Gulf War, as well as in the ongoing operations in

Afghanistan and Iraq.

17.Militaries have strong organisational memories and, military

cooperation, more often than not, transcends the shifts in

political relationships. Some examples where defencecooperation is linked with international engagement are NATOs

Peace for Progress programme and its linkage with EU;

NATOs offer of membership to former Warsaw Pact and

erstwhile republic of the Soviet Union states; the revival of India-

US cooperation through the military-to- military cooperation

initiatives in 1991, post Pokhran in 1998, and, in 2001 post-9/11;

Indias engagement of Myanmar in the late 1990s, and the Indo-

Tajik cooperation in 2001. On the other hand, the poor bilateral

relations and the near-zero defence cooperation with

Bangladesh is a contra-indicator even though a nascent

relationship appears to be in the making.

18.Defence Cooperation can assist in creating an environment of

peace and stability in the region. This can lead to the right-sizing

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(iv) Military human-resource development (training teams and such like).

(b) Enhancing our International Stature. This is a natural outcome of

participation in UNPKO and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)

ops. This however entails concomitant responsibilities and initiatives such as: -

(i) Creating UN training facilities and inviting participation by friendly

countries.

(ii) Creating and sustaining regional structures and/or constructs, such as

the IONS initiative, for cooperative HADR actions.

(c) Access to Defence Equipment This can be through : -

(i) Acquisitions. Acquisitions, however, should not create dependency

that in turn permit foreign powers to dictate terms to India.

(ii) Technology-transfers.

(iii) Joint R&D.

(iv) Joint production.

(d) Sustaining the Domestic Defence Industry. This would include: -

(i) Promoting defence exports through sales, grants, gifts, and aid.

(ii) Technology transfers.

(iii) Joint R&D.

(iv) Joint production.

(e) Enhancing Regional Security. This is achieved by rendering assistance to

friendly countries in developing/enhancing their defence capability. This may be

achieved by:-

(i) Providing exposure to own systems.

(ii) Providing assistance in the development of doctrine, concepts, material

resources and human resources.

(iii) Transfer of technology and hardware.

(iv) Repair assistance and technical advice

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(f) Enhancement of Military Capability . Our military capability would be

enhanced through cooperative activities such as: -

(i) Personnel contacts through professional military exchanges.

(ii) Human-resource development by enhancing basic and advanced

military skills and war fighting skills at tactical, strategic, conceptual and

doctrinal levels.

(iii) Defence management specialiszations in areas such as resources,

techniques and training.

(iv) Incorporating best practices.

(g) Promote Defence And Military Interoperability. This can be achieved by

having: -

(i) Commonality of equipment and exploitation practices.

(ii) Commonality in military procedures.

(iii) Military human resource development.

Defence Diplomacy and Cooperation : MoD Point of View

18.As stated in the MoD Annual Report, closer security dialogue and strengthening

of defence cooperation with friendly countries are important objectives andcomponents of the overall defence and foreign policies. The Report also states

that defence cooperation engagement has increased and diversified very

significantly since 2003-04. The MoD differentiates between defence diplomacy

and defence cooperation. It refers to defence diplomacy as those actions

undertaken through the exchange of high level-defence related visits, dialogue on

security challenges and port calls, while defence cooperation covers areas such

as training-exchanges, combined exercises, sourcing, development, production

and marketing of defence equipment, and, other forms of cooperation. The range

of the MoDs defence diplomacy and defence cooperation activities include: -

(a) Visits by Heads of Government/State where defence relations and

cooperation form a part of the agenda.

(b) Visits by Defence Ministers.

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(c) Visits by Foreign Ministers and other Ministers where defence relations

and cooperation form a part of the agenda.

(d) Defence Agreements or MoUs.

(e) Security Dialogue and Consultative Mechanisms.

(f) Visits by Heads of Defence Staff and the Services.

(g) Visits by Defence Secretaries.

