Space Security and European Union -

Leader, Decision Maker or Enabler?

A Frost & Sullivan White Paper by Aman Pannu

2 Frost & Sullivan

TABLE OF

CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................ ............... 2

SPACE SECURITY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE FOR A GLOBAL INDUSTRY 3

Space Security and its Role .......................................................... 3

Industry Challenges ...................................................................... 4

Space Security .............................................................................. 5

Europe .......................................................................................... 5

SPACE SECURITY: THREAT DOMAINS AND THE WORLD ................... 6

Space Weapons (Terrestrial and Space Based) ............................. 6

Space Situation Awareness (SSA) and Orbital Debris .................. 7

Space Traffic Management ............................................................. 8

Spectrum Management and Issues ................................................ 8

Space Terrorism ............................................................................. 9

Global Space Security Trends ........................................................ 9

EUROPEAN UNION: PAVING THE ROAD TO SUSTAINABLE SPACE .... 12

EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (EU CoC)........... 13

European SSA System ................................................................... 15

CONCLUDING REMARKS ....................................................................... 17

ABOUT FROST & SULLIVAN .................................................................. 18

SPACE SECURITY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE FOR A GLOBAL INDUSTRY

Space Security and its Role

Thought leaders around the globe are voraciously debating the impact of a 9 billion plus

population on planet Earth by 2050. The complexity of meeting the needs of a large and

diverse population is driving the search for innovative technologies and applications.

Space is emerging as the lead innovator, by facilitating new technology and applications

to confront evolving issues and opportunities. Almost a third of the countries (there

are 195 listed countries as of 2011) have a satellite (at the very least) orbiting the

Earth, even more so, most of the countries use space based applications.

Figure 1: Satellite Manufacturing (World) Forecast 2011-2020

Having weathered the economic crisis more strongly than most industries,

Frost & Sullivan research suggests the space industry is forecasted to close the decade

with approximately 10-15 percent more satellites (900 plus) launched in comparison to

the last decade. Government (Civil and Military) projects will continue to drive demand

(68 percent), however commercial satellites is forecasted to increase its share by more

than 5 percent (2011-2020) over the last decade.

Military as well as Commercial and Civil end-users rely on Space as a critical element

of global information infrastructure supporting frontline operations for them. The role

of space is no longer limited to ground connectivity, both in air and maritime domains.

Space ensures seamless connectivity in the most challenging conditions, such as that

seen in the Haiti disaster, and most recently in Japan.

Frost & Sullivan 3

“...The complexity of

meeting the needs of

a large and diverse

population is driving

the search for

innovative

technologies and

applications. Space is

emerging as the lead

innovator, by

facilitating new

technology and

applications to

confront evolving

issues and

opportunities....”

Source: Frost & Sullivan, 2011

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Conservative Medium High900 1189990

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

20202019201820172016

Figure 2: Global Space Industry Trends 2010

The early interpretation of Space’s operating environment as harsh and inaccessible (for

maintenance or repair), led to the industry researching and developing new

technologies and custom designed, ruggedised products to operate efficiently. This

inadvertently led to a stream of spin-off benefits for terrestrial applications. In recent

years, there is a growing shift towards the use of off-the-shelf components and systems,

which is creating new opportunities for market participants. As such, Space has become

an integral part of our lives, in many ways an inconspicuous part, from daily applications

of communications, navigation, and internet; to complex roles such as military

operations, disaster management, monitoring and control; to unique and spin-off

applications in robotics, agriculture, and healthcare.

Industry Challenges

European Space’s global presence is based on a network of applications and products,

both in outer space and terrestrial, delivered by a diverse set of participants. As much

as this omni-presence being a ‘unique’ nature of the Space industry, it is also a challenge.

The continuous connectivity based on Space assets is made possible by a set of policies,

code of conducts and agreements, although not sufficient enough, defining the best

practices for Space operations including access to space, orbit allocation and

positioning, spectrum management, orbital debris management, Research and

Development (R&D), Space security and so on. One such challenge for Space is the

industry’s inconsistent ‘growth lifecycle’ at a global level, with countries/regions like US,

Russia and Europe at an advanced stage of the ‘industry lifecycle’ compared to the Rest

of World (ROW). The outlook of the Space industry in the medium to long-term, is that

of growth according to Frost & Sullivan. This along with the aspirations of multiple ‘new’

participants to become a space fairing nation, driven by the political will and economic

intent, makes the Space environment a complex domain to operate in and secure. In this

context, industry experts continue to express that the (Outer) Space must be

defended, or to start with, not declared as ‘theatre of action’, there is an imperative

need for regulations and policies preventing nations from arming space.

Frost & Sullivan 4

Desire to advance regional space capabilities is an opportunity for established Space

participants, wherein they can work in partnership to gain market share while

enhancing technical capabilitis for individual nations.

