South China Sea

Yes Conflict

GenericChinese aggression in the SCS will cause military conflict.CFR 7/11 - (Council on Foreign Relations, July 11, 2016, “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea”, http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/conflict/territorial-disputes-in-the-south-china-sea)//HH

Recent Developments

Territorial and jurisdictional disputes in the S outh C hina S ea continue to strain relationships between China and other countries in Southeast Asia and risk escalation into a military clash . The United States has sought to uphold freedom of navigation and support other nations in Southeast Asia that have been affected by China’s assertive territorial claims and land reclamation efforts. In the fall of 2015, the United States signaled that it will challenge China’s assertion of sovereignty over disputed territory by flying military aircraft and deploying ships near some of the islands.

In recent years, satellite imagery has shown China’s increased efforts to reclaim land in the South China Sea by physically increasing the size of islands or creating altogether new islands. In addition to piling sand onto existing reefs, China has constructed ports, military installations, and airstrips—particularly in the Spratly Islands.

Background

China’s sweeping claims of sovereignty over the sea —and the sea’s alleged 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas—have antagonized competing claimants Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, Taiwan, Indonesia, and the Philippines. As early as the 1970s, countries began to claim as their own islands and various zones in the South China Sea such as the Spratly islands, which may possess rich natural resources and fishing areas.

China maintains that under international law, foreign militaries are not able to conduct intelligence gathering activities, such as reconnaissance flights, in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). According to the United States, countries should have freedom of navigation through EEZs in the sea and are not required to notify claimants of military activities. China’s claims threaten sea lines of communication, which are important maritime passages that facilitate trade and the movement of naval forces. In response to China’s assertive presence in the disputed territory, Japan sold military ships and equipment to the Philippines and Vietnam in order to improve their maritime security capacity and to deter Chinese aggression . In recent years, China has built three airstrips on the contested Spratly Islands to extend its presence in disputed waters, and militarized Woody Island by deploying fighter jets, cruise missiles, and a radar system. China has warned its Southeast Asian neighbors against drilling for oil and gas in the contested region, which has disrupted other nations’ oil exploration and seismic survey activities. To challenge China’s claims in international waters, the U nited S tates has occasionally deployed destroyer ships on freedom of navigation operations in the S outh C hina S ea to promote freedom of passage. Currently, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague is hearing a claim brought by the Philippines against China, although Beijing refuses to accept the court’s authority.

Concerns

The United States, which maintains important interests in ensuring freedom of navigation and securing sea lines of communication, has expressed support for an agreement on a binding code of conduct and other confidence-building measures. The United States has a role in preventing military escalation resulting from the territorial dispute. However, Washington’s defense treaty with Manila could draw the U nited S tates into a China-Philippines conflict over the substantial natural gas deposits in the disputed Reed Bank or the lucrative fishing grounds of the Scarborough Shoal. A dispute between China and Vietnam over territorial claims could also threaten

the military and commercial interests of the United States. The failure of Chinese and Southeast Asian leaders to resolve the disputes by diplomatic means could undermine international laws governing maritime disputes and encourage destabilizing arms buildups.

Yes SCS conflict — historical rivalry, lack of regional security institutions, naval clashes, and lack of naval expertiseKraska 15 — James Kraska, Howard S. Levie Professor of International Law and Research Director, Stockton Center for the Study of International Law, U.S. Naval War College; Distinguished Fellow, Law of the Sea Institute, University of California, Berkeley School of Law; and Senior Fellow, Center for Oceans Law and Policy, University of Virginia School of Law, 2015 (“Putting Your Head in the Tiger's Mouth: Submarine Espionage in Territorial Waters,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (54 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 164), Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis, Accessed 07-11-2016 AS)

Submarine operations in the Indian and Pacific Oceans are conducted within a dynamic geostrategic context. Regional maritime disputes of the East China Sea and South China Sea are either caused or magnified by historical and cultural animosity and rivalry, contending visions of order in Asia, and an absence of regional security institutions. The region is unsettled, and the risk of submarine incidents is high. North and South Korea have a bitter maritime island and boundary dispute in the Yellow Sea that [*212] periodically turns violent. China, Japan, and Korea have competing historic claims over islands and waters in the East China Sea. The Taiwan Strait is a potential flashpoint between Beijing and Taipei. In the South China Sea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia have overlapping maritime claims with China and, in most cases, with each other. Outside maritime powers, including the United States, India, and Australia, maintain a naval presence in these regions, to the annoyance of China. These disputes continually destabilize the region , and not infrequently ignite a dangerous crisis . Deadly confrontations have erupted in the waters surrounding Korea, and in the East China Sea and S outh C hina S ea, where naval ships and aircraft, coast guard vessels, and fishing trawlers frequently clash, raising tensions and on occasion leading to the loss of life . These cleavages are compounded by (except for Japan and Australia) a conspicuous lack of naval acumen and operational submarine experience among regional states, increasing the likelihood of mistake or miscalculation that could lead to conflict.

HardlinersSCS conflict inevitable in the status quo – growing dominance of hardliners, increased rivalry, and lack of trustKuo 5-26 – Lily Kuo, Reporter for Quartz, Previously reporter for Reuters, May 26th 2015(“China Warns of “Inevitable” War with US over South China Sea” Quartz, Available online at http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/05/china-warns-inevitable-war-us-over-south-china-sea/113680/, Accessed online 6/28/16, AJ)

After Chinese state media warned that war with the U nited States may be “ inevitable ,” Beijing has published a policy paper detailing how the military will shift its focus from land and coastlines to the open seas. China’s State Council released a white paper today that criticizes “external countries…busy meddling in South China Sea affairs” and sets out an “active defense” military strategy for the country.

The paper comes a day after an editorial (link in Chinese) in the state-run Chinese tabloid Global Times said conflict between China and the US will be unavoidable if the Washington doesn’t lay off Beijing for building islands and military facilities in disputed parts of the South China Sea.

“We do not want a military conflict with the United States, but if it were to come we have to accept it,” the paper said. (Editorials in state-run papers are not official representations of Beijing’s position, but often reflect government sentiment.)

The US has been calling on China to halt the construction of entire islands with ports, army barracks and at least one air strip near the Spratly Islands. The area—one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes and home to fertile

fishing grounds as well as possibly oil and gas—is the focus of overlapping claims by China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Brunei.

According to the white paper, the P eople’s Liberation Army Navy will expand its defense perimeter to include “open seas protection.” The air force will also expand its focus to include offensive as well as defensive military capabilities . “We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked,” the paper said.

Chinese authorities denied the white paper had anything to do with tension over US surveillance of China’s building in the Spratlys. On Monday, China’s foreign ministry said that it had filed a complaint with the US for flying a spy plane near Chinese island construction sites last week.

International security experts have long said that armed conflict between the two countries is unlikely given their economic reliance on each other. Increasingly scholars and analysts say that war may not be “as improbable as many experts suggest” because of growing dominance of hardliners in the Chinese government, increased rivalry, or general lack of trust between the countries.

The US and other states are preparing for any potential confrontation . Southeast Asian countries are building up their navies and coastguards—defense spending in the region is expected to reach $52 billion by 2020, up from a projected $42 billion this year, IHS Janes Defence has said.

Last week, US vice president Joe Biden told graduates at the Naval Academy in Annapolis that 60% of the United States Naval force will be stationed in the Asia Pacific by 2020, in order to stand up

for freedom of navigation and peaceful, equitable resolution to territorial disputes. “Today, these principles are being tested by Chinese activities in the South China Sea…We are going to look to you to uphold these principles wherever they are challenged,” he said.

Tipping PointThe tipping point for SCS conflict is now – nationalistic and resource-based tensions Mollman 5-12 – Steve Mollman, Asia Correspondent for Quartz News Journal, May 12th 2016(“Beijing is Setting the State for War in the South China Sea,” Quartz, Available online at http://qz.com/680123/beijing-is-setting-the-stage-for-war-in-the-south-china-sea/, Accessed on 6/28/16, AJ)

All any nation needs to go to war is a good provocation, and China is no exception.

With its sweeping territorial claims, island-building, militarization, patriotic fervor, and prickly rhetoric , Beijing is setting itself up to be repeatedly provoked in the S outh China Sea—it might even be counting on it.

Consider the nation’s manmade, militarized island at Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly archipelago. Though it didn’t even exist a few years ago, and for decades ships from other nations could routinely sail by it without disturbance, now Beijing feels provoked if anyone goes near it—and sends out warnings or makes aggressive gestures in response.

This week the USS William P. Lawrence, a guided missile destroyer from the US Navy, conducted a “freedom of navigation” operation near the island. It deliberately sailed within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef. If the US recognized the reef as China’s territory to begin with—which it does not— that would be considered entering China’s territory.

The problem is China has claimed , outrageously, that nearly the entire sea is its own territory. Considering the fact that some $5 trillion in ship-borne trade passes through the strategic waterway every year, that’s a problem not just for the US, but any number of countries participating in the global economy. The US Navy’s operation was a reminder to China that the sea is open waters, despite any impromptu islands that might have been constructed of late.

China bases its sea claim on a “nine-dash line” that it drew on a map after World War 2. Never mind that the line conflicts with international norms and overlapping claims by nearby nations, including the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia, nations whose coasts are much closer to the disputed sea than China’s.Many observers feel it’s ridiculous to base real-world claims on such a map. Internet satire has ensued.

The problem is that China is actually serious, however surreal the claim may seemFrom a military strategy point of view, at least, it’s easy to see why.

The strategic waterway is “one of the most important oil and natural gas transport choke points in the world,” geopolitical analyst Tim Daiss wrote this week in Forbes. Passing through it each year, he noted, is almost 60% of Japan’s and Taiwan’s energy supplies, and 80% of China’s crude oil imports

Were a conflict involving these or other nations to break out, control of the sea could give Beijing a distinct advantage in securing—or blocking— the energy needed to power a war machine . The most critical resource that Japan lacked in World War 2 was oil—a key history lesson surely not lost on China’s military strategists. (The sea is full of its own vast untapped reserves of oil and natural gas, too.)

To acquire the sea’s strategic advantage, though, China first needs to establish control over the waterway. That needs to be done step by step. The process might go something like this

Make the sea claim.

Create outposts in the sea, and work toward turning them into military bases. At this stage, you might want to deny the military bit.

Express outrage if anyone goes near those outposts. Over time, establish a pattern of being repeatedly provoked, despite your patient warnings. Your outposts aren’t quite military bases yet anyway, so this is a good use of your time in the meantime.

As your outposts get closer to becoming real military bases, feel free to grow more strident in your responses to the “provocations.”

Once your military infrastructure is fully up to speed, you’re ready for war—you even have a track record of provocations to point to for justification! Of course you don’t have to start a conflict, but it’s nice to know you can at any time—and feel justified about it.

China isn’t just relying on its military. The country has a massive fishing fleet, and by far the world’s largest fish industry. For years Beijing has been paying fishing boats to operate near its disputed outposts in the sea, even if they don’t catch much in the area. It certainly helps appearances.

The fishing fleet needs to expand outward because through over-fishing it has nearly depleted the fishing stock near China’s own shores. So it increasingly needs to fish in the exclusive economic zones of other nations, as it is doing. By establishing outposts and more control over the sea, China’s military can better support the fleet’s forays into distant or contested waters.

Those fishing forays often involve confrontations with foreign coastguards or navies. (Hey, more potential provocations!) With other nations responding by beefing up their maritime forces and monitoring technologies—networked nano-satellites, in the case of Indonesia—more such confrontations can be expected in the future.

Beijing has also whipped up patriotic feelings in the Chinese population about the sea being the nation’s birthright. A warship recently took a song-and-dance troupe on a tour of various disputed outposts in the sea. It started at Fiery Cross Reef, where celebrity singer Song Zuying gave a stirring rendition of a song called “Ode to the South Sea Defenders.”

State media coverage of the event included an interview with a navy officer from the audience telling CCTV after the performance, “We’ll definitely not lose at our hands an inch of the territories our ancestors left us.”

The TV coverage offered glimpses into just how impressively far along the island construction has come in a short time. The island even has runways suitable for fighter jets. This suggests China is well into Step 4 above. And indeed, it’s grown increasingly stern in its responses to “provocations.”

When a US Navy warship passed by the Spratlys last October, China simply warned it against acting irresponsibly. But this week when another warship did the same thing, it sent fighter jets scrambling and shadowed the US ship with its own warships—thanks in part to the convenient military base nearby.

Even talking about China’s activities in the sea—in diplomatic settings—now draws ire from Beijing. In April it warned G7 leaders meeting in Japan to not discuss the matter at all, and then said it was “strongly dissatisfied” after they did anyway.

Last week, one Chinese diplomat warned that criticism of China’s actions in the sea would rebound like a coiled spring. If comments are “aimed at putting pressure on China or blackening its name, then you can view it like a spring, which has an applied force and a counterforce. The more the pressure, the greater the reaction,” said Ouyang Yujing, director-general of the foreign ministry’s department of boundary and ocean affairs.

In other words, Beijing is pressing its outrageous claims in the South China, and will take any opposition as a reason to press them even harder

Mil ModernizationSCS conflict will escalate – stakes are too high, China is modernizing its technology and all other US responses have failed. Barno and Bensahel 6-14 - David Barno And Nora Bensahel, Lt. General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) is a Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, and Dr. Nora Bensahel is a Distinguished Scholar in Residence, at the School of International Service at American University, 2016 (“A Guide To Stepping It Up In The South China Sea,” War on the Rocks, June 14, 2016, Accessed July 11, 2016, Available Online at http://warontherocks.com/2016/06/a-guide-to-stepping-it-up-in-the-south-china-sea/, KC)

The S outh C hina S ea has become one of the most dangerous flashpoint s in the world as China continues to aggressively expand its influence and capabilities there. One year ago, we proposed several ways in which the United States could try to deter further Chinese encroachments. But, as the recent Shangri-La Dialogue demonstrated, tensions in the region have only risen since then. The Chinese have only accelerated their bellicose behavior , and nothing the United States has done has seemed to have any effect . The U nited S tates and its partners now have no choice but to consider a wider range of more assertive responses .

We are not seeking a conflict with China, nor do we advocate a war. We do not believe that China is an inevitable adversary of the United States. But we are increasingly concerned that Chinese actions in the South China Sea, if left unopposed, will give it de facto dominance of an area that is a vital strategic interest to the United States. More direct U.S. actions would involve significant risks — but so would failing to act, and those risks are far less appreciated.

Why does the S outh C hina S ea matter? It is one of the world’s most important shipping lanes , transited by about one-third of global commercial goods each year . It lies atop at least seven billion barrels of oil and an estimated 900 million cubic feet of natural gas. Conflicting claims to these important waters abound. These involve several U.S. allies and friends and will likely be exacerbated by the pending outcome of an international court case between China and the Philippines. Chinese efforts to establish sovereign claims over these key international waters not only threaten unimpeded access to global shipping lanes and U.S. partners in the region, but also set a dangerous global precedent . Beijing’s forceful efforts are intended to establish regional hegemony by creating a zone of “near seas” over which it can claim sole control.

