Spec Pro_SY 2014-2015_2nd Sem_assignment # 3 (Rule 77-85)

8/10/2019 Spec Pro_SY 2014-2015_2nd Sem_assignment # 3 (Rule 77-85)

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University of Cebu

College of Law

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

ATTENTION EVERYONE:

ASSIGNMENT for TUESDAY

(January 6, 2015)

A.Cases for Rule 76

1. Leviste v. CA, G.R. No. L-29184, January

30, 1989 (169 SCRA 580)

G.R. No. L-29184 January 30, 1989

BENEDICTO LEVISTE,petitioner,

vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE LUIS B.

REYES, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA,

ROSA DEL ROSARIO, RITA BANU, CARMEN DE

GUZMAN-MARQUEZ, JESUS R. DE GUZMAN, RAMON

R. DE GUZMAN, JACINTO R. DE GUZMAN and

ANTONIO R. DE GUZMAN,respondents.Benedicto Leviste for and in his own behalf.

Gatchalian, Ignacio & Associates for respondents de

Guzman.

GRIO-AQUINO,J.:

The issue in this case is whether or not an attorney whowas engaged on a contingent fee basis may, in order to

collect his fees, prosecute an appeal despite his client's

refusal to appeal the decision of the trial court.

On September 7, 1963, the petitioner, a practicing

attorney, entered into a written agreement with the

private respondent Rosa del Rosario to appear as her

counsel in a petition for probate of the holographic will of

the late Maxima C. Reselva. Under the will, a piece of

real property at Sales Street, Quiapo, Manila, was

bequeathed to Del Rosario. It was agreed that

petitioner's contigent fee would be thirty-five per cent

(35%) of the property that Rosa may receive upon the

probate of the will (Annex "A", p. 59, Rollo).In accordance with their agreement, Leviste performed

the following services as Del Rosario's counsel:

(1) Thoroughly researched and studied

the law on probate and succession;

(2) Looked for and interviewed

witnesses, and took their affidavits;

(3) Filed the petition for. probate is

Special Proceeding No. 58325;

(4) Made the proper publications;

(5) Presented at the trial the following

witnesses:

a) Eleuterio de Jesus

b) Lucita de Jesus

c) Purita L. Llanes

d) Rita Banu

e) Jesus Lulod.

On August 20, 1965, Leviste received a letter from Ms.

Del Rosario, informing him that she was terminating his

services as her counsel due to "conflicting interest." This

consisted, according to the letter, in petitioner's moral

obligation to protect the interest of his brother-in-law,

Gaudencio M. Llanes, whom Del Rosario and the other

parties in the probate proceeding intended to eject as

lessee of the property which was bequeathed to Del

Rosario under the will (Annex "B", p. 60, Rollo).

On September 20, 1965, petitioner filed a "Motion to

Intervene to Protect His Rights to Fees for Professional

Services." (Annex "B", p. 60, Rollo.)

In an order dated November 12, 1965 the trial court

denied his motion on the ground that he had "not filed a

claim for attorney's fees nor recorded his attorney's lien."

(p. 3, Rollo.)

On November 23, 1965, petitioner filed a "FormalStatement of Claim for Attorney's Fees and Recording of

Attorney's Lien,' which was noted in the court's order of

December 20, 1965 (Annexes "D" and "E", pp. 63 & 64,

Rollo).

Although the order denying his motion to intervene had

become final, petitioner continued to receive copies of

the court's orders, as well the pleadings of the other

parties in the case. He also continued to file pleadings.

The case was submitted for decision without the

respondents' evidence.

On November 23, 1966, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the

special administratrix-legatee, filed a "Motion To

Withdraw Petition for Probate" alleging that Del Rosariowaived her rights to the devise in her favor and agreed

that the De Guzman brothers and sisters who opposed

her petition for probate, shall inherit all the properties

left by the decedent. (Annex "F", p. 65, Rollo.)

In an order of April 13, 1967 the trial court denied the

motion to withdraw the petition for being contrary to

public policy (Annex "G", pp. 66-67, Rollo).

Nonetheless, on August 28, 1967, the court disallowed

the will, holding that the legal requirements for its

validity were not satisfied as only two witnesses testified

that the will and the testatrix's signature were in the

handwriting of Maxima Reselva.

The petitioner filed an appeal bond, notice of appeal, and

record on appeal. The private respondents filed a motion

to dismiss the appeal on the ground that petitioner was

not a party in interest.

The petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss his appeal,

claiming that he has a direct and material interest in the

decision sought to be reviewed. He also asked that he be

substituted as party-petitioner, in lieu of his former

client, Ms. Del Rosario.

On March 28, 1968, the trial judge dismissed the appeal

and denied petitioner's motion for substitution.

The petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition

formandamus(CA-G.R. No. 41248) praying that the trialcourt be ordered to give due course to his appeal and to

grant his motion for substitution.

On May 22, 1968, the Court of Appeals dismissed the

petition for being insufficient in form and substance as

the petitioner did not appear to be the proper party to

appeal the decision in Special Proceeding No. 58325

(Annex 1, p. 77, Rollo).

Upon the denial of his motion for reconsideration,

petitioner appealed by certiorari to this Court, assigning

the following errors against the Court of Appeals'

resolution:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in finding

that the petitioner appears not to be theproper party to appeal the decision in

Sp. Proc. No. 58325 of the Court of First

Instance of Manila.

2. Assuming the petitioner's right of

appeal is doubtful, the Court of Appeals

erred in dismissing his petition for

mandamus; and

3. The Court of Appeals erred in not

reversing the decision in Sp. Proc. No.

58325 denying the probate of the


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March 12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners filed

before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a

petition for the settlement of the intestate estate

of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things,

that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Paraaque,

Rizal, and died without leaving a will and

praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as

Special Administratrix of the estate; and that on

March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and

Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court forthe probation of the will delivered by them on

March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by the parties

that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paraaque, Rizal;

that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church

of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to

the time of his death in 1963; that he was

buried in Paraaque, and that he left real

properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and

Bulacan.

The movants contend that since the intestate

proceedings in the Court of First Instance of

Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963

while the petition for probate was filed in theCourt of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M.

on the same date, the latter Court has no

jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate,

citing as authority in support thereof the case

ofOngsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja,

G.R. No. 7792, July 27, 1955.

The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the

other hand, take the stand that the Court of

First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction

over the case upon delivery by them of the will to

the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that

the case in this Court therefore has precedence

over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.

The Court of First Instance, as previously stated denied

the motion to dismiss on the ground that a difference of

a few hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference

over the other; that, as early as March 7, movants were

aware of the existence of the purported will of Father

Rodriguez, deposited in the Court of Bulacan, since they

filed a petition to examine the same, and that movants

clearly filed the intestate proceedings in Rizal "for no

other purpose than to prevent this Court (of Bulacan)

from exercising jurisdiction over the probate

proceedings". Reconsideration having been denied,

movants, now petitioners, came to this Court, relyingprincipally on Rule 73, section 1 of the Rules of Court,

and invoking our ruling inOngsingco vs. Tan and De

Borja, L-7792, July 27, 1955.

SECTION 1.Where estate of deceased persons

settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the

Philippines at the time of his death, whether a

citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or

letters of administration granted, and his estate

settled, in the Court of First Instance in the

province in which he resides at the time of his

death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign

country, the Court of First Instance of any

province which he had estate. The court firsttaking cognizance of the settlement of the estate

of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the

exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction

assumed by a court, as far as it depends on the

place of residence of the decedent, or of the

location of his estate, shall not be contested in a

suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that

court, in the original case, or when the want of

jurisdiction appears on the record.