For satellite manufacturers the current economic downturn induced a

plausible slowdown and this is an opportunity to invest the time and expertise

in developing new technologies for attaining higher efficiencies through

advanced capabilities and streamlined production activities.

Real-time communications on the move will be the main driver for

communications (and earth observation including reconnaissance) satellites.

Some of the applications driving demand for next-generation high

throughout satellites, are: DTG, SNG, IPTV, VSAT services and other tailor-

made broadcasting packages.

The increasing demand for higher bandwidth communication and the finite orbital

slots have triggered the satellite operators to stipulate satellites that are more

powerful, and more flexible than ever before. There is an evident opportunity in

the development of high throughput satellites.

Source: Frost & Sullivan, 2011

Frost & Sullivan 5

The risk of ‘arming’ space is not only a military threat, it also poses a considerable risk

to the commercial infrastructure, a challenge that must be addressed now. Although

Space Security and Situational Awareness is becoming a prominent feature of most, if

not all space policies now, it is very evident that the current guidelines and rules

regulating this area are somewhat patchy.

Space Security

Space Security is the secure and sustainable access to, and use of, space and freedom

from Space-based threats1. Space Security is attaining a critical momentum to outline a

set of best practices for the industry. However, this is still largely influenced by regional

market / political dynamics. Frost & Sullivan’s research suggests that it is likely the

current competing guidelines will emerge as a standardised global guideline, but this will

probably only happen when the industry starts loosing a satellite a year and when the

stakeholders realise the risk as real time to their assets, a step too late in forestalling

an unsafe space environment. In this paper, Frost & Sullivan presents an overview of the

Space Security issues, challenges and opportunities in context with the European Union

(EU) Space policy and initiatives. Both military and commercial Space assets face a range

of threats (which is further compounded by the growing dual-use of satellites), including

accidental collisions, anti-satellite missiles, lasers, electronic jamming and hacking. This

is very aptly summarised in the statement by Gerard Brachet, the Chair, UN Committee

on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (2008), “Ensuring long term secured access and

use of outer space is not a defence issue only. It requires an active dialogue between

the civilian and military communities to address how space can be kept safe and secure.

Both express the same concern: security of their space assets. And they share the same

environment around our planet2”.

Europe

Europe, with its unique ‘collaborative’ model (inter-governmental and inter-industry)

for both EU and also for the European Space Agency (ESA), is well positioned to

facilitate the global norm for Space standards and policies. However, this is a road with

many obstacles. In 2008, European Parliament highlighted the need for space assets to

ensure that the political and diplomatic activities of the EU may be based on

independent, reliable, and complete information in support of its policies for conflict

prevention, crisis management operations, and global security. This applies especially to

the monitoring of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of

transportation and verification of international treaties, the transnational smuggling of

small arms, the protection of critical infrastructure and of the EU’s borders, and civil

protection in the event of natural and man-made disasters and crises. In contrast to the

evolutionary path of Space for United States of America (US) and Russia, which was

dominantly military in nature, Europe’s space programme has evolved around scientific

scope. Although in recent times Europe is focusing progressively on building a dual-use

and cooperative model encompassing both military and commercial activities. For this

paper Frost & Sullivan has analysed issues and developments across main Space Security

domains such as Space Weapons, Space Terrorism, Space Situational Awareness and

Orbital Debris, and Space Traffic Management.

“...Frost & Sullivan

research suggests that

it is likely the current

competing guidelines

will emerge as a

standardised global

guideline, but this will

probably only happen

when the industry

starts loosing a

satellite a year...”

1UNIDIR/2006/17 Building the Architecture for Sustainable Space Security 2006

2Seeking Common Security in Space, J.M. Logsdon, Director- Space Policy Institute, Elliot School of International Affairs, TheGeorge Washington University, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/space_security_logsdon.pdf

SPACE SECURITY: THREAT DOMAINS AND THE WORLD

‘Houston we have a Problem’, or is it ‘World we have a Problem’? starting in 2007 with

China annihilating one of its defunct satellites by using a ground-based missile anti-

satellite (ASAT) weapon, and (in response) the US ASAT mission in 2008, the Space

industry experienced the very real threat of securing the Space assets, both from an act

of destruction (passive or aggressive), and the aftermath in the form of orbital debris.

