Soviet role in the Korean War.pdf

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EVOLUTION OF COLD WAR RULES OF ENGAGEMENT:THE SOVIET COMBAT ROLE IN THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-53

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College in partialfulfillment of the requirements for thedegreeMASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THOMAS A. LINEER, MAJ, USAB.A., California State University at Sacramento, 1977B.S., California State University at Sacramento, 1978M.A., Central Michigan University, 1979M.S., University of Southern California, 1987

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas1993

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Thomas A. LineerThesis Title: Evolution of Cold War Rules of Engagement:The Soviet Combat Role in the Korean War, 1950-53Approved by:

, Thesis Committee Chairman

, MemberRobert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

Accepted this 4th day of June 1993 by:

I , Director, Graduate DegreePhilip J. Brookes, Ph.D. ProgramsThe opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those ofthe student author and do not necessarily represent theviews of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Collegeor any other governmental agency. (Reference to this studyshould include the foregoing statement.)


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSMany individuals and institutions in my past and

present culminated in this project. First, my appreciationand admiration to those who shared their war experiences--Clayton Capers, Mike Lineer, Jack Marshall, Jac% Gifford,Kim Chung Hawn. My profound thanks to Dr. Timothy L. Sanzand to Dr. Robert F. Baumann. Their patience, guidance,and critiques were indispensable. A special note ofappreciation to Major Ronald Bonesteel whose readingsuggestion resulted in Chapter IV1s thesis.

The staff of the Combined Arms Research Library(CARL) of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Collegeresponded superbly to requests for information andinterlibrary loans. My special thanks go to Dennis Bilgerof the Harry S. Truman Library and Thomas W. Branigar of theDwight D. Eisenhower Library for their essential help thatprovided the documentary foundation for this thesis.

My inspiration for this project was our children--this is a part of their heritage. To Dorothy: may you readand understand. To Laura and our unknown: though your liveswere brief, you are not forgotten--you live in our hearts.Finally, this paper is dedicated to my wife, Hui Suk, whoselove and support made possible this thesis.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPROVAL PAGE ...................................... iiABSTRACT............................................ iiiACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................... ivLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................... viiCHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION ................................ 1Clausewitz Coalition Warfare Theory ............. 2Elements of National Power and Coalitions ....... 2Thesis and Limits ............................... 4Thesis Development by Chapter ................... 5Endnotes ........................................ 10I1. THE COLD WAR 1945-50 ..........................llies with Different Purposes and Objectives.....he American View of the Soviet Union: 1946Enunciation and Debate of America's Cold WarPolicy ..........................................Greece: 1947-1950 ................................Berlin: 1948-1949 ...............................ran: 1946-1950 .................................China: 1945-1949 ................................Indochina: 1946-1950 ............................

..............orea: Conflicting Allied War Aims ..........orea: The Approaching War . 943-1950American Cold War Policy and UnderstandingsPrior to the Korean War .........................Endnotes .........................................................11. THE SOVIET KOREAN WAR ROLE ..............he Road to War: Thesis of the NCAThe Contemporary American View of the .North Korean invasion ...........................American Diplomacy to Quarantine the Aggressor ..Diplomacy and Coalitions ........................Prevention of World War I11 .....................Conclusion: A Monolithic Communist MilitaryConspiracy ......................................The Antithesis: The Revisionist View of theSoviet Role .....................................The Synthesis: A Revised View of the Soviet Role .Changes in the Cold War ROES from the Korean War .Endnotes .........................................


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IV . THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION'S PARADOX ........ 130A Decision Based on Facts. Unknowns.and Assumptions ................................. 132What are the Soviets Up To? ..................... 135The Soviets have Committed Combat Forces -Now What? ....................................... 138The US Policy: Concealment ...................... 141Endnotes ........................................ 142V. THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION ... 146Eisenhowerts Paradox ............................ 148The Eisenhower Administration Policy ............ 149The Post-War UN General Assembly Plenary onKorean War POWs ................................. 151summary ......................................... 154Endnotes ........................................ 156VI . CONCLUSIONS ................................ 159Coalitions ....................*........,........ 159ROES: A Rationalized Method to Determine theBalance of Power ................................ 160Vital Soviet Combat Role in Korea ............... 161Korea as a Precedent: A Rerun in Vietnam ........ 162Endnotes ........................................ 164

WORKS CITED ........................................ 165INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................... 176


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CCACCAFCIACOMECONDPRKDPRKPAECAKMAGLOCNSCPAAFPRCROCROEROKROKAUKUNUS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONSCommunist Chinese ArmyCommunist Chinese Air ForceCentral Intelligence AgencyCouncil for Mutual Economic AssistanceDemocratic People's Republic of KoreaDemocratic People's Republic of KoreaPeople's ArmyEconomic Cooperation AssociationKorean Military Assistance GroupLine of CommunicationNational Security CouncilPeople's Army Air Force (DPRK)People's Republic of ChinaRepublic of ChinaRules of EngagementRepublic of KoreaRepublic of Korea ArmyUnited KingdomUnited NationsUnited States

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CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION

As the Allied noose tightened on Berlin in theSpring of 1945, Adolf Hitler was heartened from a falseradio report that stated Soviet forces were fighting UnitedKingdom (UK) and United States (US) forces. After all, hadhe not predicted it was inevitable that the Allies wouldsplit into two warring groups--the western allies againstthe Soviets? The political systems of the Westerndemocracies and the communist Soviet Union were incompatibleand destined for conflict, as had occurred after World WarI. It was a miracle. Nazi Germany was saved to fight withthe western allies against the Soviet Union.

In reality, this was another of Hitlerrs desperatedelusions.' The allies proceeded to destroy Hitler and hissystem that had precipitated unprecedented globalconflagration and destruction. However, there was somevalidity in Hitler's analysis. The incompatibility of theallied political systems contained the seeds of the ColdWar, which were germinated by rival visions of the structureof the post-World War I1 world.


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Clausewitz's Coalition Warfare TheorvCarl von Clausewitz wrote more than a century

earlier that the results of war are never final. To develophis theory, he employed the Hegelian dialectic. His thesiswas that the termination of hostilities produced a newequilibrium (balance of power) between nations. Theantithesis was that the new equilibrium lasts until theinevitable next war. The peace between wars was occupied bybuilding and/or reconstitution of national forces and will.As a result, the perceived and actual balance of power waschanged, and is only resolved by a new war. The synthesis(result of the new war) produced a new equilibrium, whichwas the thesis that renewed the endless cycles of war. 2

Clausewitz's war without end dialectic applies tonations engaged in coalition warfare. Each coalition nationhas different balance of power calculations, goals andobjectives. The coalition is brought together by a commonenemy or threat. Once this enemy or threat is removed, thecoalition will separate with each nation following its ownseparate interests. The result will be conflicts betweenformer coalition partners.

Elements of National Power and CoalitionThese conflicts between former coalition partners

are manifested through the employment of the followingelements of national power:1. Diplomatic (negotiations, alliances, relations).

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2. Economic (trade, industrial and technological bases).3. Informational (propaganda and ideological beliefs).4. Military (strength, use or show of force).The conflict may be fought with one or any combination ofthese national instruments of power that include entirespectrum conflict.

During the Cold War, the US and Soviet Unionemployed multiple instruments of national power, whichspanned the entire conflict spectrum. The traditional viewholds that direct use of the military instrument of nationalpower, combat between the US and Soviet Union, was notemployed. All other forms and uses of national power wereused. This included the employment of the militaryinstrument short of actual combat, such as occurred duringthe 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The direct use of either theUS or Soviet Union's military force was restricted tolimited wars, such as the Korean War (1950-53), the SecondIndochina War (1961-75), Grenada (1983), and Afghanistan(1979-1987). Each side carefully avoided any publication ofdirect military combat against the other. Furtheremployment of the military instrument of power was by thearmed and trained ttproxiesw f the US and Soviet Union.These rrproxiesn onducted numerous small wars, such as inGreece (1946-1949).


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Thesis and LimitsThis historical thesis develops the evolution of de

facto Cold War rules of engagement (ROE) from 1945 to 1953.Clausewitzen coalition theory and the elements of nationalpower are used to develop and analyze the ROEs. The thesisfocuses on the Soviet role in the Korean War, and how thatrole changed the ROEs. The glasnost period, the demise ofthe Soviet Union, and the conclusion of the Cold War allowedthe unclassified publication of Russian accounts of KoreanWar participation. These accounts combined with declas-sified American documents challenges the accepted view of avery limited Soviet role.

