Soviet Naval Policy and Programs (December 1974) DECLASSIFIED

8/12/2019 Soviet Naval Policy and Programs (December 1974) DECLASSIFIED

1/40

CI H I S T O ~ f C L REVIEW PROGI\ tlRelease s Sanitizedj 996


2/40


3/40

. , . .

. . .

: . . ..

, s-b (f/656/ 14

Tap Sa-et

N IE 11 15=74

SOVIET NAVAL POLICY AND PROGRAMS

I , . .. ): . .

Top SeG et


4/40

. :rep eec et .

. - THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRALINTELLIGENCE.

THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPTAS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:The following intelligence organizations participated n the preparation ofth estimate

The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departmentsof State and Defense, and the National Security Agency.

ConcurringThe Deputy Director of Central Intelligence representing the Central lnteRigonco

-The Director of Intelligence and Research representing the Department of State The Director, Defense Intelligence AgencyTho Director, National Security AgencyTho Assistant General Manager for National Security representing the Atomic

Energy Commission. , .: ..

AbstainingThe Special Assistant to the Secretory of the T eosury representing the epartmentof the T eosury

The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of InvestigationALSO PARTICIPATING:

SG 9ma l74

Tho Assistant Chief of Stoff for Intelligence, Deportment of tho Army.Tho Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the NavyThe A55lstont Chief of Stoff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Tep e ~ r e ~


5/40

,

. \

:

Tep Seeret-

CONTENTSPage

PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS IDISCUSSION : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Preface 8I. FORCE COMPOSIT ION AND READINESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

II. WARTIME MISSIONS AND EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9:-Soviet Views of the Nature Course and Tasks of a War with the US . . . 9.The Deterrence and N.uclear Strike Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Anti-Strike Fleet Activity 14Antisubmarine Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Securing the Sea Frontiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Interdiction of Sea Lines of Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22A Projection/Intervention/Sea Control Mission? 22

III TRENDS IN stniiET .NAVAL ACTivrtlES :: . : . . : : 23.Out-of-Area Activity . . . . . 25

IV. USES OF THE SOVIET NAVY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIETPOLICY IN PEACETIME ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Peacetime Operations in Soviet Policy : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Balancing of Risk : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Future Levels of Peacetime Activity : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29P?litical Impact . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

. \V. CURRENT STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE SOVIETNAVY 30

VI. FUTURE FORCES: CONSIDERATIONS AND OPTIONS . : 32A Baseline Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Force Development Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33Decision Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

sc ffljj jf fr{ lop Secr:at ,


6/40

. .

se 67656/ 14

rep ~ e e r e t

SOVIET N V L POLICY ND PROGRAMS

PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTSA primary mission of the Soviet Navy is to furnish a deterrent toattack through the presence of a credible and swvivable SSBNforce, and, in time of genenil war, to participate m the nuclearexchange and strike at soft targets such as military installations,

i n d u ~ t r i e s apd goyemrnent e n ~ e r s .. . . . . The Soviets routinely maintain five of their operational SSBNson station. The Soviets also appear to keep[ JsSBNs readyfor deployment[ . . J the majority of these-the Y-class SSBNs will take about a week to ten days to reach .station after notice. This will change appreciably .during the nexf decade since increasing numbers of D-class submarines will be.within missile range upon leaving home port.

Under conditions of sufficient warning to get additional forces tofiring stations, the Soviets might currently expect as many as 400sea-based missiles to reach their targets in an initial strike. Underconditions of no warning, successful NATO damage limitingoperations, delays in command and control procedures, or deliberate Soviet decisions, the Soviets might be able to launch only afew score missiles from the Y class and D-class SSBNs.

f l ip lieeret


7/40

. .

.

Top S e r e ~

The Soviets are attempting to increase the survivability of theirSSBN .force in. several ways. They are constructing tunnels nearSSBN bases suitable for concealment and protection of the submarines and have built dummy SSBNs probably to conceal deployment levels during crises or to mislead NATO targeting.. .

W e expect the Soviet SSBN force to expand to 62 modem unitsby the late 1970s. The 62nd unit is probably already under construction and we believe all of them will be .completed. f theproposed SAL Agreement covering the 1977-1985 period is successfully concluded the Soviets will be limited to a total of 2 400delivery vehic les-ICBMs SLBMs and intercontinental bombers with no subliniit on SLBMs. This would require some reductions in the numbers and probably some changes in the mixof Soviet strategic forces. We believe the Soviets will retain aforee at the level of 62 modem SSBNs until about 1980. Butpressures will mount for change in the mix of strategic forces inthe 1980s and we are uncertain how these will affect the SSBNforce. 1

.An extensive program to refit new and probably MIRVed missilesto the force is expected to start in the late 1970s and to continuethrough the m i d ~ 1 9 8 0 s

- TheSovie.tfcontinue to.beUeve that a war wit]l the Westwill.prob. _.ably e v o l ~ e into a s ~ r t nucle-ar conflict ~ t they .also see some increasing likelihood that a war could begin and perhaps even remain at a conventional level. Soviet doctrine calls for the earliest

.possible destruction of enemy nuclear capabilities including navalin the early phases of a conventional conflict. Because the Sovietsthink it unlikely that a war with the West would remain convm-tional we believe that they would seek to destroy SSBNs in theearly stages of a conflict. However it is pssible i the Soviets sawthe opportunity to contain the conflict at conventional levels andgiven the low probability that they could actually destroy an SSBNthat the Soviet leadership would direct the Navy to refrainfromattacking SSBNs in order to reduce the chances of escalation.

The Defense Intelligence Agency calls attention to its footnote 10 on page 34.

2Tefl ~ u r e t

.


8/40

.- .

Jg.p .Sec;Fel

W e do not believe that the Soviets would choose to engage in awar conducted only. at sea between the major powers. Soviet war time naval operations are seen as closely related to war developments on the Eurasian landmass.Soviet capabilities for combating Western carrier strike forces tothem a first priority task include forces for the surveillance ofNATO carrier task forces in peacetime; and a combination of air,submarine and surface forces for the destruction of those NATOcarrier task forces in war.