However, as early as the 1980’s the US successfully tested a direct-ascent interceptor

against a satellite in low earth orbit in the 1980s. The interceptor was launched by a

missile carried on an F-15 aircraft. Since then the technical capability (and as such the

strike capability) of such systems has evolved formidably. The threat of total destruction

is not the only issue that concerns the security of space. There are technologies that

can cause temporary impairment of Space assets in the short term, or even over a

prolonged time period. Preventing a satellite from accomplishing its mission

temporarily, reversibly, or non-destructively is commonly called denial, while permanent

disabling is called destruction. Then there is the very real risk of orbital collisions and

the more imminent threat of orbital debris. Taking such threats into consideration and

the growing reliance of Space applications and its end-users on commercial as well as

military space assets, demands that the Space community clearly define the

expectations and boundaries from each participant / stakeholder. This becomes even

more critical when we consider the complex and diverse nature of next generation

threats such as electronic interference, space weapons, laser attacks, high-powered

microwave attacks, Attacks on Ground Stations, Laser Attacks on Satellites: Heating and

Structural Damage, Kinetic Energy Attacks- Ground and Space based, Electromagnetic

Pulse from a High-Altitude Nuclear Explosion and more. As mentioned in the

introduction, Frost & Sullivan categorises these threats across the following Space

Security domains:

Space Weapons (Terrestrial and Space Based)

The deployment and potential use of weapons / arms on or from space assets is seen

as a dangerous avenue and needs to be on the priority list of regulations in order to

avoid it from becoming the next war frontier. Although it is important to note that at

present there is no such imminent arms race, yet. Some experts even share the outlook

that it might be more realistic to address surrounding space threats, such as the recent

ASAT activity, from a policy perspective before defining the framework for

weaponisation of space. Successful agreements and code of conduct in areas with

somewhat lesser direct threat to national security should potentially pave the way for

achieving common objectives in this field. Some notable (and concerning) incidents of

using Space Weapons include:

• January 2007 - China destroyed one of its defunct weather satellites orbiting at

about 900km. This created around 2700 new pieces of tracked debris and NASA

estimates more than 150,000 pieces of debris larger than 1cm were created.

• February 2008 - US destroyed one of its satellites in the Low Earth Orbit

(LEO), few lasting pieces of debris were created as the satellite was in a lower

orbit, from which most debris rapidly re-entered the atmosphere.

Frost & Sullivan 6

“Frost & Sullivan

believes that the ideal

vulnerability

management system

should entail both an

internal and external

component.”

The perplexing element of the Chinese test is that, in contrast to the US policy,

historically China (with Russia) has been proponent in banning the use of arms in space.

Although there is no imminent risk of a Space ‘Arms’ race, industry stakeholders are

exploring guidelines for enforcing a ban or defining a code of conduct (to begin with)

to rein in such an Arms race.

Space Situation Awareness (SSA) and Orbital Debris

Lieutenant General WL Shelton (US) defines SSA as “the understanding of the space

medium to include tracking all manmade objects in space, discerning the intent of

others who operate in space, knowing the status of our own forces in real-time, and

understanding the natural environment and its effect upon space operations — simply

stated, SSA is the foundation for all space operations3” . Currently the US commands

the most comprehensive SSA system, although in line with the strategic objectives set

out in the European Space Policy of 2007 a corresponding preparatory programme for

the European SSA System has been active since the end of 2008. The SSA encompasses

the domains of objects orbiting the Earth (including space debris), space weather and

near-Earth objects, determining the various threats to space assets such as the growing

number of debris, space weather, meteorites, intentional attacks, orbital collisions and

more. It is this vast scope of activities that fall under SSA that make it a prerequisite

for ensuring a safe, secure and sovereign conduct of space operations. The foundations

for an effective SSA system are based on total visibility of the space assets, which can

be achieved through an extensive database of the orbital location, motion data, function

and state of space assets.

Even though Space debris is mapped under the SSA programme, this is considered a

specific threat / space security issue because of the growing risk it poses to the space

assets in outer Space. According to the Space Secure Foundation (data based on the

United States military's Space Surveillance Network) there are approximately 21,000

man-made objects in Earth orbit. Frost & Sullivan research indicates that currently

collisions are the smallest contributor to fragments of debris. However, as the number

of debris objects increases, collisions become more likely, thus creating yet more

debris. As the satellites are clustered in a few useful orbits and objects remain in those

orbits for many years, the risk of collision is higher than might be expected. In this

context industry experts estimate a collision to occur every 5 years on average (leading

to approximately 8-9 collisions over this period). The main orbital debris collisions

recorded over the last two decades are:

• December 23, 1991: Russia's Cosmos 1934 satellite collided with a piece of

debris from Cosmos 926 at an altitude of 980 kilometres. Two pieces of debris

from Cosmos 1934 were catalogued after that incident.

• July 24, 1996: France's Cerise spacecraft was hit at an altitude of 685

kilometres by a piece of Ariane rocket debris left from an explosion 10 years

earlier. Part of a large boom on Cerise was severed, but the satellite later

resumed operations.

Frost & Sullivan 7

3Statement of Lieutenant General WL Shelton , commander Joint functional Component Command for Space before the SubCommittee on Strategic Forces Senate Armed Services Committee on Space Posture, 2008- S http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/olc/docs/testShelton080304.pdf

• January 17, 2005: A spent stage from the US Thor-Burner 2A rocket launched in

1974 collided at 885 kilometres with a piece of a Chinese rocket stage that had

exploded in March 2000. Four pieces of debris were catalogued.