(h) Training cooperation and assistance including Indian teams abroad.

(j) Exchanges of defence and military delegations.

(k) Joint and combined exercises

(l) Overseas deployments of naval units.

(m) Naval assistance.

(n) Military level exchanges.

(p) Defence equipment transfers and sourcing.

(q) Defence Industry Cooperation (JVs, Licensed Production, ToT, etc).

Hurdles to Defence Cooperation

19.Policy Formulation and Decision Making Process. Defence Cooperation is

dealt with on a case-to-case basis and it varies from country to country. HQ IDS

and Service HQs prepare country-wise Defence Cooperation plans, as and when

required by the MoD, or as separate initiatives. These plans/initiatives are

generally prepared, incorporating the inputs of concerned branches / directorates

at Service HQ, as well as inputs from our Defence Attaches. These are approved

at the level of the appropriate PSOs, and then forwarded to MoD. Within the MoD,

all decision-making is centralised as the current rules of transaction of businessmandate that all incoming and outgoing visits and cooperation activities have to

be approved by the Defence Minister personally after Political clearance has been

accorded by the MEA. The MEA carries out an in-house analysis. It consults the

Head of Mission (who, in most cases would have cleared the proposal during

consultations with the Defence Attach prior to initiation of the proposal by

Service Headquarters) and then accords clearance or negates the proposal. The

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processing of requests for military course vacancies by foreign countries is

worked out annually. The allocation is finalised by MEA on receipt of

recommendations from the Service HQs. Till recently, MEA finalised the military

course allocations on their own, which often resulted in inappropriate military

engagement with the foreign country. In 2005, a move was initiated by Service

HQs through MoD to streamline the process wherein MEA intimates budgetary

limits and Service HQ, in consultation with Defence Attaches/ Missions abroad,

propose appropriate courses for final allotment by MEA.

20.Funding and Expenditure on Defence Cooperation. MoD has no dedicated

funds for defence cooperation except for hosting incoming foreign delegations

and the foreign travel of its personnel, needed to meet its own organisational

requirements. Clear figures are hard to come by, as there is no separate budget

head for defence cooperation. However guess-estimation would put the total

annual expenditure by MEA and MoD on International Defence cooperation, both

material assistance and foreign travel, at approximately Rs 200 Crores (US $ 40

Million).

21. Lack of Focussed Approach. Despite some instances of the successful use of

defence cooperation, in furtherance of political objective, the majority of our international

relations initiatives evidence the relatively modest use of Defence Cooperation as a foreign

policy tool. The general state of inimical relations with countries in the region and the

consequent impact on the internal stability of the country suggest deficiencies in the Indian

approach. Further, an analysis of Indias International Defence Cooperation engagement

within the strategic footprint as defined in the PMs statement Indias strategic footprint as

the region bounded by the Horn of Africa, West Asia, Central Asia, South East and Far East

Asia and beyond to the far reaches of the Indian Ocean, indicates that the Indian approach

is not fully tailored to achieve this end. It is not sufficiently proactive either, to be able to

exploit opportunities that present themselves. Bilateral agreements and MoUs are often atthe behest of the other country. Although the drivers for defence cooperation have been

precisely identified, our actions in pursuance of perceived objectives are discernibly

inadequate and disjointed. The restricted, reactive and isolated approach that characterises

our defence cooperation initiatives stems from the over-centralisation of decision making

with the MEA and the absence of a coordinated strategy for the employment of defence

diplomacy and cooperation in consonance with both foreign policy and national security

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objectives. Our bias towards relations based purely on defence trade stems from an

inability to recognise the intangible benefits that accrue from institutionalised collaboration

and other forms of cooperative interaction. It would be nave of us to remain oblivious to the

compelling need for the present directionless approach to metamorphose into a focussed

one that emulates the increasing global trend towards active bilateral and multilateral

collaboration to enhance influence, contain the influence of inimical actions in our strategic

space, address the wide spectrum of challenges that confront us, and, protection of our

sovereign interests.