During the past year, Chinese actions have grown bolder . They have completed land reclamation efforts at the three largest outposts in the South China Sea and are now focusing on developing infrastructure . Each one already has an airfield with a 9,800-foot runway, which is long enough to land most military aircraft. They have also landed a military jet on Fiery Cross Reef and deployed advanced fighters

and surface-to-air missiles on Woody Island in the Paracels. Taken together, these capabilities provide forward-positioned power projection platforms for Chinese fighters, bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft. Aircraft from these bases could easily reach — and possibly enforce — Chinese claims out to the so-called “nine-dash line” that borders the easternmost rim of the South China Sea. Chinese Navy ships and maritime militia can also use these outposts as refueling and provisioning stops that extend their sea presence across this vast expanse. U.S. aircraft carriers are at best transient visitors in these same waters, and no other country in the region can project and sustain the air and naval presence in the South China Sea that these fixed bases now offer .

The U nited S tates has responded to this continued expansion with ever stronger warnings and actions. Most notably, the U nited S tates conducted its first freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in the South China Sea in October 2015, when a U.S. destroyer sailed within 12 miles of Subi Reef to demonstrate that the U nited S tates rejects any Chinese maritime claims emanating from its artificial islands . At least two other FONOPs have been conducted since then, and the head of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Harry Harris, has stated that future FONOPs will increase in number, scope, and complexity.

Yet Chinese confrontational actions are nevertheless continuing and even escalating . In recent months, for example, Chinese fighter jets have flown dangerously close to U.S. reconnaissance aircraft in both the South and East China Seas, violating an agreement that the United States and China signed last year on safe conduct in the air. And the Chinese government recently announced that it is considering establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea as a further signal of its security claims to this key region.

China has subtly but forcefully established a permanent presence across a series of outposts on territory that did not exist five years ago. This is the new reality of the South China Sea. As a result, the U nited S tates and its regional partners now have little choice but to consider a broader and stronger range of options . These actions should be designed to achieve two primary objectives: to deter China from further expansion and combative behaviors and to better position the United States and its partners for military action to defend the international commons, if required.

We readily acknowledge that these objectives may conflict with each other, and that more options risk provoking precisely the type of conflict that the United States seeks to avoid. But failing to take stronger action also runs the very serious risk that the Chinese will gradually but inevitably gain control of this critical maritime region. That would weaken the regional position of U.S. allies and partners, but even more importantly, it would challenge the vital and longstanding U.S. interest in maintaining global freedom of navigation.

Military modernization and A2/AD capabilities massively increase the risk of conflictTorsvoll 15 – Eirik Torsvoll, research assistant at PluriCourts, an Oslo-based research center for the study of the legitimate roles of the judiciary in the global order, Winter 2015(“Deterring Conflict with China: A Comparison of the Air-Sea Battle Concept, Offshore Control, and Deterrence by Denial,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, VOL. 39:1 WINTER 2015, Accessed 6/28/16, AJ)

Anti-access and area-denial are fairly recent concepts, referring to attempts to deny an adversary access to, as well as the ability to maneuver near and within, a military theater of operation.' However, these are well established goals in combat, and A2/AD measures in this sense are nothing new.1° What is new are the recent advances in both tech nology and prolif eration that have made A2/AD capabilities much more potent. Developments in missile tech nology have been particularly important in this regard. They have radically changed the balance between offense and defense in favor of the latter , and will arguably be at the forefront of almost all intricate

reg ional problem s facing Washington and Beijing ."

China has been emboldened by the development of anti-access forces at an unprecedented rate. Its current A2/ AD capabilities comprise a formidable fusion of a "new generation of cruise, ballistic, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles with improved range, accuracy, and lethality."12 This includes the muchtouted anti-ship ballistic missile, nicknamed the "carrier-killer," which China has been integrating into the People's Liberation Army (PLA) doctrine."3 China is coupling these weapons with modernized submarines, fighter jets, and sea mining capabilities . The missiles will be able to accurately attack U.S. forces and forward bases at ranges exceeding 1,000 nautical miles."4 In addition, new developments in anti-satellite and cyber capabilities create other opportunities to hinder U.S. power projection abilities.

In a hypothetical conflict scenario, Chinese capabilities , in combination with the maritime geography of the region (where U.S. power projection is heavily reliant on island bases and

bases on allied soil), would create a difficult environment for U.S. forces . China's A2/AD capacity would, at the very outset, create doubt in the ability of the United States to intervene. Furthermore, their capabilities could constrain the scope of an intervention, or push the United States to deploy at more distant locations."5 Such deployment problems would be further exacerbated by the "tyranny of distance," as U.S. forces would have to operate far from home, encountering a range of logistical challenges, while the theater of operations would take place in China's backyard.16

The rapid expansion of Chinas military can thus be seen as a calculated approach to counter the superior strength of the U.S. military, playing on the American weakness of distance, while building on its own technological strengths. The result could be defeat for U.S. forces in the region by preventing them from fulfilling their military goals, while allowing the PRC to successfully expand its influence in the island chain. Alternatively, inaction , or a lack of response on the part of the U nited S tates, might inaccurately convince leaders in

Beijing that they would be facing an easy or no-war scenario , which , if confronted by a determined Washington, could in fact involve huge losses in blood and treasure . 7

EconomicSCS escalates – too important economically for either country to give upMody 6-5 – Seema Mody, Journalist for CNBC, June 5th 2016(“Why Beijing Won’t Back Down in the South China Sea,” The Fiscal Times, Available online http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2016/06/05/Why-Beijing-Won-t-Back-Down-South-China-Sea, Accessed online 6/29, AJ)

Tensions between the U nited States and China continue to escalate in the S outh China Sea, with freedom of navigation in one of the world's most critical maritime passages potentially at stake.

With no resolution in sight, both sides are ramping up their military capabilities in the massive body of water, potentially including nuclear weaponry and anti-ballistic missiles.

"This has become a military contest between China and the U.S.," said Jennifer Harris, former member of the policy planning staff at the U.S. Department of State and a foreign relations expert.

The so-called "nine-dash line " that China has drawn over most of the S outh China Sea — a

gargantuan territorial claim that stretches about 1,200 miles from its shores — would give Beijing control over a zone that 's estimated to handle about half of global merchant shipping, a third of the planet's oil shipping, two-thirds of global l iquid n atural gas shipments, and more than a 10th of Earth's fish catch . Most nations in the region are dependent on the free flow of goods through the body of water . Japan and South Korea, for example, receive the vast majority of their Persian Gulf oil through the South China Sea.

Tensions in the SCS are increasing now ― concerns over trade and freedom have the potential to escalate into conflictMiller 16 ― Jonathan Berkshire Miller, fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS on Japan, fellow at the EastWest Institute on China and East Asia, Founding Director Of The Council On International Policy, member of the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, M.A. in international affairs from the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa, 2016. (“Tensions Continue to Boil in South China Sea”, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, May 29th, 2016, Available Online at: http://studies.aljazeera.net/mritems/Documents/2016/5/29/4b10b189241a43478b9f862f4d1985a6_100.pdf Accessed 7-11-16 p. 2-3)

Tensions in the S outh C hina S ea, which has a raft of territorial disputes between several states in the region, have been rising sharply over the past year . The territorial row in the S outh C hina S ea has a number of criss-crossing claims disputed by the key countries in the region. China’s recent land reclamation activities, in support of its expansive “nine-dash line”, have fundamentally altered the status quo in the region. While other states, including Vietnam and the

Philippines, have also engaged in land reclamation, their pace of construction and intent to militarize is not congruent with Beijing’s efforts.

Introduction

The S outh C hina S ea has become a critical issue over the past few years and has the potential to evolve into areas of conflict if risks are not mitigated. The massive body of water is a vital maritime artery for global commerce and more than half of the world’s commercial shipping (by tonnage) transits through the Sea. The value of this trade exceeds $5 trillion per year – more than the GDP of India and all the countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) combined.(1) The area has a raft of overlapping territorial disputes with a number of claimants in the region. In addition to China’s expansive claims, there are other states with competing territorial and jurisdictional claims includ ing: the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. In addition to disputes over the rights to resources in the S outh C hina S ea, there is also a real concern from the US and other claimants that Beijing is attempting to restrict the freedom of navigation – rules underwritten by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Land Reclamation and Freedom of Navigation

Tensions in the South China Sea have risen dramatically over the past year as China tries to alter the status quo through massive land reclamation and island construction activities. Beijing’s land reclamation strategy in the South China Sea has escalated at such a pace that Washington has opted to change gears in its approach to seeking a diplomatic and multilateral resolution in the South China Sea. China’s creation of artificial islands in the Spratlys Islands has resulted in a public showdown through which the US has accused China of attempting to force its way to de-facto control in the disputed seas. President Barack Obama has been frank in his assessment(2) of Beijing’s strategy: “Where we get concerned with China is where it is not necessarily abiding by international norms and rules, and is using its sheer size and muscle to force countries into subordinate positions.”(3) These comments were put even more bluntly by Admiral Harry Harris, commander of the Pacific Fleet, who remarked that China “is creating a great wall of sand with dredges and bulldozers”.(4)

sMultiple ClaimantsSmaller claimants push China past the brink of war--- They have no end game strategy and are willing to shoot firstBateman 6-7-16---Sam, professorial research fellow at the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong, and also an adviser to the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore., 2016, (“America, China, India and Japan: Headed Towards a South China Sea Showdown?”, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/america-china-india-japan-headed-towards-south-china-sea-16485, Accessed 7/11/16, Schloss)

Recent months have seen a continuing increase in military activities in the South China Sea , particularly by the United States and China, but also by ‘bit players’ like India and Japan.

These activities only serve to heighten tensions in the region at a time when the priority should be to demilitarize the area. In the most recent serious incident, on May 17, two Chinese fighter jets intercepted a US Navy EP-3 intelligence and surveillance aircraft about 50 nautical miles east of Hainan Island. This incident could have violated agreed upon procedures between the United States and China to manage such encounters. It follows earlier incidents when Chinese jet fighters intercepted US P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft over the South China and Yellow seas. The

United States recently conducted its third freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in the South China Sea since China started its extensive land reclamation and building of airfields and support facilities on reclaimed

land in the Spratly Islands. The latest FONOP involved a US warship sailing close by the disputed Fiery Cross Reef. In March, the United States sent a small fleet of warships — comprising aircraft carrier John C. Stennis, two

destroyers, two cruisers and a Japan-based US Seventh Fleet flagship — into contested waters to counter the presence of China. During his recent visit to Vietnam, President Barack Obama announced that the U nited S tates would be lifting its longstanding ban on sales of lethal military equipment to Vietnam. This has been construed

as part of a strategy to help Vietnam defend itself against an increasing threat from China in the South China Sea. In return, Vietnam might grant the United States access to the strategic Cam Ranh Bay military base. Along with access to bases in Palawan in the Philippines, this would markedly enhance America’s ability to project military power into the South China Sea. Lyle Goldstein from the US Naval War College suggests in his recent book Meeting China Halfway that rather than enhancing US

military engagement with Vietnam, Washington should be ending it, arguing that “recent overtures toward military cooperation between Hanoi and Washington have violated reasonable principles of geopolitical moderation.” Unfortunately, moderation has not been evident in any recent developments in the South China Sea. What is significant about recent American naval activities in the region is that Washington has chosen to announce them with a blaze of publicity. This suggests a clear intention to

confront China and to show the world that the United States is doing so. India added to tensions recently when it sent a force of four naval vessels into the South China Sea for a two-and-a-half-month-long deployment, which includes participation in Exercise Malabar off Okinawa, jointly with the US Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. Predictably, Beijing reacted strongly to this naval deployment, saying that New Delhi should not encourage Tokyo and Washington to bring added tensions to the region. Meanwhile a Chinese strike group of three guided missile destroyers, two frigates and a supply ship, in addition to a submarine and aircraft carrier, have been conducting exercises in the South China Sea. This group patrolled off Chinese-controlled reefs in the Spratly Islands, including Fiery Cross Reef, only a day

before the American FONOP near that reef. All this is looking like dangerous brinkmanship . All the major powers in the South China Sea are trying to achieve an advantageous outcome by pushing dangerous events to the edge of active conflict. Anyone who knows China and its history will know that China will go to the brink . But it will not be China that actually goes over the brink. It’s much more likely to be one of the countries taking China to the brink that does so. China, with a ‘home ground’ advantage and numerous military and civil assets in the region, can readily create a

situation where one of the other parties will be forced to fire the first shot or to back down. Hopefully, though, current rules of engagement won’t allow a first shot to be fired. But we can’t be sure of that.

Significantly, the countries that are taking China to the brink are extra-regional players with often overstated interests in the South China Sea. They are ‘burning their boats behind them’, with nowhere to go other than to back down or fire the ‘first shot’. They have no concept of an end game other than compelling China to back down and follow their ‘rule of law’ . But that is not going to happen . The sad reality is that all this brinkmanship is adding to the strategic distrust that pervades the region at present.

Tensions increasing-multiple claimantsKaplan, 2015(Robert Kaplan, political and economic specialist, “Why the South China Sea is so Crucial”, an expert from “The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific”, business insider, 2/20/2015, http://www.businessinsider.com.au/why-the-south-china-sea-is-so-crucial-2015-2 --MEW)

This heightened maritime awareness that is a product of globalization comes at a time when a host of relatively new and independent state s in Southeast Asia , which only recently have had the wherewithal to flex their muscles at sea , are making territorial claims against each other that in the days of the British Empire were never an issue, because of the supremacy of the Crown globally and its emphasis on free trade and freedom of navigation. This muscle flexing takes the form of “routinized” close encounters between warships of different nations at sea , creating an embryonic risk of armed conflict . One high-ranking official of a South China Sea littoral state was particularly blunt during an off-the-record conversation I had in 2011, saying, “The Chinese never give justifications for their claims. They have a real Middle Kingdom mentality, and are dead set against taking these disputes to court. China,” this official went on, “denies us our right on our own continental shelf. But we will not be treated like Tibet or Xinjiang.” This official said that China is as tough with a country like the Philippines as it is with Vietnam, because while the latter is historically and geographically in a state of intense competition with China, the former is just a weak state that can be intimidated. “ There are just too many claimants to the waters in the South China Sea. The complexity of the issues mitigates against an overall solution, so China simply waits until it becomes stronger. Economically, all these countries will come to be dominated by China,” the official continued, unless of course the Chinese economy itself unravels Once China’s underground submarine base is completed on Hainan Island, “China will be more able to do what it wants..” Meanwhile, more American naval vessels are visiting the area , “so the disputes are being internationalized.” Because there is no practical political or judicial solution, “we support the status quo.” “ If that fails , what is Plan B for dealing with China?” I asked. “ Plan B is the U.S. Navy — Pacific Command. But we will publicly remain neutral in any U.S.-China dispute.” To make certain that I got the message, this official said: “An American military presence is needed to countervail China, but we won’t vocalize that.” The withdrawal of even one U.S. aircraft carrier strike group from the Western Pacific is a “game changer.”

