Soviet Democracy

1

BOLSHEVISM AND DEMOCRACY

CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 2

CHAPTER ONE DUAL POWER: 4

FEBRUARY TO OCTOBER 1917

CHAPTER TWO SOVIET POWER : 12 SEIZURE AND CONSOLIDATION CHAPTER THREE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY : 20

ABOLITION - AN UNDEMOCRATIC ACT? CONCLUSION 27 APPENDIX ONE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE TOILING AND 29

EXPLOITED PEOPLE APPENDIX TWO A LETTER FROM LUSIK LISINIOVA 30

2

Introduction

One of the common criticisms levelled at supporters of Marxism/Communism is that “it won’t

work, look at Russia - see how undemocratic that was. Look, they even needed to torture and

imprison their own population to stay in power!”

Whilst this view is in a general sense accurate, the purpose of this work is to attempt to

establish whether or not the regime in Russia was always an anti-democratic totalitarian state.

It is this authors contention that the course that the Bolsheviks took, under Lenin’s direction,

was the only course available which would actually guarantee democracy, and as such were

in fact democratic actions.

Two differing concepts of democracy were in contention in this period in Russia, direct

democracy, as represented by the Soviets, and bourgeois democracy, as represented by the

Provisional Government, and later by the Constituent Assembly.

Is direct democracy more democratic than bourgeois democracy? To answer this it is

necessary to examine each of these two concepts of democracy individually.

Lenin gives a breif outline of bourgeois democracy in ”The Tasks of the Prolitariat in our

Revolution”:

“The most perfect, the most advanced type of bourgeois state is the parliamentary democratic

republic: power is vested in parliament; the state machine, the apparatus and organ of

administration, is of the customary kind: the standing army, the police,and the bureaucracy -

which in practice is undisplaceable, is privilaged and stands above the people.”(1)

France would be a good example of a state organised upon the lines of Lenin’s model.

N Bobbio writing in the book “Which Socialism” makes out a case for direct democracy:

“No one doubts that perfect democracy, ideal democracy (if democracy

means government by the people and not just in the name of the people)

is direct democracy, a conviction which caused Rousseau to comment that

the English public was only free in the moment it placed its vote in the

ballot box.”(2)

3

The soviet system was a system of direct democracy. The workers, peasants, soldiers and

sailors all had a say in the local bodies, these then sent delegates to higher bodies, which in

turn sent delegates to even higher bodies (see appendix 1 for a diagramatical representation

of this). All delegates were to be subject to immediate recall, if they failed to carry out their

mandates.

These two systems were to come into conflict in Russia in 1917. Both developed alongside

one another for several months, with class polarisation in Russian society increasing, the

conflict between these two systems of government intensified. The working class and poorer

peasants looked towards the soviets, whilst the upper and middle classes looked towards a

parliamentary system along the lines of France.

It is the intention of this work to show that the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, on behalf of

the soviets, was not a coup by an unrepresentative group, but was actually clarifying the

question of power, which in all but name, was in the soviets hands anyway, and as such the

actions of the Bolsheviks and their allies the Left Social Revolutionaries were not anti-

democratic, but pro-democratic.

It is also intended to show that even the apparent anti- democratic act of dissolving the

Constituent Assembly was an action designed to preserve democracy in Russia.

4

References to introduction:

1 V I Lenin The Tasks of the Proletariat in our Revolution Progress Press 1976 p.91

2 N Bobbio Which Socialism Polity Press 1988 p.68

5

Dual power: February to October 1917

The period following the February revolution in Russia was characterised by the struggle for

power between the Soviets (elected councils of workers and soldiers delegates) and the,

initially, self appointed Provisional Government headed by Prince Lvov, a moderate liberal.

The Provisional Government underwent many changes of personnel in its brief life. The

various coalitions that existed give a fair reflection of the crisis of power it experienced

throughout its life. The bourgeois politicians dropping out as it became clear to them that they

were unable to carry through the tasks required to create a stable bourgeois Russia.

After the dissolution of the Duma by the Tsar in February 1917, the deputies did not disperse

but formed themselves into the Provisional Committee of the Duma, which then declared itself

the Provisional Government, until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.

In March the Soviet, which was dominated at this early stage of the revolution by the

Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, gave its endorsement to the Provisional

Government, at that time “having little reason to doubt its commitment to democratic

advance.”(1)

“Alongside the Provisional Government, the government of the

bourgeoisie, another government has arisen, so far weak and incipient,

but undoubtedly a government that actually exists and is growing - the

Soviets of Workers and Soldiers’ Deputies... It consists of the proletariat

and the peasants (in soldiers uniforms) ... It is a revolutionary dictatorship,

i.e., a power directly based on a revolutionary seizure, on the direct

initiative of the people from below, and not on a law enacted by a

centralised state power.”(2)

This struggle between the Soviet (direct democracy) and the Provisional Government

(bourgeois parliamentary democracy) has been referred to by many as a period of dual

power. The Provisional Government had the responsibility of office without the authority to

govern effectively, whereas the Soviets held the authority of the masses but were unwilling to

6

take control of the state machinery. This situation was to provoke conflict as Russian society

became increasingly polarised over the summer months, with the working class increasingly

looking towards the Soviets to take power fully into its own hands. This was to cause many

parties to split as the pressure of contending class forces made themselves felt within them,

leaving them two choices, support for the workers and peasants or support for the

bourgeoisie.