22.Absence of a Mechanism for Quick Funding. An all too obvious systemic

flaw, is the absence of specifically allocated funds with the Services to provide

material assistance and military training to build capacity and enhance capability

of nations that either seek our help or merit our attention, given their importance

to our strategic interests. Although the Special Diplomatic Expenditure controlled

by the MEA could be enhanced to cater for greater military equipment assistance,

the prime concern is that big-ticket grants would always be viewed through the

prism of political propriety and international approval rather than national security

concerns. In many an instance, equipment and assets to be gifted have been re-

appropriated from Services holdings as a measure of last resort, to mitigate the

effect of aggressive efforts by China to woo the innermost cordon of our

neighbouring countries as part of its perceived design of strategic encirclement ofIndia. In cases where the Services are unable to spare equipment, the MoD

approves the material assistance request from the defence budget. The Defence

Procurement Procedure (DPP) is still cumbersome and often results in

procurement being realised only after 12 to 18 months. This defeats the very

purpose of time-sensitive assistance, and, the delay is perceived by the

requesting nation as a reluctance to help in the process, allowing countries

such as Pakistan and China to fill the void.

23.Processing Delays. The rapidly changing world order requires expeditious

responses and, more often than not, proactive action. Our decision-making is

painstakingly slow and laborious.

24.Capacity and Resource Constraints. Our intention to gift hardware and/or

provide assistance to needy nations is often hamstrung by capacity-and-resource

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constraints. Resources are often limited, (as may be expected in a emerging

economy such as ours), but even when these are made available, capacity

constraints within our manufacturing facilities limit our ability to physically provide

the aid. The long lead time of our construction/production industries and their

inability to bid competitively have further blighted our desire to foster dependence

on us through aggressive defence trade.

25.Politico-Military Synergy. Better integration between the military and political

decision-making processes will enhance the scope of interaction, especially with

countries with which military diplomacy plays a crucial and catalytic role.

26.Limited Industrial Capability/Capacity. The product range offered by the Indian

military-industrial complex lags behind the competition in terms of costs, quality,

and, variety. Even the recent policy-initiative permitting 26% FDI in defence

industry does not seem to have alleviated this situation. The direct offset policy

that mandates a 30% investment back into the Indian Defence Industry for

contracts of value of more than 300 crores is skewed in that it does not enable

costing of technology transfer and joint R&D, whose infusion would breathe fresh

life into the defence industry. And finally, we are woefully short of marketing

expertise as well.

27.Absence of Enabling Agreements. While MOUs have been signed with a

number of countries, there are still cases in which delays are of the order of a

decade or more. The absence of MOUs/ agreements significantly hinders the

growth of co-operative activities. By corollary MOUs are, more often than not,

prerequisites to meaningful defence cooperation.

28. Inadequate Defence Representation in Missions Abroad. Services

representation abroad needs enhancement to cater to new roles assigned.

29. Inadequate Funding for Training . The corpus of approximately Rs 600 millionadministered by the Technical Cooperation Division of MEA for ITEC (Indian

Technical and Economic Cooperation), SCAAP (Special Commonwealth

Assistance for Africa Programme) and Aid for Disaster Relief is meant to support

the political objectives of diplomacy and provide scientific and technical expertise

in various fields to target countries. More often than not, the quantum of funds is

inadequate to meet the recommendations of the Services (in the form of

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vacancies at NDC/DSSC and deputation of incoming teams), due to competing

interests.

Avenues for Defence Cooperation

30.Defence Cooperation is the embodiment of a strategic partnership and reflects

the intent of the stake holders to take bilateral/multilateral relations to higher

levels. The decision to embark on defence cooperation is a political one and

normally emanates from strategic dialogue. The avenues of defence

cooperation that are available to the Services are enumerated below. The

cooperative engagement initiatives would be in support of political and strategic

objectives and would largely conform to the tenets of our foreign policy.

