Space for Religion- A Belfast Case Study

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Pergamon

Pdi t i c ul Geog r a p h y , Vol. 1 1, No . 2 , pp . 1 4 5 - 1 7 0, 1998

0 1998 Elwier Science Ltd. All rights reserved

Printed in Great Britain

PII:SO 2-6298(97)00039-5

0962 - 6298 / 98 19 . 00 +O. OO

Space for religion: a Belfast case study

DAVII N. LIVINGSTONE

The

Queens University of

Belfast, Belfast, Northern I reland, UK

MARGARET

C.

DEANE

St. Ma ys College, Belfast, Northern I reland, UK

FREDERICK

W.

BOAL

The Queen s University of Belfast, Belfast, Nor thern I reland, UK

.~~SIRKT. In the recent reassertion of the importance of spatiality in the proc-

esses of social reproduction, the significance of religious space has been very

largely ignored. This omission is nowhere more evident than in Northern Ireland

where, despite high levels of religious observance, remarkably little attention

has been devoted to the spaces of religious life and practice. Religious space is

not uniform: it is multi-dimensional, incorporating both the material and the

metaphysical. In this paper we focus attention on the spaces of denominational

allegiance and theological conviction, and use these as vehicles for elucidating

social, political, and moral attitudes of Catholic and Protestant churchgoers in

Belfast. Our findings reveal that, save for issues to do with constitutional identity,

the monolithising of the Catholic and Protestant communities conceals the rich

variety of religious cultures that profoundly influence everyday life in Northern

Ireland. Focusing exclusively on bi-polar constitutional objectives, therefore,

tends to deflect attention away from the diversity of underlying motivations.

0 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved

KEYWOIUX.eligion, churchgoers, denominations, Belfast

Religious space

In

recent times there

has been a growing insistence among students of human society

that physical and social space is fundamental to the constitution of social relations.

Observers-from Goffmann (1969, 1971) to Giddens (1984)-have sought to show just

how significant the various arenas in which social life is transacted really are in the proc-

esses of societal reproduction. Among these the variety of domestic, employment,

recreational, political, medical and other cultural spaces readily spring to mind. Much of

this work, moreover, has drawn inspiration from the writings of figures like Michel

Foucault (e.g. Foucault, 1980) who has uncovered some of the ways in which diverse

discourse-producing sites (like the hospital, the prison, the asylum, the school, the theatre)


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146

Space or reli gion: a Belfast case study

exercise profound power in modern society. From these sites emanate knowledge claims

and practices that are so powerful as to constitute human agency through their capacity

to produce the very social realities in which we all transact the affairs of everyday life.

One particular suite of spaces, however, does not yet seem to have fallen under the

systematic scrutiny of social theorists, namely, religious spaces, Certainly there have been

a number of geographical accounts of religion (Park, 1994; Sopher, 1967; Zelinsky, 1991),

but these have tended to ignore the significance of the interior spaces of religious cultures.

This surely is a conspicuous absence since the sites of religious practice-church, temple,

mosque, synagogue -are, for many people, highly significant social arenas; in these places

values, attitudes, and practices are promulgated which have profound ramifications in the

taken-for-granted life-world. Failure to take these seriously will inescapably result in an

impoverished understanding of a societys diverse human geographies.

In routinized ways, churchgoers come together at specified times to engage in a variety

of religious and non-religious practices that condition everyday life. Many come to places

of worship several times in a week; they bring their children to a variety of organizations;

they engage in recreational activities with other co-religionists, In all, we believe these

ecclesiastical spaces afford occasions for the constitution and reproduction of com-

munity life at least as important as, and in some cases much more important than, other

domains in which the affairs of life are played out.

Religious spaces, of course, come in a variety of forms, both material and metaphysi-

cal Most obviously, to take the Christian religion, there are the specific church sites-

material places-which provide the arenas for religious and social interaction. Church

spaces,

of course, do not exist in isolation from broader institutional religious structures.

They are frequently connected to other churches through systems of denominational

affiliation. These denominational spaces-less material than church spaces-are dif-

ferentially influential on the people who inhabit them. At the least material, and most

metaphysical, end of the spectrum, are the belief spaces that religious practitioners

occupy. Some are more orthodox or conservative in their outlook than others, and these

stances over doctrine and practice condition the everyday lives of their advocates.

Churches, then, are multi-dimensional spaces, material and metaphorical, physical and

social, in which ideology, iconography, and sociability are explicitly and/or tacitly

integrated.

In the political discourse on Northern Ireland commentators have frequently preferred

to interpret community conflict in political or economic terms. This does not mean that

religious accounts have been entirely absent. For example, Rose (1971) p. 20) depicted

Northern Ireland as a b&confessional society and in the following year OBrien (1972)

p. 307) felt drawn back to the rather obvious fact of a conflict between groups defined

by religion, And even those who assert that the conflict is not religious have sometimes

conceded that it involves a sizeable religious component (Galliher and DeGregory,

1985, p. 58). Regardless of the precise significance of religion in the continuing political

strife, there is no doubt that it has an important role to play in the construction and

maintenance of ethnic identity in Northern Ireland (Akenson, 1988; Whyte, 1986).

Nevertheless the complexity of religious commitment and experience has remained largely

unexplored despite recent analyses of the attitudes of clergy and of particular

denominational traditions (Morrow et ul.,

199

1; Bruce, 1986; McElroy, 1991). Even those

advocating the central significance of religious factors typically present the problem in

terms of bipolar religious monoliths. It is precisely because such interpretations of

Northern Ireland society have been dominated by a conllictual mode1 of social life that

Protestants and Catholics have been portrayed all too often as occupying monochrome


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DAVII)N. LIVINGSTONE,AKGAICET

C.

KFANE AND FKELXKICK. BOAL

147

oppositional camps. In contrast, we believe that each religious tradition merits scrutiny

in its own terms, and not merely in juxtaposition to its significant other.

Churchgoers in Belfast: exploring the monoliths

Recognizing the salience of religious belief and practice in Northern Irish society, we

undertook-during the winter of 1993-an extensive survey of Protestant and Catholic

churchgoers in Belfast with a view to ascertaining their attitudes on a wide variety of

contemporary issues.

This research was animated by the conviction that the Protestant and Catholic com-

munities in Northern Ireland were too frequently represented as two, monolithic, oppos-

ing blocs, and that this typecasting failed to take with sufficient seriousness the real

complexities of the two communities. The results of such a project, we believed, could.

at once, display the extent of cultural and religious variation both across and within the

Catholic and the Protestant traditions, and at the same time afford the opportunity of cor-

relating religious belief and practice with attitudinal conviction. In this way something of

the significance of religious space in the construction of identity might be unveiled.

