Special WarfareThe Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–03–2 August 2003 Vol. 16, No. 2

When Special Forces was formed in1952, the United States was facing thepossibility of supporting guerrillauprisings against communist forces inEastern Europe. Although we live in avastly different world today, the needfor soldiers qualified to perform uncon-ventional missions has not diminished.

Over the years, as the operating envi-ronment and the nature of SF opera-tions have changed, SF training hasevolved to keep pace. In response tolessons learned during the war on ter-rorism, we have added training in anumber of skills, including close airsupport, adaptive leadership, marks-manship and urban warfare.

Having commanded the U.S. ArmySpecial Forces Command during Oper-ation Enduring Freedom and the initialstages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iam intensely proud of the performanceand the sacrifices of our Special Forcesofficers and NCOs. While I revere theaccomplishments of our predecessors, Ithink we have never produced finer sol-diers than those we have today.

Operations in Afghanistan and inIraq have demonstrated the dedication,intelligence, technological skill andadaptability of our SF soldiers, and thenumber of Silver Stars that they havealready earned is a testament to theirwarrior spirit. While some lessonslearned during these operations havepointed out areas in SF training thatneed change, many more have validat-ed our existing training.

As the global war on terrorism con-tinues, SF may need to adapt furtherin order to find new ways of contribut-ing with its unique capabilities. TheSpecial Warfare Center and School

must respond to field requirementswhile simultaneously ensuring thatthe SF training pipeline fills the force.The outstanding officers, NCOs andcivilians of the command stand readyto do so.

Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert

From the CommandantAugust 2003 Special Warfare Vol. 16, No. 2

Features2 The Evolution of Special Forces Training: Maintaining

High Standardsby Command Sergeant Major Joseph Lupyak, U.S. Army (ret.)

6 Special Forces: Selecting and Training Officers for Adaptabilityby Captain Will Cotty, Jat Thompson and Dr. Michael G. Sanders

12 A Unique Organization: The 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Groupby Lieutenant Colonel Curtis D. Boyd

19 Colonel Robert S. Moore, U.S. Army (ret.), 1919-2003

20 SOCCE-Kuwait: Establishing Long-Term Military-to-Military Relationshipsby Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Joyce

24 Special Forces Role Different in Iraqby Sergeant Kyle J. Cosner

26 Unconventional Warfare in Korea: Forgotten Aspect of the ‘Forgotten War’by Dr. Richard L. Kiper

38 Special Forces Soldier Receives Silver Star for Afghanistan Combatby Sergeant Kyle J. Cosner

Departments41 Foreign SOF

42 Enlisted Career Notes

43 Officer Career Notes

44 Update

47 Book Reviews

PB 80–03–2 ContentsAugust 2003 Special Warfare Vol. 16, No. 2

Commander & CommandantMajor General Geoffrey C. Lambert

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Graphics & DesignBruce S. Barfield

Automation ClerkGloria H. Sawyer

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of theUnited States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its missionis to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examinationof established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presentedin other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited andshould be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare,USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. SpecialWarfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfareand the authors.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial-operations units. Individuals desiring privatesubscriptions should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. SpecialWarfare is also available on the USASOC internal web(https:asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm).

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

A

E T

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Peter J. SchoomakerGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Joel B. HudsonAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

0318404

Headquarters, Department of the Army

In June 1952, the United States Armyactivated a unique unit — the 10th Spe-cial Forces Group — at Fort Bragg, N.C.

The unit’s primary mission, as defined bythe Army, was “to infiltrate by land, sea orair, deep into enemy-occupied territory andorganize the resistance/guerrilla potentialto conduct Special Forces operations, withemphasis on guerrilla warfare.” SF’s sec-ondary missions included deep-penetrationraids, intelligence missions and counterin-surgency operations. The soldiers whowould perform SF’s primary and secondarymissions would need to have a commitmentto professionalism and excellence that wasunparalleled in American military history.

The 10th SF Group’s commander,Colonel Aaron Bank, was a veteran ofWorld War II’s Office of Strategic Services,or OSS. Many of the volunteers for the10th had also served during World War II,either as members of Ranger or Airborneunits, or like Bank, as members of the OSS.Other volunteers had escaped from com-munist-controlled areas of Europe in orderto join the U.S. Army. As the 10th Groupgrew, Bank began building on the experi-ence of his troops, training them inadvanced tactics of unconventional war-fare, or UW. The training was tough, andthe soldiers were held to high standards.

Today, within the SF community, thereare some people who believe that SF train-ing is no longer as difficult as it once was,and that the JFK Special Warfare Center

and School has lowered SF training stand-ards in order to graduate a greater numberof students from the SF QualificationCourse, or SFQC. Nothing could be furtherfrom the truth.

Over the years, operational demandshave affected the way that SF soldierstrain and the operations for which theytrain. Despite those demands, SF trainingstandards have remained as high as thosefollowed by the 10th SF Group in the1950s. As SF training continues to evolvein the face of increasingly complex opera-tional demands, the standards are, if any-thing, higher than ever.

To understand how SF training can beaffected by operational demands, it mightbe helpful for us to review SF trainingstrategies that have been employed overthe last 50 years.

1950sWhen the 10th SF Group deployed half

of its soldiers to Germany in November1953, the other half remained at FortBragg and was redesignated the 77th SFGroup. As new soldiers reported to the77th, they were assigned to one of the77th’s FB teams (equivalent to a company)to begin their training in the SF militaryoccupational specialties, or MOSs. Eachsoldier was required to cross-train in all ofthe SF MOSs: weapons sergeant (light andheavy weapons, patrolling techniques, and

2 Special Warfare

The Evolution of Special Forces Training:Maintaining High Standards

by Command Sergeant Major Joseph Lupyak, U.S. Army (ret.)

tactics); engineer sergeant (conventionaland unconventional demolitions); medicalsergeant (life-saving procedures, includingvenous cut downs and suturing); and com-munications sergeant (radio and antennatheory, and message transmission byadvanced international Morse code atseven words per minute). Soldiers whocompleted SF MOS cross-training earned acompletion certificate. After the initialphase of training, soldiers attended con-ventional advanced training in their spe-cific MOS. For instance, weapons sergeantsattended the 16-week Light and HeavyWeapons Course at Fort Benning, Ga.

During the three-week third phase oftraining, soldiers organized into SF teamsand parachuted into North Carolina’s Pis-gah National Forest. There, they receivedone week of mountain training, whichincluded instruction in ropes and knots;rope climbing; free climbing; rappelling;and the use of one-, two- and three-ropebridges. After the mountain training, sol-diers moved to a guerrilla base camp fortwo weeks of training in UW. Soldiersreceived the SF skill designator “3” after

having completed the third phase.In 1956, 16 soldiers taken from the 77th

SF Group formed the 14th Special ForcesOperational Detachment, or SFOD. The 14thperformed operations in Thailand, Taiwanand Vietnam. Soon three other SFODs — the12th, 13th and 16th — were also formed foroperations in the Far East. In June 1957, theSFODs were combined to form the 1st SFGroup, which was oriented on both Asia andthe Pacific. SF was steadily growing.

1960sDuring the 1960s, the Kennedy administra-

tion’s emphasis on counterinsurgency, as wellas the demands of conflicts in Laos and inVietnam, contributed to the growth of SF.Although Southeast Asia was SF’s primaryfocus during the decade, SF training teamsalso conducted missions in both CentralAmerica and South America. The worldwidenature of SF’s operational requirementsincreased the need for additional numbers oftrained SF soldiers. In September 1961, the5th SF Group was activated, joining the 1st,10th and 7th (redesignated from the 77th SF

August 2003 3

The unconventional-war-fare exercise is oneaspect of Special Forcestraining that has beenconsistent since the1950s.

File photo

Group in June 1960). Also in 1961, the SFschoolhouse, the Special Warfare School,established the SFQC to meet the increasingchallenge of training soldiers for the expand-ing SF units. At that time, the SFQC consist-ed of three phases: the individual-trainingphase (Phase 1); the MOS-training phase(Phase 2); and the collective-training phase(Phase 3), which concluded with a UW exer-cise called Cherokee Trail. In 1963, three moreSF groups were activated: the 8th (in April),the 6th (in May) and the 3rd (in December).The challenge of filling these units with fullytrained soldiers caused the Special WarfareSchool to increase not only the number of stu-dents who attended each cycle of the SFQC,but also the number of cycles that were taughteach year. In addition, lessons learned in Laosand in Vietnam caused the schoolhouse toinclude training in base-camp constructionand jungle warfare in the SFQC.

1970sThe end of the Vietnam War in the early

1970s reduced the requirement for SF sol-diers. The 3rd, 6th and 8th SF groups wereinactivated, and during the late 1970s, the7th SF Group was also on the choppingblock. But a newly developed programcalled Special Proficiency at Rugged Train-ing and Nation-Building, or SPARTAN,provided SF with a new mission. SPAR-TAN was designed to assist Native Ameri-cans in Florida, Arizona and Montana withall types of civic actions.

With the deactivation of three SF groups,the SF schoolhouse, which was now calledthe U.S. Army Institute for Military Assist-ance, or USAIMA, began concentrating on SFsustainment training. USAIMA reduced itsSFQC student output by decreasing thenumber of SFQC cycles and the number ofstudents per cycle. In spite of those changes,the SFQC remained consistent except for onechange: the culminating UW exercise Chero-kee Trail was renamed Gobblers Woods.

1980sThe 1980s saw successful SF operations

in Panama (Operation Just Cause) and inEl Salvador, as well as a resurgence ofworldwide SF deployments. The SF school-

house (renamed the JFK Special WarfareCenter, or SWC, in 1983 and then the JFKSpecial Warfare Center and School, orSWCS, in 1986) responded to the increaseddemand for SF soldiers by teaching sixcycles of the SFQC per year. Still consistingof three phases, the SFQC was extended to19 weeks: SF common skills (three weeks),MOS training (13 weeks), and SF collectivetraining (three weeks). The culminatingUW exercise, Gobblers Woods, wasrenamed Robin Sage.

Initially, because the training cycles forthe various SF MOSs were not synchro-nized, the student teams that were organ-ized for Robin Sage seldom included soldiersfrom all five SF MOSs; e.g., some teams con-sisted of all officers, all 18Bs, or combina-tions such as 18Cs and officers. Optimumtraining requires a fully manned, fully func-tioning SF team that contains all five SFMOSs. The SWC’s newly established SpecialForces Department required that its MOScommittees establish 13-week trainingcycles and that all MOS training cycles havecommon beginning and ending dates. Thatchange in training strategy made it possiblefor teams in Robin Sage to represent all fiveSF MOSs so that candidates could becomefamiliar with all the aspects of a fully func-tioning SF team.

SFASIn June 1988, SWCS began conducting

the three-week Special Forces Assessmentand Selection, or SFAS, prior to the SFQC.Patterned after the assessment program ofthe OSS, and developed with the assist-ance of the Army Research Institute, SFASscreens applicants to ensure that soldierswho are selected for SFQC training possessthe personality traits that will enable themto meet the challenges and the missionrequirements that SF demands.

Other training modifications during the1980s included altering the SFQC train-ing-phase sequence from 1-2-3 to 2-1-3.Following SFAS, SF candidates attendedthe MOS-training phase at Fort Bragg. Theindividual-training and collective-trainingphases were combined to give students sixweeks of continuous training at nearby

4 Special Warfare

Camp Mackall, N.C. But the 2-1-3sequence led to a higher student attritionrate during Phase 1, and SWCS returnedto the 1-2-3 training sequence.

1990sThe 1990s brought an even greater

increase in SF operations. Because oflessons learned from operations duringDesert Shield/Desert Storm, and fromoperations in Haiti and Somalia, the SFQCadded training that SF soldiers would needin order to meet cultural and geographicchallenges of operations in the MiddleEast, eastern Africa, Central America andthe Caribbean. The SFQC also added train-ing in surveillance techniques and in hide-site construction, with the intention ofshifting the focus from UW to direct actionand special reconnaissance.

The Robin Sage UW exercise remainedunchanged, but not without a fight. With thedemise of the Soviet Union, the Army hierar-chy believed that UW was an antiquated skill.Had it not been for the forcible objections ofretired Lieutenant General William Yarbor-ough, Major General Sidney Shachnow andseveral retired SF command sergeants major,the exercise might have been cut from the cur-riculum, and UW reduced to a four-hour blockof platform instruction.

2000sThus far in the decade of the 2000s, SF

training has been influenced by the globalwar on terrorism and by SF operations inAfghanistan and in Iraq. SWCS has imple-mented changes to the SFQC that place addi-tional emphasis on training in close air sup-port, in marksmanship, in adaptive leader-ship, in leadership reaction, in long-rangeteam movement and in urban warfare. Inter-estingly enough, recent SF experiences withindigenous forces in Afghanistan and in Iraqhave validated the UW tactics and tech-niques that have been taught in CherokeeTrail, in Gobblers Woods and in Robin Sagesince the 1950s. Soldiers of the 3rd, 5th and7th SF groups have stressed the relevance oftheir UW training during Robin Sage to thesituations they encountered in dealing withvarious tribal chiefs and cliques.

Since 1952, SF has performed demandingmissions that call for dedicated professionalsoldiers. As the world, technology and the SFoperational environment have changed, SFtraining has changed with them. But therequirement for highly-trained professionalshas never changed, and SF’s training stand-ards have remained high. Recent and ongo-ing changes to the SFQC are not deviationsfrom the traditions of SF — they are contin-uations of the SF tradition of adapting train-ing to operations. Today, as in the past, SFtraining, SF training standards and SF sol-diers themselves remain without equal.

Command Sergeant MajorJoseph Lupyak, U.S. Army(ret.) is a branch chief in theTraining Development Divi-sion, Directorate of Trainingand Doctrine, JFK SpecialWarfare Center and School.After enlisting in the Army in February1951, he was assigned to the 11th AirborneDivision and completed jump school inMay 1951. In October 1951 he was assignedto the 15th Infantry Regiment, 3rd InfantryDivision, in Korea. During 13 months inKorea, he participated in numerous opera-tions of the Korean War. His Special Forcesexperience began in February 1954, whenhe joined the 77th SF Group at Fort Bragg.He served in Detachment A-Berlin duringthe early 1960s; served in the 7th and 3rdSF Groups; participated in the Son TayRaid in 1970; and served in Vietnam withthe 5th SF Group. He was selected as thecommand sergeant major of the 5th SFGroup in 1976 and served in that positionuntil his retirement in 1980. In 1983, hewas one of the first civilian instructorshired to teach in the Special Forces School.He later became the assistant operationsofficer/training officer for the JFK SpecialWarfare Center and School’s 1st Battalion,1st Special Warfare Training Group. Mr.Lupyak is a former president of SpecialForces Association Chapter 62, of the Spe-cial Forces Museum Association, and of theSon Tay Raid Association. He is a memberof the executive board of the Special ForcesMuseum Association.

August 2003 5

United States Army Special Forcesrequires soldiers who will be able toperform their missions in unique

environments. In order to ensure the mis-sion success of SF soldiers and to maximizethe effectiveness of SF training, SF uses itstraining pipeline as a means not only oftraining but also of selecting soldiers forSF. The process, especially in the trainingof SF officers, can be seen as an example ofnatural selection.

Natural selection has been defined as aprocess that promotes the survival ofspecies that are able to adapt to changes intheir environment. While it is normallydiscussed in scientific circles, naturalselection has its place in the military envi-ronment, as well. A good example of natur-al selection in the military environment isthe evolution of the M-16 rifle.

During the early 1960s, the U.S. militarywas looking for a rifle or carbine that couldbe used in fighting communist forcesarmed with AK-47s in the jungles of South-east Asia. The U.S. had the 7.62 mm M-14rifle and the .30-caliber M-1 carbine in itsinventory, but no matter what modifica-tions were made to either weapon, neithermet the demands of the environment.What was needed was a carbine or a short-barreled rifle that would fire an intermedi-ate-weight cartridge and was capable offull automatic fire.

The M-14 performed well, but it was con-sidered to be too heavy for soldiers to carry

in the humid jungles of Southeast Asia.Because of the size and weight of the M-14’scartridge, soldiers could not carry more than100 rounds on patrols, which severely limit-ed the rifle’s capability as an assaultweapon. The M-1 carbine was lighter inweight than the M-14 and used a smallercartridge, but the carbine’s cartridge wasconsidered to be severely underpowered.

The U.S. eventually chose the 5.56 mmAR-15 rifle, the forerunner of the M-16, notbecause it was a superior weapon, butbecause it had greater capability for modifi-cation — it was capable of adapting. The M-16 weapon system is still in use todaybecause it has been able to continuallyimprove in order to meet the demands of thechanging global environment. The latestdesign is the M-4 SOPMOD, which featuresa rail system that allows attachments —including flashlights, sights, lasers andgrips — to be placed on the weapon, adapt-ing it to a particular environment.

This example illustrates the importanceof adaptability to the survival of a weaponsystem. Like the M-16, officers attemptingto become SF team leaders go through aselection process. SF is looking for officerswho have or will be able to build their ownrail system. Officers who embody rail-sys-tem adaptability are capable of adjustingto the demands of almost any environ-ment. The training for that type of officer isa progression of learning that allows himto acquire knowledge and skills that can be

6 Special Warfare

Special Forces: Selecting and Training Officers for Adaptability

by Captain Will Cotty, Jat Thompson and Dr. Michael G. Sanders

attached to his rail system. This article willlook at the process by which the JFK Spe-cial Warfare Center and School, or SWCS,selects and trains adaptive officers. Specif-ically, the article will describe the coreattributes that SF officers (18A) must pos-sess if they are to be capable of adapting tochanges in the SF environment.