W e believe that, given time to coordinate all of their surveillanceassets, the Soviets would probably be able to locate and trackmost US aircraft carriers in the northeastern Atlantic, NorwegianSea; northwestern Pacific Ocean and the eastern Mediterranean.We believe that coordinated strikes against Western carriers inthese areas would be at least partially successful. .- The degree of success would depend upon the location of the carriers, whether the Soviets use conventional or nuclear weapons,and whether surprise were achieved. f nuclear weapons wereused in a surprise attack, most of the carriers in these areas could

be destroyed. On the other hand, timely warning of a Sovietattack would allow the carriers to take action which would probably s s u ~ e the.survival of some carriers, especially against a con-v ~ r i t i o ~ a l a t t a c k

W e expect the Soviets to maintain the high priority on combatingenemy aircraft carrier task forces. Cruise-missile submarines willc o n t i ~ t i e to be built throughout the 1970s, as will major surfaceships with antiship missiles. The SS-NX-13 antiship nuclear ballistic missiie will most likely enter the force in the next year ortwo C

J.The strike capability of the Soviet Navy against Western surfaceforces will be significantiy improved by the deployment with SovietNaval Aviation of the BACKFIRE ASM strike aircraft. The BACK

FIREs increased range capability will give it coverage over all themajor sea lanes leading to Europe and extend Pacific Ocean cover-

3so fJf 65617 4 Tep liie Fel

.


9/40


10/40

. .

-sc 67656/74

Th e Soviet and other Warsaw Pact navies have concentrated largenumbers ofsmall coastal patrol, ASW and minewarfare ships, shortrange submarines, and ASWaircraft in the Black, Baltic and BarentsJ Seas and the Sea of Japan to secure their sea frontiers in time ofwar. These forces continue to receive the latest Soviet equipmentand have some significant capabilities against Western forces. TheSoviets and other Warsaw Pact navies could probably establishcontrol over the Baltic and Black Seas early in a conflict, andplant mines to prevent penetrations by Western .naval forces. nthe Sea of Japan and in the Barents Sea, enemy surface units couldbe destroyed quickly, but Western nuclear submarines would posea more difficult problem and the Soviets probably could not protect

their ships from this threat.Th e Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies maintain amphibious forcesin the Barents Sea area, in the Baltic arid Black Seas, and in the Sea

of Japan. The effectiveness of operations of these forces wouldprobably vary widely. The North Cape. of Norway could probablybe taken fairly readily if the Norwegian brigade normally deployedthere were not reinforced. n the Baltic, Soviet and other WarsawPact forces could probably capture the Danish islands, if the Danishair and ground forces on Zealand were not reinforced, and linktipwith land forces attacking Jutland. n the .Black Sea area, ~ t r o n g

u r k i ~ h defenses and difficult terrain wouid make a c o o r d i ~ t e dland and sea . assault on the Turkish straits more difficult. TheSoviets probably could not seize these Straits quickly using conventional weapons. Soviet Naval Infantry capabilities in the Pacificareinsufficient for conducting amphibious assaults on the Japanesehome islands to secure exits fwm the Sea of Japan.

W e believe that, if a conventional war in Europe were to continuefor some time, the Soviets would probably mount an interdictioncampaign against Western sea lines of Communications. The Sovietswould have major problems in doing so. They do not have forwardbases for resupply, and attempts to operate their small numberof resupply ships beyond Soviet-controlled waters could be easily

. countered. Thus their submarines would almost certainly have toreturn through choke points to an uncertain resupply situation.

5Tap i u r e t

.......... --:. . . : ...


11/40

Tep Seeret

Moreover, the North Atlantic sea lanes are basically beyond therange of all but BEAR and BACKFIRE aircraft. In a prolongedconventional conflict, therefore, the Soviets .could effect attritionon NATO shipping, but could not disrupt it completely. We believeit unlikely that, outside of direct involvement in a war with theWest, the USSR would attack Western sea lines of communication,however vulnerable.

- We do not .believe the Soviets are building naval forces for intervention in distant areas against substantial opposition nor do webelieve they have much capability for such intervention now.Soviet ability to sustain combat at sea for long periods would beseverely circumscribed by logistics-related weaknesses. Most . ofthe new larger Soviet surface combatants h ~ v e no reloads for theirinajor offensive weapons systems, and the ships limited underway

replenishment capability constrain Soviet abilities for sustainedcombat at sea. The current forward posture of the Soviet Navydepends upon _he support of auxiliaries and merchant ships inanchorages and in Third World ports, and presumes a non-hostileenvironment. . Since th.e mid-1960s, the Soviet Navy has diversified its areas of . operation. H o w e v e r ~ the rapi


12/40

_________

. . .

so f) ffl5fJ/ N

Tap Sasra.._

T We believe that the level of Soviet naval out- of-area activity isapproaching practical _imits, given the usSR s current priorities.Over the longer term; as newer more capable ships enter the force,there ~ i l l be a moderate but steady increase in the number of shipsavailable .for distant operations. Any rapid increase in sustaineddistant deployment probably would require a more intensive shipbuilding effort, not only of surface combata.nts, but also of logisticsupport ships. .

Naval activity and port visits, particularly in the Third World,probably have improved the Soviet Unions position with someforeign political leaders, but it has irritated others. Still others-perhaps a majority of Third World leaders show little outwardconcern about Soviet naval deployments. Nevertheless, in manycountries, especially developed countries .with a maritime tradition, naval activity is perceived as an important element in theinternational political balance. As long as . his view continues tobe prominent, the Soviet Navys peacetime operations will have. significant political impact. : .

