Soviet role in the Korean war confirmed: Secret documents declassified

Research Note

SOVIET ROLE IN THE KOREAN WAR CONFIRMED: SECRET DOCUMENTS DECLASSIFIED

Selection and Commentary by Vladimir Petrov

The documents related to the Korean War appearing below are meant to supplement the article "Mao, Stalin, and Kim I1 Sung," published in the summer 1994 issue of the Journal of Northeast Asian Studies. They were all declassified and made available to scholars by Russian archi- vists in 1993. The last item, excerpts from the recollections of the former chief of the operations bureau of the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) Defense Ministry, was initially published in Seoul in 1990-1991.

The availability of the once top secret Korean War documents doubtless reflects a degree of unfriendliness of the present government of Russia toward the faithful Soviet ally, the DPRK. During the visit of the South Korean foreign minister to Moscow in July 1994, President Yeltsin presented him with a large file of the most sensitive documents. Some of them may also shed light on Soviet relations with China during the war and help explain Kim II Sung's unusual influence on Moscow's and Beijing's foreign policy.

*DOCUMENT NUMBER 1: "ON THE KOREAN WAR, 1950--53, AND THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS"

Introduction

The reader should keep in mind that the report the Soviet Foreign Ministry prepared in 1966 inevitably reflects the bitter Sino-Soviet hostility of the period. This was also the time of a partial rehabilitation of Stalinism following the fall of Khrushchev that probably accounts for the report's effort to place most of the blame for the war on Kim I1 Sung. The report's preparation may have had something to do with the Soviet attempts to maneuver China into greater involvement in the Vietnam War. Perhaps in keeping with the need to cast China in an unfavorable light, the report repeatedly focuses on the arrogance of the Chinese and their mistreatment of the Korean leadership. It touches little upon the Soviet role, which, not unexpectedly, is presented largely as benevolent.

PETROV 43

*Source: Cold War International History Project Bulletin, issue 3, Fall 1993, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, pp. 15-17. Translated and edited by Kathryn Weathersby. Weathersby expanded her comments in a working paper published by Cold War Interantioanl History Project Bulletin entitled Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945- 1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives.

TOP SECRET 9 August 1966 copies to Brezhnev (2), Kosygin (2), Gromyko, Kuznetsov, Kovalev, Kornienko, Sudarikov, IDU, UVI, OIuVA (2), file (2)

On the Korean War, 1950-53, and the Armistice Negotiations

I. [Background to and Preparations for First Stage of the War] After separate elections in 1948 in South Korea and the formation of the

puppet government of Syngman Rhee, on the one hand, and the formation of the DPRK, on the other, relations between the North and the South of the country were sharply aggravated. The Seoul regime, as well as the DPRK, declared its claim to be the authority in all of Korea. The situation at the 38th parallel became even more tense in 1948 after the withdrawal of Soviet and American troops from Korea.

During this period, Kim I1 Sung and other Korean leaders were firmly determined to unify the country by military means, without devoting the necessary attention to studying the possibility that existed at that time for peaceful reunification through the broad development of the democratic movement in South Korea.

In the DPRK, a people's army was created that in manpower and equipment significantly surpassed the armed forces of South Korea. By January 1, 1950, the total number of DPRK troops was 110,000; new divisions were hastily being formed.

Calculating that the United States would not enter a war over South Korea, Kim I1 Sung persistently pressed for agreement from Stalin and Mao Zedong to reunify the country by military means. (telegrams #4-51, 233, 1950)

Stalin at first treated the persistent appeals of Kim I1 Sung with reserve, noting that "such a large affair in relation to South Korea . . . needs much preparation," but he did not object in principle. Stalin gave the final consent to support the plans of the Koreans at the time of Kim I1 Sung's visit to Moscow in March-April 1950. Following this, in May, Kim I1 Sung visited Beijing and secured the support of Mao.

The Korean government envisioned realizing its goals in three stages:

1) concentration of troops near the 38th parallel; 2) issuing an appeal to the South for peaceful unification; and 3) initiating military activity after the South's rejection of the proposal for peace-

ful reunification.

At Stalin's order, all requests of the North Koreans for delivery of arms

44 JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES/FALL 1994

and equipment for the formation of additional units of the KPA [Korean People's Army] were quickly met. The Chinese leadership sent to Korea a division formed from Koreans who had been serving in the Chinese army, and promised to send food aid and to transfer one army closer to Korea "in case the Japanese enter on the side of South Korea." (telegram 362, 1950)

By the end of May 1950 the General Staff of the KPA together with Soviet military advisers announced the readiness of the Korean army to begin concentration at the 38th parallel. At the insistence of Kim I1 Sung, the beginning of military activity was scheduled for June 25, 1950. (telegram 408, 1950)

By the time of the attack, the North Korean armed forces had significant superiority over the South Koreans. The correlation of forces between South and North Korea was as follows: in number of troops 1:2; number of guns 1:2; machine-guns 1:7; submachine guns 1:13; tanks 1:6.5; planes 1:6. The operational plan of the KPA envisioned that Korean troops would advance 15-20 kilometers per day and would in the main complete military activity within 22-27 days. (telegram 468, 1950)

[Here follows a brief factual account of the course of the war through October 1950, from the initial successes of the KPA in June, July, and Au- gust, through their near defeat following the U.S./UN amphibious landing at Inchon in September-K.W.] During this period, which was an ordeal for the Korean people, the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' party and the government of the DPRK worked strenuously on the formation of new military units, using the territory of China as well for this purpose. The most steadfast of the KPA units that were surrounded in the South carried on partisan combat in the mountains.

II. Entry of the Chinese into the Korean War During Kim I1 Sung's visit to Beijing in May 1950, Mao Zedong, in

conversation with him, underscored his conviction that the Americans would not become engaged in a war "for such a small territory as Korea" and stated that the Chinese government would transfer one of its armies to the region of Mukden in order to render the necessary assistance in case the South Koreans drew Japanese soldiers into military action. The Chinese leadership based their calculation on the fact that the American troops would not take part in the war, and they did not intend to aid the DPRK by means of the entrance of a large number of their troops.

In August 1950 American planes began bombing Chinese territory near the Yalu. In October 1950, soon after the American landing at Inchon, the front-line moved close to the Korean-Chinese border and the enemy's artillery began to fire on Chinese territory. Ships of the American Seventh Fleet entered the Taiwan Strait.

By that time the Korean People's Army had virtually disintegrated as a fighting force. Remnants of military units that escaped encirclement were making their way toward China to regroup.

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The Chinese government, under pressure from Stalin, adopted the decision to send volunteers to Korea only after a real threat to the security of China had arisen and the very existence of the DPRK had been called into question. The entry of Chinese volunteers into Korea began in the second half of October 1950. Subsequently, the total number of Chinese troops in Korea was brought to 1 million men; approximately the same number of men were sent to Korea to transport military cargo. (transmission of Soviet Embassy in Beijing #7, January 18, 1952) By the end of 1951, the strength of the Korean People's Army was brought to 337,000 men. On the other side, 700,000 officers and soldiers participated in ground operations, including 380,000 South Koreans and 280,000 American troops, not counting American naval and air forces, which blockaded Korea from the sea.

The entry of the Chinese volunteers into the war and the active participation of Soviet military advisers, who participated in the planning of all major offensive operations, brought about a vital breakthrough in the course of military events. American and South Korean troops were thrown back to the 38th parallel, and in several places even further southward. Chinese troops, operating on the Western front, occupied Seoul at the beginning of January 1951.

However, Chinese troops, following the strategic line of the leadership of the PRC to preserve the front at the 38th parallel (one may suppose that Mao Zedong was afraid of the consequences of a further advance to the south), left Seoul and withdrew to the north. They did not support the efforts of the Korean units on the eastern front to dislodge American troops from the area along the northern side of the 38th parallel.