We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of

the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested

upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father

Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its

allowance was filed until later, because upon the will

being deposited the court could,motu proprio, have

taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will,

and issued the corresponding notices conformably to

what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised

Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):SEC. 3.Court to appoint time for proving

will.Notice thereof to be published. When a

will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance

of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction,

such Court shall fix a time and place for proving

the will when all concerned may appear to

contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause

notice of such time and place to be published

three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time

appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation

in the province.

But no newspaper publication shall be made

where the petition for probate has been filed bythe testator himself.

The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is

delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is

filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the

mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if

no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the

petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will,

the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when

the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr.

Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of

Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate

proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only

on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and

exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is

incontestable.1wph1.t

But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old

Rule 77) speaks of a will being delivered to "the Court

having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the Bulacan

court did not have it because the decedent was domiciled

in Rizal province. We can not disregard Fr. Rodriguez's

33 years of residence as parish priest in Hagonoy,

Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider

that he retained throughout someanimus revertendito

the place of his birth in Paraaque, Rizal, that detail

would not imply that the Bulacan court lackedjurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the power to

settle decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all

courts of first instance, and the domicile of the testator

only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the

Court (In reKaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239; Reyes vs. Diaz, 73

Phil. 484; Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73 Phil. 676). Neither

party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or

that he left personal property in Hagonoy, province of

Bulacan (t.s.n. p. 46, hearing of June 11, 1963, Annex

"H", Petition, Rec., p. 48). That is sufficient in the case

before us.

In theKaw Singcocase (ante) this Court ruled that:

"... If we consider such question of residence asone affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court

over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that

the whole proceedings including all decisions on

the different incidents which have arisen in

court will have to be annulled and the same case

will have to be commenced anew before another

court of the same rank in another province. That

this is of mischievous effect in the prompt

administration of justice is too obvious to require

comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co.,


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26 May 1964, in accord with the latters prior decision in

Fernandez, etc., Et. Al. v. Maravilla, L-18799, 31 March

1964, 1 which settled the question of appellate

jurisdiction in favor of the Supreme Court over that of

the Court of Appeals, on the appeal from the

appointment of a special co-administrator in the same

Special Proceeding No. 4977 in view of the value of the

estate.

Appellant Herminio Maravilla, probate petitioner andhusband of the decedent, died on 16 July 1966, after the

case was submitted for decision. Upon motion for

intervention filed by Concepcion Maravilla Kohlhaas and

Rose Mary Kohlhaas, this Supreme Court allowed their

intervention on 24 July 1967, upon showing that their

interest as substitute heirs was vested definitely upon

the death of Herminio Maravilla, and that said movants

for intervention merely adopt the pleadings and briefs

filed in behalf of the deceased Herminio Maravilla so that

the intervention will not delay the disposition of the

case. 2

Appellees Pedro, 3 Asuncion and Regina, all surnamed"Maravilla," who are allegedly the brother and sisters of

the deceased Digna Maravilla and oppositors to the

probate, had moved to require the P. C. Laboratory to

submit explanations of the photographs of the will and

the signatures thereon previously filed, 4 but this Court,

considering that such explanation would amount to new

evidence not heard at the trial, denied the motion on 3

August 1967. 5

Herminio Maravillas petition for probate was opposed by

the appellees in an amended opposition filed in the

course of the trial in the court below and admitted

without objection. The opposition alleged the following

grounds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"a) That the deceased, Digna Maravilla, the alleged

testatrix and the instrumental witnesses did not sign the

alleged will, each and every page thereof, in the presence

of each other;

"b) That the deceased, Digna Maravilla, the alleged

testatrix, affixed her signature to her alleged will under

undue and improper pressure and influence and/or

duress brought to bear upon her by the petitioner, for his

own personal benefit and advantage and that of hisnieces, Adelina Sajo and Rose Marie Kohlhaas and his

half-sister Conchita Maravilla Kohlhaas;

"c) That the deceased, Digna Maravilla, at the time she

affixed her signature to her alleged will was not of sound

and disposing mind;

"d) That the alleged will, now being offered for probate

had already been revoked by the deceased, Digna

Maravilla." 6

After trial, the court below rendered judgment, holding

as unsubstantiated the last three (3) grounds above-enumerated, but sustaining the first, that is, that the

will was not executed in accordance with Section 618 of

Act 190, and, therefore, denied the probate of the will.

The petitioner and one Adelina Sajro, who was named a

devisee under the questioned will, appealed the

judgment, as aforesaid, assigning errors of fact and law.

The oppositors-appellees did not appeal but counter-

assigned errors their brief.

There is no controversy that the late Digna Maravilla

died in Manapla, Negros Occidental, on 12 August 1958,

leaving an extensive estate. Prior to her death, she was a

resident of Saravia, same province. It is, likewise,

undisputed that, at the time of the probate proceedings,

only one (1) (Aquilino Mansueto) of the three (3) attesting

witnesses to the will had survived, the two (2) others

(Timoteo Hernaez and Mariano Buenaflor) having died

previously.

The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "A," which is

typewritten in the Spanish language, purports to have

been executed in Manila on the 7th day of October,

1944; it consists of five (5) pages, including the page on

which the attestation clause was completed. The

purported signatures of the testatrix appear at the

logical end of the will on page four and at the left margin

of all the other pages. The attestation clause reads as

follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"CLAUSULA DE ATESTIGUAMIENTO

"Nosotros, TIMOTEO HERNAEZ, AQUILINO MANSUETOy MARIANO BUENAFLOR los abajo firmantes todos

mayores de edad y sin impedimento alguno para ser

testigo de este testamento, certificamos y atestiguamos:

Que en la fecha y lugar arriba mencionados Da. DIGNA

MARAVILLA ha otorgado el presente documento como su

testamento y ultima voluntad que consta de cinco

paginas utiles incluyendo esta pagina de

atestiguamiento, escrito a maquinilla en una sola cara

de cada hoja, todas paginadas correlativamente en letras

de puo y letra de la testadora, habiendo dicha

testadora, despues de leido el mismo en nuestra

presencia, firmado por triplicado al pie de este

testamento y al margen izquierdo de cada una de las

cinco paginas de que se compone en presencia de todos

y cada uno de nosotros que tambien firmamos en el

margen izquierdo de cada pagina y al pie de este

atestiguamiento los unos en presencia de los otros y

todos en presencia de lo testadora, quien en el acto del

otorgamiento y firma de este documento se halla en

plena capacidad intelectual, amenazada ni enganada par

otorgar y firmar este testamento.

"Asi lo atestiguamos y firmamos por triplicado de

nuestro puo y letra en Manila hoy a siete de Octubre de

mil novecientos cuarenta y cuatro."cralaw virtua1awlibrary

At the bottom thereof appear the purported signatures of

Timoteo Hernaez, Aquilino Mansueto and Mariano

Buenaflor, attesting witnesses. Their signatures appear

also on the left margin of all the five (5) pages. The

paging of the will is by handwritten words, such as

"Pagina Primera," "Pagina Segunda," etc., written at the

top of each page. On the lower half of the third page,

before the name "CONCEPCION P. MARAVILLA," is the

typewritten word "hermana," which was crossed out, and

over it was handwritten the word "cuada," bearing, at

the left hereof, the initials "D. M."cralaw virtua1awlibrary

After the legacies in favor of herein appellant Adelina

Sajo, a niece of Digna Maravilla, the latters sister-in-law,

Concepcion P. Maravilla de Kohlhaas, and Concepcions

daughter, Rose Mary Kohlhaas, the will named appellant

Herminio Maravilla as universal heir and executor. In

case of the heirs death, or if he should not become heir

for any reason, he is to be substituted by the legatee

Adelina Sajo in one-half of the properties bequeathed,


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the other half to pass collectively to legatees Concepcion

P. Maravilla and the daughter of the latter, Rose Mary

Kohlhaas. All previous wills are declared revoked.