Each of the 81 individual church settings which was investigated is certainly worthy of

examination sui generi s. For these are the material spaces upon which religious identity

is focused; indeed given the meaning of church attendance for many in Northern Ireland-

what C.S. Lewis once referred to as the semi-political churchgoing of Ulster (Lewis, 1966

p. 19)-these sites are imbued with a particular symbolic significance. There is not time,

however, to pursue this essentially ethnographic exercise in the present context. Rather,

our attention will focus on the somewhat less material spaces of denominational allegiance

and doctrinal persuasion to determine just how important these are in accounting for

attitudinal variation.

The denominational landscape

Whereas church-going Protestantism in Northern Ireland expresses itself through a very

wide range of denominational allegiance, Catholicism constitutes a single denomination,

a universal self-contained Church. judging by returns in the 1991

Census of Popul at i on,

it stands alongside over 30 identifiable Protestant denominations in Belfast alone, twelve

of which are represented in our present analysis. Once again, while each of these

denominational traditions is worthy of individual investigation, the analytical complexity

of such a task prompted us to seek some means of imposing a manageable taxonomy on

the extensive range of Protestant institutional religious expression. Beyond the Catholic

Church we devised the scheme portrayed in Figure I whereby the Protestant denomina-

tions could be organized into a coherent framework.

In terms of demographic structure the three largest Protestant denominations-

Church of Ireland. Presbyterian and Methodist-have a relatively older age profile than

the other groups. Indeed the Pentecostal/Charismatic cluster has much lower numbers

in the 65+ age group (14 percent) compared with Presbyterian (47 percent) and Method-

ist (45 percent). In some measure at least this variation arises from the character of

recently formed independent Fellowship churches which draw heavy support from young

people. These differences directly relate to another facet of Protestant religious experi-

ence to which we will presently return, namely, inter-denominational migration. These

age profiles are further reflected in patterns of educational attainment. This means that

those denominations with more conservative theological commitments are just as likely


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148

Space

for religion:

a Beyast case study

I

of Ireland

I

Reformed ;ao 1

/

f

f

>

Non-Subscribing Presbyterian

Baptistic

mI

lb

ongregational

I

f

Independent

Assemblies

Pentecostal

of God

I

Pentecostal/Charismatic

I

Church of God

FIWIRE1. Denominational clusters showing perceived closest denominations

as their more liberal counterparts-contrary to conventional stereotypes-to have achieved

the highest levels of academic attainment. These findings subvert the standard image of

the red-neck fundamentalist disdainful of intellectual pursuits. Indeed the largest percent-

age with a University education, for example, is to be found among the Baptistic groups

(30 percent), compared with Church of Ireland (22 percent), Presbyterian (22 percent)

and Methodist (13 percent).

As a denomination, Catholicism also attracts the middle-aged or elderly (some two

thirds over 45 and a third over 65) and has few participants under the age of 25 (7

percent). The whole spectrum of education levels is represented but given the age

structure, it is no surprise that nearly 40 percent finished their schooling at primary level

while 17 percent have a university education.


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DAVID .

LMNGSTONE, ARGARET

.

KEANE ND

FKEDERICK. BOAL

149

We should recall

that not all denominations are purely self-contained entities. In COtmaSt

to Catholicism, into which 99 percent of Catholic churchgoers were born, many Protestant

denominations are, instead, more-or-less contingent affiliations of people depending on

historical and contemporary circumstances; this has a bearing on the question of internal

migration between denominations. Some reveal much higher proportions of adherents

who have crossed denominational lines. For example, while only 17 percent of Church

of Ireland and 18 percent of Presbyterian churchgoers have ever been members of another

denomination, this is true for 67 percent in the Pentecostal/Charismatic, and 68 percent

in the Other Presbyterian, groupings. In some cases these figures reflect the historical

emergence of newer denominations as splinter groups from much longer established

traditions. In others, migration may be the result of factors as diverse as marriage patterns

and theological preference. Taken overall the three larger denominations (Church of

Ireland, Presbyterian and Methodist) are decidedly more likely to be composed of people

brought up in those denominations, whereas their smaller counterparts, typically, have

considerable majorities who have transferred from elsewhere. These migration patterns

clearly display the relative growth of more evangelical denominations. The comparative

constancy displayed by Catholics as distinct from the migrational behaviour of Protestant

denominations is referred to by Dunlop (1995, p. 96) who, no doubt controversially, sug-

gests that for theological reasons, the Catholic culture of hospitality is gentler and more

accommodating with sinners and that Catholics, therefore, may find it possible to stay

within the Catholic Church whilst disagreeing with some of its teachings. In such

circumstances Protestants would be much more likely to leave in their search for theologi-

cal precision.

On matters of faith and practice something of a cleavage is evident between the three

larger Protestant churches and the remaining four denominational clusters. Consider, for

example, the variation in attitude to a number of issues bearing on inter-church relations.

While the vast majority of those from the larger Protestant groups are happy to participate

in inter-denominational ventures with each other, rather less than half of them find joint

services with Brethren and Free Presbyterians congenial (see Figure 2).5 Indeed, it is

worth noting that respondents from these larger denominations are more willing to join

with Catholics than they are with the more fundamentalist elements within the Protestant

fold.

The contrast between the larger and smaller Protestant denominations is striking. The

latter are much more willing to join with other conservative evangelical groups, and

overall find joint services with Presbyterians and Methodists more acceptable than with

the Church of Ireland. Not surprisingly, rather less than one-quarter are willing to take

part in joint acts of worship with Roman Catholics (see

Figure 3 .

It is noticeable too that

Free Presbyterians are the least prepared of any group to participate in interdenominational

services, and particularly, are unwilling to join with the Catholic Church or indeed with

the three main Protestant denominations.

Broadly similar alignments are also to be found in responses to questions to do with

future relations between Protestant and Catholic churches, as

Table I

shows. Generally

speaking, the smaller denominations are unwilling to go beyond social co-operation;

whereas larger denominations are rather more willing to engage in social and religious

inter-church relations. Church unity, however, does not seem to be particularly welcomed

by any of the Protestant groups, though Church of Ireland respondents seem rather more

inclined to aim for unity than the other larger denominations. It is particularly noticeable

from this table that those expressing greatest interest in church unity come from the

Pentecostal/Charismatic group. This might seem surprising given the solidly evangelical


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DA\II N. LMNGSTONE, ARGARET. KFANE NI FREL ERK:K. BOAL

151

t

t

IXI

E

3

h


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152 Space o r r el i g i on : a Be l f as t case stu dy

TABLE. Future relations between Protestant and Catholic churches

Denom i n a t i o n /

d e n om i n a t i o n a l

c l u s t e r

U n i t y Rel i g i o u s a n d

soc ia l

co -ope ra t i on

Soc i a l

co -ope ra t i on

N o associ a t i o n

Catholic

Church of Ireland

Presbyterian

Methodist

Baptistic

Pentecostal/

Charismatic

Other

Presbyterian

Congregational

47%

14%

9%

11%

5%

21%

3%

16%

33

46%

54x

60

57

19

22

3

6

25

28

26

59

40

43

39

1%

6

41

5

17%

18%

49

12

but an even stronger preference (65 percent) for a Catholic ethos in the school. Neverthe-

less, the strong attachment to Catholic education overall does not imply that Catholics

are against mixing in other respects; a massive 96 percent favoured Protestant and Catholic

children working together on joint projects (see F igu re 4 ) .