As an officer progresses through the SFtraining process, his ability and his deter-mination for acquiring the knowledge andskills he will need to be an effective 18Awill determine his future in SF. During theprocess, some soldiers will recognize thatthe SF environment is not a good match fortheir skills and interests. In otherinstances, SWCS will make that determi-nation, even if the soldier does not. Ineither case, an officer who leaves the SFtraining process early departs a better sol-dier because of the experiences and train-ing that he received while he was in the SFtraining pipeline. SWCS recognizes thatmany of the soldiers who leave the pipelineearly are capable and talented officerswhose skills are not a good match for 18A.

Required attributesAn officer who assumes command of an

SF A-detachment will face many chal-lenges that are unique to SF. The 18A job is

complex, and it requires an adaptable sol-dier who can perform effectively in a num-ber of roles and missions. SF is clear aboutthe type of officer required to fill the job,and it has established nine attributes1 thatan officer must possess in order to be suc-cessful as an 18A:• Thrive in complex and ambiguous situations.• Possess the cognitive resilience and

mental dexterity needed for actingautonomously while under great stress.

• Be mentally flexible and willing toexperiment and to innovate in a decen-tralized and unstructured environment.

• Be a self-reliant team player who canfunction as a leader in a tightly knitsmall group.

• Possess good interpersonal skills anddisplay political acumen and culturalsensitivity.

• Be extremely physically fit.• Possess unquestioned integrity.• Be able to inspire others to perform

effectively under stress.• Be a war fighter.

The following discussion will describethe attributes in detail and examine thetype of training in the SF training pipelinethat produces SF officers who are ready toassume command of an SF team.

• The 18A must thrive in complex and

August 2003 7

Table 1The Nine Attributes of an SF Officer

(as listed in DA PAM 600-3)

• Thrive in complex and ambiguous situations.• Possess the cognitive resilience and mental dexterity needed for acting

autonomously while under great stress.• Be mentally flexible and willing to experiment and to innovate in a decentral-

ized and unstructured environment.• Be a self-reliant team player who can function as a leader in a tightly knit small

group.• Possess good interpersonal skills and display political acumen and cultural

sensitivity.• Be extremely physically fit.• Possess unquestioned integrity.• Be able to inspire others to perform effectively under stress.• Be a war fighter.

ambiguous situations. The breadth of theSF officer’s job is extreme. Effective per-formers in that job “are those who antici-pate future needs and adapt to changingjob requirements by learning new tasks,technologies, procedures, and roles.”2 TheSpecial Forces Qualification Course, orSFQC, is designed to expose candidates tothe types of missions they may face as SFteam leaders.

Each of the SF missions has differentdemands. As candidates are exposed to themissions, they must be able to acquire newskills and to learn the nuances of each mis-sion so that they can become effective per-formers in unconventional environments.By exposing candidates to the differentmission tasks, SF trainers are able toassess the candidates and provide feed-back on the appropriateness of candidates’actions relative to the tasks.

Using that feedback, candidates canbuild a larger body of knowledge that willhelp them to make better decisions in thefuture. The SF training pipeline assesses acandidate’s ability to learn SF tactics andprocedures and to demonstrate that he canunderstand and effectively execute SF fun-damental tasks. The ability to learn is

essential for every 18A because it will becritically important for them to learn thesituational demands of each mission and tothrive in environments that are complexand changing.

• An 18A must possess the cognitiveresilience and mental dexterity for actingautonomously while under great stress. The18A has an unpredictable job, and he mustbe able to adjust to mission changes,changes in resources and shifting priori-ties. The effective SF officer will be able toshift his focus when necessary and to con-tinue to take reasonable actions despitethe uncertainty of the situation.3

Many of the training exercises withinthe SF training pipeline create situationsin which there are changes in resources, inthe mission or in mission priorities. Thosechanges force the 18A candidate to developnew courses of action based on evolvingrealities. The training assesses whetherofficers can create structure in a situationin which there is no structure or in whichthe existing structure has fallen apart.

• An 18A must be mentally flexible andwilling to experiment and to innovate in adecentralized and unstructured environ-ment. The effective SF officer must be able

8 Special Warfare

Because SF team leaderswill consistently interactwith their team mem-bers, with host-nationpersonnel and with otherkey personnel, there is acritical requirement for18As to be situationallyaware and interpersonal-ly adaptable.

Photo courtesy Will Cotty

to solve the ill-defined and complex prob-lems that are often associated with his joband, in so doing, to develop creative andnovel solutions that will produce thedesired end state.4 The adaptability train-ing that 18A candidates receive addressesthis attribute. The officers are taught tolook at circumstances and facts differentlyand to consider alternative solutions toproblems.

There are numerous exercises through-out SF training that provide unstructuredsituations that encourage the 18A candi-date to experiment and to develop innova-tive solutions. During the military-occupa-tional-specialty phase of SF training, theofficer candidates are encouraged to per-form informal after-action reviews and todiscuss the different ways that they chosefor solving the same problems. The candi-dates are encouraged to learn from theirpeers and to develop alternative strategiesfor dealing with atypical problems.

• An 18A must be a self-reliant teamplayer who can function as a leader in atightly knit small group. This attribute“includes such things as demonstratinginterpersonal flexibility; adjusting inter-personal style to achieve a goal; adaptinginterpersonal behavior to work effectivelywith a new team.”5 To “new team,” we couldadd host-nation personnel, or representa-tives from another agency. Many of the SFtraining tasks and exercises require candi-dates to function in small groups so thatthey can develop and demonstrate inter-personal adaptability. The 18A candidateswho demonstrate that they can adapt theirinterpersonal behavior to the situationhave a much higher chance of success asSF team leaders than those who don’t.

This attribute involves a strong compo-nent of situational awareness, because the18A must identify the role appropriate forhim to play in different situations and thenbe adaptable enough to perform that role.The issue of social intelligence has latelyreceived a great deal of attention and dis-cussion. Because SF team leaders will con-sistently interact with their team mem-bers, with host-nation personnel and withother key personnel, there is a criticalrequirement for 18As to be situationally

aware and interpersonally adaptable. Vari-ous exercises throughout SF training pro-vide opportunities for candidates to inter-act with others. The candidates laterreceive feedback on their interactions anddevelopmental guidance to help themmake any necessary improvements.

• An 18A must possess good interperson-al skills and display political acumen andcultural sensitivity. Mission success willoften depend on SF soldiers’ ability toestablish rapport and influence the atti-tudes and behaviors of people from a for-eign culture. Recent feedback fromAfghanistan indicates the importance ofcultural adaptability in SF missions. Cul-tural adaptability continues to be an attri-bute that distinguishes SF from manyother components of the Army. An SFteam’s cultural adaptability often deter-mines the success of the team’s mission.

Cultural adaptability includes learningsuch things as language (including theacronyms, slang and jargon that areunique to the culture); goals and values(formal rules and principles, as well asunwritten, informal goals and values thatgovern behavior); history (traditions, cus-toms, myths and rituals that convey cul-tural knowledge); and politics (formal andinformal relationships and power struc-tures within the culture).6 But to fully inte-grate into a culture, the SF team must bewilling to behave in accordance with theacceptable customs of that culture.7 Situa-tional awareness and social intelligencehave a great effect on cultural integration,because one must first recognize the needto behave in a certain manner and then beadaptable enough to act appropriately.

A culturally adaptable SF team leaderwill significantly enhance the probabilityof his team’s success, because he often setsthe tone for the team. Several exercisesduring the training of SF officers exposethe candidates to the challenges of estab-lishing working relationships with andinfluencing people in other cultures. TheRobin Sage exercise has a strong impact onstudents because they are often shocked bythe cultural dilemmas that it presents.

• An 18A must be extremely physically fit.SF officers must maintain a high enough

August 2003 9

state of physical fitness to inspire their sol-diers, no matter how difficult the physicalenvironment, how high the level of exhaus-tion or how desperate the tactical situation,in peace or in war. During SF missions,“quickly adapting to the varied and challeng-ing physical conditions as one moves fromcountry to country and climate to climate is akey aspect of effective performance.”8

SF officers must be able to adapt tomany different physical factors, and SWCSplaces a great deal of emphasis on physicalfitness during SFAS and throughout theSFQC, in terms of requiring candidates toperform physically demanding tasks andexercises. Various exercises throughoutSFQC are designed to replicate real-worldmissions that require good mental andphysical stamina.

• An 18A must possess unquestionedintegrity. Throughout SF training, candi-dates are faced with dilemmas and exercis-es in which they must demonstrate astrong moral compass. All candidates’behavior is evaluated along that dimen-sion, and candidates receive clear guidanceconcerning the expectation of integrity forSF soldiers. Candidates who demonstratebehavior that is inconsistent with therequirement for integrity are eliminatedfrom SF training.

• An 18A must be able to inspire others toperform effectively under stress. A key fea-

ture of the 18A training is the emphasis onself-awareness and individual develop-ment — two important components ofeffective leadership in the unconventionalenvironment. All officers are given teststhat address personality dimensions relat-ed to successful performance, both in SFtraining and in the field. The officersreceive feedback on the test results. Thefeedback gives them a greater understand-ing of their strengths, possible vulnerabili-ties and preferred operating style.

Subsequent to the tests and the feed-back, 18A candidates rotate through lead-ership positions during exercises in SFASand SFQC, allowing the cadre to closelyobserve and rate each officer in terms ofthe appropriateness of his actions. Afterthe exercises, each officer’s performance iscritiqued and a summary given him for hispersonal development.

Throughout the process, cadre work withthe candidates to ensure that each candidateunderstands what he needs to do to improvehis performance in areas that are critical forsuccess in SF operations.The intent is to giveeach officer feedback on his preferred operat-ing style (this feedback is provided by profes-sional psychologists) and on exercise-basedperformance (provided by cadre members)and to help him develop a plan that will facil-itate his growth and movement toward suc-cessful performance as an 18A.

10 Special Warfare

Mission success willoften depend on SF offi-cers’ ability to establishrapport with and influ-ence the attitudes andbehaviors of people froma foreign culture.

Photo courtesy Will Cotty

• An 18A must be a war fighter. Thisattribute is a reflection, in part, of all of theissues addressed in this article. Many ofthe exercises conducted during SF trainingare designed to be intensely real simula-tions of what candidates will do in combatsituations. SF believes in the adage, “Youfight as you train.” Tough, realistic trainingprepares the future 18A to be an effectivewar fighter. Realistic training gives thecandidate a preview of what his life will belike as an 18A. Candidates who realizethat their skills are not well-suited to thedemands that are placed on an 18A havethe opportunity to drop out of training andreturn to a part of the Army that will pro-vide a better match for their skills andabilities.

ConclusionThe type of warfare being conducted in

Afghanistan and Iraq illustrates the needfor SF leaders who must adapt if they areto succeed. Based on lessons learned fromAfghanistan and Iraq, SWCS is ensuringthat SF soldiers will be prepared to meetthe demands of future engagements. Justas the rail system of the M-4 allows it toadapt to various environments, the SFQCgives SF officers their own rail system thatwill allow them to adapt to the variousenvironments that they may face in the21st century.

There are many changes underway inthe SF training pipeline — so many thatthey could not all be addressed in this arti-cle. Future articles will describe more fullythe critical components that are being con-figured at SWCS to produce adaptable SFsoldiers, leaders and teams.

Captain Will Cotty is commander of theJFK Special Warfare Center and School’sCompany G, 1st Battalion, 1st Special War-fare Training Group. His previous assign-ments include small-group instructor, Com-pany A, 4th Battalion, 1st Special WarfareTraining Group; A-detachment command-er, 7th SF Group; and executive officer, rifle-platoon leader and anti-armor platoonleader, 1st Battalion, 325th Parachute

Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Divi-sion. He received his bachelor’s degree fromThe Citadel in 1994.

Jat Thompson is a Consortium of Uni-versities research fellow with the ArmyResearch Institute at Fort Bragg. A gradu-ate student in the industrial/organization-al psychology Ph.D. program at North Car-olina State University, he has recently com-pleted his master’s thesis.

Dr. Michael G. Sanders has served aschief of the Fort Bragg office of the ArmyResearch Institute since July 1994. He andother ARI psychologists provide researchsupport to the SOF community on topicsthat address the life cycle of the soldier,including recruiting, assessment and selec-tion, training and retention. He began serv-ice in the Army at Fort Rucker, Ala., as anactive-duty aviation psychologist at theArmy Aeromedical Research Laboratory. Atthe Fort Rucker ARI Field Unit, Dr.Sanders continued his research on aviatorselection, screening, training, performanceassessment and retention. He holds a mas-ter’s and a Ph.D. in experimental psycholo-gy, with an emphasis on human factors.

Notes:1 U.S. Army, DA Pamphlet 600-3, Officer Profession-

al Development (1 October 1998), Paragraph 15.2.D.2 Elaine D. Pulakos, Sharon Arad, Michelle A. Dono-

van and Kevin E. Plamondon, Adaptability in theWorkplace: Development of a Taxonomy of AdaptivePerformance (Alexandria, Va.: Army Research Insti-tute, 2000).

3 Pulakos et al.4 Pulakos et al.5 Pulakos et al.6 Pulakos et al.7 Georgia T. Chao, Anne M. O’Leary-Kelly, Samantha

Wolf, Howard J. Klein and Philip D. Gardner, “Orga-nizational Socialization: Its Content and Conse-quences” in Journal of Applied Psychology, 79 (1994),730-43.

8 Pulakos et al.

August 2003 11

At 3 a.m., drill sergeants and cadrefrom a battalion of the 1st SpecialWarfare Training Group storm

through the barracks, banging on doors towake sleeping students. Within minutes, thestudents are standing in formation as drillsergeants bellow orders for the comingevents. In less than 30 minutes, the students

are inspecting their gear and loading theirrucksacks and other field equipment ontotrucks waiting to take them to the airfield.

At the airfield, students review jumpmas-ter procedures, receive pre-jump instructionsand rehearse aircraft-loading and -unloadingprocedures before boarding the plane fromwhich many of them will jump or airland

12 Special Warfare

A Unique Organization: The 3rd Battalion,1st Special Warfare Training Group

by Lieutenant Colonel Curtis D. Boyd

Students from the 3rdBattalion, 1st SpecialWarfare Training Group,board a plane prior tojumping in to begin theirportion of the Robin Sagefield-training exercise.

File photo

into their first tactical field operation. Thestudents are infiltrating into the fictionalcountry of Pineland to play roles in theRobin Sage field-training exercise, the culmi-nating exercise of the Special Forces Qualifi-cation Course, or SFQC. But these studentsare not Special Forces candidates — they aretraining to serve in active- and reserve-com-ponent Civil Affairs and Psychological Oper-ations units.

During Robin Sage, the students will sup-port the unconventional-warfare operationsof the SF A-detachments and provide tacticalsupport to a conventional maneuver brigadeby leveraging resources and by planning,coordinating and developing products andprograms. The Pineland scenarios will allowthe students to exercise their capabilities atthe tactical, operational and strategic levels.The exercise conditions, as intense andambiguous as those the students willencounter in an operational CA or PSYOPunit, ensure that students will be prepared tomake relevant contributions to CA andPSYOP mission success regardless of theoperational challenge. Providing this realis-tic training is the job of the JFK Special War-fare Center and School’s 3rd Battalion, 1stSpecial Warfare Training Group.

The mission of the 3rd Battalion is to trainand educate initial-entry enlisted soldiersand officers in CA and in PSYOP; to conductregional-studies courses that will increasestudents’ cultural awareness of the regions towhich they may be assigned; and to conduct

language training for Army special-opera-tions forces and for other personnel in theDepartment of Defense. The 3rd Battalionconducts initial-entry training, or IET, andreclassification training in CA and PSYOPfor junior enlisted personnel in the activecomponent, or AC, and the reserve compo-nent, or RC. It also conducts CA and PSYOPtraining for AC and RC officers.

OrganizationThe 3rd Battalion comprises cadre and

staff members that represent the AC and theRC CA, PSYOP and SF groups and com-mands. Nearly one-third of the battalion’scadre are RC soldiers serving on full-timeactive duty as Active Guard and Reserve, orAGR. The officer and enlisted AGR soldiersbring a high level of maturity and a wealth ofAC and RC experience to the 3rd Battalion’straining. Four of the battalion’s eight drill-sergeant positions are filled by AGR NCOs,who are the Army’s only full-time RC drillsergeants. The remaining drill-sergeantNCOs are active-duty soldiers who haveserved in the 4th PSYOP Group. Women areequally represented — four of the eight drillsergeants are females.

Because 80 percent of the 3rd Battalion’sstudent population is destined for servicein the U.S. Army Reserve, or USAR, thecadre is appropriately tailored to meet thetraining demands of the AC and RC groupsand commands. The 3rd Battalion’s cadre

August 2003 13

3rd Battalion

Company C(Foreign Language

Training)

Company B(CAQC, POOC,

RSC, AIT)

Company D(AIT)

3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group

also contains civilian administrative spe-cialists and civilian instructors who over-see the battalion’s language programs,negotiations training and the RegionalStudies Course. The civilian instructorsare highly educated professionals whohave extensive academic and practicalknowledge of their subject matter.