“Antagonistic classes exist in society everywhere, and a class deprived of

power inevitably strives to swerve the governmental course in its favour.

This does not as yet mean, however, that two or more powers are ruling in

society. The character of a political structure is directly determined by the

relation of the oppressed classes to the ruling class. A single government,

the necessary condition of stability in any regime, is preserved so long as

the ruling class succeeds in putting over its economic and political forms

upon the whole of society as the only forms possible.”(3)

Lenin thought it inconceivable that the socialists should merely submit to the wishes of the

bourgeois parties and form a parliamentary opposition, as the Mensheviks and Social

Revolutionaries envisaged.

“It would simply be foolish to speak of the revolutionary proletariat of

Russia ‘supporting’ the Cadet-Octoberist imperialism, which has been

‘patched up’ with English money and is as abominable as Tsarist

imperialism.” (4)

Lenin repeated Marx’s argument, calling for the violent overthrow of the existing capitalist

order, for the workers to take power firmly into their own hands in the realisation of the

second, proletarian, revolution.

Due to the weakness of the Russian bourgeois class, Pannekoek argues, that the intellectuals

joined the growing workers movement, giving it a different character to the workers

movements of the west. The workers struggle in Russia, Pannekoek contends, was a struggle

7

against Tsarist absolutism, carried out under the banner of socialism, this could then explain

the splintering along class lines of the socialist parties during the events of the Russian

revolution. (5)

STATE AND REVOLUTION

Engels tells us “that the state is an organisation of the possessing class for its protection

against the non-possessing class.” (6) This state, it is argued, needs to be swept away, all the

old organs of power needed to be smashed, in order for the newly formed proletarian state to

succeed. Lenin saw this as supporting his position against the Provisional Government and in

favour of Soviet power.

The lessons learned from the experience of the Paris Commune in 1870-1 greatly enhanced

this work.

“From the very outset the Commune was compelled to recognise that the

working class, once come to power, could not go on managing with the old

state machine; that in order not to lose again its only just conquered

supremacy, this working class must, on the one hand, do away with all the

old repressive machinery previously used against itself, and, on the other,

safeguard itself against its own deputies and officials, ...” (7)

According to Marx and Engels, the first act of the new workers state would be to abolish the

standing army and replace it with an armed peoples militia, as the Communardes had done.

The police and all other parts of the administration were to be stripped of their “political

attributes” and be directly responsible to the Commune. The representatives of the new

peoples government would be paid the wages of workers, not the high salaries that usually

accompany such positions. They were to be made responsible to their electors, by the right to

recall them instantly if it was felt that they were not acting with the best interests of their

electors.

8

“In a rough sketch of national organisation which the Commune had no

time to develop, it states clearly that the Commune was to be the political

form of even the smallest country hamlet, .... The rural Communes of

every district were to administer their common affairs by an assembly of

delegates in the central town, and these district assemblies were again to

send deputies to the National Delegation in Paris, each delegate to be at

any time revocable and bound by the mandat imperatif (formal

instructions) of his constituents.” (8)

Lenin believed that the Soviets, in Russia in 1917, in concrete form, represented a truly

revolutionary government in the style of the Paris Commune, which had been studied by

Marxists for the past four decades. It was on this model that Lenin envisaged the Soviets to

develop and establish themselves in power throughout Russia.

“The Soviet of Workers’ Deputies is an organisation of the workers, the

embryo of a workers’ government, the representative of the interests of the

entire mass of the poor section of the population, i.e., of nine tenths of the

population, which is striving for peace, bread and freedom. (9)

OTHER SOCIALISTS AND THE PROBLEMS OF POWER

From the very start of the February revolution the moderate socialists, both in and out of the

Duma, were faced with the problem of power. Many of the socialists involved with the

establishment of the Soviets in February were the most vociferous opponents of power being

concentrated in the Soviets hands in November.

“For the working class, the significance of the Russian Revolution must be

looked for in quite different directions. Russia showed to the European and

American workers, confined within reformist ideas and practice, first how

an industrial working class by a gigantic mass action of wild strikes is able

to undermine and destroy an obsolete state power; and second, how in

9

such actions the strike committees develop into worker’s councils, organs

of fight and of self-management, acquiring political tasks and

functions.”(10)

The Mensheviks in 1917 basically continued with their policies from the 1905 revolution, they

believed that Russia was undergoing a bourgeois democratic revolution and therefore ruled

out an assumption of power by the working class. They did not call for the abolition of the

army but supported the continuation of the war, to protect revolutionary Russia from German

imperialism. The Mensheviks when faced with the revolution of 1917, echoed their position of

twelve years earlier, pushing the liberal bourgeoisie for reforms.

“...within the bounds of struggle against absolutism, especially in its

present phase, our attitude to the liberal bourgeoisie should be to

encourage it in general and induce it to support the demands of the

proletariat led by the Social Democratic movement.”(11)

The Menshevik leadership, especially Axelrod, feared putting too much pressure upon the

liberals as it could ultimately benefit the very people they wished to defeat. They saw this

tactic as a joint struggle against a common enemy, whilst training and preparing the RSDLP

for future battles where power itself would be the goal. Lenin and the Bolsheviks however,

could no longer see that the liberal bourgeoisie had any progressive role left to play in the

Russian revolution.