In view of the trial courts decision of 8 February 1960

(Record on Appeal, pages 25-51) refusing probate of the

will, the instituted heir, Herminio Maravilla, and the

legatee, Adelina Sajo, perfected their appeal, assigning as

errors the findings of the trial court that (a)

instrumental witness Aquilino Mansueto did not actuallysee Digna Maravilla sign the will; (b) that Digna

Maravilla was not present when Mansueto signed the will

as witness; (c) that Mansueto "most probably" did not

see Mariano Buenaflor sign as witness to the will; (d) the

testimony of attorney Manuel Villanueva on the due

execution of Digna Maravillas testament was biased and

not deserving of credit; and (e) in refusing probate to the

alleged will for not having been executed with the

requisites prescribed by Section 618 of Act 190.

At the hearing before the court a quo, only one of the

three instrumental witnesses, Col. (ret.) Aquilino

Mansueto, appeared and testified, inasmuch as the othertwo witnesses (Timoteo Hernaez and Mariano Buenaflor)

concededly died prior to the trial of the case. Col.

Mansueto identified his own signature and those of Dr.

Timoteo Hernaez and of Digna Maravilla, and asserted

that the latter did sign in the presence of all three

witnesses and attorney Villanueva; 7 that Hernaez

signed in his presence and in the presence of the other

witnesses and of Digna Maravilla and that present at the

signing were "Dr. Timoteo Hernaez, Mr. Mariano

Buenaflor, attorney Manuel Villanueva and both

Herminio Maravilla and Mrs. Digna Maravilla, (the

testatrix) and identified his signature and those of Digna

and Hernaez 8 although, subsequently, the witness

admitted that he could not remember very well whether

Mr. Maravilla was there at the time he signed the will.

The witness explained that he could not remember some

details because fourteen years had elapsed, and when he

signed as a witness, he did not give it any importance

and because of the time he (Col. Mansueto) was very

worried because of rumours that the Japanese

Kempeitai would arrest officers of the USAFFE who did

not want to collaborate. 9

Colonel Mansuetos testimony was supported by that of

the husband of the testatrix, Herminio Maravilla, and ofattorney Manuel Villanueva. Herminio Maravillas

evidence is that a week before 7 October 1944 his wife,

Digna Maravilla, told him of her desire to "renew" her will

because of the critical period in Manila before the

liberation; 10 he invited Buenaflor, Hernaez and

Mansueto to attest to the will; 11 sent his messenger,

Mariano Buenaflor, to ask attorney Manuel Villanueva to

come to his house at Mabini, Ermita, Manila, in order to

prepare the will; 12 at his wifes request, he gave the list

of properties to Villanueva; 13 he knew that the will was

executed in the dining room while he remained in the

sala; 14 and Villanueva, Mansueto, Hernaez and

Buenaflor were in his house in the morning of 7 October1944 and sat with his wife around the table in the

dining room, with Villanueva at one end, Digna beside

him and the witnesses facing each other; 15 and after

the signing they had lunch, at his invitation, and when

they were eating, petitioner Maravilla saw the three (3)

copies of the will on the dining table. 16 However, he did

not see there sign. 17

Attorney Manuel Villanueva, as third witness for the

proponent asserted that he had been the lawyer of the

Maravillas; that 5 or 6 days before 7 October 1944 he

had been summoned through Mariano Buenaflor to the

house of the Maravillas at 222 Mabini, Ermita, Manila,

and there met Digna who requested him to draft a new

will, revoking her old one, to include as additional

beneficiaries Adelina Sajo, Concepcion Maravilla, and

the latters youngest daughter, Rose Mary Kohlhaas, who

lived with her (Digna) and whom she considered as her

real children, having cared for them since childhood.

Digna gave Villanueva instructions concerning the will,and handed him her old will and a handwritten list of

the certificates of title of her properties, which list she

asked and obtained from her husband. Before leaving,

Villanueva asked Digna to look for three witnesses; their

names were furnished him two or three days later and

he sent word that the will could be executed on 7

October 1944 (as it actually was); on that day he brought

one original and 2 copies with him, and handed them to

Digna; she read the document and while doing so the

witnesses Mansueto, Hernaez and Buenaflor came.

Villanueva talked with them and satisfied himself that

they were competent, whereupon all proceeded to the

dining room table. Attorney Villanueva sat at the headthereof, Digna at his right, and Hernaez at the right of

Digna; at his left was first Mansueto and then Buenaflor.

At the lawyers behest Digna Maravilla read the will in

the presence of the witnesses; after reading she called

his attention to a clerical error on page 3, at the second

to the last line of paragraph 9, where Concepcion

Maravilla was designated as "hermana" ; the word was

cancelled by the testatrix who wrote "cuada" above the

cancelled word, and placed her initials "D. M." beside it.

She also wrote on top of each page the words "Pagina

primera," "Pagina Segunda" and so on, upon Villanuevas

instructions, and then Digna and the witnesses signed

in the presence of one another and of attorney

Villanueva. 18 The latter did not ask the husband

(Herminio) to join the group when the will was executed,

and Herminio remained near the window in the sala. 19

Digna appeared to the witness very healthy and spoke in

Spanish intelligently. The signing ended around 12:30

p.m., and after it all ate lunch. 20

Upon the evidence, the trial judge concluded that

Mansueto did not actually see Digna Maravilla sign the

will in question, basing such conclusion upon the fact

that while Mansueto positively identified his own

signature ("I identify this as my signature") but not thatof the testatrix, his five answers to the questions of

counsel, in reference thereto, being "this must be the

signature of Mrs. Digna Maravilla."cralaw virtua1aw

library

In our opinion, the trial courts conclusion is far fetched,

fanciful and unwarranted. It was but natural that

witness Mansueto should be positive about his own

signature, since he was familiar with it. He had to be

less positive about Digna Maravillas signature since he

could not be closely acquainted with the same: for aught

the record shows, the signing of the will was the only

occasion he saw her sign; he had no opportunity tostudy her signature before or after the execution of

Exhibit "A." Furthermore, he witnessed Dignas signing

not less than fourteen years previously. To demand that

in identifying Dignas signature Mansueto should display

a positiveness equal to the certainty shown by him in

recognizing his own, exceeds the bounds of the

reasonable. The variation in the expressions used by the

witness is the best evidence that he was being candid

and careful, and it is a clear badge of truthfulness rather

than the reverse.


