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PB 80–93–3 July 1993 Vol. 6, No. 3

Special WarfareThe Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

Coalition Warfare

From the CommandantSpecial Warfare

One of the great success stories of OperationDesert Storm was the performance of our Spe-cial Forces in coalition warfare. According toGen. Norman Schwarzkopf, they were the gluethat held the coalition together. Working withthe military forces of the Arab countries andwith those as varied as France, Bangladesh,Czechoslovakia and Senegal, Special Forcesmade a vital contribution to the overall effort.

Later, during Hurricane Andrew reliefefforts, the nation-assistance skills of U.S. SOFallowed them to contribute to disaster-reliefefforts in Florida. In both instances, SOF wereable to adapt their skills to assume and succeedin a mission for which they were not specificallytrained.

Their success in supporting the coalitioncame not from the fact that Special Forces aretrained for coalition warfare, but because thestrengths needed — language proficiency, cul-tural awareness and the ability to work astrainers and advisers — were similar to those ofone of their primary missions, foreign internaldefense.

Nor are language and cultural skills theexclusive property of Special Forces. CivilAffairs used the same strengths during DesertStorm to assist them in coordinating host-nation support and to aid dislocated civilians.PSYOP forces used the same skills to produceeffective leaflets and radio broadcasts whichinfluenced enemy soldiers to surrender.

Desert Storm and Hurricane Andrew point totwo widely separate mission areas in which ourspecial-operations forces can be successful.Seemingly at opposite ends of the spectrum,these combat and humanitarian-assistance mis-sions illustrate the diversity of the roles SOFcan fill.

As we identify military functions and as newmissions emerge in the future, this diversitypromises to make SOF more likely to assume

non-traditional roles which require a variety ofskills. With strengths in numerous fields, SOFprovide a versatile and flexible capability torespond to a number of challenges and to fill orcontribute to a number of military roles andfunctions.

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

PB 80–93–3 Contents

Features2 Five Imperatives of Coalition Warfare

by Capt. John Fenzel III

9 Cross-Cultural Communication in Coalition Warfareby Capt. David E.A. Johnson

12 SOF Support to Hurricane Andrew Recoveryby SSgt. Keith Butler

18 PSYOP Task Force to JTF Andrew: A Case Study in Supportto Disaster-Recovery Operationsby Lt. Col. Paul B. Kappelman and Maj. Robert E. Armstrong

22 Roles and Functions of U.S. Special Operations Forcesby John M. Collins

28 Cameroon: CA Unit Conducts Joint Medical Exerciseby Lt. Col. Mark W. Dushnyck

30 Future Trends in Terrorist Targeting and Tacticsby Bruce Hoffman

36 The Self-Development Test: What’s In It for Me?by MSgt. Kirk Thomas

39 Military Qualification Standards System: Army Frameworkfor Leader Developmentby Carol M. Bushong

40 Interview: Lt. Col. Daniel Brownlee, commander, 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group

45 Fire-Support Planning at the ODA Levelby Lt. Col. Geoffrey Lambert

Departments46 Enlisted Career Notes47 Officer Career Notes48 Foreign SOF50 Update52 Book Reviews

Cover: Computer graphic by Bruce S. Barfield

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

A

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Commander & CommandantMaj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Graphic Art DirectorBruce S. Barfield

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of theUnited States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its missionis to promote the professional development of specialoperations forces by providing a forum for the examinationof both established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the author, and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presented inother official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited, andshould be addressed to: Editor, Special Warfare,USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone:DSN 239-5703 or commercial (919) 432-5703. SpecialWarfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare andthe author.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial operations units. Individuals desiring a privatesubscription should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government PrintingOffice, Washington, D.C. 20402.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Gordon R. SullivanGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Milton H. HamiltonAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

04499

Headquarters, Department of the Army

July 1993 Special Warfare Vol. 6, No. 3

In this new era of “peacetimeengagement,” and in the wake ofOperations Desert Shield andDesert Storm, coalition warfare hasrapidly become popularized as thefuture for military endeavors world-wide. Indeed, in recent years wehave seen the renewal of the UnitedNations as a primary vehicle informing and guiding global coali-tions through the full continuum ofmilitary operations.

Despite its apparent novelty,coalition warfare is deeply rooted inancient and contemporary history.In 1775, the Continental Congressselected General George Washing-ton to lead a tenuous coalition ofcolonies and nations during theRevolutionary War. His leadershipwas vital in employing Americanand French troops to collectivelydefeat the British at Yorktown.

Abroad, Carl Von Clausewitzwrote of “coalition formation” in18th- and 19th-century Europe.During that era, Wellington defeat-

ed Napoleon at Waterloo with hisEuropean allies. Yet not all coali-tions of the time were successful.During the Seven Years’ War (1756-63), for instance, Frederick theGreat found himself on a battlefieldvastly outnumbered by the coalitionarmies of Austria, France, Russia,Sweden and Saxony — whom hesoundly defeated.

In the 20th century, coalitionwarfare has been practiced exten-sively in both world wars, Koreaand Vietnam. In each of these cam-paigns, allied coalitions wereformed, composed of the joint forcesat each member nation’s disposal.

Whether they are classified as a“peacekeeping force” or as actualallied combatants, unified multi-national military forces define coali-tion warfare. By design, coalitionsand alliances are formed by strate-gic planners with a dual purpose: toenhance combat power, and todemonstrate global or forming coali-tions, as seen during World War II

with the allied “Grand Alliance”between the U.S., Great Britain andthe Soviet Union — then referred toeuphemistically as the “StrangeAlliance.” This classic case pointsdirectly to a significant characteris-tic of coalitions: their unique powerto unite political antagonists for acommon cause.

Coalition warfare also has a tacti-cal realm, which remains just asintricate and challenging for its par-ticipants. Here, coalition warfareencompasses the widest variety ofconventional and special-operationsmissions. It is important therefore,at the outset, not to characterizecoalition warfare as a type of mis-sion, but as an environment inwhich to operate.

What separates coalition warfarefrom other forms of warfare? Itsmany different characteristics seemto defy any single answer. And yet,further analysis reveals one over-whelming consideration that standsout above the rest, a principle of

2 Special Warfare

FiveImperatives ofCoalitionWarfare

by Capt. John Fenzel III

war both universal and essential inits application to coalition warfare.

Sixth principle of warDepending on the national identi-

ty of the forces involved, the degreeof difficulty in employing a nation-ally integrated force varies. In vir-tually all cases and at all opera-tional levels of coalition warfare,the nine principles of war are par-ticularly cogent. At the strategicand operational levels, the mostvital of these is the sixth: unity ofcommand. In 1942, Gen. George C.Marshall, then Army chief of staff,described unity of command as a“dominating factor” facing the Alliesin those days of crisis:

Of all the military lessons whichcould have been learned from[World War I], the question of unityof command is probably the mostoutstanding. Personally, I learnedmy lesson in observing the problemsof General Pershing in France andthe reluctance of our allies to meetthe issue until almost overwhelmedby the great German offensive ofMarch 1918.1

In a coalition of political antago-nists, unity of command may beachievable in name alone. EvenClausewitz recognized the inherentcomplex, fragile nature of coalitions,pointing to the “independent inter-est in and independent force withwhich (each state) prosecutes thewar.”2

This characteristic was furtherdemonstrated by another 18th-cen-tury warrior, Napoleon Bonaparte,whose distrust of coalitions was amatter of public record: “Give meallies as an enemy,” he would saydefiantly, “so I can defeat them oneby one.”3 Today such Napoleoniczeal is quite likely an anachronism.Yet, however intemperate, it isnonetheless characteristic of thewidely divergent, independentinterests which commonly existbetween coalition allies.

Depending on the circumstancesand politics involved, one comman-der may very well not have absolutecontrol over all coalition partners.

In this environment, the principle ofunity of command must therefore bereduced to its most important defin-ing component: unity of effort.

In a politically charged arena,unity of effort is a virtual prerequi-site to the other principles of war.Implicit within this tenet is thenotion that when unity of commandis not achievable in its purest form,unity of effort is created on a strongfoundation of close liaison and coop-eration between counterparts; withunified planning and execution asits cornerstones.

For leaders at all levels, thelessons of history are clear: wagingcoalition warfare successfully cen-ters not around the martial skillsespoused by Clausewitz, but on theideological and non-tangible funda-mentals which address each coali-tion partner’s social, cultural anddoctrinal differences. When thesedifferences are effectively reconciledthrough intensive dialogue andtraining, doctrinal and “instinctive”

martial skills then become decisiveforces on the battlefield. Without areconciliation of this type, however,combat power is all but irrelevant.

One of the continuing challengesfaced by commanders operatingwithin a coalition force is to effec-tively manage the countless threatsto effective, unified effort. They areoften regarded as distractions andchallenges by those who are accus-tomed to them — obstacles to beovercome.

The immediate challenges arenormally those which present them-selves upon stepping foot in coun-try: language and culture. Becausethey are the first challenges con-fronted, their importance cannot beoverstated. Adept handling of lin-guistic and cultural disparities forma vital first impression with multi-national counterparts and set thetone for future interaction.

As time progresses, other diver-sions inevitably emerge: hidden orconflicting agendas, limited

July 1993 3

As the commander ofUSCENTCOM, Gen.H. Norman Schwarz-kopf led the coalitionforce in OperationDesert Shield/Storm.Success in coalitionoperations demandsskill not only militaryoperations, but also inaddressing social, cul-tural and doctrinaldifferences within thecoalition.

Photo by Dean Wagner

resources, low confidence and trust,doctrinal differences, lack of organi-zation, political dissension, powerstruggles, lack of clear objective andpersonality clashes. If left alone,any one of these could well becomea “show-stopper.”

Five imperativesU.S. military doctrine embraces

five combat imperatives, or methodsto defeat an enemy. While they areproven, invaluable battlefieldtenets, none seem to adequatelyaddress the issues unique to coali-tion warfare. At the outset of thistype of campaign, questions of howto deal with the enemy are periph-eral to the manner in which alliesinteract. Addressing that issuerequires an entirely different set ofworking guidelines, or “impera-tives,” to be applied well before anybattle plans are executed.• Cultivate intense political and

cultural awareness.• Develop rapport between

participants.• Synchronize the force.• Maximize doctrine and innova-

tion to overcome obstacles.• Simplify the plan.

Cultivate intense political and

cultural awareness. The phe-nomenon of coalition formation hasits origins with the Achaean andAetolean city leagues of ancientGreece and the Hanseatic andSwabian Leagues in Europe. It wasalso attempted in the 1920s byWoodrow Wilson in his failedLeague of Nations. These, and othersupranational alliances since, weredeveloped primarily to counter com-mon threats and to further sharedgoals. However ancient the trend,most coalitions in history have beenrelatively short-lived; the causesare normally found at that pointwhen established associations evap-orated into shared socio-politicaldifferences.

From the city leagues of ancientGreece to today’s United Nations,cultural and political ideologies havebeen indelibly interwoven into thefabric of coalitions and alliances.The evolution of a coalition is literal-ly as complex as the cultures andpolitical systems which comprise it.Understanding the role which thesetwo factors play in forming coali-tions is vital to their function andlargely determines their ultimatesuccess or failure.

On a somewhat less grand scale,

yet equally as important, is thefoundation of any alliance — people.Because multinational coalitionsconsist of populations with differentcultural backgrounds, the chal-lenges and “distractions” to unifiedeffort are often predestined.

Culture is the single most domi-nating influence on people, andtherefore, on coalitions. In nearly allcases where alliances have failed,the cause can ultimately be traced tobasic ignorance of the other’s cultur-al values. Conversely, successfulcoalitions are bred through empathiccommunication and through a pro-found understanding of socio-politi-cal environments.

In his book Green Berets at War,Shelby Stanton describes SF rela-tionships with the Montagnardsduring the Vietnam War, clearlyillustrating the importance of cul-tural awareness:

The Special Forces found theMontagnard aborigines incrediblysimplistic and superstitious. To gaintheir allegiance, the Special Forcessoldiers carefully learned tribal cus-toms and studied the local dialects,ate the tribal food, endured the cold,mixed indigenous garb with theiruniforms, and participated in therituals and ceremonies. ... Montag-nards accepted only those whoshared their lifestyles and dangers.4

Coalition warfare demands noth-ing less than a thorough, in-depthunderstanding of the operationalarea and its people. Limited aware-ness of an area’s culture can begained through area analysis andlanguage studies. Detailed under-standing, however, can be achievedonly through actual, intensive per-sonal interaction with coalitioncounterparts. It is here that knowl-edge of cultural subtleties is gained,and true partnerships are formed.No grand strategy or technologicaladvantage can be substituted forintensive personal awareness of acounterpart’s politics and culture.

Develop rapport between partici-pants. While developing rapportamong coalition members may notbe entirely possible at the strategic

4 Special Warfare

U.S. soldiers from the 5th SF Group and Kuwaiti units prepare to cross intoKuwait from Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Storm.

Photo by John Fenzel

level of war, it is vital in performingtactical operations. Rapport isdefined by Webster’s as a “relationmarked by harmony, conformity,accord, or affinity.”5 On the battle-field, rapport extends beyond thetextbook definitions and translatesto mutual understanding, trust andconfidence between participants.

In the most ideal circumstances,synchronized effort is an elusiveequation at best. Within an allianceor coalition, however, it is accom-plished through the cultivation ofpartnership. A common goal or pur-pose, alone, is not sufficient. Inter-personal skills and linguistic abilitycommunicate perceptions and gofar in promoting a shared sense ofpartnership.

Rapport is often hard-won amongcoalition counterparts when cultur-al and political differences far out-weigh any similarities. An enduringobservation from our Desert Shieldand Desert Storm experience sup-ports this claim: Rapport-building isoften exhausting, tedious work. Itrequires the active employment ofinterpersonal skills which may ormay not be normally forthcoming. Italso requires overcoming endemicpersonal prejudices that would oth-erwise serve as barriers to effectiveinteraction.

The issue of rapport is a familiarone found throughout Americanmilitary history. A virtual casestudy of successful interaction canbe found during World War II, inGen. Dwight D. Eisenhower’sencounters with British Field Mar-shal Montgomery and French Gen-eral DeGaulle. His dealings withthese and other allies were fre-quently distressing to the alliedcommander, but he remained cor-dial nonetheless. His disagreementswith Churchill in planning the inva-sion of Europe are well-documented.Through his own experiences, hedeveloped an acute awareness ofthe need for interpersonal skills indealing with his allied counterparts:

Allied commands depend onmutual confidence. How is mutualconfidence developed? You don’t

command it. ... By development ofcommon understanding of the prob-lems, by approaching these thingson the widest possible basis withrespect to each other’s opinions, andabove all, through the developmentof friendships, this confidence isgained in families and in AlliedStaffs.6

The mutual respect and under-standing gained during such inter-action is invaluable in reconcilingagendas, calming fears, reducingethnocentrism and planning forevents to come. It is important tore-emphasize that rapport-buildingis often painstaking. It frequentlyinvolves a seemingly endless searchfor compromise, long hours spentcoordinating training events in asocial setting, and perseverance inthe face of rejection. While enjoyingthe process is desirable, it is cer-tainly not always possible, nor is iteasy.

Perhaps most important to rap-port development, and indeed, tothe effectiveness of any coalitioneffort, is commitment. At the tacti-cal level, American co-combatantsor advisers must be able to assuretheir coalition counterparts thatthey are committed to their cause.

Presence alone, however, cannotassure commitment. At the strate-gic and operational levels, commit-ment is largely measured by his-toric example. For 30 years, thetragic examples of the Bay of Pigsand Vietnam cast doubt on our abil-ity as a nation to fully commit our-selves to a just cause. Those exam-ples did not go unnoticed in theglobal arena. Desert Shield andDesert Storm have since healedthese wounds and reinforced theUnited Nations’ role as a viableglobal peacekeeping organization.

In 1990, Saudi Arabia’s KingFahd welcomed the U.S. deploy-ment on his nation’s soil based onthat sentiment of trust and commit-ment: “I trust the United States ofAmerica. I know that when you sayyou will be committed, you are infact committed.”7

In the tactical arena, Americanforces, whether they are conven-tional or SOF, must be assured oftheir ability to permanently com-mit themselves to their assignedcoalition counterparts. Once com-mitted in their roles as advisers orco-combatants, those units mustremain together until the missionis accomplished. They should not

July 1993 5

Photo by Thomas Witham

A U.S. Navy SEAL trains Saudi Special Forces troops in the use of C-4 explosives. Building rapport is important to a sense of coalition partnership.

6 Special Warfare

be detached for other missions, norshould they be subject to adminis-trative restrictions which apply toother non-affiliated forces. Oncethe mission is completed, our unitsshould depart on schedule, aspromised. Credibility and trust —the two basic ingredients to rap-port — hinge on unwaiverable,honest commitment.

Synchronize the force. Synchro-nization is a common operationalconcept which pervades U.S. mili-tary doctrine. It is also a publishedtenet of our AirLand Battle Doc-trine. Similarly, the goal of jointwarfare is expressed by our JCSdoctrine as the sequenced and syn-chronized employment of resources.8In coalition warfare, however, syn-chronization advances from its sta-tus as a tenet and a goal to that ofan imperative. The requirement forcoordinated planning and executionis critical in a diverse multinationalalliance. When compared to recentunitary national efforts such as

Grenada, Panama and the Falk-land Islands, the challenges of syn-chronization assume a differentshape and a far greater degree ofdifficulty.

Developing a synergistic effortamong multinationals, at any level,necessitates common, steadfastfocus. During Operations DesertShield and Desert Storm, 5th Spe-cial Forces Group advisers,assigned foreign-internal-defensemissions with each of the Arabcoalition armies, discovered that tobe an exhausting, and frequentlyfrustrating endeavor. Hidden agen-das, conflicting doctrine and decid-edly different sets of priorities werecommonplace and posed formidablebarriers to synchronized effort. Themethods SF advisers used to betteralign their counterpart units wereoften tailored to fit situations asthey arose. The methods which theyfound to be most effective werenumerous and form a compendiumof doctrinal lessons taught in basic

service schools. Many, in fact, wouldseem manifest in their simplicity:

• Observe and evaluate.• Begin with the basics. Set

achievable standards and objectives.• Task-organize to fit the mission

and the capabilities of the force.• Ensure the existence of a good

communications plan.• Coordinate the plan and main-

tain focus through close liaison.• Conduct extensive, realistic

training and rehearsals with coali-tion counterparts.

• Train during the day and atnight.

5th Group’s success in applyingthese tools with coalition partnerstranslated into dramaticallyincreased unit cohesion and soldierconfidence with their Arab counter-parts. Ultimately, as they discov-ered, the psychological benefits ofthis approach proved to be the mostpowerful synchronizing force of all.

Maximize doctrine and innovationto overcome obstacles. Throughoutthe course of Operations DesertShield and Desert Storm, coalitionpartners faced numerous obstacles,ranging from the tactical employ-ment of nationally diverse units toPOW management. Many of thoseobstacles were directly related to ageneral lack of needed materials toaccomplish resource-intensivetasks. Yet in every instance, thoseproblems were resolved, eitherthrough sheer force of will orthrough resourcefulness and cre-ative thought.

Perhaps the strongest and mostrecognized quality of American sol-diers is their ability to adapt andinnovate to solve problems. Innova-tion is, in fact, part and parcel ofU.S. military tradition. “Americaningenuity” has been ingrained intoour national mindset and is part ofwhat Russell Weigley has called the“American way of war.” Indeed, inthe absence of adequate knowledgeor resources, Americans habituallyadapt, innovate and overcome.

Innovation, however, should notbe perceived as a substitute for doc-trine, but rather as a supplement to

Advisers from the 5thSF Group train

Kuwaiti soldiers in theuse of the MG-3

machine gun. Goodlanguage and commu-

nications skills, com-bined with realistic

training andrehearsals, allowed SFsoldiers to develop unit

cohesion and soldierconfidence within the

coalition units.


it. One common, historic tendencyamong the U.S. military is our fail-ure or unwillingness to apply a doc-trinal approach to the problems weface. In an almost traditional way,the first piece of baggage most fre-quently thrown overboard in theheat of battle is doctrine. Invariablythen, it is common to see unfocusedinnovation take over, confusing notonly the enemy, but ourselves, inthe process.

Nor should doctrine be held as astrict set of rules or preconceivedideas on the conduct of war. Thisview is not only seriously flawed,but potentially fatal for those whopractice it. The belief that doctrineis nothing more than a rule booklends itself to predictability and cer-tain gridlock on the battlefield. Ahandbook entitled Infantry inBattle, prepared in 1929 by then-Col. George Marshall, goes to greatlengths in warning against thatmisperception:

Every situation encountered inwar is likely to be exceptional. Theschematic solution will seldom fit. ...Those who seek to fight by rote, whomemorize an assortment of stan-dard solutions with the idea ofapplying the most appropriate whenconfronted by actual, walk with dis-aster. Rather, it is essential that allleaders — from subaltern to com-manding general — familiarizethemselves with the art of clear, log-ical thinking.9

Doctrine must be realized as afundamental base of knowledge todraw upon in the search for newand innovative solutions. Onceestablished, that foundation is use-ful in allowing leaders to cope withunexpected situations as they arise.

It is often tempting to adopt dif-ferent or “hybrid” doctrinal solu-tions when working with a foreignarmy. The assumption that aBritish or German technique wouldwork better is often fallacious whenU.S. doctrine is not only just as effi-cient, but far more detailed andavailable in our own publicationsand experience. Moreover, U.S. mil-itary doctrine is a proven quantity,

and a “common denominator”among sister services and alliesalike, which ensures the critical ele-ments of continuity, interoperabilityand accuracy. Used properly andconsistently, our own doctrine is akey contributor to unity of effort.

A certain degree of flexibility,however, should always be main-tained. The infamous “buy Ameri-can” approach is one destined forfailure. Without question, there aretimes when allied partners disagreeand will choose to maintain theirown doctrinal approach. The imme-diate challenge, then, for U.S.advisers or co-combatants shouldnot be to change their allies’ minds(as instinct would dictate), but todetermine whether that approach istactically sound, and whether or notit conflicts with the coalition’s con-cept of the operation. It is herewhere a discussion of “task, condi-tions and standards” is often mostproductive for both parties.