• February 10, 2009: The first collision between two satellites occurred 800km

above Northern Siberia. One was an active US communications satellite, while

the other was a defunct Russian satellite. The event created around 1400

catalogued debris objects.

The non-binding nature of the international agreements on space debris may limit the

increase, but it will continue to grow nonetheless . The International Telecommunication

Union (ITU) provides the guidelines for orbit allocation / traffic, these guidelines

(including space debris mitigation and satellite’s end-of-life cycles) are mostly aligned to

Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO). However, Space debris is probably the most

addressed of the issues on hand, even though there is much to refine and formalise,

such as a concrete and clear set of rules for GEO as well as LEO. Since 1993, the Inter-

Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) has been developing guidelines

for space debris mitigation, eventually endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2008

(followed by an endorsement by UN Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space

(COPUOS) in 2007). The main thing to comprehend here is that having an advanced

Space Situational Awareness system is of little use if this means watching debris build

up to the point where your own satellites become unusable. Keeping this in context

Europe continues to play an active role in facilitating the formulation of well articulated

guidelines addressing the issues of space debris in all orbits. However, it is the lessons

learnt from the success of such cooperative measures that Europe can leverage to

further define its SSA programme and guidelines.

Space Traffic Management

The growing number of actors within the space domain requires well defined

regulations for registering and capturing data such as launch of satellites, orbital

locations, intended purpose, relevant technologies, re-entry operations, and in-orbit

operations. As noted in the previous section, the guidelines for these activities are not

comprehensive enough and do not traverse the depth of the issues surrounding space

operations. As an example of the gaps in the current regulations consider the

registration of a satellite. The limitation of the fact that only one state of registry can

exist for any satellite, makes it difficult (if not impossible) to account for all

stakeholders in a satellite programme with multiple actors, in practice leading to a

number of unregistered operational satellites. This lack of accountability is a potential

risk / threat to the security of space. Taking this into consideration, Frost & Sullivan

notes that effective (and cooperative) regulations would facilitate a better environment

for all space participants, by limiting any potential deliberate and / or unintended

exploitation.

Spectrum Management and Issues

Another domain of concern for space participants is the orbital congestion in terms of

orbital slot, spectrum management and RF interference. Whilst this is not a direct

threat to space assets, and does not command a military response to mitigate, this has

the potential of creating potentially volatile rifts between established space participants

and the emerging / aspiring participants. Frost & Sullivan 8

“...having an

advanced Space

situational Awareness

system is of little use

if this means

watching debris build

up to the point where

your own satellites

become unusable...”

The ability to efficiently manage orbital slots and spectrum will require systematic

cataloguing based on transparency and mandated disclosures. It is the need of having

such ‘rules of the road’ that are acceptable to all participants which will enable the

resolving of any potential conflicts in the future.

Space Terrorism

Space terrorism is an evolving discussion, but nonetheless considered a real albeit

latent threat to space. Considering that both military and commercial actors rely

heavily on Space based applications, the potential of a non-state actor causing

diminutive (if not destructive) damage to space assets and its services could have

serious consequences on critical applications and its end-users. There is an arising

awareness for formulating a space policy for protecting both military and commercial

space assets, and ground infrastructure against terrorist attacks. Some of the known

space terrorist attacks are5:

• First, the mobile satellite communication signal provided by Thuraya Satellite

Telecommunications from three widely separated locations inside Libya was

jammed.

• Secondly, Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) hijacked the

Intelsat Ltd. Intelsat-12 satellite in geosynchronous orbit to beam their

propaganda across the Indian subcontinent. While Intelsat continuously tried to

interrupt LTTE’s pirating, LTTE was able to continue its satellite piracy for 2

years.

• Thirdly, two similar events happened in China, where China’s Falun Gong

spiritual movement in June 2002 overrode the broadcast signals of nine China

Central Television stations and 10 provincial stations and replaced the

programming with their content and in 2004 disrupted AsiaSat signals for four

hours.

To effectively combat the threat of Space terrorism the global Space community needs

to devise a counter-terrorism policy for Space. However, this will need to be based on

a tripod approach, addressing and covering political intent, civil law, and where required

military action. Europe can leverage its cooperative model (and hands-on involvement

in NATO) to facilitate the formulation of such a policy.

Global Space Security Trends

Agreements and guidelines in Space have historically proven to be intricate and

complex, and continue to be so. This is the case because such agreements not only

require a political coherence but also technical relevance. This is more often the reason

why most Space agreements are not water tight, and have a high degree of ambiguity

attached to them. From the Cold War era of two-party discussions, Space has grown

into a multilateral discussion (not so optimistic would propound it even as an

argument). However, the US and Russia continue to influence any such developments.

Frost & Sullivan 9

“..There is an arising

awareness for

formulating a space

policy for protecting

both military and

commercial space

assets..”