Apart from the Church of Ireland (48 percent), all Protestant denominational group-

ings reveal a majority of respondents who prefer to have their children educated in a

school with exclusively Protestant values. But while for Methodists and Presbyterians the

figures are 5 1 percent and 57 percent respectively, it rises to 69 percent for those in the

Baptistic category and to 92 percent for Other Presbyterians. Correspondingly, schools

with shared Protestant and Catholic values draw almost no support-a mere 3 percent

from Other Presbyterians, rising to around a quarter from Baptistic and Pentecostal/

Charismatic groups, and to just under a half of those from the Church of Ireland,

Presbyterian and Methodist churches. And yet these figures conceal some interesting

variations. The Pentecostal/Charismatic grouping, for example, is composed of traditional

Pentecostal churches of various types, and a large independent charismatic fellowship.

When we disaggregate the responses to these two subgroups, we discover that a full 50

percent from the independent charismatic fellowship are supportive of schools with

shared Protestant and Catholic values compared with 17 percent from other Pentecostal

churches. The monolithic application of labels like fundamentalist to such denomina-

tions can effectively obscure significant variations which make it dangerous to assume

that such churchgoers inevitably adopt highly traditional attitudes to cross-community

endeavours. These findings are closely correlated with attitudes to the type of school to

which Protestants prefer to send their children. Again we see that those groups most in

favour of a school with mixed religious ethos are also those most in favour of a school

with equal numbers of Protestant and Catholic children. F i gu r e 4 shows the pattern of

response to school type from our seven denominational clusters.

Attitudes to the type of school to which churchgoers would prefer to send their children

provide only one measure of potential social interaction across the communities. Views

about mixed Protestant/Catholic marriage provide another indicator and whilst no great

support for mixed schooling is evident, in the case of mixed marriage an even less open

stance is discernible. Indeed Protestant churchgoers, taken over all, are rather more will-

ing to accept inter-racial marriage than Protestant/Catholic marriage-a pattern which

is at its most evident amongst the smaller denominations. Precisely the same feelings are

manifest among Catholic churchgoers (see F igu re 5 ) .


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DAVID N. LMNGSTONE.MARGARET . KEANEANDFREDEM: ;W. BUM

153


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DAVIDN. LMNGSTONE,MARGAFSTC. KME ANDFREDERICK. BOAL

155

A third

indicator of attitudes towards cross-community relations is to be found in mat-

ters to do with neighbourhood composition, an arena where contact may be important

in the formation of political attitudes and where the processes of social reproduction are

effected (Boal, 1987). Being brought up in a segregated area (experienced by 6 out of 10

Protestants and 7 out of 10 Catholics) provides a sense of physical and psychological

security, particularly given the history of forced population movement in Belfast over the

last quarter of a century (Keane, 1990) and may contribute to the fact that more than

half-57 percent of Protestants and 55 percent of Catholics-would prefer to maintain

residentially separate or almost separate communities. The one Protestant group where

support for such residential exclusivity is conspicuously higher among Other Presbyterians

where the figure rises to 85 percent.

Two very different but disaffected attitudes are apparent in matters to do with religion

and employment. On the one hand, a marked sense of Protestant alienation is detectable.

Responses to questions about fairness in employment in Northern Irish society show that

an overwhelming majority of all Protestant denominations (95 percent+) is convinced

that Catholics generally get a fair deal while a minority of between 20-30 percent feel

that Protestants do not get a fair deal; indeed in the case of Other Presbyterians a major-

ity feel this way. In contrast, there is a strong Catholic sense that, in its employment

practices, Northern Ireland has been less than kind to Catholics; only a quarter agree that

Catholics are equitably treated while a massive 96 believe that Protestants get a fair deal.

It is plain, then, that both communities shoulder some sense of grievance, though this is

more widely felt amongst Catholics. At the same time, neither community seems to have

much sense that the other is disadvantaged in the job market. For each community the

geographical distribution of perceived disadvantage follows the contours of their own

ethnic group.

These guarded attitudes to sharing employment opportunities indicate an unenthusiastic

openness to mixing in general. This mindset is evident also in respect of education where

mixed schooling will not be at the expense of preserving the values of the respective

religious cultures. When considered alongside attitudes to marriage and residential mix-

ing, these views reflect the universal tendency of being more comfortable with ones

own, especially in times of political tension.

Political identity

Despite the attitudinal variation we have so far identified, on a number of key issues to do

with the fundamentals of political identity, there is overwhelming agreement across the

Protestant denominational divides. In this respect, over 80 percent of Protestants are

convinced that Northern Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom. Similar

proportions agree that the security situation in Northern Ireland should be left entirely

to the security forces. At the same time, the vast majority of all Protestant denominations

feels that there is either very little or no understanding by people across the water of

why many Ulster Protestants want to maintain the Union with Great Britain. Ironically,

this sense of isolation, exacerbated by a perceived lack of empathetic understanding, has

done nothing to diminish the Protestant sense of Britishness. Thus, on the question of

national identity a majority of all Protestant denominations wants to incorporate a strongly

British component, by designating themselves British or to a lesser extent Ulster Brit-

ish. It is worth noting, however, that the strongest support for the designation Ulsterman/

woman is forthcoming from the Other Presbyterian group, where 35 percent identify

themselves by this label, compared with less than 20 percent from all other denominational


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156 Space o r r el i g i on : a Be I f as t case s tudy

groupings. These patterns find predictable expression in party political preference among

Protestant churchgoers. Beyond the broad band of support for the Ulster Unionist Party,

the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) derives proportionately greater support from the

smaIler denominations, while the Alliance Party attracts a quarter of Church of Ireland,

Presbyterian and Methodist churchgoers.