During this period of the war, sharp disagreements arose between Kim I1 Sung and the command of the Chinese people's volunteers, led by Peng Dehuai. The Koreans were against the surrender of Seoul by the Chinese volunteers and reproached them for not supporting the Korean units on the eastern front.

During the time that Chinese volunteers were in Korea there were numerous cases of Chinese interference in the internal affairs of the DPRK. Study- ing the morale of the Korean population, they sent reports to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party that underscored the poor conditions of the population and criticized the policies of the Korean authorities. The Chinese attempted to draw towards themselves the commanders of the KPA. Illustrative in this regard is the affair of Pak II-u, chief representative of the KPA in the headquarters of the Chinese volunteers. Kim I1 Sung more than once declared that Pak II-u was behaving as the personal representative of Mao Zedong, trying to disparage the authority of the leadership of the Korean Workers' party, placing himself above the party. The Chinese in- flamed any sort of intrigue, using Pak ll-u against Kim II Sung.

Peng Dehuai was not ashamed to express his low opinion of the military

46 JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES /FALL 1994

capabilities of Kim II Sung. Cases of great power hautiness were observed, obvious scorn toward Koreans by Chinese commanders. Once Kim I1 Sung was stopped by Chinese sentries when he went to Peng Dehuai's headquarters, and was detained by them for a long time. Local Korean authorities complained that the commanders of the Chinese volunteers frequently arbi- trarily forced the population into construction work, indiscriminate felling of forests, slaughtering of livestock, etc.

Numerous Koreans lay the blame on China for the retreat of the KPA and its huge losses, declaring that "if the Chinese help had arrived a month earlier, everything would have turned out differently." Korean leaders said at that time that if it had not been for the Chinese position, it would have been possible to expel the Americans from the Korean peninsula and unify the whole country during the successful attack of the Chinese volunteers in the winter of 1950-1951.

In all of this the Chinese volunteers, as is known, played an important role in the breakthrough in the military situation and in the retention of the front at the 38th parallel. Their losses for the first year of the Korean War alone were more than 300,000 men.

The Chinese leadership, making use of the volunteers' long stay in Korea, tried to strengthen their long-term influence in the DPRK. After the signing of the armistice in Korea on July 27, 1953, the Chinese volunteers remained in Korea for more than five years. It was the end of October 1958 before they returned to their homeland, under pressure from the Koreans.

The Chinese leaders even now, in every way possible, use the participation of the volunteers in the war in Korea to pressure the DPRK into supporting their adventuristic positions.

III. The UN and the Intervention of the USA in Korea [A brief straightforward summary-K.W.]

IV. Negotiations for the Armistice By the middle of 1951, the situation clearly indicated that it was in prac-

tice impossible to resolve the unification of Korea by military means. Both the Chinese and the Korean leaders equally were forced to acknowledge this. After preliminary consultations with the Chinese and Koreans, the Soviet government on June 23, 1951, put forward a proposal for settling the military conflict in Korea. "As a first step," the Soviet representative declared, "it would be necessary to begin negotiations for a cease-fire, for an armistice with a mutual withdrawal of troops from the 38th parallel." This proposal attracted universal attention.

On June 27, 1951, the American Ambassador [to Moscow Alan G.] Kirk visited A. A. Gromyko (at that time deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR) and appealed to him with a number of questions in connection with

PETROV 47

these proposals. Elucidating to Kirk the position of the Soviet government, Comrade Gromyko indicated that the negotiations on the armistice must be conducted by representatives of the joint American command and the command of the South Korean troops, on one side, and by representatives of the command of the Korean People's Army and the command of the Chinese volunteers, on the other. Comrade Gromyko noted that the negotiations must be limited to military questions and first of all the question of a cease-fire.

On June 29, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, who was at that time the commander of the "UN troops" in Korea, appealed over the radio to the commander of the Korean People's Army Kim I1 Sung with a proposal to begin negotiations for an armistice.

On July 1, Kim I1 Sung and Peng Dehuai broadcast over the radio a joint answer to Ridgway's appeal. The answer expressed their agreement to meet with representatives of the American command "to conduct negotiations for the cessation of military activity and the establishment of peace."

The negotiations of the representatives of the commands of the warring sides began on July 10, 1951, and continued, with breaks, for more than two years, until the end of July 1953.

In the course of the negotiations such basic questions were discussed as: the establishment of a line of demarcation between the two sides for the creation of a demilitarized zone as a condition for the cessation of military activity in Korea; the elaboration of practical measures for implementing the cease-fire and armistice in Korea, including the staff, authority, and functions of an apparatus for observing the implementation of the conditions of the cease-fire and armistice.

By the beginning of May 1952, an agreement was reached on all questions, with the exception of the question regarding prisoners of war. Later that question was also resolved on a mutually acceptable basis.

Measures undertaken by the Soviet government after the death of Stalin in many ways facilitated the conclusion of the agreement. While in Moscow for Stalin's funeral, Zhou Enlai had conversations with Soviet leaders regarding the situation in Korea. During these conversations, Zhou Enlai, in the name of the government of the PRC, urgently proposed that the Soviet side assist the speeding up of the negotiations and the conclusion of an armistice. Such a position by the Chinese coincided with our position. For the implementation of practical measures ensuing from the complicated situation, a special representative was sent to Pyongyang from Moscow in March 1953 with a proposal for speeding up the peace negotiations. By that time the Koreans also showed a clear aspiration for the most rapid cessation of military activity.

On July 27 an armistice agreement was signed in Panmunjom. The armistice agreement fixed the military demarcation line and provided for the withdrawal of troops 2 km from this line to create a demilitarized zone, [and] provided for a cease-fire and withdrawal of troops of both sides from the


demilitarized zone within 72 hours after the armistice agreement took effect. [Here follows a listing of the terms of the agreement-K.W.]

V. The Korean Question after the Armistice The conclusion of the armistice in Korea created the preconditions for a

peaceful reunification of the country. The first step in this direction must be the convening of the political conference envisioned in the agreement.

Because of the sabotage of the United States, a political conference on Korea was convened only on April 26, 1954, in Geneva. The American delegates applied maximum efforts to prevent the adoption of the proposals of the DPRK, USSR, and PRC that aimed to create on the Korean peninsula a single, genuinely democratic government. The conference did not adopt any constructive decision on Korea.

The Korean question has remained until now within the framework of the UN and is considered unresolved. It is a subject of "discussion" at every regular session of the UN General Assembly. The government of the DPRK speaks out against the discussion of the so-called Korean question in the UN and in favor of disbanding the "Commission on the Reunification and Resto- ration of Korea" and the withdrawal of American troops from Korea. This position of the Korean leadership is fully supported by the Soviet government.

D O C U M E N T NUMBER 2: "SHOULD WE BE FRIGHTENED B Y T H I S ? -

BEHIND THE SCENES O F THE KOREAN WAR"

Introduction

The following article by Col. Gen. D. A. Volkogonov, originally published in a popular Russian weekly, Ogonyok, contains excerpts from a number of extremely important documents, some of which are unavailable else- where. Among them are messages of Stalin to his representatives in Pyongyang and their replies; Kim I1 Sung's appeals to Stalin; and, unfortu- nately unidentified by date and at times merely paraphrased, Stalin-Mao ex- changes. The author tends on occasion to read more into Stalin's messages than they deserve. One example is an excerpt from an undated cable to Mao in which Stalin seems to assert that the Soviet Union and China together more than match the combined power of the United States and Britain, and if a world war is inevitable anyway, it should probably take place now rather than a few years down the road when Japanese militarism would ally itself with the United States. According to Volkogonov, Mao presumably replied expressing his agreement but then added that China should send to Korea at least nine divisions rather than five or six. To Volkogonov, this exchange is "proof" that Stalin was ready to push humanity to the brink of World War

PETROV 49

III--an assertion that contradicts everything known from numerous documents about Stalin's fear of war. His message to Mao was no more than a bit of prodding of the Chinese ally to send troops to Korea, which, Stalin reck- oned, Mao was inclined to do anyway.