- . We believe that future Soviet naval developments will bear a strongresemblance . o the current trends. Given the bureaucratic con-. tinQities i n S o v i e ~ n a v a l efforts and.the Navys apparently integralp h i ~ e in Soviet policies With regard to the .US, NATO, and the. Third World, there is not much chance for the Navy to lose itsposition. However, given the general resource problems in theUSSR, we do not expect substantial gains for the Navy at theexpense of others. We thtis expect basic changes to the currentline to come about slowly, i at all.

The Soviet Navy has been .wideiy perceived as equal to or evensuperior to the US Navy, despite the many asymmetries in thetwo forces. This perception has given the Soviet Navy a degree ofcredibility which, while not always fully supported by its combatcapabilities, has made it an important element in calculations ofinternational political power.

7l9p lieeret


13/40

.- .j

DISCUSSIONPrefacel . v ~ r the last decade or so there have beenimportant changes in Soviet naval policies and programs as well as significant improvements in theUSSR s naval capabilities. Beginning with the naval

programs emphasized largely under Khrushchev,the Soviet Navy has evolved from a force orientedto the defense of the Soviet maritime frontiers toa navy structured in addition for war-fighting onthe high seas and for use as an instrument insupport of Soviet foreign policy in peacetime.Only recently have the Soviets considered theirNavy to be an important instrument in supportingtheir foreign policy objectives in many areas ofthe world. This use has brought the Soviet Navyinto frequent contact with the . West arid intosituations where its presence and activities haveincreased the risk of c6nflict as well as the hopeof gain to the Soviets. This Estimate describes. Soviet naval policies and. programs, and t h ~ capabil.ities of the Soviet Navy both for war-fighting and .. .for peacetime operations .n distant waters.. FORCE COMPOSITION AND READINESS

2. The .Soviets describe nuclear submarines andnaval aviation as the main striking forces of thei rNavy, but they also maintain a large surface force.The active Navy currently has some 325 submarines, 220 major and 1,300 minor surface combatants, 750auxiliary ships, and 1,250 naval aircraft. The submarine force has nuclear- and diesel-powered ballistic missile, cruise-missile, and torpedo-attack submarines. The major surface force is about equallydivided between oeean going escorts and largerships of destroyer and cruiser size. Minor surfacecombatants iitclude mine warfare ships, submarinechasers, and patrol craft, primarily for operations incoastal waters. Soviet Naval Aviation has three

principal componcnts-antiship strike, reconnasance, and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraExcept for a few helicopters which are carried surface ships, Naval Aviation is a land-based forc

3. The Soviet Navy is organized into four majfleets: the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea and PaciOcean (see Figure 1 . The Northern and PacifOcean Fleets have all of the ballistic missile sumarines 3 and carry the burden of the open-ocemissions--countering Western naval .forces and iterdicting sea communieations. The Baltic and BlaSea Fleets are tailored for cOntrol of these seand for the support of land operations along theshores and at their entrances The-non-Soviet Wasaw Pact (NSWP) countries contribute to the lattmissions. The Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of tsurface ships, and the Northern Fleet the submrines, for Mediterranean Sea operations. Most Idian Ocean deployments come from the Pacif

F l e e ~ Table I sho..vs -the .roles and


14/40

Top Se;ret

Black Sea Fieet 0 Blllislic miune IUbmarines 58 Uajor 1urfm dlip1 24 General purpose 1ubmarines143 Uajor 1ficrft

inactive status which would also require morethan 90 days to become combat ready. Three. fourths of Soviet naval aircraft . could be readywith. no advance notice,a n d all but 10 percentwithin 5 to io .days. : : . . . . . .IL W RTIME MISSIONS ND EFFE TIVENESS

5. The Soviet Navy s major missions in wartimeare n u l ~ strike or deterrence against esealation,blunting the effects of enemy nuclear strikes, andsupporting ground operations on the Eurasian continent. The first is accomplished by the . SovietSSBN forces. The second involves. both anticarrier .and anti-SSBN forces. The last involves controlling

the sea frontiers of the USSR out to several hundredmiles to ensure that enemy naval forces cannotsupport the land .war while permitting Soviet navalforces to do so. It also involves, especially in aprolonged conflict, operations against sea linesof communication, particularly in the vicinity of theEurasian continent, to prevent reinforcement aridsupply of NATO .

figure r

Soviet Views of the Nature, Course, andTasks of a. War With the US6. Over the past several years there have beennumerOU >Soviet discussions of the possibility of .conflict ;at both ~ u l ~ ~ norin'U:clear. icontinental theaters of a world war. E

. . . : om e loosen-ing of older rigid Soviet scenarios m which escalation to general war _Was viewed as virtually inevitable. This loosenir.g has led to a situation in which war in Europe and associated naval activity---is_ een as possibly starting at the conventional level. The Soviets see a growing likelihood

. of this, but they still emphasize the strong likelihoodthat the US and NATO will be compelled to esca-

.late to nuclear levels. They apparently do not expect to initiate the widespread use of nudeai-weapons, except in a major preemptive strike inEurope wherrthey-become convinCed that NATOwill go beyond the limited use of nuclear weapons .

Top Se;rel


15/40

T BLE ...DISPOSITION OF SELECTED ACTIVE SOVIET AND NSWP NAVAL FORCES (1 Dec 1974)

Mission ystem Class Northern Baltic Black PacificTotal

Deterrence/Strike Modern SSBNs D, y 28 424 1 0 011 176)1 39 600)1

Older SSBNs, SSBs H SSBN, G SSD 17 54)1 0 0 14 42)1 31 96)1

General Purpose Nuclear Attack V,U,N ,E-I ,A . 25 0 0 1237

open ocean, ASW, Submarinesantiship) Missile Submarines J, E-ll, C, P 38 248)2 0 0 19 136 )