A notable exception to the Mensheviks position was Martov, who in July 1917 urged the

soviets to take power, in response to the Cadets withdrawal from the Provisional Government,

at the same time calling for the end of the war.

“There is only one proper decision for us at present: history demands that

we take power into our own hands... I believe that if the whole population

of Russia could be consulted it would turn out that we have the support of

revolutionary democracy.”(12)

10

Martov’s position fell in-between the official Menshevik line and that of the Bolsheviks,

wanting Soviet rule but with all party involvement, until the establishment of a constituent

assembly. Others in the Mensheviks, such as Tsereteli, called for the Provisional Government

to “have full executive power in so far as this power strengthens the revolution”(13) The

moderate socialist parties entered the coalition in the summer, at a time when even members

of their own party, like Martov, were calling for the establishment of a government of the

democracy and an end to the war, a reference to Soviet power, until the constituent assembly

could be elected.(14)

One of the major problems for the Provisional Government was the question of the war. Every

major change in composition of the Provisional Government was preceded by a conflict with

the Soviet over the war question. In April, with Milyukov’s note to the Allies promising a

continuation of the war on the same policies as the Tsar, in June/July with the collapse of

Kerensky’s offensive, in August with the loss of Riga, followed by Kornilov’s coup attempt. All

of these crises posed the question of power, and by the time of Kornilov’s coup it was clear

that the Provisional Government was only ruling through the Soviets reluctance to seize

power in it’s own right. As early as April, the Bourgeoisie had realised democracy was not

going to give them power, the Minister of Defence, Guchkov, prior to his resignation,

attempted to get the then commander of the Petrograd Military District, Kornilov, appointed as

Commander of the Northern Front, so as to be near Petrograd with what was to be hoped

reliable troops to restore order by means of armed counter-revolution.(15)

It was this continued threat of armed counter-revolution that pushed Lenin and the Bolsheviks

to urge the settling of the question of power by means of armed insurrection.

11

References to Chapter 1: “Dual Power”

1 G Swain The origins of the Russian Civil War Longman 1996 p.14

2 V.I. Lenin Between the Two Revolutions Progress 1976 p.76

3 L. Trotsky The History of the Russian Revolution Monad 1980 p.206


5 S Bricianer Pannekoek and the Workers Councils 1978 Telos Press p.250

6 F Engels The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State Progress 1976 p.208

7 K Marx The Civil War in France p.15

8 K Marx ibid. p.71-2


10 S Bricianer Pannekoek and the Workers Councils 1978 Telos Press p.256-7

11 A Ascher The Mensheviks in the Russian Revolution Thames and Hudson 1976 p.54

12 ibid. p.101-2

13 ibid. p.93

14 ibid. p.28

15 G Swain The Origins of the Russian Civil War Longman 1996 p.19

12

Soviet Power: Seizure and Consolidation

The Bolsheviks began gaining majorities in the soviets for the first time in September 1917.

The Democratic Conference was convened in mid September to form a Council of the

Republic, also known as the pre-parliament, to rule until the convoking of the constituent

assembly. This consisted of all the main socialist parties in the Soviets, though it was not a

“soviet” body as such.

The last coalition government was created on 24 September, out of the members of the

Council of the Republic, with Kerensky as president.

The Bolsheviks, with a majority on the Petrograd Soviet, put out a call for the convening of a

second All Russian Congress of Soviets. The Bolsheviks maintained their slogan of “all power

to the Soviets” whilst, up until 7th October at least, participating in the council of the republic.

By early October the Bolsheviks had already decided upon armed insurrection in the name of

the soviets, as a means of preventing a military coup backed by the right-wing parties, such

as the Cadets. Not all members of the Bolsheviks supported this policy of armed insurrection,

Kamenev and Zinoviev both Central Committee members voted against Lenin’s resolution at

the October 16 Central Committee meeting, distributing an address to party members stating:

“Before history, before the international proletariat, before the Russian

revolution and the Russian working class, we have no right to stake the

whole future at the present moment upon the card of armed

insurrection.”(1)

The Petrograd Soviet had formed a Committee for Revolutionary Defence, also Known as the

Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC), which consisted of members of the Bolsheviks and

Left Social Revolutionaries. On 13 October the Petrogad Soldiers Soviet voted to transfer

control of the armed forces from Headquarters to the MRC. Events in the rest of Russia were

moving with equal pace, as soviets all over the country were voting for the soviets to assume

supreme power.

From October 20 - 24 the Petrograd Soviet held Mass meetings and generally displayed its

forces as a direct challenge to Kerensky’s government.

13

Kerensky reacted with a speech in the Council of the Republic.