5The Need to Counter Space Terrorism, ESPI Perspective 17, January 2009

In the later years Europe carved a niche position for itself, especially after the end of

the Cold War era. Recently, China, India, and other emerging / aspiring space fairing

nations have actively voiced or participated in gathering momentum to discuss

framework options to address the issues such as the threat to space security discussed

in the previous pages. However, for now the growth in the number of space fairing

nations has put the historical space powers such as the US and Russia on a back foot,

leading them to adopt defensive space postures. Furthermore, today’s space

environment demands an operationally responsive framework to meet the ever

changing and unpredictable nature of threats, such as asymmetric warfare, terrorism,

cyber warfare and more. The war frontier is no longer limited to Land, Air, and Sea.

Space is widely noted as the fourth frontier of conflicts, both military and commercial

stakeholder driven.

Until recently the US was strongly opposed to negotiations on the control of space

weapons (for nearly three decades). However, in the National Security Space Strategy

(2011) the US projects a somewhat open posture towards participating in negotiations

related to continuing and the peaceful use of Space. Even though there is a definitive

mention of its clear intention of ‘right to defend or dissuade’ against any potential

threats, this is considered as a step in the right direction (albeit with little or no regard

to other actors and their right to defend). Many experts believe that the US shift

towards such a stance is considered mainly a result of the pressures / restraints of the

economic crisis and the Chinese anti-satellite test of January 2007.

As Space activities have increasingly become tied to the national power of pre-eminent

States, Frost & Sullivan notes, it is crucial for other countries to understand that the US

needs to retain an option in principle to deploy force if required. After all it is largely

this Space power that enabled the US to affect outcomes according to its preferences,

interests, and if necessary change the behaviour of other actors in order to achieve

desired outcome aimed at protecting its national security (and economic) interests to

date. As a result, core Space programmes such as the SSA are at the crux of US National

Space Policy. Furthermore, the US is currently conducting the much anticipated Space

Posture review, which is delayed, and expected in 2011.

China, on the other hand does not command a very expansive and extensive Space

heritage. Some of the notable landmarks for the Chinese Space programme are the

launch of China’s first satellite in 1970, the launch of China’s first communications

satellite in 1984, and China’s first human spaceflight in 2003. Against the general

perception of the masses, China positions itself as a cooperative member of the Space

club, rather than a Space power. For many years China, with Russia has tabled a

resolution for Prevention of Arms in Outer Space. However, in 2007 with the ASAT test

conducted by China many questions were left unanswered. Although it is worth

considering that the Chinese actions were intended to soften the stand of those

opposing such a resolution, namely the US and Israel. Frost & Sullivan notes that

immaterial of the intention, the 2007 incident risked starting an Arms Race in space, an

output that would serve no good to any of the stakeholders.

Listed below are the main milestones in setting agreements, guidelines or initiatives that

facilitates or are related to formulation of regulations in space since its evolution:

• 1950 RAND report - considered the birth certificate of American Space policy

• 1958 Preliminary U.S. Policy on Outer Space, 5814/in NSSP, NSC Documents

• 1962 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the

Exploration and Use of Outer Space as stated in UNGA Resolution 1962

(XVIII)

Frost & Sullivan 10

“...today’s space

environment demands

an operationally

responsive framework

to meet the ever

changing and

unpredictable nature

of threats...”

• 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)- Treaty banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in

the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

• 1967 Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration

and Use of Outer Space

• 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the

Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space

• 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty

• 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space

Objects

• 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space

• 1977 Environmental Modification Convention - listed Space among the places

where specific military activities were banned

• 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other

Celestial Bodies

• 1982 Reagan National Space Policy was established in NSDD 42 - This National

Space Policy directed the Department of Defence to develop and deploy an

operational ASAT capability, both to deter threats to US and allied space

systems and, within the limits of international law, to deny hostile military

forces the use of space-based support.

• 1982 ITU updated the International Telecommunications Convention (the

Nairobi Convention) prohibiting interference with non-military

communications

• 1986 UN General Assembly adopted a set of Principles on Remote Sensing

• 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

• 2002 Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

• 2002 Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunications

Union and its Radio Regulations

• 2007 European Space Policy (jointly developed by the European commission

and ESA)

• 2007: UN COPUOS Mitigation Guidelines

• 2008: At the Conference on Disarmament, Russia and China formally

presented a draft treaty on “The Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in

Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Space Objects” (PPWT).