D. A. Volkogonov, a well-known historian and biographer of Stalin (as well as a military adviser to Russia's President Yeltsin), has been attacking Stalin's record for many years. Having almost unlimited access to Moscow's most secret archives, he has developed many valuable insights into Stalin's personality, some of which the reader would be pleased to find in this article. On the other hand, Volkogonov is not known as an authority on Soviet- Chinese or Soviet-Korean relations, and he has little familiarity with non- Russian sources. While his passion for exposing Stalin's misdeeds is most commendable, it also injects a dose of subjectivity into some of his judg- ments. With these reservations, the Ogonyok article doubtless deserves the attention of historians looking for corroboration of what they know from other sources.

Source: Article by Col. Gen. D. A. Volkogonov, "Should We Be Frightened by This?--Behind the Scenes of the Korean War," appearing in Ogonyok, no. 25-26, June 1993. Translated from Russian by Craig H. Seibert.

At the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s the intensity of the cold war grew increasingly bitter. Yesterday's allies now looked at each other through the crosshairs of their gunsights. Stalin, understanding that the United States at that time was stronger than the USSR and, to all intents and purposes, invulnerable, displayed his usual caution. Nevertheless, he tried to promote anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle in every way possible. In the spirit of communist internationalism, Stalin's ultimate goal was to make the entire world "red."

Arriving in the Kremlin by noon, Stalin slowly went through his voluminous mail: dispatches from Beria, ambassadors, and party leaders in the re- publics, messages from international agencies, reports from the provinces. Following the end of the Second World War his attention was fixed not only on the West but also on the East, where Mao Zedong was scoring one victory after another over the Kuomintang with the support of the Soviet Union. The aging Soviet leader was also quite pleased with his proteg6s in Mongolia and North Korea. Kim I1 Sung grew visibly as a political leader, becoming more experienced in communist ways under the zealous stewardship of his Soviet advisors. In fact, the young leader from Pyongyang reported the successes of "socialist construction" in his country in his correspondence and requested a meeting with Stalin in Moscow.

One day in January 1949 when Poskrebyshev L came by to pick up a tall stack of papers, Stalin gave his loyal henchman the following order: "Tell


Beria to report this evening on the progress of the preparations for the testing of the atomic device."

Poskrebyshev quickly wrote down something in his notebook and then, having already turned around, heard another order: "Tell Vyshinskii 2 to answer Pyongyang that I agree to a meeting with Kim I1 Sung. We must get a closer look at him . . . . The dates will be arranged . . . . . "

The meeting took place one-and-a-half months later. The date was March 5, 1949. At 8 o'clock in the evening, diplomats A. Ia. Vyshinskii and T. F. Shtykov 3 led the Korean delegation into the foyer of Stalin's office in the Kremlin. Kim I1 Sung was accompanied by Minister of Foreign Affairs Pak Hon-yong and other high officials as well as the Korean ambassador to Mos- cow and an interpreter. The Koreans timidly and deferentially looked around at the oak paneled walls of the reception room of the office of the all- powerful leader.

Vyshinskii was minister of foreign affairs at the time of this meeting. Colonel-General Shtykov had been named Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang in 1948; thus, for all intents and purposes, he acted as Stalin's first political advisor to Kim I1 Sung.

After waiting about a half hour in the reception room, the members of the North Korean delegation were finally brought to Stalin. Getting up from behind his desk, the Soviet leader casually approached the excited group of Koreans, shook each of their hands, and then motioned for them to take their places behind a long table. The talks lasted for one hour and fifty minutes. Actually, Stalin and Kim I1 Sung did all the talking. Shtykov and Pak Hon- yong spoke up several times, but only when it was necessary to supply certain specific pieces of information.

After the perfunctory pleasantries, Stalin quickly got down to business and asked what kind of assistance the Democratic People's Republic of Korea needed.

The talks then proceeded in the following manner: Kim I1 Sung would politely make a request, and Stalin would answer with short phrases like "We will provide this . . . . " " W e will do that . . . . " " W e will send specialists. . . ," "We will bring men over here for training . . . . " etc. Only rarely did he say "We will think about it."

They agreed on the type of military assistance, the providing of training for Korean officers in the Soviet Union, the development of economic relations, and other matters. The issue of the unification of Korea by military means was not discussed. Stalin allowed allusions to the military option favored by Kim I1 Sung, but only up to a certain point. He scrutinized his Korean visitor in the talks while assessing the prospects for future development of the North and events on the Korean peninsula.

The USSR sent large amounts of arms, military technology, ammunition, and other military supplies to North Korea throughout 1949. Stalin was sent

PETROV 51

reports on the size and pace of the shipments, and the Soviet leader would initial them as he read them.

One document of possible importance was written by T. F. Shtykov on January 19, 1950, in Pyongyang, and went as follows:

Secret. Urgent. ... A reception was held in the evening at the Chinese Embassy in honor of the ambassador's departure. During the reception Kim II Sung told me the following: 'Now, when the liberation of China is under completion, is the time to take up the matter of the liberation of Korea. Partisans will not resolve the matter. Thinking about reunification makes it impossible for me to sleep at night. Mao said that we should not attack the South. But, if Syngman Rhee attacks, then it will be necessary to go on the counteroffensive. But, what if Syngman Rhee does not attack?' Kim I1 Sung said he must see Stalin and ask permission to launch an attack for the liberation of South Korea. Mao has promised assistance, and he, Kim I1 Sung, will meet with him. Kim II Sung insists on reporting to Stalin personally to gain permission for North Korea to attack the South.

Kim II Sung was a bit intoxicated and generally excited during our conversation.

19 January 1950.

Shtykov

It took Stalin more than a week to answer the report from Shtykov. First, he sent a carefully worded message to Mao Zedong. The latter answered evasively, stating that the matter could be discussed provided there was full confidence in the success of the operation. In the end, after weighing all the pros and cons, Stalin sent the following telegram to Pyongyang for Kim I1 Sung:

To Shtykov, secret. I received your message from 19 January [19150. An operation on such a large

scale demands preparation. It is necessary to organize the operation in such a way as to minimize risk. I am ready to see the man.

We would also like to receive 25 thousand tons of lead annually [sic]. We are prepared to provide technical assistance.

30.01.50 I. Stalin.

In Pyongyang, the telegram was taken to mean approval of the operation provided that its success was guaranteed. On February 4, two or three days after meeting with Kim I1 Sung, Shtykov again sent a message through Min- ister of Foreign Affairs A. Ia. Vyshinskii to Stalin in which he conveyed the Korean leader's request to accelerate the disbursement of previous loans and grant new credits for arms purchases. Kim I1 Sung formally requested permission to increase the number of infantry divisions up to ten, which would

52 JOURNAL OF NORTHEASTASIAN STUDIES/FALL 1994

entail forming an additional three units. After one more consultation with Beijing, on February 9, Stalin approved

Pyongyang's plans to unite its homeland and agreed to start the preparation of a wide-scale military operation on the Korean peninsula. This date thus represents the de facto beginning of the DPRK's official preparation for an offensive war aimed at the forceful reunification of the two states by force. Deliveries of tanks, artillery, small arms, ammunition, medical supplies, and oil from the USSR were stepped up. Plans for a wide-scale offensive operation were developed in the headquarters of the Korean army in strictest secrecy with the help of Soviet advisors. Several new Korean military units were formed at an accelerated pace. The world still did not know that it would soon be witness to one of the bloodiest regional conflicts of the twenti- eth century.