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The trial courts error gains no support from Mansuetos

statement on cross-examination that "I remember and (I)

signed the will in the presence of all the witnesses and in

the presence of attorney Villanueva" (page 29, Volume 1,

T.s.n., Amago). In the absence of an assurance that no

one else was present, this assertion does not really

contradict Mansuetos testimony in chief that "I have

read the entire document before I signed it in the

presence of the other witnesses, Digna Maravilla andAttorney Villanueva" (t.s.n., Amago, Volume 1, pages 18-

19). It is well to note that the cross examiner did not ask

Mansueto if no one else besides those mentioned by him

had seen him sign. Any contradiction inferred from both

statements is purely conjectural; it did not come from

the witness and is insufficient to impeach his veracity,

the difference in the answers being due to no more than

an accidental lapse of memory. A will may be allowed

even if some witnesses not remember having attested it,

if other evidence satisfactorily show due execution (V. Act

190, Section 632), and that failure of witness to identify

his signature does not bar probate. 21

That Mansueto, Hernaez and Buenaflor, together with

the testatrix and the lawyer, sat next to one another

around one table when the will was signed is clearly

established by the uncontradicted testimony of both

attorney Villanueva and Herminio Maravilla; and that

detail proves beyond doubt that each one of the parties

concerned did sign in the presence of all the others. It

should be remembered, in this connection, that the test

is not whether a witness did see the signing of the will

but whether he was in a position to see if he chose to do

so. 22

The trial court rejected the evidence of both Herminio

Maravilla and Manuel Villanueva, giving as a reason that

they were biased and interested in having the probate

succeed. The reasoning is not warranted: for Herminio

Maravilla certainly stood to gain more under the

previous will of his wife (Exhibit "G") where he was made

the sole beneficiary, As to attorney Villanueva, while he

had been a friend of Herminio from boyhood, he also had

been the family lawyer, and his intervention in the

execution of the will of one of his clients became

inevitable, for it is not to be expected that the testatrix

should call upon a stranger for the purpose. If

Villanueva wished to perjure in favor of Herminio, all heneeded was to color his testimony against the due

execution of the will (Exhibit "A") and not in favor

thereof, since, as previously observed, Dignas first will

(Exhibit "G") was more advantageous to the widower.

We find it difficult to understand the trial courts

distrust of a lawyer who did no more than discharge his

professional duty, or its readiness to attribute improper

motives to proponents witnesses. This Court, in Sotelo v.

Luzan, 59 Phil. 908, has remarked that

"It is hardly conceivable that any attorney of any

standing would risk his professional reputation byfalsifying a will and then go before a court and give false

testimony."cralaw virtua1aw library

And in the Fernandez v. Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380, 385, We

ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to

a will, the statements of a competent attorney, who has

been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the

proper execution of the instrument, is entitled to greater

weight than the testimony of a person casually called to

participate in the act, supposing of course that no

motive is revealed that should induce the attorney to

prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of the attorney,

being conversant with the requisites of proper execution

of the instrument, is more likely to become fixed on

details, and he is more likely than other persons to

retain those incidents in his memory." (Italics supplied)

Appellees endeavoured to sustain the courts refusal toprobate the will by referring to the evidence of their

witness Marino Tupas, a man of "no permanent job", 23

who narrated that on the last week of September, 1944

one Mariano Buenaflor had been introduced to him by

one Lt. Garaton at his guerrilla outpost in Montalban

and described as a man wanted by the Japanese. Tupas

patently exaggerated testimony is that this Buenaflor

stayed with him at his outpost camp until January,

1945, living and sleeping with him, and was never for a

single moment out of his sight. 24 Why a civilian refugee

should remain at a guerrilla outpost for four months;

without engaging in any particular helpful activity on his

part, was not explained. Shown photographs and askedto identify Buenaflor, Tupas hedged by pleading that the

Buenaflor who stayed with him had a long beard. Thus,

oppositor-appellees reverse alibi for the instrumental

witness, Mariano Buenaflor, was not only patently

mendacious but did not establish any reliable

connection between the instrumental witness of Dignas

will and the Buenaflor who, according to Tupas, stuck to

him as a burr in 1944. No wonder the trial court gave no

credit to such evidence.

Oppositors attempts to establish that the testatrix Digna

Maravilla was mentally incompetent to validly execute

the will in question met no better fate in the court below.

They introduced one Eufrocina Berja who qualified

Digna Maravilla as insane because she saw Digna

Maravilla acting strangely one morning in 1921 (23 years

before the will was executed). In Berjas own words

"Would you not call a person insane who is waving a

bunch of flowers and singing along a road, especially

taking into consideration their reputation in the

Community?" (t.s.n., 21 May 1959, page 19)

Even if to this ridiculous appraisal were to be added the

fact that (according to this witness) Digna saw her in1946, but would not answer her questions and "was in a

deep thought (sic) and her tongue was coming out of her

mouth" (Do., pages 14-15), her evidence would certainly

not justify a finding that Digna Maravilla was not

competent to execute the testament in 1944. By Berjas

standards, any one could be held insane.

Nor is the case for the oppositors improved by the

evidence of their witness Eleazar Lopez, who asserted

having visited his aunt, Digna Maravilla (whom he had

not seen since he was four years old), two days after the

first bombing of Manila by the American planes in

September, 1944. Lopez claimed to have seen Digna onthat occasion laughing and crying and then staring

blankly at the ceiling, without recognizing the witness;

and that he visited her again toward mid-October of the

same year and she had worsened. 25 Coming from a

nephew who expected to succeed if the will in question *

were denied probate, and who sought to become

administrator of the estate, even offering to resign from

his position in the government if appointed, 26 this

testimony of Lopez was evidently colored by his monetary

interest, thus leading to its correct discrediting by the


8/56

trial court. His recollection after 15 years of the alleged

symptoms of his aunt is very suspicious, as it does not

even appear that Lopez at the time bothered to inquire

from other persons what caused his aunts alleged

abnormal condition. Moreover, the courts duty to

reconcile conflicts of evidence should lead it to hold that

the symptoms described by Lopez were due to a

temporary disturbance of the nerves caused by the

unsettling effect of a bombardment not previously

experienced, compatible with the due execution of thewill on 7 October 1944. As between the testimony of

Lopez and that of attorney Villanueva, who repeatedly

visited and talked to the testatrix around the time her

will was executed, We have no hesitation in accepting the

latters view that Digna Maravilla was competent to make

the will when it was signed. The law itself declares that

"To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the

testator be in full possession of all his reasoning

faculties or that his mind be wholly unbroken,

unimpaired or unshattered by disease, injury or other

cause." (Civil Code, Article 799; Bugnao v. Ubag, 14 Phil.163.)

We are satisfied that the preponderance of evidence is to

the effect that the testament, Exhibit "A," was duly

executed by a qualified testatrix and competent

witnesses, in conformity with the statutory

requirements.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decree of the court

below denying probate of the 1944 will of Digna

Maravilla (Exhibit "A") is reversed and the said testament

is hereby ordered probated. Let the records be returned

to the Court of origin for further proceedings

conformable to law. Costs against oppositors-appellees.

Concepcion,C.J., Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,

Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar,JJ., concur.

Makalintal,J., did not take part.

4. Labrador v. CA, G.R. Nos. 83843-44, April 5,

1990 (184 SCRA 170)

G.R. Nos. 83843-44 April 5, 1990IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE

THE WILL OF MELECIO LABRADOR. SAGRADO

LABRADOR (Deceased), substituted by ROSITA

LABRADOR, ENRICA LABRADOR, and CRISTOBAL

LABRADOR,petitioners-appellants,vs.

COURT OF APPEALS,1GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, and

JESUS LABRADOR,respondents-appellees.Benjamin C. Santos Law Offices for petitioners.

Rodrigo V. Fontelera for private respondents.

PARAS,J.:The sole issue in this case is whether or not the alleged

holographic will of one Melecio Labrador isdated, as

provided for in Article 8102of the New Civil Code.

The antecedent and relevant facts are as follows: On

June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died in the

Municipality of Iba, province of Zambales, where he was

residing, leaving behind a parcel of land designated as

Lot No. 1916 under Original Certificate of Title No. P-

1652, and the following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica,

Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria

and Jovita, all surnamed Labrador, and a holographic

will.

On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but

substituted by his heirs), Enrica Labrador and Cristobal

Labrador, filed in the courta quo

a petition for the

probate docketed as Special Proceeding No. 922-I of the

alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador.

Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador

(now deceased but substituted by his heirs), and

Gaudencio Labrador filed an opposition to the petitionon the ground that the will has been extinguished or

revoked by implication of law, alleging therein that on

September 30, 1971, that is, before Melecio's death, for

the consideration of Six Thousand (P6,000) Pesos,

testator Melecio executed a Deed of Absolute Sale,

selling, transferring and conveying in favor of oppositors

Jesus and Gaudencio Lot No. 1916 and that as a matter

of fact, O.C.T. No. P-1652 had been cancelled by T.C.T.

No. T-21178. Earlier however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador

sold said parcel of land to Navat for only Five Thousand

(P5,000) Pesos. (Rollo, p. 37)

Sagrado thereupon filed, on November 28, 1975, against

his brothers, Gaudencio and Jesus, for the annulment ofsaid purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of

land which Sagrado allegedly had already acquired by

devise from their father Melecio Labrador under a

holographic will executed on March 17, 1968, the

complaint for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 934-

I, being premised on the fact that the aforesaid Deed of

Absolute Sale is fictitious.

After both parties had rested and submitted their

respective evidence, the trial court rendered a joint

decision dated February 28, 1985, allowing the probate

of the holographic will and declaring null and void the

Deed of Absolute sale. The courta quohad also directed

the respondents (the defendants in Civil Case No. 934-I)

to reimburse to the petitioners the sum of P5,000.00

representing the redemption price for the property paid

by the plaintiff-petitioner Sagrado with legal interest

thereon from December 20, 1976, when it was paid to

vendeea retro.

Respondents appealed the joint decision to the Court of

Appeals, which on March 10, 1988 modified said joint

decision of the courta quoby denying the allowance of

the probate of the will for being undated and reversing

the order of reimbursement. Petitioners' Motion for

Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision was denied by

the Court of Appeals, in the resolution of June 13, 1988.Hence, this petition.

Petitioners now assign the following errors committed by

respondent court, to wit:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

NOT ALLOWING AND APPROVING THE

PROBATE OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL

OF THE TESTATOR MELECIO

LABRADOR; and

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

FINDING THAT THE ORDER OF THE

LOWER COURT DIRECTING THEREIMBURSEMENT OF THE FIVE

THOUSAND PESOS REPRESENTING

THE REDEMPTION PRICE WAS

ERRONEOUS.

The alleged undated holographic will written in Ilocano

translated into English, is quoted as follows:

ENGLISH INTERPRETATION OF THE

WILL OF THE

LATE MELECIO LABRADOR WRITTEN

IN ILOCANO


9/56

BY ATTY. FIDENCIO L. FERNANDEZ

I First Page

This is also where it appears in writing

of the place which is assigned and

shared or the partition in favor of

SAGRADO LABRADOR which is the

fishpond located and known place as

Tagale.

And this place that is given as the share

to him, there is a measurement of moreor less one hectare, and the boundary at

the South is the property and

assignment share of ENRICA

LABRADOR, also their sister, and the

boundary in the West is the sea, known

as the SEA as it is, and the boundary on

the NORTH is assignment belonging to

CRISTOBAL LABRADOR, who likewise is

also their brother. That because it is

now the time for me being now ninety

three (93) years, then I feel it is the right

time for me to partition the fishponds

which were and had been bought oracquired by us, meaning with their two

mothers, hence there shall be no

differences among themselves, those

among brothers and sisters, for it is I

myself their father who am making the

apportionment and delivering to each

and everyone of them the said portion

and assignment so that there shall not

be any cause of troubles or differences

among the brothers and sisters.

II Second Page

And this is the day in which we agreed

that we are making the partitioning and

assigning the respective assignment of

the said fishpond, and this being in the

month of March, 17th day, in the year

1968, and this decision and or

instruction of mine is the matter to be

followed. And the one who made this

writing is no other than MELECIO

LABRADOR, their father.

Now, this is the final disposition that I

am making in writing and it is this that

should be followed and complied with in

order that any differences or troublesmay be forestalled and nothing will

happen along these troubles among my

children, and that they will be in good

relations among themselves, brothers

and sisters;

And those improvements and fruits of

the land; mangoes, bamboos and all

coconut trees and all others like the

other kind of bamboo by name of Bayog,

it is their right to get if they so need, in

order that there shall be nothing that

anyone of them shall complain against

the other, and against anyone of thebrothers and sisters.

III THIRD PAGE

And that referring to the other places of

property, where the said property is

located, the same being the fruits of our

earnings of the two mothers of my

children, there shall be equal portion of

each share among themselves, and or to

be benefitted with all those property,

which property we have been able to

acquire.

That in order that there shall be basis of

the truth of this writing (WILL) which I

am here hereof manifesting of the truth

and of the fruits of our labor which their

two mothers, I am signing my signature

below hereof, and that this is what

should be complied with, by all the

brothers and sisters, the children oftheir two mothers JULIANA

QUINTERO PILARISA and CASIANA

AQUINO VILLANUEVA Your father who

made this writing (WILL), and he is,

MELECIO LABRADOR y RALUTIN (p.

46,Rollo

)

The petition, which principally alleges that the

holographic will is really dated, although the date is not

in its usual place, is impressed with merit.

The will has been dated in the hand of the testator

himself in perfect compliance with Article 810. It is

worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the second

page of the holographic will,viz:And this is the day in which we agreed

that we are making the partitioning and

assigning the respective assignment of

the said fishpond, and this being in the

month of

March, 17th day, in the year

1968, and this decision and or

instruction of mine is the matter to be

followed. And the one who made this

writing is no other than MELECIO

LABRADOR, their father. (emphasis

supplied) (p. 46,Rollo)

The law does not specify a particular location where the

date should be placed in the will. The only requirements

are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the

hand of the testator. These requirements are present in

the subject will.

Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the

will was when the testator and his beneficiaries entered

into an agreement among themselves about "the

partitioning and assigning the respective assignments of

the said fishpond," and was not the date of execution of

the holographic will; hence, the will is more of an

"agreement" between the testator and the beneficiaries

thereof to the prejudice of other compulsory heirs like

the respondents. This was thus a failure to comply withArticle 783 which defines a will as "an act whereby a

person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by

law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his

estate, to take effect after his death."

Respondents are in error. The intention to show17

March 1968

as the date of the execution of the will is

plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the

paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was not an

agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who

plainly knew that what he was executing was a will. The

act of partitioning and the declaration that such

partitioning as the testator's instruction or decision to be

followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware ofthe nature of the estate property to be disposed of and of

the character of the testamentary act as a means to

control the disposition of his estate.

Anent the second issue of finding the reimbursement of

the P5,000 representing the redemption price as

erroneous, respondent court's conclusion is incorrect.

When private respondents sold the property (fishpond)

with right to repurchase to Navat for P5,000, they were

actually selling property belonging to another and which

they had no authority to sell, rendering such sale null


10/56

and void. Petitioners, thus "redeemed" the property from

Navat for P5,000, to immediately regain possession of the

property for its disposition in accordance with the will.

Petitioners therefore deserve to be reimbursed the

P5,000.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of

Appeals dated March 10, 1988 is hereby REVERSED.

The holographic will of Melecio Labrador is APPROVED

and ALLOWED probate. The private respondents are

directed to REIMBURSE the petitioners the sum of FiveThousand Pesos (P5,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ.,

concur.

5. De Jesus v. De Jesus, G.R. No. L-38338,

January 28, 1985 (134 SCRA 245)

G.R. No. L-38338 January 28, 1985

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OFANDRES G. DE JESUS AND BIBIANA ROXAS DE

JESUS, SIMEON R. ROXAS & PEDRO ROXAS DE

JESUS,petitioners,vs.

ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR.,respondent.Raul S. Sison Law Office for petitioners.