However, the then US administration immediately reiterated its opposition to

any new legal restrictions on its access to or use of space. Potential reasons

for opposition from the US / potentially other space fairing nations would

include the unverifiable nature of the ban on arming outer Space, and the

clear not-mention of ASAT weapons, such as the one tested by China in 2007

• 2008 EU Draft ‘Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities’

• 2009 Treaty of Lisbon- making Space a shared competency of the European

Union and its Member States

• Other relevant regulations / agreements include the Principles Relevant to the

Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space as stated in UNGA Resolution

47/68; the Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and

Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into

Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries as stated in UNGA

Resolution 51/122; the Recommendations on the Practice of States and

International Organisations in Registering Space Objects as stated in UNGA

Resolution 62/101; the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the United

Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as stated in UNGA

Resolution 62/217.

Frost & Sullivan 11

EUROPEAN UNION: PAVING THE ROAD TO SUSTAINABLE SPACE

Emerging from the challenges of a complex and

unique decision making process of combining

intergovernmental and communitary processes,

the European Space Policy is based on a

foundation of the Cooperative, Collaborative

and Consultative (C3) approach. This approach

has been proven successful (albeit not always)

in a European context where there is a

continuous need for aligning the political intent

and actions of 27 member nations, and for ESA

with 18 space fairing nations.

Europe is challenged by this unique model

where there is a strong role of Member states

in most decision making with an emphasis on

intra-European cooperation, in an environment of relatively low budgets, multiple

institutions and independent national level programmes. In 1975 the merger of two

institutions European Space Research Organisation and European Launch Development

Organisation led to the formation of the ESA. The ESA has established Europe as a

leading stakeholder in the space industry, and is highly acknowledged for the technical

(R&D) capabilities, fair and competitive markets, dual-use policies and a global outlook.

It is important to note that ESA’s role is mainly to do with technical and operational

aspects of space, and has little or no political mandates. However, it works closely with

the political institutions within Europe. Since the inception of the Space Council in

2004, Europe has taken a somewhat bolder stance to space policies and matters such

as Space security. However, Europe’s Space programme is primarily designed to operate

within a non-military realm. Although on one hand this is an attraction for many Space

fairing nations to be on the negotiating table, this has limited Europe’s influence on

enabling security issues at a global level with Space participants such as the US, Russia

and China. This is changing, as past activities, mostly at national level, have gathered pace

and are leveraged under Europe’s C3 approach to include security as a generic scope

for European Space programmes (this is fundamentally different to the US approach

where security is primarily defined from a military aspect). Europe’s security focus in

Space is driven by the objective of developing technical capabilities and competence by

leveraging national level programmes in a system of systems architecture to serve for

the larger benefit of the European states and its allies.

On December 01, 2009 Article 189 of the Lisbon Treaty came into affect making Space

a shared competency of the European Union and its Member States.

“To provide for and promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, cooperation among European

states in space research and technology and their space applications.” - Article 2 of ESA

Convention

Frost & Sullivan 12

The success of any such policy rests on the successful implementation of the C3

approach by all concerned stakeholders, such as the EU, ESA and the Member States.

Although it is clearly articulated that actions developed under this new competency of

the EU should not be of a technical nature, but rather of a political nature, whilst

leaving the technical actions within the realm of ESA and associated regional and

national institutions. The success of such structure is already visible in the GMES and

Galileo programs pursued by EU and ESA. This is a landmark step towards defining a

common European Space Policy, and more importantly gives Space a much needed

political impetus.

EU ‘Code of Conduct’ for Outer Space Activities (EU CoC)

In context of the above discussion, Frost & Sullivan notes that the founding principle of

the C3 approach is deeply rooted in the conception of the EU CoC drafted at the end

of 2008. The EU CoC is not a legally binding agreement (unlike the PPWT resolution

tabled by China and Russia), it is based on voluntary participation with the aim of

deploying Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBM) and a consultative

approach to winning the agreement of a diverse group of stakeholders including

(importantly) the third countries. The EU CoC is essentially a bottom up approach to

addressing critical but sensitive issues under Space security. Under the EU CoC a

comprehensive approach to safety and security in outer Space is guided by the

principles of freedom of access to Space for all peaceful purposes, preservation of the

security and integrity of Space objects in orbit, due consideration for the legitimate

defence interests of States6. Notably the EU CoC has an explicit mention of the

inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the United

Nations Charter. However, this is in consideration of other guiding principles such as

the responsibility of States to take all the appropriate measures and cooperate in good

faith to prevent harmful interference in outer space activities, and the responsibility of

States, in the conduct of scientific, commercial and military activities, promotion of

peaceful exploration and use of outer space and take all the adequate measures to

prevent outer Space from becoming an area of conflict.

The EU CoC incorporates cooperation mechanisms aimed at engaging subscribing

nations to share data based on TCBM principles. This includes a timely notification of

outer Space activities, information on outer space activities, and registration of Space

objects. These mechanisms are creating an extensive database of outer space activities

to enable a near total visibility of space objects and any potential threats.