While the preparations for war were in full swing, Stalin decided to again consult with Beijing. Being extraordinarily cautious, the Soviet leader signed all his secret dispatches with assumed names, a habit he developed during the days of World War II. Thus, in his correspondence with Mao Zedong on Korean affairs, Stalin became "Filipov." In May 1950, Stalin dictated 4 the following message:

Secret. For Mao Zedong. Comrade Mao Zedong!

In talks with our Korean comrades, Filipov and his friends expressed the view that, in light of the changing international situation, they are in agreement with the Koreans' proposal to move toward unification. It was pointed out that the final resolution of the matter should be made jointly by the Chinese and Korean comrades, and if the Chinese comrades do not agree to this, resolution of the matter should be postponed. The Korean comrades can give you the details of our talks. Confirm implementation of the above by cable.

Filipov

Beijing quickly agreed to this. Preparations for the operation began to pick up speed, and at the end of May Shtykov reported from Pyongyang the following:

Kim I1 Sung has informed us that the Chief of the General Staff (together with the Soviet adviser Vasilev) has completed work on the general operational plans for the offensive. He, Kim I1 Sung, has given it his approval. Organizational preparations will be completed by June 1. Of the 10 divisions, 7 are ready for offensive operations. The rains begin in July. Generals Vasilev and Postyshev have reported to me that more time will be needed for troop formation. The General Staff proposes initiating operations at the end of June.

My opinion. [Editor's note: The two preceding words were underlined by Stalin.] We can agree to this date. The Koreans are asking for gasoline and medical supplies. Request immediate instructions.

PETROV 53

30 May 1950

Shtykov

Stalin wrote the following in his own hand: "Headquarters approves your proposal. Deliveries of medical supplies and oil will be stepped up." Think- ing for a moment, the Soviet leader signed the name "Gromyko" to this note.

Then, underlining the text with a bold line he wrote the following instructions: "Inform Comrade Gromyko to send this to Comrade Shtykov."

In order to maintain a high level of secrecy, the leaders of the Soviet state not only made use of fictitious names but also used the names of their subor- dinates. Andrei Gromyko was in fact Vyshinskii's first deputy at that time.

Stalin wanted very much to keep the Americans unaware of his direct involvement in the preparations for war. This was not easy. Literally on the eve of the attack, the Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang sent one more message directly to the Soviet leader.

Urgent. Secret.

To Comrade Stalin.

Kim I1 Sung requests to convey the following: ships are needed for the offensive's landing assault. Two ships have arrived, but their crews have not been fully trained. He requests ten Soviet advisors to operate the ships. I think the request should be granted.

20 June 1950

Shtykov

The answer came back quickly: "Your proposal has been rejected. It would provide justification for [American] intervention. Gromyko. 6-22-50."

Once combat operations had begun following the North Korean invasion of South Korea, Kim I1 Sung again made a request, this time for Soviet advisers to be sent to units fighting on the front lines. Shtykov, in a conversation with the Korean leader, promised to persuade Moscow and get its approval. This provoked a sharp response in the Kremlin. The style of the ensuing response was typical of Stalin's.

Pyongyang, Soviet Ambassador.

You have obviously handled yourself incorrectly by promising to send advisers to the Koreans without asking us.

It is necessary to remind you that you are a representative of the USSR and not of Korea.

Send necessary numbers of our advisers to headquarters and to army groups dressed in civilian uniforms posing as Pravda correspondents.

54 JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES /FALL 1994

You will be held personally responsible if any of these men were taken prisoner.

Fyn Si

This is the first time that Stalin signed a message using the strange Chi- nese name "Fyn Si." Readers can add it to the long list of pseudonyms used by Stalin. When the North Koreans took Seoul in the very first days of the war and it seemed that victory was soon at hand (one more push and Kim I1 Sung's promise would be fulfilled), Stalin did not allow General Vasiliev 5 to go to the captured city to assist the military leadership with troop management because of the immediate vicinity of the front. "Fyn Si" did not want the United States, the United Nations, and world public opinion to catch him directly participating in the war; although, at that time, there was little doubt as to the degree and nature of Moscow's involvement in the war. It was important to Stalin at any price to support not only North Korea's contention about the defensive nature of the war, but also to maintain a pretense of the Soviet Union's merely "technical" participation in it. In any event, for many years Soviet citizens believed that this was the case.

The Soviet and North Korean versions of the war depict the beginning of the war as follows: "On the 25th of June, South Korean forces went on the offensive and succeeded in driving back security detachments, penetrating 1 to 2 kilometers into the territory of North Korea. The North Korean government immediately gave the command to repulse the enemy and destroy its main forces." Yet, can it really be believed that the South Koreans could have unleashed such "aggression" only to then surrender their capital, Seoul, a mere three days after the war's beginning?

His early success in the war seemingly inspired Kim I1 Sung. His advisers insisted on continuing their success and mobilizing all forces in order to reach a rapid and complete victory. They guaranteed this to Stalin. But achieving this required ever greater amounts of assistance from the USSR.

War, however, is like a pendulum, swinging back and forth. In the first phase of the war, which lasted until the middle of September, North Korean forces achieved great victories on the battlefield as a direct consequence of the advantage of the element of surprise. Many other cities besides Seoul fell under their control, and it seemed that the outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion. Stalin was already congratulating Kim I1 Sung on victory.

However, on September 16, the South Koreans together with the Ameri- cans mounted a powerful counterattack. The operation included a large-scale amphibious landing at Inchon by the 10th Army Corps. Simultaneously, an offensive was also launched from a staging area in Pusan. The defenses of the North Koreans were shattered and began to fall to pieces. The South Koreans and the Americans rapidly advanced northward while Kim I1 Sung's troops

PETROV 55

suffered severe losses, losing a large part of their artillery and tanks. Ameri-

can air power dominated the skies, destroying everything that moved or

showed any sign of life on enemy territory. Not a trace of North Korea 's once high hopes remained. It became menac-

ingly clear that without the immediate and direct help of Chinese or Soviet troops, the North could not hold out. Everything seemed to hang by a thread.

On October 1, the minister of foreign affairs of the DPRK, Pak Hon-yong, handed Shtykov an urgent message from Kim I1 Sung to be delivered to

Stalin. In a long letter apparently composed with the help of his Soviet advisers, the North Korean leader described how the tide of events turned against his forces at the front as follows:

The enemy, suffering defeat upon defeat, was driven to a small area in the southernmost extremity of South Korea, and we had a great opportunity to achieve victory in the final decisive battles . . . . But the United States, having mobilized almost all of its infantry, naval, and air forces based in the Pacific Ocean, on 16.09.1950, carried out a landing operation in the region of Inchon. Having seized control of Inchon, the enemy is conducting street battles in the city of Seoul . . . . Enemy aircraft, not meeting with any resistance from our forces, have complete control of the skies . . . . Some of our troops are surrounded by the en- e m y . . .

Dear Comrade Stalin! If the enemy carries its offensive operations into North Korea, we will not be able to halt him with our own forces. Therefore, dear Joseph Vissarionovich, we have no choice but to request special assistance from you. In other words, the sending of immediate military assistance from the Soviet Union will become quite urgent the moment enemy forces cross the 38th Parallel.

If for some reason this is not possible, then send us assistance through the creation of international volunteer units in China and other people's democracies in order to provide military assistance to our struggle.