NationalismYes war- SCS conflict inevitable only increased US-China coop solves—O/W everything on magnitude and T/FAsh 10/16/15Timothy Garton Ash is a historian, political writer and Guardian columnist., He is Professor of European Studies at Oxford University. “If US relations with China turn sour, there will probably be war” https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/16/us-relations-china-war-america

What is the biggest challenge facing the next president of the United States? How to deal with China . The relationship between the emerging and the enduring superpower is the greatest geopolitical question of our time.

If Washington and Beijing do not get it right, there will probably be war somewhere in Asia some time over the next decade. Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperialist Russia and the brutality of Islamic State are medium-sized regional challenges by comparison. Climate change and the world economy cannot be managed without American-Chinese cooperation. All this demands a bipartisan American grand strategy for the next 20 years, but US politics seems incapable of generating anything more than a partisan soundbite for the next 20 minutes.

In the South China Sea, China has, by massive dredging operations, turned submerged reefs with names out of the novels of Joseph Conrad – Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross Reef – into artificial islands, and is completing a 3,000m runway on Fiery Cross. President Xi Jinping recently presided over a massive, Kremlin-style parade of China’s military force, with Putin standing beside him as an honoured guest.

In support of its claim to a vast area of the South China Sea, within its “nine-dash-line”, China has rammed Philippine fishing boats and buzzed a US spy plane. The US has responded by telling its Asian allies that it will run “freedom of navigation” patrols past the disputed islands.

Interestingly, when Chinese warships sailed through US territorial waters around the Aleutian islands last month, the US military reacted coolly, saying the Chinese naval vessels passed “in a manner consistent with international law”. The technical term for this is “innocent passage”. So now watch out for the Chinese reaction when US warships make innocent passage past Fiery Cross or Mischief Reef. Battleships sailing defiantly past disputed islands: what century are we in?

All this is bubbling up while Xi is firmly in control at home, with no immediate domestic crisis. But the Chinese

Communist party does face a long-term legitimation crisis. For decades, it has derived political legitimacy from impressive economic growth, which is now slowing down . I believe

Xi is making a massive Leninist gamble that reasserted single-party rule can manage the development of a complex, maturing economy and satisfy the growing expectations of an increasingly educated, urban and informed society. The Chinese leadership’s crude attempt to command the Chinese stock markets to rally earlier this year, reminiscent of King Canute’s confrontation with the incoming tide, is not encouraging.

They can almost certainly keep the lid on for several years but , as always happens

when necessary reform is postponed, the eventual crisis will be larger . At

that point, the temptation for the Communist party leadership to play the nationalist card, perhaps with an actual military move , Galtieri-style, against one of China’s

Malvinas/Falkland Islands, would be very strong . Probably this would not be a direct

confrontation with a formal US ally, but the risks of miscalculation and escalation would be high . With angry, nationalist public opinion in both countries, neither the Chinese nor the American leader could be seen to lose, and both sides have nuclear weapons.

SovereigntySCS tensions high now – China is tightening military posture and solidifying its territorial sovereigntyCheng 6/8 – (Dean Cheng, The Heritage Foundation's research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs, specializes in China's military and foreign policy, previously worked for 13 years as a senior analyst, first with Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC), the Fortune 500 specialist in defense and homeland security, and then with the China Studies division of the Center for Naval Analyses; has a B.A. from Princeton and researched for a doctorate at MIT; 6/8/16, “The South China Sea Set to Boil: Is a U.S.-China Showdown in the Works?,” National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-south-china-sea-set-boil-us-china-showdown-the-works-16502, Accessed 7/11/16, Nikki Pachika)

This summer promises to be a turbulent one for the Asia-Pacific region. As the recent Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore made clear, the United States and China are each promoting a distinctly different view of the regional situation.

The United States continues to reiterate the need for regional stability, while China fundamentally perceives the S outh C hina S ea as a matter of its territorial sovereignty . As important, Beijing once again emphasized that , in its view, it is the U nited S tates that is destabilizing the region , by encouraging China’s neighbors to pursue territorial claims against it.

The fundamental disagreement about the South China Sea is likely to be raised at the coming Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED) talks in Beijing.

This will be the last S&ED talks of the Obama administration, marking the last opportunity for the two sides’ senior leaders to discuss economic and security issues of mutual concern. It is likely that ongoing cyber espionage issues will join the rancorous problem of the South China Sea on the agenda, as well as the need to maintain stability on the Korean peninsula.

But as there has been no common ground on any of these issues before (China and the U.S. each see the other as most able to influence Pyongyang, for example), there is no reason to think that a major breakthrough will occur at the S&ED talks, unless Washington is prepared to make massive concessions .

Later this summer, the Permanent Court of Arbitration is expected to issue its findings in the case brought by the Philippines against China regarding activities in the South China Sea. China refused to participate in the arbitration case, despite signing the U.N. Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST); it is not clear how Beijing will respond if the court find s in favor of Manila , as is widely expected.

One worrisome option is that China may choose to declare an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the S outh C hina S ea. Secretary of State John Kerry

has warned Beijing that this would be a “ provocative and destabilizing act.” While various states, including the U.S., have established ADIZs, China’s air defense identification zone includes a demand that foreign military aircraft file flight plans if they will enter the ADIZ, whether they are bound for Chinese destinations or not.

This position parallels China’s view of the South China Sea, i.e., foreign military vessels may transit, but must not engage in intelligence-gathering and must report their presence to China in advance. A S outh C hina S ea air defense identification zone would reinforce China’s claim that the region is Chinese territory .

Airfields that China has built atop the artificial islands in the Spratlys, and probably at Scarborough Shoal, would provide Beijing with an enhanced ability to enforce its ADIZ claim.

As a map provided by Sen. Dan Sullivan, R-Alaska, demonstrates, Chinese control of the Paracels, the Spratlys, and Scarborough Shoal creates a triangle from which Chinese aircraft would dominate the South China Sea.

Would Beijing undertake such a momentous step? That remains to be seen, but Chinese rhetoric, backed by physical construction to alter facts on the ground and an increasingly capable and modern navy, provide it with the wherewithal.

Even if Beijing doesn’t declare an air defense identification zone this summer, it is clear that it intends to uphold its sovereignty claims in the future

Power StruggleYes SCS war – shifting balance of powerIlman 7/3 – Zidny Ilman, works in Global Civil Society Research Center of University of Indonesia, 2016 (“Is the South China Sea the Stage for the Next World War?” The National Interest, July 3, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-south-china-sea-the-stage-the-next-world-war-16833, Accessed 07-11-2016, AH)

However, some are still left wondering over China’s motives in provoking such regional conflict—including with Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines. How can one explain why China risks a major war that could potentially drag the United States in for a bunch of uninhabited rocks?Some say they are fighting for control over major oil and gas reserves in those seas. But this seems not to be the case. After all, great powers have rarely fought one another in a major war over economic resources in modern history, if at all. Or is it because of China’s nine-dash line? For sure, one needs to differentiate the means, ways and ends of phenomena. The nine-dash line is a means that China uses to justify its policy ends. But it does not explain the endgame it wants to achieve—therefore, it cannot be used to explain its motives in the South China Sea.

Let’s take a look back at the twentieth century. World War I started when Austria-Hungary declared war on and attacked Serbia. So, does it mean that World War I was caused by Austria-Hungary’s invasion? No. Austria-Hungary did start the war, but it was certainly not caused by it. The cause of the war was the great powers’ concern about the prevalent regional order in Europe—and their wish to alter it.

The Germans (together with Austria-Hungary) looked uncomfortably at the shifting balance of power towards the Franco-Russian (and possibly British) alliance. They saw the erosion of Germany’s dominance over the European order while looking for a way to reverse the trend. The French and the Russians, boosted by newly gained power, had been humiliated during the German-led political order before and were also looking for a way to punish Germany along with her allies.

Similar to World War I, World War II started with an invasion, when Hitler invaded Poland. However, Poland was not the   cause   of the Anglo-French and German rivalry escalating to a war in 1939. Instead, the Anglo-French were concerned over the shifting balance of power towards Germany’s favor and sought to prevent it from going further in that direction. That determination finally led to war over Poland’s survival.

Put simply, what Serbia and Poland have in common with the South and East China Seas is that they served as   a venue of great-power rivalry.   But they are definitely not the cause of that rivalry.

To understand the cause of the current U.S.-China rivalry, one needs to see the history and strategic picture of the Asian region. Put simply, one needs to see beyond the South China Sea. Following the defeat of Imperial Japan in World War II, the U nited S tates has been the sole great power that can project its power throughout the region. Since that day, the region has come under American-led regional order. Having only a fraction of the U nited S tates ’ power, other states in the region accepted American primacy.

What is happening today is that China has gathered enough power and is becoming   powerful enough to match (or even surpass)   America’s ability to project power throughout much of Asia . Power means leadership throughout history and with its newly gained power, China wants a bigger role in regional leadership . For sure, though it seems weird for most people, anyone who carefully study history will concede that this is a   normal —though arguably regrettable— state behavior. One might point a finger towards Japan and Germany as comparisons—both of whose rise of power in recent times does not correspond with a regional crisis that risks regional war—and, therefore, accuse China’s behavior as not normal. However, history once again shows that both states are the anomaly—not China.

As Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew once remarked, “Unlike other emergent countries, China wants to be China and accepted as such, not as an honorary member of the West .” It is clear from his observation that China has set its sights on displacing the U nited S tates as the dominant power that will dictate the regional order in the Asia region . This is not to say that we must agree with or accept all China wants to do. We may dislike how our rival thinks and behaves, but we have to understand them. Without understanding how China thinks, a plausible solution to the current conflict will be hard to devise.

Hague rulingYes SCS war — island building and CCP nationalismLouie 7/11 — Simon Louie, policy intern at the Centre for Independent Studies, July 11th 2016 (“Haig South China Sea judgment will be momentous,” Online Opinion, available online at http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=18372, accessed 7/11/16) JL

On July 12, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague is set to hand down its verdict regarding the Philippines claims against China in the South China Sea . Should the verdict go against China’s self-proclaimed interests, then the possibility of a military confrontation - particularly with the U nited S tates , as self-proclaimed guarantor of global freedom of navigation - would escalate dramatically. China claims the majority of the South China Sea as its historic waters, with a nine-dash line extending all the way down to the Natuna islands in Indonesia - more than two thousand kilometres away from the Chinese mainland. Beijing has not only rejected the authority of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to deal with the South China Sea issue, but has also expanded its territorial claims by building islands in areas falling in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. Since 2013 when the case was first filed by the Philippines, China has built seven islets by piling sand on reefs. It has constructed port facilities, military installations and airstrips on these artificial islands, and these bolster China’s foothold in the South China Sea. An influential Chinese paper, the state-run Global Times has said that China should prepare for military conflict - the Global Times is known for its strident nationalist views, and whilst it does not represent government policy it nevertheless has the effect of inflaming Chinese public opinion. At the same time American officials are concerned that the ruling could prompt Beijing to declare an Air Defence Identification Zone ( ADIZ ) over the E ast C hina S ea - when China did the same thing in 2013 over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands the American response was to fly two B-52 bombers over the islands as a show of resolve. It is no surprise that Chinese President Xi Jinping is a much more nationalistic leader than his two predecessors and has been using nationalism as a means for garnering support for the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) . The ‘China Dream’ has become the political manifesto and signature ideology of Xi Jinping’s administration. In more concrete terms the phrase refers to the rejuvenation of China - the Chinese see themselves as returning to greatness or past glory , and the various humiliations from the Opium War to the Second Sino-Japanese War as a mere blip in its long and glorious history. Behind it though, stands a China unsatisfied with the United States led global status quo. It should be noted that the post-war international order was built by the victorious Western powers without the input of China. The Chinese economy is currently undergoing a shift from an investment led economy to a consumption based one, and it is not a given that the transition will be smooth. Indeed, if anything, given China’s gargantuan debts it is indeed possible that a massive debt bust is likely . Given that the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy is predicated on economic growth and national unity it is not inconceivable that in the face of an economic crisis, the CCP will revert to raw nationalism to bolster what little legitimacy it has left. The result of this verdict , and China’s reactions to it, will have tremendous implications for not only East and South-east Asia, but also for Australia and the entire world . Currently $5 trillion of annual shipping passes through the South China Seas and whilst it appears unlikely that China would seek to disrupt this trade, a belligerent China which tries to exert its suzerainty over an international body of water has profound negative implications for the very basis of freedom of navigation through international waters - other countries could very well try to press their claims on open bodies of

water too. Should China choose to ignore the ruling, and continue with its island building and blatant bullying of smaller countries, then the U nited S tates will be confronted with a dilemma - either allow China to continue to have its way, putting the whole international system of freedom of navigation of international waters into question, or confront China militarily with the risk of igniting a major conflict. Both options are distinctly unpalatable to the US - should it choose to allow China to continue to have its way, then this would signal to countries like Japan and the Philippines that US security guarantees are worthless (akin to the Western powers 1930s appeasement of the Nazis), and in such a scenario smaller regional countries may seek to acquire a much stronger military deterrent of their own. China may continue to press its claims, and it is already sending boats to Indonesian waters. Indonesian President Widodo has recently visited the Natuna Islands indicating that he will not stand by idly whilst China encroaches on its sovereignty. On the other hand, the US risks the very real possibility of war with China should it decide to confront China militarily by sending US ships into the disputed waters. Given that Chinese public opinion is already strongly in favour of using force to resolve the South China Sea issue, it would be very difficult for Chinese leaders to back down in the face of an unfavourable ruling. In part the US faces this dilemma because of the Obama administration’s unwillingness to previously confront China over the issue - had it stood up to China earlier on, it could very well have avoided this problem. Should conflict erupt between China and the United States, then it is indeed possible that it could escalate into a gargantuan conflic t - both powers are nuclear armed . How China reacts in the next few days and weeks could very well determine the course of world history.

China will ignore the Philippines challenge. Benner 6-5-16(Tom Benner, Journalist for Al Jazeera, 6-5-16, “Tensions escalate over South China Sea Claim, ” Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/tensions-escalate-south-china-sea-claims-160605065515637.html)

At the weekend-long Shangri-La Dialogue , Chinese military o fficials vowed to ignore a legal ruling expected in the next few weeks by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague on a Philippines' challenge to China's growing assertiveness in the key sea route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

"We do not make trouble, but we have no fear of trouble," said Admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army, who led the Chinese delegation at the summit.

The Hague court is expected to rule on the legality of the so-called " nine-dash line " , China's cartographic marker that it uses to claim territorial rights over most of the resource-rich sea. China's claimed sovereignty stretches hundreds of kilometres to the south and east of its most southerly province of Hainan, covering hundreds of disputed islands and reefs.