Protestant churchgoers are evidently concerned to retain their British identity. When it

comes to reasons why they feel that Protestants object to a United Ireland, fear of the

power the Roman Catholic church would have in a United Ireland was the most com-

mon answer. What is noticeable, however, is that while for the larger denominations the

difference between this response and a fear of losing British identity was only in the

order of 2 to 3 percent, among the smaller denominational groupings the gap widened to

15 percent for the Baptistic cluster and 43 percent for Other Presbyterians.

These findings should be placed alongside the reasons expressed by Catholics themselves

as to why over 70 percent of them want a United Ireland. By far the most common

response was that it would enable them to express their Irish identity (65 percent) and

only 7 percent indicated that it was because they would prefer to live in a Catholic

country. There was no such consensus in Catholic perceptions of Protestant opposition

to a United Ireland. Only a quarter believed that Protestants fear the power that the

Catholic church might have in such a political environment but slightly more of them

suggested that, as they saw it, Protestants want to keep their privileged position in

Northern Ireland.

It is clear that Northern Ireland Catholics are worlds apart from Protestant denomina-

tions with regard to national identity, no more than 2 percent considering themselves to

be British. Rather, the overwhelming majority identify with some form of Irishness, 7 out

of 10 as unequivocally Irish and 2 out of 10 as Northern Irish. This strong sense of Irish-

ness finds political expression in preference for parties which are nationalist in political

philosophy and which see Northern Irelands future within an all-Ireland framework;

around 70% support the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) while another 12

percent find Sinn Fein to be closest to their views. In contrast, unlike the mainstream

Protestant denominations, only 7 percent expressed a preference for the cross-

community but prounion Alliance party.

Because for Protestants opposition to a United lreland springs from an uneasiness about

the loss of national or religious identity, it is highly significant that more than 75 percent

of all Protestant denominations (except for Other Presbyterian-69 percent) believe

that at some stage in the future, more than half the population of Northern Ireland will

be Roman Catholic, with all the political and religious implications inherent in that

circumstance. Indeed, around half of al1 Protestant denominations are assured that this

demographic change will be effected in the next 20 years.8 Such findings run directly

counter to the political aspirations that the vast majority of al1 Protestant denominations

(SO-95 percent) share, namely, that Northern Irelands long term political future should

be to remain part of the United Kingdom. Here we find exposed a siege mentality amongst

Protestants, who whilst perceiving themselves likely to be outnumbered in the not-too

distant future, nevertheless remain overwhelmingly committed to a future within the

United Kingdom. Demographic trends elicit a different reaction from Catholics. The fact

that 85 percent of Catholic churchgoers believe that there will be a Catholic majority in

Northern Ireland-and for almost 80 percent of these that circumstance is believed to be

no more than 30 years away-induces considerable psychological confidence.

Given these expressions of both ecclesiastical and civic identity, it is clear that for a

large minority of Protestant churchgoers (unlike their Catholic counterparts) theological


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DAVID

N.

LMNCSTONE,MARCARET

.

KEANEAND

FREDERICK. BOAL

157

convictions are tied to Northern Irelands geographical

space. Between one-quarter and

one-third of denominations (rising to almost a half of Other Presbyterians) expressed a

view that the flourishing of the gospel depends upon the continuance of the protective

shield of the state. Here we find expressed that intimate connection between territory

and theology such that the preservation of the theology requires the maintenance of the

geography. For a considerable minority of Protestant churchgoers, it seems, grace and

space belong together. Catholics, it seems, do not see things this way: no more than 12

percent considered that the Catholic faith can only flourish in the northern part of Ireland

if Ireland is united and more than half of these were over

65.

Nevertheless, the system

of Catholic education in Ireland is sometimes defended in the categories of national-

spatial identity. According to one prominent Catholic educationahst, Monsignor Denis

Faul, Catholic schools have a special obligation to preserve a specific religious ethic and

moral training in family life as well as the distinctive Irish culture. (Belfast Telegraph, 26

September 1996).

Having analysed the nature of religious space in Northern Ireland through the filter of

denominational allegiance, we propose now to turn to the social and political

significance of the least material and most metaphysical of religious spaces-that of

doctrinal conviction.

Doctrinal space

While denominational affiliation makes a demonstrable difference to a wide range of

attitudes among Belfast churchgoers, other studies both here and elsewhere have pointed

to the even greater significance of theological convictions, lying on a spectrum from

conservative to liberal (Boa1

et al .,

1991; MacGrSl, 1991; Bruce, 1984; Martin, 1967). If

indeed this is the case, it becomes important to determine the nature of the beliefs

espoused by churchgoers. Accordingly, we now turn to an examination of the influence

of theological convictions in conditioning the attitudes of contemporary Protestant and

Catholic churchgoers.

Protestant churchgoers fall into three relatively distinct categories based on beliefs

about conversion and the Bible: conservative, liberal-conservative, and liberal. While

these relate in significant ways to other conventional terms of religious description-like

evangelical or fundamentalist-we have chosen to make scarce use of these labels because

they carry a range of associations not necessarily implied in our typology. Amongst the

Protestant churchgoers sampled, 50 percent occupy the conservative category, with 25

percent liberal, and a further one quarter falling into the middle 1iberaIconservative

group. The numerical predominance of conservatives that these figures reveal further

confirms the findings of an earlier survey in 1983 (Boal et al ., 1985); indeed if anything

there has been a marginal increase in the proportion of those of conservative persuasion.

Theological conservatism is continuing to thrive and theories assuming the decline of

either fundamentalism or evangelicalism with the progress of industrial modernism must

be seriously questioned (Martin, 1982; Bruce, 1990).

Theological space, we must further note, does not map directly onto denominational

space: almost every denomination encompasses churchgoers occupying different points

on this theological spectrum (see Table 2). Indeed in some cases within a single denomina-

tion it is possible to find congregations that are predominantly liberal and others

predominantly conservative. Nevertheless, certain denominations are more heavily

concentrated in one of the categories while others are spread across the three groups.

Amongst Presbyterians and Methodists, for example, 38 percent and 43 percent respectively


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158

Space o r r e l i g i o n : a

Belfast case study

TABLE2. Theological composition of Protestant denominational clusters

Denom i n a t i o n a l

c l u s t e r

I n Conser va t i v e ( j L i b er a l -Conser va t i v e

L i b er a l ( j

C h j

Ch&ch of Ireland

Presbyterian

Methodist

Congregational

Baptistic

Pentecostal/

Charismatic

Other Presbyterian

27

28 45

38

29 33

43

35 23

79

17 4

83

I5 1

87

12 0

94

6 0

can be described as theologically conservative; among some smaller denominations virtu-

ally no theological liberals are to be found.