Respectfully, Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea Kim I1 Sung, Pak Hon-yong 29 September 1950

On the scales of political prestige rested not only the ambitions of Kim I1 Sung as "military leader and liberator" but also those of Stalin and Mao Zedong, who had given their backing to the Korean leader to launch this war. The Soviet dictator drafted a forcefully worded letter to Mao Zedong contain- ing language that even today evokes a deathly chill. Essentially, what was being discussed was the probabil i ty of a third world war. Stalin wrote the following in a message to Mao:

the United States, for reasons of prestige, might be drawn into a large war; this, in turn, will draw China into war and, at the same time, this will lead to the involvement of the USSR, which has a treaty of mutual assistance with China. Should we be frightened by this? In my opinion we should not. Together we are stronger than the United States and England while the other capitalist states of Europe, exclud-


ing Germany, which is not able to render any sort of assistance to the U.S. at this time, do not add up to a serious military power. If war is inevitable, then let it be at the present time and not several years from now when Japanese militarism reestab- lishes itself and becomes an ally of the United States.

It is frightening to think that the Third World War was close to becoming a reality during the conflict in Korea where the two blocks of nations opposed each other (a similar situation, bordering on nuclear war, developed later during the Cuban missile crisis). And this war could have been triggered by communist leaders. It is also known that in the most critical phase of the Korean War Washington considered a resort to nuclear weapons.

Mao responded that he was "very happy that the struggle against the Americans was described as a joint effort of China and the USSR . . . . To be sure, if we must fight a war, then we must fight it now . . . . It would be advisable to send in at least nine divisions rather than just five or six."

However, after receiving this message, Moscow got another report indicat- ing that Beijing was still debating not only the details but also the very possibility of military intervention by China. The Kremlin became apprehen- sive.

Meanwhile, in Beijing, the arguments "for" and "against" intervention continued. Stalin anxiously awaited the results. The Chinese decision was crucial. Stalin had decided that he would send in Soviet troops at the final moment only as a last resort in order to salvage the situation. However, Stalin had already begun assisting North Korea's war efforts with Soviet air power based in Chinese airfields. On his orders, the Soviet 64th Air Corps, which included anti-aircraft artillery units, fought on the side of the North Koreans. It should be mentioned that this anti-aircraft unit amassed rather impressive statistics. According to Soviet information, 1,309 American planes were hit during the war. This was not the result of mere luck: the majority of the men in this unit had gained considerable expertise as pilots and artillery officers during the Second World War.

But let us return to Stalin, who was waiting for Beijing to come to a decision. In the end, Mao Zedong sent a message to Moscow agreeing to give the North Koreans direct military support.

Stalin no doubt sighed with relief. It would not be an easy war. There would be no victory. But defeat would be avoided this time. The main burden of the war would fall on the Chinese, whom he would help in every possible way with air cover, weapons, technology, ammunition, but not with manpower. The Soviet dictator, getting increasingly weak and infirm, and nearing the end of his life, had grown tired of war.

On October 25, 1950, an enormous wave of Chinese troops went on the offensive. The socialist press called them "volunteers." The offensive was long and tortuous. The "volunteers" countered the Americans' domination of the air with trench and tunnel building. Whole companies, battalions, and

PETROV 57

regiments burrowed into the earth beyond the reach of both bombs and na- palm.

Pyongyang was liberated; Seoul, Inchon, and other cities were recaptured. The pendulum of war swung back to the other side. A blow was then struck from the south, and the line of the front became nearly fixed along the 38th Parallel.

After coming to the realization that fighting would yield no victor, Stalin gradually lost interest in the Korean War. He ordered Vyshinskii to call for peace talks, reckoning that more could be gained in the diplomatic arena than on the field of battle.

Meeting with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in Moscow on September 19, 1952, Stalin discussed ways to preserve the existing positions of China and North Korea and means of exchanging prisoners of war. Stalin remained true to himself here, too. He reminded the Chinese leader that "the Americans will try to recruit a part of the prisoners of war to serve as their spies." He confirmed his readiness to supply China with arms for 60 Chinese infantry divisions. Yet, even while conducting negotiations for peace in Korea, Stalin did not exclude a continuation of the military conflict. When the talks were finished, the members of the Chinese delegation were presented with new Soviet "ZIM" limousines as a sign of Stalin's great respect for the Chinese leaders.

Stalin at this point had less than half a year left to live. He would never know that the war in Korea that began with his approval would come to an end on June 27, 1953, in Panmunjon upon the conclusion of a cease-fire agreement. The futile, horrible attempt to resolve the Korean problem by force of arms cost many hundreds of thousands of lives, many billions of rubles and dollars, and led to the destruction of thousands of villages and cities and industries. The dictator in the Kremlin never suffered from the throes of conscience . . . . He believed absolutely in his right to decide the fate of millions of people.

The Korean War was thus the last terrible military episode in the political biography of Stalin.

DOCUMENT NUMBER 3: "THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF 'FYN SI '"

Ingoducfion

Stalin's cables to his representatives in Pyongyang (T. Shtykov, Soviet ambassador to the DPRK and Kim I1 Sung's chief political adviser, and A. Matveyev, chief Soviet intelligence officer in Korea, both generals) reflect the state of confusion that spread in the Kremlin at the news of the KPA collapse in September 1950. They also shed light on Stalin's attitude toward Kim I1 Sung, as the catastrophe unfolded. While rudely berating Soviet advisers in Korea for their incompetence, he voiced no criticism of the KPA

58 JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES/FALL I994

commander-in-chief: the leader's prestige had to be upheld at all costs. At the same time, however, Stalin ordered his men to pass his rather specific instructions to Kim (and to Pak Hon Yong, leader of the South Korean commu- nists) for implementation, as if he himself were in command.

One must assume that Stalin's instructions (politely called "advice") had little relation to the chaotic situation in Korea where U.S. forces cut the peninsula in two, trapping most of the KPA troops in the south where they were systematically exterminated. Stalin's strategic mind, developed in the war against Germany, simply could not grasp Korean realities. His demand that Shtykov and Matveyev "put an end to the attitude of uncertainty among the leadership" was nonsensical by any measure. After venting his anger, however, Stalin concluded his (second) message by informing his envoys that in order to get the indispensable manpower to rescue Korea, as Kim had begged him to do, it would be necessary to "consult with the Chinese comrades."

A minor but characteristic point: even at that late date Stalin slyly tried to hide his true role in the Korean War by signing his cables to his underlings with a pseudonym, "Fyn Si," and referring to "Fyn Si" in the third person. In communicating with Mao, he used the pseudonyms "Filipov" and even "Gromyko."

Source: "The Recommendations of 'Fyn Si'," Rodina, no. 4 (June 1993). Translated from Rus- sian by Craig H. Seibert.

Top Secret

Pyongyang To: Matveyev

Shtykov A serious situation has recently developed on the front of the Korean People's

Army, both in the area of Seoul and in the southeast, resulting largely from errors made by the army command at the front and command of individual army groups and troop units in matters of troop management and, in particular, in tactics for combat utilization of troops in battle.

Our military advisers are even more guilty of these mistakes. Our military advisers failed to implement the order of the commander-in-chief [Kim I1 Sung] to transfer four divisions from the main front to the region around Seoul in an effi- cient and timely manner. There was ample opportunity for this when the order was given; yet, because this did not happen, seven days have been lost, giving the Americans near Seoul a great tactical advantage. The timely withdrawal of those divisions could have radically altered the military situation around Seoul.

The battalions and regimental units deployed around Seoul were incomplete and unprepared for battle and thus ineffective in view of their disorganization and lack of communication with headquarters. Divisions arriving from the southeast were sent directly into battle unprepared and in a piecemeal fashion, thus allowing the enemy to inflict heavy damage. According to our earlier instructions, these divisions should have been deployed for combat to the northeast and east of Seoul,

PETROV 59

allowed at least a day's rest, readied for combat, and only then, sent into battle in an organized manner.

Your erroneous and absolutely unacceptable tactics in tank warfare warrant serious attention. You recently used tanks in combat without first clearing the field of battle with preliminary artillery strikes, which resulted in your tanks being easily destroyed by enemy fire. Given the experience gained in the Great Patriotic War, our military advisers should have known that such incompetent use of tanks would only result in losses.