2 S7 384 )2Diesel Attack F,.z, T 46 5 2 28 81

Submarines

oASW Ships MOSKVA 0 0 2 0 2KARA, KRESTA II 4 32)2 1 8)2 3 24)2 2 16 )2 10 80) 2

KRIVAK, KASHIN DLGM 3 12}1 7 28)2 3 12 )2 0 13 52)2Mod K I L I ~ -KASHIN DLG, KANIN - 5 2 8 5 20

Missile Ships KYNDA, KRESTA I 2(8)2 1 (4 )I 2 16 )2 3 20 )2 8 48)2

KILDIN, KRUPNYY 0 0 2 3} 2 2 3)2

Cruisers SVERDLOV2 1 4 3 10

SAM Destroyers KOTLIN 2 1 3 2 8Reconnaissance BEARD 25 0 0 21

46 3Aircraf t It ng ..range) ..ASW i r c r a f ~ BEAR F 12 0 0 0 14 3MAY 25 8 0 22 57 3

MAIL 21 12 30 34 104 3Strike Aircrnft BADGER C, G 66 66)4 71 107)4 61 79 )

4 91 138)4 289 390)4Strike Support BADGER D, E, J, K 26 13 2 28 69

Aircraft CUB B, C 2 2 2 28

BLINDER c> 0 3 3 0 6BADGER A (tanker) 21 15 15 27 8J3


16/40

f

i o ~ . . : : ; as-saults would be limited to regimental size in theNorthern Fleet to two regiments in the Pacific andBlack Sea areas and to about three regiments in theBaltic. In the Baltic amphibious operations wouldprobably include Polish _amphibious troops a ndwould be coordinated with airborne assaults andwith major ground offensives.

29. The effectiveness of these operations wouldprobably vary widely. The North Cape of Norwaycould probably be taken fairly readily i the Nor-wegian brigade normally deployed there were not

s {) fflS(Jf ' 4 Tep Seeret


27/40

l p S a ~ i F t

,.reinforCed. n the Baltic, Soviet and other WarsawP.act forces could J?robably capture the Danish islands if the Danisli air and ground forces on Zea-land .were hot reinforced and link up with land forces on Jutland. n the Black Sea area; strongTurkish defenses and difficult terrain would makea coordinated land and sea assault on the TurkishStraits more difficult. The Soviets probably couldnot seize these straits quickly using conventionalweapons. Soviet Naval Infantry capabilities n thePacific are insufficient for conducting aniphibiQusassaults on the Japanese home islands to secure exitsfrom the Sea of Japan. Moreover, such assaultswould obviously broaden a war to include Japan,and, short of nuclear war, would certainly be successfully resisted by the substantial Japanese SelfDefense Forces.

Interdiction of Sea lines of Communications30. The importance to the. Soviets of interdictionof NATO s sea lines of communication and the effort .expended on this mission woUld depend to agreat extent on the nature and length of a NATOWarsaw Pact war. Sqviet military doctrine empha-. sizes ashort war, .in which interdiction .of sea linesof communiCation would be unlfkeiy til h a ~ e nportant impact on the outcome of the conflict. n

a short war, or in the eaily stages of a protractedone, the large number of nuclear torpedo attackand cruise-missile submarines and ASW-equippedaircraft that would be most effective against shipping w ~ u l almost certainly be engaged in othertasks. The interdiction mission therefore does notappear to have a high priority in a short war, andas such has not driven force procurements overthe past two decades.

31. f the conventional phase of a war were tocontinue for some time, which the Soviets view asunlikely, they would .probably mount an interdiction campaign. Some Soviet writings have stressedNATO s dependence on sea lines of communiea-tions as a vulnerability to be exploited. The Soviets

would have major problems n doing so, however.They do not have forward bases for resupply, andattempts to operate resupply. ships beyond Sovietcontrolled waters could be easily countered. Thus,their submarines would almost ~ r t a i n l y have to return through choke points to an uncertain resupplysituation. Moreover, the North Atlantic sea lanes are basically beyond range of all but BEAR andBACKFIRE aircraft. n a prolonged conventionalconflict, therefore, the Soviets could effect attrition on NATO shipping, but cOuld not disrupt itcompletely.

32. t is unlikely that; outside of direct involvement in a war with the West, the USSR would attack Western sea lines of communication, howevervulnerable. The Soviets did not do so in the Vietnam or Arab-Israeli wars. Such an attack would ex-pose their ownlarge merchant, fishing, and oceanographic fleets to retaliatory attack. f undertakenwith small forces, such a campaign could lead toloss of the forces; if undertaken with 1arge forces,it could lead to n expanded war that would notbe jilstified by the probable gain. A P r o j e c t i o n / l n h ~ r v e n t i o n / 5 e a Control

Missiol l? 33. Although the Soviets are deploying their navalforces further from the USSR and a re building newaircraft carriers and amphibious and logistic ships,

they are not developfug a capability to intervenein distant areas analogous to that of the US forces.he small Soviet amphibiou.S lift and assault capa

bility has been developed for use in the areas adjacent to the USSR, and . t is not growing at a sufficient rate or with. the type of ship necessary tosupport a significant strategic projection of powerashore against substantial opposition. Moreover, theUSSR has no ships for helicopter assault or aircover for distant amphibious assault The KIEV willhave a limited potential along this line, but it wasprobably not constructed for this purpose, nor willit represent a very substantial capability.

22-se 165fit Tap Sa Fet


28/40

Top SaGF t

34. Such intervention at a distance from the. USS'R U:Oplies control of the sea at least the scene. of action and over S o v i ~ t lines of communication;a major intervebtion involving projecting powerashore in distant areas could therefore not be undertaken against significant opposition and without aircover. And in those areas in which the Soviets mightfeel compelled to intervene in support of an ally orclient state, they would most likely have access toports or airfields into which to bring .their forces.They thus probably do not see the need for, nor dothey seem to be building, naval forces for intervention in distant areas against substantial opposition.

35. For such a projection mission, the Sovietswould require some control of the sea. For the So-viets, sea control in the oceans is not a mission in .itself, but rather only a means for establishing afavorable local balance in order to carry out othertasks. In the Soviet concept, sea control means thatnaval task forces must be viable in a hostile environment and thus must be able to defend themselvesagainst air, surface, and subsurface attack in order

ties iri Soviet ship design and . he ships' limitedunderway . replenishment capability constrain Soviet abilities for sustained combat at .sea. The current forward posture of the Soviet Navy is basedupon support from auxiliaries and merchant shipsin anchorages and in Third World ports .and presumes a non-hostile environment.