The EU CoC addresses the basic issues surrounding Space security such as orbital

debris (including having measures on space debris control and mitigation), Space

situational awareness (further supported by the cooperation mechanisms), data

cataloguing and analysis, and information sharing on outer Space activities and Space

objects. This bottom up approach coupled with the TCBM is an intelligent approach to

tackle a very hostile threat of Space weapons to Space security. Having (potentially)

garnered support of notable (and most) Space fairing nations, the EU can then leverage

this to influence the historical Space powers such as the US and Russia in articulation

of a code of conduct (to begin with) for issues regarding space weaponisation.

Frost & Sullivan 13

6PESC 1697, CODU_ 61, Council conclusions and draft Code of Conduct for outer space activities, 2008,http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17175.en08.pdf

The success achieved in implementation and acceptance of the CoC could then lead to

a broader Space legislation / treaty that has essential legally binding clauses, especially

for the military component of the Space.

The EU CoC and the Lisbon Treaty have established EU as an emerging Space actor in

Europe with notable political authority that can continue to build on the Space

experience of Europe and its independent states (such as France, Germany, Spain, UK,

Italy and more).

The EU’s Space security efforts are built on a distributed network approach, leveraging

existing European and national capabilities and assets. Such a network is designed to

address issues concerning security of European Space interests. The EU continues to

work on issues of Space terrorism threats, missile defence issues, threat of Space Arms

Race, and development of a fully operational Space situational awareness system.

However, the EU actively combats the challenges of working in a collaborative model,

such as security implications of joint projects, deployment of Space for internal

security, integration of national programmes, institutional set-up in Europe and the

governance / political guidance. Despite these challenges Europe has established itself

quite strongly in the ‘Space hierarchy’. The question to ask and answer is where does

Europe (EU and ESA) want to position itself on this hierarchy- Leader, Decision Maker,

Enabler? To maintain a leading position in the space hierarchy Europe will need to make

both political and budgetary commitments towards the sector. It is important to

acknowledge and plan Europe’s Space positioning today in line with the evolving Space

trends globally to avoid sliding down the global Space Hierarchy, and losing the

opportunity to influence key decisions and directions for the industry at an

international level. This would threaten the very principles that Europe has set out to

achieve in the EU CoC and even the Lisbon Treaty. Speaking on a non-political (non-

budgetary) stand point, Europe is well positioned to play the role of an enabler for now.

The potential successes in this role will eventually create opportunities for Europe to

take a Leadership role in the industry. This is especially true when we consider the

depreciating share of the historical space powers / leaders (US and Russia) in light of

the emerging space fairing nations.

As an ‘enabler’ the consultative approach of the EU CoC plays a vital role. This is visible

from the systematic introduction and promotion of the Draft to various stakeholders.

A first “food for thought” paper was presented in September 2007 to the First

Committee of the UN General Assembly, and a first version of a draft code of conduct

was circulated to the United States, China, and Russia in July 2008. Currently, the EU is

conducting rounds of consultations with third countries in order to maximise the

consensus and possibilities of a wide adoption of the Code by the international

community. Japan, India, and Canada are on the list of target countries to be consulted

by the EU. There is a likelihood of engaging further countries for the consultation

phase, such as from Latin America, Africa and APAC. EU CoC is designed to encourage

all countries to access and operate in space as long as the activities are conducted for

peaceful purposes and do not cause, intentionally or accidentally, harmful damages to

space objects nor create debris. The EU CoC has specific provisions to ensure the code

is adhered to by subscribing nations. This is facilitated by the consultative mechanism,

and is further supported by an investigation mechanism within the code.

Frost & Sullivan 14

Although the EU CoC does not explicitly define the issue of Space weaponisation, the

EU CoC strongly disagrees with the developing and testing of ASAT, such as the Chinese

ASAT Test in 2007. Europe has intentionally and intelligently not aligned its policies

within the context of military approach to Space security. Europe continues to lobby

international stakeholders creating opportunities for aligning security interests of

multiple actors in line with the Space and security interests of emerging / aspiring Space

fairing nations. Europe’s approach to Space security largely entails a tri-solution, which

includes identifying and addressing the main issues threatening security of Space,

leveraging the capabilities and strategic intent of main stakeholders, and applying the C3

approach to reach agreements, achieve common objectives and successfully deliver joint

programmes. Europe’s Space security focus is on developing a distributed network to

address issues on hand such as European SSA (including orbital debris) and spectrum

issues, Space terrorism, Space traffic and Space weapons.

European SSA System

Another notable development in Europe with regards to Space security is the 2008

initiation of a preparatory programme for the development of a European SSA system.