There are occasions, in fact, whenmethods espoused by coalition part-ners fill our own doctrinal voids.Sadly, the concept of learning fromcounterparts is frequently over-looked or ignored. Additionally,there may be occasions when U.S.

doctrine is found to be in conflictwith a host nation’s cultural mores.Some Arab, Eastern and Africanarmies, for instance, do not train orfight at night for fear of nocturnalpredators, superstition or religiousreasons. Attempts to change thatlogic often prove futile.

Simplify the plan. Another princi-ple of war which is especially rele-vant to coalition warfare is simplici-ty. This principle states that sim-plicity plays an important role inproviding direction, focus and accu-racy to the battle: “Other thingsbeing equal, the simplest plan isheld to be the best plan.”10

This dictum has been extensivelytested with the “strange alliances”which are now becoming more com-monplace. Language barriers, con-flicting doctrinal methods and inter-operability problems make a simple,easily understood plan essential tosuccess on an already complex,chaotic battlefield. The more com-plex a plan is, the more time mustbe allocated in training forces tostandard, and in maintaining theplan’s focus and intent.

American doctrine offers a varietyof powerful tools designed specifi-cally to ensure accuracy, coherence

July 1993 7

Photo by Joel Torres

A U.S. soldier processes EPWs captured during Desert Storm. Management ofenemy prisoners was one of the obstacles to be overcome by the coalition.

and simplicity:• The Army Problem Solving

Process.• Troop-leading procedures.• Backward planning• Mission analysis• Operations orders• Mission-essential-task lists• Time phasingEach of these was developed with

the principle of simplicity in mind.Their utility, however, is magnifiedtenfold when they are used in devis-ing joint plans with coalition part-ners. Albert Einstein’s advice per-haps best defines this imperative:“Everything should be made as sim-ple as possible, but not simpler.”11

ConclusionsThese five “imperatives” of coali-

tion warfare were chosen for theircritical function and relevance tocoalition operations. They have incommon an enduring logic usedthroughout history by diplomatsand warriors alike. When used as asystemic approach to the manage-ment of coalition warfare, theyassist in finding solutions to seem-ingly impossible problems and in

forming lasting partnerships. Theresults achieved in applying theseimperatives are surprising only inretrospect.

Capt. John FenzelIII is currently thecommander of Com-pany A, 3rd Battalion,5th SF Group. DuringOperations DesertShield/Desert Storm,he commanded ODA 582, CompanyB, 3rd/5th SF Group. His detach-ment advised a newly formedKuwaiti motorized infantry battal-ion throughout the campaign. Hisother assignments include servingas the executive officer, HHS Bat-tery, 4/27th Field Artillery; assis-tant operations and training officer,72nd Field Artillery Brigade; andcommander, Company D, 3rd/5thSF Group. Captain Fenzel holdsbachelor’s degrees in internationalrelations and history from TulaneUniversity.

Notes:1 George C. Marshall, “Address before the

American Academy of Political Science, NewYork City, November 10, 1942,” in Selected

Speeches and Statements of General of theArmy George C. Marshall, ed. Maj. H.A.DeWeerd (Washington, D.C.: The InfantryJournal, 1945), p. 215.

2 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. AnatolRapoport (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books,1968), p. 390.

3 Napoleon Bonaparte, quoted in J.Christopher Herold, The Mind of Napoleon,n.p., 1955.

4 Shelby L. Stanton, Green Berets at War:U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia1956-1975 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press,1985), p. 39.

5 Webster’s Third New International Dic-tionary (1986), s.v. “rapport.”

6 Dwight D. Eisenhower, quoted in JointPub 1 (Washington, D.C.: National DefenseUniversity Press, 1991), p. 42.

7 King Fahd, letter to President GeorgeBush, 1990, quoted in Congressional Quar-terly, October, 1990.

8 Joint Pub 1, p. 47.9 George C. Marshall, quoted in Russell

Weigley, The American Way of War: A Histo-ry of United States Strategy and Policy(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana UniversityPress, 1977), p. 215.

10 Weigley, p. 214.11 Albert Einstein, quoted in The New

Webster’s Library of Practical Information(1987), s.v. “simplicity.”

8 Special Warfare

Recently a senior American offi-cer visited a Middle Eastern coun-try where a Special Forces teamwas conducting training in order tocoordinate future operations. Hewas invited to lunch with the host-nation-unit officers and the SFteam leader. Offered food, heresponded, “No, thank you, I am nothungry,” and pulled out a notebookto conduct an American-style lun-cheon meeting. His hosts respondedpositively to his coordinationefforts, but after he left, theyquizzed the embarrassed team lead-er about his compatriot’s mannersand gave the impression that thecoordination would have to berepeated in an appropriate forum.

What went wrong? The visitorsent a message his hosts were notready to hear. He was polite, basedon American hospitality and busi-ness customs, but not based onthose of the host nation. His breachof manners, refusing food andinterpersonal interaction beforeworking, diminished his authority,

and his hosts were not ready to lis-ten to such a low-caste source. Tobe polite, they responded favorably,but they considered the coordina-tion to be non-binding.

Soldiers in coalition-warfare mis-sions are likely to find themselvesin similar situations to that of thevisiting officer, and their successwill depend on their skill in cross-cultural communication. Cross-cul-tural communication is the processof transmitting facts, ideas or feel-ings to someone of different cus-toms, religion, language or socialorganization, and it is essential tocoalition warfare.

Communication seems simple: Asender transmits a messagethrough some medium to a receiv-er, who then responds in a mannerthat indicates understanding. Withcross-cultural communication, how-ever, there are difficulties with allthree components of communica-tion — the sender, the medium andthe receiver. During coalition war-fare, only effective and efficient

communication will enable a coali-tion force to succeed on a rapidlychanging battlefield.

In cross-cultural communication,biases and perceptions affect themessage being transmitted. Prob-lems occur in three basic areas:direction and source of the message,expectations of response and need,and social credibility.

Direction and sourceIn directing a message it is easy

for special-operations soldiers toassume that their coalition counter-parts have the same responsibilitiesand decision-making authority theythemselves have. During DesertShield, this was often not the case.It was common for a Special ForcesNCO to request that radios or otherassets be available for training andreceive a positive response from hiscounterpart, only to find that noequipment arrived. Often the coun-terpart did not have the authorityto commit the resources, and he didnot want to upset the American or

July 1993 9

Cross-Cultural Communicationin Coalition Warfare

by Capt. David E. A. Johnson

admit his own lack of importance.When communicating to the deci-

sion maker through aides, staff offi-cers or interpreters, soldiers shouldalso remember that often the least-essential officer is assigned to escortor deal with foreigners, and he mayhave difficulty getting anyone totake his message seriously. Thesolution is to build a closer relation-ship with the decision maker and tocommunicate directly, in order tosave time and energy spent trans-mitting in the wrong direction.

Like the message’s direction, itssource can also affect its reception.Coordination, advice and assistancemay be rendered ineffective becausethe coalition decision maker isunreceptive to the source. In somehighly centralized armies, whereNCOs have less knowledge orauthority, a message sent by a non-officer may be seen as bearing littleweight. This may make it difficultfor highly qualified special-opera-tions NCOs to do their jobs.

During Operation Desert Shield,a senior Special Forces NCO turnedin a coalition ground-to-air radiofor repair. Every week for a month,he asked if the radio was fixed.Every week the division communi-cations officer said the radio hadbeen repaired. It had not. Finallythe team leader, a captain, went tothe brigade commander to ensurethe maintenance was completed.The division communications offi-cer, when confronted with the radioitself, insisted he had not beenproperly asked to perform themaintenance. His attitude was thatif the need was important, someoneimportant would have sent themessage.

In cultures where women haveless authority, an allied officer isless likely to accept a woman’sadvice or assistance. A female offi-cer assigned to the 1st CavalryDivision, purchasing supplies inSaudi Arabia, found shopkeepersand allied officers alike confirmingeverything through her driver, ajunior-enlisted male.

ExpectationAnother problem area is expecta-

tion. The U.S. Army has a highoperations tempo even in peace-time. Our soldiers are secondary-school graduates and volunteers,and we have adopted a tactical sys-tem which requires initiative at thelowest levels. The coalition forcemay not have these advantages. Itmay have adopted another tacticalsystem based on centralized controland rigid formations.

When the special-operations sol-dier training with a coalition unit isconfronted with tactics not per-formed to American standards, heshould realize this does not indicateincompetence. Their tactical andoperational systems are based ontheir needs and experiences andmay be more correct than our own.If asked to evaluate a coalition unit,hold them to their own standards.We can give advice, training anddemonstrations of our system toimprove joint operations, but coali-tion warfare involves adapting toeach other’s systems, not changingthem.

The receiver’s expectations arealso important. If our training,advice and assistance have not

actually been requested by the hostnation, the counterpart may have alow expectation of his need and beconfident that his culture and mili-tary doctrine are correct. As onecoalition officer explained early inOperation Desert Shield, “Our tac-tics already take the best of Ameri-can and Soviet systems.” This atti-tude makes it unlikely that thecoalition soldier will admit failureor ignorance and may cause him notto ask important questions thatcould improve interoperability. Inthese cases, it is best to frame mes-sages in terms of our training needsrather than theirs. This will alsohelp to bolster their stature withintheir peer group.

CredibilityThe third problem area is credi-

bility. For the sender, it is impor-tant to recognize that the credibilityof his messages may be linked to hissocial credibility. In class-orientedor rigid societies, awareness ofsocial rules of etiquette can definethat credibility.

We can establish credibility bybuilding rapport. This may meaneating goat and playing cards in oneculture or drinking so-ju in another,

10 Special Warfare


Soldiers from the 5th SF Group dine with their coalition counterparts. Socialinteraction is often important to the accomplishment of military objectives.

regardless of personal taste. If wedesire to receive the respect afford-ed our counterpart officers, we haveto play the part. As always, honestyand tact in even the smallest thingsare critical. Behaving appropriatelywhen invited to dine can enhance ordiminish authority and credibility.

The object of all this social inter-action is to accomplish something ofmilitary value. During OperationDesert Storm, effective rapportbuilding resulted in one 12-manteam receiving the use of armoredvehicles, ground-to-air radios, landline, a water trailer and directaccess to unit scouts.

For our coalition partners, theneed to maintain social credibilitycan hamper their response. In someenvironments, no coalition soldierwants to be the one to say “no” oradmit they do not have the authori-ty to answer a message. Beingassigned to assist the Americansmay be seen as a political plum, andthe problem for the coalition deci-sion maker may be to keep theAmericans happy without seemingto give away resources or makemany changes. This is why “maybe”and “soon” are such commonresponses.

The desire to keep the Americanshappy can sometimes result inwasted effort and resources. DuringOperation Desert Shield, a SpecialForces company commander devel-oped a comprehensive trainingplan, complete with start dates,based on potential coalition needsand his company’s capabilities. Hepresented the list of tasks to thecoalition division commander as asuggestion, and amazingly enough,those were exactly the subjects andstart dates the coalition unit felt itneeded. When the company’sdetachments later conductedassessments of each brigade, theyfound the majority of the tasks wereneither needed nor battle-focused.

MediumIn addition to problems of trans-

mission and reception, the mediumwe use to communicate may also

distort the message. Even when thecoalition relationship is cordial, dif-ferences in verbal and body lan-guage between cultures can causemisunderstandings.

Although the special-operationssoldier may be proficient in thehost-nation language, it is difficultto anticipate the impact a word’sshades of meaning may have. Whentrying to fix a land-line connectionbetween the Special Forces compa-ny commander’s tent and the coali-tion division commander’s tent, sol-diers used the Arabic word for “bro-ken” instead of “out of order,”resulting in the coalition unit bring-ing a new telephone instead of try-ing to find the problem in the line.

One way to overcome this prob-lem is through graphics. Luckily,the Infantry Officer AdvancedCourse teaches Soviet-threat tac-tics, doctrine and map symbols,with which Arab forces were alsofamiliar. Once differences in grid-reference systems were resolvedduring Operation Desert Shield,missions could be briefed and dis-cussed in commonly understoodsymbols.

Another way the language prob-lem may be addressed is through aninterpreter, but we should under-stand enough to spot-check ourinterpreters. A translator who doesnot want to lose face with his subor-dinates or points with his superiorsis unlikely to admit to being unableto translate. One interpreter duringOperation Desert Shield, when baf-fled by the term “brown-out” (obscu-rity caused by blowing dust andsand), told students that U.S. heli-copters used laser beams to landand thus damaged the eyes of thelanding-zone control party.

Body language is a large part ofour communication, but body codesare not universal. In some cultures,holding hands among men is anacceptable demonstration of friend-ship and trust. In the American cul-ture it can mean something differ-ent. An Arab may stand very closeto see our pupils dilating in order totell if we are being honest; if we are

wearing sunglasses or avert oureyes, he may feel that we are tryingto hide something.

There are many problems inher-ent in cross-cultural communica-tion. The sender’s choice of where todirect the communication, highexpectations of response and lack ofsocial credibility affect the message.The coalition receiver’s bias towardthe source of the message, lowexpectation of his own needs andthe need to maintain social credibil-ity can impede his response. Themedium, verbal or body language,distorts the message. All these fac-tors can combine to create a com-munication failure that will taketime and energy to correct.

Luckily, communication is a two-way street, and our coalition part-ners face the same difficulties try-ing to get through to us. Study andawareness of the problem can go along way toward solution, and withhard work and patience we canaccomplish the mission together.

Capt David E.A.Johnson is a 1984graduate of the U.S.Military Academy atWest Point. Commis-sioned in Infantry, hehas served as an anti-armor platoon leader, brigade assis-tant adjutant and company execu-tive officer with the 9th InfantryDivision. He served as commanderof SFODA 552 during OperationDesert Shield/Storm, as J-3 for theJoint Special Operations Forces-Somalia during Operation RestoreHope, and is currently assigned ascommander of SFODA 565 in the2nd Battalion, 5th SF Group. Air-borne-, Ranger- and Special Forces-qualified, he has previously pub-lished articles in Infantry magazineand is a Russian, French and Ara-bic linguist.

July 1993 11

When Hurricane Andrew strucksouthern Florida in August 1992,Army special-operations forces wereamong the first on the scene toassist residents in recovering fromthe damage.

In fact, some were among thosestruck by the storm. Members of the478th Civil Affairs Battalion, 361stCivil Affairs Brigade, were sta-tioned near the heart of the hurri-cane’s path.

Reserve Maj. Lee L. Stockdale, aCivil Affairs specialist, turned onthe television weather report atmidnight on Aug. 23, and watchedas the radar showed a green swirlheading toward his area on themap. He woke his family, andtogether they huddled on the floorin their 4-by-5-foot downstairs bath-room for almost six hours.

“We heard trees smashing off theside of the house and the fencesbeing ripped apart. Then the roofcame off,” said Stockdale. “The windsounded like a freight train goingthrough, only it wouldn’t stop.”

By morning, the hurricane hadripped apart Stockdale’s neighbor-hood and other housing areasthroughout Dade County. Pullingtogether, he and his neighborsbegan to clean up and rebuild.Stockdale was one of 38 of the unit’ssoldiers who bore the storm’s wrath.In spite of their own personal loss-es, they immediately pitched inwith the relief operation for south-ern Dade County.

Civil AffairsReservists from the Civil Affairs

community pulled together as well.The 361st Civil Affairs Brigadecalled in volunteers from unitsaround the country to ease thestrain on the local Reserve soldiers.The CA soldiers, who work in anarray of professions in civilian life,from corrections officers andlawyers to governmental employeesand engineers, are trained to bringnormalcy back to communities.

“Civil Affairs units act as a medi-ator between civilian government

and its military counterpart,” saidMaj. George M. Waldroup, 478thCA Battalion executive officer.“Civil Affairs expertise is immedi-ately available to provide reliefoperations. We have a high level ofskills in a myriad of jobs.”

“We speak ‘governmentese’ andunderstand the jargon that opensdoors in communities,” said Capt.John Orillo of the 414th CA Battal-ion. Orillo works as an attorney inUtica, N.Y. “Interaction with localauthorities is key. We started mar-rying up the services of the police,water authorities, sewage, engi-neers, Florida Power and Light andbuilding-code officials to people whoneeded help the most.”

As relief operations continued,mail carriers were used to find outmore about damage in the commu-nities and what businesses werecoming back on line. Capt. RonaldPost of the 414th CA Battalionlearned about the pulse of the Per-rine, Fla., community from about150 mail carriers, who regularly

12 Special Warfare

SOF Supportto Hurricane Andrew

Recoveryby SSgt. Keith Butler

July 1993 13

reported to him.“Everybody gets mail. Who better

can tell you who is staying torebuild and who is leaving?” saidPost, a Vietnam veteran. “I learneda long time ago in Civil Affairs to beinnovative.”

At first, the Civil Affairs teamsassessed damage throughout thecity and directed residents to localrelief centers and medical facilities.When the relief operation turnedinto one of recovery, the CivilAffairs practitioners focused onlinking customers to reopened localbusinesses. Building contractors,utilities companies and insuranceoffices began answering the callthrough Civil Affairs coordination.

One of the biggest challengesteams faced was getting rid ofdebris. With help from the localpolice, Army Corps of Engineers,the XVIIIth Airborne Corps andlocal contractors, the Civil Affairsteams helped organize a uniquegarbage-disposal plan. Designed byArmy engineers to efficiently burntons of debris, about 20 trash andrefuse collection points as high as60 feet were set up throughoutDade County. Police were located atbusy intersections to direct thenearly 2,500 trucks rolling into eachdump site per day.

Civil affairs also assisted withanimal rescue. Col. Thelton M.C.McCorcle, a 478th CA Battalionmember from Auburn, Ala., treatedfarm animals and pets. Workingfrom four tents, McCorcle and vol-unteers from animal-welfare agen-cies also coordinated a lost-and-found program. The crew took pic-tures of animals that were broughtin and tried to return them to theirowners. “We were concerned for theanimals for humanity’s sake, butthey also posed a danger for thepeople around here. Dogs, particu-larly, can get nasty when they formpacks and are very hungry,” saidMcCorcle, who works as a veteri-narian for the U.S. Department ofAgriculture.

Throughout Dade County, theCivil Affairs work continued for

other members of the 361st CABrigade. Food-distribution reliefpoints were centralized at the heartof the hardest-hit enclaves.

Stockdale, who began trackingdown insurance compensation andputting his family life in order rightafter the hurricane, provided adviceto the Reservists who lost homes.The international-relations lawyerfor the 478th CA Battalion, Stock-dale helped coordinate the county’smobilization of more than 100lawyers to provide free legal adviceto residents for their recovery.

Special ForcesWhile they were not on-scene at

the time of the hurricane, SpecialForces soldiers were among the firstto arrive. Soldiers from the ArmyReserve 11th SF Group deployedimmediately after the hurricane hitto provide medical assistance, ini-tial damage assessment and com-munications link-ups. NationalGuardsmen from the 20th SF Groupalso moved in quickly when they gotword from the Florida governor toprovide 24-hour security againstlooting of businesses, homes andpublic buildings left vulnerableafter the hurricane.

“Within 24 hours our soldiersbecame operational with the Home-stead police officers,” said Capt.Thomas Bradey, operations officerfor the 3rd Battalion, 20th SFGroup during the relief operation.“A lot of sales were going on to themigrant farmers who were afraid ordidn’t know about relief centersbecause they didn’t speak English.”

Soldiers from the 7th SF Groupalso deployed from Fort Bragg toaid in recovery efforts. Soldiersfrom all three SF groups targetedsouthern Florida communities toassess the damage and focus aid tovictims of the hurricane. Communi-ties with the most dire needs werepinpointed by roving Special Forcesteams. Many accompanied federal-agency personnel to provide food,water, lanterns, heating fuel andmedical treatment to beleagueredcitizens.

Through the end of August andinto September, teams from allthree SF groups went door-to-doorsearching for people trapped intheir homes on the outskirts ofDade County, while conductingdamage assessment for the JointTask Force and aid agencies. Theirpatrols took them as far as the

Photo by Keith Butler

Soldiers from the 20th SF Group help to direct residents into designated linesat the Homestead, Fla., post office following Hurricane Andrew.

Everglades.Soldiers of the 20th SF Group

found one family trapped in theirhome. “A van rolled over andblocked the front door, while a treecovered the back way. The teamopened up the house and found anelderly couple,” said SFC DanielPaul, NCOIC of the 3rd/20th’s per-sonnel administration center. “Theywere trapped for days without elec-tricity or water. They were veryglad to see the 20th SF Group ofFlorida.”

The determination to help citi-zens rebuild their lives after thedisaster showed no more than withSgt. Maj. Richard Wolf and anothergroup of 20th Group soldiers. Help-ing those in the rural sections of thecounty, they brought out food,water, building materials and chil-dren’s books. They pitched tents forthose whose homes had beendestroyed.

“Close your eyes and picturesheer hell. That is what this wholeordeal has been like,” said LaVanne

Donaldson, an avocado farmer whoreceived assistance from Wolf andhis soldiers. “These guys have madeit bearable. They are always check-ing on us even though we live outhere in the ‘boonies.’ I’ll never for-get what they have done for all ofus.”

The 7th SFG also teamed up withCivil Affairs soldiers to assess dam-age on the Miccosukee IndianReservation and provide assistancecoordination for the 10th MountainDivision.

The 75,000-acre Miccosukee Indi-an Reservation, set along Highway84 north of the Everglades NationalPark, showed how brutal naturecould be. Trees lay uprooted ontheir sides; homes were demolished.

“The 10th Mountain Division G-5told us there were rapport problemsbetween the Miccosukee Indiansand various federal agencies. Theytold us to get our foot in the door toaddress the problems,” said CWO 1Bruce D. Phelps, commander ofODA 716, A Company, 1st Battal-

ion, 7th Special Forces Group atFort Bragg, N.C. “We build rapportall of the time when we go to LatinAmerica. We learn as much as wecan about people we are trying tohelp — customs and their way oflife.”

To assist in the relief effort,Phelps linked up with Detachment3, Team 3, of Civil Affairs TaskForce 489. Army Reservists Capt.Daniel E. McCabe and Sgt. AnthonydeForest, a Cherokee Indian him-self, stepped in to help gatherresearch on the Miccosukee Indiancustoms.

The Miccosukee tribe operatesmuch like a country within a coun-try. They practice customs morethan 300 years old and live by lawsset forth in their own constitution.They speak their own language,called Mikasuki.