(a) Formal/Institutional Interaction.

(i) Joint Defence Committees, Bilateral Talks, Joint Working Groups, Staff

Talks, Steering Groups, etc.

(ii) Joint Exercises (Bilateral / Trilateral / Multilateral).

(iii) Exchange visits of subject-matter experts, study teams, and, scoping

delegations.

(iv) Participation in Seminars/Symposia, and Conferences and workshops.

(b) Military Training/Extra Curricular Exchanges.

(i) The provision of courses to foreign students under ITEC-I/II, Special Aid

Packages and Self Financing Schemes, and, the availing of courses by our

own officers in foreign training establishments.

(ii) The conduct of specially structured training packages for selected countries

on an as required basis.

(iii) The deputing of Training and Advisory Teams (both long and short term)to countries in our immediate neighborhood and countries of strategic importance

to us.

(iv) The undertaking of trainer and trainee exchange programmes.

(v) Participation in sports, adventure and cultural activities with foreign Armed

Forces.

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(vi) Visits and exchange-visits of military bands.

(vii) Cross-exchanges of officers for limited duration afloat attachments in

units/establishments/ships/aircraft/submarines.

(c) Military Equipment Transfer.

(i) Gifting of military hardware (and /or sale of hardware at friendship rates).

(ii) Loan /lease of military equipment for specified periods and for specified

terms of utilisation.

(iii) The provision of follow-on and subsequent support to create dependence on

India. This would include the, provision of ordnance and ordnance stores; the,

service, /over-haul, rotation and/or upgradation of equipment and supply of

spares, etc.

(iv) Procurement, Joint R&D, and, Production ventures.

(v) The provision of technical advice and human resources for technical

assistance.

(d) UN Peace Keeping Operations.

(i) Peace Keeping Contingents (both for peace support and for peace

enforcement) and MILOBS.

(ii) Training at our Centre for UN Peace Keeping.(CUNPK)

(iii) Participation in UN Missions.

(e) Professional Exchanges. In addition to the facts already covered at Para

30(b) above in respect of training this would include exposure/interaction to the

facilities and assets of friendly foreign countries and could involve the joint

formulation/development of concepts and/or doctrines.

Framework for Defence Cooperation

31. International Defence Cooperation will be conducted (but not limited to) through a

framework of following activities:-

(a) Strategic dialogue at the political and higher defence levels.

(b) Military to military cooperation.

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(c) Professional exchanges also referred to as Subject Matter Expert Exchanges

(SMEE).

(d) Technical (defence industry and R&D) cooperation.

32. The activities undertaken for defence cooperation must be supported by a framework

of defence cooperation agencies, appropriate funding, fora/structures for interaction, both

internally and with foreign agencies and decision-making processes.

Planning Considerations

31.While formulating the overall plan for defence cooperation with a particular

country/or countries in a regional grouping the following aspects would be

addressed: -

(a) Aims

(b) Objectives

(c) Framework for the conduct of Defence Cooperation, namely,

agreements/MoUs/cCharters, multilateral/bilateral forums, long term and annual

cooperation plans.

(d) The List of Negative export countries, promulgated by MEA.

(e) Budgetary allocation.

(f) The availability of funds, the appropriate funding agency, mode of funding(hire

of Credit/Grant), procurement methodology to be followed and other finance related

issues. Some of the specific areas of defence cooperation that merit a careful

examination of budgetary support are:-

(i) Provision of training courses and deputation of training/support teams

under ITEC.

(ii) Conduct of seminars, conferences, symposia, etc (organised by the

MoD, Services, and, autonomous and quasi-autonomous think tanks such as

IDSA, USI, CAPS, CLAWS, NMF etc).

(iii) Publication of Journals.

(iv) Hosting of foreign delegations (from within Service HQ funds under

local powers).

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(v) Planning and execution of professional exchanges.