Enlisted trainingThe 3rd Battalion’s Company D and

Company B share the responsibility forconducting the 12-week advanced individ-ual training, or AIT, for CA enlisted spe-cialists (MOS 38A) and PSYOP enlistedspecialists (MOS 37F). The AIT completesthe soldierization process by refining basicsoldier skills, introducing SOF skills andinculcating the seven Army values. The 3rdBattalion is the only Army IET unit notlocated on an Army Training and DoctrineCommand installation that conducts MOStraining and certification. The AIT coursestrain CA and PSYOP specialists prior totheir first assignment to an active orreserve unit to give them the skills thatthey will need to be immediately deploy-able for operational missions.

Active-component soldiers in MOS 37Fmust attend AIT, basic airborne training andlanguage training prior to receiving an oper-

ational assignment. Except for a small num-ber of 37F specialists who are assigned to air-borne RC PSYOP companies, soldiers in theRC MOS 37F attend only AIT prior to theirassignment to one of the two PSYOP groupsin the USAR. Because there is no active-com-ponent enlisted CA MOS,1 all enlisted CAspecialists are members of the USAR; theyare required to attend only AIT prior to theirassignment to one of the seven USAR CAcommands.

AIT for both CA and PSYOP has threecomponents: basic combat skills, MOS train-ing and a situational-training exercise/com-mand-post exercise/field-training exercise, orSTX/CPX/FTX. The first component, fourweeks long, consists of training and testing incommon tasks, land navigation (dismountedand mounted), patrolling, communications,night-vision devices, marksmanship, field-craft and driver’s training (day and night).The second component, MOS training, lastssix weeks. The third component, the two-week STX/CPX/FTX, tests soldiers’ individ-ual MOS proficiency and collective team-taskproficiency in a crawl/walk/run sequence.Imposing an operational timeline andemphasizing the troop-leading proceduresthat are necessary in preparing for a combatdeployment, the exercise scenario replicatesoperations in both hostile and semi-permis-sive environments. It is during the third com-

14 Special Warfare

CA and PSYOP Enlisted Specialist AIT

MOS 38A TrainingCommand Post/

Field Training Exercise

MOS 37F Training

Basic Combat Skills4 Weeks

Basic MOS Training6 Weeks

CPX/FTX2 Weeks

CAEnlisted Specialist

PSYOPEnlisted Specialist

Common Tasks, Land Naviga- tion, Patrolling, Driver’s Training, Combatives, Marksmanship

Common Tasks, Land Naviga- tion, Patrolling, Driver’s Training, Combatives, Marksmanship

Command Post/ Field Training

Exercise

ponent that students take part in the RobinSage exercise.

To meet the operational needs of the force,the 3rd Battalion also emphasizes trainingstudents to the SOF certification standards ofthe U.S. Army Civil Affairs and PsychologicalOperations Command, or USACAPOC. Sol-diers must complete combat water-survivaltraining; they must achieve 70 points or betteron each event in the Army Physical FitnessTest; they must complete a 10-kilometermarch within two hours while carrying a 55-pound rucksack; and they must complete theirannual common-task testing. The battalion’sintent is to provide the operational groups andcommands with soldiers who will be immedi-ately capable of contributing to the success ofoperations at the tactical-team and detach-ment levels.

Officer trainingInitial training and education in CA and

PSYOP for branch-qualified captains andmajors is conducted by the 3rd Battalion’sCompany B, which also conducts the 15-week Regional Studies Course.2 During theCA and PSYOP training for active-compo-nent officers, students must completeeither the four-week CA QualificationCourse, or CAQC,3 or the four-week, three-day Psychological Operations Officer

Course, or POOC; the Regional StudiesCourse; and either a four- or six-month lan-guage program, depending upon the levelof difficulty of the language they will study.These training requirements must be com-pleted before AC officers can proceed totheir operational assignments.

USAR CA and PSYOP officers have theoption of attending the same CAQC andPOOC as the AC officers or completing adistance-learning Phase I and a residentPhase II. Phase I is available as a “box ofbooks” for PSYOP officers and as a CD-ROMfor CA officers. Once RC officers completePhase I, they are eligible to enroll in the res-ident Phase II: either the 21-day RC POOCfor PSYOP officers or the 14-day Phase IICAQC. The Phase II CAQC aligns with theAC CAQC four times each year, allowing ACand RC students to have identical trainingfor the final 14 days of the course.

CAQC includes a comprehensive mid-course examination, training in hand-to-hand combat and self-defense (now knownas linear infighting neural-overrideengagement, or LINES), marksmanshiptraining with the 9 mm pistol, and trainingin negotiations and in the military deci-sion-making process. CAQC and Phase IICAQC culminate with the students’deployment as part of the Robin Sage field-training exercise, during which the stu-

August 2003 15

CA and PSYOP Officer Training

CAQCLINES, Marksmanship,Negotiating, MDMP, FTX

Regional Studies CourseForeign

LanguageTraining

POOCCPX Regional Studies Course

ForeignLanguageTraining

1 Month 15 Weeks 4 or 6Months

Active ComponentCA Officer

Active ComponentPSYOP Officer

NOTES

1. Reserve component officers may optionally attend the same CAQC/POOC or complete a distance learning Phase I and a resident Phase II.

2. The CAQC resident Phase II is 14 days long, the POOC resident Phase II is 21 days long.

dents provide CA mission support to fic-tional conventional and special-operationstask forces.

During the exercise, the officer studentsmust conduct basic troop-leading proce-dures and prepare for combat tasks thatare similar to those performed by the AITstudents as they prepare for deployment toPineland. Once the CA officer studentsreceive the operations orders for the divi-sion and for the joint task force, they beginpreparing their brigade-level courses ofaction, their commander’s estimate, theirCA annex and their support plan.4

Over the next 72 hours, the CA studentswill work around the clock to prepare andissue their civil-military operations estimateand mission analysis; to provide a capabili-ties brief, an area studies brief and a course-of-action brief; and to deploy via fixed-wingairborne or airland infiltration to begin theirCA mission activities. During the next four tofive days, they will be required to plan andexecute five of the six CA mission activities,5to conduct a negotiation; to work with aninterpreter and to conduct an interview withthe local media. At the end of the exercise,the CA students will receive a fragmentary

order to prepare for the transition to a follow-on force or other designated authority.

Language trainingThe 3rd Battalion is also responsible for

the ARSOF language program, which is con-ducted by the battalion’s Company C. Thelanguage program includes instruction in 20foreign languages.6 During OperationEnduring Freedom, in order to adjust to theoperational needs of the force, SWCS alsoadded Persian Farsi, Pushtu and Dari to themenu of languages available for instruction.Because the demands of operations inAfghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere brought anincrease in the number of SFQC candidatesin training, the language school’s populationdoubled. But despite the increase in thequantity of students, the 3rd Battalionallowed no decrease in the quality of lan-guage instruction, and students continued tomeet the 0+/0+ standard on their DefenseLanguage Proficiency Test, or DLPT. In fact,on average, students scored (and continue toscore) 1/1 or better on the DLPT.

To give students greater motivation for learn-ing language and to provide operational rele-

16 Special Warfare

Training for enlisted sol-diers in Civil Affairs andin Psychological Opera-tions now includes dri-ver’s training, patrollingand land navigation.

File photo

vance for language training, Company C hasadded situational training exercises to make thelanguage training more hands-on. Each classcapitalizes on the unique skills of its ARSOF stu-dents by applying their talents to a mobile-train-ing-team scenario during which the class uses itsnewly acquired language skills to simulateteaching military tasks to the military or securi-ty forces of a target country. From the SF med-ical NCO who teaches administering an IV tothe PSYOP specialist who teaches how to oper-ate a tactical loudspeaker, the students put theirlanguage skills to the test.This practical trainingnot only instills confidence among the membersof the class, it makes clear that the time spent inthe classroom is valuable and that languageskills are applicable to operational missions.

Training tempoThe tempo of 3rd Battalion continues

nonstop. Each year, the battalion conducts16 iterations of AIT, four iterations of thePOOC, two iterations of the RC POOC,seven iterations of CAQC, two iterations ofthe RSC and 80-90 language classes. Thebattalion also sends a number of mobiletraining teams and subject-matter-expertguest lecturers to various locations.7

During fiscal year 2002, the demands ofOperation Enduring Freedom placed addition-al demands on U.S. forces, and USACAPOCrequired a 20-percent increase in the duty-MOS qualification of its PSYOP and CA sol-diers to ensure that soldiers would be availableto meet force-manning requirements. The 3rdBattalion responded by training 849 officersand 629 enlisted soldiers for duties in opera-tional PSYOP groups and CA commands, and2,038 students graduated from 3rd Battalioncourses overall. During FY 2003, the battaliontrained nearly 1,700 students, and the projec-tion for FY 2004 is approximately 2,500.

RegimentalizationAlthough the number of students in the

3rd Battalion continues to increase, thebattalion has maintained its enthusiasmfor instilling the Army values in its SF, CAand PSYOP students and for imbuingthem with a strong sense of professional-ism, tradition, career-mindedness, andpride in themselves and in their units. To

achieve that end, the 3rd Battalion hasdeveloped the process of regimentalization,which provides a means for soldiers tobecome assimilated into their respectiveregiments. For AIT students, regimental-ization consists of four initiatives designedto inculcate a sense of unit, esprit, pride,history and lineage: the “living-heroes” pro-gram, regimental excursions, the rite-of-passage ceremony, and the graduation.

The living-heroes program provides spe-cial recognition to a CA or PSYOP soldieror veteran who has made a significant con-tribution to the career field (representativeof the seven Army values) and whoseaccomplishments serve as an inspiration.Each class names its regimental excursionafter the class living hero and invites itshero to serve as a guest speaker during theclass rite-of-passage ceremony.

The regimental excursion is a trip to anarea of historical significance to bothstrengthen soldiers’ connection to the his-tory of the defense of our nation and recog-nize the class’s living hero. Regimentalexcursions have included trips to the USSNorth Carolina in Wilmington, N.C.; to theVeterans Administration Hospital inFayetteville, N.C.; to the Civil War battle-field at Bentonville, N.C.; to Lewisburg,W.Va.; and to the White House and Arling-ton National Cemetery in Washington,D.C. The regimental excursions are memo-rable experiences that help the studentsdevelop a strong sense of brotherhood.

The rite-of-passage ceremony is the culmina-tion of the field-training-exercise component ofAIT. Upon redeployment from the FTX, AITstudents receive orders to reload the trucks,with their rucksacks, and return to Pope AirForce Base. At Pope, they are ordered to dis-mount and begin a road march to an undis-closed location. The students are, in fact, enroute to the rite-of-passage ceremony. Duringthe ceremony, the drill instructors and cadrerecognize the AIT soldiers for their competen-cies, honor their units, issue regimental crestsand enter the soldiers in the rolls of their regi-ment. Following a dinner, the soldiers listen towords of advice and congratulations from theirclass hero, followed by a ceremonial recognitionof their accomplishments in training and areading of their regimental history. Afterward,

August 2003 17

the senior instructor, first sergeant and drillsergeants recognize the class members for theirachievement of the course standards andauthorize their names to be read and entered inthe official roll of the CA or PSYOP regiment.Once all the names have been entered on therolls, the guests and spectators extend theircongratulations. The CA and PSYOP officerstudents have recently begun conducting simi-lar rite-of-passage ceremonies in conjunctionwith evening graduations.

The battalion holds its AIT graduationceremonies at Fayetteville’s Airborne andSpecial Operations Museum. The museumprovides a place in which students’ familiesand friends can more easily share the sig-nificant event, and the historical associa-tions help to instill in the graduates a senseof honor and pride in their achievements.

From initial-entry soldierization and train-ing to regimentalization and standardiza-tion, the 3rd Battalion’s objective is to ensureoperational readiness and relevance withinthe student population and to create a com-mon thread within the PSYOP and CA com-munities. That common thread sets condi-tions prior to instruction; indoctrinates sol-diers during instruction; and reinforces andsets conditions for fraternity, camaraderieand professionalism following instruction.

The battalion’s regimentalization processhas four goals: (1) to develop and enrich ourcommunity with a true sense of history, patri-otism and brotherhood; (2) to create a posi-tive training experience that will ensurecompetence and promote longevity in thecareer field and in the Army, and that willsustain confidence within the regimentalassociations; (3) to promote and increaserecruitment, membership and retention; and(4) to establish a sense of lineage, fraternity,commitment and pride in individual soldiers,in the unit and in the regiment.

As the demand for qualified and qualityCA, PSYOP and SF soldiers continues toincrease, the 3rd Battalion will remainrelentless in its efforts to train ARSOF oper-ators to be warriors who will be ready andrelevant to confront an asymmetric andambiguous threat on any battlefield. Evenwhen hostile, permissive and semi-permis-sive environments occupy the same battle-space, supported commanders can be

assured that these soldiers will competentlyand successfully execute their missions.

Lieutenant Colonel Curtis D.Boyd is commander of the JFKSpecial Warfare Center andSchool’s 3rd Battalion, 1st SpecialWarfare Training Group.Commis-sioned as an infantry officer in1984,he served tours with Infantryunits in Germany and at Fort Bragg, N.C. In 1995he began his operational tours in the 4th Psycholog-ical Operations Group,where he served as a detach-ment commander,group operations officer and bat-talion executive officer. He participated in Opera-tions Just Cause, Desert Shield, Desert Storm,Uphold Democracy, Joint Endeavor, EnduringFreedom and others. In addition to holding a bach-elor’s degree in interdisciplinary studies from Nor-wich University,Lieutenant Colonel Boyd is a 1992graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School’s specialoperations and low-intensity conflict curriculum,and he is a 1994 graduate of the Defense LanguageInstitute.

Notes:1 The active-component enlisted equivalent to the

USAR’s 38A are the 18-series NCOs who occupy positionsin the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion.

2 RSC is a 15-week course of instruction that is tailoredto provide ARSOF officers and NCOs with the ability toassess the significance of diplomatic, informational, mili-tary and economic factors in a regional and cultural con-text. Regions of study include Southwest Asia, SoutheastAsia, Latin America, Europe and Africa. RSC Class 01-03is the first to contain officers, NCOs and allied students.

3 Class 01-03 (conducted in January 2003) was the firstCAQC to combine RC and AC CA officers into a singletraining course.

4 Currently, the POOC conducts only a CPX at the end ofthe course. POOC training in the military decision-makingprocess culminates in the preparation of a briefing for anambassador. The POOC Class 02-03 (February 2003)replaced its Cortina scenario with a Pineland scenario.

5 The six CA mission activities are: foreign-nation sup-port; humanitarian assistance; population and resourcecontrol; military civic action; emergency services; and sup-port to civilian administration.

6 Language instruction begins at the conclusion of theSFQC’s Phase IV. Classes start in March, June, Septem-ber and November.

7 Class listing does not include mobilization courses andother courses that were conducted to meet operational-forcerequirements.There were 543 CA and PSYOP graduates ofmobilization courses during FY 2002. FY 2003 will be thelast year that the 3rd Battalion will conduct a CA OfficerAdvanced Course.

18 Special Warfare

Robert S. Moore joined the First Special ServiceForce at Fort William Henry Harrison, Mont., inJanuary 1943 as commander of the 2nd Battalion,2nd Regiment. At the time, he had been in theArmy for three years. After receiving his ROTCcommission upon his graduation from Wofford Col-lege, Spartanburg, S.C., he had seen duty as a pla-toon leader and company commander with the29th Infantry Regiment at Fort Benning, Ga.Immediately prior to joining the Force, he hadserved with the War Plans Division of the WarDepartment in Washington, D.C., where he hadbeen promoted to lieutenant colonel in August1942.

Serving overseas with the FSSF, Moore tookcommand of the 2nd Regiment during the battlefor Monte La Defensa on Dec. 6, 1943. He com-manded the regiment for the next year, distin-guishing himself by his lead-from-the-front style,tactical acumen and physical prowess. He led the2nd Regiment during the battles around Anzio,during the liberation of Rome and during the cam-paign in southern France. The highlight of thecampaign in southern France was the regiment’scapture of the chateau at Villeneuve-Loubet, anaction that opened the way for the Force to moveup the French coast.

When the FSSF disbanded in December 1944,Moore moved to command the 3rd Battalion,504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Air-borne Division. While assigned to the 82nd, hecommanded two battalions and served as the divi-sion G3. His subsequent career included assign-ments as the G4 of U.S. Army Alaska; G4 of theInfantry Center at Fort Benning; commander ofthe Military District of Seoul, South Korea; com-mander of the Special Operations Task Force, U.S.European Command; and chief of staff of the U.S.Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leaven-worth, Kan. He retired from the Army as a colonelin 1972 and took up residence in Henderson, N.C.

In August 2001, while serving as president ofthe First Special Service Force Association,

Colonel Moore returned to southern France to rep-resent the unit at celebrations commemoratingthe FSSF’s liberation of various French townsfrom German occupation. His legendary staminawas still evident as he actively took part in thewhirlwind activity of memorials and parades, inthe midst of which he found time to conduct a bat-tlefield tour for the Special Forces soldiers whoformed the honor guard for the U.S. contingent.

Robert S. Moore was a true Southern gentleman,and with his passing in June 2003, he left a legacyof leadership and dedication that is in keepingwith the highest traditions of military service.

— Dr. Kenneth Finlayson, SWCS historian

August 2003 19

Colonel Robert S. MooreU.S. Army (ret.)

1919–2003

Above: Retired Col-onel Robert S.Moore (left) leadsmembers of theFirst Special ServiceForce Associationduring the Force’s60th reunion, held inHelena, Mont., inAugust 2002.