So far as Catholic churchgoers are concerned, three categories of doctrinal orthodoxy-

high, moderate and low-were developed to relate to the Protestant conservative-liberal

range by using respondents degree of commitment to a range of Catholic church teach-

ings. At the conservative end the high orthodoxy group (48 percent) show no doctrinal

doubts, whilst the moderates (38 percent) and those of low orthodoxy (14 percent)

exhibit decreasing levels of conformism.3

Th e demog r a ph i c

dimension

While, for both Catholics and Protestants, gender does not make any appreciable dif-

ference to doctrinal conviction, age turns out to be strikingly important. Protestant

churchgoers in the younger age cohorts are overwhelmingly conservative in their

doctrinal beliefs compared with those in the older age groups. Of those between the

age of 18-24, 76 percent are conservative compared with only 10 percent who are

liberal. For the over 65s, by contrast, the proportions change to 41 percent and 32

percent respectively.

Generally speaking the percentage of conservatives declines as one moves upward

through the different age bands (see F igu re 6 ) . Age is also a crucial factor among Catholics

but, unlike their Protestant counterparts, those of higher orthodoxy are the older group,

8 out of 10 of whom are over 45. Correspondingly, low orthodoxy is much more

characteristic of younger Catholics (see

F igu re 7 ) .

Of course it is not at all obvious just

how Protestant and Catholic religious conservatism relate to each other or how important

different strategies of retention might be in accounting for these patterns. Nevertheless,

these contrasts between Catholic and Protestant young people suggest markedly differ-

ent future scenarios. For Protestants increasing theological conservatism seems likely,

while the Catholic Church seems set to experience either an increasing theological

liberalism or the inroads of secularization.*

Not surprisingly, the contours of the theological spectrum closely map on to a range of

related matters such as the practice of personal and family devotion, frequency of church

attendance, and attitudes to women clergy. Here, however, we choose to turn attention

to their bearing on other affairs by ascertaining the significance of individual doctrinal

conviction as a conditioner of social and political attitudes.


15/26

DAVID

N.

LMNGSTONE,ARGARET. KFANE ND REDERICK. BOAI

159

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Y Conservative

---+-- Lib-Cons

- Liberal

I I

I

I I

I I

Under 17 18 - 24 25- 34 35 -44 45 - 54 55 -64 65 +

FIGURE. Protestants--theological spectrum and age.

Community relations

Profound differences in attitudes to community relations are immediately apparent. Deal-

ing first with the more purely religious aspect of this issue we find that among churchgo-

ing Protestants, only 19 of conservatives express a willingness to participate in joint

services of worship with Catholics whereas for liberals the figure rises dramatically to 71

percent. Having said this, however, very few church-going Protestants of any theological

stripe express much interest in church unity (around one in ten) though it should be

noted that liberals are far more enthusiastic about church services with Catholics than

with fellow Protestants from the more religiously conservative denominations. All this

points to highly significant religious cleavages within Ulster Protestantism: for some, the

culture of Protestant Fundamentalism is much less congenial than the traditions of Catholic

worship.

Among Catholic churchgoers, in spite of a strong denominational commitment in

religious practice and belief, there is evidence of a general willingness to compromise on

the matter of worshipping with members of Protestant denominations, at least on occa-

sions. Indeed, only 15 percent expressed any reservation and this group cannot be

distinguished in respect of theological conviction. Nevertheless, the fact that strongest

support for church unity is among the most highly orthodox Catholics, 55 percent of

them as compared with 42 percent at the low orthodoxy end of the spectrum, leads to

the conclusion that they may view such unity as a return of their separated brethren to

the Catholic fold-a view that may share something with that of the Free Presbyterian


16/26

160

Space or reli gion: a Belfat case study

70 -

60 -

50 -

40 -

% -

30 -

20 -

10 -

High

Moderate

Low

n&l7 18:4

25: 34 35: 44 45: 54 55: 64 6;+

FKXIRE

.

Catholics-orthodoxy and age

respondent

who observed that church unity was to be welcomed when the Church of

Rome is reconciled to the God of the Bible.

A broadly similar range of attitudes also manifests itself on the issue of mixed marriage.

Taken overall among Protestants there is an overwhelming opposition to Protestant and

Catholic marriage, although understandably this is strongest among conservatives-a

mere 7 percent indicate a willingness to marry a Catholic compared with 28 percent of

liberals. Beyond this a majority of conservatives are willing to take a marriage partner

from the range of Protestant denominations. By contrast liberals seem to be much more

selective in the Protestant denominations from which they would happily choose a mar-

riage partner; over 90 percent are favourably disposed to members of the Presbyterian,

Church of Ireland and Methodist denominations, whereas for such groups as the Brethren,

Pentecostalists and Free Presbyterians the number is closer to one in four-a figure even

smaller than for Catholics.

As with Protestants, Catholics strongly favour endogamous marriage relationships. This

is in line with the traditional Catholic church expectation that Catholics should marry

Catholics, a view still valued by many older churchgoers of a high orthodox outlook, only

12 of whom would be happy to marry a Protestant as compared with just over half of

their low orthodox coreligionists. It should be noted, however, that intermarriage with

the mainstream Protestant denominations, and most especially with members of the

Church of Ireland, is markedly more attractive to Catholics at all points on the theologi-

cal spectrum.

If there is this variety of attitudes expressed towards mixed marriage then it is likely

that it will have an impact on views about schooling since in the school environment

future marriage partners may be found. As far as Protestants are concerned, three-quarters

of conservatives prefer to have their children educated in a school with exclusively


17/26

DAVID . LMNGSTONE,ARGARET. KE NE ND FREDERICK. Boa

161

Protestant values and therefore want to send their children to either an all Protestant or

mostly Protestant school. Correspondingly, only around one in five want a shared Protestant

and Catholic ethos for their childrens education compared with three in five liberals.

Much the same attitude is revealed by Catholics. The pattern suggests that for them

also,

separate denominational schooling has a secure future; indeed, nearly 8 out of 10 of the

high orthodox group indicated their preference for a religiously exclusive educational

ethos for their children. This is a less popular choice among those at the other end of the

theological scale where it drops to 4 in 10 churchgoers; they are also less insistent that all

pupils must be Catholic. It is among this latter, if numerically smaller, low orthodox group

that most support for a shared Catholic-Protestant school ethos lies.