The nine-dash line, first shown on a 1947 Chinese map, carves out an area that runs deep into the maritime heart of Southeast Asia, and overlaps claims from Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan.

China has boycotted The Hague tribunal' s proceedings and instead wants bilateral talks with rival claimants , all of which lack China's economic and military prowess.

China rejects the UN court rulingBitzinger 6-21 – Richard Bitzinger, Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Military Transformations Program at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Junes 21st 2016(“China’s Militarization of the South China Sea: Building a strategic strait.” Asia Times, Available online at http://atimes.com/2016/06/chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-building-a-strategic-strait/, Accessed 6/24/16, AJ)

The UN arbitration court will soon rule on the case, brought by the Philippines against China, over who owns the Scarborough Shoal, located in the South China Sea

(SCS). It is all but certain that China will reject the ruling , no matter what it says, because Beijing has already decided that the SCS is a Chinese lake , subject to its “ indisputable sovereignty .” However, the issue of Chinese hegemony in the SCS is less and less about economics – oil and gas reserves, or fishing rights – and increasingly about the militarization of this body of water. The South China Sea is becoming, quite simply, a key defensive zone for China.

MiscalcTensions will escalate! Miscommunication and misclac! Arms race! Symonds 16 — Peter Symonds, editor for the world socialist website, 5-30-2016 ("The danger of nuclear war between the US and China," 5-30-2016, Available Online at https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/05/30/pers-m30.html, Accessed 7-11-2016-- MEW)In the campaigns currently underway for the US presidency and the Australian federal election, a conspiracy of silence reigns over the preparations for war, aimed at deadening the consciousness of the population to the rising danger of nuclear conflict. Two nuclear-armed powers are facing off not only in the South China Sea , but other dangerous flashpoints such as North Korea and Taiwan, each of which has been greatly exacerbated by Washington’s “ pivot to Asia ” and aggressive military build- up throughout the region. An arms race is underway that finds its most acute expression in the arena of nuclear weaponry , delivery systems and associated technologies. Determined to maintain its supremacy in Asia and globally, the US is planning to spend $1 trillion over the next three decades to develop a broader range of sophisticated nuclear weapons and means for delivering them to their targets. The unstated aim of the Pentagon is to secure nuclear primacy—that is, the means for obliterating China’s nuclear arsenal and thus its ability to mount a counter attack. The Chinese response , which is just as reactionary, is to ensure it retains the ability to strike back in a manner that would kill tens of millions in the United States. The reality of these dangers was underscored last week by the release of a report by the US-based Union of Concerned Scientists ( UCS ). It chillingly warned: “Twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year, the governments of the United States and the People’s Republic of China are a few poor decisions away from starting a war that could escalate rapidly and end in a nuclear exchange . Mismatched perceptions increase both the possibility of war and the likelihood it will result in the use of nuclear weapons. Miscommunication or misunderstanding could spark a conflict that both governments may find difficult to stop.” While appealing for the two sides to acknowledge the risks and heighten diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict, the UCS analysis offered not the slightest hope that such steps would be taken. The report bleakly declared: “Lack of mutual trust and a growing sense that their differences may be irreconcilable incline both governments to continue looking for military solutions —for new means of coercion that help them feel more secure. Establishing the trust needed to have confidence in diplomatic resolutions to the disagreements, animosities, and suspicions that have troubled leaders of the United States and the PRC [China] for almost 70 years is extremely difficult when both governments take every effort to up the technological ante as an act of bad faith.”

SCS conflict will escalate- Chinese aggression could spark miscalc. Glaser 12 — Bonnie Glaser, Bonnie Glaser is a Senior Adviser for Asia in the Freeman Chair in China Studies, where she works on issues related to Chinese foreign and security policy. She is concomitantly a senior associate with CSIS Pacific Forum and a consultant for the US government on East Asia, May 31, 2016

(“Armed Clash in the South China Sea” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883, accessed 7/11/16, AC)

The risk of conflict in the South China Sea is significant . China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines have competing territorial and jurisdictional claims, particularly over rights to exploit the region's possibly extensive reserves of oil and gas. Freedom of navigation in the region is also a contentious issue , especially between the United States and China over the right of U.S. military vessels to operate in China's two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). These tensions are shaping—and being shaped by—rising apprehensions about the growth of China's military power and its regional intentions. China has embarked on a substantial modernization of its maritime paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary. At the same time, it is developing capabilities that would put U.S. forces in the region at risk in a conflict, thus potentially denying access to the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific. Given the growing importance of the U.S.-China relationship, and the Asia-Pacific region more generally, to the global economy, the United States has a major interest in preventing any one of the various disputes in the South China Sea from escalating militarily. The Contingencies Of the many conceivable contingencies involving an armed clash in the South China Sea, three especially threaten U.S. interests and could potentially prompt the United States to use force. The most likely and dangerous contingency is a clash stemming from U.S. military operations within China's EEZ that provokes an armed Chinese response. The United States holds that nothing in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or state practice negates the right of military forces of all nations to conduct military activities in EEZs without coastal state notice or consent. China insists that reconnaissance activities undertaken without prior notification and without permission of the coastal state violate Chinese domestic law and international law. China routinely intercepts U.S. reconnaissance flights conducted in its EEZ and periodically does so in aggressive ways that increase the risk of an accident similar to the April 2001 collision of a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter jet near Hainan Island. A comparable maritime incident could be triggered by Chinese vessels harassing a U.S. Navy surveillance ship operating in its EEZ , such as occurred in the 2009 incidents involving the USNS Impeccable and the USNS Victorious. The large growth of Chinese submarines has also increased the danger of an incident, such as when a Chinese submarine collided with a U.S. destroyer's towed sonar array in June 2009. Since neither U.S. reconnaissance aircraft nor ocean surveillance vessels are armed, the United States might respond to dangerous behavior by Chinese planes or ships by dispatching armed escorts . A miscalculation or misunderstanding could then result in a deadly exchange of fire, leading to further military escalation and precipitating a major political crisis . Rising U.S.- China mistrust and intensifying bilateral strategic competition would likely make managing such a crisis more difficult.

SCS war likely – miscalc, Chinese deterrence, and recent military exercises prove Baohui 15 —Professor of Political Science and Director of the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies at Lingnan University in Hong Kong. He is the author of 'China's Assertive Nuclear Posture: State Security in an Anarchic International Order'

(Routledge 2015), 2015 (“China, US, and the Unintended Crisis on the South China Sea,” The Nation, 11-14-2015, Available to Subscribing Institutions via LexisNexis, Accessed on 7-11-2016)//CM

RSIS On October 27, USS Lassen, a guided missile destroyer , entered the 12-nautical mile zone of one of the Chinese -controlled features in the Spratly islands , which are currently going through massive land reclamation. China immediately issued strong protests against the US act. However, the Pentagon and the US Navy have stated that the so-called "freedom of navigation patrols" will become routine in the future. Although China did not take concrete actions this time to confront the US warship, future such operations could gravely destabilise the South China Sea situation, even peace and stability of the whole region. They could touch off an unintended escalation and push the two countries towards military conflicts. The logic is quite obvious. Dynamics of escalation More actions by the US Navy will corner the Chinese leadership and force them to respond to perceived provocations to its national interests and power reputation. After all, the South China Sea constitutes an essential part of China's geostrategic interests. Moreover, China's reputation as a great power is at stake when its key interests face a direct and deliberate challenge by another great power. Further, China may feel the urge to stand firm in order to deter future escalation in US challenges to its interests and reputation. Chinese decision-makers may worry that if China does not respond to this perceived US provocation, Washington may escalate pressures on China in the future. The above strategic imperatives could result in Chinese decisions and measures to resist further US naval intrusions into the 12-nautical-mile zones around its claimed islands in the Spratly chain. Indeed, on November 2, 2015, Vice Admiral Yi Xiaoguang, PLA's deputy chief of staff, stated that China "will use all means necessary to defend its sovereignty" if the US takes similar actions . The next day, General Fang Changlong, vice president of the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party, told Admiral Harry Harris Jr, commander of the United States Pacific Command, that any future actions by the US Navy could trigger accidental escalations that harm the interests of both countries. Indeed, the Chinese are also escalating their actions. The PLA revealed that its air force conducted war games on October 30 in the South China Sea. Specifically, the photos released by the PLA suggest the war games involved Chinese J- 11b jet fighters taking off from Woody Island, which has the closest airport to support military operations in the Spratlys chain of islands. Then, the PLA Air Force announced that it conducted a joint war game on November 2 that included a H-6k bomber launching cruise missiles in the South China Sea. Finally, on November 3, the PLA released rare photos of the JL-2 sea-based strategic missile, which is borne by China's Type 094 nuclear submarines, lifting out from the sea. Chinese media analyses all suggest that the unexpected release of the photos is meant to deter the US. Therefore, it is obvious that China has stepped up deterrence against a potential repeat of similar US operations in the South China Sea. Various Chinese rhetoric and measures suggest that China could resort to more concrete and forceful measures to confront the US navy. If so, a face-off between the two navies becomes inevitable . Even worse, the face-off may trigger an escalation toward military conflicts. However, the US military appears oblivious to this scenario. A logical answer lies in the current conventional military imbalance between the two countries. The vast US conventional military superiority in theory discourages China from responding forcefully to the projected scenario. It is highly likely that US decision-makers assume China would adopt of policy of inaction when facing intruding American naval vessels. This US expectation is flawed , as China is a major nuclear power . When cornered, nuclear-armed states can threaten asymmetric escalatio n to deter an adversary from harming its key interests. The September 3 military parade in Beijing revealed that China's new

generation of tactical missiles, such as the DF-26, could be nuclear-armed. Recent information also indicates that China's air-launched long-range cruise missiles can also carry tactical nuclear warheads. Indeed, the latest photos of the JL-2 sea-based nuclear missile lifting out of the sea could be a veiled nuclear signalling by China to deter the US. The challenge for the US is that while the South China Sea concerns China's strategic interests, few would think that these Spratly islands constitute US core interests. The asymmetry in stakes would certainly give China an advantage in "the balance of resolve" over the US. If so, when a crisis situation escalates and starts to involve potential nuclear scenarios, the US faces the stark choice of either backing down first or facing the prospect of fighting a nuclear-armed China . Neither option is attractive and both exact high costs , either in reputation or human lives , for the US. Therefore, it would be imprudent for the US to challenge China. By underestimating Beijing's resolve to defend its interests, reputation and deterrence credibility, this plan could touch off a spiral of escalation that would in the end harm US interests. What is vital for peace and stability in the South China Sea is that all concerned parties should base their strategies and policies on worst-case scenarios. Both China and the US need to consider how their actions may lead to unintended consequences, especially unintended escalation toward military conflict. Prudence is very much needed at this stage of Sino-US relations, when mutual mistrust has reached an all-time high. Imprudent actions by one or both parties may well turn mistrust into bloody military conflicts. Nobody, especially countries in the region, wants this scenario. If the US claims to be the defender of world peace and regional stability, it must do everything to avoid this scenario through unintended escalations. Zhang Baohui is Professor of Political Science and Director of #124the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies at Lingnan University in Hong Kong. He is the author of 'China's Assertive Nuclear Posture: State Security in an Anarchic International Order' (Routledge 2015).

A2 DiplomacyInternational Diplomacy fails on the South China Sea – wavering support, feasibility, and US engagement proveParameswaran 15(Prashant Parameswaran, Journalist for the Diplomat, 4-10-15, “A New Way to Resolve Disputes in the South China Sea?,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/one-new-way-to-resolve-the-south-china-sea-disputes/)While it is not uncommon to hear versions of such an idea floated as potential options publicly and privately, it is certainly not one of the more orthodox approaches usually featured in the headlines. It would also seem at first glance to make some sense, if achieving some clarity as soon as possible is the overriding objective. But the proposal would also likely face several formidable challenges if actually attempted. First, even leaving China aside — given its allergic reaction to ‘internationalizing’ the issue — it is unclear how much support there would be among the remaining S outh China Sea claimants for such a public way to resolve differing claims . A few may not even wish to attend the conference, as they may prefer more low-profile or quieter ways of handling disputes. Much of this will also depend on form rather than substance. Heavy involvement by outside actors including the United States might appeal to bolder claimants like the Philippines or Vietnam but be less appealing to Malaysia, for example — particularly if it is read as external interference by China and places these states in a rather awkward position between Washington and Beijing. And let’s not even mention the diplomatic minefield of inviting both Taiwan and mainland China to participate in an international dialogue on sovereignty issues.

Second, assuming the conference is convened and most of the claimants do attend, resolving claims between parties is likely to be notoriously difficult in practice. For all the attention paid to China’s nine-dash line and its challenge to other claimants, several Southeast Asian states have unresolved disputes amongst themselves as well. Blair suggested that some of these issues might be more negotiable than other, fiercer disputes because they do not involve lost homelands, large populations, or even significant economic resources (depending on how one estimates potential hydrocarbon resources). Instead, the South China Sea disputes are largely about national pride and politics . To be fair, incremental efforts have been made to at least resolve some of these disputes over the years, including Malaysia’s quiet resolution with Brunei in 2009. But as the recent controversy between Malaysia and the Philippines over issues related to the South China Sea and Sabah during the past few weeks has illustrated, some of these disagreements are tough nuts to crack.

Third and lastly, even if the conference did leave with some resolution of the disputes between claimants, it is unclear how exactly these claimants , along with other outside actors, would implement this new reality on the ground , as Blair proposed, and whether they have both the capabilities and the willingness to do so. This is particularly the case if China is not part of how that reality is shaped; Beijing has so far aggressively demonstrated that it is serious about altering the status quo in its favor – including through coercion if necessary. Would the Philippines or Malaysia, or even ASEAN countries collectively, be expected to challenge Beijing over areas that lie within the nine-dash line following the conference, and, if so, how much would they be willing to risk? I have noted more specifically some of the challenges inherent in even slightly more forward-leaning individual and regional approaches in the maritime realm and the South China Sea, let alone overt challenges to China there (see, for instance, here, here and here).

As for outside actors, taking the example of the United States, how much would Washington be willing to commit to operationalize this new reality given its nuanced policy of not taking a position on the disputes themselves but being concerned about how they are resolved and their broader consequences for the region? Blair, for his part, believes that

U.S. policy in the South China Sea thus far has been “ tentative and quite weak ” and does not adequately recognize key American interests. But that still leaves the more difficult question of how far America is willing to go – including committing assets and risking a downturn in the U.S.-China relationship – to see a proper resolution to conflicting claims in the South China Sea.