Left: Lieutenant Col-onel Robert S. Moore(right) with BrigadierGeneral Robert T.Frederick in Italy inJanuary 1944.

photo by Earl Moniz

National Archives

In March 2003, during the final days of theUnited States’ preparation for OperationIraqi Freedom, U.S. forces crossed the

desert of Kuwait and passed smoothlythrough the Kuwaiti lines of defense. Whilethe operation was apparently seamless, itmight have been extremely difficult had it notbeen preceded by years of training and rap-port-building between U.S. Special Forces andthe forces of the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense.The success of the U.S.-Kuwaiti training rela-tionship is due in large part to a forward-posi-tioned, permanently deployed U.S. element inKuwait, the Special Operations Commandand Control Element-Kuwait, or SOCCE-KU.

SOCCE-KU was formed Sept. 15, 1997,when the commander of the U.S. Central Com-mand, or CENTCOM, approved a proposal toestablish permanent special-operations com-mand-and-control elements, or SOCCEs, inKuwait and Bahrain.1 SOCCE-Bahrain laterevolved into another headquarters, butSOCCE-KU has remained relevant as a subsetof CENTCOM’s theater-engagement strategy.Although SOCCE-KU now focuses on its liai-son function, the history of its operations pro-vides an example of the value of the continuouspresence of U.S. special-operations forces, orSOF, in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility.

BackgroundThe primary impetus for maintaining a

continuous SOF presence in Kuwait wasthe need to conduct Exercise Iris Gold, a

training mission performed predominantlyby soldiers from the 5th SF Group but alsosupported periodically by soldiers from the3rd, 19th and 20th SF groups. Managed bythe Fort Bragg, N.C.-based Security Assist-ance Training Management Office and bythe Office of Military Cooperation-Kuwait(in coordination with the Kuwaiti Ministryof Defense), Iris Gold was an aspect of theU.S. program of foreign military sales withKuwait.

Iris Gold came into existence shortlyafter the liberation of Kuwait during Oper-ation Desert Storm in 1991. It was initial-ly imbedded within a larger exercise, Oper-ation Intrinsic Action, which was laterrenamed Operation Desert Spring, or ODS.During the ODS scenario, a brigade com-bat team and an SF company, with its sixSF A-detachments, deployed to CampDoha, Kuwait, in support of CENTCOM’sland-component commander during con-tingencies related to the defense of Kuwait.

SF tasks during ODS included foreigninternal defense, or FID, and coalition sup-port. In the event of combat operations, SFcoalition-support teams, or CSTs, would pro-vide connectivity between CENTCOM’sland-component commander and selectedbrigades and battalions of the Kuwaiti LandForce. When alerted, the three-man CSTswould move to their predetermined brigadeor battalion assignments to serve as liaisonsbetween Kuwaiti ground forces and U.S.forces or headquarters of U.S. ground troops.

20 Special Warfare

SOCCE-Kuwait: Establishing Long-TermMilitary-to-Military Relationships

by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Joyce

The primary function of Iris Gold was toallow U.S. forces to conduct regular train-ing with the forces of the Kuwaiti Ministryof Defense and forge lasting military-to-military relationships. Those relationshipswould enable U.S. and Kuwaiti forces tomake a quick transition to coalition-sup-port operations in the event that combatoperations again became necessary fordeterring threats to Kuwait’s sovereignty.

Before SOCCE-KU was established, SFadvanced operating bases, or AOBs,deploying to Kuwait were required to workwithin Camp Doha’s complex logisticsstructure without the benefit of any insti-tutional knowledge of the systems or anyfamiliarity with key Camp Doha person-nel. The AOBs’ missions consequently metwith limited success. In order to acquirethe necessary support while they weredeployed to Kuwait, the AOBs were oftenforced to depend upon their own initiativeand the generosity of the Camp Doha staff.When the AOB redeployed, the interper-sonal rapport that it had developed withthe Camp Doha garrison evaporated andhad to be re-established by the next SFunit.

The establishment of SOCCE-KU creat-ed a permanent SOF presence in Kuwaitthat would take the burden of logisticaland administrative coordination from therotating SF unit. SOCCE-KU’s presence as

a tenant unit at Camp Doha also facilitat-ed the flow of communication regardingforce-protection measures and generalinformation about the garrison.

SOCCE-KU’s specified mission set encom-passes four complex responsibilities: sys-temic continuity; organizational liaison; for-eign internal defense, or FID; and commandand control, or C2, of combat forces. Applica-ble in peace, conflict or war, the mission tasksmay be executed simultaneously, individual-ly, in multiple pairs or in sequential order,depending upon the level of conflict.

Systemic continuitySOCCE-KU was established for maintain-

ing professional, redundant, long-term rela-tionships with key Kuwaiti personnel, unitsand organizations in the vicinity of CampDoha. Those relationships are focused on theadministrative and logistics functions thatare provided by Army Central Command-Kuwait, as well as by the staff of the 3rd U.S.Army’s land component commander, referredto during combat operations as the coalitionforces land-component commander, orCFLCC.

SOCCE-KU also fosters the developmentof host-nation military-to-military contactsand civilian contacts. The relationshipsthus formed with units and individuals inKuwait have assisted SOCCE-KU in coor-

August 2003 21

The primary function ofExercise Iris Gold was toallow U.S. forces to con-duct training withKuwaiti forces and forgelasting military-to-mili-tary relationships.

U.S. Army photo

dinating logistical and administrative sup-port for units that are forward-deployed inor near Kuwait. SOCCE-KU also performsliaison with other U.S. SOF stationed inKuwait in order to share information andto deconflict operations.

Organizational liaisonAs a subordinate command of the Special

Operations Command-Central Command, orSOCCENT, SOCCE-KU has a mandate totell the SOCCENT story. SOCCE-KU ischarged with conveying to various audiencesthe operations, plans and intent of the SOC-CENT commander, as well as demonstratingthe professional capabilities, prowess andmaturity of SOF NCOs. SOCCE-KU’s liaisonfunction also includes providing relevantinformation from the land-component com-mander back to SOCCENT.

In March 2003, during Operation IraqiFreedom, SOCCE-KU served as the founda-tion of a wartime liaison cell that communi-cated information between SOCCENT andCENTCOM’s CFLCC. This expanded liaisoncell included sub-cells that represented eachof the key subordinate components of SOC-

CENT. Each sub-cell was led by an Army SFcolonel or a Navy special-warfare command-er. Each sub-cell also had 3-5 additionalSOF personnel so that it could provide 24-hour liaison support. A senior Army SFcolonel, SOCCENT’s senior liaison with theCFLCC, synchronized the efforts of the liai-son sub-cells.

FIDDuring peace and conflict, SOCCE-KU

has executed the SF mission of FIDthrough Exercise Iris Gold. More than atraining mission, Iris Gold was the bridgeby which SF units established long-termmilitary-to-military relationships thatwould allow them to quickly transitionfrom being trainers to being partners withKuwaiti forces during coalition-supportoperations.

In coordination with the Office of Mili-tary Cooperation-Kuwait, the U.S.Embassy and the Kuwaiti Ministry ofDefense, SOCCE-KU ensured that each fis-cal year, SF A-detachments conducted fourfour-week Iris Gold programs of instruc-tion, in accordance with both the desires of

22 Special Warfare

SOCCE-KU Organizational Liaison

Coalition ForceCommander

SOCCE-KUCFLCC CFSOCC

CJSOTFHqs(s)

V Corps MEF

SOCCEMEF

SOCCECorps

CFSOCC assetssupporting CFLCC

LEGEND

Operational Command Operational Control Tactical Control

the host nation and the restrictions of theFMS program.

During its 12-year history, Iris Goldtrained thousands of Kuwaiti soldiers,sailors and airmen. Training typically con-sisted of instruction in entry-level soldierskills. It focused on skill-level-one taskssuch as basic rifle marksmanship, first-aidtraining, map-reading and land naviga-tion. Additional training courses that theSF soldiers provided to Kuwaiti unitsincluded training for senior NCOs and offi-cers on operations orders and on the mili-tary decision-making process. The trainingcycles typically began during the secondmonth of a 90-day deployment. Class sizesvaried with each SF detachment, but class-es were usually limited to 30 students.

Command and control of CSTsDuring combat operations and during

Operation Iraqi Freedom, SOCCE-KU ischarged with maintaining command andcontrol of the CSTs assigned to work withKuwaiti land forces, with ensuring the

CSTs’ combat readiness, and with makingprudent distribution of CSTs to appropri-ate battalions of the Kuwaiti land forces.The CSTs provided two-way connectivitybetween the Kuwaiti battalions andCENTCOM’s land component commanderduring Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The bond created between Kuwaitibrigades and hundreds of SF teams duringthe 12 years of Iris Gold training paid hugedividends when CSTs deployed withKuwaiti forces in December 2002 as a cov-ering force during the defense of Kuwait.The seamless operations of the coalitionforces was a direct reflection of the rapportthat had been established by SF soldiersduring Exercise Iris Gold and of theadministrative, technical and operationalcontinuity that has been provided to SFunits by SOCCE-KU since 1997.

Lieutenant Colonel ThomasM. Joyce is commander ofSpecial Operations Com-mand and Control Element-Kuwait. His previous enlist-ed and officer assignments inInfantry and Special Forcesunits include service with the 75th InfantryRegiment (Ranger), the 82nd AirborneDivision, the 10th SF Group, the 1st SpecialWarfare Training Group and the U.S. ArmyPersonnel Command. He was commis-sioned in 1987 through ROTC upon hisgraduation from St. Mary’s University inSan Antonio, Texas. He holds master’sdegrees from Syracuse University (MBA1997) and the U.S. Army Command andGeneral Staff College (MMAS 1998). Lieu-tenant Colonel Joyce is scheduled toassume command of a recruiting battalionduring the summer of 2004.

Notes:1 Memorandum to SOCCENT, through the U.S. Cen-

tral Command for USCENTCOM J1, dated 15 Sep-tember 1997.

August 2003 23

The bond forged between SF soldiers and Kuwaiti forcespaid huge dividends when U.S. coalition-support teamsdeployed with Kuwaiti forces in December 2002.

U.S. Army photo

As Operation Iraqi Freedom tight-ened the noose around the outlawregime of Saddam Hussein, U.S.

Army Special Forces soldiers were busyconducting missions designed to bring fastfreedom to an oppressed Iraqi citizenry.

Freeing the oppressed, in fact, is a con-cept close to the hearts of all Special Forcessoldiers. “De oppresso liber,” their regimen-tal motto, means exactly that in Latin.

Although the concept of exportingdemocracy through these warrior-diplo-mats has seen success during many con-flicts — most recently in Afghanistan —the mission of U.S. special-operationsforces in Iraq will most likely be differentthan anything seen so far during the glob-al war on terror, said Major General Geof-frey C. Lambert, commanding general ofthe U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Centerand School and former commander of theU.S. Army Special Forces Command.

According to General Lambert, the mis-sions for SF soldiers in Iraq were unlikethose they conducted in support of Opera-tion Enduring Freedom, where special-operations assets have been relied uponheavily as the force of choice.

During the first year of the global war onterrorism, SOF operations in Afghanistan,the Philippines and Georgia were general-ly unilateral in nature. The challenge forSOF in Iraq, Lambert said, was to findtheir niche as a support asset for larger,traditional forces on the ground.

Because the deployment of SOF in Iraqis the largest in history, Lambert said, SFsoldiers have yet to conduct joint missionson a scale as large as Operation Iraqi Free-dom, even though they’ve had experiencewith integration into conventional opera-tions in the past. During the first Gulf War,SOF had a more limited role than in Iraq.“We did that integration in Afghanistan,but now we’ve got to go in there and get the

24 Special Warfare

Special Forces Role Different in Iraq

by Sergeant Kyle J. Cosner

A soldier from the 3rdSF Group looks down

the barrel of an M-2 .50-caliber machine gun

mounted on a GroundMobility Vehicle, or

GMV. The GMV is in useby SF soldiers deployedin support of Operation

Iraqi Freedom. Photo by Kyle J. Cosner

complete parts of the modern battlefield —precision special-operations strike forcesand conventional land forces — together.”

General Tommy Franks, then-command-er of the U.S. Central Command, made sim-ilar remarks during a March 22 pressbriefing at Doha, Qatar.

“In some cases, our special-operationsforces support conventional ground forces,”Franks said. “Examples of this includeoperations behind enemy lines to attackenemy positions and formations or perhapsto secure bridges and crossing sites overrivers or perhaps to secure key installa-tions, like the gas-oil platforms, and, ofcourse, in some cases, to adjust air power,as we saw in Afghanistan.”

“That plan gives commanders at all lev-els … latitude to build the mosaic … in away that provides flexibility so that we canattack the enemy on our terms, and we aredoing so,” Franks said.

During a March 27 speech at MacDill AirForce Base in Tampa, Fla., PresidentGeorge W. Bush made references to “thesilent warriors who were first on theground … in Iraq.”

“Many of you here today were alsoinvolved in the liberation of Afghanistan,”the president said to an audience filledwith personnel from the U.S. Special Oper-ations Command headquarters. “The mili-tary demands are very different in Iraq.”

“At the opening of Operation Iraqi Free-dom, Special Forces helped to secure airfields and bridges and oil fields, to clear theway for our forces and to prevent sabotageand environmental catastrophe,” Bushsaid.

General Lambert noted that anotherimportant difference between operations inIraq and previous missions is the immedi-ate presence of the media, both nationaland international, on the ground withcoalition forces as part of the Departmentof Defense’s new media embed program.The initiative places reporters alongsidemilitary units on the front lines.

General Lambert said media reports onspecial-operations integration would be avaluable tool for assessing SOF success.

“It will be interesting in the open envi-ronment with the press and embedded

reporters … to gather the observationsfrom the potential upcoming battles of howthe integration … has worked into the pre-cision fires (and special-operations forces)mix,” he said.

General Lambert predicted that a small-er special-operations role in Iraq couldallow conventional forces and otherbranches of the military to share in amedia spotlight that Army special-opera-tions forces have dominated since Opera-tion Enduring Freedom began in October2001.

Sergeant Kyle J. Cosner is a journalistassigned to the U.S. Army Special Opera-tions Command Public Affairs Office atFort Bragg, N.C.

August 2003 25

Those who are familiar with the historyof Army special operations recognizethe terms “OSS,” “SOE,” “Det 101” and

“Jedburgh” — all those terms are associatedwith unconventional warfare, or UW, con-ducted during World War II.1 Few who arefamiliar with the foregoing terms, however,have heard of “Donkeys,” “FEC/LG,” “8086Army Unit,” “8240 Army Unit,” “CCRAK”and “JACK” — those terms are associatedwith UW during the Korean War.

The military legacy of the Korean War hasbeen Task Force Smith, Inch’on, the Yalu River,the Chosin Reservoir, Heartbreak Ridge andthe 38th Parallel. Yet while conventional sol-diers were fighting initially for survival, andfinally for re-establishment of a free SouthKorea, guerrillas and partisans — aided by a

few American soldiers — were conducting anactive UW campaign behind the lines of NorthKorean forces, or NK, and the Chinese Com-munist Forces, or CCF.2 Although the 50thanniversary of the Korean War has given rise toseveral works that examine the previouslyunrecognized role of partisan operations in thatconflict, UW remains a little-known aspect ofthe Korean War.

During World War II, the Office of Strate-gic Services, or OSS, provided the UnitedStates with the capability for performingUW. But three weeks after World War IIended, President Truman disbanded theOSS, and the American military capabilityfor performing unconventional operationsdisappeared.3 Not until the National Securi-ty Act of 1947 created the Central Intelli-gence Agency did the U.S. government for-mally acknowledge the need for a UW capa-bility. National Security Council Directive10/2, “National Security Council Directive onOffice of Special Projects,” dated June 18,1948, assigned to the CIA the responsibilityto “conduct covert operations,” including“direct action, including sabotage … assist-ance to underground movements … [and]guerrillas.”

NSC Directive 10/2 also directed the JointChiefs of Staff to assist the CIA during“wartime covert operations.” The JointChiefs implemented the military’s portion ofDirective 10/2 through a March 1, 1949,memorandum, “Study on Guerilla Warfare,”which stated that the Army “shall be

26 Special Warfare

Unconventional Warfare in Korea: ForgottenAspect of the ‘Forgotten War’

by Dr. Richard L. Kiper

Dr. Kiper’s article is part of a largerresearch project on special operations dur-ing the Korean War that he is producing forpublication under contract to the USASOCHistorian’s Office. — Editor

Although the 50th anniversary of the KoreanWar has given rise to several works that exam-ine the previously unrecognized role of parti-san operations in that conflict, UW remains alittle-known aspect of the Korean War.

assigned primary responsibility for all otherguerrilla warfare functions.”4 But not untilSeptember 1950, when Secretary of theArmy Frank Pace forced the Army to acti-vate the Office of the Chief of PsychologicalWarfare under Brigadier General Robert A.McClure, was there a branch of the ArmyG3 section that was responsible for UW.5

General Douglas MacArthur, command-er of the U.S. Far Eastern Command, orFECOM, in 1950, had a long-standingantipathy toward the OSS during WorldWar II. It is therefore not surprising thatwhen war came to the Korean peninsula onJune 25, 1950, the CIA (the successor tothe OSS) had only six personnel in Japanfor planning and conducting UW opera-tions.6 The FECOM G2, Major GeneralCharles Willoughby, had not detected anybasis for conducting UW operations inKorea, although he had received uncon-firmed reports of guerrilla resistance.