Rafael Dinglasan, Jr. for heir M. Roxas.

Ledesma, Guytingco Velasco and Associates for Ledesa

and A. R. de Jesus.

GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order ofrespondent Hon. Jose C. Colayco, Presiding Judge Court

of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI disallowing the

probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana

Roxas de Jesus.

The antecedent facts which led to the filing of this

petition are undisputed.

After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and

Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, Special Proceeding No. 81503

entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres

G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus" was filed by

petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, the brother of the deceased

Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.

On March 26, 1973, petitioner Simeon R. Roxas wasappointed administrator. After Letters of Administration

had been granted to the petitioner, he delivered to the

lower court a document purporting to be the holographic

Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. On May 26,

1973, respondent Judge Jose Colayco set the hearing of

the probate of the holographic Win on July 21, 1973.

Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that after his

appointment as administrator, he found a notebook

belonging to the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus and that

on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, a letter-win

addressed to her children and entirely written and

signed in the handwriting of the deceased Bibiana R. de

Jesus was found. The will is dated "FEB./61 " andstates: "This is my win which I want to be respected

although it is not written by a lawyer. ...

The testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by

the testimonies of Pedro Roxas de Jesus and Manuel

Roxas de Jesus who likewise testified that the letter

dated "FEB./61 " is the holographic Will of their

deceased mother, Bibiana R. de Jesus. Both recognized

the handwriting of their mother and positively Identified

her signature. They further testified that their deceased

mother understood English, the language in which the

holographic Will is written, and that the date "FEB./61 "

was the date when said Will was executed by their

mother.

Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir

filed an "opposition to probate" assailing the purported

holographic Will of Bibiana R. de Jesus because a it was

not executed in accordance with law, (b) it was executed

through force, intimidation and/or under duress, undue

influence and improper pressure, and (c) the alleged

testatrix acted by mistake and/or did not intend, norcould have intended the said Will to be her last Will and

testament at the time of its execution.

On August 24, 1973, respondent Judge Jose C. Colayco

issued an order allowing the probate of the holographic

Will which he found to have been duly executed in

accordance with law.

Respondent Luz Roxas de Jesus filed a motion for

reconsideration alleging inter alia that the alleged

holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus

was not dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil

Code. She contends that the law requires that the Will

should contain the day, month and year of its execution

and that this should be strictly complied with.On December 10, 1973, respondent Judge Colayco

reconsidered his earlier order and disallowed the probate

of the holographic Will on the ground that the word

"dated" has generally been held to include the month,

day, and year. The dispositive portion of the order reads:

WHEREFORE, the document purporting

to be the holographic Will of Bibiana

Roxas de Jesus, is hereby disallowed for

not having been executed as required by

the law. The order of August 24, 1973 is

hereby set aside.

The only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61 "

appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased

Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the

Article 810 of the Civil Code which reads:

ART. 810. A person may execute a

holographic will which must be entirely

written, dated, and signed by the hand

of the testator himself. It is subject to no

other form, and may be made in or out

of the Philippines, and need not be

witnessed.

The petitioners contend that while Article 685 of the

Spanish Civil Code and Article 688 of the Old Civil Code

require the testator to state in his holographic Win the"year, month, and day of its execution," the present Civil

Code omitted the phrase Ao mes y dia and simply

requires that the holographic Will should be dated. The

petitioners submit that the liberal construction of the

holographic Will should prevail.

Respondent Luz Henson on the other hand submits that

the purported holographic Will is void for non-

compliance with Article 810 of the New Civil Code in that

the date must contain the year, month, and day of its

execution. The respondent contends that Article 810 of

the Civil Code was patterned after Section 1277 of the

California Code and Section 1588 of the Louisiana Code

whose Supreme Courts had consistently ruled that therequired date includes the year, month, and day, and

that if any of these is wanting, the holographic Will is

invalid. The respondent further contends that the

petitioner cannot plead liberal construction of Article

810 of the Civil Code because statutes prescribing the

formalities to be observed in the execution of holographic

Wills are strictly construed.

We agree with the petitioner.

This will not be the first time that this Court departs

from a strict and literal application of the statutory


11/56

requirements regarding the due execution of Wills. We

should not overlook the liberal trend of the Civil Code in

the manner of execution of Wills, the purpose of which,

in case of doubt is to prevent intestacy

The underlying and fundamental

objectives permeating the provisions of

the law on wigs in this Project consists

in the liberalization of the manner of

their execution with the end in view of

giving the testator more freedom inexpressing his last wishes, but with

sufficien safeguards and restrictions to

prevent the commission of fraud and the

exercise of undue and improper

pressure and influence upon the

testator.

This objective is in accord with the

modem tendency with respect to the

formalities in the execution of wills.

(Report of the Code Commission, p. 103)

In Justice Capistrano's concurring opinion in Heirs

ofRaymundo Castro v. Bustos(27 SCRA 327) he

emphasized that:xxx xxx xxx

... The law has a tender regard for the

will of the testator expressed in his last

will and testament on the ground that

any disposition made by the testator is

better than that which the law can

make. For this reason, intestate

succession is nothing more than a

disposition based upon the presumed

will of the decedent.

Thus, the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of

the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud

and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary

curtailment of testamentary privilegeIcasiano v.

Icasiano

, 11 SCRA 422). If a Will has been executed in

substantial compliance with the formalities of the law,

and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise

thereof is obviated, said Win should be admitted to

probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282). Thus,

xxx xxx xxx

... More than anything else, the facts

and circumstances of record are to be

considered in the application of any

given rule. If the surrounding

circumstances point to a regularexecution of the wilt and the instrument

appears to have been executed

substantially in accordance with the

requirements of the law, the inclination

should, in the absence of any suggestion

of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean

towards its admission to probate,

although the document may suffer from

some imperfection of language, or other

non-essential defect. ... (Leynez v.

Leynez 68 Phil. 745).

If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply

with all the requisites, although compliance is not literal,it is sufficient if the objective or purpose sought to be

accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by

the form followed by the testator.

The purpose of the solemnities surrounding the

execution of Wills has been expounded by this Court

inAbangan v. Abanga40 Phil. 476, where we ruled that:

The object of the solemnities

surrounding the execution of wills is to

close the door against bad faith and

fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and

testaments and to guaranty their truth

and authenticity. ...

In particular, a complete date is required to provide

against such contingencies as that of two competing

Wills executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming

insane on the day on which a Will was executed (Velasco

v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such contingency in

this case.

We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and

found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its executionnor was there any substitution of Wins and Testaments.

There is no question that the holographic Will of the

deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely written,

dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and in a

language known to her. There is also no question as to

its genuineness and due execution. All the children of

the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the holographic

Will of their mother and that she had the testamentary

capacity at the time of the execution of said Will. The

objection interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz

Henson is that the holographic Will is fatally defective

because the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the

holographic Will is not sufficient compliance with Article810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to

be entertained.

As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should

include the day, month, and year of its execution.

However, when as in the case at bar, there is no

appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and

pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established

and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61"

appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance

with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the

holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of

substantial compliance.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The

order appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and

the order allowing the probate of the holographic Will of

the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is reinstated.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova

and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

6. Ajero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106720,

September 15, 1994 (236 SCRA 488)

G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994

SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA

AJERO,petitioners,vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE

SAND,respondents.Miguel D. Larida for petitioners.

Montilla Law Office for private respondent.

PUNO,J.:This is an appeal bycertiorarifrom the Decision of the

Court ofAppeals1in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30,1992, the dispositive portion of which reads;

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the

questioned decision of November 19,

1988 of the trial court is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the

petition for probate is hereby

DISMISSED. No costs.