The strategic incompetence of our advisers as well as their blind inability to gather intelligence has also come to our attention. They failed to appreciate the strategic significance of the enemy's landing at Inchon, they doubted the serious- ness of the landing, and Shtykov even suggested that the author of an article appearing in Pravda about the American landing be brought to court. This blind- ness and lack of strategic experience have led to a situation where the necessity of redeploying troops from the south to the area around Seoul was called into question, and the redeployment itself was prolonged and delayed, thus resulting in a loss of seven days, much to the delight of the enemy.

The support provided by our military advisers to the Korean Command in such vitally important areas as communications, troop management, organization of intelligence gathering, and direction of combat operations has been exceptionally weak. As a result, the forces of the Korean Army are essentially out of control. They are going into combat blindly and unable to coordinate the different branches of the service in battle. This might be acceptable during a successful offensive but, given the complications at the front, this is absolutely intolerable.

You must make all of this clear to our military advisers, beginning with Vasiliev.

In order to provide assistance to the Korean Command under the present circumstances, especially in matters pertaining to the orderly withdrawal of the forces of the Korean People's Army from the southeast and the rapid formation of a new line of defense to the east, south, and north of Seoul, it is essential that our advisers strive to accomplish the following:

1. Carry out the withdrawal of the main forces under cover of a strong rear guard formed from elements within the division capable of providing strong resistance to the enemy. To this end, place commanders with combat experience in charge of rearguard operations, reinforce these rearguard units with field and, most importantly, antitank artillery, engineering troops, and, where possible, tanks.

2. Rearguard troops must wage combat while they retreat, making extensive use of mines and other available means for creating obstructions. The rearguard's operations should be decisive and forceful enough to win the time necessary for the withdrawal of the main forces.

3. As much as possible, keep the main forces of the divisions together so as to be prepared to battle their way out of encirclement. It is necessary to form a strong advance guard from the main forces, equipping it with artillery and, as much as possible, tanks.

4. Utilize tanks in battle only in conjunction with infantry and only after preliminary artillery strikes.

5. Gorges, bridges, river crossing points, passes through mountain ranges, and important road junctions on the routes used for major troop movements should


be occupied and held by advance detachments until the passing of the main forces.

6. Special attention should be devoted to problems of organization of field recon- naissance as well as to the securing of flanks and maintaining communication between troop columns.

7. Avoid overextending your forces along the front during the creation of defensive lines; firmly protect your main lines of retreat, while creating strong re- serves for offensive operations.

8. When organizing communication with troops through the Korean Command, make sure that radio messages are sent in code.

As was instructed earlier and in accordance with this directive, you must take all measures to ensure that not a single one of our military advisers is taken prisoner in the course of performing his duties.

Report back on actions taken.

FYN SI 28 September 1950

Top Secret

Pyongyang To: Shtykov

Matveyev We have received your telegrams dated 30 September and 1 October. It is clear

from these telegrams that Comrade Kim I1 Sung and other comrades from the Korean leadership have many questions, which you have avoided answering. We consider your conduct in this matter to be erroneous. Given the growing severity of the present situation, it is natural that the Korean comrades should seek counsel and assistance; yet, Comrade Shtykov remains silent, thus increasing the apprehen- sions of the Korean leadership. Comrade Matveyev was not sent to Korea to send back to us summaries of events in Korea, which we have already been receiving without him; yet, he still has not sent Moscow his own thorough evaluation of the military situation in Korea, not to mention the fact that he has failed to offer any proposals or advice relevant to the situation, thus making it difficult for us to make decisions concerning Korea. Comrade Matveyev has provided little assistance to the Korean leaders, which is obvious from the fact that the Korean leadership to this day has no plan of defense for the republic at, and to the north of, the 38th parallel, and has no plan for withdrawing its troops from South Korea.

Bear these instructions in mind during your future actions in Korea. Go see Kim I1 Sung and Pak Hon-yong at once and tell them the following: One. With regard to whether the enemy will go north of the 38th parallel. It is

necessary to first approach this matter from a worst case scenario; that is, the enemy will try to seize North Korea. You, therefore, must immediately mobilize all forces to prevent the enemy from crossing the 38th parallel. To achieve it the troops must be prepared to fight the enemy north of the 38th parallel.

Don't underestimate the forces and capabilities of the Korean republic [DPRK] in organizing defenses. There are great human and other resources available for mobilization in North Korea. Under the present difficult circumstances, the task of creating a battle-ready fighting force must be resolved at all costs and in the

PETROV 61

shortest possible time, both by reinforcing existing forces and the formation of new units. We will fully supply all these troops with weapons.

We consider your view that North Korea is not capable of resisting the enemy at, and to the north of, the 38th parallel to be incorrect. The Korean government has military forces; it is only necessary to organize and fully utilize them for defense. You must speed up the formation of various units in every way possible; arms for these units are already on their way to Korea. In addition, it is essential to take all possible measures to pull the troops out of the south, bearing in mind that the front in the south is not continuous and, consequently, the troops will have ample opportunity to withdraw to the north. This should be done quickly, since the Americans will certainly try to deprive the army of this opportunity in the near future.

Two. It is essential in the south, behind enemy lines, to switch over to guerrilla operations using recruits from the local population and the troops that had been unable to withdraw to the north. Assign the guerrillas the task of disorganizing and terrorizing the enemy's rear by disrupting their communications, destroying their command centers, disrupting supply lines, attacking enemy officers and soldiers, and carrying out other active operations.

Three. The situation that has arisen demands firm leadership as well as its reorganization so as to meet the new goals of building strong defenses. In order to accomplish this, it is first of all essential to put an end to the attitude of uncertainty among the leadership and to strictly and clearly define the duties of the leading comrades, assigning to each man well-defined goals and specific responsibilities in building of the country's defenses. The forces of reaction must be crushed quickly and mercilessly, so that order behind the lines can be established. Using reliable people from local defense forces, form extermination units to destroy enemy com- mandos. The government must maintain at hand a strong military force for its protection, comprised of persons of proven loyalty. Immediately take all measures to undertake the mining of major ports and areas suitable for enemy troop land- ings; we will send the material assistance needed for this operation.

Four. Concerning the question of providing military assistance with our armed forces put forward in the letter of Comrade Kim I1 Sung to Comrade Fyn Si, we consider the formation of volunteer units to be a more acceptable form of assistance. We must first consult with our Chinese comrades on this issue. You will receive our response to Comrade Kim I1 Sung's letter shortly.

FYN S1 1 October 1950

DOCUMENT NUMBER 4: NOTE TO A. N. POSKREBYSHEV FROM SHTEMENKO, 9 DECEMBER 1951

Introduction

A report by Gen. S. Shtemenko, chief of the general staff of the Soviet

ministry of defense, to A. Poskrebyshev, chief of Stal in 's personal secretariat,

proves a) that the Soviet air force was deployed on Korea ' s periphery as early as November 1950, only a couple of weeks after the Chinese "People ' s Vol- unteers" crossed the Yalu River; and b) that the number of destroyed U.S. air-


craft greatly exceeded Soviet losses. According to Col. Gen. D. Volkogonov (see Document No. 2), during the period of Soviet active participation in the war (until June 1953), the 64th Air Corps downed 1,309 U.S. aircraft.

Source: Reprinted from "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War," Journal of American-£astAsian Relations, vol. 2, no. 4 (Winter 1993), pp. 457-458. Translated and edited by Kathryn Weathersby.

To Comrade Poskrebyshev, A. N. In response to your inquiry, I report that for the entire time of the fighting in

Korea, for the period from 1 November 1950 through 6 December 1951, 569 enemy aircraft have been destroyed by our aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery.