“When you’re dealing with theMiccosukee, you’re dealing with asovereign nation,” said Phelps, whopicked up a little of the language toadd to his repertoire of Spanish.“They are people like you and me —after the hurricane, they neededhelp.”

After the first meeting with Mic-cosukee chairman Billy Cypress, asort of Indian-soldier pact wasformed. The Miccosukee pickeddeForest to serve as the liaisonbetween the Indians and soldiers. Itwas also agreed that promisedbuilding supplies be delivered rightaway.

“We established immediate rap-port with the Miccosukee as a team,SF and CA, and backed it withaction,” said McCabe, a landscaperwho volunteered to come help in thehurricane-relief effort from hishome, Knoxville, Tenn. “The 710thfolks (710th Main Support Battal-ion, 10th Mountain Division) gaveus that capability.”

Two days after their initial meet-ing, the Civil Affairs and SpecialForces troops were escorting twotractor-trailers to the Miccosukeereservation about 60 miles north-west of Homestead where the Armyelements were headquartered.

14 Special Warfare

Capt. Alvin Sanders ofthe 7th SF Group gives

out supplies duringHurricane Andrewrelief operations in

south Florida.


July 1993 15

In a traditional, Miccosukee man-ner, the leader of the tribe gave hisblessing to the soldiers for the reliefwork they had orchestrated. “Weare very satisfied with what youand the Army have done for ourpeople,” said Jasper S. Nelson,assistant chairman of the Miccosu-kee Tribe of Indians of Florida. Out-side the conference room, the thirdset of trucks carrying roofing mate-rial, plywood and ladders was beingunloaded. The Miccosukee Indiannation was ready to rebuild.

“The Miccosukee Indian reliefeffort will be one of the mostnotable things to come out of this,”said Lt. Col. James T. LaRue, com-mander of the Civil Affairs TaskForce 489. “We put this task forcetogether in 24 hours from all overand it jelled into an excellent team.The relationship between all spe-cial-operations forces — CivilAffairs, Special Forces and Psycho-logical Operations — has beenunparalleled. The devastation herewas on a magnitude that we’venever dealt with before. This hasbeen a textbook operation in SOFintegration and execution.”

CommunicationsThe “ears” for soldiers of the 7th

SF Group deployed for HurricaneAndrew relief operations came fromthe112th Signal Battalion’s special-operations team.

The three-soldier team workedaround the clock to keep six teamsfrom the 1st Battalion, 7th SFGroup linked to the special opera-tions command-and-control elementin Florida and to the 7th Groupheadquarters at Fort Bragg.

“The 112th team did a superb jobkeeping us linked to headquartersand our ODAs,” said Sgt. Maj.Michael W. Jefferson, SOCCEsergeant major. “This allowed us toperform a difficult mission whilekeeping our commanders informedhere and at Fort Bragg. You have tobe informed to support the guys onthe ground.”

Ready to pack up and move out atall times with any of the Special

Forces units, the 112th Signal Bat-talion loaded up a flat-bed trailerafter receiving word to move out forsouthern Florida.

“We not only support SpecialForces, but all special-operationsunits,” said SSgt. Andre L. Topp,net-radio-interface team chief, ACompany, 112th Signal Battalion.“We had a four-hour notification todeploy to Florida.”

Working hand microphones andan array of knobs and lights, the112th radio-team members calledthe confines of a 2-by-4-foot cubiclehome for 12-hour shifts throughoutthe hurricane-relief operation. Theymonitored UHF satellite nets andHF nets with the ODAs providingdamage assessment throughoutsouthern Florida. They were thesole connection between SF troopsreporting on Hurricane Andrew’sdamages and the headquartersdirecting aid.

“It’s always a rush when you getcalled up for a real-world mission,”said Spec. Martin J. Mancuso,senior radio operator from A Com-pany, 112th Signal Battalion. “Mostunits do a lot of training missions.Most of what we go on is for real.There’s a lot of pride in doing the

job. You have to be ready to go in amoment’s notice and be proficient,because people are depending onyou at all times.”

PSYOPAlso active in recovery operations

were Army Psychological Opera-tions specialists, who steered vic-tims of Hurricane Andrew to reliefcenters throughout southern DadeCounty with a three-week blitz ofpublic-service information — viaprint products, radio and loud-speaker teams.

The Psychological OperationsTask Force, comprised of active-duty soldiers from the 1st Battalion,4th PSYOP Group, and ArmyReservists from 5th PSYOP Group,plugged the hole in public-informa-tion services left by the hurricane.

Telephones, radio stations, news-papers and television had beenwiped away, leaving local citizenswith no means of receiving theword about relief centers and aidavailable.

“There was a tremendous require-ment when we arrived,” said Lt.Col. Paul B. Kappelman, comman-der of the 1st Battalion, 4th POG,at Fort Bragg, and POTF comman-


CWO 1 Bruce Phelps, 7th SF Group (left) and Sgt. Anthony deForest, a CivilAffairs NCO, discuss rebuilding with members of the Miccosukee Indian tribe.

der in Florida. “Our services wereuseful for people’s survival initiallyand for recovery later. We helpedthem get back on their feet. Theoperation was a success. Our sol-diers performed an essential servicein a professional manner.”

Because of PSYOP’s ability to getthe word out quickly and efficiently,they were called on to spread theword, initially from a 400-watt,mobile radio station. A second1,000-watt transmitter was then setup to broadcast public-serviceannouncements from 6 a.m. to 10p.m., seven days a week, on “Recov-ery Radio.”

“The radio went on the air strictlyto broadcast public-serviceannouncements — such as theopening of disaster-relief centersand to inform the public abouthealth facilities and disaster-relief-application centers,” said Capt.John L. Wesson, the assistant oper-ations officer for the 1st Battalion,4th POG, who served as the liaison

officer to the XVIII Airborne Corpsthroughout relief effort.

“From what we got by talking tothe people, they were getting neces-sary information about humanitari-an aid being performed by militaryand civilian organizations,” saidSSgt. Thomas R. Ayers, the NCOICof Recovery Radio.

Content for the public-serviceannouncements, which were broad-cast live and on tape, was compiledby the Product Development Cen-ter, perhaps the heart of POTF.Scripts were written for airing onthe radio along with an assortmentof printed products. Fliers, posters,instructional wallet-sized cards,maps to relief centers and anewsletter were crafted by teamsworking around the clock.

“Newspaper boys weren’t throw-ing newspapers on people’s frontporches, because they didn’t havefront porches anymore,” said Maj.Robert E. Armstrong, officer incharge of the PDC. Armstrong, an

Army Reservist from the 5th POG,put aside his work as a self-employed crop scientist to help.

“PDC developed all the productsthat were disseminated. We placeda priority on information that hadto go out immediately — then decid-ed on how to get it out quicklythrough radio, print and loudspeak-ers,” added Armstrong. Posters andfliers placed throughout DadeCounty gave phone numbers andlocations for aid agencies, includingfood-distribution points, inoculationcenters and insurance offices.

In all, 400 different products weredesigned at the PDC, which alsoinformed citizens about safety pre-cautions, preventive medicine,debris clearing, schools and churchfunctions. More than 500,000 copiesof materials were printed byPSYOP members. The printed pub-lic-service information was postedat camps, on telephone poles andthroughout neighborhoods acrossDade County.

While PDC soldiers worked attheir headquarters, eight loud-speaker teams hit the streets as asort of an electric town crier, broad-casting public-service news similarto the radio and print teams, butreaching people whose radios andtelevisions were destroyed.

Because of the diverse blend ofcultures there, the PSYOP teamused its Spanish-speaking ability toget the word out to Hispanic areas.It also broadcast in Creole forHaitian communities and Kanjobal,a dialect spoken by Guatemalans.

“We tried to draw people out oftheir homes to travel to relief cen-ters. I felt real strong about going tohelp these people; it looked like ahuge mess,” said Sgt. Jon E. Walsh,NCOIC of 4th POG’s rovingHumanitarian Information SupportTeams. “My parents were in theSan Francisco earthquake. I wasproud that we had a chance to useour knowledge and skills to helpout.”

Using the LSS-40, a 3-by-2-footbox-like contraption which can bemounted on a soldier’s back with a

16 Special Warfare

PFC Shelen B. Ayling,112th Signal Battalion,

provides communica-tion between 7th SF

Group teams and head-quarters elements dur-

ing the relief operation.


July 1993 17

battery pack or mounted on aHumvee roof, the HISTs coveredmore than 50 square miles of urbanand rural areas throughout thecounty, broadcasting public-serviceinformation. They also operatedstatic loudspeaker systems at reliefcenters to explain how residentscould get further assistance.

As relief turned into recovery, thepace slowed. Newspapers and radioand television stations continued tocome on-line. “We are working our-selves out of a job,” said 1st Lt. Eliz-abeth C. McClure, the HIST officer-in-charge and a Reservist from the5th POG out of Washington, D.C.“When we got here, people had noway to get information. Our soldiershit the ground and took off.”

SSgt. Keith Butleris a journalistassigned to the PublicAffairs Office, U.S.Army Special Opera-tions Command.


PSYOP soldiers prepare folders in the Product Development Center. The Center designed 400 products to inform residents about a variety of topics.

The PSYOP task force formed tosupport relief efforts following Hur-ricane Andrew was unique in sever-al aspects, and a review of its orga-nization and function provides anumber of valuable lessons learnedfor the PSYOP community.

Initially, the only PSYOP troopsdeployed were loudspeaker teamsaccompanying the 82nd AirborneDivision. Within days of their deploy-ment, as the extent of the damagebecame more evident, the need foradditional PSYOP assets becameobvious. Within less than a week, thePOTF had been established.

Any POTF uses assets from theentire 4th PSYOP Group. TheAndrew POTF was unique becauseit included Reserve forces. Reserv-ists held positions at every levelwithin the POTF, from the staffdown to the loudspeaker teams.

OrganizationAs in any military operation, the

role of the POTF required a clearmission statement, as well as anarticulation of the commander’s

intent and a concept of the opera-tion. The following were developedto state the POTF’s role as preciselyas possible:Mission: Provide coordinated in-formation programs in support of thejoint-task-force relief operations.

Commander’s intent: • Supply immediate relief infor-

mation through radio, loudspeaker,print and face-to-face contact.

• Identify key communicators andappropriate language balance toprovide greatest impact.

• Assess the adequacy of recoverycommunications infrastructure andeffectiveness of relief information.

• Synchronize emerging informa-tion programs oriented at recoveryoperations using mass media(radio).

• Keep the information programahead of events to inform and pre-pare the population for restorationof its former communication andinformation network.

Concept of operation: • Immediately establish radio

operations in the vicinity of Home-

stead City and provide for thegreatest “footprint” in the affectedarea.

• Provide immediate survivalinformation from command, publicaffairs office and press releases.

• Provide loudspeaker teams tosupplement the communication mixand provide personal, face-to-facecontact.

• Stress themes of survival andbasic needs.

• As a daily routine is formed,apply PSYOP assets so that infor-mation remains ahead of events toelevate behavior beyond survival torecovery and sustainment.

The most useful tool developed bythe staff was an operational contin-uum that showed the concept of theoperation in a longitudinal manner.Any POTF involved in a militaryoperation supports a commanderdirecting his troops in the executionof a specified mission. The POTFcan envision its mission as a succes-sion of stages, tied to the overalltask-force mission and mirroringthe task-force commander’s concept.

18 Special Warfare

PSYOP Task Force to JTF Andrew:A Case Study inSupport to Disaster-RecoveryOperations

by Lt. Col. Paul B. Kappelman & Maj. Robert E. Armstrong

July 1993 19

In a disaster-recovery operation,troops assist in the recovery, butthey cannot cause it to happen inthe same sense that they can com-plete a tactical mission. The POTF’srole is to provide information toassist the population in recovery.Regardless of how the task-forcecommander may phase the overalloperation, transition from onephase to the next depends on thepopulation’s response, and that islargely dependent upon its ability toobtain accurate information onwhere to go and what to do.

It was critical to know at alltimes where the POTF was in thecontinuum, to be able to shift theemphasis of work in the ProductDevelopment Cell and to allow ade-quate time for development andpreparation of timely materials.Accurate information on how therecovery was progressing was ascrucial as if the POTF had beensupporting a combat operation.

Operating within the UnitedStates raised two major issues forthe Andrew POTF: the product-

approval process and use of theword “PSYOP.”

The JTF commander reported toa civilian agency — the FederalEmergency Management Agency —which in turn reported to the Secre-tary of Transportation, the overalldirector of the effort. While thePOTF’s role was solely to provideinformation, its products stillrequired approval from those withinthe chain. In general, the finalapproval authority for the POTF’sproducts was at the JTF level. In aclassic PSYOP campaign in an over-seas theater, the theater comman-der-in-chief or the JTF commanderis, by doctrine, the approval author-ity. There is no doctrine coveringapproval for products in a U.S.-based organization.

To some segments of society, amisunderstanding persists withrespect to PSYOP and its variouscapabilities. The very use of theword conjures up images of “brain-washing.” To avoid a misinterpreta-tion of its role, the POTF wasreferred to as the Humanitarian

Assistance Information Element,and the troops making daily contactwith the civilians were referred toas humanitarian information sup-port teams.

Lessons learnedTo say that the soldiers assigned

to the POTF performed well is anunderstatement. In the best tradi-tions of military operations, thingsdid not always go as planned, and,in the best traditions of the U.S. sol-dier, the troops always found a wayto fix whatever was broken.

We learned numerous lessons atthe unit level, and the lessonsoffered here are for planners, com-manders and staff of the next POTForganized to assist in a U.S.-baseddisaster. Even before we redeployedfrom Florida, a warning order wasissued to form another POTF to goto Hawaii and assist in the recoveryfrom Hurricane Iniki. Although thatPOTF was not deployed, it illus-trates the point that the Andrewmission is unlikely to stand as asingular event.

20 Special Warfare

•Formation of the POTF: APSYOP representative should bedeployed at the beginning of a crisisto make an assessment of communi-cation-and-information require-ments. If needed, a POTF can bebuilt within 18-72 hours and insert-ed into the task organization. Thisis much more effective than provid-ing piecemeal support.

If a POTF is to be deployed, itshould be sent within the first 24-36hours. Not only does this quickly fillthe information vacuum, but it alsopermits the POTF to harness anysources of information still presentin the area. The POTF must bedeployed as a unit, which will likelyrequire at least one dedicated air-craft. The POTF should also havecompatible communications withthe supported command.

Augmentation by reserve-compo-nent forces is a viable option, partic-ularly in a U.S.-based operation,but the mobilization process maypresent some delays. Part of the

problem lies in the fact that somePSYOP units have mobilization sta-tions other than Fort Bragg — avestige of the days before the forma-tion of the U.S. Army Civil Affairsand Psychological Operations Com-mand. To whatever extent possible,PSYOP units should have FortBragg as their mobilization site anda standardized procedure developedby USACAPOC to bring the RC sol-diers onto active duty.

•Role of the POTF and the opera-tional continuum: Stating thePOTF’s role in the manner used forcombat operations helps keep theunit focused. The same languagewill be used by the JTF. Be pre-pared for some confusion by civilianagencies: Much of their thinkingcenters on providing information tothe press. Our emphasis must be oninformation the population needs tokeep it moving toward recovery.

To accurately judge your positionon the operational continuumrequires timely and accurate intelli-

gence. In Andrew, we frequentlyrelied on the local newspapers.

A consolidated information-and-intelligence collection plan shouldbe developed that satisfies the intel-ligence-collection requirements forthe entire JTF, with the emphasison human intelligence. The task toconduct face-to-face communicationand to survey attitudes is an idealtask for Special Forces disaster-assistance relief teams, or DART,and Civil Affairs personnel. DARTand CA personnel were deployed inAndrew and will likely be present inany future recovery operation. Theintelligence cycle has to feed backinto the POTF, to ensure timelyproducts.

The CONUS perspective: ThePOTF was assigned to the Armyforces, presenting several chal-lenges to its successful operation.When product requests came fromthe JTF or FEMA, they were notnecessarily viewed as a priority bythe Corps. In addition, having thePOTF below the JTF level created alayered approval chain, slowingdown the process and in some caseswatering down the final product.FM 33-1, Psychological Operations,clearly indicates that the POTFshould work directly for the JTF.Just as PSYOP has had to argue itscase to be recognized as properlybelonging in the G-3/S-3, so, too,must POTF commanders arguetheir way into the JTF. The POTFcommander should work as a spe-cial staff officer in the JTF.

The crisis environment requiresthat many things happen at once,and there is a temptation to decen-tralize. For information activities,that seems an incorrect approach.Many critiques of the Andrew effortnoted the lack of a central approvalauthority for information release.

Civilian planning does provide forsuch a central authority. Under theprovisions of the Robert T. StaffordDisaster Relief and Emergency Act(Public Law 93-288, as amended),the Federal Response Plan calls forthe establishment of a joint infor-mation center. According to “the


Spec. Michael Parrish(left) and PFC Michael

Stork ensure POTFbroadcasts are goingout over the airwavesduring the Hurricane

Andrew relief operation.

July 1993 21

Plan,” as it is commonly called, theJIC coordinates all informationreleased to the public and the newsmedia.

The JIC, formed at FEMA-level,should serve as the “informationCINC.” It should hold a daily meet-ing with all parties involved anddirect the themes to be followed. TheJTF contingent should consist ofrepresentatives from the J-2 (armedwith the latest intelligence gatheredby the DART and CA teams), PAO,Civil Affairs and PSYOP. On an as-needed basis, consideration shouldbe given to including other staff offi-cers, e.g., staff judge advocate, sur-geon and chaplain. Taking thethemes determined in the meeting,the POTF should prepare the prod-ucts and the JTF should act as theapproval authority.

While the JIC was formed andserved as the focal point for infor-mation, as in the Plan, its initialemphasis was on providing informa-tion to the press. Although the JICeventually began focusing on infor-mation to the population, asopposed to information about thepopulation, it continued to have astrong orientation toward its PAOrole. The POTF commander muststay alert to the PAO orientation ofmany of the other players in theinformation arena and educate

them on the capabilities and role ofPSYOP assets.

At the outset, the POTF comman-der should ensure that the dissemi-nation of information by militaryforces is centralized. A JTF direc-tive should state the JTF comman-der’s policies and guidelines. Withthe advent of personal computers,laser printers and graphics pro-grams, it is all too easy for a “mini-POTF” to spring up and start print-ing its own leaflets. There were acouple of instances of this in Flori-da, and while the efforts were well-intentioned, they did not supportthe overall JTF mission, nor werethey designed by PSYOP-trainedsoldiers.

Finally, use of the word “PSYOP”warrants some discussion. Therehave been a number of valid argu-ments put forth over the years, call-ing for a change in our designation.That change, however, would playinto the hands of those who alreadymisunderstand our role, providingthem even further “proof” if they feltwe were deliberately trying to con-ceal our true identity. Particularlyin the wake of Desert Storm, theU.S. public is reasonably well-informed about the U.S. military —including PSYOP — and holds it inhigh regard. When the opportunitypresents itself, we should try to edu-

cate that portion of the public stillill-informed about the versatility ofthe PSYOP soldier.

Lt. Col. Paul B.Kappelman is com-mander of the 1stPSYOP Battalion, 4thPSYOP Group, FortBragg, N.C. Duringthe Hurricane Andrewrelief effort, he served as the POTFcommander. He has also served withthe 82nd Airborne Division duringOperation Urgent Fury and with the7th Special Forces Group duringOperation Just Cause.

Maj. Robert E. Arm-strong is the civil-mili-tary operations officerfor the 5th PSYOPGroup, Washington,D.C. He served in theAndrew POTF as offi-cer-in-charge of the Product Develop-ment Cell. An Army Reserve officer,he has held various command andstaff positions in the Army Reserveand National Guard and served inVietnam with the 173rd AirborneBrigade and 5th Special ForcesGroup.

Congress specifies broad roles foreach U.S. military service and theU.S. Special Operations Command.The Secretary of Defense, withpresidential approval, assigns func-tions that amplify those responsibil-ities. The President and Secretaryof Defense prescribe operationalmissions for each unified and speci-fied command. Some assignmentsare clean cut, others unavoidablyinterlock and overlap.

Title 10, United States Code, asamended by Congress in 1986,directs the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff to review roles andfunctions not less than once everythree years. Re-evaluation is re-quired to determine whether redun-dancies foster flexibility or raisecosts without increasing capabili-ties; to ensure that responsibilitiesare properly distributed among U.S.military services and USSOCOM;

and to fill gaps that encourageinterservice competition for scarceresources.

Several special-operations rolesand functions might benefit fromreviews that could help Congressand the Secretary of Defense deter-mine what additions to, subtrac-tions from and other adjustmentswould be appropriate.

Inconsistent instructionsTitle 10, Section 167, lists 10

“activities” equivalent to statutoryroles and missions for special opera-tions: direct action; strategic recon-naissance; unconventional warfare;foreign internal defense; counterter-rorism; theater search and rescue;psychological operations; civilaffairs; humanitarian assistance;and “such other activities as may bespecified by the President or theSecretary of Defense.”

DoD instructions differ from Title10 in important respects. Directive5100.1 tells the Army, Navy and AirForce “to organize, train, equip andprovide forces for the support andconduct of special operations,” but

specifies no functions for USSOCOM.Special-operations doctrine down-

grades humanitarian assistance froma statutory obligation to a collateralmission, with the attendant admoni-tion that SOF “commanders shouldexercise care in allocating forcesagainst non-primary missions to pre-clude overcommitment.” These incon-sistent instructions require revision.The following observations mightmake useful starting points.

Direct actionDoD officially defines direct

action as a “specified act involvingoperations of an overt, covert, clan-destine or low visibility nature con-ducted primarily by a sponsoringpower’s special operations forces inhostile or denied areas.”

That description invites disparateinterpretations. SO doctrine, forexample, asserts that “units mayemploy raid, ambush, or directassault tactics; emplace munitionsand other devices; conduct standoffattacks by fire from air, ground, ormaritime platforms; provide termi-nal guidance for precision-guidedmunitions; and conduct indepen-dent sabotage.” Direct action alsoincludes efforts to locate and cap-ture or recover personnel andmateriel; neutralize, seize, ordestroy critical facilities; and evenhelp stem the spread of mass-destruction weapons.