In fact, after United Nations forces land-ed at Inch’on Sept. 15, 1950, and advancednorthward, Korean guerrillas rose upbehind the U.N. advance and supplantedthe communist North Korean governmentofficials who had been in control since1945. But after China entered the war, theU.N. forces were forced to withdraw fromNorth Korea, leaving the Korean partisansin dire straits. The partisans soon with-drew to Hwanghae Province, on Korea’swest coast. From there, many of them were

able to flee to nearby islands; others wentinto hiding.

Not until FECOM’s Army component, theU.S. Eighth Army, or EUSA, received a mes-sage from Navy Task Force 95.7 on Jan. 8,1951, that there were 10,000 partisans inHwanghae Province, were the reports ofguerrilla resistance confirmed.

The intelligence regarding the existenceof such a large body of partisans waspassed immediately to Colonel JohnMcGee, the officer in the EUSA G3 whowas responsible for UW. One week later,EUSA created, within its G3’s Miscella-neous Division, the Attrition Section,which had the responsibility for managingpartisan operations. By Jan. 23, McGeehad produced “Operational Plan NumberOne” for employing partisans in support ofan anticipated U.N. counteroffensive.

McGee’s plan called for the establishmentof three partisan units: “William Able Base”(soon renamed Leopard), which would oper-ate off the west coast of Korea; “Kirkland,”which would operate off the east coast; and“Baker Section,” which would conduct air-borne operations throughout North Korea.The plan included a fourth unit, “Task ForceRedwing,” which was actually a company ofRepublic of Korea Marines that was organ-ized for conducting raids and sabotage. Allthe partisan units were to be commanded byMcGee’s Attrition Section.7 Thus began U.S.Army UW operations against North Korean

August 2003 27

Initial Attrition Section Organization

GHQFEC

G3 G2

FEC/LGEighthArmy

AttritionSection

MiscellaneousDivisionG3

and Chinese-communist forces.Immediately after McGee received the

report of a potential partisan force on theislands off the west coast in January 1951,he sent Major William Burke to assess thesituation and to provide the partisan forcewith weapons and ammunition.

Burke learned that partisans occupiedfive islands, with the largest group beingon the island of Paengnyong-do, which isjust south of the 38th Parallel. On the basisof Burke’s report, McGee quickly revisedOperational Plan Number One. Among the

revisions was a provision that Americanofficers would command each partisanbase. The Americans would train and equipthe partisan forces and deploy them inaccordance with orders from EUSA.8 Aftermaking his report, Burke quickly assem-bled a staff and returned to Paengnyong-doin February to establish a partisan-train-ing program.

Burke’s new mission was to prepare thepartisans to conduct guerrilla operationsin conjunction with a planned U.N. coun-terattack that would force the NK armyand CCF to withdraw at least to the 39thParallel. He moved quickly to establishtraining bases on Paengnyong-do, Tae-chong-do, Sok-to, and Cho-do.9 By Marchthe training bases were ready.

The partisans had organized themselvesinto bands whose leader was usually aprominent individual from the area thatwas home to that particular band. Thebands referred to themselves as “donkeys.”Three primary theories exist for the originof that name, none of which can be agreedupon by former partisans as the reason.One theory is that the name originates

from the Korean word “dong-li,” whichmeans “liberty.” Another theory is that thename refers to the traits of a donkey:mean, patient and sturdy. A third theory isthat the partisans thought they looked as ifthey were riding a donkey when they wereoperating the crank-driven generator forthe AN/GRC-9 radio.10 Whatever the ori-gin, the name was a source of pride. So, too,would be their accomplishments.

‘Leopard’ activitiesOn March 3, 1951, Donkey 1, led by for-

mer merchant Chang Jae Hwa, became thefirst Donkey unit to return to the mainlandof North Korea. Chang and 37 partisansmoved to the vicinity of Sari-won andHwang-ju to obtain information aboutenemy movements on the main highwayleading south from P’yongyang. When thepartisans returned to their island base,Chang reported 280 enemy killed and rail-road and telephone links cut.11 On March5, Donkey 4 (known as the “White Tigers”)landed on the mainland, followed by Don-key 7 on March 27, Donkey 11 on April 14,and Donkey 3 on May 27.12 Most Donkeyunits had one or more American advisers,but existing records indicate that theAmericans only occasionally accompaniedthe partisans on operations.13

One such operation was launched fromWollae-do, two miles off the North Koreancoast, on July 13, 1952. A North Korean 76mm gun was harassing the partisan baseon Wollae-do as well as ships operating inthe coastal waters. Pak Chol, leader ofDonkey 4, persuaded the U.S. adviser onPaengnyong-do, 1st Lieutenant Ben Mal-com, that the gun had to be eliminated.After four months of intense training, Pak,Malcom and 118 partisans boarded fourjunks and set sail for the mainland.

At 4:30 a.m., according to plan, the U.S.Navy began a 30-minute barrage of the objec-tive. At 5 a.m., Donkey 4 began its attack.With Navy air support, the partisans gainedthe top of the bunker that housed the gun;from there, they threw grenades through thegun apertures. Eventually they forced openthe door leading into the bunker. Close-quar-ters fighting ensued, and several partisans

28 Special Warfare

The partisans had organized themselves intobands whose leader was usually a prominentindividual from the area. … The bandsreferred to themselves as ‘donkeys.’Three pri-mary theories exist for the origin of that name,none of which can be agreed upon by formerpartisans as the reason.

August 2003 29

were killed. Finally, Donkey 4 overcame allenemy resistance and, using C-3 explosive,its members destroyed the gun and thebunker. When Navy aircraft reported thatenemy reinforcements were moving in rapid-ly, the partisans began a wild run to thebeach. Naval gunfire was invaluable as itcovered their withdrawal. Soon Pak, Malcom,the partisan force and 10 refugees reachedWollae-do.14

The mission was a success. Sustaininglosses of six partisans killed and sevenwounded, Donkey 4 had destroyed a hard-ened enemy position, had killed approxi-mately 60 enemy soldiers, and had gar-nered an abundant haul of intelligence.Also important was the fact that the train-ing techniques and skills of the partisan

advisers had been proven effective. Byaccompanying the raiders, Malcom hadgained great “face” with the Koreans. Theraid also demonstrated that the NorthKoreans were not invulnerable.15

‘Baker’ activitiesAlthough the CIA had begun parachut-

ing agents into North Korea shortly afterthe war began, Baker Section did not con-duct its first airborne operation untilMarch 15, 1951.16 That night, the SpecialAir Mission Detachment of the 21st TroopCarrier Squadron dropped four Americansand 20 Koreans near Hyon-ni, 30 milesinland from the Sea of Japan, where thepartisans were to destroy railroad tunnels.

30 Special Warfare

Two of the Rangersinvolved in Operation Vir-ginia, Edward Pucel (2ndfrom left) and WilliamMiles, are received onboard the USS St. Paulfollowing their rescue byhelicopter. Miles had beenshot in the left side of hisface.

National Archives

The Americans — three corporals and oneprivate first class — were from the 4thRanger Company and had volunteered fora classified mission.

The mission, code-named Operation Vir-ginia, was a disaster. The team missed thedrop zone, and a blizzard delayed theteam’s arrival at its primary objective.Finding that tunnel to be too heavilydefended, the team slowly moved east toattack another tunnel. After the attack,because of heavy cloud cover and cold sosevere that it caused the team’s radio bat-teries not to function, the team was unableto contact friendly units for two weeks.

When the team was able to make radiocontact, the Navy dispatched three heli-copters to rescue the team. One helicopterwas shot down as it approached the pick-upzone. The remaining two helicopters man-aged to hoist three Americans out, but heavyenemy fire prevented any further evacua-tions. The pilot of the downed helicopter, theremaining Ranger and seven Koreansescaped the site. The two Americans werecaptured after they had evaded the enemyfor 10 days. They would not be released untilSept. 6, 1953. Five of the seven Korean parti-sans returned to friendly lines on foot.

By the end of the war, Baker Section hadconducted 19 airborne operations, involving389 partisans. Including the five partisanswho returned from Operation Virginia, only10 of the 389 partisans returned. Two advis-ers were never heard from. Tangible resultsof airborne insertions made by Baker Sec-tion are nil. A 1956 study concluded: “Thesedecisions to use partisans against enemysupply routes in airborne operationsappears to have been futile and callous.”17

‘Kirkland’ activitiesKirkland, the third partisan force, was

organized in April 1951. Jurisdictional dis-putes between the Army and the CIA led toKirkland’s area of operations being limitedto the area from Wonsan south. The CIA con-ducted all operations north of Wonsan.McGee transferred 1st Lieutenant WilliamS. Harrison from Donkey 4 to commandKirkland. Initially, one other U.S. officer andtwo U.S. enlisted soldiers assisted Harrison.

Based on the island of Nam-do, Kirklandhad the initial mission, as did Leopard, ofsupporting a major U.N. counteroffensive.

When the U.N. did not mount the coun-teroffensive, Kirkland’s mission changed toconducting coastal raids, collecting intelli-gence, and identifying targets for Navy airoperations and naval gunfire. The scarcity ofislands off Korea’s eastern coast forced Kirk-land to become a secondary partisan opera-tion. During the war, slightly more than 1percent of the partisan operations occurredalong the east coast. By January 1952, only11 Americans and 195 partisans had beenassigned to Kirkland’s region. Seventeen

months later, Kirkland’s personnel strengthpeaked at 4,844 partisans and 32 Americanadvisers. Soon afterward, an increase in thenumber of enemy troops along the east coastand the pending armistice led the U.N. toevacuate the partisans to islands lying southof the 38th Parallel.18

ReorganizationsAt the same time the Army’s UW opera-

tions began, there also began a bewilderingseries of command changes, reorganizationsand redesignations, as FECOM sought toestablish the responsibility for UW. Fortu-nately for the Americans who workedclosely with the partisan groups, the suc-cessive UW reorganizations had littledirect impact on partisan operations.

Although the Attrition Section was estab-lished in January 1951 as part of the FECOMG3’s Miscellaneous Division, which was anoperational organization, the Attrition Section

August 2003 31

The mission, code-named Operation Virginia,was a disaster. The team missed the dropzone, and a blizzard delayed the team’s arrivalat its primary objective. … After the attack,because of heavy cloud cover and cold sosevere that it caused the team’s radio batter-ies not to function, the team was unable tocontact friendly units for two weeks.

received its operational guidance from theFECOM G2, through a sub-section known asthe Far East Command/Liaison Group, orFEC/LG. On April 11, 1951, Lieutenant Gen-eral Matthew Ridgway replaced MacArthuras commander of FECOM, and LieutenantGeneral James Van Fleet replaced Ridgway atEUSA. On May 5, Van Fleet redesignated theAttrition Section as the Miscellaneous Group,8086 Army Unit, or 8086 AU, “to develop anddirect partisan warfare.”19 Partisan opera-tions were now the responsibility of an Armyunit, not of a staff section.

On July 26, Ridgway designated theFEC/LG as FEC/LG, 8240 Army Unit. Healso activated the Far East Command/Liai-son Detachment (Korea), 8240 Army Unit,or FEC/LD (K). Initially FEC/LD (K) wasresponsible only for intelligence-gathering;partisan operations remained the responsi-bility of EUSA’s 8086 AU.20

That arrangement changed dramatically

on Dec. 10, when, in an attempt to resolvejurisdictional disputes and to deconflict on-going UW operations, FECOM createdanother organization — the CombinedCommand for Reconnaissance Activities,Korea, 8240 Army Unit, or CCRAK.CCRAK, under the command of FEC/LG,21

assumed total control of all partisan opera-tions. Although FEC/LG was based inTokyo, CCRAK was to be based in Seoul.While EUSA retained some staff, adminis-trative and logistics functions for support-ing guerrilla operations, all covert activi-ties were to be the responsibility of onecommand at the theater level, at least onpaper.22 EUSA abolished the 8086 AU, butseveral of 8086 AU’s functions were takenover by FEC/LD (K). FEC/LD (K), whichremained under the operational control ofthe FECOM G2, now had two sections —an intelligence section and a guerrilla sec-tion that controlled partisan operations.

32 Special Warfare

Final Unconventional Warfare Organization

HQFEC/UNC

Ministry ofNational Defense

8250ROK AU

J3 J2

G2

SOD

G3

HQAFFE

CCRAFFE8177 AU (Tokyo)

UNPIK8240 AU (Seoul)

AFFE Coord Det8078 AU (Seoul)

1st PIR(Paengnyong-do)

2nd PIR(Kanghwa-do)

3rd PIR(Sokcho-ri)

6th PIR(Yongyu-do)

1st PAIR(Seoul)

The reason why there were jurisdictionaldisputes and conflicting UW operations wasthat while the U.S. Army had been estab-lishing a structure for managing partisanoperations, the U.S. Air Force and the Cen-tral Intelligence Agency had been doing thesame. In July 1950, one month after NorthKorea invaded South Korea, Hans Tofte, anOSS veteran, had arrived at CIA headquar-ters in Tokyo to take charge of the agency’scovert operations in Korea in accordancewith NSC Directive 10/2. Tofte began torecruit, train and insert agents who wouldgather intelligence behind enemy lines. InJuly 1951, the CIA created an operationalarm known as the Joint Advisory Commis-sion-Korea, or JACK, for inserting agents.

In early 1951, the Air Force had createdSpecial Activities Unit Number One, one ofwhose missions was to conduct guerrillaoperations, but in March 1951, that portionof the unit’s mission had been deleted. TheAir Force allowed the CIA to use the SpecialAir Mission Detachment of the 21st TroopCarrier Squadron and aircraft from the581st Air Resupply and CommunicationsWing for parachuting agents into NorthKorea. The Air Force also operated a fleet ofboats for inserting agents into the north.23

At one time, therefore, three autonomousagencies were planning and conductingguerrilla operations in Korea, with no cen-tralized control. After the Air Force relin-quished any pretense of advising guerrillasin March 1951, the major issue over thecontrol of UW was between the Army andthe CIA. Coordination between the twoagencies was not improved by the bitter-ness that resounded between Tofte andFECOM G2’s Willoughby.24

When Ridgway directed FECOM to cre-ate CCRAK, he determined that, in orderto enhance coordination and reduce con-flict, the commander would be an Armyofficer, and the deputy commander wouldbe a member of the CIA. Unfortunately,while the CIA’s JACK came under theoperational control of CCRAK, the ordersthat created CCRAK did not place JACKunder CCRAK’s command. Furthermore,CIA officers in Korea had no confidence inthe ability of the FECOM G2 staff to com-mand operations. So while the creation of

CCRAK appeared to alleviate the bureau-cratic bickering between the Army and theCIA, the reality was otherwise.25

By early 1952, it became apparent to thepartisans, who had believed that they wouldsupport a U.N. counteroffensive, that theyexisted only for providing intelligence. Theirperception changed on Oct. 1, 1952, when theU.S. activated U.S. Army Forces Far East, orAFFE, as the theater Army-component com-mand. General Mark Clark, who hadreplaced Ridgway as FECOM commander,then removed CCRAK from the jurisdictionof FEC/LG, renamed it Army Unit 8242,placed it directly under AFFE, and gave itoperational control of FEC/LD (K). FEC/LG

remained a part of FECOM G2 but wouldprovide administrative and logistics supportto CCRAK. Simultaneously, Clark directedthat partisan strength be increased from10,000 men to 20,000 by March 1953 and to40,000 by July 15, 1953. On May 10, 1953,FEC/LD (K) OPLAN Partisan Operations(K), Phase IIA, directed that partisan activi-ty be increased. FECOM also began draftingplans for a general offensive.26

Another organizational change occurredon Nov. 21, 1952, when the guerrilla sectionof FEC/LD (K) became United Nations Parti-san Forces-Korea, or UNPFK. Of the guerril-la section’s partisan units, Leopard, Wolfpack(which had been created Jan. 1, 1952, by tak-ing part of Leopard) and Scannon (renamedfrom Kirkland in September 1952) becamepartisan infantry regiments. Baker Sectionbecame the 1st Partisan Airborne InfantryRegiment. In December 1952, in a major shiftof responsibility for guerrilla operations,Clark ordered that FEC/LG become a sup-

August 2003 33

At one time, therefore, three autonomousagencies were planning and conducting guer-rilla operations in Korea, with no centralizedcontrol. After the Air Force relinquished anypretense of advising guerrillas in March 1951,the major issue over the control of UW wasbetween the Army and the CIA.

port element for partisan operations, andthat the operations themselves be returnedto the control of EUSA.27

In April 1953, FECOM formed two addi-tional partisan infantry regiments. OnAug. 16, 1953, FECOM, in cooperation withthe government of the Republic of Korea,or ROK, established the 8250 ROK ArmyUnit to provide administrative support topartisans. The last UW organizationalchange occurred in the fall of 1953. OnSept. 23, UNPFK became United NationsPartisan Infantry-Korea, or UNPIK.CCRAK was abolished and re-establishedin Japan as the Combined Command forReconnaissance Activities Far East, 8177Army Unit, or CCRAFE. Simultaneously,AFFE activated the AFFE CoordinatingDetachment, 8078 Army Unit, in Korea torepresent AFFE’s UW interests.28

Belated doctrineThese organizational changes and

shifts in responsibility for UW occurredduring less than three years. Bureau-cratic rivalries contributed significantly

to the constantly changing landscape oflines and boxes on organization charts.Much of the flux also resulted from thelack of Army doctrine for implementingNSC Directive 10/2. To remedy the lackof doctrine, the Army began drafting twomanuals. FM 31-20, Operations AgainstGuerilla Forces, acquainted commanderswith the “organization and tactics ofguerillas” and provided “a guide for com-bating and destroying guerillas.” FM 31-21, Organization and Conduct of Gueril-la Warfare, addressed “organizing, train-ing, commanding, and exploiting guerillaforces in war.” Unfortunately, neithermanual was published until 1951, andFM 31-21 was not published until Octo-ber of that year.29

Retired Colonel Ben Malcom, who wasthe adviser for Donkey 4, made clear howthe lack of doctrinal guidance affectedthose who were charged with executingthe mission: “We were sent to conductpartisan operations with no knowledge ofthe history of these operations and notraining in how best to implement them.”He continued: “To my knowledge not a

34 Special Warfare

Korean partisan infantrysoldiers receive trainingon American weapons.Partisan forces had noschools for tactics; theylearned those throughexperience.