This thesis develops the Soviet role using aHegelian dialectic. The thesis is the contemporaneous USNational Security Council (NSC) view of Sovietparticipation. The antithesis is the revisionist historianviews of a limited Soviet role. The synthesis combinesrecently published Russian articles and declassified USdocuments to form a new view of Soviet participation and itsconsequences for the ROEs. This thesis providesdocumentary evidence that US and Soviet forces did engage indirect combat during the Korean War (1950-53), and that bothgovernments withheld this information. In conclusion, thethesis develops a theory to explain the mutual withholdingof information on the Soviet combat intervention.


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The development of this thesis uses primary andsecondary sources that combine facts and opinions. Thisthesis is primarily based on US declassified documents andsources because of the limited availability of Sovietsources. Consequently, it cannot be considered a definitivework because of the predominance of US sources combined witha mixture of facts and opinions.

pevelo~ment f the Thesis bv ChapterChapter I1 is the historical setting of the 1945 to

1950 period of the Cold War leading to the outbreak of theKorean War. How did the NSC's views of the Soviet Unionevolve before the Korean War? This chapter focuses on theNSCrs view using declassified US documents and recollectionsof principles from this period. Chapter I1 develops the USview of the Cold War ROES.

Over the next four decades, different historicalinterpretations developed to explain the right or wrong ofthe NSCrs view of the Soviet threat. Because the rootcauses of these differences are philosophical, no attemptwas made to construct a reconciled and definitive historyfor this period. Instead, these interpretations werecompared and contrasted.

With the accepted pre-Korean War employment ofnational power rule, Chapter I11 uses the Hegelian dialecticto construct a history of the Soviet role in the Korean War.The thesis is the contemporaneous NCA view that the Soviet

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Union was the real enemy. The Soviet Union was themastermind behind the communist aggression and commanded andcontrolled her satellite states of the Democratic People'sRepublic of Korea (DPRK) and People's Republic of China(PRC) as surrogate combatants. The US was unprepared forWorld War I11 against the Soviet Union and her satellites.Thus, the conflict must be limited to the Korean Peninsulauntil the US had rebuilt her military capabilities, whichwas estimated to take at least two years. Consequently, allefforts must be taken to prevent a Soviet decision to becomeengaged in Korea and thus avoid direct combat with Sovietforces, which was the trigger for World War 111.

The antithesis was the revisionist view that theKorean War was a civil war, which was made into aninternational war by US intervention. They discredited thecontemporaneous NSC view as conclusions reached by biasedinformation reinforced with an irrational fear of communism,instead of conclusions based on facts and analysis. TheSoviet Union and PRC response to the US intervention wasbased on their respective self-interests contrary to the NSCinterpretation as evidence of a Soviet-led monolithiccommunist conspiracy to conquer the world. The communistresponse resulted in a loosely formed confederation thatbattled the much more cohesive US lead coalition. TheSoviet role was strictly limited to diplomatic,informational, economic, and military logistics support for


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the DPRK and the PRC. This support to the DPRK and PRC wasinadequate and uncoordinated, which proved the NSC view ofthe communist monolith as fiction.

The synthesis compares and contrasts thecontemporaneous and traditional views with declassified USdocuments and recently published Soviet and Russian militaryhistories. These documents and histories providedocumentary evidence that the Soviet Union was an activecombat participant in the Korean War. Instead of the NSC orrevisionist views, Soviet participation is betterinterpreted under the lens of coalition warfare. Thischapter provides a fragmentary Soviet order of battle duringthe Korean War. The conclusion is how the Korean Warchanged and modified the Cold War ROEs that prohibitedcombat between US and Soviet forces.

Chapter IV considers the dilemma confronting theTruman Administration. In the last few days of June 1950,the Truman Administration employed a set of facts andassumptions t o make a rapid decision to employ United Statesmilitary power in Korea to prevent World War 111. Thequestion that this chapter seeks to answer is: what if oneor more of the assumptions were wrong and/or the enemy(Soviet Union) goes outside of the previously accepted ColdWar ROEs? From the recently declassified NSC documents, t hethesis documents that the Truman Administration knew ofdirect Soviet combat involvement. In the informational


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campaign against the communists, the Truman Administrationaccused the Soviet Union of every sin except for directcombat involvement. Why did the Truman Administrationdevelop a policy that studiously avoided any acknowledgmentof the Soviet combat role? This chapter concludes withtheory to explain the ncooperationn between the TrumanAdministration and the Soviet Union to suppress any publicknowledge of the Soviet combat role during the Korean War.

Dwight D. Eisenhower won the 1952 Presidentialelection partly because of his pledge to end the Korean War.Chapter V seeks to answer the following questions: Did theEisenhower Administration change or continue the TrumanAdministration policy to suppress public information on theSoviet combat role? How did the Eisenhower Administrationview and modify the Cold War ROEs, specifically direct USand Soviet combat?

Chapter VI draws conclusions and lessons from therevision of Cold War ROEs that allowed plausibly deniabledirect combat between the United States and Soviet Union.Either coalition, democratic or communist, used combatforces to protect its vital strategic interests. Korea wassuch a strategic interest that neither side could afford tolose. Neither coalition computed or had adequate militarystrength to assure victory in a World War 111. During thethree mobile phases of the Korean War (DPRK invasion toPusan, the United Nations counterattack and drive to Yalu,


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and the Chinese intervention), each side was convinced ithad the winning answer. However, the winning strategyproved to be elusive because neither side believed it couldafford to lose. Consequently, the two coalitionscontributed an adequate mixture of forces to avoid defeatand sparking World War 111. The US "cooperated1@ ith theSoviet Union to conceal Soviet combat actions to limit thescope of the war. In doing so, the Cold War ROES werepermanently changed. This change later manifested itself inthe alleged 1950 to 1970 US reconnaissance overflights ofthe Soviet Union and a repeat performance of the SovietKorean War role in the Second Indochina War.


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Endnotes'~ohn Toland, Adolf Hitley (New York: BallantineBooks, 1976), 874-875.2 ~ a r l on Clausewitz, On Way (Reproduced by theUnited States Army Command and General Staff Collegexntroduction to Militam Theory: 1992), 54-61.3n~eading: Fundamental Concepts Section A.National Securityrn oint and Combined Environments (C510)(Fort Leavenworth: United States Command and General StaffCollege: 1992), 57-8.


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CHAPTER 11THE COLD WAR 1945-50

The Cold War lasted from the conclusion of World WarI1 (1945) to the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991).During and immediately after World War 11, the Allies held aseries of conferences, which concluded agreements toestablish a lasting peace. These conferences and agreementsincluded :1. The Declaration of the United Nations (1 January 1942).2. The Moscow Conference of Foreign Secretaries thatresulted in the Declarations on General Security, Italy, onGerman Atrocities, and on Austria (30 October 1943).3. The Cairo and Tehran Conferences (November 1943), whichplotted war strategies and declared that the allies wouldcooperate in peace as in war.4. The Yalta (February 1945) and Potsdam (July 1945)Conferences.5. The Moscow Foreign Minister Conference (December 1945),which agreed to a Far Eastern Commission composed of 11countries to formulate principles to govern Japan and toa joint Soviet-American Commission and a four-powertrusteeship to rule and prepare Korea for independence.1


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These conferences and agreements tried to breakClausewitzls dialectic of endless war. Unfortunately,Clausewitzls assumption that coalitions fracture upon thesuccessful conclusion of war held true. Each of the fourmajor allied powers entered World War I1 with discordantpurposes and objectives. These differences resulted inconflicting formal and informal understandings of the spiritof the conferences and agreements. Subsequentinterpretative disagreements and outright violations betweenthe allies from 1945 to 1950 created informal Cold War rulesof engagement between the ex-allies.

Allies with Different Pumoses and ObjectivesThe big four Allies of World War I1 were the

Republic of China (ROC), the UK, the Soviet Union, and theUS. Each nation entered the Allied coalition because oftheir common Axis enemies of Germany and Japan. Theirdifferent backgrounds and circumstances resulted inconflicting war aims and associated post-war visions.

The ROC was first to be engaged by the Axis powers.In the fall of 1931, Japan exploited the Nationalist andCommunist Civil war2 and seized ~anchuria. After severalyears of relative peace, the Japanese attack on 7 July 1937at Lukouchia initiated the general war with China.' InSeptember 1937, the ROC and communist insurgents agreed tohalt their Civil War and to form a united front against theJapanese enemy "through parallel statements, not a single

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de~laration."~ The collective Chinese war aim was "for ourfreedom to survive and develop as a nation.^^ This includedthe restoration of all Chinese territories and propertiesseized by foreign powers "since the first Sino-Japanese Warof 1894-95."' China's war objectives led to conflicts withChina's allies, first with the Soviet Union and subsequentlywith the US and the UK. The ROC and Communist militaryceasefire generally held during the 1937-45 Sino-JapaneseWar. However, both sides continued to use diplomatic andinformational elements of power. lo From 1924 to 1940, theSoviet Union was the ROC'S major international source ofmilitary aid.'' However, the Soviet Union changed fromsupporting the ROC to outright support of the communists by1945. In exchange for entering the Pacific War, the Yaltaagreement of 1945 gave the Soviet Union a special positionin Manchuria. "China was left with little option but toconfirm this; but when doing so by treaty of August 14,1945, received in exchange Russia's promise to 'render toChina moral support and aid,' which was 'to be entirelygiven to the National Go~ernment."~'~ The Soviet Unionpromptly disregarded that part of the Yalta agreement. Thiswas evidenced by the Soviet Union's "vital aid to theChinese communists, turning over to them vast stores ofsurrendered Japanese arms and permitting them to move atwill into areas under their control.n13 The ROC retreatedto Taiwan in 1949. At the onset of the Korean War, the US


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Navy blockaded the Taiwan Straits at the onset of the KoreanWar in July 1950. This blockade brought the US into directconflict with the new PRC Government.