Some SOF are explicitly orga-nized, equipped and trained toundertake DA operations. The JointSpecial Operations Command, asecret, triservice organization thatconcentrates on counterterrorism,emphasizes “surgical” strikes thatconventional forces seldom couldengage successfully. The Navy’sSEAL teams undertake DA opera-tions in maritime and riverine envi-ronments. Specially armed Armyhelicopters and Air Force fixed-winggunships able to operate at nightand in adverse weather also qualify.

Rangers, in contrast, are primar-ily superb parachute infantry thatunified commanders normallyemploy in battalion or greater

22 Special Warfare

Rolesand Functionsof U.S. SpecialOperations Forces

by John M. Collins

This article is taken from the 1993Roles and Functions of U.S. CombatForces, prepared by John M. Collinsfor the Library of Congress’ Congres-sional Research Service.

strength to accomplish convention-al missions, as they did duringOperations Urgent Fury and JustCause. Their combat-diving andscout-swimming teams possesscapabilities comparable to those ofthe SEALs.

Marine Expeditionary Units des-ignated “special operations capa-ble,” like Rangers, are essentiallyconventional forces. They are orga-nized, trained and equipped to con-duct operations that include mar-itime special-purpose missions, butthey are not SOF and have nevercome under USSOCOM control.Congress and the Secretary ofDefense might use that precedent torevamp current roles and functionsso that USSOCOM would retainprimary responsibility only fordirect actions that truly requirespecial talent. They should resolvethe future purpose and assignmentof the Ranger Regiment, however,before they opt for change. At leastthree options are open:

• The Ranger Regiment couldgreatly expand its direct-action capa-bilities at little cost by adapting thebest features of spetsnaz brigadesthat once served the Soviet Unionand now belong to various indepen-dent republics. Ranger companies, ifrequired, could then quickly formmany small, uniquely-tailored teamsorganized, equipped and trained toneutralize scattered, high-value,heavily guarded targets. Rangers insuch event would become SOF inevery sense of the word and functionmuch more effectively as members ofUSSOCOM, provided they could sup-plement infantry skills with area-ori-ented direct-action specialties.

• The Ranger Regiment mightmove from USSOCOM to Armyjurisdiction. Careful considerationshould precede any decision to doso, because few Army generalsfully appreciate Ranger capabili-ties and limitations. Their prede-cessors briefly lionized Rangers fordaring deeds early in World WarII, later misused and destroyed twobattalions at Cisterna, Italy,reduced the remainder to separate

companies during the Korean con-flict, then erased all Rangers fromactive rolls from September 1951until 1974. Returning Rangers toArmy control consequently wouldbe wise only if senior Army leaderswelcomed the move.

• The Ranger Regiment mightremain under continued USSOCOMcontrol, even though the missions itperforms are mainly conventional.Current arrangements clearly arewelcome.

Strategic reconnaissanceTitle 10 identifies strategic recon-

naissance as a special-operationsactivity. SO doctrine insteadaddresses special reconnaissance,intended to collect specific, well-defined and time-sensitive infor-mation of national or theater-levelsignificance.

SR often depends primarily onhuman-intelligence agents in hos-tile or politically touchy territorywhen technological systems are less

satisfactory or infeasible. Typicaltasks include contact with insur-gent or resistance factions to ascer-tain whether they deserve U.S. sup-port; topographic, meteorological,hydrographic and demographicexplorations; forays to find worri-some enemy weapons; investiga-tions to confirm the strength, loca-tion and movement of major enemyforces; and battle-damage-assess-ment probes.

SEALS concentrate their strate-gic-reconnaissance capabilities alongcontinental shelves and coasts. Spe-cial-operations aircraft performunique missions aloft. Army SpecialForces conduct strategic reconinland. Whether SF should continueto do so is debatable:

• Special Forces teams, composedmainly of seasoned, professionalNCOs, are fully qualified to performstrategic-reconnaissance missions.Their employment, however, riskshard-to-replace personnel whospend years acquiring language pro-

July 1993 23

Army Rangers aresuperb parachuteinfantry that have per-formed well in Opera-tions Urgent Fury andJust Cause. Althoughthey are often used inconventional missions,few conventional com-manders fully under-stand their limitationsor capabilities.

U.S. Army photo

ficiency and cross-cultural under-standing applicable to a particulargeographic area. One option wouldbe to consider SR a collateral ratherthan primary function for ArmySpecial Forces.

• Rangers, in response to anysuch decision, might fold strategicreconnaissance and surveillanceinto their repertoire. That wouldcapitalize on professed abilities ofRanger companies and battalionsto infiltrate and exfiltrate hostileterritory, survive in all types ofweather and terrain under adverseconditions, and perform short-duration tactical reconnaissance.Individual Rangers and smallintelligence-collection teams thuscould excel at SR if given propertraining and retention policies thatstabilize assignments.

• USSOCOM, at additional costin terms of personnel, time andmoney, could activate the necessarynumber of specialized SR units.Rangers and Special Forces thencould concentrate on other impor-tant responsibilities.

Unconventional warfareUnconventional warfare, which

may replace, complement or supple-

ment conventional military opera-tions, involves strategically offen-sive covert, clandestine or low-pro-file assistance for insurgents, seces-sionists or resistance movements inforeign countries.

U.S. SOF, primarily Army SpecialForces, help organize, train andadvise indigenous undergroundsand guerrillas. They furnish intelli-gence, communications, psychologi-cal operations and medical support,and establish evasion-and-escapenetworks that allow safe movementby individuals and small groups toand from enemy-held areas.

Raids, sabotage, deception andsurvival techniques are UW stocksin trade. Success depends in largepart on professional SOF steeped inlocal cultures and proficient in locallanguages. UW professionals fur-ther require the acumen, maturityand temperament needed to influ-ence local leaders, whom they nor-mally must persuade instead ofcommand.

The U.S. conducted three notableUW operations during World WarII, in the Philippines, Burma andFrance. The succeeding half-centuryhas seen none on a comparablescale.

Anticommunism and containmentpolicies, which inspired most if notall U.S. unconventional warfare dur-ing the Cold War, no longer seem inprospect. A counterrevolution inRussia that adversely affected U.S.security conceivably could reviveinterest, but not necessarily — deci-sion makers in Washington werereluctant to launch large UW opera-tions against the Soviet Union orRed China when both were bonafide threats.

• Congress therefore might weighthe advisability of discardingunconventional warfare as a statu-tory role. DoD Directive 5100.1, inresponse, could designate UW a col-lateral function. USSOCOM thencould devote full attention to foreigninternal defense, which requiresArmy Special Forces to emphasizequite different skills.

• Alternatively, it might be wiseto retain unconventional warfare asa statutory role. UW was the origi-nal function of Army Special Forces.It still contributes to their mys-tique, and pride in related capabili-ties remains an immeasurablemorale builder. Financial costswould be minuscule.

Foreign internal defenseForeign internal defense, a unique

form of collective security, is thestrategically defensive counterpartof unconventional warfare. Itinvolves protracted interagency andmultidisciplinary efforts by U.S.civilian specialists and armed forcesto forestall or defeat selected insur-gencies, resistance movements andlawlessness.

The primary purpose of U.S. SOFis to train, advise and otherwisehelp host nations develop militaryand paramilitary forces fully able tomaintain internal security. SomeUW and FID skills, such as appreci-ation for local culture and languageproficiency, are interchangeable,but different organizations andequipment are required.

As a result, Army Special Forcesand Navy SEALs are not equallyadept at foreign internal defense and

24 Special Warfare

U.S. Army photo

The primary purpose of U.S. SOF in foreign internal defense is to train andadvise host nations to develop forces able to maintain internal security.

unconventional warfare, althoughU.S. policy makers currently expectequal competence at both.

The need to fix the relative impor-tance of UW and FID seems press-ing, because FID is becoming evermore complex in the post-Cold Warworld. Multinational operations maybecome the norm. Successful FID,moreover, might promote U.S. inter-ests in global stability at less costand risk than most known means.Alternatives listed below thereforemight prove advantageous:

• Title 10 designates foreign inter-nal defense and humanitarian assis-tance as special-operations activities.Humanitarian assistance, however,is a subset of civil-military opera-tions which, in turn, contribute toFID. No harm therefore would bedone if Title 10 discarded humani-tarian assistance as a discrete rolefor SOF. USSOCOM then couldlegally consider foreign internaldefense as an entity and freely deter-mine which aspects to emphasize.

• DoD Directive 5100.1 does nottell USSOCOM whether unconven-tional warfare or foreign internaldefense should take precedence.That document might helpfullyassign the primary function.

Paramilitary operationsGuerrillas and other armed irreg-

ular forces that employ quasimili-tary tactics and techniques areoffensive paramilitary forces.Defensive paramilitary forces helpregular armed forces and law-enforcement agencies retain orregain internal security.

The Office of Strategic Servicesconducted U.S. paramilitary opera-tions during World War II. TheCIA, its successor, thereafterassumed paramilitary responsibili-ties. Diversified endeavors duringthe 1950s occurred in China, Korea,the Philippines, Guatemala,Indonesia and Tibet.

CIA retains primary responsibili-ty for paramilitary operations, butthe Drug Enforcement Agency nowconducts or controls small-scaleactions in Andean states. The State

Department’s Bureau of Interna-tional Narcotics Matters hasreceived legal permission to arm itsown air wing of 60 fixed-wing air-craft and helicopters for such pur-poses. Consolidation rather thanproliferation of paramilitary respon-sibilities, however, seems worthconsideration. Accordingly:

• Congress might amend Title 10to identify USSOCOM as the leadagency for all U.S. paramilitaryoperations. It might simultaneouslyamend Title 50, Section 403(d)(5) toexclude participation by the CIA,which the present text implicitlypermits with these words: “performsuch other [unspecified] functions ...as the National Security Councilmay from time to time direct.” DoDDirective 5100.1 and joint special-operations doctrine thereafter couldcontain specific instructions relatedto paramilitary functions, missionsand interdepartmental and intera-gency relationships.

• CIA might retain primaryresponsibilities if, after carefulreview, policy makers decided thatit is best qualified to plan and con-duct paramilitary operations.

Anti/counterterrorismTerrorism is public, repetitive vio-

lence or threats of violence intendedto achieve socio-political objectivesby intimidating innocent people andseverely disrupting community rou-tines. Domestic terrorism, whichoriginates within and is directedagainst one country or factionstherein, is a favorite tool of someinsurgents. Transnational terrorism,instigated by groups that renegadegovernments may sponsor and sup-port, emanates from foreign bases.

U.S. programs to combat terror-ism comprise two basic roles.Antiterrorism emphasizes passiveprotection for personnel and instal-lations. Counterterrorism mayattack terrorists before they canstrike or be reactive. Timely, accu-rate intelligence is essential to both.

Title 10 designates counterterror-ism, but not antiterrorism, as a spe-cial-operations activity. DoD Direc-

tive 5100.1 assigns neither functionto USSOCOM or any military ser-vice. Joint special-operations doc-trine, in the absence of contraryinstructions, considers counterter-rorism a primary activity and callsantiterrorism collateral.

Distinctions between antiterror-ism and counterterrorism aresharp; they demand different skills.Steps to discourage terrorists beforethey strike and to mitigate damageembrace individual-protection pro-grams to reduce risks, public educa-tion to increase awareness andinstallation-protection programs.

Active countermeasures, in con-trast, require unique reconnaissanceand surveillance techniques. Withrare exceptions, such as the 1986 airattack against Libya, they requireintricately choreographed SOFactions as well. Flexibility and a flairfor improvisation often are impera-tive. Hostage-rescue units thatexpect the unexpected, for example,must maintain a mind-bogglingarray of special skills on standby,because they cannot predict thenature of any future emergency.

Antiterrorism and counterterror-ism nevertheless are closely linked,because they are flip sides of thesame coin. Roles and functions thatdisregard antiterrorism thereforeare apt to be flawed. Amendmentsto Title 10 and DoD Directive 5100.1accordingly may prove appropriate:

• Members of JSOC, all intimate-ly familiar with terrorist tactics, areeminently qualified to help theState Department and FBI educateand train antiterrorists. Title 10could encourage them to do so byadding antiterrorism to other spe-cial-operations activities.

• DoD Directive 5100.1, inresponse, could assign antiterror-ism to USSOCOM as a primaryresponsibility without degradingJSOC’s counterterrorism capabili-ties in the slightest.

Theater search and rescueSearch-and-rescue forces must be

properly organized, equipped, trainedand controlled to recover personnel

July 1993 25

in distress on land or at sea undertrying conditions. They remain onconstant call, ready to pick updowned aircrews and passengers inpeacetime. Combat-search-and-res-cue operations under fire duringminor contingencies and major warsare even more demanding.

Title 10, Section 167, designatestheater SAR as a special-operationsresponsibility. DoD Directive 5100.1tells the Coast Guard to providemaritime search-and-rescue forcesin wartime, but otherwise snubsSAR. Joint doctrines differentiateSAR from CSAR: Every sovereigncountry conducts SAR within itsown boundaries. U.S. military ser-vices and SOF assist in accord withexisting agreements. Each U.S. uni-fied commander, however, regularlyconducts CSAR operations in sup-port of U.S. forces within his area ofresponsibility.

CSAR forces received due atten-tion throughout the Vietnam war,but units dedicated to that purposeinexplicably disappeared there-after. Only the Air Force currentlymaintains full-time CSAR assets.Other service contributions are adhoc. Only USSOCOM has fixed-and rotary-wing aircraft able to

penetrate deeply into enemyairspace, pick up evaders andrecover high-priority cargo andreturn surreptitiously.

As a result, USSOCOM hasbecome the de facto force of choicefor providing theaterwide CSAR.Continued reliance at current inten-sities reportedly would degradeabilities to satisfy a host of otherSO requirements unless USSOCOMreceived extra aircraft, personneland funds.

Some redistribution of search-and-rescue roles and functions thusmight be appropriate. Various pro-ponents propose several options:

• Congress might begin by revis-ing Title 10 requirements for the-ater search and rescue to read com-bat search and rescue, since the-ater-wide SAR operations in peace-time are basically a host-countryresponsibility.

• DoD Directive 5100.1 mightsubdivide CSAR functions amongthe Army, Navy, Marine Corps,USSOCOM and the Air Force. Suchaction would require all but USAFto designate full-time CSAR assets,since no other service currentlydoes so. A Joint Rescue Centercould coordinate all combat-search-

and-rescue forces in wartime. Deci-sion makers might consider theater-wide peacetime SAR a collateralfunction if they take this tack.

• Option three, the consolidationof all CSAR units under USSOCOM,would be consistent with the currentemphasis on streamlined functions.Centralized control could foster effi-ciency and effectiveness in peacetimeas well as war. USSOCOM, however,would need substantial augmenta-tion, as noted above.

• A compromise that assignedprimary covert or clandestine CSARfunctions to USSOCOM and allother combat search and rescue tomilitary services under joint controlmight register useful improvementswith minimum disruption. USSO-COM then could concentrate on SO-related CSAR, even if it receivedconventional CSAR as a collateralfunction.

Psychological operationsPsychological operations, as prac-

ticed by the U.S. military establish-ment, constitute the purposeful useof information and actions to influ-ence the emotions, attitudes andbehavior of target audiences inways that expedite the achievementof security objectives in peacetimeand war.

PSYOP targets are idiosyncratic.Subtle themes that work wellagainst timid souls seldom fazetough adversaries such as SaddamHussein or Serbia’s President Slobo-dan Milosevic. Leaflets are useless ifprinted in improper dialects or incolors that recipients considerunlucky. PSYOP specialists whohope to manipulate key individualsor groups consistently must there-fore be conversant with local idioms,customs and predispositions.

PSYOP often involves interagen-cy coordination. Most U.S. militarycapabilities reside in the Army,which maintains an active-dutyfour-battalion PSYOP group. Threemore groups are reserve compo-nents. Air Force aircraft deliverleaflets and provide platforms forloudspeakers.

26 Special Warfare

U.S. Air Force photo

Search-and-rescue forces recover personnel in distress on land or at sea. Theymust remain constantly ready to pick up downed aircrews and passengers.

A “shotgun marriage” betweenPSYOP and special operations tookplace at Fort Bragg, N.C., in 1952when the first Special Forces groupjoined a newly-formed PsychologicalWarfare Center to soften resistanceby Army, Air Force and CIA offi-cials who then opposed all efforts tocreate military SOF formations.Those largely artificial relation-ships have long since ceased toexist. The former PsychologicalWarfare Center currently is calledthe John F. Kennedy Special War-fare Center.

Perhaps 90 percent of all PSYOPoutput supports conventional opera-tions. Critics accordingly questionwhether psychological roles andfunctions are properly assigned:

• Title 10 specifies that only somuch of PSYOP as relates to specialoperations is legitimately a SOactivity. Retired Gen. Richard G.Stillwell, bearing that fact in mind,stated to the Secretary of the Armythat “the only thing ‘special’ aboutpsychological operations is theirextraordinary importance.”Congress consequently could consid-er shifting PSYOP to Army control,especially since it normally sup-ports conventional operations. DoDDirective 5100.1 would pass prima-ry PSYOP functions to the Army vs.USSOCOM in such event.

• Others prefer present arrange-ments, partly because PSYOPforces, like Rangers, might atrophyif returned to Army jurisdiction.They nevertheless recommend thatDoD Directive 5100.1 formally des-ignate PSYOP assets as SOF. As itstands, fuzzy relationships report-edly frustrate USSOCOM efforts tocommand, control, administer andbudgetarily support PSYOP forcesas congressional legislation intends.

Civil AffairsCivil Affairs specialists facilitate

civil-military cooperation betweenU.S. armed forces and allied gov-ernments. They operate at nationaland local levels before, during andafter hostilities or other emergen-cies, in accord with international

law and bilateral or multilateralagreements. They may also exerciseexecutive, legislative and judicialauthority in occupied territory.Fundamental functions are to iden-tify and coordinate the acquisitionof indigenous resources and facili-ties; minimize civilian interferencewith U.S. military activities; assistmilitary commanders in meetinglegal and moral responsibilities tothe populace; advise U.S. and host-country authorities on civic action;and train allied counterparts.

Title 10 identifies CA as a special-operations activity insofar as itrelates to SO. Perhaps 90 percent ofassigned CA missions, however,assist conventional commanders.Most U.S. Civil Affairs forces residein the Army, which maintains oneactive battalion under USSOCOMcontrol. Ninety-seven percent arereserve components subject to callas required. Two Marine CorpsReserve CA groups support Marineair-ground task forces. Neither isassigned to USSOCOM.

Civil Affairs operations, likePSYOP, frequently require intera-gency and multiservice coordina-tion. Like PSYOP, they supportassorted U.S. military programs inpeacetime and at every conflictlevel. Even more than PSYOP, themerger of Civil Affairs with specialoperations was a marriage ofadministrative convenience. Criticsseldom question the value of CivilAffairs, but they do debate whetherCA roles and functions are properlyassigned. Arguments for andagainst change are virtually identi-cal with those previously describedfor psychological operations:

• Congress might amend Title 10to relieve USSOCOM of CivilAffairs roles, since only a smallfraction of all CA efforts supportspecial operations. DoD Directive5100.1 then could order the Army toorganize, equip and train CA forcesas a primary function.

• Civil Affairs might suffer as a“stepchild” under Army control ifTitle 10 remains unchanged. DoDDirective 6100.1, however, reported-

ly would have to formally designateCivil Affairs forces as SOF beforeUSSOCOM could command, control,administer and budgetarily supportCA as congressional legislationintends.

Title 10 and DoD Directive 5100.1tell the services and USSOCOMwhat roles and functions each mustperform to ensure well-balancedarmed forces with capabilities theU.S. combatant commands need toaccomplish their assigned missions.Every change creates a ripple effect.Decision makers consequentlyshould strive to determine before-hand whether any given amend-ment would increase cost effective-ness or deprive U.S. combat forcesof desirable flexibility.

John M. Collins is a senior spe-cialist in national defense at theLibrary of Congress. He is theauthor of a number of books, includ-ing America’s Small Wars: Lessonsfor the Future, Military SpaceForces: The Next 50 Years, andGreen Berets, SEALS andSpetsnaz. A frequent defense consul-tant for members of Congress andthe U.S. defense establishment, hehas 30 years of military service, hav-ing enlisted as a private in 1942 andretired as a colonel in 1972.

July 1993 27

Crowds came from miles around,primarily on foot, forming long linesand standing for hours under arelentless sun which generated tem-peratures up to 120 degrees. Theywere waiting to see a doctor.

The second joint Civil Affairs andmilitary medical exercise betweensoldiers from the armies of theUnited States and Cameroon wasunder way, with uniformed doctorsand nurses conducting a 10-daymedical program that left many citi-zens of Cameroon happier andhealthier.

More than 5,000 residents of thecentral-African country’s extremenorth province poured into 12 townsand villages to see two teams ofAmerican and Cameroonian doctorsand nurses, who diagnosed andtreated a variety of ailments, manyunheard of in the United States.

Most of the exercise took place inthe Mayo-Tsanaga district, an areanear the site of the first bilateralexercise in 1991. That campaignfocused on immunization against

meningitis, which had struck theregion severely. Early in 1992,another severe outbreak of the dis-ease struck the province, but withrelatively modest impact on thosevaccinated in 1991.The success ofthe 1991 mission, coupled with adesire to expand training for Ameri-cans and Cameroonians, led to anemphasis on general medical treat-ment in 1992.

The mission involved a team of 12reservists from six Civil Affairsunits throughout the U.S. Sinceonly three of the 12 had prior toursin Cameroon, there were inevitableadjustments in terms of environ-ment, language, culture and localmedical problems and practices.

Most of the deploying Americansdid research about Cameroon beforetravelling, and they received addi-tional briefings upon their arrivalfrom embassy personnel and mili-tary physicians of the Cameroon Ar-my on the health-care system, areadiseases and common treatments.

Within a few days the citizen-sol-

diers were working long hours intiny towns and villages whosenames they had never heard of.Usually split into two teams, theyplied their Civil Affairs and medicalcraft side-by-side with their Cam-eroonian counterparts — more oftenthan not with the aid of military orcivilian volunteer interpreters.

Capt. Mary Ellen Robbins pri-marily performed triage, the sortingand screening of patients, duringthe exercise. A member of the 443rdCivil Affairs Company, West War-wick, R.I., she recalls how languagebarriers constituted one of thebiggest challenges. “At practicallyevery site we visited, there had tobe translation from a local or tribaldialect into French and then intoEnglish for us to work,” she said.