37. f an ability to carry on sustained conflict in distant areas were a high priority goal of the SovietNavy, it would be developing less vulnerable replenishment capabilities and combatants bettersuited for this task. More than a decade after thefirst appearance of an underway-replenishmentoiler, the Navy hasonly 14 such oilers, and still has .only three ships for underway replenishment ofsolid stores. A new class of underway-replenishmentoi:ler is being built at a rate of only one a year. Alarge ship w h i ~ h might be a multiple-stores-replenishment ship is under construction, but evidence onits role is inconclusive. Thus Soviet development ofunderway replenishment is growing, but at a slowrate in relation to the relatively large number. of, . . o perform their primary mission. \Vhile the So

~ e t s are taki.Dg many steps to ' improve theh- . ships ,that might'be serViced. >.fighting capabilities, they are not following the USpath. The new KIEV-class ASW aircraft carrier;rfor example, is different from US ASW and attackearners (see Figure 6). The KIEV represents a Soviet approach to a command ship for a task forcethat would better be able to maintain its position inthe open ocean against attack, and at the same timec ny out its combat assignments.

36. Even with this added capability, however-and there will be only two operational K I V ~ l a s sships by 1980--Soviet ability to sustain combat atsea for long periods will be severely circumscribedby logistics-related weaknesses. The relative priori-

This designation is based on the ship's eStimated primarymission but does not exclude the performance of othermissions.

23

38. These apparent shortcomings are critical onlyi f the Soviet Navy is to fight a suStained war of the .kind the US Navy is suited to fight, at the end oflong sea lines of communication. We believe that .the Soviets do not expect they will have to do this.They recognize the importance to the US Navy ofsea control in broad areas, but also recognize thatthey are not dependent on long sea. lines and require sea ~ n t r o l only in a few vital areas.Ill. TRENDS IN SOVIET NAVAl ACTIVITIES

39. During the past decade the Soviet Navy hasbecome an increasingly visible, capable, and politicatiy important force. Continuous Soviet navaloperations outside of home waters basically beganin 1964 but the Navy remains most active around

s 9 656{7 : Top SeGFet


29/40

f ircraft and Helicopter Carriers

ttSCALE DIMENSIDIS II FEET

LIDO

US KITTY HAWK CUSSATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIER

US HANCOCK CUSSASW AIRCRAFT CARRIER

SOVIET KIEV CUSSAIRCRAFT CARRIER

SOVIET MOSKVA CUSSASW HELICOPTER CARRIER

JO

LIGHT DECI AREA

AIRCRAfT fUYUORS56 6 5 12 t 81A

se 07656Fl4

711 IU

.The Kim HAWK clan is typical of modern US attack carriers; the HANCOCK classASWcarriers have been r e t i r e d ~ The o v i a ~ KIEV class lacks the catapults and arresting gearuud on US carriers and can only handle V/STOL aircraft and helicopters. The MOSKVAclass could support limited V/STOL operations but is basically designed for helicoptersonly. Ia contrast to the larga clear decks and elevators of tha US carriers both of theSoviet ships have massive superstructures and carry various weapons systems in eddi- .tion to aircraft. . ~ t o r t . I A ~


30/40

Tep ~ e e r e t

the perip tery of the S


31/40


32/40

r. . 5eeretFigure 8..

Operations of Soviet Naval Surface Combatantsand Attack Submarines Outside Home Waters, 196574Sh ip days

25 000

20 ,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

EERET excludes the harbo r clearing operations in Bangladesh (11}7219J4)UJ 18 f4 8111t

IV. USES OF THE SOVIET NAvY AS AN .INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY INPEACETIME

. Peacetime Operations in Soviet Policy843. Since the mid-1960s the Soviet leadership has. actively used the Navy to support its economic and political influence around the world. This relationship between Soviet political objectives and naval actions-together with other factors-has resultedin a broader spectrum of Soviet naval activities. TheSoviets probably believe that their strategic retalia- In a sense, foremost on the scale of peacetime uses of theSoviet Navy is the use of the SSBN fleet, along with the

SRF and LRA, as the strategic deterrent to US attack. In theeyes of Admiral Corshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the So\'ietNavy, the SSBN is the most effective deterrent because ofits relative invulnerability. The uses of the SSBNs wereseparately discussed in Section II .

and the minesweeping activity in the Gull of Suez (1974). )

t o r y I > o w e ~ now such that the US would be i ~ ~hibited from expanding an incident involving USand Soviet naval forces into war. They probablybelieve as well that US commitment to a policy ofdetente and reevaluation of US overseas commitmentS in the wake of the Vietnam experience further inhibit the US Finally, the Soviet Navy's capabilitie for peacetime ope::ations in distant areashave improved as new ships have been added to theforce and access has been gained t


33/40


34/40

efl &ecce

48 .Thus the Soviet leadership has sought to inf l u e n ~ e ~ US actions at some cost and risk, while atthe sarrie time keeping to a minimum the chancesof aCtual US-Sovicft conflict. (Moscow always carefully monitors crisis .situations and .directly controlsthe Soviet forces involved.) The Soviets have notsought to stop US actions by direet naval opposition but have acted through their naval presenceto show concern and thereby restrain the US. The.Soviets recognize that such behavior carries With itthe risk of conflict with the US and that .this element must be considered. Thus, despite the factthat the Soviet actions incident to the Arab-Israeliwar in October 1973 were more visible than in previous similar crises, at no time have the Sovietsindicated ~ h e y would be willing to push this riskto a purely naval challenge; rather, they have beenclear in their desire not to do so. With the navalforces available to them, the Soviets probably Willcontinue this approach throughout the period ofthis Estimate.