China and ASEAN say no.Kuok 15 – Lynn Kuok, fellow at Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies, a visiting fellow at the Harvard Law School, and a senior visiting fellow at the Centre for International Law, May 2015(“Tides of Change: Taiwan’s evolving position in the South China Sea,” Brookings, Available online at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/05/taiwan-south-china-sea-kuok/taiwan-south-china-sea-kuok-paper.pdf, Accessed on 6/22/16, AJ)

Taiwan’s recent moves and approach notwithstanding, very little has been made of the role Taipei can play in contributing to better management of the dispute and overall stability in the South China Sea. At the root of this is China’s “one-China” principle, namely, “there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.”4

The principle has cast a long shadow over Taiwan and has resulted in Taiwan’s exclusion from regional negotiations and forums relating to the South China Sea, such as negotiations on a code of conduct, as well as cooperative activities with claimants. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states are worried about being seen to fall foul of China’s one-China principle . Moreover, they see little benefit in including Taiwan in the fray. To them, Taiwan’s claims are virtually indistinguishable from China’s and there are lingering concerns about cross-strait co-operation to defend claims in the South China Sea, despite clear statements from Taipei that this is out of the question.

China is cautious about Taiwan’s involvement in the S outh China Sea as it regards this as a slippery slope toward recognition of ROC sovereignty . Beijing also appears to have linked flexibility on Taiwan’s regional and international participation to Taipei demonstrating a greater willingness to discuss the island’s political relationship with the mainland. Till then, China’s default position is to stand firm against it . This, however, is counterproductive insofar as it is resented by Taiwan and undermines cross-strait relations.

Goes NuclearConflict goes nuclear – conventional and nuclear forces are linked and indistinguishable.Talmadge 16 – Caitlin Talmadge, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Elliot School of International Relations at George Washington University, February 2016(“Preventing Nuclear Escalation in U.S.-China Conflict”, Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/china_policy_brief_talmadge_0.pdf, Accessed 7-1-16, AJ)

Conventional war between the United States and China remains a low-probability event. But if such a war were to break out, the risk of nuclear escalation —that is, actual

detonation of nuclear weapons— likely would be high er than many observers realize. Some

aspects of a likely U.S. campaign in a conventional war against China could look to China like an attempt at conventional counterforce, pressur ing China to escalate to nuclear use while it still could.

This escalation scenario is distinct from other possible pathways to nuclear use. For example, in the Cold War the classic scenario for escalation was pre-emption , the notion that one side might try to use its nuclear weapons to pre-emptively destroy the arsenal of the other. Other scenarios for nuclear escalation include mistaken launch based on faulty warning information, and unauthorized launch by a commander who is physically able to use nuclear weapons but does not have political permission to do so. In addition, some states develop doctrines that deliberately threaten to escalate to the first use of nuclear weapons in the event of rapid conventional losses.

Nuclear escalation in response to an opponent’s perceived attempt at conventional counterforce constitutes an alternative pathway to nuclear escalation . It can arise when one side’s conventional military campaign infringes or appears poised to infringe on the other side’s ability to use or control its nuclear arsenal . For example, conventional military attacks by one side against the other’s command and control networks, air defenses, early warning radars, submarines, and missile sites have the potential not only to degrade that side’s conventional capabilities but also its nuclear capabilities. After all, command and control networks for conventional forces may also be relevant to the control of nuclear weapons; air defense systems may protect both conventional and nuclear assets; early warning radars are relevant to both conventional and nuclear operations; attack

submarines and ballistic missile submarines share shore-based infrastructure, with the former often protecting the latter ; and the same sites can house both conventional and nuclear missiles (called co-location).

For all of these reasons, a state subject to attack on these targets may have a difficult time distinguishing whether the adversary is merely conducting a normal conventional campaign, or is seeking to neuter the state’s nuclear capabilities . If the state fears the latter, it may wish to escalate to nuclear use while it still has the ability to do so. Such fears also could lead the state to engage in behaviors that make other pathways to escalation more likely. For example, the state could opt for more decentralized control of nuclear weapons, which would reduce vulnerability to conventional counterforce but heighten the danger of unauthorized launch.

No Conflict

GenericNo ECS or SCS war – it’s all posturingCronin 15 – Patrick M. Cronin, Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, Feb 27, 2015(“Countering China’s Maritime Coercion,” The Diplomat, Available online at http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/countering-chinas-maritime-coercion/, Accessed 6/22/16, AJ)Is China-U.S. competition for primacy in Asia this century’s greatest threat to peace? Some analysts think so. But in leaping from Sino-American competition to potential world war, they miss the obvious : Chinese leaders probe, seize opportunities, and challenge the international system with creeping assertions of sovereignty in the East and South China Seas. Yet they have no intention of sparking war , and they know that

American, Japanese and other leaders are equally averse to risking so much over something as arcane as maritime boundaries and rights .

Odds of SCS war slim due to balancing effect Jennings 16- Ralph Jennings, Attended National Chengchi University, a news reporter stationed in Taipei since 2006, tracking Taiwanese companies and local economic trends that resonate offshore. At Reuters through 2010, I looked intensely at the island’s awkward relations with China. More recently, studied high-tech trends in greater China expanded my overall news coverage to surrounding Asia, 2016 (“Why Odds Of War In The Contested South China Sea Are Near Zero,” Forbes, June 6th, Available online at http://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2016/06/06/why-odds-of-war-in-the-contested-south-china-sea-are-near-zero/#40cc9da735e0, Accessed 07-11-16, WSS)

If you live in Taiwan, you know how this works: Show up in a café or a library and find the tables occupied not by people but their stuff. Books and a water bottle, even a laptop computer, tell you “don’t sit here, it’s occupied.” Owners of the stuff aren’t in the toilet. They’re in a class or out shopping. Seat seekers usually oblige the hint even though it’s a slap in the face, or maybe just a forgettable nip.

This metaphor happens to apply to the South China Sea, a tropical Asian body of water contested by seven governments, including an expansionist China and others backed by Beijing’s rival world superpower the United States. Taiwan is a claimant as well. Despite speculation about armed conflict as China bores deep into other countries’ maritime territory, the parties have learned during their dispute of more than 40 years to avoid one another’s stuff yet keep saying in public that it’s all theirs and please everyone else stay away . China, for example, disagrees that Malaysia has a territorial right to explore for undersea natural gas around the Spratly Islands, but it doesn’t sabotage the equipment. Vietnam and Taiwan claim islets elsewhere in the Spratlys, one archipelago in the 3.5 million-square-meter ocean, that are so close you can see from one to the next. But they don’t attack and Taiwan says it has even helped Vietnamese vessels – erstwhile maritime intruders per Taiwanese law – recover from storm damage. The two governments still occasionally point fingers for infringing on each other’s maritime claims to parts of the ocean that’s packed with fish and undersea fuels.

Armed conflict would follow only if a claimant took the books and laptop off someone’s metaphorical library table and there’s little precedent. “I only think

there would be a war if Vietnam or the Philippines tried retaking territory already seized by Beijing,” says Sean King, senior vice president with consulting firm Park Strategies in New York. “I think a de facto code of conduct is evolving, most easily shaped by Beijing.”

Fear of conflict has obvious merit . Vietnam fired on two Chinese ships in 1974 and in 1988 China killed 74 Vietnamese sailors as it sank or demolished three ships. Two years ago Chinese and Vietnamese boats sparred after Beijing allowed a Chinese state oil company to park a rig off Vietnam’s coast. China’s militarization of some of the sea’s approximately 500 islets among the various archipelagos raises more concern, prompting weaker claimants such as the Philippines to seek help from the United States or start buying more weapons.

But those upsets are oddball incidents, nothing near routine. No one wants a war despite the maddening erosion of their claims and the economic opportunity they represent . First, the countries claiming the S outh C hina S ea have been leaving their stuff there a long time and coast guards from other places know where it is , reducing odds of a mishap . China and the U nited S tates both move in “predictable” ways and military commanders from each side have probably ordered no shooting except in “extreme” cases , says Denny Roy, senior fellow with the East-West Center think tank in Honolulu. The idea is the U nited S tates could strike on behalf of its old colony the Philippines as the two sides have increased defense cooperation since 2014.

But the United States, China and other Asian countries with maritime claims depend on one another too much economically to get into an armed struggle , says Lin Chong-pin, a retired strategic studies professor in Taiwan. Interdependence has surged since the Global Financial Crisis seven years ago, he says. China, he adds, since 1982 has advocated struggle without a reaching a breaking point. “The unprecedented magnitude of interdependence of powers in the world and especially after the great recession 2009 is such that they wouldn’t want a war,” Lin says.

SCS won’t escalate- interdependence and diplomacy checks- assumes military modernization and Chinese aggression Chaibi 13Abraham Chaibi, 3-4-2013, "The outlook for continuing stability in the South China Sea," OxPol (Oxford University Political Blog), http://blog.politics.ox.ac.uk/the-outlook-for-continuing-stability-in-the-south-china-sea/, Accessed 7/11/16//SRawalWhat then is the evidence suggesting a continued reluctance to engage in full-scale military confrontation? Although in the past conflict has often arisen between economically interdependent nations (viz. the previous peak of global trade in 1914), the China-ASEAN relationship is one of fundamental interdependence of production , visible in the prevalence of international supply chaining in manufacturing processes , rather than solely trade and labour movement[i]. The burgeoning economic

interdependence and growth of neighbouring states contributes a major incentive to prevent a conflagration . $5.3 trillion of trade , of which approximately 20% is US, transits the S outh C hina S ea annually and any interruption would not only severely restrict regional trade revenues , but would also very likely guarantee US military intervention[i i] . The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is becoming increasingly interconnected and 2015 will mark a key turning point with the opening of internal ASEAN borders for free movement of labor. The ASEAN bloc has also concluded a number of reconciliation agreements with China. Regarding security, both the 2002 Code of Conduct and the 2011 Guidelines to the Code of Conduct are intended to help coordinate diplomacy and maintain peace in South China Sea disputes. Economically China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner since 2009, and at its opening in 2010 the ASEAN-China free trade area (ACFTA) became the largest in the world by population. These arrangements come at a time when growing estimates of the value of the natural resources contained in the South China Sea are generating pressures associated with ensuring energy security. Economic interdependence between China and ASEAN, however, is not the sole factor at play. In areas with considerable interstate tension sub-state actors have often contributed to the deterioration of international relations, most prominently with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand tipping Europe into World War I. Recent developments in state-level Chinese political and military discourse reflect a strong interest in cooperation. Chinese President Hu Jintao’s 2011 discussions with Filipino President Corazon Aquino firmly expressed the hope that “ the countries concerned may put aside disputes and actively explore forms of common development in the relevant sea areas”[iii]. Additionally in 2011 the Chinese State Council Information Office released a white paper with a similar emphasis on joint development . Yet China is also reported to have developed internal fractures in its South China Sea policy, with a number of different ministries controlling paramilitary units that are not under express government oversight[iv]. For example, the Bureau of Fisheries Administration (BFA) now directs a relatively well-equipped law enforcement fleet that is tasked with patrolling Chinese-owned fishing areas. Such interest groups repeatedly instigate minor disputes with their ASEAN counterparts and the US navy that exacerbate state-level discussions and risk eventually drawing unintended consequences (characteristically, in 2004 two BFA vessels obstructed a US Navy surveillance ship in the Yellow Sea). The region has also seen a rise in high-tech militarization , with rapid development in areas ranging from aircraft carriers and submarines to cyber-espionage; this is likely to further increase due to the 2011 US “pivot to Asia” and military surge. The pivot is considered to be a sign that the US intends to continue playing a leadership role in East Asia, a strategy at odds with China’s vision[v]. An associated complication is the imprecise definition of US commitments to its ally nations in the event of disputes in contested territories, especially vis-à-vis the Philippines and Vietnam, and the possibility that alliances will be used to escalate a small battle into a regional affair. The US is making efforts to address these complications ; for the first time since RIMPACS’s creation in 1971, China has been invited to participate in a US-led naval exercise . Positive near-term repercussions of growing US involvement have also been postulated; analysts suggest that one of the root causes behind Chinese interest in cooperation is the fear that aggression in the South China Sea will drive other parties to strengthen their ties with the US[vi]. The relative wealth of economic and diplomatic compromises on all sides presents a compelling argument that under current conditions, disputes in the South China Sea will continue to be restrained to small-scale skirmishes that do not threaten overall stability. This is not to say that the increase in regional tension is insignificant, but rather that the involved parties all have a strong interest in maintaining mutual growth and have demonstrated their willingness to make strategic sacrifices to maintain the status quo. Furthermore as China is the common link in the majority of the disputes, it is probable that it will be at the heart of any conflict — and China has frequently shown restraint in this regard

(though not so, for example, in Tibet). In terms of China’s priorities, policy analysts tend to agree that if China were to begin a large

DiplomacyDiplomacy solves Nye 15 - Joseph S. Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs ("Is U.S.-China Conflict Imminent in the South China Sea?." The Huffington Post, June 3, 2015.)Raam Taambe

The U.S. response was designed to prevent China from creating a fait accompli that could close off large parts of the South China Sea. Nevertheless, the original policy of not becoming embroiled in the sovereignty dispute continues to make sense. The irony is that the U.S. Senate's failure to ratify UNCLOS means that the U.S. cannot take China to ITLOS over its efforts to convert reefs into islands and claim exclusion zones that could interfere with the right of free passage — a major U.S. interest.

But, because China has ratified UNCLOS and the U.S. respects it as customary international law, there is a basis for serious direct negotiation over clarification of the ambiguous nine-dashed line and the preservation of freedom of the seas. With properly managed diplomacy, a U.S.-China conflict in the South China Sea can and should be avoided.

No SCS conflict – China will resort to diplomacy and negotiations – expert consensusBaculinao 16 – Eric Baculinao, Reporter for NBC News, Jan 24th 2016(“China will not initiate military conflict over Island Disputes: Expert,” NBC News, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/china/china-will-not-initiate-military-conflict-over-island-disputes-expert-n501851, Accessed 6/29/16, AJ)

BEIJING — China will not start a war over disputed islands in the S outh China Sea amid recent muscle-flexing, experts with close links to the country's government told NBC News .

"We will not initiate military conflict to recover islands illegally occupied by other countries," said Wu Shicun, the former foreign affairs chief of Hainan province, an island in the South

China Sea. "Our stand is to resort to negotiations [with] the countries directly involved, to resolve the territorial and maritime disputes."

Wu is the president of the National Institute of South China Sea Studies and acts as a sort of unofficial spokesman on the issue for the government of President Xi Jinping.

China claims almost all of the South China Sea, including reclaimed coral reefs known as the Spratly Islands that sit in an area thought to be rich in oil and gas reserves. Beijing has built runways, seaports and other facilities on the Spratlys.

The U.S. — as well as Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan, which have overlapping claims with China — condemn Beijing's moves in the region. Washington has vowed to defend freedom of passage through the waters.

"Make no mistake, the United States will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, as we do around the world, and the South China Sea is not and will not be an exception," Defense Secretary Ash Carter said on October 13.

On Oct. 27, a U.S. destroyer sailed within 12 nautical miles of the Spratlys in an open challenge to Beijing.

Related: China Accuses U.S. of 'Serious Military Provocation'

Shi Yinhong, a senior foreign policy scholar at Renmin University of China and foreign policy adviser to the government, agreed with Wu that Beijing was unlikely to "launch unprovoked war."