(vi) Planning and conduct of training programmes at Service-specific

training centre with friendly foreign countries/Service (e.g at CIJW, HAWS,

PTS, etc).

(vii) Planning and conduct of bilateral and multilateral exercises involving

one or more Service.

(viii) Technical and repair-assistance to foreign militaries.

(ix) Lease of territory and upgradation of facilities on foreign soil in pursuit of

forward-basing capability.

(x) Prolonged deployment of warships in foreign waters for assistance in

EEZ surveillance, hydrographic survey, protection of offshore assets, etc.

(xi) Deployments of warships in support of scientific experiments/space

launches.

(xii) Deployment of forces for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

missions.

(xiii) Deployments in support of Indian diaspora in exceptional

circumstances.

Mechanisms for Defence Cooperation

32.Prioritisation of Countries. Based on the general policy guidelines for defence

cooperation, friendly foreign countries will be classified into Priority I, Priority II,

Priority III and Priority IV categories of engagement. The prioritisation will be as

per the overarching driver of political considerations and will flow from Indian

regional security and economic interests. Given the dissimilar imperatives of

military engagement of different countries and the degree of politico-military

benefits that would accrue from this defence engagement, prudence demands the

prioritisation of countries to define the scope and intensity of cooperative activities

with them. It would, of course, be an obvious conclusion that this prioritisation is

dynamic due to its close inter-linkage with domestic political sentiment, the

changing geo-strategic environment, economic interests, national security

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considerations and international opinion. Countries would be prioritised into four

categories as follows:-

(a) Priority I. This grouping would comprise countries with which, defence

cooperation would need to be pursued across a wide spectrum of activities and the

engagement provided substance through formalised mechanisms at the politico-military and military to military levels. The countries in this grouping are those that

directly impinge on our immediate strategic environment and whose engagement

would quantum benefits.

(b) Priority II. This would encompass those countries of relatively lesser

importance than Priority I countries. Nevertheless, they would also merit wide

ranging engagement in recognition of the possibility of them having to be accorded

higher priority due to a changed strategic environment and a consequent

reassessment of their importance to us.

(c) Priority III. This category seeks to include those countries that in terms of

geographical positioning, technological advancement, military prowess and strategic

importance do not qualify for extensive engagement. Nonetheless their engagement

is warranted at the politico-military level as a display of our intention for greater

bilateral cooperation, as also in support of our economic and political ties with them.

(d) Priority IV. This grouping includes countries of marginal, albeit noticeableimportance.

33.Tiered Mechanism for Institutionalised Interaction. It is a universally

acknowledged fact that institutionalised interaction constitutes the most important

facet of defence cooperation; a fact attributable to the overarching policy

guidance it provides and the engagement objectives it defines. Each of these

four categories of prioritised countries would consequently be engaged through a

tiered mechanism of institutionalised interaction reflective of the levels of politico-military and purely military dialogue desired. As a general rule, Priority I countries

will be engaged in a Four Tier / Three Tier Arrangement, Priority II countries in a

Three / Two Tier Arrangement and Priority II countries in a Two / One Tier

Arrangement.

(a) Four Tier Arrangement.

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(i) Ministry level Apex forum.

(ii) Working Group/Subgroups at Ministry/IDS level.

(iii) Integrated Staff Talks at IDS or Services level.

(i) Service to Service Staff Talks for each service.

(b) Three Tier Arrangement.


(ii) Working Group/Subgroups at Ministry/IDS level.

(iii) Mil to Mil Staff Talks under HQ IDS/lead service.

(c) Two Tier Arrangement.


(ii) Working Groups/Subgroups at either Ministry/IDS level OR Mil to Mil

staff talks under HQ IDS/lead service.

(d) Single Tier Arrangement. Ministry level forum with representatives of

services, on as required basis.

(e) No Institutional Forum. There will not be any institutionalised forum with

countries in this category but the countries can be engaged through exchange of

visits or occasional training activities on request/approval of the MoD.