The UXZ declared war against Germany on 3 September1939 in response to the 1 September 1939 invasion of Poland.The UK went to war against Germany to honor its pledge todefend Poland. Interestingly, the UK (and France) did notdeclare war on the Soviet Union when Soviet forces invadedPoland on 17 September 1939 and partitioned Poland withGermany. One interpretation for the UK and France's failureto declare war on the Soviet Union was that they could notcontend with the combined military weight of Germany andRussia. The UK war objective was to reduce the power ofGermany, and to hold the Soviet Union as far east aspossible. l4 To this end, Churchill made bilateralagreements with Stalin dividing Europe into spheres ofinfluence. President Roosevelt was excluded15 and would nothave approved.16 The UK's fundamental view of post-wararrangements reflected the vicissitudes of Europeaninternational politics. "The ally of today might become theenemy of tomorrow and, as tradition required, this principlewas applied also to the Soviet Union in World War 1 1 . " ~ ~

The Soviet Union's self-interests and ambitionsdominated her relations with the Allied Western Powers andthe Axis Powers. In 1938, the Soviet Union wasdiplomatically isolated and ignored by the major European


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powers of Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain. 18After the 1938 Czechoslovakia crisis, the Soviets foundthemselves sought after as a possible ally by Nazi Germanyand the Western powers. Stalin concluded that the UK andFrance failed to resist Hitler because of their desire tofoment a war between Germany and Russia. l9 Subsequently,he completed the famous Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact on23 August 1939. This provided Hitler the necessary securityto invade Poland on 1 September 1939 and start the Europeanphase of World War 11. The secret provision of this pactpartitioned Poland and divided the rest of Eastern Europeinto spheres of influence for eventual control oroccupation. On 17 September 1939, the Soviet Union moved tooccupy its portion of Poland. In September and October1939, the Soviet Union forced the three Baltic states,Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to sign mutual assistancepacts and in July 1940 absorbed them. Finland resistedSoviet pressure and was invaded by the Red Army on 29November 1939. The UK and France supported Finland anddecided to send combat troops a few days before theconclusion of the Soviet-Finnish Peace Treaty in March 1940.As a result of their actions, the Soviet Union was expelledfrom the League of Nations in 1939. 20 However, Stalin hadaccomplished his basic war aim to extend his westernboundaries to about the same position as the Russianfrontier of 1795 and added eastern Galicia.


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The 22 June 1941 German invasion forced the SovietUnion into the Allied coalition. Soviet war aims did notchange: push Soviet hegemony as far west in Europe aspossible. At Yalta, the Soviets added a new war aim:recover the lost influence and territory from the 1904-05Russo-Japanese War. 22

The US unofficially entered the war with the Lend-Lease Act of 1940 and embargoes on raw materials to Japan.While officially a neutral nation, the US providedsignificant diplomatic, informational, economic and militaryassistance (Lend Lease) to the UK and waged diplomatic,informational, and economic war with Japan to force an endto Japanese aggression in China. With the 7 December 1941Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the US officially enteredthe war. The US objective was to replace the failed Leagueof Nations with an effective United Nations (UN), where theallied powers would be "the Pour Roosevelt'splan was to blend two hostile ideologies "into a harmoniousspirit inspiring the future United Nations to open a new erain which strife among nations would give way tocooperation.1124 Further, "the United states and GreatBritain could not fight the Soviet Union. The Europeanswould simply have to endure the Russian domination, in thehope that their master would improve after a decade or twoof hardships. n25 81Collective ecurity, then, became thefinal and positive American war aim with the understanding


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that the cooperation of the Soviet Union had to besecured. 2

President Roosevelt's death on 12 April 1945 openeda struggle for the direction of US foreign policy.Initially, President Truman continued Roosevelt's policy ofconcessions to the Soviets in return for c~operation.~' Thenew American Secretary of State, James F. Bynes wrote,

I had assumed that at the end of hostilities an era ofpeace would be so deeply desired by those nations thathad fought the war in unity that the inevitabledifferences2gf opinion could be resolved without seriousdifficulty.

Truman's and Stalin's views produced conflict at the PotsdamConference in July 1945. President Truman's experience atthe Potsdam Conference combined with Soviet post-World WarI1 intransigence changed his mind and the direction ofAmerican foreign policy. He later commented,

It had taken him a little time to grasp the truth as toRussian bad aith, but that he had since thoroughlylearned it. 24

In March 1946 in Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill proddedPresident Truman with his famous speech that stated: "FromStettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an ironcurtain has descended across the continent.tr30 AsClausewitz predicted, the Allied Coalition had separated.

The American View of the Soviet Union: 1946President Roosevelt's hoped-for cooperation with the

Soviet Union faded by 1946 with irreconcilable differencesbetween the US and Soviet Union. President Truman directed

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his Special Counsel, Clark M. Clifford, "to prepare a reportsummary of American relations with the Soviet TheClifford Report stated that there was a remarkable agreementamong the senior National Security advisers to the Presidenton "estimates of current and future Soviet policies," and"on recent Soviet activities affecting the security of theUnited States, and recommendations concerning AmericanPolicy with respect the Soviet ~ n i o n . " ~ ~he report startedby stating:

The gravest problem facing the United States today isthat of American relations with the Soviet Union. Thesolution of that problem may determine whether or notthere will be a third World War. Soviet leaders appearto be conducting their nation on a course ofaggrandizement designed to lead to eventual worlddomination by the U.S.S.R. Their goal, and theirpolicies designed to reach it, are in direct conflictwith American ideals, and the United States has not yetbeen able to persuade Stalin and his associates thatworld peace and prosperity lie not in the directionwhich the Soviet Union is moving but in the oppositedirection of international cooperation and friendship.33The report stated that Soviet foreign policy is

based on the fundamental tenet of communist philosophy thatpeaceful coexistence of communist and capitalist nations wasimpossible34 and on centuries-old Russian nationalism andexpansionism concealed under the guise of internationalc o m m ~ n i s m . ~ ~he Soviet strategy was to build up its ownstrength, to undermine capitalist nations, and to postponethe inevitable conflict for many years until the SovietUnion was stronger. "Soviet leaders will continue to


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collaborate whenever it seems expedient, for time is neededto build up Soviet strength and weaken the opposition.t136

In Europe, the Soviet Union considered that all landeast from Stettin to Trieste was essential for its security.The Soviet opposition to US-UK peace settlements supportedits efforts to control eastern Europe by allowing Red Armytroops to remain legally in enemy c~untries.~' The longerrange Soviet goal was to dominate the eastern Mediterraneanand near East.

[The] Soviet Union is interested in obtaining thewithdrawal of British troops from Greece and theestablishment of a "friendly" government there. Ithopes to make Turkey a puppet state that could serve asa springboard 5gr domination of the easternMediterranean.In Asia, the Soviet strategy employed the divide-

and-conquer method to pave the path for Moscow-leadcommunist domination.

[The] basic Soviet objective in China, Korea, and Japanis to ensure that these countries remain internallydivided and weak until such time as the U.S.S.R is in aposition to exert greater influence there than any othercountry. The Chinese Communist Party is supported bythe U.S.S.R. In Korea the Soviets have shown that theywill consent to the unification of %$e country only ifassured of a "friendly1@ overnment.The Clifford Report stated that "the Soviet Union

joined the United Nations as a matter of expedience.and notbecause of any devotion to abstract principles of peace."*'The causes, disagreements, and mistrust between the twocountries were a direct result of Soviet violations of theseries of conferences and written agreements arranged by


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President Roosevelt from January 1942 to February 1945.Soviet bad faith was poignantly demonstrated by Stalin. Afew days before his death, President Roosevelt was denouncedby Stalin in bitter and vitriolic tones because sf a falsereport that the US had attempted to make a separate peacewith Germany. 41 The US Government was convinced that theSoviet Union violated these agreements to the detriment ofAmerican security and interests in Germany, Austria, EasternEurope (particularly flagrant in Yugoslavia, Romania,Bulgaria, and Poland), Iran, and Korea.42

In Korea, the Soviet refusal to consult withdemocratic parties in the US zone violated the MoscowConference of Foreign Ministers December 1945 agreement thatrequired a joint commission to consult with Koreandemocratic parties. 43 In contrast, the US viewed theirconduct in Korea as constructive and to the letter andspirit of the Moscow Conference.