The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of

Quezon City, Branch 94,2in Sp. Proc. No. Q-


12/56


13/56

Considering then that it is a well-

established doctrine in the law on

succession that in case of doubt, testate

succession should be preferred over

intestate succession, and the fact that

no convincing grounds were presented

and proven for the disallowance of the

holographic will of the late Annie Sand,

the aforesaid will submitted herein must

be admitted to probate.3

(Citationsomitted.)

On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition

for probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The Court

of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet

the requirements for its validity."4It held that thedecedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of

the New Civil Code, which read, as follows:

Art. 813: When a number of dispositions

appearing in a holographic will are

signed without being dated, and the last

disposition has a signature and date,

such date validates the dispositions

preceding it, whatever be the time of

prior dispositions.

Art. 814: In case of insertion,

cancellation, erasure or alteration in a

holographic will, the testator must

authenticate the same by his full

signature.

It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were

either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It

also found that the erasures, alterations and

cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated

by decedent.

Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that

will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:

(a) If not executed and attested as

required by law;

(b) If the testator was insane, or

otherwise mentally incapable to make a

will, at the time of its execution;

(c) If it was executed under duress, or

the influence of fear, or threats;

(d) If it was procured by undue and

improper pressure and influence, on the

part of the beneficiary, or of some other

person for his benefit;(e) If the signature of the testator was

procured by fraud or trick, and he did

not intend that the instrument should

be his will at the time of fixing his

signature thereto.

In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil

Code reads:

Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in

any of the following cases;

(1) If the formalities

required by law have not

been complied with;

(2) If the testator wasinsane, or otherwise

mentally incapable of

making a will, at the

time of its execution;

(3) If it was executed

through force or under

duress, or the influence

of fear, or threats;

(4) If it was procured by

undue and improper

pressure and influence,

on the part of the

beneficiary or of some

other person;

(5) If the signature of

the testator was

procured by fraud;

(6) If the testator acted

by mistake or did not

intend that theinstrument he signed

should be his will at the

time of affixing his

signature thereto.

These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to

disallow a will.5Thus, in a petition to admit aholographic will to probate, the only issues to be

resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is,

indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2)

whether said will was executed in accordance with the

formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent

had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the

will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of thewill and its signing were the voluntary acts of the

decedent.6

In the case at bench, respondent court held that the

holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed in

accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held

that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code,ante

,

were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate

of said will. This is erroneous.

We reiterate what we held inAbangan vs.Abangan, 40

Phil. 476, 479 (1919),that:

The object of the solemnities

surrounding the execution of wills is toclose the door against bad faith and

fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and

testaments and to guaranty their truth

and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on

this subject should be interpreted in

such a way as to attain these primordial

ends. But, on the other hand, also one

must not lose sight of the fact that it is

not the object of the law to restrain and

curtail the exercise of the right to make

a will. So when an interpretation already

given assures such ends, any other

interpretation whatsoever, that addsnothing but demands more requisites

entirely unnecessary, useless and

frustrative of the testator's last will,

must be disregarded.

For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these

formal solemnities include the subscription, attestation,

and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805

and 806 of the New Civil Code.

In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what

assures authenticity is the requirement that they be

totally autographic or handwritten by the testator

himself,7as provided under Article 810 of the New CivilCode, thus:

A person may execute a holographic will

which must be entirely written, dated,

and signed by the hand of the testator

himself.It is subject to no other form, and

may be made in or out of the

Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Failure to strictly observe other formalities will

not result in the disallowance of a holographic


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will that is unquestionably handwritten by the

testator.

A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that

its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions

contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If

the testator fails to sign and date some of the

dispositions, the result is that these dispositionscannot

be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render

the whole testament void.

Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted toprobate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the

provisions of Article 814. In the case ofKalaw

vs.Relova

132 SCRA 237 242(1984), this Court held:

Ordinarily, when a number of erasures,

corrections, and interlineations made by

the testator in a holographic Will have

not been noted under his signature, . . .

the Will is not thereby invalidated as a

whole, but at most only as respects the

particular words erased, corrected or

interlined. Manresa gave an identical

commentary when he said "la omission

de la salvedad no anula el testamento,segun la regla de jurisprudencia

establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril

de 1985."8(Citations omitted.)Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations,

cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the

holographic will or on testator's signature,9their

presence does not invalidate the will itself.10The lack ofauthentication will only result in disallowance of such

changes.

It is also proper to note that the requirements of

authentication of changes and signing and dating of

dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814)separate from that which provides for the necessary

conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article

810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and

688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the present

provisions covering holographic wills are taken. They

read as follows:

Art. 678: A will is called holographic

when the testator writes it himself in the

form and with the requisites required in

Article 688.

Art. 688: Holographic wills may be

executed only by persons of full age.

In order that the will be valid it must bedrawn on stamped paper corresponding

to the year of its execution, written in its

entirety by the testator and signed by

him, and must contain a statement of

the year, month and day of its execution.

If it should contain any erased,

corrected, or interlined words, the

testator must identify them over his

signature.

Foreigners may execute holographic

wills in their own language.

This separation and distinction adds support to the

interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810

of the New Civil Code and not those found in Articles

813 and 814 of the same Code are essential to the

probate of a holographic will.

The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie

Sand could not validly dispose of the house and lot

located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety.

This is correct and must be affirmed.

As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are

limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will

sought to be probated. However, in exceptional

instances, courts are not powerless to do what the

situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain

provisions of the will.11In the case at bench, decedentherself indubitably stated in her holographic will that

the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late

father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero

to question her conveyance of the same in its entirety).

Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot

validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares

with her father's other heirs.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.

22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the

disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran,

Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial

Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-

37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to probate

the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby

REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards

the Cabadbaran property. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza,

JJ., concur.

7. Kalaw v. Relova, G.R. No. L-40207

September 28, 1984 (132 SCRA 237)

G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984

ROSA K. KALAW,petitioner,vs.

HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of

the CFI of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, andGREGORIO K. KALAW,respondents.Leandro H. Fernandez for petitioner.

Antonio Quintos and Jose M. Yacat for respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA,J.:On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO

K. KALAW, claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased

sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the

Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa

City, for the probate of her holographic Will executed on

December 24, 1968.

The holographic Will reads in full as follows:My Last will and Testament

In the name of God, Amen.

I Natividad K. Kalaw Filipino 63years of age, single, and

a resident of Lipa City, being of sound and disposing

mind and memory, do hereby declare thus to be my last

will and testament.

1. It is my will that I'll be burried in the cemetery of the

catholic church of Lipa City. In accordance with the

rights of said Church, and that my executrix hereinafter

named provide and erect at the expose of my state a

suitable monument to perpetuate my memory.

xxx xxx xxx

The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K.Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir. Hence, on

November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed

probate alleging, in substance, that the holographic Will

contained alterations, corrections, and insertions

without the proper authentication by the full signature

of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil

Code reading:

Art. 814. In case of any insertion,

cancellation, erasure or alteration in a

holographic will the testator must


15/56

authenticate the same by his full

signature.

ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first

written, should be given effect and probated so that she

could be the sole heir thereunder.

After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an Order,

dated September 3, 197 3, reading in part:

The document Exhibit "C" was

submitted to the National Bureau of

Investigation for examination. The NBIreported that the handwriting, the

signature, the insertions and/or

additions and the initial were made by

one and the same person. Consequently,

Exhibit "C" was the handwriting of the

decedent, Natividad K. Kalaw. The only

question is whether the win, Exhibit 'C',

should be admitted to probate although

the alterations and/or insertions or

additions above-mentioned were not

authenticated by the full signature of

the testatrix pursuant to Art. 814 of the

Civil Code. The petitioner contends thatthe oppositors are estopped to assert the

provision of Art. 814 on the ground that

they themselves agreed thru their

counsel to submit the Document to the

NBI FOR EXAMINATIONS. This is

untenable. The parties did not agree,

nor was it impliedly understood, that

the oppositors would be in estoppel.