National Archives

single copy of FM 31-21 ever filtereddown to the operational level.”30 The offi-cers and enlisted men who were detailedto advise the partisan groups were ontheir own.

The only doctrine available to partisansprior to the arrival of the Americans inJanuary 1951 was the principle of sur-prise. Although the principle was not cod-ified, as partisan leader Pak Chol stated,“Surprise is the whole of guerrilla war-fare.” Pak and other leaders knew that,because they lacked training and equip-ment, they could not stand against regu-lar army units. All their operations had tobe planned for striking the enemy whenthey would be least expected. No schoolprepared the partisans with studies oftactics; they learned from experience. “Weguerrillas had no theory, but we had expe-rience,” said Pak. “In the experience wefound the theory.”31 But experience is oflittle use without transportation, commu-nications, weapons, ammunition andtraining.

Compounding the problems resultingfrom the lack of both doctrine and in-place organizations was the fact, asretired Colonel Al Paddock put it, thatthe Army’s “unconventional warfarecapability was nonexistent.”32 AfterWorld War II, soldiers with UW experi-ence who remained in the Army had beenassigned to conventional units. The bur-den of providing trainers for the growingpartisan force fell to McGee and hisreplacement, Lieutenant Colonel JayVanderpool (who had World War II expe-rience with Filipino guerrillas), and sol-diers such as 1st Lieutenant William S.Harrison (who had advised a South Kore-an guerrilla battalion), and a fewRangers who had been recruited whenthe Army disbanded all its Ranger com-panies in August 1951.

Competing with the Army for the fewavailable soldiers who had OSS experi-ence was the CIA, which recruited offi-cers such as Major John K. Singlaub, whohad served with the OSS in France andin China. The shortage of experiencedpersonnel was the reason that infantryofficers, such as Malcom, who had no lan-

guage skills, no UW experience, and notraining to prepare them, were pressedinto the role of UW adviser.33

ConclusionsWhat are we to make of the UW cam-

paign of the Korean War? Did its opera-tions have a material effect on the war?Between March 1951 and the armistice onJuly 27, 1953, partisans reported 4,445combat actions and 69,084 enemy casual-ties. While these figures are impressive,they cannot be verified. Furthermore,because the CCF had an almost inex-haustible pool of manpower, the number ofcasualties inflicted by the partisans hadvirtually no effect on the war’s outcome.The UW campaign’s airborne operations,other than those the CIA conducted forgathering intelligence, were complete fail-ures. Until the beginning of truce talks,partisan activity did tie down enemyforces. Once the lines stabilized, however,the CCF and NK were able to shift theirforces to the coastal areas. The subsequentoverwhelming number of enemy soldiers inthe coastal areas rendered any partisanactivity inconsequential.34

The operational ineffectiveness of parti-san operations can be blamed on a numberof factors:• The lack of experienced guerrilla-war-

fare personnel in the U.S. Army as awhole.

• The inability of the Army and the CIA towork together consistently toward acommon goal.

• The lack of understanding at FECOM ofwhat partisans could do.

• The lack of U.S. doctrine on unconven-tional warfare.The results of those shortcomings were:

• Haphazard mechanisms for identifyingsoldiers who had OSS experience.

• The assignment of soldiers to a foreign cul-ture for which they had no understanding.

• A lack of training — other than basicinfantry training — that would prepareAmerican soldiers for organizing andtraining partisan forces.

• A constantly changing commandstructure that only confused UW

August 2003 35

responsibilities.• A rotation policy that allowed soldiers

who were gaining in-theater UW experi-ence to leave just when they werebecoming most effective.Not until Nov. 14, 1986, when the U.S.

Congress passed the Nunn-Cohen Amend-ment to the Defense Reorganization Act,were many of the problems identifiedabove resolved.35 Nevertheless, the little-known story of UW during the Korean Warand the courage of the Korean partisans,guerrillas and their American advisersremains a notable chapter in the history ofArmy special operations.

Dr. Richard L. Kiper earned his Ph.D. inhistory at the University of Kansas. Heserved as an officer in Special Forces, air-borne and Infantry units, served on theArmy Staff, and was an instructor at WestPoint and at the Army Command and Gen-eral Staff College. He earned his CombatInfantryman Badge and Purple Heart inVietnam, where he served as an Infantrycompany commander and in the 5th Spe-cial Forces Group. He is the author of MajorGeneral John Alexander McClernand:Politician in Uniform, which received theFletcher Pratt Award for best nonfictionCivil War book in 1999. He also edited DearCatharine, Dear Taylor: The Civil War Let-ters of a Union Soldier and His Wife, whichwas published in 2002. He co-authoredWeapon of Choice: Army Special Opera-tions in Afghanistan, to be published in2003. Dr. Kiper teaches history at KansasCity Kansas Community College.

Notes:1 The Office of Strategic Services, or OSS, under the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, was responsible for conductingUW, both in Europe and in the Pacific. The SpecialOperations Executive, or SOE, was the British equiv-alent of the OSS. Detachment 101 conducted guerril-la operations for the OSS in Burma. Jedburgh teamscoordinated French resistance operations in supportof Allied ground operations.

2 The Dictionary of U.S. Army Terms for 1950 definespartisan warfare as “activity carried on against anenemy by people who are devoted adherents to acause, but who are not members of organized and rec-ognized military forces.” The Dictionary defines guer-rilla warfare as “operations carried on by small inde-

pendent forces generally in the rear of an enemy.” TheDictionary does not define either “unconventionalwarfare” or “special operations.” In practice, guerrillaand partisan often were used interchangeably.

3 The same is true for Ranger and psychological-war-fare capabilities.

4 NSC 10/2, “National Security Council Directive onOffice of Special Projects,” http://www.state.gov//www/about_state/history/intel/290_300.html; “Memoran-dum for the Record: Study on Guerrilla Warfare,” 1March 1949, National Archive Record Group 319.

5 Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: ItsOrigins (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas,2002), 68, 93.

6 Richard J. Aldrich, et al., eds., The Clandestine ColdWar in Asia, 1945-65: Western Intelligence, Propagandaand Special Operations (London: Frank Cass, 2000),22-23; John Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA andPentagon Covert Operations Since World War II (NewYork: William Morrow and Company, 1986), 68.

7 Message, CTG 95.7, to Eighth U.S. Army Korea,080135Z Jan 51; Rod Paschall, “Special Operations inKorea,” Conflict 7 (1987):158; Frederick W. Cleaver, etal., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951–1954 (ChevyChase, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Opera-tions Research Office, 1956), 30, 32, 39; Ben Malcom,White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea (Wash-ington: Brassey’s, 1996), 19. During World War II,McGee had been captured by the Japanese in thePhilippines, had later escaped, and had then foughtwith Filipino guerrillas.

8 Ed Evanhoe, Dark Moon: Eighth Army SpecialOperations in the Korean War (Annapolis, Md.: NavalInstitute Press, 1995), 38, 40.

9 William Breuer, Shadow Warriors: The Covert Warin Korea (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996), 161;Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 32.10 Evanhoe, Dark Moon, 41; AFFE MHD 8086 AU, UNPartisan Forces in the Korean Conflict, 21, 94; Mal-com, White Tigers, 56. Former Donkey 13 leader KimChang Song provides the generator version as thereason for the name “donkey.”11 Breuer, Shadow Warriors, 161; Cleaver, et al., UNPartisan Warfare in Korea, 32; AFFE MHD 8086 AU,UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict, 47.Although Donkey 1 was the first partisan unit to beinserted behind enemy lines, the CIA had been insert-ing agents. In Operation Bluebell, the CIA insertedstay-behind agents whose mission was to gather intel-ligence, not to conduct combat operations. CentralIntelligence Agency, CIA in Korea, 1946-1965 (Wash-ington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1973),1:100, 3:97; Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars, 69. TheTactical Liaison Office, a section of FEC/LG, recruitedagents as line-crossers to gather intelligence immedi-ately behind enemy lines. The 25-man Korean teams,usually controlled by one American officer and twoenlisted men, were attached to each front-line U.S.division. Garth Stevens, et al., Intelligence Informa-tion by Partisans for Armor (Fort Knox, Ky.: TheArmor School, 1952), 1:19.12 AFFE MHD 8086 AU, UN Partisan Forces in theKorean Conflict, 47, 77, 99, 101, 117, 119.

36 Special Warfare

13 Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 13.14 Malcom, White Tigers, 83-107.15 Malcom, White Tigers, 106-07.16 The code name for clandestine airborne operationswas Aviary. Douglas C. Dillard, Operation Aviary: Air-borne Special Operations-Korea 1950-1953 (Victoria,Canada: Trafford, 2003), 4.17 The first insertion of an intelligence team by theCIA was on 9 December 1950. Stevens, et al., Intelli-gence Information by Partisans for Armor, 1:10; Evan-hoe, Dark Moon, 50-51; Robert W. Black, Rangers inKorea (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 85; John W.Thornton, Believed to Be Alive (Middlebury, Vt.: PaulS. Eriksson, 1981), 70-80, 100, 255; Michael E. Haas,Apollo’s Warriors: United States Air Force SpecialOperations During the Cold War (Maxwell Air ForceBase, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997), 44; Cleaver, etal., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 52, 94; Lawrence V.Schuetta, Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea,1950-53 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air UniversityPress, 1964), 146-49. Some sources say 19 partisanswent on Operation Virginia.18 Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 32,41, 82, 114, 117, 132, 158. In July 1951, 1st LieutenantJoseph Ulatoski replaced Harrison as commander ofKirkland Forward when Harrison returned to theUnited States. Major A.J. Coccumelli became com-mander of the entire Kirkland area of operations.19 Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, Table ofDistribution 80-8086, Miscellaneous Group, 8086Army Unit, undated, Record Group 319, NationalArchives, as quoted in Paddock, U.S. Army SpecialWarfare, 104.20 Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 34-37.21 Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 37-39.22 Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 39.23 Schuetta, Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower inKorea, 73-74, 77-78. The 581st also had H-19 heli-copters that were used to insert agents. B Flight,6167th Operations Squadron eventually assumed theUW support missions of the Special Air MissionDetachment. Haas, Apollo’s Warriors, 66-75.24 “National Security Council Directive on Office ofSpecial Projects,” NSC 10/2, 18 June 1948, NationalArchives and Records Administration, RG 273;Michael E. Haas, In the Devil’s Shadow: UN SpecialOperations During the Korean War (Annapolis, Md.:Naval Institute Press, 2000), ix, 40, 177-79; Paddock,U.S. Army Special Warfare, 106.25 Malcom, White Tigers, 27; Haas, In the Devil’sShadow, 41-42.26 Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 62-64, 66, 156, 162-65.27 Haas, In the Devil’s Shadow, 42; Headquarters andService Command, FEC, General Order 21, 3 October1952; Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 67-68,155-56; “United Nations Partisan Forces-Korea, 8240thAU (FEC/LD) Partisan Operations,” http://www.korean-war.com/SpecOpsRosters/UNPIKPART.htm.28 Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 112,157; Harry G. Summers, Korean War Almanac (NewYork: Facts on File, 1990), 112.29 Field Manual 31-20, Operations Against Guerilla

Forces (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army,February 1951), 1; FM 31-21, Organization and Con-duct of Guerilla Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Depart-ment of the Army, October 1951), 1.30 Malcom, White Tigers, 40-41.31 Armed Forces Far East Military History Detachment8086 Army Unit, UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Con-flict, 1951–1952: A Study of Their Characteristics andOperations (Tokyo: 8086 Army Unit, 1954), 66-67.32 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 65.33 Haas, In the Devil’s Shadow, 37, 62-63, 65.34 Stevens, et al., Intelligence Information by Parti-sans for Armor, 1:13; Cleaver, et al., UN Partisan War-fare in Korea, 16. In 1985, retired Colonel Glenn Mug-gleberg, former commander of U.N. Partisan InfantryKorea, commented on the partisan reports. “The par-tisan reports were about as accurate as our own,” hesaid. U.S. Army Military History Institute Oral Histo-ry Project 85-S, 15 November 1985.35 Public Law 99-661 created the Office of the Assis-tant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/LowIntensity Conflict), established the unified UnitedStates Special Operations Command, and dramatical-ly increased funding for special operations. On Dec. 1,1989, the Army activated the Army Special Opera-tions Command as a major Army command thatwould command all Army special-operations forces inthe continental United States and train all Army spe-cial-operations soldiers.

August 2003 37

Asoldier from the 5th Special ForcesGroup received the Army’s thirdhighest award for valor in June for

his actions during a January 2002 raid ona suspected al-Qaeda stronghold inAfghanistan.

Master Sergeant Anthony S. Pryor, ateam sergeant with Company A, 1st Bat-

talion, 5th SF Group, received the SilverStar Medal for his gallantry in combat.During the raid, he single-handedly elimi-nated four enemy soldiers, one in unarmedcombat, all while he was under intenseautomatic weapons fire and suffering froma crippling injury.

“Receiving this award is overwhelming,but … this isn’t a story about one guy,”

Pryor said of the events that led to his Sil-ver Star. “It’s a story about the whole com-pany. … If the guys hadn’t done what theywere supposed to do, (the mission)would’ve been a huge failure.”

“I just did what I had to do,” he said,recalling his hand-to-hand struggleagainst the suspected terrorists. “It wasn’ta heroic act — it was second-nature. I won,and I moved forward.”

During the ceremony, Major GeneralGeoffrey C. Lambert, then-commandinggeneral of the U.S. Army Special ForcesCommand, said that Pryor was a perfectexample of the SF mentality.

“About a year ago … I said to Tony, ‘Whatdid you think when that fellow knockedyour night-vision goggles off, pulled yourarm out of its socket and was twisting it,all while you were fighting with your otherhand?’ ” Lambert said. “And (Pryor) said,‘It’s show time.’ He must have meant whathe said, because he earned that Silver Star.Think about a cold, black night; thinkabout fighting four guys at the same time,and somebody jumps on your back andstarts beating you with a board. Thinkabout the problems you’d have to solve —and he did.”

“This is the singular hand-to-hand com-bat story that I have heard from this war,”Lambert added. “When it came time toplay, he played, and he did it right.”

On Jan. 23, 2002, Pryor’s companyreceived an order from the U.S. Central

38 Special Warfare

Special Forces Soldier Receives Silver Starfor Afghanistan Combat

by Sergeant Kyle J. Cosner

Master Sergeant AnthonyS. Pryor receives the SilverStar Medal from Lieu-tenant General Philip R.Kensinger Jr., command-ing general of the U.S.Army Special OperationsCommand.

Photo by Kyle Cosner

Command to conduct its fourth combatmission of the war — a sensitive siteexploitation of two compounds suspected ofharboring Taliban and al-Qaeda terroristsin the mountains of Afghanistan.

Because of the presence of women andchildren within the compounds, Pryor said,aerial bombardment was not an option.Once on the ground, the company was tosearch for key leadership, communicationsequipment, maps and other intelligence.

Sergeant First Class Scott Neil, an SFweapons sergeant, was one of Pryor’s teammembers that night. He found himselfmomentarily pinned down by a sudden hailof bullets after the team’s position hadbeen compromised.

“After the initial burst of automaticweapons fire, we returned fire in thebreezeway,” Neil said. “After we heard thewords ‘Let’s go,’ everything just kind ofkicked in.”

Moments later, though, the team becameseparated in the confusion, but with thesituation desperate for the SF soldiersagainst a determined and larger-than-expected enemy force, Pryor and one of histeammates kept moving forward, room toroom. They began entering a room togeth-er, but another enemy soldier outside theroom distracted Pryor’s team member, whostayed outside the room to return fire.

Pryor first encountered an enemy soldierwho charged out of the room; he assisted ineliminating him. Then, without hesitating,Pryor moved into the room. There he foundtwo enemy soldiers at the back of the roomfiring their weapons at his comrades whowere still outside the compound.

“I went in, and there were some windowsthat they were trying to get their guns outof to shoot at our guys that hadn’t caughtup yet,” Pryor said. “So I went from left toright, indexed down and shot those guysup. I realized that I was well into halfwaythrough my magazine, so I started tochange magazines. Then I felt somethingbehind me, and thought it was (one of myteammates) — that’s when things startedgoing downhill.”

Pryor said it was an enemy soldier, alarger-than-normal Afghan, who hadsneaked up on him. “There was a guy

behind me, and he whopped me on theshoulder with something and crumpled medown.” Pryor would later learn that he hadsustained a broken clavicle and a dislocat-

August 2003 39

ARSOF Soldiers Earn SilverStars for Actions in Iraq

Five soldiers from Army special-operations units haverecently been awarded the nation’s third-highest medal forvalor in wartime as a result of their actions during OperationIraqi Freedom.