“Lately, all of Russia, and the...capital in particular, has become

alarmed...by those open appeals for insurrection which come from an

irresponsible - I would not say extremist, in the sense of the (political)

trends, but extremist in the sense of absence of reason - section of the

democracy which has split off from the revolutionary democracy...Ulyanov

[Lenin] speaks explicitly about the necessity for an immediate uprising,

and says: ‘Any delay of the uprising is tantamount to death.’ “(2)

The Soviets provocation had the desired effect, on October 24 Kerensky ordered the

suppression of the MRC, the closure of the Bolshevik’s press and ordered troops to the

capital to defend the Provisional Government. These orders were never carried out for the

lack of troops loyal to the Provisional Government. October 24 also saw the council of the

republic pass in effect what was a motion of no-confidence in Kerensky’s government which

had the effect of destroying all remaining “residual legitimacy of the Provisional

Government”.(3)

Lenin believed at this stage that “the success of the Russian and world revolution depends

upon a two or three days’ struggle”(4) Now was the time for action not empty

phrasemongering and worthless resolutions.

“Though initially the bourgeoisie, to quote Shlyapnikov, “from the Guards

officers to the prostitutes,” had vanished from the streets of Petrograd it

was now emerging again, obviously taking heart because the last bastion

of reaction was still standing. The City Council decided to march to the

square before the Winter Palace and there to interpose their democratic

socialist bodies between the Bolshevik bullets and the seat of the lawful

government. This resolution came to nought as a sailors’ detachment

barred their way and refused either to shoot them or let them pass.

Disconsolate, they went back to pass a resolution.”(5)

14

Lenin’s assessment of the situation was proved right. At 2.00 a.m. on 25 October the

insurrection began, at 12.00 in the afternoon troops loyal to the Soviet closed down the

Council of the Republic, and by 2.00 a.m. the following morning the Winter Palace had fallen

and the Provisional Government was under arrest. The Second All-Russian Congress of

Soviets, which had begun meeting the previous day, October 25, immediately elected a new

government, the Council of People’s Commissars and passed decrees on peace and land

distribution.

In the words of Pannekoek:

“In 1917 the war had weakened government through the defeats at the

front and the hunger in the towns, and now the soldiers, mostly peasants,

took part in the action. Besides the worker’s councils in the towns,

soldiers’ councils were formed in the army; the officers were shot when

they did not acquiesce to the soviets taking all power into their hands to

prevent entire anarchy. After half a year of vain attempts on the part of

politicians and military commanders to impose new governments, the

soviets, supported by the socialist parties, were master of society.”(6)

Now in power the Bolsheviks, through the soviets, had to consolidate their gains.

The composition of the first Soviet Government was purely Bolshevik, even though out of one

hundred and one members of the new Central Executive Committee sixty-two were

Bolsheviks and twenty-nine Left Social Revolutionaries. A coalition of sorts.

“Lenin’s insistence... determined that this first government was purely

Bolshevik in composition, and not a coalition of the left socialist parties as

many, including his followers, insisted. One can see in this, and rightly so,

his lack of democratic principles, but to give him his due, there were good

practical reasons for that exclusiveness. As we shall see, for all the years

of tight discipline, for all his enormous authority, it was still hard enough for

Lenin to ride herd over the Bolshevik commissars who kept disagreeing

15

and threatening to resign at the slightest provocation. Who could believe

that a government with, say, Martov in its ranks would have ever been

able to agree on a simple policy, would have ever been able to stop

talking?...And besides, there were few candidates for ministerial posts

from the other parties. Why join this mad adventure of the Bolsheviks, this

government that would not last out a week?”(7)

THE ATTITUDE OF THE OTHER PARTIES TO THE SEIZURE OF POWER

The Mensheviks were effectively split by the Bolsheviks actions. Axelrod, on the right of the

party, denounced the Bolshevik coup as counter-revolutionary and destroying democracy in

Russia.

Martov, on the left of the party, initially opposed the seizure of power, but then gave qualified

support to the Bolsheviks, due to the belief that any alternative regime would be counter-

revolutionary and worse than the Bolsheviks. Both wings withdrew from the Second All-

Russian Congress in protest, and were joined by the Right Social Revolutionaries.

In a statement issued on 27 October the Menshevik Internationalists displaying all the

hallmarks of the previous six months prevarication said:

“On the eve of Congress...the Bolshevik party...seized power in the name

of the soviets and overthrew the Provisional Government. In this way

Congress was prevented from discussing the substantive question of the

transfer of power to the soviets and, moreover, the question of the manner

of such transfer and whether the problem should be solved by peaceful or

violent means.”(8)

At a time for decisive action the Mensheviks shrank back, preferring to sit and talk about how

to accomplish an already accomplished fact.

16

Khinchuk, of the Right Menshevik faction, argued at the Congress:

“The military conspiracy of the Bolsheviks...will plunge the country into civil

dissension, demolish the Constituent Assembly, threaten us with a military

catastrophe, and lead to the triumph of the counter-revolution...Open

negotiations with the Provisional Government for the formation of a power

resting on all layers of the democracy.”(9)

A proposal which Trotsky believed was to ignore the events of the previous two days.

Returning to a government which only two days earlier, the Mensheviks, and others in the

Council of the Republic, had passed a vote of no confidence in.(10)

Trotsky contemptuously sums up the position of the compromisers:

“The Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries were quite ready to remain in

a Provisional Government or some sort of a Pre-Parliament under any

circumstances, Can one after all break with cultured society? But the

soviets - that is only the people. The soviets are all right while you can use

them to get a compromise with the bourgeoisie, but can one possibly think

of tolerating soviets which have suddenly imagined themselves masters of

the country?”(11)

The Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks who had walked out of the Congress in protest at

the Bolsheviks actions formed a rival body, which they called the Committee for the Salvation

of the Revolution and the Motherland (CSRM).