Future Levels of Peacetime Activity49. Despite the groWth of Soviet naval activities

> : n distant:areas. in peacetime, . here are both p o l i t i ~cal 'arid practiCal' limits on the e i t ~ n t o f f t i r u ~ egrowth. In the absence of a major Western navalpresence; the Soviet political gains from a naval

p r s n ~ can be achieved with a fairly low levelof deployment. OccaSional visits to Latin Americanports, for eiample, . support foreign policy, but amajor Soviet naval task force in Latin Americanwaters would be unwelcome. The Soviets have apparently assessed that a token naval presence isappropriate for West African waters. In the IndianOcean, a large unilateral expansion of Soviet navalpresence would not be well received either by themajority of the littoral powers or by China.

50. While the current level of about 25 surfacecombatants in distant areas can easily be heldsteady or .increased dramatically for short periOds,any substantial sustained increase m hese deployments would require some shift in the pattern of

29

ship dispositions and . affect capabilities . n homewaters. Forces kept in home waters, however, aretied to more important tasks and probably would not be allowed to fall below specified levels. Theslowing of the growth of out-of-area activity andslumps in routine deployments after a surge indicate that the practical limits, under present priorities, are being approached,

51. Over the longer term, as newer, more capableships enter the force, there will be a moderate butsteady increase in the number of ships availablefor distant operations. Any rapid increase in sustained distant deployments probably would requirea more intensive shipbuilding effort, not only .ofsurface combatants, but also of logistic supportships.52. The deployment of military forces far from

the USSR to serve political purposes is probablyviewed as a requirement to be provided for aftermore central military concerns are served. The vastmajority and most important of Soviet national security interests still involve the defense of theUSSR on the Eurasian landmass and its immediateperiphery in a limited or general war .The statei n t e r e t s ~ thaf Navf.can serve in distant areas Will .likel:y continue to rank behind Soviet c:Ol1cems .about the potential danger from the US and China, and about possible opportunities in Europe.

Political Impact53. The increase in naval activity over the pastdecade has been on.e of the several factorS whichhave contributed to the USSR's superpower i ~ a g eIn that sense, the Navy is probably perceived bythe Soviet l e a d e ~ s h i p as an effective instrumentof foreign policy. But aside from this, the SovietNavy's record in this role has been mixed. Navalactivity and port . visits, particularly in the ThirdWorld, probably have improved the Soviet Union'sposition With some foreign political leaders, buthave irritated others. Still o t h e r ~ p e r h a p s a majority of Third World leaders show little outward

sc fJ t656/74 Top Se,Fet


35/40

Fop Sec;el

,concern about Soviet naval deployments. Never- theless, in many countries, especially developed

c o u n t r i e s with a maritime tradition, naval activityis perceived as an important element in the international political balance. As long as . his view continues to be prominent, the Soviet Navy's peacetimeoperations will have significant political impact.V. CURRENT STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSESOF .THE SOVIET NAVY

54. The Navy's principal strengths stem fromits status as the maritime arm of a basically continental power, with relatively little need for .capabilities to protect extended sea lines of communication or to project power ashore in distant areas.As a result, the Soviet Navy has been free to concentrate efforts on antinavy capabilities, optimizedto negate the projection .and sea control capabilitiesof US and allied naval forces. These strengths haveincluded:

- the development of strong capabilities againstaircraft carriers operating within strike rangeof the USSR; and

. : the maintenll1lce .of very strong capabilitiesg ~ i r i s t the operation o hostile surface forces'in ,Soviet coastal waters;

- t h ~ ability to pose a significant submarinetlu\eat to Western sea lines of communications.55. The same considerations also serve to explainsome of the more obvious weaknesses of the Soviet .l {avy. Not having a m j ~ r requirement to projectpower ashore, for example, the Navy has developedlittle capability of this kind. While the Sovietsmight not view this as a weakness, it is nevertheless a limitation .on their naval capability.56. More importantly, however, the way in whichthe Soviets have chosen to develop naval forces has 'left them with real .and serious vulnerabilities. Inparticular:Whi le possessing impressive offensive strikecapabilities, major e l e m e n t ~ of the Soviet n ~ v l

30

forces are relatively vulnerable to attack them-selves. .- Because Soviet naval doctrine emphasizes theimportance of the first strike and Soviet forcesare strongly oriented toward a pre-emptive

strategy, situations that gave the opposingforce the initiative could leave the Soviets ina precarious position.

57. The Soviet Navy has been widely perceivedas equal to or even superior to the US Navy, despitethe many asymmetries in the two forces. This perception has given the Soviet Navy a degree ofcredibility which, while not always fully supportedby its combat capabilities, has made it an important element in calculations of international politicalpower.

58. To summarize, the Soviet Navy's major elements of strength are:

Th e world's largest and most diversified inventory of antiship missiles deployed on submarines, aircraft. and surface ships and at shoresites.A. large submalfue force,. including r ~ w i n g . number of modem nuclear-powered units(plus a number of modem as well as obsoles-

. cent diesel-powered units). .A substantial force of land-based bombers,capable of strike and reconnaissance operations

throughout the c:ca approaches to the USSR.A growing number of multipurpose surface

corpbatiwts-generally faster and more ex-tensively armed than Western counterparts.A strong and . steadily improving capability

for ocean surveillance (against sudace targets), especially in and near the sea approaches to the USSR.

Large and relatively modem sea frontier de-fense forces.

sc 67 656{74 TQp S1u;ret


36/40

ap Seeret

-Substantial offensive and defensive mine war-f r ~ forces.

- Secure and reliable cotnmunications systems,providing for_, af high degree of control andcoordination between forces of various types.-A substantial capabili ty for electronic warfare.-A well-developed shipbuilding industry,backed y large-scale research and develop-ment efforts.59. The Soviet Navy's major weaknesses are:- Geographic constraints requiring the maintenance of four separate fleets, making it diffi

cult to concentrate forces or provide mutualsupport.