Clearly the Soviet Union was to blame for increasinginternational tensions and for the threat posed by theirmilitary forces. "The most obvious Soviet threat toAmerican security is the growing ability of the U.S.S.R. towage an offensive war against the United ~ t a t e s . " ~ ~histhreat was stated by Stalin by "his intention of sparing noeffort to build up the military strength of the Soviet~ n i o n . ~ ~ ~ ~t was backed up by intelligence reports ofSoviet violations of the Berlin Protocol to destroy captured


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German shipyards and submarines and by Soviet forcesoutnumbering US forces in Germany, Austria, and Korea Isinoverwhelming strength, thus placing our forces literally atthe mercy of the Soviet ~overnment 4 3

The report concluded that the primary objective ofUS foreign policy toward the Soviet Union was:

to convince Soviet leaders that it is in their interestto participate in a system of world cooperation, thatthere are no fundamental causes for war between our twonations, and that security and prosperity of the SovietUnion, and that of the rest of the world as well, isbeing jeopardized by aggressive militaristic imperializysuch as that in which the Soviet Union is now engaged.

The American message to Soviet leaders was that cooperationproduces benefits, and non-cooperation produces costs. Itwas hoped that this message could be maintained firmly andlong enough for its logic to permeate into the Sovietsystem. 48

If US foreign policy objectives toward the SovietUnion could not be achieved through diplomatic andinformational uses of national power, the US should joinwith the UK and other Western countries in using economicinstruments of power to isolate the Soviet Union andsatellite countries. The economic isolation of the Sovietblock was conceived to be a "peaceful divorce," in which theWest would:

build up a world of our own which will pursue its ownobjectives and will recognize the Soviet orbit as adistinct entity with which conflict is not pz~destinedbut with which we cannot pursue common aims.


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The US would have to be the center of this economic westernalliance through generous American financial aid to ensureeconomic opportunities, personal freedom, and socialequality.50

US foreign policies must be global in response tothe overall Soviet objectives. In addition to diplomatic,informational, and economic elements of national power,

the United States should maintain military forcespowerful enough to restrain the Soviet Union 39d toconfine Soviet influence to its present area.This is the start of American doctrine of containment.The NSC blamed Soviet expansionism and hegemony asthe reason for the fracture of the World War I1 Alliedcoalition. The Clifford Report provided a dual track USstrategy to respond to the global Soviet challenge: theolive branch of peaceful coexistence and the sword andshield of containment.

The Eirst track was an olive branch that principallyrelied on the use of diplomatic and informational elementsof national power.

Our best chances of influencing Soviet leaders consistin making it unmistakably clear that action contrary toour conception of a decent world order will rebound tothe disadvantage of the Soviet regime whergfs friendlyand cooperative action will pay dividends.This strategy was rooted in President Rooseveltgs post-warvision of cooperation. However, in the year since theconclusion of World War 11, it had lost credibility withinthe NSC.


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The second strategy was the sword and shieldemploying all elements of national power short of directmilitary combat with the Soviet Union. This strategy reliedmore on the economic and military instruments of power thanthe diplomatic and informational for success. The CliffordReport (24 September 1946) laid the foundation for theTruman Doctrine (12 March 1947) of providing militaryassistance to defeat Soviet sponsored or inspiredaggression, for the Marshall Plan (8 May 1947) of economicaid to immunize allies from the siren calls of communism,and for the diplomatic and informational effort to containthe Soviet Union's control and influence.

Fnunciation and Debate of America's Cold War PolicyThe Clifford Report provided a factual and

intellectual foundation to change American foreign policytoward the Soviet Union from cooperation, based on westernconcessions, to confrontation, based on the US creating andleading western alliances. This change was implemented fromlate 1946 through the spring of 1947 before the onset of thepublic debate in the summer of 1947.

On 12 March 1947, President Truman addressed a JointSession of Congress and enunciated the "Truman Doctrine."President Truman seized the communist insurgency in Greecewith Soviet threats to Turkey as continued proof of hostileSoviet actions that required an American counter-action.The Truman Doctrine stated that the US would provide Greece

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and Turkey (and in general all non-communist countries)economic and military assistance in defeating direct andindirect Soviet communist insurgencies. The military aidwas limited to military hardware and advisers.

To persuade Congress and the American public,President Truman argued that the World War 11 sacrificeswould be in vain if the American postwar vision collapsedbecause of failure to resist Soviet hegemony. PresidentTruman stated,

We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless weare willing to help free peoples to maintain their freeinstitutions and their national integrity againstaggressive movements 8Qat seek to impose upon themtotalitarian regimes.The US objective was the implementation of the principles ofthe UN Charter. Further, he articulated a domino theory,and stated that Soviet hegemony in Greece and Turkey

would be disastrous not only for them but for the world.Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be thelot of neighboring people~~strivingo maintain theirfreedom and independence.

President Truman asked for and received immediateCongressional support and action to implement this shift inAmerican policy.

The harsh European winter of 1946-47 combined withthe Soviet threat was instrumental in the formulation of theMarshall Plan. During this winter, Western Europe sufferedchronic housing and food shortages. Former PresidentHerbert Hoover's report to President Truman on 27 February1947 painted a desperate situation in Germany, and generally


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unstable conditions throughout Western Europe. Aftersuffering great economic destruction and dislocation duringthe war, the countries of Western Europe did not have thefinancial resources for reconstruction. Former PresidentHoover's report concluded that the US would have to providefood and capital for European economic recovery or risklosing the peace. 56

The Marshall Plan, as described by Undersecretary ofState Dean Acheson on 8 May 1947, was promulgated in ournational self-interest. The US objective was to provide forthe economic stabilization of Europe, which included theSoviet Union and dominated states of Eastern Europe.Stabilization of Europe was essential.

Until the various countries of the world get on theirfeet and become self-supporting, there can be nopolitical or economic stability in the work? and nolasting peace or prosperity for any of us.This was the economic complement to the Truman Doctrine.The priority and eligibility for Marshall Plan economic aidwas limited by the American containment policy.

Free peoples who are seeking to preserve theirindependence and democratic institutions and human needsagainst totalitarian pressures, either internal orexternal, will rece&e top priority for Americanreconstruction aid.Secretary of State George C. Marshall stated that Germanywas the top priority for American reconstruction aid in hisChicago address of 18 November 1947.

The restoration of Europe involves the restoration ofGermany. Without revival of Germag3;1s economy there canbe no revival of Europels economy.


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Together, the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrinemobilized and furnished American economic and militaryinstruments of national power to implement of the doctrineof containment.

The Marshall Plan was offered to all countries ofwar-ravaged Europe. At first, the Soviet-controlled statesof Poland and Czechoslovakia replied favorably, but thenreversed their decisions under Stalinls pressure. 60 ~ t a l i ndistrusted the United State's offer. Consequently, theSoviet Union rejected the Marshall Plan, and forced theirsatellites to do like~ise.~' As a counter to the MarshallPlan, the Soviet Union established the Council for MutualEconomic Assistance (COMECON) in January 1949. 62 Thus,Europe and the world were split into two economic as well aspolitical camps.

US foreign policy toward the Soviet Union hadchanged for good before the public debate of summer and fall1947 between George F. Kennan ("Mr. XI1) and Walter Lippmanover its merits. George F. Kennan was a career ForeignService Officer and very influential in analyzing Sovietforeign policy.63 Walter Lippman was one of the mostwidely-read and influential American authors and journalistof this period.64 Kennan and Lippman endorsed the MarshallPlan, and had contributed to its formulation. The debatecentered on the Truman Doctrine's policy of containment.This debate was for American public opinion and support.

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The public informational battle for the Americanpublic support was initiated by George F. Kennanls article,"The Sources of Soviet ConductI9* ublished in ForeianAffairs, Volume XXV, July 1947. In this article, Kennanreiterated the Clifford Report's sense that the Soviet Unioncould not be trusted in the postwar world. "There can neverbe on Moscowls side any sincere assumption of a community ofaims between the Soviet Union and power which are regardedas ~a~italisrn.~~~*onsequently, it "means we are going tocontinue for a long time to find the Russians difficult todeal with.1166 On one hand, the Soviets were easier to dealwith than Napoleon and Hitler because they are sensitive toand will withdraw in the face of superior forces. On theother hand, Soviet ideology discouraged and prevented asingle decisive victory by its opponents.67 Thus, the"Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration, andthey see that already they have scored great successes.t168The solution Kennan proposed was containment until theinternal and inherent weakness of the Soviet system forces achange in Soviet conduct.

Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, asopposed to the Western world in general, is still by farthe weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible,and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencieswhich will eventually weaken its own total potential.This would of itself warrant the United Stated enteringwith reasonable confidence upon a policy of firmcontainment, designed to confront the Russians withunalterable counter-force at every point where they showsigns of encroach g upon the interests of a peacefuland stable world.$8


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Walter Lippman agreed with Kennan's thesis that"Soviet power will expand unless it is prevented fromexpanding because it is confronted with power, primarilyAmerican power, that it must respect. n70 However, Lippmancontended that Kennan8s analysis was flawed.

Lippman viewed Kennan's containment strategy asfounded on the unsubstantiated belief that the Soviet systemand threat would eventually collapse from internal decay,and failed to consider the historical inheritance of thecommunist Russians from the Czars. To contain futuremilitary adventures of the Soviet Union, Lippman reasonedthat the US would have to construct, arm, and finance itsown satellite alliances because the standing Americanmilitary forces were insufficient to contend with allpossible threats. These far-strung alliances conceded tothe Soviet Union the international initiative by selectingthe time and place for military confrontations. Thisstructure of US-led alliances was proposed to be financed bymanipulation of the world economy (sardonically stated asthe planners in the State Department). Further, Sovietexpansionism was more influenced by historical Russianinsecurity than communist ideology. Lippman concluded thatcontainment would result in the loss of US initiative,resources and prestige. Further, pursuit of containmentwould destroy the UN, which was the hope for a peacefulpostwar world. 71


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As a counter to the Truman Doctrine, Lippmanproposed a loose concept for European unity. This proposalwas for a:

European system and a European economy. Not a GermanUnity but European unity, not German self-sufficiencybut European self-sufficiency, not a Germany to containRussia but a Germany neutralized as between Russia andth e west, not the Truman Doctrine but the Marshall Plan,purged of the ?suman Doctrine, should be the aims of ourGerman policy.Instead of heavy military content contained in the TrumanDoctrine, Lippman argued for diplomacy resulting from abalance of power.

Diplomacy deals with a world where rival powers organizea balance of power which deprives the rivals, howeverlacking in intimacy and however unresponsive to commonappeals, of a good prospect of successful aggression.The balance of powgg is such that they cannot afford t ocommit aggression.This debate did not change the Truman

Administration. Instead, the purpose of the debate was toprepare and mobilize the American public to support anexpanded Cold War. The Clifford Report concluded that theUS was already fighting Soviet expansionism by use ofdiplomatic and informational elements of national power.The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan announced that theUS was willing t o employ all elements of national power,including the military and economic elements, to stop Soviethegemony.

The US and Soviet Union participated in a series ofindirect confrontations from 1947 to 1950. This includedconflicts in Greece, Berlin, Iran, China, Vietnam, and


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Korea. Each conflict expanded and added to the de factoCold War ROEs. The following are brief histories, and howeach conflict expanded the de facto Cold War ROEs.

Greece: 1947-1949The Greek Civil War enlarged the ROES to include the

limited use of the military element of national power. Thiswar saw the Soviet Union and the West (UK and US) providinglogistics, training, and advisers to opposing combatants.7Thus, the Greek Civil War was a limited military test ofstrength between the US and Soviet Union, whose proxiesperformed the actual combat.

The Truman administration viewed the Greek Civil Waras Soviet-directed aggression to overthrow the legalgovernment,75 which was supported by a popular majority. 76The Communist defeat in 1949 resulted from "US-UK militaryaid, the Greek military effort, and Tito1s defection fromthe omi inform.^^^^ The US learned that military aid withadvisers and economic support was a low risk, successfulmeasure that stopped Soviet hegemony.

At the conclusion of the war, the de facto militaryROES allowed the US and Soviet Union to arm, train, andadvise their proxies. However, combat between the US andSoviet Union armed forces was prohibited.


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Berlin: 1948-1949The next challenge to the Truman Doctrine was the

Berlin Blockade in 1948-49. The Soviet Union tried to forcethe Western Power out of Berlin by imposing a blockade. Itfailed. Instead, it confirmed American and western fears ofthe Soviet Union. President Truman stated, "Russiarstoughness and truculence in the Berlin matter has led manyEuropeans to realize the need for closer military assistanceties among the western nations, and this led to thediscussions which eventually resulted in the establishmentof NATO."'~ The Berlin Blockade hastened the establishmentof the West German state7' and its eventual rearmament andintegration into NATO. 80

The US concluded that the Soviet backdown on theBerlin Blockade acknowledged their political and economicweakness in Germany. Superior instruments of nationalpower, diplomatic and economic, supported by a firm militaryresolve successfully avoided a direct military clash andachieved the political goals. Thus, the US de facto ROE wasthat Soviets would back down when confronted by superiorinstruments of national power.

The Council of Foreign Ministers was employed as aface-saving device to give the appearance of a quid pro quo.The Soviet Union would not try again in Europe, as theyappeared to have adopted a similar containment policy.Rather, the Soviet Union turned east to the Middle East and


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Asia, where the situation was more favorable for expandedinfluence and control.81

Jran: 1946-1950During the World War 11, Iran had been vital to the

western allies for oil and to the Soviet Union as the majortransit route for American Lend-Lease supplies. Americanand British troops were posted in Iran to control thesupply route and oil. The Soviet Union moved troops intotheir common border area under the provisions of Article VIof the 1921 Irano-Soviet Treaty. The Soviet troops werewithdrawn after the war. 8

Iran's strategic geographical location and largeproven oil reserves were the primary reasons for competitionbetween Western Allies and the Soviet Union. Post-warIran's variety of political, social, and economic weaknessescollided with the rivalry between Western powers and SovietUnion. These weaknesses combined with the perceived Sovietthreat were successfully exploited by the US with militaryand economic aid.8

The Truman Administrationls use of informational,economic, and military elements of national powersuccessfully denied Soviet goals and brought Iran into theAmerican sphere of influence. The competitive struggle forinfluence in Iran continued well beyond 1950. However, theUS de fact0 ROES were that Soviet global hegemonic goalscould be defeated by an economy of force applications of

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elements of national power. This later principle wasfurther refined in the CIA inspired military coup of August1953.8

China: 1945-1949The ROC and communist ceasefire ended with the

surrender of Japan in 1945. The World War I1 Allies choosedifferent sides, and the Soviet Union flagrantly violatedthe Yalta Agreement in supporting the communists. The USpursued a dual track approach to the Chinese civil war. Onone track, the US attempted to broker a peace settlement.On the other track, the US provided military logisticsupport for the ROC armies. The communists steadily gainedthe upper hand in the renewed civil war with massive Sovietsupport, internal divisions within the ROC Government, andrampant inflati~n.'~ In 1949, the communists forced the ROCto flee the mainland to Taiwan, and proceeded to consolidatetheir victory over the next few years.

The contemporary American view of the communistvictory was that:

The USSR, in its drive for world domination, can beexpected to continue its present attempts at expansionand consolidation in Eurasia by all means short ofdirect involvement of Soviet armed forces, in an attemptto attain eventual decisive military superiority overthe US in intercontinental warfare. . . . Communistdomination of China is significant primarily because itenhances USSR capabilities for obtaining Sovietstrategic objectives in the Far East and, concomitantly,tends to insure the prosoviet political orientation ofnearly half the population of that region with theconsequent danger of eventual Soviet control over theremainder. Soviet ability to capitalize on the situa-


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tion in China will depend on the degree of consolidationand control that the Chinese ~ommuriist an exert overall elements of Chinese society, and the control thatthe Kremlin can exert over Chinese Communist leaders.It must be assumed that the grasp of the USSR upon Chinaand the Chinese Communist on the Chinese peggle will,for the foreseeable future, grow more firm.

The popular US view was that China was lost to thecommunist monolith controlled by the Soviet Union. On 23December 1949, the NSC reported bluntly to the Presidentthat the "extension of communist authority in Chinarepresents a grievous political defeat for It wasalso a defeat for the US-led Western Alliance. However,members of coalitions have different objectives, The UK'sobjective in Asia was to protect Hong Kong, which wassuddenly vulnerable to the PRC. Consequently, the UK alongwith several nations of the British Commonwealth establisheddiplomatic relations with the new PRC Government: within ayear of their victory. Before the Korean War, the US hadmade similar calculations and preparations to recognize thePRC .

Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated, "TheCommunist were in complete control of China not primarilybecause the Nationalist suffered military defeat, butbecause the National government collapsed."88 USintelligence reported on 19 October 1949 that:

Communist capabilities are such that only extended U.S.military occupation and control of Taiwan can preventits eventual capture and subjugation by Chinesecommunist forces. Failing U.S. military occupation andcontrol, a non-communist regime on Taiwan probably wA41succumb to the Chinese communist by the end of 1950.