Both Martov and the Left Social Revolutionaries, who had stayed in the congress recognising

its legitimacy, pushed for a compromise, aiming to establish a coalition of the democratic

parties, the Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries. These proposals

were enthusiastically pursued by the leadership of the Railway Workers Union.(12) The aim of

the Railway Workers Union was not only to affect a compromise deal upon the nature of the

Government but to prevent what it saw as a developing civil war between two wings of the

democracy.

17

The CSRM was split between those who wanted the reinstation of Kerensky, and a liberal-

socialist coalition, and those who wanted a socialist government but with the exclusion of the

Bolsheviks.(13)

Kerensky, meanwhile, had enlisted the support of the Tsarist General, Krasnov and the Third

Cavalry Regiment, to march upon Petrograd to restore his regime. He had the support of the

Right Social Revolutionaries on the CSRM in this action, they were supposed to lead an

insurrection against the Bolsheviks in Petrograd in conjunction with Krasnov’s assault.

The attitude of the Bolsheviks to the Railway Workers Union talks was initially one of

willingness to discuss compromise proposals, accepting the principle that other socialists be

included in the government. The Bolshevik delegates even reminding the other “delegates

that in mid-September the Bolsheviks had proposed an all-socialist government to the

Democratic conference, and would even now be quite willing to transfer power to the

Constituent Assembly as soon as it met.”(14)

“The Railway Workers’ Union talks were aimed at preventing a... civil war

between Bolsheviks and SRs by forming a coalition socialist government.

They failed not because agreement was not an objective possibility, but

because conciliatory Bolsheviks like Ryazanov and Kamenev did not

remain in positions of authority in the Bolshevik party...Trotsky was

extremely forthright: the Bolsheviks had always supported the idea of a

socialist coalition on the basis of a defined program, and still did today, but

“we consider the process of talks cannot paralyse our struggle against the

counter-revolutionary troops of Kerensky’. Talks with democratic

organisations were one thing, he said, ‘but we will allow no talks with the

Kornilov brigade”.” (15)

The Railway Workers’ Union talks were only important insofar as they gave breathing space

to the Bolshevik regime, when faced with a possible civil war led by Kerensky and Krasnov.

When this threat disappeared the need for the talks disappeared. Lenin was quite happy to

18

continue with the support of only the Left Social Revolutionaries, as he felt the other parties

represented the ideas of yesterday. This attitude is summed up in Pravda, the day after the

seizure of power:

“They wanted us to take the power alone, so that we alone should have to

contend with the terrible difficulties confronting the country...So be it! We

take the power alone, relying on the voice of the country and counting on

the friendly help of the European proletariat. But having taken the power,

we will deal with the enemies of the revolution and its saboteurs with an

iron hand. They dreamed of a dictatorship of Kornilov...We will give them

the dictatorship of the proletariat...”(16)

19

References to Chapter 2: Soviet Power

1 L Trotsky The History of the Russian Revolution Monad Press 1980 p.153-154

2 M Jones (editor) Storming the Heavens Zwan Publications 1987 p.77-78

3 ibid. p.77

4 L Trotsky The History of the Russian Revolution Vol. 3 Monad Press 1980 p.154

5 A B Ulam The Bolsheviks Macmillan 1965 p.371

6 S Bricianer Pannekoek and the Workers Councils Telos Press 1978 p.255

7 A B Ulam The Bolsheviks Macmillan 1965 p.376-377

8 A Ascher The Mensheviks in the Russian Revolution Thames and Hudson 1976 p.105-

106


10 ibid. p.308

11 ibid. p.310


13 ibid. p.56

14 ibid. p57

15 ibid. p62-63


20

Constituent Assembly: Abolition - An Undemocratic Act?

“I believe we are more confused over the Constituent Assembly than over

most things that have happened in Russia. And there is good reason for

that confusion. Following the political developments as closely as I did in

those days, I found it difficult enough to understand. Here were the radical

parties for months shouting for the Constituent - in fact, ever since the first

revolution. At last it was called, suddenly dissolved, and not a ripple in the

country.”(1)

The above quote from Louise Bryant refers to one of the more well known accusations of anti-

democratic behaviour of the Bolsheviks, that of the dissolving of the Constituent Assembly by

force of arms on the first day of its existence. The reasons for this action will be looked at in

their historical context, and the question of whether it was a democratic act or not shall be

discussed. Also, the reasons why each party placed so much importance upon the call for a

Constituent Assembly during the revolution will be looked at.

The Bolsheviks, after the breakdown of talks with the Railway Workers Union, set a date for

the elections to the Constituent Assembly. This was done in order to give themselves time to

consolidate their position in power, whilst hoping that the international revolution, which Lenin

believed to be imminent, would happen.

The Social Revolutionaries were quite happy with this state of affairs as they expected to gain

a majority in the elections, and as a result have power handed over to them from the Soviets.