- Inadequate antisubmarine warfare capabili-ties,0 notably:a lack of long-range open-ocean submarinedetection capability;

- surface forces highly vulnerable to submarine attack; and

.. .. submarine forces markedly inferior to e s t ~em ci>unterparts in ~ b i l i t Y to d ~ t e c t ~ n dtrack opposing submarines.

.....

- Limited (although improving) fleet air defense capabilities, especially:- a lack of air cover beyond coastal waters;and

-little capability to provide area defense fordeployed surface forces. Although newerunits have good point defense systems, oldersurface combatants and all auxiliary forcesremain highly vulnerable to air or missileattack

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of theNavy, notes that this weakness refers to current capabilitiesand that t may well. change in the future as stated infootnote 6 on page 20.

3

..:...A.poor capability for sustained combat operations, especially by surface forces deployed indistant areas, as evidenced by:-surface combatants optimized for initial nuclear strike capability, with limited or no re

loads for principal offensive weapons;-surface combatants relatively vulnerable tocombat damage;

~ limited capability to provide logistical support to forces at sea; anda logistics train highly vulnerable to interdiction.

- A potential vulnerability to electronic warfaremeasures, as seen by:,;_ocean surveillance and target acquisition ca

pabilities heavily dependent on emissionsfrom opposing forces; andantiship strike capabilities almost totally dependent on complex electromagnetic systemsfor coordination of forces and guidance ofmissiles in contrast to the flexibility ofmanned aircraft systems):

L i t t l ~ c a p ~ b i l i t } to p i : ~ j e ~ t power 5 h o r ~ indistant areas, to wit:-no sea-based tactical air power; and-amphibious forces designed and equippedonly for short-range operations in supportof the flanks of main ground forces.. . .

: Difficulty in meeting conflicting requirementsof nuclear and cOnventional warfare, withIlittle or no at-sea capability to change or re-plenish warheads and missiles on surface andsubmarine units.

- No major n v l allies.Lack of combat experience.

- Obsolesence of the larger number of forcesbuilt n the 1950s.

Tef &eeret


37/40

Tep 6eeret

VI. FUTURE .FORCES: CONSIDERATIONS AND. . .OPTIONS. 60. Future ~ o v i e t naval developments will prob- .ably bear.a strong resemblance to the current trends.Throughout SoViet history, the Ki emlin has con

sistently supported substantial investment in forcesfor defense of the sea frontiers, in submarines, andin shore-based naval aviation. Even given changesin the leadership, these forces are unlikely to de-.crease in importance. But the national leadership,in spite of pressures from the Navy on several occasions, has not always equally supported largesurface combatants. Thus, investment in those combatants is likely to be more sensitive to leadershipchanges and might experience shifts in priority.

A Baseline Projection61. Admiral Gorshkov, who has commanded theSoviet Navy. under both Khrushchev and Brezhnev,recently provided a comprehensive rationale tor theNavy's state and direction. He has emphasized theneed for a balanced navy that is, one which cancarry out: missions assigned it in nuclear war, nonnuclear war, or peacetime. He has called for surface

s h i p s ~ h i c h will greater eombat f l e ~ b i l i t : y andbe able to operate for longer periodS in more distanf 'areas. But he has also called for continued strengthening of submarine and naval air forces in supportof general war capabilities. He foresees more capable and expensive individual units, but he is alsooperating within budgetary constraints. He apparently sees little prospect for solving the anti-SSBNproblem with present technology, and gives scantmention to . o ~ c e s for projecting troops ashore. Hiswritings also reflect an interest in interdiction of sealines of communication.

62. Based on these considerations and ongoingconstruction programs, the Soviet Navy probablywill:

Continue a top priority for its SSBN deter. rent force, expanding it, by the late 1970s, to

32

the 62 modem u ~ i t s permitteci under the SAL Interim Agreement. The 62nd unit is probablyalready under construction, and we belieye alof them will be completed. f the proposedSAL Agreement covering the 1977-1985 periodis. successfully concluded, the Soviets will belimited to a total of 2 400 delivery vehiclesICBMs, SLBMs, and intercontinental bombers with no sublimit on SLBMs. This wquldrequire some .reductions in the numbers andprobably some changes in the mix of Soviestrategic forces. We believe the S o v i ~ t s will retain a force at the level of 62 SSBNs untiabout 1980. But pressures . will mount fochange in the mix of strategic forces in the1980s and we are uncertain how these will affect the SSBN force.

~ P u r s u e an extensive program to refit new andprobably MIRVed missiles to the SSBN forceThis program is expected to start in the late1970s, and to continue through the mid-1980s

'7 ' Continue the high priority on rom bating eneiny aircraft carrier task forces. Cruise missile

.. submarines will continue to be built through. out the 197oS; ~ ~ 1 1 majot s u r f a ~ ships with

antiship missiles. The SS-NX-13 antiship nuclear ballistic missile will inost likely enter theforce in the next year or two.C

J---: Expand the area of potential strike coverage

of Naval Aviation by introducing ASMequipped BACKFIRE bombers, which wilprobably become operational in 1975.

- Pursue various approaches to antisubmarinwarfare, with emphasis on the anti-SSBN problem. Improved ASW sensors and supportingsystems and stand-off weapons will be more

3C 6Yf35t3/ f4 Tep &eeret


38/40

Tep Sec:ret

extensively deployec}. The construction rate ofASV./ submarines probably will increase.- Contlnue to givf. the slaward defense missions about the same share of naval resources, whichwill provide yet additional generations of pa. trol, eseort; and mine warfare ships and coastaldefense missiles.- Continue to improve slowly the amphibious forces. They will not, however, be developed to the extent that they could successfully project substantial Soviet power over great distances or against significant opposition.- Build up the afloat support forces at a modestrate to permit more effective resupply andmaintenance of Soviet forces in distant areas inpeacetime, but. not enough to support pro

longed distant wartime operations.63. This baseline projection thus sees a continuedmodc.:mization of Soviet naval forces. New ships andsubmarines occasionally embodying innovative propulsion and armament concepts will continue to appear .and to replace older units. But because the

. process moves at a slow pace, a decade. from now.s o r ~ hvO-thfrds o the Soviet Nary probably wii(: still consist of ships that are currently operational,and the remaining third will result from programdecisions now being made. With the addition of

.. even more capable and.expensive units, and limitedresources, the numbers of ships will deeline. Capa

. .bilities of the Navy as a whole, however, w ll im

. prove. In particular, the Navy w ll become bettersuited for sustained peacetime deployments in distant areas.