Chief Warrant Officer Donald Tabron, Master SergeantPatrick M. Quinn, Staff Sergeant Jason D. Brown, StaffSergeant Jeffrey Adamec and Corporal Jeremiah C. Olsen havebeen awarded the Silver Star Medal. Army Chief of Staff Gen-eral Peter Schoomaker awarded the medals to Tabron, Quinnand Adamec Sept. 10 in Washington, D.C. Brown and Olsenwere awarded the medal at their home stations.

Tabron is a MH-47E Chinook pilot assigned to the 2nd Battalion,160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. Quinn is a SpecialForces team sergeant in Company A,2nd Battalion,10th SF Group.Brown is assigned to the 3rd Battalion,3rd SF Group.Adamec is anSF weapons sergeant in Company C, 3rd Battalion, 3rd SF Group.Olsen is assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment.

Interviewed following the ceremony, Quinn and Adamec saidthat the Silver Star medals they received were about what theirunits did during the war. “Every unit functions as a team onsome level,” said Adamec. “Most of the awards people get … (are)not just about them, (they are) a direct reflection on the abilitiesof the people around them to do their job.”

“To me, it’s a tribute to everything that my (detachment) didduring our fighting in Iraq,” Quinn said. Quinn was awardedthe medal for leading his team and a group of Kurdish militiaduring a battle with an Iraqi armored unit April 2-5. Duringthe battle, Quinn’s actions resulted in the destruction of twotanks and four armored personnel carriers, the killing of 30Iraqi soldiers and the seizure of 30 kilometers of ground.Adamec destroyed four Iraqi armored personnel carriers andone enemy position with Javelin anti-tank missiles, whileunder fire, when his team attacked a fortified ridgeline innorthern Iraq. His actions helped secure an intersection link-ing Mosul and Kirkuk, Iraq. Details of Tabron’s, Brown’s andOlson’s actions were not available.

Quinn and Adamec want the American public to understandthat good things are happening every day in Iraq. “There are aton of amazing soldiers in the Army and they’re doing amazingthings every day,” Quinn said, “and a lot of that story’s not get-ting out.” — Specialist Bill Putnam, Army News Service

ed shoulder during the attack.“Then he jumped up on my back, broke

my night-vision goggles off and startinggetting his fingers in my eyeballs. I pulledhim over, and when I hit the ground, itpopped my shoulder back in,” Pryor said.When he stood up, he was face-to-face withhis attacker. Pryor eliminated the manduring their hand-to-hand struggle.

Pryor had now put down four enemy sol-diers, but the fight wasn’t over yet. “I wasfeeling around in the dark for my night-vision goggles, and that’s when the guys I’dalready killed decided that they weren’tdead yet.”

Pryor said that it was then a race to seewho could get their weapons first, and theenemy soldiers lost. He left the room andrejoined the firefight outside. When thebattle ended, 21 enemy soldiers had beenkilled. There were no American deaths, andPryor was the only soldier injured.

The announcement of the award and thecircumstances surrounding it shifted anintense public focus onto Pryor, who tookevery opportunity to shift that focus fromhimself onto his team’s efforts in the suc-cessful raid.

“Tony is getting a Silver Star because heentered a room by himself, and he engagedthe enemy by himself,” said Sergeant FirstClass James Hogg, an SF medical sergeanton Pryor’s team. “He elevated his pure sol-dier instinct and went to the next level,and that’s what this award is recognizing.He didn’t stop after his initial battle, andcontinued to lead.”

Leading his soldiers, despite his injuries,is something Neil said that Pryor couldn’tseem to stop doing. “As soon as he left thatroom, he came running up to me and want-ed to know if everybody was okay,” Neilsaid. “He never mentioned anything aboutwhat went on … and during the wholeobjective and as the firefight continued, henever stopped. He was always mission-first, and that’s what his Silver Star is allabout.”

Pryor is the third SF soldier to receivethe Silver Star Medal for actions duringOperation Enduring Freedom. The othertwo, Master Sergeant Jefferson Davis andSergeant First Class Daniel Petithory, also

of the 5th SF Group, received their SilverStars posthumously.

Sergeant Kyle J. Cosner is a journalistassigned to the U.S. Army Special Opera-tions Command Public Affairs Office atFort Bragg, N.C.

40 Special Warfare

August 2003 41

Foreign SOFSpecial Warfare

A new battalion-sized Nepalese special-operations unit — termed a ranger unit —will be subordinate to the Royal Nepalese Army. According to media reports, the1,000-man airborne-qualified battalion is being trained to conduct “commando”style missions, especially counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations, andoperations against armed criminal groups, such as drug traffickers. The unit isexpected to be the beneficiary of foreign training, drawing on the earlier elite-forcetraditions of British, Israeli and U.S. special-operations units.

A March 2003 interview with Russia’s Rear Services Chief of Staff of the Ministryof Internal Affairs, or MVD Internal Troops, highlighted logistics support for MVDspecial-operations forces in Chechnya. The interview principally discussed logis-tics support for the five deployed battalions of the 46th Separate Brigade of Oper-ational Designation,as well as for the expanding MVD special operations, or Spet-snaz, detachments deployed in the region. Support of the Spetsnaz components issaid to have challenged the rear-services system because of the need for nonstan-dard clothing, rations and equipment items that, in some cases,had to be designedand manufactured. The MVD elements collectively are tasked to locate and killChechen insurgents, to conduct reconnaissance, and to perform a range of law-enforcement and other “special operations” missions. Russian has placed empha-sis on establishing infrastructure for MVD troops, and plans call for new barracksand medical and equipment-maintenance facilities at basing areas.

Mexican President Vicente Fox has called for increased security measures in Mex-ico’s border areas, around sensitive strategic facilities, and around transportationand energy infrastructure.The measures will involve the Mexican army and navy,as well as other national and regional law-enforcement agencies. To prepare forthe stepped-up security, the Mexican navy conducted an exercise in the Gulf ofMexico in early March. The exercise featured surface combatants, aviation andmarine (naval infantry) elements. Mexico’s southern border is also receiving sub-stantial attention. Mexican security forces, including the army, naval special-oper-ations forces and Beta Group immigration components, are concerned about thelarge number of illegal border-crossers entering the southern state of Chiapas.Most of the illegals are Central Americans, but others are Asians, Arabs or SouthAmericans. Mexico is concerned over the potential of terrorists and insurgentsbeing introduced into Mexico, although drug traffickers, arms dealers and othercontraband smugglers represent a more common problem.While Mexico’s porousborder is not a new problem, the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks have added newurgency to Mexico’s efforts to reinforce control measures.

Nepal establishing new special-operations unit

Mexico increases internaland external security

Russians discuss logisticssupport to special-ops units

in Chechnya

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., who recently retired from the U.S. Army’s For-eign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

42 Special Warfare

Enlisted Career NotesSpecial Warfare

The realities of SF manpower requirements and an analysis of the available in-service recruiting base have prompted the Special Forces proponent to take sev-eral initiatives aimed at filling and sustaining CMF 18. One of those is the SpecialForces Initial Accessions Program, or IAP. The U.S. Army Recruiting Commandbegan recruiting for IAP in January 2001. A soldier can enlist in the Army as an“18X” and attend Infantry one-station unit training, or OSUT, and airborne train-ing at Fort Benning, Ga. He will then make a permanent-change-of-station moveto Fort Bragg to attend Special Forces Assessment and Selection,or SFAS,and theSpecial Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC, as an SF weapons sergeant or SFengineer sergeant.Training for 18X soldiers is two years long.Those who make itthrough SFAS, the SFQC, language training and the Survival, Evasion, Resist-ance and Escape Course, or SERE, will be promoted to sergeant.The quality of the IAP recruits is impressive. A demographic snapshot of the 18Xsoldiers shows that they have an average GT score of 121, that their average age is21.5, and that 50 percent have attended college (18 percent are college graduates).The Army has developed the following IAP requirements in order to identify thehighest-quality recruits:• Be at least 18 years old but under 30 at the start of OSUT.• Be qualified for and volunteer for airborne training.• Be a U.S. citizen.• Attain a minimum GT score of 110 and a minimum CO score of 98.• Possess a high-school diploma.• Be eligible for a secret clearance.• Take the Defense Language Aptitude Battery or the Defense Language

Proficiency Test within 30 days of entering the program.• Score at least 229 on the Army Physical Fitness Test, with at least 60 points

on each event.So far, the 18Xs have exceeded expectations. 18X soldiers are just beginning tocomplete the SFQC, language training and SERE. Six have reported for duty onSF A-detachments, and approximately 150 more are scheduled to arrive in FY2004. To date, more than 1,300 18X soldiers have begun OSUT, more than 800have arrived at Fort Bragg,nearly 400 have completed SFAS,and nearly 300 areattending the SFQC. Eventually, SF detachments will average receiving a new18X every 8-12 months.SF detachments in the field will perform a thorough qualitative assessment ofthe 18X population in approximately one year. The JFK Special Warfare Centerand School will continually evaluate the 18X IAP recruiting mission and makeadjustments relative to the 18Xs’ success in SF training and feedback from theforce.The 18X recruiting mission for FY 2004 is to recruit 1,500. Probably fewerthan 400 of those will ultimately complete SF training. For additional informa-tion, telephone Master Sergeant Larry P. Deel at DSN 432-8423 or commercial(910) 432-8423.

SF IAP exceeding expectations

August 2003 43

Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

The Army has approved the designation of Chief Warrant of the Branch forMOS 180A, Special Forces Warrant Officer. The duties of the position havebeen incorporated within the duties and responsibilities of the position ofthe SF warrant officer proponent manager in the Special Operations Propo-nency Office of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. The new SF war-rant officer proponent manager is CWO 5 William McPherson, who hasreplaced CWO 5 Walt Edwards. CWO 5 Edwards has retired after more than30 years’ service. He has been the driving force in the advancement of MOS180A at the tactical and operational levels, and he will be missed. CWO 5McPherson, most recently assigned to the 10th SF Group, has more than 27years of SF experience. He may be reached at DSN 239-9002/1879 or com-mercial (910) 432-9002/1879, or send e-mail to: mcphersw@soc.mil.

The overall 2003 FA 39 selection rate for promotion to lieutenant colonel wasslightly below the average rate for the operations career field, or OPCF. Anexamination of the promotion rates for PSYOP and CA officers within FA 39shows that if three more PSYOP officers had been selected, the PSYOPselection rate would have matched the OP CF average. If one more CA offi-cer had been selected, the CA selection rate would have been above the OPCF average. This year’s eligible FA 39 officers had six more months ofbranch-qualification time than last year’s group (27 months vs. 21 months).They also had an average of 10 more months of FA 39 utilization time,because of their early career-field designation as FA 39 officers. For addi-tional information, contact Jeanne Goldmann at DSN 239-6406 or commer-cial (910) 432-6406, or send e-mail to: goldmanj@soc.mil.

SF officer management has matured to the point that SF is now recruitingand accessing officers strictly by year-groups, so that it can properly man-age the strength of each year-group and ensure that all officers competefor accession on an equal basis. The commander of the Special WarfareCenter and School recently signed a policy change that prohibits officersoutside the targeted year-group from applying for SF training. The FY2004 SF accession board, which will meet in April 2004, will consider offi-cers in year-group 2001 only. Interested officers should apply by January2004 if they hope to be considered. Officers who fail to submit their pack-ets in time, for any reason, will be ineligible. Officers are responsible forensuring the completeness and accuracy of their initial packets. Officerswill no longer be allowed to submit appeals packets to the SF proponent.For assistance or further information, visit the SF Branch Web page atPERSCOM Online (www.perscomonline.army.mil) or contact the SFRecruiting Office at DSN 239-1818 or commercial (910) 432-1818.

Army designates chief warrant of MOS 180A

FA 39 2003 LTC selectionrate under OPCF average

Only YG 2001 officers mayapply for 2004 SF accession

board

SWCS welcomes new commander

The U.S. Army John F. KennedySpecial Warfare Center and Schoolwelcomed a new commander andsaw its former leader promoted tolieutenant general during cere-monies held July 16.

Major General William G. Boykinrelinquished command of the spe-cial-operations training center toMajor General Geoffrey C. Lambert.Immediately following the changeof command ceremony, Boykinreceived his third star.

Lambert, a 30-year Army veteranand an SF officer for most of hiscareer, was formerly commandinggeneral of the U.S. Army SpecialForces Command.

Lambert’s other assignmentsinclude rifle platoon leader andassistant operations officer, 75thInfantry (Ranger); battalion com-mander, 7th SF Group; commander,10th SF Group; commander, SpecialOperations Command-Europe; anddirector, Center for Operations,Plans and Policy, U.S. Special Opera-tions Command, MacDill Air ForceBase, Fla.

Boykin is now Deputy Undersec-retary of Defense for Intelligence,Intelligence and Warfighting Sup-port, Office of the Secretary ofDefense, Washington, D.C.

Special Warfare Museumdisplays GWOT artifacts

An exhibit featuring artifactsfrom the global war on terrorismopened Aug. 21 at the JFK SpecialWarfare Museum.

The exhibit is a work in progressthat allows visitors to see how recent

special-operations missions are be-coming milestones in history. “It is aneducational tool,not only for those whoare going to go into those theaters, butalso for those who have come out of(them),” said Roxanne M. Merritt,museum director and curator.

The display contains items,mostly from Operation EnduringFreedom, that were donated by dif-ferent SF groups. “We also havetwo items that are from the WorldTrade Center,” Merritt said.

While the museum is limited byspace, Merritt said it is looking toexpand the exhibit as operations con-tinue. “We are looking for things thatare representative of people’s partici-pation, whether it is in OEF, OIF or inthe Philippines. We want to be able toshow the best-rounded picture ofSOF’s involvement.”

Because the display is growing andreceiving contributions from Civil

Affairs and Psychological Operationsunits, the artifacts will eventually spillover into a different room in the muse-um. “We are starting to get items thatdeal primarily with the other SOFunits,” Merritt said. “We want to makesure they get equal coverage.”

The museum is open from 11 a.m.to 4 p.m., Tuesday through Sunday,and closed Mondays. For more infor-mation, telephone the JFK Museumat DSN 239-1533 or commercial(910) 432-1533. — Specialist Jen-nifer Eidson, USASOC PAO

4th POG opens SOF mediaoperations complex

The 4th Psychological Opera-tions Group has opened a newfacility at Fort Bragg that bringsall the group’s media elementsunder the same roof.

The Special Operations ForcesMedia Operations Complex openedJune 30. Colonel James Treadwell,then-commander of the 4th PSYOPGroup, said the 51,756 square-footfacility cost $8.1 million and willreceive additional equipmentworth about the same amount overthe next few years.

“This complex, coupled with newequipment that is scheduled forpurchase during the next severalyears ... marks PSYOP as a growthfield — one that is becoming moreimportant in the achievement ofthe national goals and objectives,”Treadwell said.

“This complex consolidates theheavy print facility, the media pro-duction facility, production distribu-tion facility, electronics mainte-nance shop and the maintenancesupport team of the 3rd Psychologi-

44 Special Warfare

UpdateSpecial Warfare

Items on display in the new global war on ter-rorism exhibit at the Special Warfare Museum.

Photo by Jennifer Eidson

cal Operations Battalion under oneroof,” Treadwell said.

Without the hard work of pastand current PSYOP specialists,the complex would not have beenpossible, Treadwell said. “Thesenew facilities are a tribute to thesuccess of previous psychological-operations soldiers, as theyproved the value of PSYOP as acombat multiplier and a peace-time contributor,” he said. “Thecommitment of the U.S. SpecialOperations Command and theU.S. Army Special OperationsCommand to build these facilitiesfor us recognizes the great poten-tial for psychological operationsin all future military operations.”

Special Forces Commandchanges hands

Brigadier General Gary M. Jonesassumed command of the U.S. ArmySpecial Forces Command Sept. 15from the deputy commanding gener-al and acting commander, BrigadierGeneral David P. Burford.

Jones was formerly commanderof the Special Operations Com-mand-Europe. Since completingthe SF Qualification Course in1982, he has held a number of lead-ership positions within the special-operations community.

“Jones is the right man … to takeover the command,” said LieutenantGeneral Philip R. Kensinger Jr., com-manding general of the U. S. ArmySpecial Operations Command. “He isthe epitome of the special-operationssoldier — a skilled, combat-experi-enced soldier. … He is a leader whowill take this highly trained group ofSpecial Forces soldiers where ournation most needs them.”

With the high demand on SF sol-diers to support the global war onterrorism, Jones said, SF soldiersmust continue to evolve with therequirements of their mission andmaintain high standards of readi-ness. “The hallmark of SpecialForces is that we are always open

to change and out-of-the-box think-ing,” Jones said.

SWCS honors instructors of the year

The JFK Special Warfare Centerand School named its instructors ofthe year Aug. 14.

Major General Geoffrey C. Lam-bert, SWCS commanding general,presented Army Achievement Medalsand congratulatory letters to the topofficer, NCO and civilian instructor.

The officer instructor is MajorJesse McIntyre III. McIntyre,assigned to Company B, 3rd Battal-ion, 1st Special Warfare TrainingGroup, teaches in the PsychologicalOperations Officer Course.

The NCO instructor is SergeantFirst Class Kelly S. Foster. Foster,assigned to the SWCS NCO Academy,is an instructor in the SF AdvancedNCO Course.

The civilian instructor is RobertT. Lane. Lane, assigned to CompanyA, 1st Battalion, 1st SWTG, is aninstructor in the Survival, EvasionResistance and Escape Level-CCourse.

SOSCOM welcomes new commander

With soldiers from the UnitedStates Army Special OperationsSupport Command standing in for-mation on Fort Bragg’s Dick Mead-ows Field, Colonel Kevin A. Leonardpassed SOSCOM’s reins to ColonelRobert L. Cursio Jr., June 26.