The Court finds, therefore, that the

provision of Article 814 of the Civil Code

is applicable to Exhibit "C". Finding the

insertions, alterations and/or additions

in Exhibit "C" not to be authenticated by

the full signature of the testatrix

Natividad K. Kalaw, the Court will deny

the admission to probate of Exhibit "C".

WHEREFORE, the petition to probate

Exhibit "C" as the holographic will of

Natividad K. Kalaw is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.

From that Order, GREGORIO moved for reconsideration

arguing that since the alterations and/or insertions were

the testatrix, the denial to probate of her holographic

Will would be contrary to her right of testamentary

disposition. Reconsideration was denied in an Order,dated November 2, 1973, on the ground that "Article 814

of the Civil Code being , clear and explicit, (it) requires

no necessity for interpretation."

From that Order, dated September 3, 1973, denying

probate, and the Order dated November 2, 1973 denying

reconsideration, ROSA filed this Petition for Review on

certiorari on the sole legal question of whether or not

theoriginal unalteredtext after subsequent alterations

and insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of

authentication by the full signature of the testatrix,

should be probated or not, with her as sole heir.

Ordinarily, when anumber

of erasures, corrections, and

interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Willlitem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is

not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as

respects the particular words erased, corrected or

interlined.1Manresa gave an Identical commentarywhen he said "la omision de la salvedad no anula el

testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida

en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1895."2

However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in

dispute had only one substantial provision, which was

altered by substituting the original heir with another,

but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full

authentication by the full signature of the testator, the

effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked

for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will

after that which could remain valid. To state that the

Will as first written should be given efficacy is to

disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix.

But that change of mind can neither be given effect

because she failed to authenticate it in the manner

required by law by affixing her full signature,The ruling inVelasco, supra,must be held confined to

such insertions, cancellations, erasures or alterations in

a holographic Will, which affect only the efficacy of the

altered words themselves but not the essence and

validity of the Will itself. As it is, with the erasures,

cancellations and alterations made by the testatrix

herein, her real intention cannot be determined with

certitude. As Manresa had stated in his commentary on

Article 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, whence Article 814

of the new Civil Code was derived:

... No infringe lo dispuesto en este

articulo del Codigo (el 688) la sentencia

que no declara la nulidad de untestamento olografo que contenga

palabras tachadas, enmendadas o entre

renglones no salvadas por el testador

bajo su firnia segun previene el parrafo

tercero del mismo, porque, en

realidad,tal omision solo puede afectar a

la validez o eficacia de tales palabras, y

nunca al testamento mismo

, ya por estar

esa disposicion en parrafo aparte de

aquel que determine las condiciones

necesarias para la validez del

testamento olografo, ya porque, de

admitir lo contrario, se Ilegaria al

absurdo de que pequefias enmiendas no

salvadas, que en nada afectasen a la

parte esencial y respectiva del

testamento, vinieran a anular este, y ya

porque el precepto contenido en dicho

parrafo ha de entenderse en perfecta

armonia y congruencia con el art. 26 de

la ley del Notariado que declara nulas

las adiciones apostillas

entrerrenglonados, raspaduras y

tachados en las escrituras matrices,

siempre que no se salven en la formaprevenida, paro no el documento que las

contenga, y con mayor motivocuando

las palabras enmendadas, tachadas, o

entrerrenglonadas no tengan importancia

ni susciten duda alguna acerca del

pensamiento del testador, o constituyan

meros accidentes de ortografia o de

purez escrituraria, sin trascendencia

alguna(l).

Mas para que sea aplicable la doctrina

de excepcion contenida en este ultimo

fallo,es preciso que las tachaduras,

enmiendas o entrerrenglonados sin

salvar saan de pala bras que no afecter4

alteren ni uarien de modo substancial la

express voluntad del testador manifiesta

en el documento. Asi lo advierte la

sentencia de 29 de Noviembre de 1916,

que declara nulo un testamento olografo

por no estar salvada por el testador la

enmienda del guarismo ultimo del ao

en que fue extendido3(Emphasis ours).


16/56

WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and the

Decision of respondent Judge, dated September 3, 1973,

is hereby affirmedin toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Plana, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Relova, J., took no part.

8. Vda. de Perez v. Tolete, G.R. No. 76714, June

2, 1994

G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994

SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ,petitioner,vs.

HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding

Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan,respondent.Natividad T. Perez for petitioner.

Benedicto T. Librojo for private respondents.

QUIASON,J.:

This is a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of theRevised Rules of Court to set aside the Order dated

November 19, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch

18, Bulacan presided by respondent Judge Zotico A.

Tolete, in Special Proceedings No. 1793-M.

We grant the petition.

II

Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-

Cunanan, who became American citizens, established a

successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. The

Cunanans lived at No. 2896 Citation Drive, Pompey,

Syracuse, New York, with their children, Jocelyn, 18;

Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14.

On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will

and testament, bequeathing to his wife "all the

remainder" of his real and personal property at the time

of his death "wheresoever situated" (Rollo

, p. 35). In the

event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his

property to his children and grandchildren with Dr.

Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife

as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael

G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of his

will states:

If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN,

and I shall die under such

circumstances that there is notsufficient evidence to determine the

order of our deaths, then it shall be

presumed that I predeceased her, and

my estate shall be administered and

distributed, in all respects, in

accordance with such presumption

(Rollo, p. 41).

Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan

executed her own last will and testament containing the

same provisions as that of the will of her husband.

Article VIII of her will states:

If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and

I shall die under such circumstancesthat there is not sufficient evidence to

determine the order of our deaths, then

it shall be presumed that he

predeceased me, and my estate shall be

administered and distributed in all

respects, in accordance with such

presumption. (Rollo

, p. 31).

On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family

perished when they were trapped by fire that gutted

their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as

trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed

separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the

Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York.

On April 7, these two wills were admitted to probate and

letters testamentary were issued in his favor.

On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother

of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed

with the Regional P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein,

filed with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a

petition for the reprobate of the two bills ancillary to theprobate proceedings in New York. She also asked that

she be appointed the special administratrix of the estate

of the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm

land in San Miguel, Bulacan.

On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16,

Malolos, Bulacan, presided by Judge Gualberto J. de la

Llana, issued an order, directing the issuance of letters

of special administration in favor of petitioner upon her

filing of a P10,000.00 bond. The following day, petitioner

posted the bond and took her oath as special

administration.

As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a

motion, praying that the Philippine Life InsuranceCompany be directed to deliver the proceeds in the

amount of P50,000.00 of the life insurance policy taken

by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan with Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan

and their daughter Jocelyn as beneficiaries. The trial

court granted the motion.

Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance

Company then filed a manifestation, stating that said

company then filed a manifestation, stating that said

company had delivered to petitioner the amount of

P49,765.85, representing the proceeds of the life

insurance policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan.

In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that

Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be ordered to deliver to her a

Philippine Trust Company passbook with P25,594.00 in

savings deposit, and the Family Savings Bank time

deposit certificates in the total amount of P12,412.52.

On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of

appearance as counsel for the heirs of Dr. Jose F.

Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla

Cunanan Bautista, Lydia Cunanan Ignacio, Felipe F.

Cunanan and Loreto Cunanan Concepcion (Cunanan

heirs). He also manifested that

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