34.Levels of Leadership. Levels at which each of the above mentioned interactions

are to be headed will be as follows: -

(a) Ministry Level Apex Forum. Will be led by Def Secy in case of Priority I/II

countries, by AS/JS in case of Priority II/ III and other countries by JS, unless

otherwise dictated by MoU / MOA or desired by MoD.

(b) Working Group/Sub Groups at Ministry level. Will be led by AS/JS

with 2/1 star representatives from HQ IDS and Service HQ.

(c) Mil to Mil Staff Talks at HQ IDS Level or Lead Service Level. Will be led

by 2/1 star officer from HQ IDS or lead service with representatives from HQ IDS and

all services.

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(d) Service to Service Staff Talks. Will be led by 2/1 star with Col/eqvt

representative from each service.

Policy Guidelines

37.General. The direction and intensity of Indian Defence Cooperation will be

governed by the following guidelines: -

(a) Political considerations constitute the first and, without doubt, the

overarching driver of defence cooperation. The political driver is often dynamic,

manifests itself as government-direction, and overrides all other considerations.

(b) Balanced cooperation with no visible/perceptible tilt towards any one

country/region, consistent with Indias posture of non-alignment and belief in multi-

polar world.

(c) Defence Cooperation will be driven by the need to ensure:-

(i) Stability in our immediate continental and maritime neighbourhood

and promote own security interests, thus enabling India to create a

unique footprint in the littoral and hinterland areas of theIndian Ocean

Region.

(ii) Energy Security, and the Security of Energy, leading to cooperation with

those countries whose geographical location influences the security of our

energy lines-of-communication.

(iii) The safety and security of our overseas trade, leading to cooperation with

countries with whom we have strong and growing economic ties, as also

those whose geographical location influences the security of our trade

Lines-of-Communication.

(iv) The eradication/elimination of terrorism, insurgency, piracy, maritime

crime, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), etc, leading to

cooperation with countries that share our views in this regard.

(v) Theadoption of proactive, calibrated measures to prevent and contestthe

strategic encirclement of India leading to cooperation with countries that

could provide Forward Operating Bases/Areas/facilities that would enable

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Enhanced monitoring of our strategic space, increase our reach, and, reduce

our reaction time in responding to a crises..

(vi) Our ability to effectively undertake perception-management, and shape

probable maritime battle-space in the IOR and its environs, including

countries that control the choke-points of the Indian Ocean and other areasthrough which our seaborne trade passes.

(vii) The promotion of our own R&D and Defence Industry, through the

constructive engagement of technologically advanced nations, including

countries as are advanced in Space and dual use technologies as also

countries from whom ourcivil nuclear programme would be advanced.

(viii) The promotion of our regional influence by strengthening defence

relationships, assisting friendly foreign Armed Forces in developing defencecapability without impinging on our own national security.

(ix) The strengthening ourLook East policy and other foreign policy

initiatives of the Government.

(x) The projection of our own national power for in support of our own

strategic interests.

(xi) The development of our military doctrine, tactics, techniques,

procedures, equipment, exploitation, philosophies/practices, training,

and enhancement of our overall operational efficiency.

(xii) Continued and active participation in UN Peace-Keeping Operations

(UNPKO).

(xiii) The promotion of understanding and cooperation with countries

having abundant natural resources.

(xiv) The provision of reassurance, succour and extrication options tothe Indian Diaspora under exceptional circumstances and Persons of Indian

Origin, leading to cooperation with countries that host significant numbers of

the Indian Diaspora. All on-going Defence Cooperation activities would be

regularly reviewed vis--vis tangible/non-tangible gains, so as to extract the

biggest Bang for the Buck and ensure that the cost-benefit ratio is always

favourable to us.

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conducted by any Service with a particular country in one calendar year.