Even the majority of the parliamentary Bolsheviks regarded the Soviet government as

provisional, handing power over to the Constituent Assembly when it convened. Lenin was

outraged by this breach of party discipline and wanted all the conciliationist Bolsheviks

expelled from the party.(2)

Kamenev, one of the leaders of the conciliatory Bolsheviks, was rewarded for his conciliatory

stand, by being instructed to stand down from all his official posts on the Soviet executive by

the Bolshevik Central Committee on 8 November.(3)

21

The elections to the constituent Assembly were to be done by a system of proportional

representation, off party lists drawn up before Kornilov’s revolt, and therefore did not reflect

the changes that had occurred in the Social Revolutionary Party. The Social Revolutionary

Party had split between left and right and were now two separate parties, the party lists

favoured the Right Social Revolutionary Party. This discrepancy was to play a major role in

arguments over the legitimacy of the Constituent Assembly.

The results of the elections to the Constituent Assembly were :

Bolsheviks 23.7%

Social Revolutionaries 37.3

Allies of the Right Social Revolutionaries * 16.7%

Kadets 7%

Others 15.3%

* Including the Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries

This result, argued Lenin, represented the state of the parties prior to the October

insurrection:

“Firstly, proportional representation results in a faithful expression of the

will of the people only when the party lists correspond to the real division

of the people according to the party groupings reflected in those lists. In

our case, however, as is well known the party which from May to October

had the largest number of followers among the people, and especially

among the peasants - the Socialist Revolutionary party - came out with

united election lists for the Constituent Assembly in the middle of October

1917, but split in November 1917, after the elections and before the

Assembly met.

For this reason, there is not, nor can there be, even a formal

correspondence between the will of the mass of the electors and the

composition of the elected Constituent Assembly.”(4)

22

The argument that the developing social revolution begun in October and spreading through

the Army and peasantry in November and December invalidating the party lists is a strong

one. The Left Social Revolutionaries won a majority on the previously Right SR controlled

Central Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasant Deputies in November.

This victory of the under-represented faction of the Social Revolutionaries, offers support to

the assertion that the Right SR dominated party lists were out of step with popular opinion.

The Left SRs victory in the Peasants Soviet opened the way for a joint Soviet Executive to be

established, the Bolshevik administration would then be answerable to this body.(5) This was

to remain in effect until the Constituent Assembly met. This also created a coalition

government with four Left SRs gaining ministerial roles.

The disparity between Left SR popular support and representation in the Constituent

Assembly was a major cause of concern to the ruling coalition. As the election results stood

the ruling coalition would have to hand over power to the Right SRs, which was why the

debate over party lists was deemed so vital.

“...in the course of November and December, the revolution spread to the

entire army and peasants, this being expressed first of all in the deposition

of the old leading bodies (army committees, guberania peasant

committees, the Central Executive Committee of the All-Russia Soviet of

Peasant Deputies, etc.) - which expressed the superseded, compromising

phase of the revolution, its bourgeois, and not proletarian, phase, and

which were therefore inevitably bound to disappear under the pressure of

the deeper and broader masses of the people - and in the election of new

leading bodies in their place...Consequently, the grouping of the class

forces in Russia in the course of their class struggle is in fact assuming, in

November and December 1917, a form differing in principle from the one

that the party lists of candidates for the Constituent Assembly compiled in

the middle of October 1917 could have reflected.”(6)

23

An attempt to solve this disparity was made by suggesting that in the disputed areas a new

election of delegates take place, this had the support, unsurprisingly, of the disadvantaged

parties but not the others.(7)

The Soviet coalition government spent much of December trying to find a method of merging

the Constituent Assembly and Soviet body into a viable form of government, but met with little

success, with the Bolsheviks, privately, for the first time conceding that the Constituent

Assembly may have to be dissolved.(8)

The Left SR paper “Znamya truda”, referred to the Constituent Assembly in late December, as

“a rump parliament surrounded by the soviets.”(9)

The Constituent Assembly opened on 5 January 1918, Raskolnikov testifying to it being a bit

lively at the start, “A certain exchange of fisticuffs took place on the parapet covered steps of

the tribune.(10) The coalition government put to the assembly the “Declaration of the Rights

of the Labouring and Exploited People”(11), which had in it the right of the soviets to recall

Constituent Assembly delegates, and acknowledging soviet power. The right wing delegates

would not endorse the Declaration, so the Bolsheviks and Left SRs walked out of the

assembly, and later it was dissolved.

“The Soviets - that is the working class, organised in Soviets - threw out

the Constituent Assembly, declaring that in the epoch of direct and

immediate conflict between class forces only one class or another can

rule, openly and solidly - that at this moment there can be either the

dictatorship of capital and landownership or the dictatorship of the working

class and the poorest peasantry.”(12)

The reaction to the dissolution from the mass of the population was surprisingly muted, the

most popular demand for the previous ten months was that of the call for a Constituent

Assembly, now it had been dissolved, and apart from the right wing politicians, barely a

murmur, why?