"Other countries have also said the same, and this is all helpful for peace and stability in the South China Sea," he said. "There will be measures to slow things down. China will adopt a new diplomacy to try to lower tensions with the U.S. and other relevant countries."Fiery Cross reef, located in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, on Sept. 3, 2015. Handout / Reuters

While insisting that China "will not initiate hostilities," Wu stuck by Beijing's line that building on the reclaimed Spratlys was "within China's sovereign rights," denying a Pentagon report that they could extend China's military reach.

"Any military facilities we build on them will be to secure the safety of Chinese personnel and installations involved," Wu said. "Any ordinary person can tell that these tiny outposts cannot play a major role in any military conflict."

Being would be open to sharing oil and gas resources under what he called " joint development" agreements in areas under Chinese control , he said.

According to Wu, a 1999 incident should be seen as a sign that China would not resort to violence over such disputes. That was when Philippines deliberately grounded a warship on the disputed Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratlys to claim the atoll. The Philippines keeps a handful of marines on the wrecked and rusting warship to this day.

"China has been exercising great restraint," Hong Lei, the spokesman for China's Foreign Ministry told NBC News when asked about the ongoing dispute on Second Thomas Shoal. "We maintain that relevant disputes should be resolved between parties directly concerned through dialogues and consultation on the basis of historical facts and international laws. China and other countries should work together to maintain peace and stability of the region."

No SCS War — Diplomacy Solves and Tensions Don’t Cause Conflict. Wiessmann 14 — Mikael Weissmann, Senior Lecturer at the Swedish Defence University, Senior Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, PhD in Peace and Development Research from the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, M.Soc.Sci. in Peace and Conflict Studies from Uppsala University, BA in International Relations and Economics from the University of Queensland, 2014 (“Why is there a relative peace in the South China Sea?” Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Accessible Online at

http://www.mikaelweissmann.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Weissmann_Why-is-there-peace-in-the-SCS-ISEAS-chapter.pdf, Accessed On 07-11-2016)

This is the case also after the SCS situation has deteriorated since late 2007 , in particular

between China and Vietnam and China and the Philippines. These developments do not increase the risk for more confrontations , at least if the trend continues. Their impact so far should not be overestimated . There are signs that China understands that it has pushed too far .12 It is also clear that diplomacy continues to be the preferred option among all parties , and the general commitment to cooperative approaches aimed at reducing the risk of conflict , joint development , and the protection of the marine environment remains .13 The regionalisation process has continued, with substantial progress in particularly in the economic sphere with the implementation of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) 1 January 2010.

Thus, despite the increased tensions, the unstable peace continues to tilt towards a stable peace . The parties do not perceive each other as enemies , and in the short-term perspective, the U.S. continues to be a safe guard for peace . In the

longer-term perspective, as long as China continues to focus on its need for economic development there are strong incentives for continuing to develop positive relations with its Southeast Asian neighbours . It should here be noted that China's assertive stance has not come as a shock for an ASEAN that has been deceived by the Chinese "charm offensive", as some analysts suggests.14 As argued by Dewi Fortuna Anwar, the ASEAN members "were and continue to be fully aware of both the inherent promises and dangers that China present", and it continues to believe "that the best course of dealing with China ... is to engage and integrate it fully into the regional order".15

SCS states prefer stability and diplomacy – prefer data over alarmism Huang, 15(5/13, Chin-Hao, Political Science Professor-Yale, “Security Dimensions of China’s Relations with Southeast Asia,” Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Huang_Written%20Testimony_5.13.2015%20Hearing.pdf)

The conventional wisdom points to China’s recent maritime actions as aggressive, revisionist, and disruptive to regional stability. To many, Beijing’s aspirations in the South China Sea mirror-image what other rising powers have done in the past: establish blue water extensions of its territorial borders to build an oceanic empire. That the claimant states in the South China Sea are taking steps to extend their sovereign jurisdiction unilaterally to guarantee their access to natural resources indicate rising tensions, competition, and confrontation that will only intensify in the years ahead. If China’s actions are clear departures from its baseline policies, then the narrative about the dangers that an increasingly aggressive and confident China portends for the region is probably accurate. For example, the sudden discovery of substantial deposits of natural resources such as oil and gas in the contested seabed could be a trigger point for rapid escalation. Or, perhaps China may unilaterally decide to hasten the “salami-slicing” strategy and use force because, put simply, it can. China could even be emboldened to stake out its own sphere of influence to counter or even undermine U.S. role in Southeast Asia,

with military build-up and deterrence at the forefront in the contested seas. But, if the conventional wisdom that territoriality, resources, and power projection are all so central to China’s strategic priorities in its latest maritime adventures, it is equally important to probe deeper and further on this puzzle: why hasn’t a regional war—even if a limited one—break out between China and the other claimant states in the South China Sea? In other words, to what degree is the South China Sea—and the region more broadly—really “ripe for rivalry?” I offer a slightly different view from the standard, alarmist narrative. While lowlevel confrontations have occurred, there is no clear pattern (yet) that the clashes are escalating in lockstep to a militarized conflict and outright balancing in Southeast Asia. In fact, a closer reading of regional trends, and a comparison of observable data lead to the preliminary conclusion that even in one of the most uncertain security environments , China and the other claimant states appear to be seeking ways to manage relations with each other that emphasize restraint and reciprocity , rather than a military escalation in the South China Sea. This testimony provides an attempt to more carefully assess the developments in the South China Sea. To do so, I compare across time to see how different China’s current actions are from past behavior and analyzes them across the region. This provides one way to assess what China and the other key claimant states are actually doing, in addition to what they are saying, and the degree to which the region has heightened threat perceptions about China’s behavior in the South China Sea. In particular, I look at three common issues and claims about increasing aggression in the South China Sea, namely: (1) militarization of the conflict; (2) oil and natural resources; and (3) the likelihood of China establishing an air defense identification zone in the South China Sea. Why is this important for U.S. security interests in the Southeast Asia? Put simply, if the South China Sea presents a more limited existential security threat to any of the Southeast Asian claimant states than we commonly presume, then the strategic way forward with regards to the U.S. rebalancing strategy to the region would need to move beyond security deterrence and militarization and begin to emphasize more on political and diplomatic leadership and forging stronger economic partnerships with Southeast Asia. Equally important, as regional governments’ interests begin to converge in Southeast Asia and align ever more closely In their positions over the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Washington should support this regional effort and allow for ASEAN to come up with a unified and more powerful, collective bargaining voice vis-à-vis China. I. Restrained Militarization

Direct military confrontation in the South China Sea has been surprisingly low . The last time an actual military battle occurred in the South China Sea was nearly thirty years ago in 1988 at the Fiery Cross Reef. Claiming that it was carrying out a scientific mission on behalf of the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 3 Organization (UNESCO), the Chinese government dispatched Chinese naval vessels to the Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea to build observations stations. Vietnam, which had previously claimed the Fiery Cross Reef, lodged formal complaints and sent armed forces to disrupt the Chinese construction of the observation towers on the reef. An armed confrontation lasting 28 minutes ensued , with 75 Vietnamese personnel killed or missing and three Vietnamese naval ships sunk or set ablaze. Since the armed confrontation, the Vietnamese Defense Ministry has gradually fortified and expanded its presence in 29 islets and reefs in the Spratly Islands, making Vietnam the claimant state with the most number of islets and reefs under its control in the South China Sea.

China’s policy in the South China Sea is calculated – their focus is on stability and assertiveness is not an inherent goal, they avoid direct use of force and resort to multilateral cooperation. Zhou 6-20 – ZHOU FANGYIN, Professor and Director of the Center for China's Regional Strategies, Guangdong Institute for International Strategies, Guangdong

University of Foreign Studies, 2016 (“Between assertiveness and self-restraint: understanding China's South China Sea policy. International Affairs,” doi: 10.1111/1468-2346.12657” Version of Record online: 20 JUN 2016 DOI: 10.1111/1468-2346.12657 date accessed 7-11-16 EAKJ)Not only has the status of the South China Sea in the bigger picture of Chinese diplomacy shifted; China's strategic thinking on dealing with these issues has also been adjusted since 2010, especially in terms of what is the most appropriate way of realizing the nation's broad strategic goals. The shift from keeping a low profile to striving for achievement involves important adjustments to the policy and measures adopted by China in its foreign policy. Broadly speaking, the change in the strategic thinking behind the Chinese approach to dealing with the South China Sea disputes has gone through a series of stages.13 During the first stage, China adopted a principled policy of shelving disputes and seeking common development (gezhi zhengyi, gongtong kaifa). This policy, which was guided by the principle of keeping a low profile, worked well for some time and helped China to maintain friendly relations with the ASEAN countries, although in the latter part of this first stage it became increasingly difficult to sustain.14 Nevertheless, the Chinese government generally kept to this line, drawing on economic cooperation and diplomatic dialogue to ease the rising tensions and to maintain overall stability. In the second stage, as regional tensions rose, the Chinese government realized that the policy based on keeping a low profile was becoming less effective and could not calm tensions in the South China Sea. In this context, a debate emerged as to whether the priority in dealing with the South China Sea disputes should be to ‘defend [China's] sovereign rights’ or ‘maintain regional stability’. Academic discussion deepened the understanding of the relationship between the two, and a general consensus was reached that China should not allow its essential sovereign rights to be compromised for the sake of maintaining regional stability. It was also generally agreed that there was no simple and quick fix that would resolve the matter: striving to reconcile the two aims in practice would be a long and tortuous process.15 Similarly, the government departments concerned underwent a cognitive shift from the presumption that regional stability was of the highest importance to prioritizing the defence of China's sovereign rights, or at least to a realization that equal importance should be placed on both in policy-making.16 At the same time there was a surge in nationalism in China, prompted by the South China Sea disputes.17 Against this background, China's South China Sea policy gradually began to become more proactive and assertive. This trend was reflected in the Scarborough Shoal standoff of 2012, during which China took a robust approach towards the Philippines and gained full de facto control of the shoal. China's successful assertive approach to the Scarborough Shoal standoff, which ushered in the third stage, had two important implications. First, China realized that it had the necessary capacity to attain further such successes. Second, ordinary Chinese citizens came to believe that their government would not easily give up national interests, and the upsurge in nationalist sentiment dissipated somewhat as a result.18 These two factors have had a transformative effect on the Chinese government's approach to dealing with the South China Sea disputes, giving it more confidence in taking initiatives to deal with those disputes and consequently a wider choice of policy options. In the wake of the Scarborough Shoal standoff, the Chinese government chose a delicately balanced combination of assertiveness and self-restraint in dealing with the South China Sea disputes. The basic idea behind this stage has been that China could draw on a variety of methods short of military force to explore possible ways to stabilize the situation and ease tensions in the South China Sea, while being prepared to use force, if necessary, as a means of persuasion . 19 During the fourth stage, with the promulgation of the ‘one belt, one road’ initiative and the preparations for the establishment of the AIIB, the focus of Chinese diplomacy shifted to development issues in the countries surrounding China, giving regional development precedence over, or at least making it of commensurate importance with, traditional security issues. Regional development is an area in which China has a clear comparative advantage. During this stage, China has become more restrained in its approach towards the South China Sea disputes, but this has not stopped it from steadily working to enhance its physical presence in the areas under its effective control. This intention is highlighted by China's large-scale land reclamation in the

South China Sea between 2014 and 2015. Land reclamation, it should be noted, is a practice that has already been commonly used by other claimants, notably the Philippines and Vietnam, in the South China Sea. The difference is that China has been doing it on a much larger scale over a much shorter period of time, evoking strong opposition from other regional countries and from the United States. It is still too early to see how this shift will affect the situation in the South China Sea. Several important points can be drawn from this outline of China's changing strategic thinking in dealing with the South China Sea territorial and maritime disputes. First, the changes in Chinese foreign policy towards these disputes have occurred in the context of the US pivot to Asia, rising tensions in the South China Sea, and China's own rapidly increasing power and capacity. China's policy shift has not come about as a result of the wishes of any particular leader, but can instead be seen as a contingent development. More specifically, having long been guided by the principle of keeping a low profile, Chinese diplomacy needs to go through a period of ‘becoming assertive’ in order to establish the level of deterrence necessary for China to be in a position to defend its sovereign rights and national interests in the South China Sea. The Chinese government has learned from experience that during a process of conflict and confrontation, a unilateral policy of moderation will not achieve stability, and may even whet the appetite of the other side. As the situation in the South China Sea has become increasingly heated, Chinese government and academic circles have gradually come to understand that although China hopes to maintain peace and stability there, this goal cannot be achieved simply by adopting a consistently moderate approach, or only by applying self-restraint in its diplomacy. The policy of self-restraint may instead encourage some countries to be more demanding in their relations with China. Second, although Chinese foreign policy during this period of transition has become more assertive , assertiveness itself is neither the goal nor an inherent characteristic of Chinese diplomacy . The priority of Chinese foreign policy in the short term is to keep the situation in the South China Sea under control and to contain the escalating provocations of certain neighbouring countries in defence of its own national interests. During this process, China has attempted to establish necessary and reliable deterrence of a kind likely to have only a very limited negative impact on regional stability.20 What is important for China is not to provoke any physical confrontation with the claimants in question , but to change the expectations of those claimants about how China will behave in a given situation, making sure that they fully understand China's firmness of purpose and resolve to defend its fundamental rights and interests. This can be achieved through adopting an approach that is consistent and reasonable and at the same time firm and assertive. In order to achieve this aim, in the short term, rather than worrying about being perceived as too ‘tough’ and ‘assertive’, China should avoid being seen as ‘not tough enough’, because that could undermine all previous efforts it has made to establish a credible deterrence. Our focus of attention during this process should be the scale of China's actions to defend its sovereign rights. Though China has more recently

adopted a firmer approach to defending its sovereign rights and interests, it has been careful to avoid resorting to military measures or using simplistic and heavy-handed means in doing so. In other words, China is attempting to defend its rights without compromising regional stability, and to become more sophisticated in its use of different techniques to achieve this goal, even though it has clearly developed a stronger capacity to withstand external pressure. By the middle of 2014, China had already achieved a certain level of success in this respect.21 A major reflection of this initial success is that Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam have all stopped taking provocative measures to escalate their physical confrontation with China over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and in the South China Sea.22 From this point, without compromising the necessary deterrence it has managed to establish, the Chinese government has been trying to demonstrate a certain amount of flexibility over the issues in the South China Sea. An important indication of this flexibility can be found in the advocacy of ‘dual track thinking’, an expression first used by Wang Yi, China's Foreign Minister, on 9 August 2014. According to Wang, this means, first, that any relevant dispute should be addressed by the countries directly concerned through friendly talks and negotiations to find a peaceful solution; and second, that peace and stability in the South China Sea should be jointly maintained by China and the ASEAN countries.23 This formulation shows that China does not rule out the idea of drawing on multilateral cooperation to solve the South China Sea disputes , and that it is not opposed to the establishment of regional rules and

norms. Even in a context where China clearly has a power advantage, it is not attempting to impose its will by assertion.24 Since 2012, China's behaviour in dealing with issues in the South China Sea has remained relatively consistent . In its interactions with south-east Asian

countries, it has demonstrated a high level of strategic patience , and its use of strategic measures in handling specific issues has become more flexible and effective. Today, China's policy on the South China Sea disputes is more proactive and confident than it has been in the past. It is largely implemented according to China's own strategic design and thinking, and is not easily influenced by international opinion or external pressure.