The same basic pattern of response also surfaces in attitudes towards the neighbour-

hood type in which respondents would like to live. Conservatives among Protestants are

much more inclined to favour an all Protestant neighbourhood--2 1 percent-compared

with 6 percent of liberals. This pattern of residential preference is even more strongly

manifest amongst high orthodox Catholics, 46 percent of whom express a wish for

residence in a segregated neighbourhood-contrasting with 22 percent of the low

orthodox. Neighbourhood preference is, of course, quite closely linked to current

neighbourhood experience. Here we find that conservative/high orthodox churchgo-

ers are much more likely to reside in segregated neighbourhoods than their liberal/

low orthodox counterparts. Thus, with Catholics, just over half of the high orthodox

group live in all Catholic neighbourhoods-for the low orthodox the figure is only 10

percent. Likewise with Protestants-68 percent of conservative Protestant churchgo-

ers live in all-Protestant neighbourhoods, a proportion that falls to a mere 6 percent

for liberals.

These findings point to the existence of a set of very significant socio-spatial milieux.

Conservative Protestants are, on average, likely to reside amongst other Protestants. In

turn. those of their Protestant neighbours who are churchgoers are likely to be conserva-

tive and, relative to the experience of liberal Protestants, are also likely to be working

class. Similarly with Catholics-high orthodoxy Catholics are likely to reside amongst

other Catholics. And again, churchgoers in their neighbourhoods are likely to be high

orthodox and are also more likely to be working class. The reverse situation will apply

with the low orthodox/liberal amongst Belfasts churchgoers. They are more likely to

experience neighbourhoods that are religiously mixed, where a significant proportion of

the churchgoers amongst the residents will be a melange of low orthodoxy Catholics and

liberal Protestants, in both cases predominantly of middle class background. Our data

do not permit exploration of the social dynamics of these contexts, but reinforcement of

conservatism/high orthodoxy on the one hand, and liberalism/low orthodoxy on the

other-and their class connections-would seem a possible consequence of the neighbour-

hood environments described.

Attitudes to mixed marriage, school ethos, school type, neighbourhood prefer-

ence and work environment form a spectrum concerning aspects of cross-

community interaction. The differences between conservative, liberal-conservative

and liberal Protestants and between high, moderate, and low orthodoxy Catholics

are recorded below (see Figure 8 and Figure 7). Here we can clearly see that,

whereas the

extent

of exclusivity varies between the sub-groups, the attitudinalpat-

tern for Catholics and Protestants alike is remarkably consistent. For both religious

groups exclusivity seems in every case to be more important for conservatives than

for either of the other two groups.


18/26

Space

or e l i g i o n

a Belfast

case study

80

80

20

T

Conservative

q

iberal/Conservative

Liberal

Marriage

School

Ethos

School Type

Neighbourhood

Work

Cross-Community Arenas

Marriage:

Those who would not be happy to marry a Northern Irish Catholic

School Ethos:

Those preferring to send their children to a school with Protestant values

School Type:

Those preferring to send their children to an all-Protestant school

Neighbourhood: Those preferring to live in an all-Protestant neighbourhood

Work:

Those who would not be happy to work with a Northern Irish Catholic

FIGURE. Protestant exclusivity.

Pub l i c a n d p r i u a t e mo r a l i t y

Given the very considerable disparities that we have just identified, the question arises as

to whether these attitudes permeate other aspects of social life. Here we consider a

number of moral issues ranging from public disciplinary procedures and institutions in

society to matters of private morality in general and sexual mores in particular.

Turning first to the public arena and to its most extreme expression of judgement-

capital punishment-we find that a majority of Protestant churchgoers of all theological

opinions would support its re-introduction (conservative 75 percent; liberal-conservative

68 percent; liberal, 61 percent), with the strongest supporting expression stemming from

the conservatives. The depth of concern over this issue that is recorded by conservatives

also comes through in their feelings that the courts let wrong-doers off too lightly and

that corporal punishment in schools should be brought back. Nevertheless, this should

not obscure the overwhelming agreement across the spectrum that is voiced concerning

the judicial system; nine out of every ten Protestant churchgoers, across the theological

range, are convinced that the courts are too lenient these days.

Catholic opinion across their theological range, in contrast to that of Protestants, is

generally resistant to the re-introduction of capital punishment and only around a quarter

accept the need for it, whatever their religious bent. That is not to say, however, that


19/26

DAVID . LMNGSTONE,MARGARET. KEANEANDFREDERICK . BOAI

163

80 -

60 -

40 -

20 -

0-r

High Orthodox

q

Moderate Orthodox

q OW

Orthodox

7

v

Marriage School Ethos School Type

Neighbourhood Work

Cross-Community Arenas

Marriage:

Those who would not be happy to marry a Northern Irish Protestant

School Ethos: Those preferring to send their children to a school with Catholic values

School Type: Those preferring to send their children to an all-Catholic school

Neighbourhood: Those preferring to live in an

all-Catholic neighbourhood

Work: Those who would not be happy to work with a Northern Irish Protestant

FIGURE. Catholic exclusivity.

other disciplinary procedures such as bringing back the cane in schools would be regarded

unfavourably; rather, this disciplinary measure finds approval with two-thirds of the

religiously more conservative, although only with around two in five of those of a more

liberal outlook. And what is more, the view that the courts are too lenient with offenders

is a shared one (83 percent of the high orthodox and 75 percent of their low orthodox

counterparts).

Position on the theological spectrum also counts in the private domain. Thus differ-

ences between conservative and liberal Protestants widen substantially when it comes to

matters of divorce (see F i gu r e 20) . Whether on the grounds of violence, mental cruelty,

desertion, incompatibility, or irretrievable breakdown, Protestant liberals are in every

case at least 25 percent more likely (and in some cases nearly 50 percent more likely)

than conservatives to countenance divorce. There is, moreover, some difference of opinion

on whether adultery provides legitimate grounds for divorce. While 67 percent of conserva-

tives believe that this is so, the figure for liberals drops to 59 percent. Clearly the issue of

sexual fidelity remains a salient component of the conservative psyche and is, correspond-

ingly, less prominent within the liberal mindset, at least compared with other divorce-

related circumstances.

In spite of the fact that the Catholic Church has long frowned on divorce, it is prepared

to accept it as long as there is no re-marriage. In these circumstances around 4 out of 5


20/26

a 6

4 2

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b

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8

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21/26

DAVIDN. LIVINGSTONE, ARGARET . KUNE ANI FREDEKICKW. BOAL

165

respondents indicated a willingness to accept divorce in some contexts especially where

physical violence or mental cruelty has occurred (around 60% in both cases). Even so,

those of a highly orthodox mindset display greater steadfastness in the face of societal

pressures: 36 percent of them, as compared to only 6 percent of the low orthodox, would

not countenance divorce in any circumstances. These cleavages in moral stance are even

more accentuated when it comes to the question of abortion. There is an overwhelm-

ingly anti-abortion ethic shared by churchgoers across the various theological positions

in the sense that there is practically no support for the view that abortion is always, or

even generally, morally acceptable. Having said that, the strongest opposition to abortion

is forthcoming from Catholics, and especially from the more religiously conservative

Catholics among whom opposition is almost universal: 93 percent of them declare it to

be wrong, comparedwith 74 percent of the moderates and 43 percent of the low orthodox

group. Compare this pattern to 53 percent of Protestant conservatives who regard it as

always wrong, a conviction which finds support among 25 percent of liberal conserva-

tives and only 11 percent of liberals. Correspondingly, it is not surprising that the great-

est sense of equivocation is expressed by liberals, On the abortion issue, we cannot fail

to note that conservative Protestants stand much closer to Catholics than to fellow

Protestants of liberal outlook.