A B Ulam, in the book “The Bolsheviks” offers the following opinion on the dissolving of the

Constituent Assembly:

24

“It is often pointed out in the obituaries of the Constituent Assembly that

the Bolsheviks’ argument against it, while completely mendacious from the

legal and moral points of view, was a fairly sound one politically. The

peasant masses voting in droves for the Socialist Revolutionaries were

often unaware of the split within the party. The lack of a violent public

reaction to the dissolution of the Assembly shows that the “masses” in

general did not care about its fate.(13)

The Menshevik position was:

“If the Revolution, on account of the establishment of a dictatorship in the

name of “soviet power”, deliberately turns its back on a Constituent

Assembly elected by the whole people, this does not signify in practice

that it has attained some higher form of revolutionary-proletarian

development. What it signifies is that there has been foisted on the

Revolution a Utopian programme, which is radically out of keeping with the

backward state of the country and, being devoid of solid support in the

present state of political forces, can only be pursued in opposition to the

wishes of the majority. ...Taking the Soviet order as its starting point on the

ground of established fact and not of principle, the party sees as its main

task, at the present stage of the Revolution, to work upon the masses in

such a way as to rescue them from the Utopian illusions of the Soviet

dictatorship and make possible the restoration of the revolutionary alliance

between the working class and the peasants and urban democrats.”(14)

The Right SRs had made plans for military action, with the aid of the Semenovskii regiment, if

the Constituent Assembly was dissolved, but only if there was “a spontaneous insurrection

developed from below.(15) But as no action from below occurred, they did not call upon the

Semenovskii regiment.

25

Were the Bolsheviks actions in dissolving the Constituent Assembly undemocratic? Was

Lenin right in claiming that “The republic of Soviets is a higher form of democracy than the

bourgeois republic with the Constituent Assembly.”?(16)

Attacking the Right SRs during the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, Ivan Ivanovich

made the following point:

“How can you...appeal to such a concept as the will of the whole people?

For a Marxist “the people” is an inconceivable notion: the people does not

act as a single unit. The people as a unit is a mere fiction, and this fiction

is needed by the ruling classes. It is all over between us...You belong to

one world, with the Cadets and bourgeoisie, and we to the other, with the

peasants and the workers.”(17)

Lenin and the Bolsheviks, as Marxists, were concerned only about ending the class

domination of the bourgeoisie, replacing it with the domination of the proletariat. In this

context, the suppression of the bourgeois dominated Constituent Assembly, was a

progressive democratic act. Even though a section of Russian society (the bourgeois) were

disenfranchised, the fact was, that under the Soviet system of government, more people had

a direct influence in the governing of their country than in any contemporary democracy. In

the polarised social and political climate of Russia at this time, a bourgious-rightwing socialist

regime would not survive, the alignment of class forces would not allow such a coalition to

exist, without relying upon the guns of the Tsarist Generals.

“The Right Socialist Revolutionaries, moreover, had to leave the soviets,

which in October - that is, before the convocation of the Constituent

Assembly - had taken the government into their own hands. On whom,

then, could a ministry formed by the Constituent Assembly’s majority

depend for support? It would be backed by the upper classes in the

provinces, the interlectuals, the government officials, and temporarily by

the bourgeiosie on the right...At such a political centre as Petrograd, it

would encounter irrestistable opposition from the very start. If under these

cicumstances the soviets, submitting to the formal logic of democratic

26

conventions, had turned the government over to the party of Kerensky and

Chernov, such a government, compromised and debilitated as it was,

would only introduce tempory confusion into the political life of the country,

and would be overthrown by a new uprising in a few weeks. The soviets

decided to reduce this belated historical experiment to its lowest terms,

and dissolved the Constituent Assembly the very first day it met.”(18)

27

References to Chapter 3: Constituent Assembly

1 L Bryant Six Red Months in Russia Young Socialist publication Sri Lanka 1973 p.72

2 V I Lenin Collected Works Vol. 26 Lawrence and Wishart 1972 p.280-282



5 G Swain The Origins of the Russian Civil War Longman 1996 p.77-78


7 G Swain The Origins of the Russian Civil War Longman 1996 p.78-80

8 ibid. p.81

9 ibid. p.82

10 F F Raskolnikov Tales of Sub-Lieutenant Ilyin New Park 1982 p.7

11 contained in Appendix 2

12 L Trotsky How the Revolution Armed Vol.1 New Park 1979 p.33

13 A B Ulam The Bolsheviks MacMillan 1965 p.397

14 A Ascher The Mensheviks in the Russian Revolution Thames and Hudson 1976 p.110


16 D Volkogonov Trotsky Harper Collins 1996 p.94

17 F F Raskolnikov Tales of Sub-Lieutenant Ilyin New Park 1982 p.13-14

18 L Trotsky in A Richardson(Ed.) In Defence of the Russian Revolution

Porcupine Press 1995 p.99-100

28

“Declaration Of The Rights Of The Toiling And Exploited People”

The Constituent Assembly resolves:

( I )

1. Russia is hereby proclaimed a Republic of Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’

Deputies. All power centrally and locally, is vested in these Soviets.

2. The Russian Soviet Republic is established on the principle of a free union of free nations,

as a federation of Soviet national republics.

( II )

Its fundamental aim being to abolish all exploitation of man by man, to completely eliminate

the division of society into classes, to mercilessly crush the resistance of the exploiters, to

establish a socialist organisation of society and to achieve the victory of socialism in all

countries, Constituent Assembly further resolves:

1. Private ownership of land is hereby abolished. All land together with all buildings, farm

implements and other appurtenances of agricultural production, is proclaimed the property of

the entire working people.