Cursio was formerly assigned tothe U.S. Army War College, CarlisleBarracks, Pa. “Colonel Cursio is not astranger to the (special operations)community or Fort Bragg,” said Lieu-tenant General Philip R. KensingerJr., commanding general of the U.S.Army Special Operations Command.“He did a tour with the RangerTraining Brigade. … He was aninfantry officer for more than 10years, and his deployments andexperience over the last 10 years as aquartermaster officer made him the

right man to lead these outstandingsoldiers in providing the logisticaland signal support Army special-operations soldiers can’t do without.”

Leonard will become chief of theLogistics Division, Office of the JointChiefs of Staff, at the Pentagon.

Summe takes command of 4th PSYOP Group

Colonel Jack Summe took com-mand of the 4th PsychologicalOperations Group July 17 during aceremony at Fort Bragg.

Summe, formerly assigned to theJoint Staff at the Department ofDefense, had previously served inthe 4th PSYOP Group as command-er of the 1st PSYOP Battalion.

Summe assumed command fromColonel James Treadwell, who isnow assigned to the U.S. SpecialOperations Command, MacDill AirForce Base, Fla.

USASOC announces NCO, Soldier of the Year

The United States Army SpecialOperations Command announced itsfiscal year 2004 NCO and Soldier ofthe Year July 25.

Sergeant First Class John C.Dozer, a small-group leader at theJFK Special Warfare Center andSchool’s NCO Academy, and Special-ist Jason A. Parsons, a member ofCompany A, 2nd Battalion, 75thRanger Regiment, Fort Lewis,Wash., are this year’s winners.

1st Special Warfare TrainingGroup changes command

Colonel Manuel A. Diemerassumed command of the JFK Spe-cial Warfare Center and School’s 1stSpecial Warfare Training Groupfrom Colonel Charles King June 13.

Diemer was formerly deputy com-mander of the United States ArmySpecial Forces Command. His otherSF assignments include chief of staff,U.S. Army Special Forces Command;commander, 1st Battalion, 1st Spe-cial Warfare Training Group; group

August 2003 45

operations officer and executive offi-cer, 10th SF Group; company com-mander and operations officer, 3rdBattalion, 10th SF Group; anddetachment commander, 2nd Battal-ion, 10th SF Group.

King’s new assignment is chief ofstaff, Special Operations Command-Pacific, U.S. Pacific Command.

7th SF Group receives new commander

The 7th Special Forces Groupconducted a change of command atFort Bragg July 10.

Colonel Jeffrey D. Waddellassumed command from ColonelPeter J. Dillon. Waddell, a 28-yearArmy veteran, has been an SF officerfor most of his Army career. He wasformerly the plans and operationsofficer for the U.S. Army SpecialForces Command.

Dillon, who had led the 7th Groupsince June 2001, has assumed newduties as a member of the ArmyJoint Staff in Washington, D.C.

Special-ops unit winstop Army deployment award

An Army special-operations sup-port unit based at Fort Bragg haswon honors for its excellence indeployment.

The 112th Special OperationsSignal Battalion was recognized inJuly by the Department of theArmy as the first-place winner inthe large-unit category of the 2003Chief of Staff of the Army Deploy-ment Excellence Awards.

The awards are designed toacknowledge units that exceedArmy standards for deploymentplanning and execution. Competi-tion categories are designed to rec-ognize deployment excellence at alllevels of the Army, including smallunits, large units, support unitsand installations.

“Deploying to war is what we’re allabout, and the fact that we’re beingrecognized for deployment excellenceis something I’m tremendously proud

of,” said Lieutenant Colonel PeterGallagher, the 112th’s commander.

“The award … recognizes theprofessionalism of the soldiers andthe unit,” he said. “Deploymentexcellence is almost a state of mindhere. If we can’t take off on a dime,we’re no good to anybody.”

As the Army’s only special-opera-tions signal battalion, the 112thhas the mission of providing world-wide operational and tactical com-munications in support of Armyspecial-operations forces and thecommanders of joint special-opera-tions task forces.

AAR to yield PSYOPlessons from OEF, OIF

The JFK Special Warfare Centerand School’s Psychological Opera-tions Training and Doctrine Divi-sion, Directorate of Training andDoctrine, is conducting after-actionreviews, or AARs, with Psychologi-cal Operations units returningfrom Operations Enduring Free-dom and Iraqi Freedom.

The purpose of the AARs is tocapture lessons learned, to identifyissues and to analyze PSYOP oper-ational and methodological trends.Information gleaned about currentoperations will help developers ofPSYOP doctrine and training initi-ate any necessary improvements.

The AAR was begun by MajorAlbert F. Armonda, an ArmyReservist activated for active-dutyspecial work in order to augment thePSYOP Division’s Collective Train-ing Branch. Armonda and several ofthe PSYOP Division’s doctrine andtraining-development specialistsbegan conducting AARs in mid-Julywith members of the 305th and310th PSYOP companies.

The input of returning PSYOPunits has yielded worthwhile lessonsin a number of areas, including:• PSYOP force structure and

organization.• Integration of active- and reserve-

component PSYOP units.

• PSYOP support to Army andMarine conventional forces andother special-operations forces.

• Critical tasks for MOS 37F (skilllevels 1-4) and FA 39 officers.

• PSYOP command and control.• PSYOP planning.• Effective PSYOP programs,

products and psychologicalactivities.

• PSYOP targeting.• Equipment (PSYOP-specific and

non-specific).• Utilization of host-nation media.• Measures of effectiveness.

The PSYOP Division’s goal is tocapture input from all PSYOPunits redeploying throughout theduration of OEF and OIF. The divi-sion is working with other PSYOPunits and headquarters in an effortto capture pertinent informationand incorporate it into doctrineand training products. The PSYOPDivision is also collecting lessonsgathered by teams sponsored bythe Army Training and DoctrineCommand.

The PSYOP Division plans to beginmaking periodic releases of the AARresults in the near future. To submitrecommendations or to provide as-sessments or comments, contact DebraA.Weltz, deputy division chief, at DSN236-4010, commercial (910) 396-4010;or send e-mail to: weltzd@soc.mil or debra.weltz@us.army.mil.

The PSYOP Division is also solicit-ing photos of PSYOP personnel inaction in support of OEF/OIF. Thephotos will be included in new doctri-nal and training materials. Photosmay be hard-copy or digital; hard-copy photos will be returned. Toobtain submission instructions, con-tact Staff Sergeant Daniel A. Reeder,Training Development Branch, atDSN 239-7257, commercial (910) 432-7257, or e-mail: reederda@soc.mil.

46 Special Warfare

In the Devil’s Shadow: U.N.Special Operations During theKorean War. By Michael E. Haas.Annapolis, Md.: Naval InstitutePress, 2000. ISBN: 1-55750-344-3.243 pages. $33.

It would not be surprising if manywho served in the Korean War sawit as an aftershock or echo of WorldWar II, which had ended only fiveyears earlier. With few exceptions,the organizations, equipment,weapons and uniforms were thesame as those used during WorldWar II. The generals were WorldWar II generals, and because of thepresidential decision to call upreserve officers, even a great manyof the company-grade officers wereWorld War II veterans.

In the earlier war, excepting thegreat Philippine guerrilla-warfareeffort, what is now titled specialoperations had been almost exclu-sively the province of the Office ofStrategic Services, or OSS. Serviceleaders, except for General DouglasMacArthur, did not view that as astrange or hostile arrangement.From the early days of World WarII, the OSS was subordinate to theJoint Chiefs of Staff, it providedliaison to major field commands,and it drew most of its operationalpersonnel from the services.

The OSS had been disbandedsoon after the war ended, but ithad been replaced within a fewmonths by the Central IntelligenceGroup, which soon became theCentral Intelligence Agency. Thenew agency drew on the services,particularly the Army, for opera-tional personnel, in much the sameway that the OSS had done. Given

these similarities and the inter-agency agreements that said thatin wartime the CIA would supportthe regional military commander,one can easily understand how mil-itary commanders could haveexpected that in Korea the CIAwould reprise the OSS’s World WarII role. That was not to be.

The CIA saw a need to make a rep-utation, and not one as merely ahandmaiden to the services. It there-fore took a very independent tack andconducted its own special operationsunder the cover title Joint AdvisoryCommission-Korea, or JACK. It wasaided in its independent actions by itslargely unchallenged self-view as thepresident’s own operational organiza-tion and the fact that as a new agencyit was not yet encumbered with layersof administrative, legal and congres-sional restraints.

At the time, service commanderswere clearly at a disadvantage indealing with the CIA. The CIA

enjoyed the advantage of a smallorganization and the direct communi-cation to its Washington headquar-ters that have long been an effectiveweapon in interagency disputes. Lackof restraint by the normal govern-ment ethics allowed the CIA to bribeArmy clerks to divert officers to CIAassignments. A senior general whoserved as a captain with JACKdescribed it as, “Dealing with peoplewho have been trained to lie to youand who don’t hesitate to.”

If the Army ever protested theCIA’s independent stance, it wasunsuccessful, and such protestswere probably drowned out in thehigh pace of activities during thefirst chaotic year of the war. In anyevent, the Army took advantage ofthe opportunities offered by thou-sands of anti-Communist NorthKoreans and established a seminalunconventional-warfare capability,primarily operating from islands offof North Korea’s west coast.

Peace negotiations and a stabi-lized front soon undermined effortsto create a true internal resistance,and the UW effort evolved into acoastal-raiding program. SpecialForces experienced its first combatand suffered its first casualties when50 newly trained SF officers joinedthis program during the last sixmonths of the war. In organizationalisolation from the major effort, theArmy conducted other operations,primarily intelligence-related, thatwould now be considered to be with-in the special-operations arena.

The Air Force, which had been aseparate service for only two yearswhen the war began, employed itsnewfound independence to conductspecial operations: unilaterally, in

August 2003 47

Book ReviewsSpecial Warfare

consort with the Korean govern-ment, and in support of the CIA.One of its more notable activitieswas the establishment of air resup-ply and communications wings, itsfirst special-operations unit as aseparate service and its first sincethe World War II air-commandogroups were disbanded.

As might be expected, the Navy,with its long history of contendingboth that naval forces were differ-ent and should not be subordinatedto regional commands, and that bypossessing air, ground and afloatforces, it was by definition “joint,”also went its own way and conduct-ed special operations. These, if notas extensive, were at least as var-ied as the Army’s and included theinfiltration of U.N. forces.

With four independent players,the potential for interference anddisaster was enormous. In reality,disaster did not occur. Geographicalseparation, possibly abetted by eachparty’s desire not to have to coordi-nate with the other players, served tokeep the operations separate. Theestablishment of an overall inter-agency command with the title ofCombined Command for Reconnais-sance Activities, or CCRAK, waslargely abortive. The CIA saw it asan Army effort to control all specialoperations. Given the fact that all ofthe senior Army leaders had WorldWar II experience wherein the OSSsupported the field armies, that viewprobably contained more than agrain of truth. The CIA provided rep-resentation but gave only lip serviceto coordination, much less coopera-tion. Some service members saw theCIA as using the organization onlyas a means of spying on the otherplayers. Given these conditions, fewcan be surprised that CCRAK hadlittle effect.

Retired Air Force Colonel MikeHaas has written a book thataddresses all of these organiza-tions and their activities. It couldbe said that he has written the pre-mier book on the subject, but as the

reviewer knows of no other authorwho has had the courage and dedi-cation to take on this dauntingsubject, that would not be highpraise, nor would it be very helpfulto potential readers.

Irrespective of its lack of competi-tors, In the Devil’s Shadow is anexcellent book. It is organized intofour sections or monographs that arecentered on the special-operationsactivities of each of the major organ-izations. Unlike many history writ-ers, Haas does not limit himself tomere recitation of facts but providesanalysis of the good and bad aspects,the potential, and the impact ofessentially unilateral operations.With an extensive military special-operations background that includesservice as an SF NCO and as an offi-cer in Air Force special operations,Haas is exceptionally well-qualifiedto make such judgments.

In his attempt to provide anextensive and inclusive picture,however, Haas fails to provide afully balanced picture. He weighsrelatively minor Navy and AirForce activities equally with thelarger and longer-term Army pro-grams. Haas’ treatment of CIA pro-grams is somewhat spare, but thatproblem is explained in the intro-

duction, wherein the author indi-cates that the CIA’s failure todeclassify and release historicaldocuments as directed by law wasa major research limitation.

This is not a book of high adven-ture in the Orient. If that is thereader’s interest, he is referred torecently published memoirs such asColonel Ben Malcom’s White Tigers,Ed Evanhoe’s Dark Moon, or“Heine” Aderholt’s Commando One.In the Devil’s Shadow has its shareof tersely described combat opera-tions, but its real wealth lies in itsrevelation of the wheels-within-wheels and the cross-connectionsand disconnections that composedKorean War special operations.

In the Devil’s Shadow is well-organized and has an excellentindex and bibliography. Further-more, up front, it has a list of abbre-viations without which the readerwould be lost in Acronym Swamp. Itis highly recommended to those whohave an interest in special-opera-tions history or the Korean War, orto those who sometimes havedoubts concerning the utility anddesirability of modern joint special-operations headquarters.

COL J.H. CrerarU.S. Army (ret.)Vienna, Va.

Deception in War: The Art of theBluff, the Value of Deceit and theMost Thrilling Episodes of Cun-ning in Military History, fromthe Trojan Horse to the GulfWar. By Jon Latimer. New York: TheOverlook Press, 2001. ISBN 1-58567-381-1 (paperback). 356 pages. $17.95.

John Latimer’s Deception in Waris an excellent primer for anyonewho is interested in learning moreabout the value or the techniquesof military deception. Although thebook could be better organized, it isa good blend of theory and histori-cal examples at the tactical, opera-tional and strategic levels of war.

48 Special Warfare

Deception is one of the mostchallenging tasks for the staffplanner. Deception can be a signifi-cant combat multiplier and canultimately save lives and conserveresources. A poorly planned andpoorly executed deception mayactually give away one’s intentionsto the enemy. The best deceptionsreinforce what the enemy com-mander already believes, but it isnever easy to know what is in theenemy commander’s head.

Latimer, a career British armyofficer, maintains that becauseactive deceptions (whose intent isto get the enemy to act) are inher-ently risky, most planners considerpassive deception (whose objectiveis to hide one’s intentions orstrength) more important. Passivedeception is essentially camouflageand operational security. Thisreviewer’s observations during fourWarfighter exercises over the lastfive years support Latimer’s asser-tion.

The key part of Deception in Waris the chapter in which the authorexplains the principles of decep-tion. Latimer’s principles are simi-lar to current principles of decep-tion outlined in Joint Publication3-58, Joint Doctrine for MilitaryDeception. A few of Latimer’s prin-ciples deserve to be examined here.• Focus. Deception must always be

aimed at the opposing com-mander or someone who isempowered to make decisions.

• Action. The purpose of deceptionsis to get the enemy to performactions that support your plan. Itis not enough to make someonethink something. A good decep-tion makes him do something.

• Coordination and central control.Although deception is mainly thedomain of the operations staff,each staff element has a role insupporting it. Deceptions need tobe carefully controlled, becauseyou are essentially trying to painta complex and delicate picture.

• Preparation and timing. A poor-

ly planned deception is worsethan none at all. Deceptionneeds time to work. You cannotinfluence the enemy instantly.

• Security. A deception plan mustbe kept as secure as the opera-tions plan.

• Creditability and confirmation. Adeception is of no value if theenemy does not believe it. Thecreditability of the cover plan isincreased when it is confirmedfrom a variety of sources. Falseinformation is made more credibleif it is fed to the enemy in waysthat will make him believe that hehas discovered your intentionsthrough his own efforts.

• Flexibility. A deception is notstatic, because no plan survivescontact. Deception operationsmust be guided by feedback andby changes in the situation.Latimer’s chapter on the meth-

ods of deception is poorly organ-ized, but it does contain some valu-able insights. The chapter beginsby discussing electronic warfareand psychological operations, orPSYOP, and then proceeds to cate-gorize the different methods ofdeception. Electronic warfare andPSYOP are really tools, not meth-ods, of deception, and the chaptermakes no clear distinction betweentools and methods. However,Latimer does a good job of usinghistorical examples to outline sev-eral basic deception methods.• Masking. Disguise your forces as

something else.• Substitution. Make the enemy see

one thing, and then replace it withsomething completely different.

• False routines. Repeat a processso many times that it does notappear unusual.

• Lures. Draw the enemy into anunfavorable position.

• Mistakes and bad luck. Feed theenemy false information thatappears to be the result of yourincompetence or misfortune.

• Double bluffing. This is the mostdifficult. The objective is to make

the enemy recognize that he isbeing deceived, and to make hisreaction to the apparent decep-tion advantageous to you.In the final chapter, Latimer com-

ments on the future of deceptionoperations. Deceptions will not bemade obsolete by modern technolo-gy. The air campaign against theSerbs showed that there is a varietyof low-tech and time-honored mea-sures that can effectively deceivesophisticated intelligence-gatheringmeans. The fact is that modern sur-veillance and information technolo-gy provides the deception plannerwith more avenues to the target andmore ways to focus the deception.

Deception in War is an interest-ing read for the experienced decep-tion planner and a “must read” forthe junior staff officer or anyonewho is new to deception planning.

MAJ William J. Gormley304th PSYOP CompanyBagram Airfield, Afghanistan

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Special Warfare

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