Despite this trilingual method ofhealth-care delivery, there was suc-cess. “To a degree, I was unsure ofwhat we would encounter in termsof patient load, severity of illness,etc. So imagine our collective thrilland pride in possibly saving three

28 Special Warfare

Cameroon:CA Unit Conducts Joint Medical Exercise

by Lt. Col. Mark W. Dushnyck

lives and delivering a baby girl aswell,” said Col. Charles Kilhenny,senior medical member of the team.Assigned to the 411th Civil AffairsCompany, West Hartford, Conn.,the 64-year-old radiologist also rel-ished the opportunity to see how“my military-medical counterpartsfunction without much of the equip-ment that is available to the Ameri-can medical profession.”

At each location, the team set upfour stations: registration, triage,treatment and pharmacy. TheAmerican soldiers worked closelywith Cameroonians, military andcivilian, to deliver hope and healthcare to a region that has been veryvulnerable to illness in the past.

The team treated more than5,000 Cameroonians. An analysis ofpatient data disclosed 13 fairly com-mon conditions that prevailed, withone of every six patients afflictedwith malaria. One of every eightpatients suffered from respiratoryinfections or schistosomiasis, a vari-ety of tropical diseases caused byparasites in the bloodstream.

“Considering some of the geo-graphical and sociological chal-lenges that are part of an Africanmission, the operation’s success wassimply overwhelming,” said Col.Albert P. Grupper, 353rd CivilAffairs Command, mission comman-der for the American contingent.

Lt. Col. Patricia Heringa, a mem-ber of the 308th Civil Affairs Group,Homewood, Ill., and a registerednurse in civilian life, recalls theseverity of the work environment.“This was my first trip outside ofthe U.S., let alone Africa, and I wasalmost overwhelmed by the heat.With one exception, the 14 hospitalsor clinics in which we worked hadno running water or electricity.Water for washing or drinkingwould come from a nearby well. ... Itwas simply an extraordinary experi-ence, but one in which I am glad Ihad a chance to play a role.”

As a physician, Lt. Col. EugeneWhite of the 413th Civil AffairsCompany, Lubbock, Texas, said helearned about new cultures, dis-

eases and how to deal with them.The gynecologist also cited theunique opportunity to “teach andlearn from our Cameroonian fellowphysicians in the spirit of comrades-in-arms. … I went home with astrong sense of satisfaction aboutour accomplishments in so short aperiod.”

The U.S. ambassador toCameroon, the Honorable FrancesD. Cook, visited the exercise andencouraged the team to persevere inspite of the austere conditions. Shethanked them for helping to bettercement the ties of cooperation forthe United States in the “Hinge ofAfrica” and expressed hope that shewould see the soldiers in futureexercises.

Col. Carol A. Miller served as theexercise’s public health team chief.Deputy commander of the 308th CAGroup and a registered nurse incivilian life, Miller said that themission to Cameroon “was the ulti-mate in Civil Affairs training. We’re

all a lot smarter in terms of culturalimpact and in our language andcommunications skills. We workedwith elements of a foreign militaryin concert with representatives of aU.S. country team. Our understand-ing of how the population’s health isaffected by customs, traditions, poli-tics and egomaniacs is greatlyimproved, and I learned about med-ical treatment in Africa.”

Brig. Gen. Donald F. Campbell,former commander of the 353rd andcurrently commander of the ArmyCivil Affairs and PSYOP Command,is eager to see the unit’s role in thedevelopment of Cameroon grow.“The training the Army Reservegets is beyond compare, as are thebenefits to the indigenous popula-tion. I hope to see this relationshipcontinue and flourish.”

Lt. Col. Mark W. Dushnyck is cur-rently commander of the 353rd CACommand, Bronx, N.Y.

July 1993 29

Lt. Col. Pat Heringadiscusses medicationwith a CameroonianArmy officer as U.S.ambassador FrancesCook looks on.

Photo by Raymond Barrager

Although terrorists killed morepeople during the 1980s than in theprevious two decades combined,they did so without having to resortto the exotic or esoteric weaponspopularized by both fictionalthrillers and pseudo-scholarly,headline-grabbing analyses.

Bombings continue to account forroughly half of all terrorist attacksannually — as they have since1968. Few skills are required tomanufacture a crude bomb, surrep-titiously plant it and then be milesaway when it explodes. Bombings,therefore, do not require the sameorganizational expertise, logisticsand knowledge required of morecomplicated or sophisticated opera-tions, such as kidnapping, assassi-nation and assaults against defend-ed targets.

Indeed, the frequency of varioustypes of terrorist attacks decreasesin direct proportion to the complexi-ty or sophistication required. Attacks

on installations are the second mostcommon tactic, accounting for fewerthan 20 percent of all operations, fol-lowed by assassinations and shoot-ing, kidnapping, hijacking, barricadeand hostage situations. Significantthreats account for the small num-ber of remaining incidents.

The fact that these percentageshave remained largely unchangedfor the past 25 years provides com-pelling evidence that the vastmajority of terrorist organizationsare not tactically innovative. Radi-cal in their politics, these groupsappear to be conservative in theiroperations, adhering largely to thesame limited operational repertoireyear after year. What innovationdoes occur is mostly in the methodsused to conceal and detonate explo-sive devices, not in their tactics ortheir use of non-conventionalweapons.

In this respect, despite its popu-larity as a fictional theme, terror-ists have in fact rarely attemptedthe infliction of mass, indiscrimi-nate casualties. Of more than 8,000

incidents recorded in the RANDChronology of International Terror-ism since 1968, for example, only 52evidence any indication of terroristsplotting such attacks or attemptingto use chemical, biological or nucle-ar weapons.

Most terrorist activity throughoutthe world is primarily “symbolic,”designed to call attention to the ter-rorists and their causes. Attackstend to be directed not against peo-ple, but against “things” —embassies, consulates, governmentoffices, businesses, airlines and mil-itary installations — that have sym-bolic connotations. Thus, diplomatictargets have historically been thefocus of most terrorist attacks, fol-lowed by business, airline, military,and civilian targets — with attackson energy, maritime, transportationand communications targets com-paratively rare.

Only 20 percent of the terroristincidents during the 1980s, in fact,killed anyone, but those operationsthat did kill tended to kill more peo-ple than before. The reasons for this

30 Special Warfare

Future Trends inTerrorist Targeting andTactics

by Bruce Hoffman

Copyright 1992 by Bruce Hoffman.Reprinted with permission.

trend — the terrorists’ apparentbelief that lethality attracts atten-tion; improved effectiveness of ter-rorist organizations over genera-tions; the resurgence of religiousterrorism; the fact that terroriststhemselves are more adept atkilling; and increased state-sponsor-ship of terrorism — also shed lighton terrorist capabilities, targeting,tactics and decision making.

Increasing lethalityThe most obvious explanation for

international terrorism’s increasinglethality is that public attention isnot as readily aroused as it was inthe past. The general proliferationof terrorist movements and theincrease in terrorist incidents havecreated problems for both old andnew groups who now must competefor a wider audience share. Terror-ists have therefore been forced toundertake spectacular and bloodydeeds in order to achieve the sameeffect a small action would have had10 years ago.

Other terrorist acts are not onlydriven by the desire for publicitybut are explicitly coercive as well,threatening dire consequencesunless specific demands are met.The wave of bombings that shookParis during 1986 — beginning inFebruary with an explosion in ashopping center that killed eightpersons and culminating the follow-ing September with a nine-day ter-rorist rampage that killed anothereight persons and wounded morethan 150 others — is an example ofthis symbiosis of objectives. Follow-ing the first incident, a group call-ing itself the Committee of Solidari-ty with the Arab and Middle EastPolitical Prisoners claimed creditfor the bombing and demanded therelease of three terrorists impris-oned in France. After the Frenchgovernment refused, three morebombings occurred in February, twomore the following month, and fivein September.

Still other terrorist operations arecarried out in reprisal for a particu-lar government’s actions. In this

category is the September 1986attack on an Istanbul synagoguethat claimed the lives of 22 peopleand wounded three others. Aspokesman in Beirut later claimedthat the operation had been stagedin retaliation for a recent Israeliraid on a guerrilla base in southernLebanon.

An almost Darwinian principle ofnatural selection also seems toaffect terrorist groups, so that eachnew generation learns from its pre-decessors, becoming smarter,tougher and more difficult to cap-ture. For terrorists, intelligence isessential not only as a prerequisitefor success, but for survival. Succes-

sor generations, therefore, routinelystudy the “lessons” from mistakesmade by former comrades who havebeen killed or apprehended. Surviv-ing group members cull and absorbinformation on security-force tacticsfrom press accounts, courtroom tes-timony and trial transcripts.

Successor generations also tend tobe more ruthless and less idealisticthan their predecessors. For some,violence becomes almost an end initself rather than the means to apolitical end embraced by previousgenerations. A dedicated, “hard core”

of some 20 to 30 terrorists today, forexample, composes a third genera-tion of Germany’s Red Army Faction.In contrast to the group’s first gener-ation, who more than 20 years agoembarked on an anti-establishmentcampaign of non-lethal bombingsand arson attacks, the present gen-eration — at least until recently —has pursued a strategy of cold-blood-ed assassination.

During the past five years, theRed Army Faction has murdered sixprominent Germans. The last vic-tim was Detlev Rohwedder, awealthy industrialist and chairmanof the government agency chargedwith overseeing the economic tran-sition of eastern Germany. A shotfired from a high-powered riflekilled Rohwedder in April 1991while he sat in his study. In Decem-ber 1989, financier and DeutscheBank president Alfred Herrhausenwas assassinated when a remote-control bomb, concealed in a parkedbicycle and triggered by a light-beam, was detonated just as his carpassed. A similar device was usedthe following July in an attempt toassassinate Germany’s top govern-ment counterterrorist official, HansNeusel.

Almost as disturbing as the assas-sinations themselves is the fact thatthe perpetrators and their fellowconspirators have eluded what isperhaps the most sophisticated anti-terrorist machinery in the world.“The ‘Third Generation’ learnt a lotfrom the mistakes of its predeces-sors — and about how the policeworks,” a spokesperson for the Bun-deskriminalamt recently lamented,“they now know how to operate verycarefully.” Indeed, according to aformer member of the organization,Peter-Juergen Brock, currently serv-ing the seventh year of a life sen-tence for murder, the group hasreached maximum efficiency.

Another key reason for terrorism’sincreased lethality is the growingincidence of violence motivated by areligious, as well as a nationalist orseparatist imperative. Certainly, therelationship between terrorism and

July 1993 31

“The proliferation ofterrorist movementsand the increase inincidents have createdproblems for both oldand new groups whonow must compete fora wider audienceshare. Terrorists havebeen forced to under-take spectacular andbloody deeds in orderto achieve the sameeffect a small actionwould have had 10years ago.”

religion is not new. In fact, as DavidC. Rapoport points out in his semi-nal study of what he terms “holy ter-ror,” until the 19th century, “Reli-gion provided the only acceptablejustifications for terror.” This formof terrorism has occurred through-out history, although in recentdecades it has largely been over-shadowed by nationalist/separatistor ideologically motivated terrorism.

The record of terrorist acts byShi’a Islamic groups reinforces, forexample, the causal link betweenreligion-motivated terrorism andterrorism’s growing lethality.Although these groups have com-mitted only eight percent of allinternational terrorist incidentssince 1982, they are responsible for30 percent of the total number ofdeaths.

Contrary to its depiction and dis-cussion in Western news accounts,terrorism motivated by religion isby no means a phenomenon restrict-ed to Islamic terrorist groups. Manyof the characteristics — the legit-imization of violence based on reli-gious precepts, the sense of alien-ation, the existence of a terroristmovement in which the activists arethe constituents, and preoccupationwith the elimination of a broadlydefined category of “enemies” — arealso apparent among militantChristian white supremacists in theUnited States and in at least someradical Jewish messianic terroristmovements in Israel. Both groupsview violence as morally justifiedand an expedient toward the attain-ment of the religious and racial“purification” of their respectivecountries.

That terrorists motivated by areligious imperative can contem-plate massive acts of death is areflection of their belief that vio-lence is a sacramental act or adivine duty. Terrorism thusassumes a transcendental dimen-sion, and its perpetrators areunconstrained by the political,moral or practical constraints thataffect other terrorists.

Religious and secular terrorists

also differ in their constituencies.Religious terrorists are at onceactivists and constituents engagedin what they regard as a “totalwar.” They perform their terroristacts for no audience but themselves.Thus the restraints on violence thatare imposed on secular terrorists bythe desire to appeal to an uncom-mitted constituency are not rele-vant to the religious terrorist.

Finally, religious and secular ter-rorists have different perceptions ofthemselves and their violent acts.Secular terrorists regard violence asa way of correcting a system that isbasically good or to foment the cre-ation of a new system. Religious ter-rorists regard themselves as “out-siders,” seeking vast changes in theexisting order. This sense of alien-ation enables them to contemplatefar more destructive and deadlytypes of operations than secular ter-rorists and to embrace a far moreopen-ended category of “enemies”for attack.

Terrorism’s trend toward increas-ing lethality is also a reflection ofthe fact that terrorists themselvesare more adept at killing. Not onlyare their weapons becoming smaller,more sophisticated, and deadlier,but terrorists have greater access tothese weapons through theiralliances with foreign governments.

In addition to their standardarsenal of small arms and ordinaryexplosives, “state-sponsored” terror-ists used a truck carrying some12,000 pounds of high explosives,whose destructive power wasenhanced by canisters of flammablegases, to kill 241 U.S. Marines inwhat has been described as the“largest non-nuclear blast ever deto-nated on the face of the earth.”Other groups deployed nearly 200sophisticated, multifused, Soviet-manufactured acoustic mines to dis-rupt shipping entering the SuezCanal from the Red Sea and fabri-cated the device that explodedaboard Pan Am Flight 103, killingall 259 on board and 11 others onthe ground. It is not surprising,therefore, to find that state-spon-

sored terrorist incidents are, onaverage, eight times more lethalthan those carried out by groupsacting on their own.

Admittedly, diminishing commu-nist-bloc support and training ofvarious international terrorist orga-nizations will make it more difficultfor those groups to operate. Howev-er, recent reports that during thepast decade Czechoslovakia shippedmore than 1,000 tons of Semtexplastic explosive (the same typeused against Pan Am 103) to Libyaensure that at least those terroristorganizations still favored byColonel Khadafy will have amplesupplies of that explosive for yearsto come.

Czechoslovakia is also thought tohave exported some 40,000 tons ofSemtex to Syria, North Korea, Iranand Iraq — countries long cited bythe U.S. Department of State assponsors of international terroristactivity. Irrespective of communist-bloc action, terrorists now areassured an almost inexhaustibleinternational stockpile of plasticexplosives on which to draw forfuture operations.

TechnologyThe availability of these weapons,

coupled with the terrorists’ owningenuity, has enabled at leastsome groups to stay constantlyahead of the counterterrorist tech-nology curve and repeatedly frus-trate or defeat the security mea-sures placed in their path.

Relying on unconventional adap-tations or modifications to conven-tional explosive devices, these orga-nizations have developed innovativeand effective means to conceal,deliver and detonate all kinds ofbombs. The devices used in theassassination of Alfred Herrhausenand the downing of Pan Am Flight103 are two examples of terroristsusing specially or cleverly modified“off-the-shelf” technology to strikeat well-defended targets.

A 1/8-inch thick, four-inch wide,and 10-inch long bomb, constructedof 300 grams of Semtex and trig-

32 Special Warfare

gered by a combination electronictimer and barometric sensor, wasplaced under the seat cushion of aTWA flight en route from Cairo toAthens via Rome and exploded,killing four persons and injuringnine others in April 1986.

Liquid explosive concealed in ageneric half-gallon whiskey bottlewas placed in an overhead bin dur-ing a Korean Air flight in November1987. It was detonated nine hourslater by 12 ounces of C-4 plasticexplosive wired to a timing devicehidden in a transistor radio placedin the seat pocket below, killing all115 persons on board. These arechilling examples of terrorist cre-ativity and adaptation.

The PIRA’s relentless quest topierce the armor protecting both thesecurity forces in Northern Irelandand the most senior governmentofficials in England illustrates thedynamics of the struggle for techno-logical superiority. The first genera-tion of early 1970s PIRA deviceswere often little more than crudeanti-personnel bombs, consisting ofa handful of roofing nails wrappedaround a lump of plastic explosive,that were detonated simply bylighting a fuse.

Time bombs from the same erawere hardly more sophisticated.They typically were constructedfrom a few sticks of dynamite andcommercial detonators stolen fromconstruction sites or rock quarriesattached to ordinary battery-pow-ered alarm clocks. Neither devicewas terribly reliable and often putthe bomber at considerable risk.

In hopes of reducing that risk, thePIRA’s bomb makers invented ameans of detonating bombs from asafe distance using the radio con-trols for model aircraft purchased athobby shops. Scientists and engi-neers working in the British Min-istry of Defence’s scientific researchand development division in turndeveloped a system of electroniccountermeasures and jammingtechniques for the Army that effec-tively thwarted this means ofattack.

Rather than abandon this tacticcompletely, the PIRA began to searchfor a solution. In contrast to thestate-of-the art laboratories, hugebudgets and academic credentials oftheir government counterparts,PIRA’s own “R&D” department toiledin cellars beneath cross-border safe-houses and back rooms of urban ten-ements for five years before devisinga network of sophisticated electronicswitches for their bombs that wouldignore or bypass the Army’ s elec-tronic countermeasures.

Once again, the Ministry ofDefence scientists developed a newsystem of electronic scanners to

detect radio emissions just tenths ofseconds before the bomber can actu-ally transmit the detonation signal.The almost infinitesimal window oftime provided by this “early warn-ing” of impending attack is just suf-ficient to allow Army technicians toactivate additional electronic mea-sures to neutralize the transmissionsignal.

For a time, this countermeasureproved effective. But within thepast year, the PIRA has discovereda means to outwit even this coun-termeasure. The group’s bomb mak-ers fabricated a detonating systemtriggered by the same type of hand-

held radar gun used by police tocatch speeding motorists. Since theradar gun can be aimed beforebeing switched on, and its signal isnearly instantaneous, no practicalmeans currently exists to detect orintercept the transmission signal intime.

Even attacks that are not suc-cessful in conventionally understoodmilitary terms can still be a successfor the terrorists, provided that theyare technologically daring enough togarner media and public attention.Indeed, the terrorist group’s funda-mental organizational imperative toact also drives this persistentsearch for new ways to overcome,circumvent or defeat governmentalsecurity and countermeasures.

Thus, while the PIRA failed tokill then-Prime Minister MargaretThatcher at the ConservativeParty’s 1984 conference inBrighton, the technological ingenu-ity involving the bomb’s placementat the conference site weeks beforethe event and its detonation timingdevice powered by a computermicrochip succeeded in capturingheadlines and provided the PIRAwith a propaganda platform.

Similarly, although the remote-control mortar attack staged by thePIRA on No. 10 Downing Street —as Prime Minister John Major andhis cabinet met at the height of the1991 Gulf War — failed to hit itsintended target, it elbowed the warout of the limelight and shonerenewed media attention on the ter-rorists, their cause and theirimpressive ability to strike at thenerve center of the British govern-ment even at a time of heightenedsecurity.

Although the technological mas-tery employed by the PIRA isarguably unique among terroristorganizations, experience hasdemonstrated repeatedly that,when confronted by new securitymeasures, terrorists will seek toidentify and exploit new vulnerabil-ities, adjusting their means ofattack accordingly.

This point is especially pertinent

July 1993 33

“Although the techno-logical masteryemployed by the PIRAis arguably uniqueamong terrorist orga-nizations, experiencehas demonstratedrepeatedly that, whenconfronted by newsecurity measures, ter-rorists will seek toidentify and exploitnew vulnerabilities,adjusting their meansof attack accordingly.”

to the threat posed by terrorists tocommercial aviation. During thelate 1960s, for example, hijacking ofpassenger aircraft was among ter-rorists’ favored tactics, accountingfor 33 percent of all incidents. How-ever, as security at airportsimproved, as metal detectors and x-ray machines were installed atboarding areas, and as passengerprofiling and other countermea-sures were adopted, the incidence ofairline hijackings declined apprecia-bly to just 7 percent of all incidentsin the 1970s and only 4 percent inthe 1980s.

While these measures were suc-cessful in reducing airline hijack-ings, they did not stop terroristattacks on commercial airlines alto-gether. Prevented from smugglingweapons on board to hijack aircraft,terrorists merely continued toattack them by means of bombs hid-den in carry-on or checked baggage.

A new generation of sophisticatedbomb-detection devices — able todetect even plastic explosives — iscurrently being installed at airportsthroughout the world, while a suc-cessor generation involving othertechniques is already being tested.

These machines will doubtlesslymake it more difficult for terroriststo place bombs on board aircraftmuch the same as the metal detec-tors and x-ray machines madehijacking more difficult. But if pastexperience is any guide, as airportsecurity and bomb-detection tech-nology closes off this avenue ofattack, terrorists will merely findanother.

They are likely to turn to readilyavailable shoulder-fired, precision-guided surface-to-air missiles as theonly practical means to attack com-mercial aircraft. A single terrorist,trained in the use of this weapon,could position himself at the edge ofany airport’s runway and fire atincoming or departing passengerplanes with devastating results.

Black-nationalist guerrillasdowned two Rhodesian passengerjets with SAM-7s in 1978 and 1979,killing 107 persons. Sudanese

rebels used a SAM-7 in 1986 toshoot down a Sudan Airways com-mercial jet, killing all 60 persons onboard. Polisario Front guerrillas inMorocco downed an American DC-7weather plane in 1988 with a Sovietmissile, killing its five-man crew.

The effectiveness of such weaponshas reportedly led the British Armyto respond to alleged PIRA posses-sion of Libyan-supplied SAM-7s byequipping its helicopters in North-ern Ireland with infrared defensivesystems to thwart missile attacks.

Given the fact that the arsenalsof some 80 countries throughout theworld now contain SAM-7s or theirequivalents, that countries asdiverse as Egypt, China, Brazil,South Africa and Sweden are atvarious stages of producing theirown man-portable surface-to-airmissiles, and that such weapons canreportedly be purchased on theinternational arms “black market”for as little as $80,000, terrorist andguerrilla use of these weapons islikely to increase in the future.