(xii) The budgetary provisions for all bi/multilateral exercises are to be

catered for by the MoD and not impinge on Service-specific estimates.

Cooperative activities undertaken at the behest of the MEA such as EEZ

surveillance assistance, hydrographic surveys, etc, would be funded by theMEA.

(xiii) Due care is to be taken which fielding of equipment for various

exercises so as not to compromise its security and usage in actual operations.

(xiv) No contractual obligations/clauses are to be compromised while

displaying / participating with own eqpt.

(xv) Multilateral exercises with more than two countries will be carried out

under Joint patrolling in IOR, Disaster/relief operations, UNPKO, to enhance

own operational capability and to develop common standing operating

procedures for joint ops to cater for possible multinational forces operating

together in a common scenario under the aegis of UN.

Note : Under no circumstances such exercises should be perceived as possible

growth of an alliance/s and therefore should be evenly balanced out.

(xvi) A block proposal covering five-year period will be worked out by the

services and fwd to HQ IDS by 01 July of the preceding year for coordination

and onward approval by MoD Interim changes due to unforeseen

circumstances may be communicated mid-way to HQ IDS for amendments on

case-to-case basis.

(b) Military-to-Military Cooperation Visits. The mil to mil visits that may be

undertaken after due clearance from the MoD and the MEA would, inter alia, be to:-

(i) Finalise mutually agreed agendas for Defence Cooperation.

(ii) Share information. The exchange of information is to be

governed by existing MoU / MOA on sharing of classified information.

(ii) Gather and collate as much information of value (Military or otherwise)

from hosts/participants during visits / by study teams ./ delegations.

(iii) Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEE).

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(iv) The conduct of technical dialogues.

(v) Seminars and conferences for enhancement of knowledge.

(vi) Seminars and conferences proposed to be hosted by our own Services will

form a part of the Annual Visit Plan, to include, inter alia, details of topics,

participation, venue, administrative aspects and related costs for approval

of MEA / MoD.

(vii) Scoping visits, Institutionalised dialogue, Professional/Technical Assistance,

Exercise planning, Visits to defence/industry facilities, Witness trials,

Observers for exercises, Contractual visits etc.

Note :- Offers of visits to foreign strategic facilities will be declined, to

avoid any issues of reciprocity.

(c) Training/Courses.

(i) Courses to Foreign Military students under ITEC I/II, SFS and Special Aid

Packages to friendly foreign countries are to be coordinated by HQ, IDS.

The budgeting and allocation of vacancies for defence related courses are

to be controlled by MoD. These courses, including financial outlay will

henceforth be decentralised and vacancies proportionately distributed by

HQ IDS.

(ii) Specially structured training packages for selected countries will be

conducted as per MoU / MOA on the subject between the respective

governments at the level of the MoD. Funding will be the responsibility of

the requesting agency.

(iii) Deputation of Training / Advisory Teams to selected countries would be

governed by terms and conditions of MoU / MOA on the subject between

the respective governments at the level of the MoD. The MoU / MOA will

continue to be drafted by the respective Service as per existing practice.

This arrangement would also be applicable for trainee and/or Trainer

exchange programmes, sports, adventure, and, cultural activities.

(iv) The provisions at sub-para (c) above will also be applicable for countries

wishing to send their training teams to India. Terms of engagement for

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training teams being sent consequent to purchase of equipment will be

stipulated in the contract/purchase agreement.

(v) It must be endeavoured to avail courses abroad only in those disciplines in

which we possess neither the expertise nor the institutional

experience/wherewithal. This restriction is, however, not applicable toreciprocal courses, as also gratis offers.

(vi) Courses offered by friendly foreign countries, under their respective military

training and education programmes, may be subscribed-to provided that the

course offered does not carry monetary obligations other than for travel,

boarding and lodging or is gratis / reciprocal.