No US draw-in — no military challenge and alliances remain stableTaylor 14 — Brendan Taylor, Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, 2014 (“The South China Sea is Not a Flashpoint,” The Washington Quarterly, March 12th, Available Online at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2014.893176, Accessed 7-11-16)

U.S. Vital Interest?

Some commentators suggest that the S outh C hina S ea constitutes a vital U.S. interest because it is a litmus test for China's challenge to U.S. primacy in the Western Pacific. Patrick Cronin and Robert Kaplan observe that “the South China Sea will be the strategic bellwether for determining the future of U.S. leadership in the Asia–Pacific region.” In their view, it is in this body of water “where a militarily rising China is increasingly challenging U.S. naval preeminence—a trend that, if left on its present trajectory, could upset the balance of power that has existed since the end of World War II.”40

To be sure, the balance of military power between China and the countries of Southeast Asia is clearly shifting in Beijing's favor. Although Vietnam and the Philippines have recently embarked upon their own military modernization programs—and while Southeast Asian claimant states have geographical advantages over China given their proximity to the disputed waters of the South China Sea—Beijing's military modernization commenced during the mid-1990s, giving China a substantial head start over its southern neighbors. Moreover, Beijing has not had to deal with the fiscal constraints which periods of economic downturn and political unrest have created for a number of Southeast Asian governments over the past two decades.41

That said, it is equally important not to exaggerate the pace and scope of China's military modernization , conflating trends in the Southeast Asian distribution of power with a potential Chinese challenge to U.S. primacy in the broader Western Pacific. China currently does not possess the capability to project substantial power into the South China Sea , and will likely remain unable to do so for at least another two decades , its ongoing experimentation with aircraft

carriers notwithstanding. As Dan Blumenthal has observed, “the PLA lacks a sustained power projection capability associated with asserting full control over the area, including sufficient at-sea replenishment and aerial refueling capabilities, modern destroyers with advanced air defense capabilities, and nuclear submarines, as well as regional bases to support logistical requirements.”42 Added to this, questions have risen regarding the as yet largely unproven ability of PLA Navy crews to undertake prolonged operations at sea, particularly under conditions of high-intensity conflict.43

Other commentators have argued that the S outh C hina S ea is a vital U.S. interest because it symbolizes the United States' commitment to its Asia–Pacific alliance partners. According to this line of reasoning, any wavering or unwillingness on the part of Washington to come to the defense of one of its Southeast Asian allies in the face of Chinese coercion would lead other regional partners to question the reliability of their own strategic relationship with the United States.

Yet, despite the fact that Washington ultimately refused to side with the Philippines during the April 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, there is little evidence to suggest any such crisis of confidence amongst America's closest Asia–Pacific allies . In its May 2013 Defense

White Paper, for example, Canberra characterizes Australia's alliance with the United States as being “our most important defence relationship” and “a pillar of Australia's strategic and security arrangements.”44 The U nited S tates was certainly swift to demonstrate the credibility of its alliance commitment to Seoul following the March 2010 sinking of the Cheonan, undertaking a series of high-profile military exercises with South Korea in waters proximate to China and in the face of strong opposition from Beijing.45 Likewise in November 2013, Washington sent a strong signal of support for Tokyo by flying two B-52 bombers through China's newly announced “Air Defense Identification Zone” without informing Beijing in advance.46 U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel backed up this show of defiance with unequivocal confirmation that Article V of the U.S.–Japan Mutual Defense Treaty extends to the Senkaku Islands.47

These examples call into question the connection that some commentators draw between U.S. strategy toward the South China Sea and the continued viability of the United States' Asian alliances. What they instead appear to demonstrate is that U.S. alliance relationships with Australia, Japan, and South Korea are simply in a different category than those it has with the Philippines and Thailand.

No SCS war — the geography allows for diplomacyTaylor 14 — Brendan Taylor, Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, 2014 (“The South China Sea is Not a Flashpoint,” The Washington Quarterly, March 12th, Available Online at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2014.893176, Accessed 7-11-16)

The strategic geography of the South China Sea also militates against it being a genuine flashpoint . Throughout history , large bodies of water have tended to inhibit the willingness and ability of adversaries to wage war . In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, for instance, John Mearsheimer refers to “the stopping power of water,” writing of the limits that large bodies of water place on the capacity of states to project military power —relative, at least, to when they share common land borders.17 Even when clashes at sea do occur, history suggests that these generally afford statesmen greater time and space to find diplomatic solutions . As Robert Ross observes, in such cases “ neither side has to fear that the other's provocative diplomacy or movement of troops is a prelude to attack and immediately escalate to heightened military readiness. Tension can be slower to develop, allowing the protagonists time to manage and avoid unnecessary escalation.”18

MultilateralismNo SCS War – multilateral cooperation ensures peace – empiricsWeissmann 15 - Mikael Weissmann joined UI as researcher in the East Asia Programme in 2010. He is also Senior Researcher in War Studies at the Dept. of Military Studies at the Swedish National Defence College. His research focuses on international relations, conflict management, and peace-building in East Asia and his main focus is on China and China's role. Mikael Weissman's main focus is on the conflicts in the Taiwan strait, the South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula, and on Soft Power in China's relations with Southeast Asia. He is also leading the project 'Collaboration at Sea', focusing on the role and impact of collaboration for maritime security. He received his Ph.D. in Peace and Development Research from the University of Gothenburg in 2009. He also holds an M.Soc.Sci. in Peace and Conflict Studies from Uppsala University (2003) and a B.A. in International Relations and Economics from the University of Queensland, Australia (2000). He is an affiliated researcher at the East Asian Peace program at Uppsala University. Mikael Weissmann has been a visiting fellow at the University of Warwick (UK) as well as Peking, Renmin, and China Foreign Affairs University (China). He has published on conflict prevention and peace-building in the East Asian region. His focus has been on the role and impact of informal processes, including track-two and three diplomacy, regionalisation, and personal networks. He has also written on the Korean conflict and conflict management theory. Mikael Weissman has taught courses at Renmin, Peking, and Uppsala University. 2015 Asian Survey, Vol. 55, Number 3, pp. 596–617. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © The South China Sea Still No War on the Horizon 2015 by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved (Accessed 07-11-16)The SCS conflict itself has moved from a situation where the claimants actively pursued their respective claims by military means to one where serious military confrontation is highly unlikely . This transformation began in 1992 with the so-called Manila Declaration, in which the foreign ministers of the ASEAN emphasized ‘‘the necessity to resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the SCS by peaceful means, without resort to force’’ and urged all parties to exercise restraint to create a positive climate for a resolution to the conflict.20 Moving away from the practice of using military means to pursue claims was a major change, as the pursuit of claims through occupation had been standard practice since the French withdrawal in 1956. Initially, China was opposed to the ASEAN move, and within days seized the Da Lac Reef in the Spratlys. However, since then, with the 1995 Mischief Reef incident standing out as the exception, the conflict was visible primarily in the building of different structures by claimants on several of ‘‘their’’ islands; the granting of oil concessions and exploration in ‘‘their’’ territories; and the harassment of each other’s fishermen, including the occasional seizure of equipment and fishermen. By the late 2000s, not only had the nonuse of military means become the norm, but with the high level of economic interdependence, and the amount of effort that had been put into developing good relations between China and ASEAN, a situation had developed where the negative effects of such actions would be hurtful for all parties. There was also a risk of triggering US military intervention, which did constrain Beijing’s policy options.

Recent developments, in particular the Scarborough Shoal standoff and China’s buildup of its naval capabilities, have created a fear that China might again be considering the use of military means in the SCS. However, China still shows its commitment to peaceful resolution through measures such as statements, the continued support of the DOC , and the issuing of the 2011 white paper . Also, in

practice China has avoided the use of naval ships , instead deploying fishery patrol

boats, to avoid military conflict and to show its desire to rely on peaceful means to resolve the disputes

in the SCS.21 This can be seen for example in the Scarborough Shoal standoff , when despite reportedly at one point deploying as many as 80 surveillance ships and other craft,22 China refrained from using its navy.

Since its signing in 2002, the DOC has set the benchmark for behavior in the SCS for China and the ASEAN member states. In the declaration the parties ‘‘undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations.’’23 They also commit ‘‘to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability ...and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.’’24 Despite its not being legally binding, and not being rules in a strict judicial sense, it sets the norms that are expected to be followed in the SCS. Deviation from the declaration would be problematic and undermine trust among the other claimants. The negative effects of perceived deviation from or overstretching of the DOC can be seen in the case of China’s assertive behavior, which undermined almost two decades of tediously built trust.25 This behavior has also been one of the reasons making the Southeast Asian states, and the international community, reconsider and possibly re-evaluate their view on China’s peaceful development and its international expansion. Without suggesting that deviation from the DOC is the only cause, it is part of the reason why the Southeast Asian states have become more positive toward an increased US military presence in East Asia as hedging against China.

Despite the increased tensions since late 2007, the DOC has not lost its value . This has also been signaled at times when China has moderated its behavior , realizing it had pushed too far. At the July 2011 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), China also agreed to sign the guidelines for the implementation of the DOC in the SCS.26 In terms of rules transformation, this was an acknowledgement of the previous rules on how to behave and to peacefully resolve disputes. These guidelines are mainly symbolic, with little on how to actually resolve the disputes;

however, they are still a sign of good faith in a peaceful resolution and recognition that the norms of behavior in the DOC are still relevant.

To conclude, with some reservation, the context transformation is still relevant despite the developments since 2007. The norms have unquestionably been shaken up, with fear of the re-emergence of military means as a tool in China’s policy toolbox and for the relevance of the DOC. However, military means have not become acceptable, and if the 2011 guidelines on the implementation of the DOC have not strengthened the existing norms, they have at least re-affirmed them. The norms are still there but are weaker. Much of the almost two decades of trust-building underlying the norms has been destroyed by China, but with its new moderate policy it might be possible to save the situation. However, it will take time to get back to the mid-2000 situation, particularly while Chinese rhetoric is not matched by its actions. Actions such as the capture of fishermen and the approval of a dock project in the disputed Paracel Islands do not rebuild trust,27 nor does the practice of planting national flags on disputed islands, nor establishing a military garrison on Woody Island in the Paracels with the intention to ‘‘exercise sovereignty over all land features inside the South China Sea,’’ including more than 40 islands ‘‘now occupied illegally’’ by Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia.28 Still, much of the harsh rhetoric and provocative behavior is best understood as directed toward the United States, which has made it clear that it is in the region to stay and that it does not accept a hegemonic China.2

Structural Transformation

Structural transformation is the type of conflict transformation where the most fundamental transformations can be seen. This is because these changes are concerned with the overarching Sino–ASEAN relations in which the SCS conflict is embedded. These relations have been fundamentally transformed since the early 1990s, when relations between China and ASEAN were characterized by distrust and sometimes outright hostility.30 Three key structures have been transformed as a result of the engagement. Firstly, there has been an institutionalization of peaceful norms with the Southeast Asian countries .

Secondly, China has accepted multilateralism as a basis for diplomatic relations . Thirdly, over time economic cooperation has created a high level of economic integration and interdependence between China and the ASEAN members .

Until the early 1990s, China did not even have diplomatic relations with a number of regional states. ASEAN was perceived as an ally of the United States and hence a potential threat to China’s interests. Conversely, China was seen as a threat to ASEAN, driving a military buildup and efforts to retain US regional engagement. Since then relations have drastically changed, with ASEAN pursuing a diplomatic campaign to engage rather than isolate China. This ‘‘constructive engagement’’ strategy was to become a reciprocal process, with China moving from a Great Power–oriented foreign policy to ‘‘soft power’’ diplomacy to counteract the perception of China as a threat.31 In the late 1990s, in particular after the 1997 Asian financial crisis , which was a critical juncture for ASEAN’s perception of China and for the level of communication and diplomatic respect between the two, the peaceful norms became institutionalized .32 Of particular importance for this process was the initiation of the ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation, initiated in December 1997 when the then nine ASEAN members plus China, South Korea, and Japan met to discuss opportunities for cooperation. ASEAN Plus Three was to become the platform for cooperation, reconciliation, and communitybuilding in East Asia. Through it, interstate relations have reached a level where there has been less need for deliberate efforts to avoid confrontations over conflictual issues—it has become possible to avoid conflict .33

The second major transformation, multilateralism, developed in close connection with the above process. Starting in the early 1990s, with the inclusion of China, Taiwan, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in the SCS workshops and the 1992 Manila Declaration, over time a wide range of multilateral dialogues have developed in East Asia. Initially, China was both inexperienced and reluctant to engage in multilateral frameworks; it only reluctantly joined the security-focused ARF in 1994. This, to quote Ren Xiao, was ‘‘a remarkable development,’’ as China at the time had ‘‘little experience in multilateral processes.’’34 Through participation , over time the ‘‘mindsets’’ towards multilateral approaches’’ changed.35 Despite China’s remaining opposed to internationalization of the SCS and having a preference for bilateral diplomacy, multilateralism did become complementary rather than supplementary in Chinese policy toward ASEAN.36 In 1995, prior to the ARF meeting in Brunei Darussalam, China even declared its willingness to discuss the Spratlys in a multilateral setting. Two years later, at the ARF meeting in Subang Jaya in July 1997, China accepted the SCS conflict’s being put on the agenda. Multilateralism was also what made the 2002 DOC possible. The process leading to the drafting, finalization, and eventual signing of the declaration would not have been possible through bilateral dialogues, or without China’s becoming confident in engaging in multilateral forums, and in its ability to handle multilateral agreements to its own benefit.