64. The baseline projection aSsumes a continuation of past bureaucratic accommodations, of a collective political leadership like the present one, andof national policies of detente similar to those nowbeing pUrsued. This projection reflects a judgmentthat there w ll be no disproportionate increase inallocation of resources to naval programs or major

33

expansion of facilities . The present share of re- .source claims has held steady for some time as apercentage of total deferise expenditures and represents a share .that can be held for some time to come.Force Development Alternatives65. t is possible, of eourse, that the Soviets willexperience in the years ahead successes or frustrations that will lead them to expand their efforts insome particular areas:The detailed terms of the p r o p o s ~ StrategicArms Limitations Agreement have not yetbeenformulated. However, within the apparent allowances of that proposed agreement, the So-viets could expand their SSBN force beyond62 units at the expense of other strategic programs.

- Frustration in supporting distant client regimes might lead the Soviets to conclude thatsubstantial forces are necessary to support liberation . movements or to thwart us actions,and that sea control forces are needed to maintain sea lines of communication to these forces .Th({gtowth of the . hinese NilVy ~ u l causethe Soviets to deploy larger fleet in the Pa-

. cific without cutting back elsewhere, thus causing total efforts to increase.

- A leadership might come to the fore in Moscow that would be more adventurous and support expanSion of the Navy as a symbol andinstrument of a more aggressive foreign policy.A breakthrough in . he anti-SSBN problem

would ahnost certainly result in major investments. But our estimates .do not indicate thatsuch an eventuality is near.

66. On the other hand, it is possible that the levelof resources devoted to the Soviet Navy will decline.

- Within the apparent allowances of the proposed SAL agreements, the Soviets could

se 67656/7 4 Tap Sec:rel


39/40

Tap Sa;rQt

choose to reduce the number of SSBNs in favorof other. strategic programs.1. - Poli?ymake:S wlio are oriented more towarddevelopment of the civilian economy maycome to the fore and be strong enough to reduce military expenditures-including thosefor the Navy.

It may be that, with the completion of theSSBN construction program at 62 modernboats under the Interim SAL Agreement, someof the SSBN resources that were apparently aspecial net addition to Navy programs will notcontinue to be available to the Navy.A review of naval expenditures could lead to acutback in construction of major surface shipsand in operations in areas distant from Sovietshores, and to concentration on direct defenseof the USSR.

67. Various courses of development could arisefrom pursuit of some of these alternatives. Pursuingall of them on the high side would require majorchanges in the pattern of resource allocations and a.change in Soviet naval doctrine, and therefore isunlikely. Siniilady, pllriuing ailQf therrt on the low side is unlikely. But moderate adjustments to budget allocation could accommodate one or two of thesechanges, especially if they should be offsetting. The Defense Intelligence Agency does not believe thatthe Soviets will choose to m ~ i n t a i n a force of fewer than62 modern ballistic missile submarines during the period of

t h i ~ E ~ t i m a t e ; however, the Soviets may reduce the pace ofSSBN production in the near term. The Director of NavalIntelligence, Department of the Navy, and the AssistantChief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, sharethis view.

34

Decision Points. 68. We believe that, if the Soviets were to pursueaspects of these force development alternatives,some early decision points would bec:Ome apparentin building programs, in Soviet naval writings, andin leadership statements. Examples might include:The national leadership showing signs of be

coming more receptive or less receptive to pro,posals from the military.

- The opening up or closing down of buildingways for naval shipbuilding.The manner in which SSBN production resources are allocated after the 62nd SSBN isbuilt.The writings of the Navy s leadership setting

forth a change in the party line on naval policy.A decision made to deemphasize, say, domesticmerchant marine construction and to allocatethese resources to a more ambitious amphibious shipping program .The changes would benoticeable at building yards several years before they affected the f o r ~ structure to any

. extent .:69. Given the bureaucratic continuities in Soviet

naval efforts and the Navy s apparently integralplace in Soviet policies with i:egard to the USNATO, and the Third World, there is not muchchance for the Navy to lose its position. However,given the general resource problems in the USSRwe do not expect substantial gains for the Navy atthe expense of t h e r s ~ We thus expect basic changesto the current line to come about slowly, i f at aU.

se e7656/r4 Tap ~ e e r e t


40/40

Tep Seeret

DISSEMINATION NOTICE1. This document was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy

Is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction on aneed-to-know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:

a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of Stateb. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of

Defense and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staffc. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, for the

Department of the Armyd. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navye. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the AirForcef. Assistant General Manager for National Security, for the Atomic Energy

Commissiong. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigationh. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agencyl. Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, for the Department of

the. Treasury . . . . . . . _ .(. The OCt s Deputy for National Intelligence Officers, for any other Depart- -

ment or Agency2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning In accordance with

applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency byarrc:mgement with the DCI s Deputy for National Intelligence Officers.

3. When this document Is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients mayretain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, thedocument should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain It In accordance with

I A C ~ 9 / 2 22 June 1953.t ihe title ef this .iuvmeRt wheR uud upaPataly SreM tfte-teMt aheuhl lie 1la1

sifted. SE RET

so (j f{Jfj(Jf 4 1 lgp 5ieeret

Soviet Naval Policy and Programs (December 1974) DECLASSIFIED

Documents

Transcript of Soviet Naval Policy and Programs (December 1974) DECLASSIFIED