(vii) Courses conducted in languages other than English will be preceded by a

comprehensive language course either at the School of Foreign Languages(SFL) or by the host country, prior to commencement of the course. The

latter will be funded entirely by the host country unless otherwise mutually

decided by a specific MoU. In latter case, the duration of the course may

exceed one year and is to be treated as permanent posting.

(viii) A detailed After Course / Event Reports is to be submitted by participant/s

to their respective Service HQ This report is to include inter alia comments

on the usefulness, shortcomings, and, recommendations. For tri-Servicedetailment, such reports are to be rendered to HQ IDS with a copy to

respective Service HQ.

(ix) It will be ensured by respective service HQs that post course employment of

such candidates is ensured in organizational interest for a minimum period

of three continuous years. Adverse career certificates may be obtained to

ensure compliance.

(x) Foreign students attending military courses in India are not to be exposed

to classified equipment/ subjects.

(d) Reciprocal Programmes. Such programmes will henceforth not be

negotiated at service level. Service HQs will, however, forward their annual

requirement, specifying the disciplines concerned, to HQ IDS, which, in turn, will

finalise the itinerary along with allied details under the aegis of MCG meetings.

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operationalisation, and, equipment Training are also to be governed by the

MoU/MOA as is any requirement for the prolonged positioning of technical

support/maintenance staff.

(vii) Details of Strategic assets are not to be divulged at any level unless

otherwise specifically tasked/ cleared by MoD.

(viii) Utmost care is to be taken in guarding electronic signature of all emitters.

(ix) Teams deputed abroad in conjunction with Defence R&D/Industry will be

governed by the MOU defining the terms and conditions of the deputation.

(e) Space. Military applications of space are not to be discussed at any

level, unless tasked / cleared by MoD. However, dialogues/seminars/ visits may be

progressed/undertaken so as to keep abreast with associated technological

developments.

(f) UN Peace-Keeping Operations (UNPKO). UNPKO are to be governed

strictly according to the UN Charter. No deviations are permitted. Offers/Expressions

of Interest for availing training at the UN Centre for Peace Keeping are to be actively

encouraged and accommodated to the maximum possible extent.

(g) Professional Exchanges. These may include exposure/interaction to

concepts, doctrines, facilities, training and assets of technologically/militarily

advanced foreign countries but are to be effected without compromising our own

security. It is to be ensured that such interaction does not connotate any military

alignment.

(h) Other Fields of Cooperation. Cooperation between countries may also

involve exchange of information and experience in the following areas: -

(i) Strategic Situation and Current Defence Policy Matters.

(ii) Leadership Concepts.

(iii) Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR).

(iv) General Defence Technology.

(v) General Defence Business Cooperation.

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ground or in the air. Contractual obligations with respect to IPR will be complied.

Avionics / weapons / other equipment and manoeuvres that would compromise the

performance and violate secure information of the aircraft are not to be used /

demonstrated. Procedure for pre-flight briefing, medical, emergency drills and debrief

are to be strictly followed. Photography would be permitted only on ground as per

existing rules. The IAF shall not be liable for any compensation or claims in the event

of injury or death of a foreign aircrew in connection with the familiarization sortie.

This aspect must be addressed in the Staff Talks and included in the Minutes.

CONCLUSION

39. The Defence Services are an instrument of state policy and reflect the aspirations,

strengths and vulnerabilities of the body politic that sustain it. If India has to take its

appropriate place in the global hierarchy as a truly independent, responsible, peace loving

nation with all the attributes of a liberal, secular democracy, military defence diplomacy and

defence cooperation would certainly have pivotal roles.

40. In keeping with the changing global order, international defence engagement with the

world community has grown rapidly over the last few years. It is, therefore, important that

our organisational structures as well as the processes are re-engineered continuously, in

order to remain effective and geared to meet the challenges and opportunities in the

international arena, in tune with our growing status as an emerging power.

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Speech; Def Strat & Int Def Coop IDS

Documents

Transcript of Speech; Def Strat & Int Def Coop IDS