510 planes were destroyed by our fighter aircraft: B-29 40 B-26 1 B -45 2 B-94 8 F-86 172 F-84 132 F-80 101 F-51 22 Meteor 4 32

59 planes were destroyed by fire from our anti-aircraft artillery. Our losses amounted to 63 MiG-15s, and 30 pilots. In the anti-artillery units, 29

men were killed and 53 w e r e w o u n d e d . 6

DOCUMENT NUMBER 5: YU SONG-CHOL REMINISCENCES

Introduction

A third generation "Russian Korean," Yu Song-chol met Kim I1 Sung when he was assigned to the so-called 88th independent sharp-shooting brigade near Khabarovsk. The "brigade" was actually an intelligence unit con- sisting of personnel of Asian origin; Kim I1 Sung commanded one of its "battalions." Fluent in Russian, Yu Song-chol proved to be indispensable as an interpreter; as Kim was launched on his spectacular career upon his return to Korea in 1945, Yu advanced as well. In 1948 he was appointed chief of the KPA operations bureau, ultimately getting the rank of lieutenant general. In 1959 he was purged and sent back to the Soviet Union where he lived until he was permitted to visit both Koreas in 1989. His voluminous recollections, first published in Seoul, are those of an insider of the Kim I1 Sung regime. Based exclusively on his excellent memory, his story would have been even more valuable had he been able to refresh his knowledge with archival research. The excerpts from Yu Chol's memoirs presented here deal with the preparations for the war and with its spectacular early stage. Although not a

PETROV 63

member of Kim's inner circle, Yu was in a position to observe closely the

Soviet as well as the North Korean military.

* c a *

Source: FBIS-EAS-90-249, December 27, 1990, pp. 24-30 and FBIS-EAS-90-250, December 28, 1990, pp. 13-15.

Even though I myself was the author of the southern invasion plan, having drawn up the plans with my own hands, I am not in a position to reveal the full story of the war. That task must be left to historians of future generations.

All I can do with my testimony here is hope that I can be of some help to the readers and scholars in understanding from a military aspect how "6-25" (the June 25 invasion) was planned and why North Korea provoked the war.

Like many other North Koreans, at the time I believed that the war was a sacred undertaking that would unify our divided fatherland and liberate the South Kore- ans from the oppression of foreign powers.

Reflecting on it now, the war instead drove an ever more decisive wedge in the division of the peninsula and was a sin towards our race for it planted deep abhorrence and mistrust between South and North Koreans.

Kim I1 Sung, however, who must ultimately take responsibility for the war, simply used it as a stepping stone for his own eternal power by purging North Korean leaders or generals who participated in the war after shifting its responsibility to them.

Kim I1 Sung had emerged victorious in an intensive power struggle and was wielding absolute power over the country. Not one month after the republic was established in South Korea did Kim proceed to establish the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 9 September 1948, Kim himself becoming the premier.

The communization of North Korea was already in its final stage. Following the advice of the Soviet military government, Kim I1 Sung instituted such reform measures as land reform, nationalization of major industries, an agricultural tax-in- kind system, and laws ensuring equality of sexes in February 1946. From 1947, an economic development plan was established and implemented each year.

With reform measures such as these, the devoted efforts of the people, abundant natural resources, and Soviet aid, by the end of the 1940s North Korea had established economic strength surpassing that of South Korea.

In military power alone, we were confident that the North Korean People's Army (KPA) was the strongest of the world's revolutionary forces. We had numerous commanders with abundant command experience fighting the Japanese in Manchuria and the Soviet Union. We also were equipped with modem military equipment transferred to us by the Soviet forces who withdrew in 1948. Unsatis- fied with this, Kim I1 Sung made two trips to the Soviet Union in 1949, concluding a treaty of friendship with Stalin and receiving military aid in heavy weaponry such as tanks and field guns, further strengthening the KPA.

Kim I1 Sung's confidence was bolstered by these various circumstances, leading him to dream that he could unify the Korean peninsula by force. Those sur- rounding him sided with him, such as individuals from the South Korean Workers' party (SKWP). In addition, even in China the People's Liberation Army had just finished driving the Kuomintang from the mainland, unifying the country. I re- member that there was an atmosphere of envy among the KPA's hierarchy over this fact.


Although I cannot know just when Kim I1 Sung made the decision to attack, it is at least clear that it was before early 1950 when he made his secret visit to see Stalin.

Although I vaguely sensed that Kim I1 Sung was visiting Stalin, it was not until later--around 1951--that I learned the purpose of his visit from his secretary, Mun I1, who had accompanied Kim on the visit. Mun, with whom I enjoyed a close relationship, revealed to me that as soon as Kim I1 Sung met Stalin and told him of his plan to invade the south, Stalin replied, "Since I alone cannot decide, I will pass your war plans and military assistance request on to the party political committee for decision. Accordingly, Kim I1 Sung simply returned. Shortly after he arrived in the country, a dispatch authorizing an invasion of the south came down from the Soviet Union.

The Soviets afterwards began a complete changeover of personnel in May 1950, replacing the military advisers who had been dispatched to North Korea with individuals with extensive combat experience. Lieutenant General Vasiliev, a hero of the German-Soviet War, replaced Major General Smirnov as the head of the military advisory group.

The draft plan for the "6-25" southern invasion was prepared directly by this Soviet military advisory group. Its title was "Preemptive Strike Operational Plan." After the plan was handed over to Kim I1 Sung, he passed it on to Kang Kon, the chief of the General Staff of the KPA, who in turn passed it on to me. Kang instructed, "Translate this into Korean and formulate a plan." That was in early May 1950.

Under the direction of Kang Kon, the plan was discussed and redrafted in Korean by myself; Artillery Commander Maj. Gen. Pong-yul; Maj. Gen. Chong Hak-chun, chief of staff of the artillery command; and Senior Colonel Pak Kil- nam, Engineering Bureau commander. Everyone who participated in this project was a Soviet-born Korean. The Yenan faction individuals who had entered various military positions were excluded from this effort because they could not compre- hend the operational plan and because we had to maintain security.

It was 0400 in the morning as the dawn began to break on Sunday, 25 June 1950. All the heavy weaponry that the KPA had amassed along the entirety of the 38th parallel belched its fire in unison towards the South. This was the beginning of the preemptive strike operation.

The reason that North Korea chose this time to commence operations is because that was when the South Korean National Defense Forces (NDF) would be at their weakest, with soldiers on pass and guard duty being lax.

The South Korean NDF, which had come under an all out blitzkrieg attack before they even had time to awaken from their sleep, collapsed even more easily than we had expected.

Aside from some delays on the Eastern front, where the KPA encountered some strong counterattacks from the NDF, the KPA surged down to the outskirts of Seoul with no particular resistance along the way.

In particular, the power that the Soviet-made T-34 tank showed along the way was indeed tremendous. Over and over again the NDF forces, seeing a Soviet- made tank for the first time, were so amazed and dumbfounded that they helplessly retreated. Until now, the 105th Tank Division had consisted of one brigade composed of only one regiment. However, after occupying Seoul, more tanks were received from the Soviet Union and the unit was expanded to a division. The division commander was Yu Kyong-su. Yu was a partisan who had been active in the 88th Brigade as a platoon leader.

The movement of the main body of the Second Auxiliary Command Post was

PETROV 65

delayed so that it took until the evening of the 27 June to occupy Chunchon. The major reason for this is because the light tank unit commanded by Senior

Colonel Chon Mu-pyon, a partisan, was tied up in some difficult mountainous terrain.

This was an absurd error that arose because Soviet military advisers who were not familiar with Korea's terrain developed the southern invasion plan. Since this was a problem among the Soviet military advisers, they were later recalled to their home country.

Though there were errors like this, the main body of the invasion completely occupied Seoul as expected after only three days of fighting on the morning of 28 June. If the situation on the Eastern front had been smoother, Seoul would have fallen before the 28th.