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Secretary Acheson reasoned that the US had extricated itselffrom the Chinese civil war, and it was important not to bedrawn into it again. Soon, the PRC would be generallyrecognized. China was now in the Soviet sphere ofinfluence, but in the future there would be conflict betweenChina and the Soviet Union. Continued military assistanceto the ROC would only deflect Chinese fears from the SovietUnion to the Thus, the Truman Administration waitedfor the inevitable collapse of the ROC regime beforediplomatic recognition of the PRC.

Within the next year, Secretary Acheson StateDepartment's calculation to recognize the PRC was scrambledby the Korean War and domestic politics of "who lost~ h i n a ? ~ * ~ ~hese fractured calculations added credence toAmerican policy makers who viewed communism as a monolithicmovement controlled by the Soviet Union, and discreditedAcheson and others who saw potential cracks in the communistmovements.

The Chinese Civil War added to the limited militaryROE. The Soviet Union disregarded international agreements(diplomatic) to muted protests (informational) in supply andsupporting (military) the communist victory. Thus, when onepower (US) is unable to effectively employ its elements ofnational power and is unwilling to start a general war, theother power (Soviet Union) unilaterally determines theconflict ROES.

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Indochina: 1946-1950Japan seized the opportunity of the armistice

between Germany and the pro-Axis Vichy French regime tooccupy Indochina beginning on 22 September 1940. The localFrench colonial administration cooperated with the Japanesebecause they believed there was no other alternativecourse of action. This cooperation lasted until 9 March1945, when the Japanese expelled all French colonial forcesand administration. After the Japanese surrender inSeptember 1945, the French returned to reestablish theircolonial administration. Their administration was opposedby the communist Viet Minh, who had fought the Japaneseoccupation. Attempts at a peaceful settlement failed, andthe war started on 19 December 1946 with communist attackson French garrisons in Haiphong. 92

The US initially viewed the Indochina conflict as aFrench colonial war. In principle, the US supported thepost-World War I1 trend of decolonization. However, itcould not support the leading role of the communist VietMinh to expel the French. US intelligence wrote:

So long as the war against the French forces continues,neither the Communist nor the non-Communist group withinthe resistance is in a position to carry on an extensiveand persistent propaganda against the other withoutsplitting the ranks of the resistance. Both groups areagreed that elimination of all French controls is theprimary objective. However, with their long experiencein the techniques of persuasion and coercion and withtheir control of many of the important governmental 93positions, the communists are playing a winning game.


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For the anti-communist western governments,effective counter-measures against the Viet Minh communistthreat were marginal:

There is almost no effective manner in which Westerngovernments unilaterally through the French can opposethe trend favorina the Communists so lona as theindigenous, poten&ally anti-communist f ces acceptpredominantly C ~ p u n i s t eadership in order to eliminateIn the first half of 1950, US intelligence believed

that most immediate avenue for communist expansion wasagainst the French in ~ndochina.'~ Despite this view, theUS was reluctant to provide economic and military supportfor the French colonial effort. The US strategy to stopcommunism in Asia was:

to use its influence looking toward resolving thecolonial nationalist conflict in such a way as tosatisfy the fundamental demands of the nationalist-colonial conflict, lay the basis for political stabilityand resistance to communism, and avoid weaksging thecolonial powers who are our western allies.Further US intelligence analysis stated that if

"Indochina fell into Communist hands, the way would be pavedfor communist control over Thailand and Burma.t197 This wasthe beginning of the US domino theory for Southeast Asia.The domino theory, a sense of urgency to stop the spread ofcommunism in Asia, and the Korean War convinced the US tobegan providing economic and military logistical support forthe French in July 1950. The Cold War ROE that evolved inUS foreign policy was that the ideal in the stated policyprinciples and methods were secondary to a pragmatic


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response to support many flavors of anti-communists in theworld wide effort to contain Soviet-inspired and ledcommunist expansionism.

porea: Conflictina Allied War AimsThe big four Allied powers of World War I1 had

conflicting visions for post-war Korea. These visions werefounded on their respective history and politics in Korea.Each vision was based on national self-interest.

Historically, the UK favored Chinese or Japanesehegemony over Korea. The UK had never favored Koreanindependence until the Cairo Declaration. At the end ofWorld War 11, the UK was too beset by economic problems andthe dissolution of the empire to have a major interest orrole in the future of Korea. Instead, the UK vision wasembodied in the Allied declarations: a united andindependent Korea. To implement this vision, the UK waswilling to support and follow US'policies.

China had a vital interest in the future of Korea,which was discounted with disastrous results by the US in1950. The Korean Peninsula was a historic invasion routeinto China, and Manchuria contained a significant Koreanminority. For either the ROC or PRC Governments, the issueof who ruled or dominated Korea was a major securityconcern. The Chinese vision was a united, independent, andpro-Chinese Korea, which would serve as a bulwark againstChina's historic rivals of Japan and Russia.


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Russia and Japan divided Korea at about the 38thparallel into sphere of influence in 1896. Later, Japanused Korea as a base to defeat Russia in the 1904-5 War.The subsequent 1910 Japanese annexation witnessed thousandsof Korean emigrating to Siberia, who would later provide apool of trained communist cadre for Soviet domination.Consequently, the ruler of Korea was of vital importance toSoviet far east security. Thus, the Soviet Union's visionwas a united, independent, and pro-Soviet Korea, which wouldserve both as a bulwark against the USSR's historic rivalsof Japan and China and as base for the expansion ofcommunism. 98

Historically, the US had neither the ambition orpower to exert any influence in Korea. 99 The result ofWorld War I1 injected the US into the future of Korea. TheUS vision was a united, independent, pro-western Korea,which would serve as a buffer state between the historicrivals of Japan, China, and Russia.

Each Allied power had a common end state: anindependent and unified Korea. However, national self-interests reflected the fundamental conflict over Korea: whowould dominate Korea. "A shrimp is crushed in the battle ofthe whales" loo is an Ancient Korean lament. This was Korea'spast and future.


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Jtorea: The ~wproachina ar - 1943-50US policy toward Korea had three distinct periods.

The first period was from the Cairo Conference of November1943, where the Allies declared "that in due course Koreashall become free and independent, "lol to September 1947,when the US moved the Korean independence question from theSoviet-American Joint Commission to the second regularsession of the UN General Assembly on 17 September 1947.The second period was the UN sponsored transition for Koreanindependence from 14 November 1947 to 12 December 1948, whenthe third regular session of the UN General Assemblydeclared that,

There has been established a lawful government (theGovernment of the Republic of Korea) having effectivecontrol and jurisdiction over the part of Korea wherethe Temporary Commission was able to observe andconsult ' 02 and that this is the only such Governmentin Korea.The third period was from January 1949 to the outbreak ofthe Korean War on 25 June 1950. This period wascharacterized by the development of diplomatic, economic,and military relationships between the US and Republic ofKorea (ROK), and by the hostility between the ROK and DPRK.

Korean aspirations for independence were guaranteedby the Allies through international agreements reached atCairo, Yalta, Potsdam, and Moscow. Following the Japanesesurrender in 1945, Korea was split into two occupationzones. South of the 38th parallel was the US zone, and theSoviet zone was north. The Moscow Agreement of December

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1945 created a US and Soviet Union Joint Commission. ThisCommission was charged to make recommendations on theformation of a provisional united Korean Government, and onthe negotiation of a four power (US, Soviet Union, UK, ROC)trusteeship agreement to guide Korea toward fullindependence. It held fifteen formal sessions from 16January 1946 to 5 February 1946, when negotiations weresuspended. The negotiations were resumed in on 20 March1946 and were suspended again on 6 May 1946. This patternof protracted negotiations continued until the referral ofthe Korean question to the UN on 17 September 1947. lo3 AS aresult, the joint US-Soviet Union occupation became aclearcut failure of Allied post-war cooperation because ofirreconcilable strategic goals.

Korea was important to Soviet far eastern securitybecause it intersected Soviet lines of communicationsbetween Vladivostok and Port Arthur. Furthermore, Korearepresented a far eastern buffer state similar to Sovietcontrolled Eastern Europe. For the US, Korea's strategicimportance was to deny Soviet control over the peninsula.If the Soviet Union achieved control over the Koreanpeninsula, US diplomatic, informational, and economic goalsfor China and Japan would be jeopardized, and general USsecurity throughout the Pacific would be threatened.104

The inability of the US-Soviet Union JointCommission to resolve these irreconcilable strategic goals


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resulted in the US referring the Korean issue to the UN.After two months of debate, the UN General Assembly adoptedon 14 November 1947 a US-proposed resolution for a nine-nation UN Temporary Commission on Korea. This Commissionwas empowered to facilitate national elections leading tothe establishment of a National Korean Government and to thewithdrawal of US and Soviet occupation forces. TheCommission was denied access to Soviet-occupied North Korea.This denial resulted in a further UN General Assemblyresolution on 26 February 1948 that stated:the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea shouldproceed with the observance of elections in all Koreaor, if that were @jossible, in as much of Korea as wasaccessible to it.