On matters of morality in Northern Ireland it does not come as a surprise that the dif-

ferences between conservatives and liberals are at their sharpest on questions of sexual

behaviour. An overwhelming percentage of conservatives thus find sex before marriage,

cohabitation, and homosexual practices to be always wrong. Among Protestants this

amounts to 88 percent, 85 percent, and 94 percent of conservative opinion respectively

while for liberals these figures drop to 31 percent, 28 percent and 56 percent. Catholic

attitudes are fairly similar

if

a shade less strict; 82 percent, 81 percent and 87 percent for

the conservatives and at the other end of the orthodoxy scale, 23 percent, 20 percent

and 39 percent. These figures clearly reveal substantial disparity in judgements about

sexual morality and underline the significance of religious space in Northern Ireland.

Pol i t ica l

pe r suas i on

Despite all the divergences in the religious, moral, and cultural spheres that have been

observed, when it comes to issues of politics and identity in Northern Ireland there is

remarkably little internal variation in attitude within each of the two traditions. Of

course this is not to say that there is

no

intramural difference of outlook, and in the case

of both Protestants and Catholics there is evidence of subtle nuances conditioned by

religious conviction.

Consider, for example, our findings on the question of which political party comes

closest to respondents current views. Protestant respondents confirm that there is a

broad band of support across the theological spectrum for the Ulster Unionist Party;

beyond that, liberals are more inclined towards the Alliance Party and conservatives

towards the Democratic Unionist Party (see Figure I .

As for Catholics, 70 percent of churchgoers across all shades of religious opinion are

strongly in agreement that the Social Democratic and Labour Party comes closest to

expressing their views but, on balance, it is a party which receives stronger support from

the more orthodox churchgoers (see

Figure 12 .

Many among the 7 percent who sup

port the Alliance Party express moderate to low levels of orthodoxy. Further, it is interest-

ing that much Sinn Fein support comes from those convinced that individual conscience

is the most important guide to leading a Christian life; these supporters are, however,


22/26

166

Space

for reli gion: a Belfast case study

60

Conservative

q

iberal-Conservative

Liberal

DUP

Unionist

Alliance

Political Party

FIGURE1. Protestant party political preference and theological spectrum

70 -

80 -

50 -

40 -

30 -

20 -

10 -

o+

High Orthodox

q

Moderate Orthodox

q

ow Orthodox

Sinn Fein

SDLP

Alliance

Political Party

FIGURE2. Catholic party political preference and religious orthodoxy.

only a shade

more likely to be in the low orthodoxy segment of the theological spectrum.

For Protestants the only other political matter on which much divergence of opinion

surfaces is in attitudes towards the Orange Order. The strongest expression of support is

forthcoming from those of conservative opinion-

65

percent, with the figures falling to

62 percent for liberal-conservatives and 50 percent for liberals. In some ways this is a lit-

de surprising given the traditional antipathy to the Orange Order from certain fundamental-

ist denominations. However, we now find that the Orange Order attracts approval from


23/26

DA~~L). LMNGSTONE, ARGAJIET. KFANE NUFREDERICK. BOAL 167

nearly halfof Brethren and Baptist churchgoers. This hints at some changes to the traditional

position adopted by these groups. Historically their non-political stance was partly

grounded in religious conviction and perhaps partly in a sense that others might be relied

upon to preserve a staunch Protestant bulwark. If so this shift would seem to indicate an

increasing politicisation in the wake of perceived constitutional uncertainty.

As for attitudes to the constitutional future of Northern Ireland, there is no more than

a small margin of disagreement across either Catholicism or Protestantism. In the first

place, the majority of Catholics aspire to an all-Ireland solution. It is also clear that this

aspiration does not vary according to position on the orthodoxy scale; around 70 percent

of the high orthodox group show support for a united Ireland and this does not fall below

60 percent even at other end of the scale. As for Protestants. lack of disagreement on

politic,al issues across the theological spectrum is nowhere more clearly revealed than in

the constitutional question, where around 9 out of 10 of both conservatives and liberals

insist that the long-term political future of Northern Ireland should be within the United

Kingdom.

Given the remarkable diversity of opinion that conservative, liberal-conservative and

liberal Protestants and high, moderate and low orthodoxy Catholics espouse on so many

moral and social issues this political unanimity may well seem surprising. Beyond the

obvious connections at the macro-scale between Catholicism and nationalism, and

Protestantism and unionism, what our findings clearly do reveal is that intra Protestant

and Catholic religious identities do not map on to political identities in any simple way.

Doctrinal conviction, it seems, has little direct bearing on political identity. By contrast,

when we take an indicator of Protestant religious identity-the experience of conversion-

the differences across the theological spectrum are immense (93 percent of conservatives

report a born-again experience, compared with 69 percent of liberal conservatives and

22 percent of liberals). And as for Catholics (who find religious conversion to be of much

less significance) their enormous range of religious identity is uncovered in the variety of

convictions expressed regarding the Catholic Church being the one true church (100

percent, 60 percent and 15 percent across the orthodoxy scale). The unanimity of politi-

cal identity thus stands in marked contrast to the diverse expressions of religious identity.

However, underlying this political equiiinality-the final objectives of constitutional

aspiration-is a continuum of social and political motivations and strategies that runs

from the exclusionist to the inclusionist.

It is clear that the only way in which many Protestants feel that they can maintain their

religious and cultural pluralism is within a constitutionally secure political monolith.

Precisely the same is true of Catholics-only the desired political monolith differs. Advocacy

of a singular constitutional arrangement can evidently spring from a diversity of motiva-

tions. Au pays des assieges, le monolithisme est de rigueur (Frere Untel, 1960, p. 35).

Conclusion

The findings we have presented in this paper are designed to illustrate something of the

complexities of religious life in Northern Ireland. Consider the deceptive simplicity of

the labels Protestant and Catholic. In the first place, despite the apparently religious

connotations of these terms, they are typically invested with almost exclusively political

meaning. However, our survey clearly demonstrates that religion matters in Belfast and

that the religious spaces that dot the urban landscape are of immense significance even

though they remain largely terrue incognita to the eye of much scholarship and politi-

cal commentary. Furthermore, it is clear that these Catholic and Protestant spaces are


24/26

168

Space or reli gion: a Belfbst case study

themselves far from monochrome. Rather they constitute a diverse array of sites and

social spaces within which culture is differentially reproduced.