As I received the report on the morning of 28 June that the Fourth Division led by a tank division finally entered the city of Seoul I thought to myself "Now the war had ended."

However, such a feeling was only passing. We discovered the fatal flaw in our preemptive strike operation and were bewildered by it.

As I mentioned before, our southern invasion plan ended with the occupation of Seoul after four days. This is not because our operational concept did not include an intention to seize the entirety of South Korea.

It is just that we were under the illusion that once we occupied the South Korean capital, then the entirety of South Korea would come into our hands.

Thinking about it now, it is difficult to understand such an error in judgment. However, throughout the history of war, it was frequently the case that capturing the enemy's capital meant military victory.

Additionally, we all steadfastly believed the boastings of Pak Hon-yong that once we first occupied Seoul, the 200,000 SKWP members who were in hiding throughout South Korea would rise up and revolt, toppling the South Korean regime. These words of Pak Hon-yong were one of the major factors in hardening Kim II Sung's resolve to invade southward. At the same time, it also became a reason for Kim I1 Sung to later sweep away the SKWP faction, including Pak Hon- yong.

It is said that Kim I1 Sung gave a speech to some military officers in 1963 along the following lines:

"Pak Hon-yong, the spy employed by the American scoundrels, exaggerated that there were some 200,000 underground party members in South Korea, with 60,000 in Seoul alone. Far from 200,000, by the time we had advanced to the Nakdong River line, not even one uprising had occurred. If only a few thousand workers had risen in Pusan, then we certainly could have liberated (South Korea) all the way down to Pusan, and the American scoundrels could not have landed (in Inchon)." In this manner, our war scenario was flawed from its basic conception.

In spite of the occupation of Seoul, the Front Line Command received reports that Syngman Rhee and the South Korean government had moved to Taejon and resistance by the National Defense Forces (NDF) continued. Orders to urgently continue advancing southward were passed down to Kim Ung, commander of the First Auxiliary Command Post.

It appears as though the order to press southward was discussed and decided upon directly by Chief of the General Staff Kang Kon and Kim I1 Sung.

The Front Line Command itself also moved down to Seoul. If at this time the Korean People's Army had not rested and continued to advance, then the history of "6-25" may have been entirely different.

After three days of continuous combat, however, the KPA was extremely fa-


tigued. They stopped in Seoul to savor the joy of victory. On the afternoon of 28 June, Commander Kim Ung even threw a celebration party in the Capitol Building when Minister of National Defense Choe Yong-kon arrived in Seoul.

Although we expected "6-25" to last three days, in reality it was a war that lasted nearly three years.

In other words, this implies that any war outside of three days was one that was not in the game book of the Korean People's Army.

The war expanded from a limited war to an all-out war from 1 July, the third day of our occupation of Seoul when the KPA began to advance southward.

The Front Line Command assigned new roles to the First and Second Auxiliary Command Posts. The First Auxiliary Command Post was instructed to go southward along the Kyongbu road [Kyonggi to Pusan] on the Western front while the Second Auxiliary Command Post was entrusted with the central and east coasts. Beyond that, however, operational plans were left to be decided as the situation developed either at the command posts or at the division level.

The KPA had no established fronts, no coordination between artillery and infantry, or even a basic strategy. Each division simply pushed southward on its o w n .

In spite of this, the high-spirited KPA continued to drive back the National Defense Forces [NDF] like a tidal wave. Although it is true that unlike the north of Seoul where the NDF resistance increased daily, the KPA easily occupied Suwon and Wonju as they headed towards Taejon.

Here, we encountered yet another obstacle that we had not expected--the swift intervention by the United States. With the landing of lead units of the U.S. Army 24th Division on 1 July, the day we had been attacking Suwon, full-scale U.S. participation in the war began.

The worst error in judgment Kim I1 Sung committed during the war was over- looking the possibility of U.S. intervention. High-ranking cadres such as Choe Yong-kon had warned of the possibility of intervention during preparations for the southern invasion. Kim I1 Sung strongly rebuked them, saying that they had a "defeatist" attitude."

With the transfer of operational control of the NDF from Syngman Rhee to UN Forces Commander MacArthur on 15 July, "6-25" expanded from a limited war to an international war.

The Fourth Division of the KPA was the first to encounter the Smith Battalion, the advance party of the U.S. 24th Division. However, since the task force had not been adequately prepared for combat, they were instantly annihilated. It was not until after combat was over that the KPA even knew they had faced U.S. soldiers.

The KPA, who now had even emerged victorious in a confrontation with the world's strongest armed forces--the United States--kept their momentum going and captured Taejon on 20 July.

At this time, the indiscriminate air raids by the U.S. forces was the one thing that most tormented the KPA. The U.S. forces, which had total air superiority, mobilized heavy bombers such as the B-29 and B-25 along with Saber jets and bombed not only the forward lines but also the entire rear area, pouring bombs daily on the area. During heavy periods, there were even occasions when more than one hundred fighter bombers would be flown at one time to perform carpet bombing.

This indiscriminate bombing created a situation in which the KPA could nei- ther fight nor move during daylight. Rear area support to the frontline units also became nearly impossible.

PETROV 67

Whether Kim II Sung was aware of the predicament the KPA was in or not, he continued to press for the occupation of Pusan by 15 August. In any case, we concentrated all the manpower we could into the Nakdong River line and attempted to break through; however, all we did was lose tens of thousands of troops as the situation deteriorated day by day.

In the midst of this, I received the shocking report one day that U.S. forces had commenced a large-scale amphibious landing at Inchon.

Seoul fell on 28 September, and the new defense lines became meaningless. Each individual sought only to flee, with the KPA command structure in total collapse. Contact between the Front Line Command and the Auxiliary Command Posts was cut off. Mass confusion set in to the degree that commanders were unlocated.

However, isn't it only natural that the person who should take responsibility for the defeat is the person who was totally unable to foresee the U.S. intervention or the lnchon landing operation--Supreme Commander Kim 11 Sung?

We moved the Front Line Command to Tokchon in South Pyonyan Province. We desperately tried to halt the northward-advancing NDF and U.S. forces who had broken through the 38th parallel. However, there was nothing we could do with our strength alone.

Just as the South Korean regime was rescued from burial at sea by the United States at the last moment, it was the Chinese forces' entry into the war that saved Kim I1 Sung's regime at the last moment.

NOTES

1. Aleksandr Nikolaevich Poskrebyshev. Stalin's personal secretary. (Born 1891; vanished in prison after Stalin's death.)

2. Andrei lanuarevich Vyshiuskii (1883-1954). Deputy foreign minister 1940-1949, foreign minister 1949-1953.

3. Terentii Fomich Shtykov (1907-1964). Political officer in armed forces during and after World War II. Ambassador to North Korea 1948-1951.

4. "Dictated" suggests that D. A. Volkogonov may not have seen the cable itself. It is doubtful that Stalin could direct Mao to "confirm implementation of the above." Beijing's "agreement" is not cited.

5. Maj. Gen. Vasiliev was chief military adviser to Kim I1 Sung in 1950. 6. General Georgii Lobov, who commanded the 64th Independent Fighter Aviation Corps in

Korea, has stated that approximately 70,000 Soviet pilots, technicians, and gunners served in the corps throughout the war. ("Blank Spots in History: in the Skies Over North Korea," JPRS Report, JPRS-UAC-91-004, p. 3.) Boris Sergeevich Abakumov, who twice received the Order of the Red Banner for his service in the Korean War, has reported that over the course of the entire war, Americans lost up to 2,500 planes. "Sovietskie lietehiki v nebe Korei" (Soviet pilots in the skies over Korea), Voprosy lstorii (Questions of history), 1993, no. 1:131.

Soviet role in the Korean war confirmed: Secret documents declassified

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