Subsequent to the resolution, elections were held inthe US-occupied South Korea on 10 May 1948. The fairness ofthis election was questionable. The US occupation hadfavored the conservative political elements and had drivennorth the leftist and communists. Major moderate politicalfigures, such as Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik, and leftistpolitical parties did not participate. Many voters wereuneducated and viewed the election as a referendum to end USoccupation. They voted for the remaining ballot choicesconsisting mostly of conservatives. On 7 May 1948, NorthKorea completed the polarization of South Korean politics byrenewing the threat to cut off electricity to the South. 106With some misgivings, the elections were certified as validby the UN Temporary Commission on 25 June 1948. The third

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session of the UN General Assembly on 12 December 1948confirmed the validity of the South Korean election andproclaimed that government as the legitimate government ofKorea.107

The US use of the UN to establish the ROK achievedits strategic goal to deny Soviet control over the KoreanPeninsula. The Soviet Union countered by holding electionsin North Korea on 25 August 1948, which led theestablishment of the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea"on 9 September 1948. Both Korean Governments claimedjurisdiction over the entire Korean peninsula, which led toa guerrilla war in the south and frequent boarder clashesalong the 38th parallel. 108

The final period of US policy before the Korean Warincluded the withdrawal of American forces and the provisionof economic and military assistance to the ROK. As the USwas pursing a political solution to the Korean problem, theJoint Chiefs of Staff stated on 26 September 1947,

from the standpoint of military security, the UnitedStates has little strategic interest in maintaining thepresent troops and bases in Korea. . . . In the lightof the present severe shortage of military manpower, thecorps of two divisions, totaling some 45,000 men, nowmaintained in South Korea, could well be used elsewhere,the withdrawal of these forces from Korea would notimpair the military position of the Far East Commandunless, in consequence, the Soviets establish militarystrength f ~ ~ s o u t horea capable of mounting an assaultin Japan.


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As the political situation stabilized, US military forcesbegan a gradual withdrawal starting in September 1948 andfinishing on 29 June 1949.110

Concurrent with the US withdrawal was theestablishment of the 500-man US Korean Military AdvisoryGroup (KMAG). KMAG worked with the US Ambassador toadminister military aid. In the year before the outbreak ofwar, there were many internal American debates over the sizeand equipment to be supplied for the ROK armed forces. Forexample, the ROK requested the F-51 fighterlbomber. Therewas a debate over the wisdom and the ability of the ROK tomaintain this aircraft. Additionally, the request was toolate to be included in FY50 and FY51 budgets. Thus, theplanes could not be supplied until f952 at the earliest.Consequently, at the time of the DPRK invasion on 25 June1950, "the program of American military aid to the Republicof Korea was barely getting under way. ~ 1 1 1

Throughout the period from 1945 to 1950, the USprovided essential economic assistance to the ROK. The ROKeconomy was not self-sufficient. This was furtheraggravated by the separation of ROK's economy from NorthKorea and Japan. At first (1945-1948), the economicassistance provided through the US Army Military Governmentin Korea was to prevent disease and unrest that couldthreaten US occupation forces. The emphasis was on reliefand rehabilitation for the civilian population consisting of


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food, fertilizer, and agricultural supplies. The goal wasto provide a satisfactory standard of living as measured bypre-war Japanese and potential North Korean livingstandards. The program held no prospect of financial returnand no prospect of making the ROK self-sufficienteconomically. Rather, the assistance of $356 million112 wasintended to enable the ROK to subsist at pre-war standardswith a minimum of relief, which "was justified only bypolitical and strategic considerations of the highestorder. *1114 The economic program was shifted from theDepartment of the Army to the Economic CooperationAdministration (ECA) with the formation of the ROK in 1948.However, the priorities of the civilian administered ECA didnot change to nation building from subsistence, and the ROKcontinued as an economic ward of the US.

Despite the ROK1s economic and militaryshortcomings, President Rhee had an optimistic view of hiscapabilities. With a little American military assistance,lohe was ready to go north and fight. He realized thatas long as American forces were in Korea, he could notundertake his war of unification. However, if the Americansfurnished him with military assistance and then withdrew,"he would be ready to go with 150,000 Koreans who had foughteither with the Japanese or ~ h i n e s e . ~ ~ ~ " owever, thesoprime inister and Minister of War, who was not on verygood terms with President Rhee, wanted us to stay in Korea


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to create an army and navy and to increase the Korean armyto 150,000.~1117 The 1949-50 reality was that the ROK didnot have the forces President Rhee claimed, and that the ROKmilitary was defensively equipped. The ROK military did nothave and the US was not providing offensive capability(artillery, armor, combat aircraft) to launch a successfulnorthern invasion.

The differences at highest levels of the ROKGovernment assessment of capabilities and objectivescontributed to the following American intelligenceassessment of 25 July 1949:

The predominant trend in Korea is toward completeCommunist control of both northern and southern Koreas.This trend is expected to continue until the KoreanRepublic falls victim to the presently less numerous butprobably better trained and disciwlined forces of thenorthern Communist regime, augmented when necessary byChinese Communist forces from Manchuria. This trend mavbe accelerated by the inefficiency and shortsightedauthoritarianism which characterize the Republic'sefforts to restrain Communism in its territory, inducingby these oppressive measures a public reaction favoringCommunism.Barring the possible eventuality that the Republic willinvite Communist domination earlier than planned by theUSSR by impetuously openly hostilities with the northernregime, the time for invasion of the Republic mustdepend upon Soviet estimates of the area's vulnerabilityto an attack by the northern regime which does notinvolve assistance of USSR forces, as well as upon theUSSR's planning schedule for extending its directcontrol in the Far East. Until that time arrives,Soviet short-term objectives may be adequately served byallowing the Republic to continue as an economicliability, draining US resources, while the USSR directscontinuation of psychological warfare, harassing borderincidents and guerrilla operations throughout theRepublic.


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There are factors, however, which tend to decelerate thetrend toward Communist control of Korea. These are (1)the ability of the Republic's armed forces to absorb UStraining and equipment, (2) the effectiveness of USeconomic assistance in preventing distress and, ideally,in stimulating limited self-sufficiency, (3) thedevelopment of traditional Korean attitudes andstandards that are incompatible with Communism and, (4)counteraction of the effects of Communist psychologicalattacks. Nevertheless, it is not expected that thesefactors can preyfgt ultimate Communist control of thewhole of Korea.

The report concluded that in case of Soviet attack, "thelife expectancy of South Korea would be, at best, only a fewdays. 80119

If Khrushchev's recollections were correct, theSoviet Union had similar problems in restraining theirsurrogate, Kim 11-sung, from launching an attack on SouthKorea. 120 A recent Master of Military Arts and Sciencethesis concluded that the "evidence suggests that the SovietUnion was not responsible for proposing the concept oractively encouraging Kim I1 Sung to attack the South. 1,121Instead, Stalin did his best to restrain Kim I1 Sung andagreed to the eventual invasion because of ideologicalsolidarity. 122

The Truman Administration did not see this supposedSoviet restraint and caution. Instead, it saw the SovietUnion as actively pursing the complete communist dominationof the Korean peninsula. The lesson that the US derivedfrom its Korean experience was expressed by Secretary ofState Dean Acheson in his speech to the National Press Clubon 20 January 1950. Korea was outside of the American

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defensive perimeter in the Pacific, within which the USwould unilaterally employ military forces. . However, Achesonwarned that any communist move against the ROK was groundsfor invoking "the commitments of the entire civilized worldunder the Charter of the United The Americanpolicy, approved by President Truman in NSC 812 on 23 March1949, was to consolidate the stability of the Government ofthe ROK by continued diplomatic, economic, and militarysupport. The policy objective was to:

strengthen that Government to the point where it can (1)successfully contain the threat of expanding Communistinfluence and control arising out of the existence innorth Korea of an aggressive Soviet-dominated regime,and (2) serve as a nucleus for the eventual peacefulunificfzion of the entire country on a democraticbasis.To implement this policy, the US adopted an economy of forcestrategy to deny Soviet control over the entire KoreanPeninsula. This economy of force strategy relied on limitedUS economic and military assistance combined with UNdiplomatic and US informational pressures to deter acommunist attack and deny Soviet control over South Korea.

American Cold-War Understandinas Prior to the Korean WarThe series of Cold-War conflicts in Greece, Berlin,

Iran, China, Indochina, and Korea confirmed the 1946Clifford Report's assessment of the hostile nature of theSoviet Union, and the wisdom of George F. Kennanfscontainment strategy, implemented by the Truman Doctrine andthe Marshall Plan. By January 1950, it was clear to

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President Truman and his NSC that the US was engaged in abi-polar world struggle for survival with the Soviet Union.In this struggle, the US had used all elements of nationalpower in varying levels to contain Soviet and communistexpansionism.