2. The Soviet laws on workers’ control and on the Supreme Economic Council are hereby

confirmed for the purpose of guaranteeing the power of the working people over the exploiters

and as a first step towards the complete conversion of the factories, mines, railways, and

other means of production and transport into the property of the workers’ and peasants’ state.

3. The conversion of all banks into the property of the workers’ and peasants’ state is hereby

confirmed as on of the conditions for the emancipation of the working people from the yoke of

capital.

4. For the purpose of abolishing the parasitic sections of society, universal labour conscription

is hereby instituted.

5. To ensure the sovereign power of the working people, and to eliminate all possibility of the

restoration of the power of the exploiters, the arming of the working people, the creation of a

socialist Red Army of workers and peasants and the complete disarming of the propertied

classes are hereby decreed.

(III)

29

1. Expressing its firm determination to wrest mankind from the clutches of finance capital and

imperialism, which have in this most criminal of wars drenched the world in blood, the

Constituent Assembly whole-heartedly endorses the policy pursued by Soviet power of

denouncing the secret treaties, organising most extensive fraternisation with the workers and

peasants of the armies in the war, and achieving at all costs, by revolutionary means, a

democratic peace between the nations, without annexations and indemnities and on the basis

of the free self-determination of nations.

2. With the same end in view, the Constituent Assembly insists on a complete break with the

barbarous policy of bourgeois civilisation, which has built the prosperity of the exploiters

belonging to a few chosen nations on the enslavement of hundreds of millions of working

people in Asia, in the colonies in general, and in the small countries.

The Constituent Assembly welcomes the policy of the Council of People’s Commissars in

proclaiming the complete independence of Finland, commencing the evacuation of troops

from Persia, and proclaiming freedom of self-determination for Armenia.

3. The Constituent Assembly regards the Soviet law on the cancellation of the loans

contracted by the governments of the tsar, the landowners and the bourgeoisie as a first blow

struck at international banking, finance capital, and expresses the conviction that Soviet

power will firmly pursue this path until the international workers’ uprising against the yoke of

capital has completely triumphed.

(IV)

Having been elected on the basis of party lists drawn up prior to the October Revolution,

when the people were not yet in a position to rise en masse against the exploiters, had not yet

experienced the full strength of resistance of the latter in defence of their class privileges, and

had not yet applied themselves in practice to the task of building socialist society, the

Constituent Assembly considers that it would be fundamentally wrong, even formally, to put

itself in opposition to Soviet power.

In essence the Constituent Assembly considers that now, when the people are waging the

last fight against their exploiters, there can be no place for exploiters in any government body.

Power must be vested wholly and entirely in the working people and their authorised

representatives - the Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies.

30

Supporting Soviet power and the decrees of the Council of People’s Commissars, the

Constituent Assembly considers that its own task is confined to establishing the fundamental

principles of the socialist reconstruction of society.

At the same time, endeavouring to create a really free and voluntary, and therefore all the

more firm and stable, union of the working classes of all the nations of Russia, the Constituent

Assembly confines its own task to setting up the fundamental principles of a federation of

Soviet Republics of Russia, while leaving it to the workers and peasants of each nation to

decide independently at their own authoritative Congress of Soviets whether they wish to

participate in the federal government and in the other federal Soviet institutions, and on what

terms.

Taken from: V I Lenin Collected Works Vol. 26 Progress Publishers p.423-425

31

The following letter is taken from the book “Storming the Heavens”. The letter, is from a young

Bolshevik student, Lusik Lisiniova, who was killed by machine-gun fire on 1 November 1917 in the

street fighting during the Moscow insurrection. It adds a human side to the drier, political texts of

the period.

13-24 October 1917

My dearest girl, Anik,

I received your letter and two postcards. Today is my second day out of bed for good. I have

my nose in the air and keep smiling, for everything in life makes me happy.

I am very grateful to my friends for taking care of me. They are all very busy, but there was

hardly a time when I was alone. They brought me food from home, cocoa, buns, coffee,

butter, cheese, and my dinners. It even made me feel embarrassed. Two days ago I went to

see the doctor. I was very much afraid it was my lungs and asked him about it with trembling

knees; imagine my joy when he said they are in perfect order and that I had no cause to worry

at all. Whew! How happy I was when I left his office. Autumn was shining brightly all about

me, with its golden leaves and hoarfrost and the beautiful sun, so gentle and jolly and, at the

same time, so sad, as it was taking leave of the earth. I couldn’t help feeling that the sun and

every person knew that I had got up from my sickbed that day, that I was happy and that my

lungs were in perfect order.

Hooray! Perhaps the Soviets will take over power in Petrograd tomorrow... Yes, of course,

there will later be, or perhaps even now, a terrible bloodbath... there has never yet been a

time when the bourgeoisie surrendered a single position without a fight, to say nothing of

surrendering power, so that we must expect this as an inevitable part of all proletarian

revolutions, can the triumphant international revolution be kindled... “Long live the

international Soviet of workers’ deputies!”...Oh, Anik! I can’t tell you how elated I feel. A great

feeling of triumph is like a lump in my throat. You know, there are sad times and hard times,

but still, it is wonderful, for that’s what we’re like. You understand whom I mean, don’t you?

Our group, a close-knit group of Social-Democrats.

That’s all for now.

Your

Lusik

Soviet Democracy

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