This is intended to address core threats to the security of Space assets including

surveillance and tracking, orbital debris, efficient Space weather capabilities, and surveys

of near Earth objects (NEO). There is an allocation of €50 million over three years

(beginning 2008) with a mandate to develop the main elements of this programme,

which include:

• Core element - covering governance, data policy, data security, architecture and

Space surveillance

• Optional Elements - Space weather studies, NEO surveillance, and pilot data

centres

• Enabling Capabilities such as supplementary surveillance radars (scheduled to

be discussed in 2011)

Europe is working towards creating a system of systems architecture for SSA, wherein

it will create a vast network of SSA infrastructure based on existing and developing

national capabilities of Member States and even international stakeholders. At a

European level the main stakeholders involved in development and deployment of the

European SSA system are the ESA, European Commission, the EU Council Secretariat-

General, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European Union Satellite Centre

(EUSC), and Member States.

The programme currently includes four projects that will merge to form Space

Situational Awareness (SSA) architecture7

• First, it is looking to develop a Space survey and tracking system. This involves

a catalogue registering satellites in Space so as to better manage Space traffic.

Frost & Sullivan 15

7The Continuing story of Europe and space Security- A conference organised by Institut Français des RelationsInternationales (Ifri) and the Secure World Foundation- October 2010, http://swfound.org/media/15091/spacesecurityeuropec-ifri-al.pdf

• Second comes long-term studies of Space weather conditions;

• Third, a programme concerning NEOs that should go into implementation

phase; and

• Finally, a networking and data centre.

Attaining full operational capability (FOC) will give Europe a sound platform to conduct

technical exchanges with the likes of the US, aiming at improving the overall

performance of the system. Moreover, it is estimated that the European SSA system

would reduce the quantifiable estimated loss for European assets due to collision with

debris and space weather (circa €332million on a yearly basis on average, not taking

into account the collateral damage due to loss of services for critical satellite

applications)8. An advanced fully operational SSA system can then be leveraged to

enhance data sharing amongst international and national stakeholders enabling better

tracking and monitoring of orbital debris, Space objects and any potentially threatening

outer Space activities. The potential success of the European SSA system could then be

applied to the formulation of broader international regulations and framework for areas

such as debris mitigation procedures and spectrum management. Largely due to

Europe’s balanced approach to security (without an intensive focus on military), and its

collaborative rather than legally binding proposals, it is strategically positioned to align

and collaborate with international stakeholders in reaching agreements on collective

rules of the road and responsible behaviours within Space.

However, before contemplating the success of such a system it is important to address

some outstanding issues such as dual nature of end-user requirements for both civil and

military, the rules of the road for data acquisition and sharing, categorisation /

classification of assets as national or shared, and the potential access of the assets for

the European SSA system. Initiatives / Programmes such as the Space Data Acquisition

(SDA), which is mainly collecting data and processing it in order to avoid accidents

and/or determine responsibilities if they take place, are enabling tools of this system.

Frost & Sullivan suggests Europe should approach these issues in a consultative

approach with an aim to define activities and expectations for each stakeholder. While

undergoing the consultations with the European stakeholders it will be important to

consider the impact of emerging rules of the road in relation to its implementation in

the broader international framework in the future.

Space Terrorism, as mentioned earlier in this paper, is a growing threat for Space assets.

Europe should leverage its access and positioning within the Space hierarchy to

increase awareness of this very real danger. Leading by example would be the suggested

route for Europe, wherein it could introduce ‘counter-terrorism’ measures for Space as

a part of the broader European Space Security Strategy.

Frost & Sullivan 16

8 A new space policy for Europe: Independence, competitiveness and citizen’s quality of life, Reference: IP/11/398, April2011,http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/398&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Space security has attained enough critical mass, such that it is an integral part of most

Space discussions and forums. Europe has the benefit of a unique institutional model

based on the C3 approach, which it should leverage for leading the formulation of a

broader international framework proactively, including a well defined UN Space Policy.

However, in the short-term the EU should work closely with additional countries and

the receptive space powers to create an acceptance of the EU CoC. If countries are for

now in full agreement with these initiatives (countries such as Russia and China may be

more interested in pushing through the PPWT) Europe should continue to reach out to

other stakeholders / countries. In light of (in the medium to long term) a broader

acceptance of these rules of the road, and the changing environment of Space security

(considering orbital debris / collision and other basic issues), Europe would have

established a convincing argument for the historical Space powers to buy into a broader

international framework for Space and Space security.

Europe’s ability to implement these policies is largely dependent on the voluntary buy-

in from the stakeholders within EU and in the Rest of the World. Frost & Sullivan

expects the successful implementation / adoption of such policies to Space security will

not only provide a safe and sustainable operating environment for Europe and other

Space participants, but it will further create opportunities for the industry. The

successful implementation of such rules of the road are driven by the advances in R&D

of efficient data collection and analysis, better imaging and surveillance technologies,

spectrum and orbital location optimisation, safer technologies and systems, low cost -

high efficiency solutions, and other technologies and applications. This will generate a

stream of R&D and market opportunity for industry participants. Frost & Sullivan

suggests that while positioning these policies to the decision makers the EU and ESA

put forth the direct and indirect market opportunities, and not just focus on the costs.

Frost & Sullivan 17

18

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