The US viewed Asia as one of several fronts ofdirect and indirect conflict with the Soviet Union. The USviewed the Soviet Union as a first-class Asiatic power andthe major threat to US and western interests and security inAsia and the Pacific, expressed in NSC 48/1 on 23 December

Now and for the foreseeable future it is the USSR whichthreatens to dominate Asia through the complementaryinstruments of communist conspiracy and diplomaticpressure supported by military strength. For theforeseeable future, therefore, our immediate objectivemust be to contain and where feasible to reduce thepower and influence of the USSR in Asia to such a degreethat the Soviet Union is not capable of threatening thesecurity of the United States from that area and thatthe Soviet Union would encounter serious obstaclesshould it attempt to threaten the peace, nationallz5independence or stability of the Asiatic nations.The US did not intend to or was not capable of

fighting a major land war on the Asian continent. Instead,the US military strategy relied on the atomic bomb to deterSoviet expansionism. Thus, the Soviet explosion of anuclear device in August 1949 came as a great shock to theTruman Administration. No longer could the US "relyprimarily on the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter or,if necessary, to stop a Soviet invasion. 11126 Subsequently,President Truman ordered the NSC on 31 January 1950 to:


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undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace andwar and of the effect of these objectives on ourstrategic plans, in the light of the probable fissionbomb capability and possible thfgonuclear bombcapability of the Soviet Union.This review resulted in NSC 68, which was the first

of "a series of basic national security policy papersproduced each year through the Truman and Eisennoweradministrations. The premise of NSC 68 was that:

the Soviet Ynion, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony,is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to ourown, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over therest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, becomeendemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union,by violent or non-violent methods in accordance with thedictates of expediency. With the development ofincreasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction,every individual faces the ever-present possibility ofannihilatifggshould the conflict enter the phase oftotal war.At the root of the US-Soviet conflict were theirreconcilable differences between freedom under agovernment of laws and "slavery under the grim oligarchy ofthe Kremlin.n130 The world-wide Soviet assault hadpolarized the world into two camps, and "a defeat of freeinstitutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere.v1131 Thisanalysis painted a black-and-white world situation.

The US had world leadership thrust upon it becauseit was the only power capable of stopping the Soviet questfor world domination.132 However, the US was unprepared fora military confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The fact remains, however, that so long as the SovietUnion is virtually mobilized, and the United States hasscarcely begun to summon up it forces, the greatercapabilities of the U.S. are to that extent inoperative


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in the struggle for power. Moreover, as the Sovietattainment of an atomic capability has demonstrated, thetotalitarian state, at least in time of peace, can focusits efforts on any3qiven project more readily than thedemocratic state.If war with the Soviet Union had broken out in 1950 or inthe next few years, the US and western allies could onlyhave waged a strategic defense with a couple of powerfulatomic blows and hoped to hold on long enough for a WorldWar I1 type mobilization and counterattack to victory. 134

NSC 68 stated that the military component ofcontainment had failed. US military strength had beenallowed to decline because of sole possession of atomicweapons. Soviet military strength had continued to increaseand had broken the US monopoly on atomic weapons. 135 TheSoviet's military advantage placed the US at a disadvantagefor any negotiations. Thus, it was imperative for the US torebuild military strength before the commencement ofsuccessful negotiations. Further, the failure to rebuildthe US military strength equal to or greater than the Sovietwould result in the eventual collapse of containment.

The NSC viewed the Soviet threat to bring the freeworld under its control by subversion, infiltration, andintimidation backed up by overwhelming military force. TheUS was the glue in the center of the western coalition. Forthis coalition to work, it was essential that the:

allies and potential allies do not as a result of asense of frustration or of Soviet intimidation driftinto a course of neutrality eventually leading to Sovietdomination. If this were to happen in Germany the


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effect upon Westfsg Europe and eventually upon us mightbe catastrophic.NSC 68 considered four options: Status quo,

isolation, war, and a peacetime political, economic, andmilitary build-up. Each option except the last wasdismissed because it would lead to eventual Sovietdomination. NSC 68's recommendation, which was accepted bythe President called for:

a more rapid build-up of political, economic, andmilitary strength and thereby of confidence in the freeworld than is now contemplated is the only course whichis consistent with progress toward achieving ourfundamental purpose. The frustration of the Kremlindesign requires the free world to develop a successfullyfunctioning political and economic system and a vigorouspolitical offensive against the Soviet Union. These, inturn, require an adequate military shield under whichthey can develop. It is necessary to have the militarypower to deter, if possible, Soviet expansion, and todefeat, if necessary aggressive Soviet or Soviet-directed actions of a limited or total character.137NSC 68 was a reaffirmation of approved American

policy in NSC 20/4, which had been approved by PresidentTruman on 24 November 1948. The only significant differencewas the immediacy of the Soviet threat, which required arapid build-up of US capabilities to counter significantlyincreased Soviet capabilities. This rapid build-up was theonly chance of seizing the initiative from the Soviet Unionand the only means short of war to force the Kremlin tonegotiate acceptable agreements. 138

NSC 68 incorporated the lessons the US Governmentdrew from the Cold War from 1945 to 1950 and proposed anaction plan to counter Soviet and communist advances. It


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abandoned any distinction between national and globalsecurity. International and national securities weresynonymous. This radically changed the US defense budgetaryprocess. Instead of subordinating security needs in areducing fixed budget, the perceived and expanded USsecurity requirements justified large increases insucceeding defense budgets. As a result, the defense budgetbecame the dominate element of the US national budget at theexpense of the domestic budget. 139

Korea was placed outside of the American securitynetwork because of US military weakness and a consensusdesire among the NSC to avoid a land war on the Asianmainland. 140 Thus, the US adopted an economy of forcestrategy to deter an outright communist attack. When thisfailed and the North Korean invasion occurred on 25 June1950, the assumptions, analysis, and conclusions of NSC 68predicted the American response. The US reaction was not areversal of American foreign policy, as has been suggested.Rather, it was the application of NSC 68 that any communistvictory threatened the security of the US which would useall elements of its national power to prevent such a~0mnIunist riumph. Thus, NSC 68, written in April 1950,laid the foundation for a rapid decision to employ US armedforces to resist the June 1950 North Korean invasion.Beyond the philosophical foundation to resist communism


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everywhere, there was no direct linkage between NSC 68 andthe outbreak of the Korean War.

During the Presidential Election of 1952, theRepublicans1 right wing accused Secretary of State DeanAcheson of inviting the DPRK invasion. Later revisionisthistorians saw a conspiracy, which linked NSC 68 to the DPRKinvasion and subsequent American remilitarization and apermanent war economy. 142

These divergent views form the bases for Chapter111's analyses of the Soviet role in the Korean War. Thereare three parts to this analysis: the contemporaneous NSCview, the accepted historical view with its divergences, andthe revised view based on recently declassified documentsand articles.


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Endnotesklark M. Clifford, American Relations with theSoviet Union: A Re~0rt o the President bv the SvecialCounsel to the President, 24 September 1946. Papers of Harry

S. Truman, President's Secretary's File, Intelligence File,Box 267, Harry S. Truman presidential Library, 27:50.'~awrence K. Rosinger, China's Wartimes Politics2937-1944 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945), 25.3 ~ u no, China Looks Forward (United StatesGovernment: 1944), 34. Sun Fo is the son of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, founder of the modern Chinese Republic and an importantleader of the Kuomintang (Nationalists). He writes, IfFrom1911 to 1927 we had not even attained the internal unitywhich to start building a progressive, powerful modernstate. Just when this was about accomplished, foreign

invasion struck our land to break up this unity by force,and continue the imperialist policy of "divide and ruleffweakened China.

'~osin~er, 6-27. "The Communist on September 22,1937 announced from their capital at Yenan that they had onthe basis of peace and national unity and joint resistanceagainst foreign aggression, reached an understanding withthe Ku~rnintang.~~age 99: Chiang Kai-Shek Nationalistresponse was published on 23 September 1937. It stated thatthe Chinese Communist Party statement agreed with the spiritof the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang, and sur-rendered its prejudices for national unity.

'FO, 180. "China should recover such territories asTaiwan (Formosa) and Penghu Islands (Pescadores), whichJapan took from us as a result of the first Sino-JapaneseWar, Talien (Dairen), Lushun (Port Arthur), and the SouthManchuria Railway, which the enemy seized and possessed atthe end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the four Nor-theastern Provinces of Manchuria and Jehol, and all theterritories held by the enemy since July 7, 1937."g~osinger, 38-39. There were several militarybattles between Kuomintang

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