Future tacticsMost analyses of the possibility of

chemical, biological or nuclear ter-rorism have tended to discount itbecause few terrorists know any-thing about the technical intricaciesof developing or dispersing suchweapons. Political, moral and prac-tical considerations also affect ter-rorist decision making.

There are few realistic demandsthat terrorists could make bythreatening the use of such indis-criminate weapons. More impor-tant, as Brian Jenkins notes, “Ter-rorists operate on the principle ofthe minimum force necessary. Theyfind it unnecessary to kill many, aslong as killing a few suffices fortheir purposes.” Terrorists havedemonstrated repeatedly that theirgoals and objectives can be accom-plished by using the same tacticsand “off-the-shelf weapons” thatthey have traditionally relied upon.

These arguments are supportedby the general pattern of worldwideterrorism. Bombing continues toaccount for the majority of terroristoperations, and most of the bombsare not particularly innovative.Most are made of commercially pur-chased or stolen dynamite or fromplastic explosives from militarystockpiles. Even in those instancesinvolving comparatively moresophisticated, state-sponsored ter-rorists, the weapons used have beenexclusively conventional.

If, however, terrorist lethalitycontinues to increase and the con-straints, self-imposed and otherwiseimposed, on terrorists in the com-mission of mass murder erode fur-ther, actions involving chemical,biological or nuclear weapons couldbecome more attractive to somegroups. In this respect it should beemphasized that terrorists have yetto reach their killing potential usingeven “off-the-shelf” weapons. Theyhave generally kept their threats“realistic,” in the sense that theycan and will carry them out ifdenied their objectives, and approxi-mately commensurate with the

34 Special Warfare

“Bombing continuesto account for themajority of terroristoperations, and mostof the bombs are notparticularly innova-tive. Most are made ofcommercially pur-chased or stolendynamite or fromplastic explosivesfrom military stock-piles. Even in thoseinstances involvingcomparatively moresophisticated, state-sponsored terrorists,the weapons usedhave been exclusivelyconventional.”

demands made. Any use of chemi-cal, biological or nuclear weaponscould result in unprecedented num-bers of casualties and damage, withattendant undesired (by the terror-ists) implications for public opinionand government reaction.

Today, however, when oldempires and countries are crum-bling and new ones are being built,the possession of a nuclear bomb orthe development of a chemical orbiological-warfare capability maybecome increasingly attractiveeither to new nations seeking topreserve their sovereignty or towould-be nations seeking to attaintheir independence. In bothinstances, terrorists may find newroles for their skills and expertise.

Ethnic and religious fanaticismcould more easily allow terrorists toovercome the psychological barriersto mass murder than could a radicalpolitical agenda. A terrorist groupof religious zealots, with state sup-port, in a context of ongoing vio-lence, could see the acquisition anduse of a chemical, biological ornuclear capability as a viableoption. State sponsorship, in partic-ular, could provide terrorists withthe incentives and resources theypreviously lacked for undertakingan ambitious operation in any of

these domains. Combined withintense ethnic enmity or a strongreligious imperative, this couldprove deadly.

One final observation seems inorder: while the volume of world-wide terrorism fluctuates from yearto year, one enduring feature is thatAmericans remain favored targetsof terrorists abroad. Since 1968, theUnited States has annually headedthe list of countries whose nationalsand property are most frequentlyattacked by terrorists. This is a phe-nomenon attributable as much tothe geographical scope and diversityof America’s overseas commercialinterests and the large number ofits military bases on foreign soil asto the United States’ stature as asuperpower and leader of the freeworld.

Terrorists, therefore, are attract-ed to American interests and citi-zens abroad precisely because ofthe plethora of readily availabletargets; the terrorists’ perceiveddifficulty of operating and strikingtargets in the United States itself;the symbolic value inherent in anyblow struck against U.S. “expan-sionism,” “imperialism,” or “eco-nomic exploitation,” and, not least,because of the unparalleled oppor-tunities for exposure and publicity

from perhaps the world’s mostextensive news media that anyattack on an American targetassures.

These reasons suggest that,despite the end of both the ColdWar and the ideological polarizationthat divided the world, the UnitedStates will nonetheless remain anattractive target for terrorists seek-ing to attract attention to them-selves and their causes. As the onlysuperpower, the United States maylikely be blamed for more of theworld’s ills and therefore could bethe focus of more terrorist attacksthan before.

Dr. Bruce Hoffmanis a member of thesenior research staff ofthe RAND Corpora-tion in Santa Monica,Calif., and is current-ly director of theArroyo Center’s Strategy and Doc-trine Program in RAND’s ArmyResearch Division. A graduate ofOxford University, where he under-took his doctoral research, he holdsdegrees in government, history andinternational relations.

July 1993 35

The old Skill Qualification Test isgone. Now we have somethingcalled a Self-Development Test. Is itthe same thing with a differentname? What impact will it have onsoldiers’ careers?

One of the jobs of the IndividualTraining Division of the JFK Spe-cial Warfare Center and School is todevelop the MOS portion of the SDTfor CMF 18. In that capacity, wecan answer these questions andexplain some of the whys andwherefores of the SDT.

Is the SDT the same thing as theSQT with a different name? No.There are similarities, and evensome of the same questions could beused, but there are major differ-ences. Each SDT will have 20 lead-ership questions, 20 training ques-tions and 60 MOS-knowledge ques-tions. The old SQT always had sev-eral questions for each task; theSDT might have only one, but it willbe one important for the task. Theold SQT notice had more tasks list-ed than were actually tested; with

the SDT, there is no more guess-work — if it’s in the notice, it will betested. Another difference is thatpreparation for the SDT is now onyour own time; duty time will not bescheduled for SDT train-up.

What impact will it have on sol-diers’ careers? Starting in FY 94, itwill have a major impact. While theSDT was under development, testresults were sent only to the soldier.With the FY 94 SDT, however, testresults will be used for personnel-management decisions about pro-motions, selection for schools andre-enlistment. Your rater can alsocomment about your SDT score onyour NCOER. The FY 94 SDT is thefirst one that will count for real.

Who makes these tests up, any-way? The Center for Army Leader-ship, U.S. Army Command andGeneral Staff College, Fort Leaven-worth, Kan., develops the leader-ship questions. The U.S. ArmySergeants Major Academy, FortBliss, Texas, develops the trainingquestions. The Army Training and

Doctrine Command school which isthe MOS proponent writes the MOSquestions for that SDT. For theMOS portion of the Special ForcesSDT, the SF Development Branchof the Individual Training Divisionof the Directorate of Training andDoctrine at the SWCS is responsiblefor assembling the questions,administering and evaluating thevalidation test, and for putting thefinal version of the test together.

The last time I took one of thosetests, I found some mistakes; whatcan I do about that? The validationpart of the development process isdesigned to identify testing errors,bad questions, etc. Despite our bestefforts and intentions, however,mistakes still get into the final ver-sion of the test. But if you find whatyou believe to be an error in a testquestion or the answer choices, sub-mit an inquiry. After finishing thetest and turning in the answersheet, ask to see the testing stan-dards officer and tell him you wantto fill out an inquiry sheet for that

36 Special Warfare

The Self-Development Test:What’s In It for Me?

by MSgt. Kirk Thomas

test. This inquiry will be sent to theSDT developers in our office, whowill evaluate the comment and sendan answer back to the TSO. On sev-eral occasions, we have even calledthe soldier on the phone to discusshis comment. If there was an errorin the way the question was writtenor in the answer choices, theinquiry may result in the SDT beingrescored without that questionbeing counted. Every inquiry will beread, evaluated for validity, and if itwould result in a change in the waythe test was scored, the test isrescored accordingly.

OverviewThe SDT replaces the old SQT on

the recommendation of senior com-mand sergeants major during a con-ference in October 1989. They feltthe NCO Corps had outgrown theSQT and believed the Army neededan evaluation tool to measure andguide the growth of NCOs as theycontinue to develop as leaders. TheArmy leadership agreed, and theChief of Staff of the Armyannounced the SDT on July 3, 1990.

Units will not schedule SDTtrain-up time. It is the individualsoldier’s responsibility to study dur-ing off-duty time. To prepare for theleadership questions, study FMs 22-100, -101, and -102. To prepare forthe training questions, study FM25-101. To prepare for the MOS-knowledge portion, study yourMOS-specific soldier’s manual andsupporting technical referencesidentified in your SDT notice. Bynow you should have received a setof the SDT publications from yourunit. If not, ask your unit publica-tions clerk to order FMs you needusing normal publication-orderingprocedures.

SF units having trouble obtainingpublications may need to establishor modify publications accounts.Since Jan. 1, 1990, the Army Publi-cations Distribution Center in Balti-more no longer sends publicationsto units on an automatic basis.Instead, units must establish publi-cations accounts to tell the Army

what they need.To establish an account, the unit

publications officer should preparea DA Form 12, Requirements forPublications. To request initial dis-tribution of new or revised publica-tions, units must also complete DA12-series forms to identify the titlesand quantities of publications theywill need. These should be forward-ed to Commander, USAAGPC; Attn:New Account Processing; 2800Eastern Boulevard; Baltimore, MD21220. See DA Pam 310-10, TheStandard Publication System UsersGuide, for further information.

After taking the SDT, you willreceive two reports showing yourresults. The first, an initial Individ-ual Soldier’s Report, will be sentwithin 30 days after your test. TheISR will show the number of correctanswers for each part of the SDT.The second report, or final ISR, willbe sent about 2 1/2 months after theclose of the test period. This reportwill show the SDT score and a com-parison with other NCOs in yourMOS and skill level. It will alsoreflect changes in the scoringresulting from testing errors identi-fied during the testing period.

SDT developmentSDT development begins with

task selection. All tasks in the sol-dier training publication for eachMOS are subject to be tested,though not all are tested every year.Usually the most important of thesubject areas are tested every year,while the less-important areas arerotated through so they all will betested in a 3-5-year period. A simi-lar rationale is applied to the selec-tion of tasks within a subject area.

Once the tasks are selected, thenext step is to collect questions foreach task. We like to have severalquestions for each task, but it ispermissible to have only one, aslong as it is a question vital for thattask. We do not question trivia; allquestions must concern somethingtruly significant for the task. It isalso important to remember that wedo not write the questions our-

selves. Questions for a task comefrom the school that has proponencyfor that task; the Engineer Schoolat Fort Leonard Wood, the SignalSchool at Fort Gordon, etc. Thosetasks for which SWCS is proponentare written by the company in the1st Special Warfare Training Grouphaving proponency for that task.

The validation test is composed ofmore than enough questions tomake up the final version for theofficial SDT. This is done to leaveroom to eliminate questions thatare not suitable (poorly written, notrelevant to the task, etc.). We taskthe Army Special Forces Commandto provide contacts in each SF groupto coordinate and schedule troops,times and locations for validationtesting. Testing is done in Augustand September of each year. Valida-tion testing gives the soldier in theunit an opportunity to affect what istested in his MOS, how the ques-tions are written, and what kind ofanswer choices are given. The vali-dation test given in FY 93 will befor the FY 94 SDT, the first one tobe used for personnel-managementdecisions.

Soldiers taking this and later val-idation tests will have an advancelook at what might be on the follow-ing year’s SDT. Several things comeout of the validation phase:

• We find out how long it takes toanswer the questions so we can besure the final version stays withintime limits.

• We find out which questionsneed revising. Soldiers taking thetest have the opportunity to com-ment on each question, and they areencouraged to be specific about whythey think a question is wrong orpoorly written and how they wouldfix it. What we want to know is:

Are the questions relevant to theMOS and the job as performed inthe field? Are there any bad or poor-ly written questions? Are there anyambiguous questions? Is there morethan one right answer? Is there noright answer? Is the answer givenaway in the question? Is there any-thing else that would make this a

July 1993 37

better test, a better measure of asoldier’s ability to do the job? We dopay attention to comments and usethem in correcting the test.

Soldiers taking the validation testcan be assured that the results ofvalidation testing do not leave ouroffice; the team sergeant orsergeant major will never knowwhether they passed the SDT vali-dation test or not. As a matter offact, scoring is done on a task-by-task basis, rather than scoring theentire test as a whole. Our tabulat-ed data shows, for example, howmany soldiers got a particular ques-tion right, not what “Staff SergeantSmith’s” score was.

Once all the validations havebeen done and the results tabulat-ed, selection for the final version ofthe test can proceed. The final ver-

sion will come in its entirety fromthe validation test administered tothe field, but not all the questionswill be used. Some questions will beeliminated as too hard, too easy, notrelevant, etc., others will be rewrit-ten according to comments from thefield and our own review.

We want to do a good job andmake this the best test we can, butwe need your help. If you are select-ed to take the validation test, makeyour time count for something.Take the test with an open mindand think hard about all thosequestions placed before you. This isyour chance to have an impact onthe way the test is written; yourcomment, however trivial you mightthink it is, can make a difference.

MSgt. Kirk Thomasis NCOIC of the Indi-vidual Training Divi-sion of the Directorateof Training and Doc-trine, JFK SpecialWarfare Center andSchool. With more than 20 years’experience in Special Forces, hismilitary schooling includes the Spe-cial Forces Qualification Course,Korean and Spanish languagecourses, Intelligence Analyst Course,Static Line Jumpmaster Course andthe SF Operations and IntelligenceCourse. He holds a bachelor of artsdegree from Francis Marion Univer-sity in Florence, S.C., and is a can-didate for a master’s degree fromWebster University.

38 Special Warfare

July 1993 39

To develop its officers as leaders,the Army has established a system togive officers, school commandantsand unit commanders a commonframework for leader development.

The Military Qualification Stan-dards System identifies common andbranch-specific training requirementsfor officers. It has two components:The military-task-and-knowledgecomponent identifies critical battle-focused tasks, skills and knowledge,and the professional-military-educa-tion component establishes responsi-bilities and standards for professionaldevelopment and education.

MQS covers officer training fromprecommissioning to promotion tocolonel and is organized into threestages. MQS I establishes minimumskills for branch qualification and istaught at the commissioningsources: the U.S. Military Academy,Reserve Officers Training Corps andOfficer Candidate School. MQS IIcovers company-grade officer train-ing and includes officer basic andadvanced courses, the CombinedArms and Services Staff School andoperational assignments. MQS IIIapplies to field-grade officers and isbeing formulated by the Combined

Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth,Kan.

Leader development under MQS isa product of three factors: institu-tional training, operational assign-ments and self-development.

• Institutional — School comman-dants identify officer-performancerequirements and train students toperform those duties.

• Operational — Unit comman-ders establish leader-developmentprograms to complement unit train-ing programs. MQS does not requirethem to train tasks not on their mis-sion-essential task list. Commandersmust tailor their MQS training andprofessional reading program toMETL-based unit training plans.

• Self-development — Self-devel-opment involves individual officersin their development as leaders.

MQS IIMQS II applies to company-grade

officers in the active and reservecomponents. It prepares them toaccomplish wartime tasks, providesthe basis for promotion and atten-dance at command-and-staff-college-level schools, and prepares them forgreater responsibilities.

The military-task-and-knowledgecomponent consists of company-grade common and branch-specifictasks. The professional-military-edu-cation component consists of a read-ing program and, in some cases,advanced civil schooling.

Common and branch manualssupport MQS II training. Commonmanuals concentrate on company-grade-officer critical tasks; branchmanuals on branch qualification.Two branch manuals, Special Forcesand Civil Affairs, are relevant toArmy SOF.

The Special Forces branch manualdescribes tasks critical for captainsplanning and executing the five SFmissions: unconventional warfare,foreign internal defense, directaction, special reconnaissance andcounterterrorism. It complementsinstruction in the officer advancedcourse and SF Qualification Course.It contains SF branch tasks, orga-

nized by battlefield operating sys-tem, and Infantry branch tasksessential to SF.

The CA branch manual describestasks critical for CA captains andcomplements the CA OfficerAdvanced Course. Because CA unitssupport general-purpose forcesthroughout the operational continu-um, CA captains must know theirSOF tasks and retain the conven-tional skills of their accessionbranch. The CA branch manual isscheduled for completion in Septem-ber 1994.

MQS IIIMQS III charts the development of

field-grade officers through lieu-tenant colonel, preparing them forgreater responsibility, for commandand service on Army and joint staffs,and for senior service colleges.Unlike MQS I and MQS II, it is not atask-based program — it describesbroad areas of knowledge. Two publi-cations support MQS III: DA Pam-phlet 600-3, Commissioned OfficerDevelopment and Career Manage-ment, and the MQS III leader-devel-opment manual.

The SWCS Directorate of Trainingand Doctrine made initial distribu-tion of the MQS II SF branch manualto ensure that each officer received acopy. That will continue with theMQS II Civil Affairs branch manualand the MQS III leader-developmentmanual. After initial distribution,unit publications officers will have toestablish unit requirements andorder the manuals from the Balti-more AG Publications Center usingDA Form 4569. For more informationon MQS, contact Carol Bushong,DSN 239-9802, commercial (919)432-9802.

Carol M. Bushong isan education specialistin the Directorate ofTraining and Doctrineat the JFK SpecialWarfare Center andSchool.

Military Qualification Standards System:Army Frameworkfor Leader Development

by Carol M. Bushong

Lt. Col. Daniel Brownlee is cur-rently commander of the 1st Battal-ion, 5th Special Forces Group at FortCampbell, Ky. During OperationsDesert Shield/Desert Storm, heserved as the operations and trainingofficer for the 5th SF Group. Otherassignments during his careerinclude serving as the operations andtraining officer and executive officerin the 1/5th SF Group, as a MiddleEastern foreign-area officer servingin the embassies in Amman andCairo, as a company commander inthe 24th Mechanized Infantry Divi-sion, as a detachment commander inthe 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group,and as a platoon leader in the 82ndAirborne Division.

SW: How important was coalitionwarfare to the success of DesertStorm?Brownlee: It was critical to thesuccess of Desert Shield and DesertStorm. Obviously, the United States

and the major NATO allies likeFrance or Britain could have putenough combat power on the groundto have accomplished the mission toliberate Kuwait, but in order tolegitimize our effort over there, itwas critical that all of the Islamiccoalition allies be integrated intothe defensive and offensive phasesof the operation. If there had notbeen an effort to organize and inte-grate all the various countries intothe coalition, I don’t think we couldhave been successful.

SW: Did it contribute to our successfrom a military standpoint?Brownlee: It did contribute to themilitary success, and I will tell youfrom my perspective, having workedwith all the allied countries, downto the smallest contributor, that itwasn’t so much what they con-tributed to combat power as it wasthat they were integrated, so thatwe could maximize their contribu-

tions and minimize the limitationsthey might have. The extent towhich we could integrate the forcesincreased our chances of success onthe battlefield, even though theircombat power did not sway the bal-ance. It’s not like GeneralSchwarzkopf said “OK, we finallygot the 2nd Egyptian Division andnow we are ready to go on the offen-sive.” The 2nd Egyptian Divisionwas there, and they had a corpsheadquarters, they were more acontributing partner, and it broughtthe ratio of forces into a more legiti-mate balance, but did it increasethe overall combat power or theability to conduct a offensive? Onlyto a limited extent.

SW: How many countries were inthe coalition?Brownlee: The primary contribu-tors were Egypt, Syria, Saudi Ara-bia, obviously Kuwait, and then to alesser extent, the peninsula shield

40 Special Warfare

Interview:Lt. Col. Daniel Brownlee,

commander, 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group

forces — Oman, the UAE, Qatarand Bahrain — and then we hadsmall forces from Morocco, Senegal,Nigeria, Niger and Afghanistan, sothere were many countries who con-tributed. You can also say thatwithin the coalition, even thoughwe were traditional allies used tooperating together, you had theFrench and the British.

SW: Did Special Forces soldierswork with all those countries?Brownlee: Yes, they worked withevery country I mentioned, some toa greater extent than others. Withthe French and the British, forinstance, our role was usually morein a liaison mode, but with theKuwaitis we basically fell in as theshadow chain of command in thebrigades as they built them.

SW: What roles did Special Forcesperform in coalition warfare?Brownlee: We started out with twoprimary functions. The first was toassess the capability of the variousnon-European coalition allies tosurvive and conduct battlefieldoperations in an NBC environment.That was the key issue becauseNBC posed a serious threat fromIraq. Our job was to assess thecapability and then, to the extentwe could, raise that level. In somecases we found entire brigadeswhich had no NBC equipment, notraining and no capability. That’s agood piece of information, becauseyou know what ground zero is.Some units had all the equipmentsitting in a building and didn’tknow what to do with it. You getthem to issue that equipment andtrain them to use it and then theycan survive as individuals and oper-ate as a unit. Some of the moresophisticated units had the equip-ment and the rudimentary training,and you bring them up a little bit towhere you can start talking aboutdecontamination.

Our second role was in the close-air-support arena. During DesertShield, there were tremendous the-ater aviation assets available to sup-

port the battlefield, especially in theinitial days in the defense, butexcept for the French, the Britishand the U.S., the coalition allies hadno way, either by communications ortraining or language, to become cus-tomers of that system. At the sametime, they were the ones most for-ward arrayed, so they had thebiggest need for close air support.

We tried to get as far forward aswe could, to provide ground-air com-munication, coordinating instruc-tions and the means to link into thesystem, so we could bring air sup-port to bear against a threat if itcame across the border. In the earlydays the coalition was not organizedto conduct a defense. All they wouldbe able to do if the Iraqis cameacross in numbers would be to reportand then attempt to disengage. Wecould say to the Syrians or the Egyp-tians, “I’m here and I’ve got a radio,and I can talk to AWACS and I cancall air strikes on the threats outthere,” and they would say, “You’rethe kind of guy we want, stick veryclose to me.” Our two main entréeswere close air support and NBC,because the allies knew they neededthose two things and that’s what wewere ready to do when we got on theground. That was truly what we’renow calling support to the coalition.

We later took on the role to assessunit capabilities: could they maneu-ver, did they have fire support, whatwas their mobility and countermobil-ity capability, what were their intel-ligence capabilities, what was theircommand and control, what weretheir air-defense capabilities — theconventional battlefield operatingsystems. We could provide assess-ment reports on a given Saudibrigade so that a brigade comman-der in the 24th Mechanized InfantryDivision could look at that assess-ment and understand it.