On issues of religious belief and practice, public and private morality, community relations

and experience, and motivations for political stance, we have discerned signiIicant variation

correlated in complex ways with denominational affiliation and the nature of individual

religious conviction. The stereotypical portrayal of two traditions, we believe, fails to do

justice to these realities, however analytically convenient or politically expedient such a

rudimentary taxonomy may be. That there are a number of key political issues on which

Protestants and Catholics are diametrically opposed is undoubted. But to subsume every

aspect of social life and cultural identity under the bi-polar rubric of constitutional antithesis

is to fall captive to a political reductionism whose status is, at the very least, contestable.

Acknowledgements

This

project was part funded by the European Regional Development Fund. Additional suppon was

received from the Central Community Relations Unit of the Northern Ireland Office. We are also

grateful for the helpful comments of two anonymous referees.

Notes

Historical and social circumstances contribute to the generally very high levels of church participa-

tion in Northern Ireland with affiliation rates at 91 here compared with a European average of

75 or the Great Britain average of 58 . In terms of church attendance, just over half the

population attend at least once a week whereas only three out of every 10 in Continental Europe

and one out of every 10 in Britain now do so (Whelan, 1994). However, even within Northern

Ireland, there are denominational differences; for instance in Belfast 75 of Catholics are regular

churchgoers compared to 30 of Protestants (tabulations derived from the Northern Ireland

Continuous Household Survey 1988-1991).

This attitudinal survey of regular churchgoers, both Protestant and Catholic, was carried out

during November-December

1993

n a variety of social areas in Belfast. A total of 5255 completed

questionnaire responses was obtained from 81 churches located in seven different areas of the

city chosen to cover social class characteristics, religious affiliation, ethnic pressure edges, inner

city locations, and suburbs. The information gathered from this source was supplemented by a

sequence of clergy interviews that had already been conducted between March and May 1993.

Full details of the methodology are available in Boa1 et al., 1997.

These were, respectively, Church of Ireland (11 congregations); Presbyterian (11); Methodist

(8); Baptist (7); Pentecostal (6); Free Presbyterian (4); Brethren (3); Congregational (2); Evangeli-

cal Presbyterian (2); Independent Evangelical Church (1); Non-Denominational Fellowship (1);

Non-Subscribing Presbyterian (1). Twenty-one Catholic churches were also surveyed.

Two of the largest denominations, Church of Ireland, and Methodist, were each left as separate

denominational groups. By examining Protestant respondents answers to the question Which

other denomination do you think is closest in doctrine to your own? we identified five further

denominational coalitions-Presbyterian, Baptistic, Pentecostal/Charismatic, Other Presbyterian

and Congregational. The appropriateness of this scheme was reinforced both from in-depth

interviews with clergy and from historical factors which connect certain traditions with each

other. For example the category Other Presbyterian encompasses two groups, which, though

conservative Presbyterian in theological persuasion, have historically seen their identity as distinct

from mainstream Ulster Presbyterianism. Again, the group labelled Baptistic is consistently scepti-

cal about a variety of charismatic claims and shares a fundamental commitment to the importance

of adult Baptism.

5.

Figure 2 and Figure 3 include respondents indicating that they would be happy to have a joint


25/26

DAVID

N.

LMNGSTONE,MAR(.AKET. KE.ANE NDFREDERI~X . BOAL 169

service of worship with their own denomination. For each denomination this presumably should

be lOO%, but non-response causes percentages to drop. This may be due to respondents think-

ing it was not necessary to complete the question for their own particular denomination.

6. Conversely when it comes to marrying across the divides, the main Protestant denominations

are less prepared to welcome marriage with Free Presbyterians and Pentecostalists than with

other denominations.

7. The 20% remaining suggest other solutions to the Northern Ireland problem, such as Independ-

ence (4%12%), a European Solution (around lo/u), Devolution (around 1%) and Majority Rule

(1%,-2X). Figures advocating a United Ireland range from 0% to 7%. These variations reflect

denominational differences.

8. It is worth noting that in our 1983 survey a slightly larger proportion of Protestant churchgoers

made the same prediction.

9. The validity of this assertion was confirmed in our earlier 1983 investigation of Protestant

churchgoers in Belfast.

10.

Conseruutives are

those who indicated that Only a conversion experience ofJesus Christ as personal

Saviour makes you a Christian and that What is written in the Bible is the Word of God and is

completely without error.

Liberals

disagreed with both of these propositions. In other words liber-

als are neither conversionist nor inerrantist in any sense. The

Liberal/Conseruutiues

can be

either

conversionist or inerrantist and are therefore intermediate between the first two groups.

11. In addition, positioning on the theological spectrum differentiates individual congregations

within some-mainly the larger-denominations. That is, some congregations display a highly

conservative pattern, others more liberal, with yet others somewhere between these poles.

12.Thc nine church teachings were: The Resurrection of Christ; The Bible is the Word of God;

People can sin; The Assumption of the Blessed Virgin; The Immaculate Conception; Papal Infal-

libility; Sins are forgiven in Confession; Transubstantiation; The Catholic Church is the One True

Church. Those who firmly believe in all nine doctrines constitute the High Orthodox category;

those who firmly believe in 4-B are considered IModerate Orthodox; those firmly believing in

less than 4 were considered Low Orthodox.

13. We need to record, however, that there is no

emct

equivalence between Protestant and Catholic

positions on these scales, namely, Protestant conservatives can not be considered simply as the cor-

relates of Catholic high orthodox because of the differing criteria used to construct the scales.

14.Further investigation of such scenarios would need to take seriously the potentially different

meanings of church attendance for different denominational groups,

15. The reader should be reminded, however, of two features; firstly that the majority of Protestant

conservatives are middle class, and secondly that while a small majority of low orthodoxy

Catholics are indeed middle class, an almost equal number are of working class background. In

other words our interpretations of the neighbourhood milieux need to be interpreted very

much in terms of

tendencies.

16.ln both cases there are 20% more conservatives than liberals who strongly agree with the

propositions.

17. It should also be noted that some such groups, for example, the Brethren, Baptist and Pentecostal

denominations, historically maintained an apolitical stance refusing to exercise their voting rights.

Our survey has only ascertained which political party comest closest to their outlook and does not

indicate whether or not such groups exercise the franchise. Having said that, we suspect that there

is now a greater willingness among such groups to vote than was the case in the past.

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