We would assess them to be eithergreen, amber, red or black — we hadto come up with a new categorybecause in many cases, the coalitionallies had no capability that wasappropriate. For instance, the Egyp-tian divisions came in with no mobil-

ity/countermobility capability; theyhadn’t brought any equipment withthem, so when that battlefield oper-ating system was lost, we rated themas black. Later on, when we wereable to get them mine detection andbreaching equipment, we were ableto raise them up to red. When wetalked to a 24th Division guy andsaid the unit was raised into red, tohim that would mean “no capabili-ty,” but when you consider they hadnothing, and then they had a rudi-mentary capability, that was animprovement. We would providethese assessments and update themevery two weeks for every unit intheater, so when GeneralSchwarzkopf and his senior counter-parts developed an operational plan,they knew what they had to workwith.

Another area in which we madeparticular contributions was intheir operational planning. Theiridea of conducting operations was tomove to a line and sit. We wouldsay, “What are your alternate, sup-plementary positions? What areyour passage lines? What are yourcoordinating points? Do you have anorder? Do people know what to do?Have you rehearsed it? Do youknow who the unit is behind you?Do you know what their actionswould be if you moved backthrough?”

These are basic questions whenyou’re in the defense, but theirplanning was not at a sophisticatedlevel; their attitude was, “If theywant us to leave the field, we willturn around and drive south.”That’s not good when you’ve got the101st and the 24th Mech behind theline — it’s a prescription for disas-ter. We helped them develop andcoordinate plans so that if therewas an Iraqi offensive operation,they would have a series of thingsthey would do next, and some unitsactually rehearsed it.

We also tried to raise individualsoldier skills, especially rifle marks-manship, rudimentary patrollingskills and general collective opera-tional skills, as far as we could. With

July 1993 41

individual skills, it doesn’t take longto determine what their level is. Forinstance, if you go into a unit andtalk to soldiers and find out theyhave never fired their M-16s, youknow they’ve never fired on a qualifi-cation range, so you can approachthe commander with a trainingschedule and say, “Here are thethings we can help with to raise thelevel of your soldiers’ individualskills.” In some cases they would behappy to do it, and in other casesthey would resent it. That’s wherethe interpersonal skills and negotia-tion come in. With something liketank gunnery, obviously, our capa-bility to assess is limited. What wecould do, if we were with an M-60A3company in the Saudi Brigade thatreally needed some help in theirgunnery, would be to look across theentire 5th Group and find the guyswith that expertise and bring themover to work with them.

Another important contributionthat we made was in integration.You’ve got a Saudi brigade sittinghere, you’ve got an Egyptian brigadesitting here and you’ve got a Syrianbrigade sitting here. You’ve gotbrigade and battalion boundaries,and on a map it looks real nice. Intruth, the Saudis, Egyptians andSyrians had no communication orcontact between each other. The firstthing we would do is go to the rightand the left, see who’s there, estab-lish contact, develop control mea-sures and coordination. That was thelast thing that they would do. Theywould talk only to the people inRiyadh, to their liaison elements,and in most cases they didn’t knowwho was on their right and left anddidn’t care, but if you’re going to con-duct a defense and later move to anoffensive operation, that has to becoordinated.

On the 13th of January, there wasgreat consternation — the airborneplatforms and the other moving-tar-get indicators determined that therewas a tremendous amount of Iraqimechanized traffic moving downtoward the tri-border area. Theywere concerned about it, because

they were getting ready to start theair campaign, and they were afraidthe Iraqis were going to cross anddisrupt all the preparations. Theyordered the 1st Cav Division to moveto establish a defense, to block what-ever it was. This was at 1800, andwe got a call from ARCENT throughthe headquarters saying “Get withthe Syrians and ensure that the Cavcan move through there unhinderedand without incident.”

It is no small matter to coordinatea night movement. Even among

American units, it would taketremendous coordination, but we’regoing to move through an edgy coali-tion Arab ally who has similar equip-ment to the Iraqis, and we have apossible movement to contact, andeverybody has ammunition. We wereable to accomplish it, but we had toput a lot of resources and assets onthe ground in that Syrian division,

which they didn’t like, to ensure thatthe U.S. forces could move throughthere safely, and it was done bysunup the next day. It was transpar-ent from the outside, but when youconsider what the negative ramifica-tions would have been, if a Syrianhad fired a main-gun round at sometank from the 1st Cav ... Undoubted-ly the 1st Cav would have engagedevery T-62 they saw, because theywould have been sure it was theIraqis, and you can imagine how per-ilous that would have been for thewhole coalition. So that was one ofthe most significant contributions wemade — to prevent those thingsfrom happening.

SW: How well prepared were the SFsoldiers for the CW mission?Brownlee: We were well-preparedto provide support to the coalitionbecause the 5th SF Group’s primarymission is foreign internal defensefor the CINC, USCENTCOM. If youlook in the doctrinal manual, it willtell you one of the key components isto be prepared to provide training,advice and assistance, and organiza-tion, and to be prepared to conductcombat operations with the peopleyou’re providing this to. The conductof coalition warfare was just a logicalextension of our FID capability, so wewere prepared to conduct these oper-ations when we hit the ground. Youhave to make adjustments dependingon the coalition ally. When we had ateam that fell in with the French,they didn’t have to advise and assistthem, but they did provide the link inthe close-air-support system and didprovide them certain NBC capabili-ties. When we fell in with one of theSaudi or Kuwaiti units, we had toadvise, assist, train, equip and inte-grate, so it was just a logical exten-sion of what we were already pre-pared to do.

SW: Did we identify any shortcom-ings or were there any lessonslearned?Brownlee: It’s not so much that welearned lessons as that we validatedwhat we believed was true in the

42 Special Warfare

“Coalition warfarewas a logical exten-sion of our FID capa-bility, so we were pre-pared to conduct theseoperations when wehit the ground.”

CENTCOM area of operations. Wevalidated that in order to be able toconduct FID or support a coalition,our personnel have to be at least asmobile as our allies. We’ve knownthis all along, but we weren’t readyto go to the extreme, which was tomount every detachment. We havedetermined that it is valid and we’vegone in to mount all of our detach-ments with at least a Humvee-typevehicle. You can’t support the coali-tion if you don’t have that capability.After we had been with them longenough, our guys were riding in theSaudi tanks, the Kuwaiti BMP’s andthe Egyptian 577s — that’s the goalyou want to get to, but until you do,you’ve got to be able to drive towhere they are and move with them.

We found that we had someshortcomings in the communica-tions area: We are well-equippedwith communications equipment tosupport FID, to do DA and SR andthe other primary SF collateral mis-sions, but in order to provide sup-port to a coalition like we had inDesert Shield/Desert Storm, you’vegot to be able to replicate all thecommunications you find in a con-ventional operating force. We don’thave that, so we had to draw thosecommunications assets and inte-grate them into our system.

Now, it doesn’t make sense for usto be equipped with all the commu-nications you need in a division,and to have all this equipment sit-ting in a warehouse at Fort Camp-bell in case we’re required to go tothat level. What makes sense is forus to identify that equipment and tounderstand that in certain support-to-coalition situations, the Armymay have to supply us with thatcapability.

We also validated that in our the-ater, our soldiers have to be compe-tent in armor and mechanized tac-tics, at least through the battalionlevel, because when you go to theCENTCOM area of responsibility,that’s how our counterpart coalitionallies are equipped. In SOUTHCOM,the typical unit might be lightinfantry, but our typical counterpart

unit is a tank or mechanized-infantry battalion. It’s not sufficientfor our guys to go to the light lead-er’s course at Fort Benning; theyhave to attend armor and mecha-nized courses so they’re competent inthose tactics and in the equipment.We have to be competent to fall in ona counterpart brigade, and we haveto understand their requirementsand capabilities for indirect fire, airdefense and engineer countermobili-ty/mobility. We have to be able to getthat competency down to the lowestpossible level. There’s a tremendoustime and money requirement tomake every operational attachmentcompetent in all those skills, butthat is the goal. Our soldiers aremore mature and very smart, andthey bring a lot of skills when theycome to SF. If a guy has been a pla-toon leader in the 24th Mech, heautomatically becomes one of thesubject-matter experts in 5th SFGroup on anti-armor operations, andthe entire group takes advantage ofhis skills.

SW: How well-suited are conven-tional forces to conduct coalitionwarfare?Brownlee: I would say that theirrole is more logically combined war-fare, that’s where they’ve beenworking with the NATO allies. Youcan get a brigade from the 82nd to aBritish division and they couldoperate on the battlefield, butthey’re conducting combined opera-tions. What could a brigade or abattalion from the 82nd contributeto a battalion in the Kuwaiti army?The Kuwaiti army doesn’t have thecapability to operate with them in acombined fashion. Could a battalionin the 82nd fall in on a brigade inthe Kuwaiti army and make them acompetent fighting brigade able toconduct a combined operation? Intheory, I would say yes, but is thattheir primary mission and theirrole? I would argue that that’s not agood utilization for the 82nd —their job is to be prepared to fight,not to train. They have to be per-sonally trained to do their job. It’s

not their job to transpose that capa-bility to another element. I wouldsay the same thing for the MarineCorps; it needs to be able to operatein a combined fashion, not trainother people to operate as it does.

We’ve got the senior, mature,experienced NCOs and officers whohave the interpersonal skills and thenegotiation capabilities. We cultivatethose skills, we train our guys to beable to make that coalition unitcapable of conducting an operation. Idon’t believe the conventional forceswould want to spend the resources,because everything they would haveto do to support a coalition woulddetract from their capability to oper-ate. I don’t believe they would havethe staying power, I don’t believethey have the maturity and theexperience and the interpersonalskills to be successful in providingsupport for a coalition. They havethe job to participate in a coalition,but not to provide support to thecoalition, and I think that’s the dif-ference between the conventionalArmy and the Marine Corps andArmy special-operations forces.

SW: Coalition warfare is now seenas a collateral activity for SF.Should we place more emphasis onit as a full-fledged mission?Brownlee: I would say that it isperfectly appropriate for the 5th SFGroup to place more emphasis on itas a collateral activity, because theway we operate in the CENTCOMAOR and the way CENTCOM oper-ates, it is the most likely activity wewill be asked to conduct in support ofthe CINC, USCENTCOM. We needto emphasize the areas that willenable us to provide better supportin a coalition, because that is themost likely collateral activity underthe FID umbrella that we will beasked to do. That’s become very evi-dent, and that’s why we put tremen-dous emphasis on it in the 5thGroup. We look at the full FID spec-trum, from the perspective of howour training in mission-essentialtasks enhances our capability to con-duct support to a coalition. That’s

July 1993 43

where we put our emphasis. So it’ssomething we need to identify, notas a full-fledged mission, but as themost likely collateral activity we willbe asked to do in the CENTCOMAOR.

SW: How do you identify these areasand plan for your requirements?Brownlee: We analyze the poten-tial coalition counterparts for theirequipment and missions, then weorient individual companies andteams on specific brigades and spe-cific armies, down to the point thatwe identify what kind of tanks theyhave, what kind of tracks theyhave, what their combat-servicesupport is, what their air-defensecapabilities are, what their engi-neering assets are. Each team,then, in its mission-area analysisand its area study, emphasizes itsability to provide coalition supportto a unit that’s configured like that.If they have M-60A3s, T-62s orAMX-10 French tanks, our guys ori-ented toward that brigade will learnabout that tank, will study the pre-ventive maintenance checks andservices, the gunnery and how it’sused.

SW: How does coalition warfare dif-fer from FID?Brownlee: We’ve had a lot of theo-retical discussions in the 5th Groupabout coalition warfare, and person-ally, I am much more comfortablecalling it “support to a coalition.”When you say “coalition warfare,”that’s limiting, but when you say“support to a coalition,” that allowsyou to do many things. That allowsyou to do what we did with DesertShield/Desert Storm, it allows youto do what we did in Somalia, itallows you to conduct joint exerciseswith other coalition allies in sup-port of U.S. operational war plans.It’s transparent to the people you’reworking with, but everything you’redoing while you’re exercising withthem is enhancing their ability.You’re supporting the coalition byenhancing their capabilities, andgetting to know their capabilities

and limitations by conductingassessments. That all supportscoalition activities in the future. Ifwe had to go to war in country Xtomorrow as part of a coalitionforce, and the U.S. had conducted ajoint readiness exercise with thesecountries, we would already be ableto say, “Here’s what you can expectto find on the ground, here are thecapabilities and limitations, here’show they can best be integrated,”and that’s what we do on a continu-ous basis. Foreign internal defense

is when we help them help them-selves. When we go to Jordan anddo a joint readiness exercise underthe FID umbrella, we’re helping theJordanians become a better army.When we do coalition warfare, weare helping them help us. By help-ing them, by increasing their capa-bilities, by making them a better

player in the U.S. coalition, we helpus. The U.S. has a national objec-tive, and to the extent we can makethose guys better, they help usachieve it. That’s the only distinc-tion that I will make between FIDand support-to-coalition activities.

SW: Do you expect to see moreemphasis on support to coalitions inthe future?Brownlee: In the CENTCOM AOR,it’s absolutely essential. There areno forward-deployed forces inCENTCOM. If the national com-mand authorities decide to partici-pate in an operation, i.e., Somalia,Desert Shield/Desert Storm, if weare going to do anything in theCENTCOM AOR, it is going to beconducted under the aegis of a coali-tion. Only in the most extreme cir-cumstances, none of which I caneven envision, would there be uni-lateral U.S. operations in theCENTCOM AOR. Anything that wedo over there is going to be part of acoalition. It’s a proven commodity,it’s been successful, and our alliesthere are comfortable operatingwith the United States in a coali-tion. It allows them the breathingspace and the legitimacy to be anequal participating partner, ratherthan a subordinate element to aU.S. operation. Saudi Arabia andthe other coalition allies were will-ing to liberate Kuwait as part of acoalition; they would not have beenwilling to as subordinate militaryelements of a U.S. operation. It willbe the primary collateral activity forus in the future. We consider that tobe completely complementary toFID, the primary mission whichwe’ve been given by the ASOC. It’snot a new mission, it’s not some-thing that requires us to reinventthe wheel. We are already doing it,have been doing it, and will contin-ue to do it.

44 Special Warfare

“If we are going to doanything in theCENTCOM AOR, it isgoing to be conductedunder the aegis of acoalition. It’s a provencommodity.”

July 1993 45

Having completed a rotation at theJoint Readiness Training Center anda recent battalion-level OCONUSexercise, and having had the oppor-tunity to isolate active- and reserve-component Special Forces detach-ments from four SF groups andSEAL elements for direct-action andspecial-reconnaissance missions, Iam not convinced that we are doingour job teaching subordinate leadersthat fire support is an essential ele-ment of combat power.

If recent contingency operationsare any guide to the potential mod-ern battlefield, it is likely that SFwill be operating in the proximity offriendly light or heavy forces. Oursoldiers can be brought on-board toplan for this significant battlefieldoperating system if we, as leaders,do a few simple things:• Define fire support.• Teach fire-support planning and

coordination.• Demand overlays.• Use the special operations com-

mand-and-control element, theSOCCE.

• Ensure that the joint task force isinformed.

Define fire support. Fire supportincludes mortars, field artillery,naval gunfire, Army or SOF avia-tion, and air-delivered weapons, aswell as non-lethal electronic war-fare, illumination or smoke. Failureto recognize all the fire-support sys-tems that can affect ODA opera-tions may leave our units less thanadequately concerned about plan-ning communications, targets orcontrol measures.

Teach fire-support planning andcoordination. Officer-professional-development and NCO-professional-development classes addressing thebattlefield coordination element, orBCE, at echelons above corps andthe fire-support element, the FSE,at corps, division, brigade and bat-talion will make it apparent to oursoldiers that air support, fieldartillery, naval gunfire, aviationand even air defense artillery (ifused as fire support) are effectivelysynchronized and managed — andthat ODA requirements will be con-sidered in the system.

Demand overlays. ODAs in isola-tion should be required to providefire-support overlays complete withproposed restrictive measures.These restrictive fire-control mea-sures could protect ODA mission-support sites, selected portions ofoperational areas, and routes andcorridors. Overlays should also pro-vide proposed targets in case firesupport becomes available. TheODA should also brief its annotatedoverlay to the area specialist team,including the proposed communica-tion plan and overall concept for firesupport. This will establish a start-ing point, and the forward opera-tional base or SOCCE can providecoordinating information if the ODAfalls within range of fire-supportsystems.

Use the SOCCE. Since SF unitshave no fire-support officers, theSOCCE is the best way to enter thefire-support system. On Solid Shield’88, ODA no-fire areas receivedacknowledgment at the CINCLANTlevel when data was provided to theXVIII Airborne Corps FSE by the

7th SF Group’s SOCCE. If noSOCCE is available, the air compo-nent of the joint special-operationstask force may have to fill the bill.Early coordination between theArmy special-operations task forceand joint fire planners should alignthe effort.

Ensure the JTF Is informed. It isimperative that our plannersensure proper fire-support visibili-ty. Unless a unique command-and-control arrangement exists, the onlycomplete coordination level in ourmost likely scenario is the joint taskforce BCE or FSE. Most delicatecould be the coordination of fires forcompartmented operations. Theymust be planned and carefully coor-dinated at the JTF level within theguidance issued by the JSOTF. Tocoordinate fires only within theSOF community could be a fatalmistake.

The existing fire-support systemworks, it is responsive, and it ismanned by fire-support coordina-tors trained to provide flexibilityand to anticipate future contingen-cies. Our charter should be to trainour detachments to tap into the sys-tem and fully put this essential ele-ment of combat power into the Spe-cial Forces arsenal.

Lt. Col. Geoffrey C.Lambert is currentlyattending the ArmyWar College atCarlisle Barracks, Pa.His previous assign-ments include duty asthe deputy commander, 7th SpecialForces Group and commander, 1stBattalion, 7th SF Group.

Fire-SupportPlanning at theODA Level

by Lt. Col. Geoffrey Lambert

46 Special Warfare

The Special Operations Proponency Office reminds soldiers that effectiveOct. 1, 1993, promotion to sergeant major will be restricted to graduates ofthe Army Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas. The SMA currentlyconducts two classes per year, beginning in January and July, whose aver-age size is 450 students. In March, the Chief of Staff of the Army approveda recommendation to conduct one nine-month class per year beginning inAugust 1995. Average size of the nine-month class is projected to be 700students. Soldiers are chosen to attend the SMA by an annual Army selec-tion board. Others may qualify for a nonresident SMA course to be takenby correspondence. Qualifications for nonresident training are outlined inan annual MILPO message normally released in August or September. Formore information contact SFC R.B. Gardner, Special Operations Proponen-cy Office, at DSN 239-9002, commercial (919) 432-9002.

SMA required for promotion to sergeant major

SF NCOs may apply for 18D cross-training

Credit for 38A MOS switch ends soon

Since the establishment of the Special Forces Enlisted Branch in 1983, theBranch has been trying to fill the force, recruiting more than 2,500 soldierseach year until 1993, according to Sgt. Maj. William L. Frisbie of the Spe-cial Operations Proponency Office. With the exception of 18D, medicalNCO, which is currently at 80 percent, the fill has been accomplished, withMOSs 18B, weapons NCO; 18C, engineer NCO; and 18E, communicationsNCO; currently at more than 100 percent. Soldiers in these MOSs ingrades of sergeant and staff sergeant may currently apply for cross-train-ing into 18D by submitting a DA Form 4187 through normal channels. Thecurrent waiting period for 18D training is approximately seven months,and the next available class will begin Nov. 24, 1993. For more informa-tion, contact Sgt. Maj. William L. Frisbie at DSN 239-2415/9002, commer-cial (919) 432-2415/9002, or Donna Wheeler in the Special Forces Recruit-ing Office, DSN 239-1818, commercial (919) 432-1818.

Time is running out for soldiers wishing to change their military occupa-tional specialty to 38A (Civil Affairs) by completing the two-week CivilAffairs Operations Course. After September, the CAOC cannot be appliedtoward an MOS change to 38A, said MSgt. Michael J. Rupert of the SpecialOperations Proponency Office. Currently, soldiers working in a 38A posi-tion who have completed the CAOC and meet the specifications listed inAR 611-201 are eligible to change their MOS to 38A. Soldiers who wantcredit for the CAOC in order to change MOSs need to submit their packetsto the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, deputy chief of staff forpersonnel office, this year, Rupert added. For more information contactMSgt. Michael J. Rupert, DSN 239-6406, commercial (919) 432-6406.

Enlisted Career NotesSpecial Warfare

July 1993 47

Current Army policy calls for the accession of warrant officers from enlist-ed soldiers with 5-8 years of active federal service. Proponents of the vari-ous branches have the authority to vary this service requirement, up to 12years. According to CWO 3 Shaun Driscoll of the Special Operations Propo-nency Office, Special Forces is currently accessing soldiers with more than12 years in order to fill its warrant-officer vacancies, but this may becomemore difficult as SF nears its goals. For more information, contact CWO 3Shaun Driscoll at DSN 239-2415/9002, commercial (919) 432-2415/9002.

Warrants accessed up to 12 years

Board selects RC officers to return to active duty

Experience earns credit for FA 39 courses

A PERSCOM selection board convened Mar. 31, 1993 to select reserve-component captains and first lieutenants to be returned to active duty inBranch 18, Special Forces, and Functional Area 39C, Civil Affairs. Accord-ing to Maj. Ron Fiegle of the Special Operations Proponency Office, theboard selected officers who were fully qualified and able to compete for pro-motion and retention with their active-component counterparts, to fill criti-cal shortages within the personnel inventory. Selection was based on thequality of the individual’s file, advanced-course completion, language capa-bility, experience and demonstrated potential. Officers selected will incur afour-year obligation. During their third year on active duty, they will beeligible to compete for voluntary indefinite or conditional voluntary indefi-nite status. Selected FA 39C officers will be accessed in their basic branchbut will single track as FA 39. The first of these officers should be return-ing to active status before the end of fiscal-year 1993.

Increasing numbers of officers are getting credit for Functional Area 39courses because of their experiences. Records of the Special OperationsProponency Office reveal that about half of the officers requesting con-structive credit for the Regional Studies Course, the Psychological Opera-tions Course and the Civil Affairs Course qualify, according to JeanneSchiller, FA 39 manager. Multiple deployments of significant duration tovarious areas in the same geographic region will earn constructive creditfor the Regional Studies Course if officers had the opportunity to learn ofthe culture, religion, government, economics and military aspects duringthose deployments. Constructive credit for PSYOP or CA courses requiresextensive PSYOP or CA experience. That experience must have been for asignificant amount of time and at a level where the training parallels thecurriculum of the courses. A review of all FA 39 officer records indicatedthat many officers would probably receive constructive credit for thePSYOP Officer Course or the Civil Affairs Course; fewer officers wouldqualify for the Regional Studies Course. Officers interested in applying forconstructive credit should contact Jeanne Schiller, Special Operations Pro-ponency Office, at DSN 239-6406/9002, commercial (919) 432-6406/9002.

Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

48 Special Warfare

In what was characterized as “Humanitarian Assistance: Colombian Style,”Russian security officials reported the Feb. 16, 1993, seizure of 1,092 kilo-grams (1.4 short tons) of cocaine in the city of Vyborg. Concealed in canslabeled “Meat with Potatoes,” it had been shipped from Colombia via Fin-land to Vyborg, a port city about 70 miles northwest of St. Petersburg, theshipment’s destination. It would have subsequently been sent on to Euro-pean markets. The largest-ever cocaine seizure in Russia, it marks thegrowing involvement of international drug traffickers in the former SovietUnion and Eastern Europe. According to the Russian Ministry of Security,or MB, Russia is “on the eve of a massive offensive by the drug business.” Ina statement reminiscent of Soviet days, the deputy chief of the MB’s Direc-torate for Countering Smuggling and Corruption added that he could notrule out the possibility that foreign intelligence services were aiding thedrug deliveries, though he noted that he had no reliable information to thateffect. Russia has also become a frequent transhipment or target area forillegal narcotics from the former Soviet Central Asian republics, the Cauca-sus, Southwest Asia and other regions. Indigenously-produced syntheticnarcotics have also become a substantial problem, with some 70 illegal druglaboratories seized in Russia during 1992. This growing drug-traffickingproblem, sometimes linked with arms trafficking and ethno-national con-flict, will clearly shape the organization and activities of law-enforcementand security forces in Russia and neighboring states and has the potentialof involving military resources as well.

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, KGB Bor-der Troops played a central role in border-security operations along the Sovi-et-Afghan border. During the war, according to Soviet statistics, 515 BorderTroops were killed and another 3,000 injured. Prominent among the borderunits were special-operations forces termed “Assault-Landing Motorized-Maneuver Groups,” which conducted heliborne strikes, raids and interdic-tion actions in defense of the frontier and against mujahedin targets 100kilometers deep into Afghanistan. Today, in accord with a two-year agree-ment between Russia and the now-independent state of Tajikistan concludedin 1992, Russian Border Troops under the Russian Ministry of Security arestationed along the 2,000-kilometer border between Tajikistan andAfghanistan. By all accounts, the border is at least as active as it was duringthe war years, with Border Troops engaging in numerous firefights againstnarcotics and arms traffickers and with armed Islamic groups affiliated withfactions in the Tajik civil war. Tajik fighters opposing the government arethought by the Russians to undergo guerrilla training in Afghan camps runby the Islamic Party of Afghanistan. Following their training, they crossback into Tajikistan, one of a number of factors that fuels Russia’s concernsabout Islamic extremism along the southern borders. Some 30 armed clasheswith illegal crossers had occurred during the first two months of 1993. As ofMarch 1993, Russian border guards were deployed on territory controlledboth by the Tajik government and opposition forces, as well as facing hostilearmed groups of various types in Afghanistan. Given recent historical prece-

Colombian cocaine in Russia

Russian border troops on Tajik-Afghan frontier

Foreign SOFSpecial Warfare

July 1993 49

The proliferation of terrorist groups associated with ethno-national conflictin Eastern Europe is directly threatening the stability and development offragile new states and institutions in the area. Virtually every ethno-nation-al “flashpoint” in the region — of which the former Yugoslavia is the mostnotable at present — has spawned terrorism and terrorist groups, withgrowing emigré and refugee populations creating potential support bases foralienated groups using violence as a means to their goals. As with terroristgroups generally, the agenda, size, location and activity level of groups inEastern Europe are far from precise. A few examples of groups appearingover the last two years illustrate the nature of the problem. Amidst growingconflict in Yugoslavia in 1991, a Pan-Serbian “Chetnik” faction threatenedthe destruction the Krsko nuclear power plant owned jointly by Croatia andSlovenia, the kind of threatened action that has continued to generate con-cerns in the region. In the fall of 1992, a Belgrade newspaper reported asmuggling network trying to bring “uranium” into Yugoslav conflict zones,and speculated about linkages to Soviet nuclear warheads rumored to havedisappeared. While such rumors seem highly unlikely and often evenabsurd, the fact that the theft and diversion of nuclear fuels and materials ofvarious types is under way is beyond dispute. In the Czech and Slovak Fed-erative Republic, which at the start of 1993 became separate Czech and Slo-vak states, a 1990 text attributed to the “Slovak Republican Army” — anextremist right-wing organization that identifies its enemies as Hungarians,Czechs, Jews and renegade Slovaks — noted its contacts with the “IrishRepublican Army, Vatra Romanescu in Romania, Poland’s 13 DecemberIndependence Group, (and) the PLO.” The organization declared its inten-tion to create an apocalypse in central and southeastern Europe through thedestruction of nuclear power plants, petroleum and gas pipelines and otherfacilities, if the “Slovak nation is threatened with extinction.” While the divi-sion of Czechoslovakia took place peacefully, the potential for this kind ofactivity remains a concern to security establishments in the region. In Bul-garia, the proliferation of small terrorist groups include the “ResistanceNational Revolutionary Committee,” “Political Rights,” “Eagle,” “FutureInnovation,” the “Secret Revolutionary Committee,” “Reality,” “Warriors ofIslam,” “Red Pirates,” and the “Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organi-zation,” which has the apparent goal of creating a Macedonian state out ofMacedonian-populated areas of Bulgaria and the Yugoslav republic of Mace-donia. The “16 September Commando” in Hungary illustrates the ethnicdimension of terrorism. Claiming a membership of several hundred, thegroup has promised to murder Slovak law-enforcement officials involved in aso-called anti-Hungarian pogrom in Bratislava in 1992 stemming from a soc-cer match. Overall, these and other appearing, disappearing and changingterrorist groups in Eastern Europe seem likely to threaten stability in theregion. This post-Cold War development has implications for foreign nationsand forces providing peacemaking, peacekeeping and security-assistancesupport to East European states, since these groups have the clear potentialfor generating terrorist actions locally and abroad.

Terrorism, ethnic conflictthreaten stability

of eastern Europe

dent from the war in Afghanistan, and Russia’s forcefully stated securityinterests in the region, the special-operations dimensions of Russian effortsto deal with a dangerous border and the threat of extremist-inspired insta-bility may be particularly instructive in the months ahead.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Scott takes command of USASOC

Maj. Gen. James T. Scott tookcommand of the Army Special Oper-ations Command during ceremoniesat Fort Bragg May 20.

Scott, commander of the 2ndInfantry Division since July 1991,replaced Lt. Gen. Wayne A. Down-ing, now commander of the U.S. Spe-cial Operations Command atMacDill AFB, Fla.

Scott has formerly served as com-mander of Special Operations Com-mand - Europe; commander of the3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division;and as commander of the 1st RangerBattalion, 75th Infantry.

Reserve linguist unit seeks members

The 1st U.S. Army Reserve Lin-guist Unit is recruiting soldiers whowish to practice their language skillsand improve their proficiency.

The unit is a non-pay, reinforce-ment training unit whose soldiersdrill for retirement points. Its re-cent realignment with the Armyspecial-operations community opensnew opportunities to perform dutieswith Civil Affairs, Psychological Op-erations and Special Forces unitsboth during training and on actualoperations.

The unit headquarters in Wash-ington, D.C., monitors the activitiesof all its soldiers in CONUS andOCONUS. Subordinate detachmentsare currently located in San Diego,Calif.; Houston, Texas; Tampa, Fla.;Chicago, Ill.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; NewYork City and Charlottesville, Va.

Membership is open to all lan-guage-qualified soldiers of the ArmyReserve and National Guard regard-less of rank or MOS. For more infor-

mation, soldiers should write: 1stUSAR Linguist Unit; Attn: A/S-1(Recruiting); 6601 Baltimore Ave.;Riverdale, MD 20737-1025.

New handbook covers terminal-guidance operations

The Special Warfare Center andSchool will soon release a new hand-book for use by special-operationsforces in planning terminal-guidanceoperations.

Intended primarily for Army SOF,the Terminal Guidance Handbookaddresses joint operations, coveringthe operational concept of TGO andgiving guidance and checklists forstaff planning and coordination. Ter-minal guidance is a joint direct-action mission — SOF ground forcesprovide assistance in locating targetsto be destroyed by aircraft, missiles,ships or artillery elements.

“The handbook is not designed toprovide new doctrine,” said Maj. R.L.Snyder, chief of the SWCS DoctrineDevelopment Division. “We havereviewed existing doctrine and pro-cedures and consolidated the infor-mation into what we feel is an easilyread quick reference.”

The handbook describes TGO pro-cedures and provides definitions andchecklists for planning. Referenceguides allow users to ensure commu-nications compatibility.

For more information on the hand-book, contact Maj. R.L. Snyder, DSN239-5393/8689, commercial (919)432-5393/8689.

USACAPOC gets new commander

Brig. Gen. Donald F. Campbelltook command of the U.S. ArmyCivil Affairs and Psychological Oper-ations Command during ceremonies

on Fort Bragg’s Sicily Drop ZoneMay 2.

Campbell, a superior court judgefor the state of New Jersey and for-mer commander of the 353rd CivilAffairs Command, Bronx, N.Y., tookcommand from Brig. Gen. Joseph C.Hurteau, who retired from the activereserve component.

USACAPOC is the headquartersfor all Army Civil Affairs and Psy-chological Operations units and con-sists of 11 separate commands.Approximately 83 percent of its10,000 soldiers are Army reservists.Two of its units, the 4th PSYOPGroup and the 96th Civil AffairsBattalion, are active-component andbased at Fort Bragg. Its reserve ele-ments are located in 29 states.

New free-fall manual available for issue

FM 31-19, Military Free-FallParachuting Tactics, Techniques andProcedures, is complete and is beingissued to field units.

The new manual supersedes TC31-19, dated Sept. 9, 1988. Unitswhich have established publicationsaccounts should receive the newfree-fall manual automatically.Those who do not should check to seeif they have established a need forthe manual as detailed in DA Pam-phlet 310-10, The Standard Publica-tion System Users Guide.

National Guard SF unit looking for members

The 3rd Battalion, 20th SpecialForces Group is currently recruitingsoldiers to serve in the unit.

The battalion, assigned to theFlorida National Guard, has a num-ber of openings for personnel, includ-ing HALO and scuba slots. Soldiers

UpdateSpecial Warfare

50 Special Warfare

with an 18-series military occupa-tional specialty or who are willing tovolunteer for SF training should con-tact Capt. John Wright at (904) 533-3550 or Capt. Rick Jones at (904)533-3419.

Analysis identifies critical PSYOP tasks

An ongoing analysis of criticaltasks for PSYOP units will have far-reaching effects on PSYOP doctrine,training and personnel in the future.

The Analysis Branch of the Indi-vidual Training Division of theSWCS Directorate of Training andDoctrine began conducting thePSYOP front-end analysis in the sec-ond quarter of FY 93 to identify criti-cal collective tasks for PSYOP units,from the group to the team level.The analysis will conclude with thePSYOP Critical Task SelectionBoard, scheduled for August 1993.Results of the analysis will affectPSYOP doctrine, instruction andtraining materials, and will serve asa basis for further analysis of indi-vidual positions within the PSYOPcareer-management field.

SOF veterans dedicatememorial stones

Two groups of SOF veterans haverecently dedicated memorials totheir fallen comrades in the JFKMemorial Plaza at Fort Bragg.

On May 31, members of the Spe-cial Forces Association joined sol-diers of the 3rd and 7th SF Groupsto dedicate a stone to the memory of606 SF soldiers killed in action and126 missing in action since 1952. Lt.Gen. James T. Scott, commander ofthe U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand, challenged his listenersto preserve the memory of those sol-diers honored by the stone. “To us,they’re more than just a name on awhite cross or a memorial stone in acemetery somewhere,” he said.

Veterans of World War II’s 1stSpecial Service Force joined withmodern Special Forces soldiers todedicate a stone in memory of theirunit at the Plaza April 2.

Twenty former members of the 1stSSF and soldiers from the 3rd and7th Special Forces Groups unveiledthe stone, dedicated to the unit fromwhich modern Special Forces unitstrace their lineage.

“There are great similaritiesbetween us and those young soldiersout there today,” said retired Col.Robert S. Moore, a 1st SSF veteran.“You can see it in their spirit, atti-tude and confidence. Their dedica-tion is equal to that exhibited by the1st Special Service Force.”

Activated July 9, 1942 at FortWilliam Henry Harrison, near Hele-na, Mont., the combined U.S.-Cana-dian force of 173 officers and 2,194enlisted men was formed to conducthit-and-run raids against Germangarrisons in Norway and Romania.

Before its training was finished,the unit’s original mission was can-celed, but its leader, Brig. Gen.Robert T. Frederick, found new mis-sions. During the Anzio operation,the unit earned the name, “TheDevil’s Brigade,” but its reputationwas forged in the taking of Monte LaDifensa, a strategic 3,210-foot moun-taintop in southern Italy.

On the night of Dec. 3, 1943, 600men of the 1st SSF’s 2nd Regiment

climbed the mountain”s 1,000-footcliffs to approach German defensesfrom the rear. Under heavy fire, theAmericans attacked and foughthand-to-hand to overrun enemy posi-tions. Within hours the 1st SSFsecured a victory that Allied generalshad estimated would take six days.

The 1st SSF went on to fight nearRome and in southern France. It wasinactivated Dec. 5, 1944 near Men-ton, France. — Linda Thompson,USASOC PAO

Roach new commander of 7th SF Group

Col. James S. Roach assumed com-mand of the 7th Special ForcesGroup in a Fort Bragg ceremonyJune 8.

Roach, 46, replaced Col. James G.Pulley, now chief of staff for theArmy Special Forces Command.

Roach’s previous assignmentsinclude SF detachment, companyand battalion command. He servedtwo tours in Vietnam, was an advis-er in El Salvador, and most recentlywas Director of Training and Doc-trine at the JFK Special WarfareCenter and School.

MILES brackets available for foreign weapons

In the May 1993 issue of SpecialWarfare, the article, “Using MILESon Foreign Weapons,” described aprocedure for adapting the M-16mounting bracket of the MILEStransmitter to an FN FAL rifle.

According to Gene McCarthy ofthe Collective Training Instrumen-tation and Engagement SystemsDirectorate, Combined Arms Com-mand Training at Fort Eustis, Va.,MILES mounting brackets for avariety of foreign weapons havealready been developed and areavailable through his directorate orlocal training and audiovisual sup-port centers. For further informa-tion, contact Gene McCarthy, DSN927-3313/4589, commercial (804)878-3313/4589.

July 1993 51

1st SSF veterans dedicate memorial stone.


52 Special Warfare

Terrorism, Politics and Law. ByAntonio Cassese. Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1989.ISBN 0-691-07838-6. 162 pages.

This compact book by a notedItalian jurist, diplomat and authorexplores, with clarity and brevity,the impact of terrorism on interna-tional law.

The hijacking of the Italian cruiseliner Achille Lauro provides theauthor’s focal point. He skillfullyexplains the facts of the hijacking,the precepts of international lawapplicable to the incident, and theimpact of domestic political consid-erations on the election by thosenations involved to respond eitherwith diplomatic initiatives or witharmed force.

Cassese begins his book with anoverall discussion of terrorism andits effect on international relations.In subsequent chapters, he reviewsthe details of the Achille Lauro inci-dent. Finally, he presents his viewof the lessons to be learned from theAchille Lauro affair. The actions ofall the participants, governmental(the U.S., Italy and Egypt) andquasi-governmental (the PLO andits offshoot, the PLF) are closelyscrutinized for compliance withexisting standards of internationallaw. There is an abundance of criti-cism for everyone involved.

Cassese has little use for terror-ists and no sympathy for theirmethods. He does look beyond theircriminal acts, however, to the rootcauses of their aberrant behavior.Although not an advocate of “peaceat any price,” Cassese favors thediplomatic response. He levelsscathing criticism against the U.S.government for its refusal to cooper-ate with the Italian government’s

diplomatic initiatives. He condemnsthe American government’s insis-tence from the very outset of the cri-sis that it would use a special-oper-ations force deployed immediatelyto the area even as the Italianswere achieving success throughtheir diplomatic initiatives.

He is almost as harsh on the

Egyptians for their duplicity in cov-ering up the death of LeonKlinghoffer during negotiationswith the hijackers and offers anexplanation for their behavior. Healso expresses disappointment atthe Egyptian government’s failureto comply with a treaty obligation tothe United States to extradite thehijackers here for trial. He viewsthis violation as provoking the sub-sequent diversion by U.S. Navywarplanes of the Egyptian airlineras it carried the hijackers over theMediterranean — the scene, onlydays earlier, of their murderousactivities.

Although Cassese is generally

sympathetic to the approach takenby the Italian government, he simi-larly condemns its decision not tohonor the U.S. government’s requestto extradite the terrorist Abul Abbas.He explains the lenient treaty-stan-dard for extradition (adopted earlier,ironically, at the urging of the Ital-ian government, which desired tofacilitate the extradition from theUnited States of criminals wantedfor offenses in Italy) and how theItalian municipal court’s misapplica-tion of stricter standards, resultingin the escape from justice of the prin-cipal architect of the hijacking, wasprobably the result of domestic polit-ical considerations.

The author thoroughly re-searched the material available tohim. His review of the court tran-scripts from the trials and appealsof the hijackers and his use of othersources provides the reader withmany interesting facts. He providessome insightful speculation on AbulAbbas’ purpose in ordering thehijacking, as well.

The author’s stated purpose inwriting this book is to demystifyinternational law for the layman.He cites the influential legal scholarEmmerich de Vattel, who wrote in1758 that, “International law is thelaw of sovereigns. It is writtenmainly for them, and for their min-isters. In truth, it should interestall men and, in a free Nation, itsprecepts should be the study of allits citizens.”

Cassese feels that internationallaw should not be, and no longer is,solely the province of “sovereigns.”He believes that informed andthoughtful citizen action is the besthope for eliminating the problem ofterrorism. His interesting andthought-provoking book should be

Book ReviewsSpecial Warfare

July 1993 53

of particular interest to policy mak-ers and, equally, to those whoimplement these policies, especiallyin the area of special operations.

Maj. Neil R. Porter Jr.Deputy Staff Judge AdvocateUSACAPOCFort Bragg, N.C.

Clandestine Warfare: Weaponsand Equipment of the SOE andOSS. By James D. Ladd, KeithMelton and Peter Mason. New York:Sterling Publishing Co., 1988.ISBN: 0-7137-1822-6. 159 pages.$24.95.

In 1942, William “Wild Bill”Donovan, the director of the Officeof Strategic Services, appointedStanley P. Lovell, a chemist thenserving with the Office of ScientificResearch and Development’s Divi-sion 19, as chief of the OSSResearch and Development Branch.“I need every subtle device andevery underhanded trick to useagainst the Germans and theJapanese — by our own people —but especially by the undergroundresistance groups in all occupiedcountries,” he said. “You will haveto invent all of them, Lovell,because you’re going to be my man.”

Stanley Lovell rarely disappoint-ed (Donovan later referred to Lovellas his Professor Moriarty). But hedid not invent all the specialweapons and devices associatedwith OSS. Lovell brought some overto OSS R&D from Division 19. TheBritish developed others for theirSpecial Operations Executive, thenpassed them on to their Americanallies. The Yanks’ abundant fund-ing of military research and devel-opment occasionally improved uponthese weapons, and the Americancapacity for mass production madeit possible to turn them out in vastnumbers.

Among the many special weaponsand devices developed, adapted orconsidered for use by the OSS wereBlack Joe, an explosive coal thatcould blow away an enemy blast

furnace or steam engine; the BigJoe 6, an OSS crossbow that firedan arrow at the rate of 200 feet persecond; the OSS Stinger, a single-shot pistol small enough to concealin a man’s hand; the LockpickingKnife, an OSS device that wouldpry open both bolt locks and cylin-der locks; and Aunt Jemima, anexplosive powder with the appear-ance and consistency of flour thatcould be kneaded into dough, bakedinto bread and then used to destroyan enemy bridge. The OSS had K-tablets to knock out a man, andGeneral Donovan himself some-times carried the deadly L-tablet, agelatin capsule coated with rubber

and filled with potassium cyanide,to ensure that he would not be cap-tured alive. Clandestine Warfarediscusses these and other fearfulinstruments of subversive warfarein some detail.

To date, it seems that research inthe records of the Office of Strate-gic Services has discovered little orno evidence to show that most ofthe OSS weapons and devices dis-cussed in Clandestine Warfare wereever actually employed in combator special operations. A few, likethe OSS Matchbox Camera and theOSS Silenced Pistol, were widelyused. Triggering, demolition and

incendiary devices developed bySOE and adopted and modified byOSS also proved highly effective inOSS operations.

Some OSS special weapons didmore to inspire confidence andstrengthen morale than to affectoperations. The OSS Stiletto, anadaptation of the Fairbairn Knife,was issued to most OSS personnelserving overseas, and possession ofthis weapon is still a point of prideamong OSS veterans. In practice, itleft much to be desired. Its sheathwas awkward, and its razor-sharpedge and needle point made theStiletto much too brittle and fragile.

James Ladd, who has writtenwell concerning subversive warfare;Keith Melton, the owner of an out-standing collection of OSS and SOEweapons and equipment; and Capt.Peter Mason, who served with theBritish Special Air Service and theBritish commandos during WorldWar II, have combined their consid-erable talents and resources to com-pose an exciting and interestingbook. It is well-illustrated and care-fully indexed. It is undocumented,however, and understandably, theauthors have not avoided some mis-takes in writing about a subject socomplex. Certainly ClandestineWarfare is not the last word on spe-cial weapons and devices. Still, itmakes a good read in an endlesslyfascinating field of research. Thoseinterested in unorthodox warfareand the weapons and equipmentdeveloped for special operations willwant to add this book to theirlibrary.

Lawrence H. McDonaldNational ArchivesWashington, D.C.

Department of the ArmyJFK Special Warfare Center and SchoolATTN: AOJK – DT – PD – BFort Bragg, NC 28307 – 5000

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Special Warfare

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