In recent years, there have also been moves from China to push for more bilateral diplomacy, both in policy stands and in behavior. This move can be most clearly seen in the successful push to divide the ASEAN members, thereby blocking ASEAN from presenting a united front toward China, and the Chinese courtship of Vietnam and the Philippines, handing out economic incentives to demonstrate the benefit of developing bilateral relations with China.37 However, multilateralism has become institutionalized in the different multilateral forums and dialogues, and in the accepted diplomatic norms and practices. China has not succeeded in making the SCS a solely bilateral issue, as it continues to be discussed in multilateral settings. For example, despite intense lobbying, China did not in the end succeed in keeping the issue off the agenda at the ASEAN Summit in April 2012. 38 However, as argued by Donald K. Emmerson, as long as the other ASEAN states that claim land features in the SCS ‘‘cannot settle their own differences,’’ China will ‘‘remain free to pursue its bilateralist hub-and-spokes approach,’’ and furthermore the US cannot ‘‘be expected to support a more equitable ASEAN solution if one does not exist.’’39

In the economic sphere, where a significant process of economic cooperation has taken place since the early 1990s, the bilateral trade between China and the members of ASEAN increased as much as 15 times between 1991 and 2005, when it reached US$130.3 billion.40 And the economic integration and interdependence goes beyond the volume of trade. Arguably most importantly for conflict

transformation, the focus on economic growth and prosperity across the region has created a common policy goal across East Asia . The ever-increasing economic cooperation also goes hand in hand with the creation of a multitude of institutions and frameworks to help facilitate economic cooperation , including the agreement on a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area that came into force January 1, 2010. 41

The high level of economic interdependence has raised the cost of military conflict, and thus increased the incentive for China as well as its Southeast Asian neighbors to pursue nonconfrontational paths. This works well in a region where the preference is to avoid rather than address conflicts and tensions, with the practice of conflict avoidance being deeply embedded in the diplomatic culture, as it is in the regional culture itself. It should be emphasized here that the assumption, found in many pessimistic accounts of ASEAN, that conflict resolution is needed for conflict prevention, does not hold up under scrutiny, as ‘‘in reality, conflicts can also be avoided, or conflict structures can be transformed so that violent disputes will not arise.’’42 With the foremost importance being placed on ensuring economic growth and national prosperity, the disputes in the SCS have been less central on the agenda than would otherwise have been the case.43

Today, economic interdependence seems to have lost some of its signifi- cance in suppressing tension in the SCS. However, it should be emphasized that Sino–ASEAN economic ties have never been stronger . Despite the high tensions, economic cooperation has continued to increase. Annual trade was expected to exceed US$350 billion in 2011, and potentially reach or surpass US$500 billion by 2015. 44 To take bilateral trade between China and the Philippines as an example, despite high tensions over disputes in the SCS, such trade reached an all-time high in 2011 (exceeding US$30 billion) and in the same year plans to double the trade to US$60 billion by 2016 were announced.45 This is not to say that economic cooperation will resolve the territorial conflicts, but it does continue to provide a mutually beneficial path for cooperation. Moreover, it contributes to economic growth and prosperity in all claiming states. This is important not least in China as regime survival is (at least partially) dependent on continuing economic growth.

US PressureNo SCS War- The US had a good balance and will not let it escalate Xue and Xu 15(June 19, 2015 Dr. Xue Li is Director of the Department of International Strategy at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Xu Yanzhuo received her doctorate from Durham University (UK) in December 2014 and studies international responsibility, South China Sea disputes, and Chinese foreign policy. “The US and China Won't See Military Conflict Over the South China Sea “http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-us-and-china-wont-see-military-conflict-over-the-south-china-sea/ )ski

In a recent piece on the S outh C hina S ea disput es, I argued that “the ASEAN claimants are largely staying behind the scenes while external powers take center stage .” Based on recent developments on the South China Sea issue, it seems the U.S. will not only be a ‘director’ but an actor . We saw this clearly on May 20, when the U.S. military sent surveillance aircraft over three islands controlled by Beijing.However, this does not necessary mean the South China Sea will spark a U.S.-China military conflict .As a global hegemon , the United States’ main interest lies in maintaining the current international order as well as peace and stability . Regarding the South China Sea, U.S. interests include ensuring peace and stability, freedom of commercial navigation, and military activities in exclusive economic zones. Maintaining the current balance of power is considered to be a key condition for securing these interests—and a rising China determined to strengthen its hold on South China Sea territory is viewed as a threat to the current balance of power. In response, the U.S. launched its “rebalance to Asia” strategy. In practice, the U.S. has on the one hand strengthened its military presence in Asia-Pacific, while on the other hand supporting ASEAN countries, particularly ASEAN claimants to South China Sea territories .This position has included high-profile rhetoric by U.S. officials. In 2010, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton spoke at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi about the South China Sea, remarks that aligned the U.S. with Southeast Asia’s approach to the disputes. At the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta explained how the United States will rebalance its force posture as part of playing a “deeper and more enduring partnership role” in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel called out China’s “destabilizing, unilateral activities asserting its claims in the South China Sea.” His remarks also came at the Shangri-La

dialogue, while China’s HY-981 oil rig was deployed in the waters around the Paracel Islands. In 2015, U.S. officials have openly pressured China to scale back its construction work in the Spratly islands and have sent aircraft to patrol over islands in the Spratly that are controlled by China. These measures have brought global attention to the South China Sea . However, if we look at the practical significance of the remarks, there are several limiting factors. The interests at stake in the South China Sea are not core national interests for the United States. Meanwhile, the U.S.-Philippine alliance is not as important as the U.S.-Japan alliance, and U.S. ties with other ASEAN countries are even weaker. Given U.S.-China mutual economic dependence and China’s comprehensive national strength, the United States is unlikely to go so far as having a military confrontation with China over the South China Sea. Barack Obama, the ‘peace president’ who withdrew the U.S. military from Iraq and Afghanistan, is even less likely to fight with China for the South China Sea.As for the U.S. interests in the region, Washington is surely aware that China has not affected the freedom of commercial navigation in these waters so far. And as I noted in my earlier piece, Beijing is developing its stance and could eventually recognize the legality of military activities in another country’s EEZ (see, for example, the China-Russia joint military exercise in the Mediterranean).Yet when it comes to China’s large-scale land reclamation in the Spratly Islands (and on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands), Washington worries that Beijing will conduct a series of activities to strengthen its claims on the South China Sea , such as establishing an air defense identification zon e (ADIZ) or advocating that others respect a 200- nautical mile (370 km) EEZ from its islands. Meanwhile, the 2014 oil rig incident taught Washington that ASEAN claimants and even ASEAN as a whole could hardly play any effective role in dealing with

China’s land reclamation . Hence, the U.S. has no better choice than to become directly involved in this issue.At the beginning, the United States tried to stop China through private diplomatic mediation, yet it soon realized that this approach was not effective in persuading China. So Washington started to tackle the issue in a more aggressive way, such as encouraging India, Japan, ASEAN, the G7, and the European Union to pressure Beijing internationally. Domestically, U.S. officials from different departments and different levels have opposed China’s ‘changing the status quo’ in this area.Since 2015, Washington has increased its pressure on China. It sent the USS Fort Worth, a littoral combat ship, to sail in waters near the Spratly area controlled by Vietnam in early May. U.S. official are also considering sending naval and air patrols within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands controlled by China.Washington has recognized that it could hardly stop China’s construction in Spratly Islands. Therefore, it has opted to portray Beijing as a challenger to the status quo, at the same time moving to prevent China from establishing a South China Sea ADIZ and an EEZ of 200 nautical miles around its artificial islands. This was the logic behind the U.S. sending a P-8A surveillance plane with reporters on board to approach three artificial island built by China. China issued eight warnings to the plane; the U.S. responded by saying the plane was flying through international airspace.Afterwards, U.S. Defense Department spokesman, Army Col. Steve Warren, said there could be a potential “freedom of navigation” exercise within 12 nautical miles of the artificial islands. If this approach were adopted, it would back China into a corner; hence it’s a unlikely the Obama administration will make that move.As the U.S. involvement in the South China Sea becomes more aggressive and high-profile, the dynamic relationship between China and the United States comes to affect other layers of the dispute (for example, relations between China and ASEAN claimants or China and ASEAN in general). To some extent, the South China Sea dispute has developed into a balance of power tug-of-war between the U.S. and China, yet both sides will not take the risk of military confrontation. As Foreign Minister Wang Yi put it in a recent meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, “as for the differences, our attitude is it is okay to have differences as long as we could avoid misunderstanding, and even more importantly, avoid miscalculat ion.” For its part, China is determined to build artificial islands and several airstrips in the Spratlys, which I argue would help promote the resolution of SCS disputes. But it’s worth noting that if China establishes an ADIZ and advocates a 200 nautical miles EEZ (as the U.S. fears), it would push ASEAN claimants and even non-claimants to stand by the United States. Obviously, the potential consequences contradict with China’s “One Belt, One Road” strategy.In February 2014, in response to reports by Japan’s Asahi Shimbun that a South China Sea ADIZ was imminent, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs hinted that China would not necessarily impose an ADIZ . “ The Chinese side has yet to feel any air security threat from the ASEAN countries and is optimistic about its relations with the neighboring countries and the general situation in the South China Sea region ,” a spokesperson said.Since the “Belt and Road” is Beijing’s primary strategic agenda for the coming years, it is crucial for China to strengthen its economic relationship with ASEAN on the one hand while reducing ASEAN claimants’ security concerns on the other hand. As a result, it should accelerate the adjustment of its South China Sea policy; clarify China’s stand on the issue, and propose China’s blueprint for resolving the disputes.The South China Sea dispute has developed a seasonal pattern, where the first half of the year is focused on conflicts, and the second half tends to emphasize cooperatio n. Considering its timing at the peak of ‘conflict season,’ the Shangri-La Dialogue serves as a hot spot. Since 2012, the Shangri-La Dialogue has become a platform for the U.S. and China to tussle on the South China Sea, with the U.S. being proactive and China reactive. (Incidentally, this partly explains why China is upgrading Xiangshan Forum as an alternative dialogue platform). This year was no exception, as the U.S. worked hard to draw the world’s attention to the Shangri-La Dialogue this year .But audiences should be aware that aggressive statements at the Shangri-La Dialogue are not totally representative of U.S.-China relations. After all, these statements are made by military rather than political elites. Cooperation will be the key

when the U.S. and China have their Strategic and Economic Dialogue in late June, with the ASEAN Regional Forum and other meetings following later this summer.

CCP CollapseNo SCS conflict – CCP won’t risk collapse and points of conflict will never be strong enough to cue escalationKausikan 16— Bilahari, ambassador-at-large, the Institute of Policy Studies' 2015/16 S R Nathan Fellow for the Study of Singapore, 2016 (“US, China closer on South China Sea issues than they appear,” The Straits Times, May 21, Available Online at http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/us-china-closer-on-south-china-sea-issues-than-they-appear, Accessed 07-11-2016, AV)

President Xi Jinping has termed the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) role as leading the "Great Rejuvenation" of the Chinese nation after a century of weakness and humiliation. But the outcome of the second phase of reforms , even if completely successful,

will be slower growth , as the CCP has itself acknowledged. The "Great Rejuvenation" must therefore be as much, if not more, outwardly than internally directed . Externally, it is increasingly an essentially revanchist narrative. Herein lies the importance of the South China Sea (SCS) to China. Put simply, it is the least risky way of putting some shreds of meat on the bare bones of the historical narrative by which the CCP justifies its right

to rule.¶ The United States defines its interests in the SCS in terms of upholding international law and freedom of navigation ( FON). These are important interests but not of the same order as the CCP's primary interest , which is existential: the legitimacy and ultimately the survival of the CCP. The US has made clear that the US-Japan alliance covers the Senkakus; it has been ambiguous about the US-Philippines alliance, and hence in effect made clear that it does not

cover the disputed areas in the SCS. War in support of the principal US East Asian ally is credible, if unlikely. War over rocks, shoals and reefs would be absurd. ¶ I doubt that China can be deterred from continuing its reclamation activities and deploying military assets on the artificial islands it is creating. But I doubt too that China can deter the US from operating in the SCS. Military assets that cannot be used are a weak deterrent. To use them to deny access must evoke a US response. This confronts the CCP with Hobson's choice: escalate and risk war or at least serious conflict which will jeopardise CCP rule; or respond weakly, which will expose the hollowness of the "Great Rejuvenation", which will also shake

confidence in CCP rule. The CCP will not willingly place itself in such an invidious position . ¶ China's bluster masks this dilemma. Beijing has carefully kept each action in the SCS below a threshold that must draw a response from even the most reluctant of US administrations. Miscalculations and accidents can of course happen. If an accident occurs, the highly nationalistic public opinion that the CCP both cultivates and fears could lead Beijing

down a path it does not want to travel. But the probability of accidents can be minimised. China has of late taken a more positive attitude towards rules of engagement for unplanned encounters at sea and in the air. If we look past the chest-thumping by both sides, the

probability of US-China competition in the SCS becoming ritualised is not to be discounted.¶ I think the process is already under way . In my view, there are less differences between the US and China on FON than immediately meets the eye. I think differences over what military activities are acceptable in another country's Exclusive Economic Zone ( EEZ) reflect differences of capability rather than irrecon- cilable differences of concept . ¶ China says that it has not and will never impede FON in the SCS. This is credible in so far as the merchant marine is concerned because China, too, is a trading nation. The US riposte is that there is a difference between FON granted by the leave and favour of a major power and FON as a right enshrined in international law. This is true. But the US is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) and says it considers Unclos largely customary international law and abides by it on that basis. It does not take an extreme sceptic to consider this a gentler way of saying that the US too grants FON by its leave and favour, because of a

particular calculation of American national interests and not an obligation it must fulfil irrespective of such calculations. Some American interpretations of FON have been questionable, for example, when it tried to assert the right to stop and search vessels

on the high seas under the Proliferation Security Initiative after 9/11. One may have more trust in one major power's leave and favour than another's, but that is a matter of political choice and not international law . ¶ There is at present a difference of interpretation between the US and China over what military activities are permissible under Unclos in another country's EEZ. But is this an irreconcilable difference of concept or does

the apparent difference of concept reflect only a difference of capability? I am not so sure

InterdependenceInterdependence and public weariness prevent SCS conflict – checks back miscalcDesker 15 – Barry Desker, Distinguished Fellow and Bakrie Professor of Southeast Asia Policy, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, November 6th 2015(“South China Sea Tensions Unlikely to Lead to War,” East Asia Forum, Available online at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/11/06/south-china-sea-tensions-unlikely-to-lead-to-war/, Accessed online on 6/27/16, AJ)

Still, as major powers, the United States and China will focus on the management of their differences. The two countries have already held a video conference. And, although China emphasised that there is a risk of ‘a minor incident that sparks war’, both sides agreed to maintain the dialogue and to follow agreed protocols to prevent clashes .

Scheduled port visits by US and Chinese ships and planned visits to China by senior US Navy officers remain on track.

Self-interest means China and the United States are unlikely to miscalculate and rush into war . It would be difficult to convince a weary American public to embark on another major overseas conflict . And China’s leadership has an interest in avoiding war so that it can continue to focus on economic development.

Despite some assertions otherwise, a rising China does not mean that there is a considerable risk of war as China challenges the dominance of the U nited States. An increasingly confident China has also recently promoted economic policies designed to strengthen its ties to Southeast Asia, such as its ‘One Belt, One Road’ polices to establish a Maritime Silk Road linking East Asia to the Middle East

Still, China’s security strategy run the risk of alienating regional opinion and has made it easier for competitors, such as the United States and Japan, to reinforce their ties with states in the region. The exceptions to this are states bordering China, like Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. Despite the resistance in the region, Southeast Asian states should expect a more assertive China in the years ahead.

As China rises, Chinese policymakers recognise that the only power with the capacity to threaten Chinese interests is the United States and its web of alliance relationships. This has resulted in a Chinese re-balancing with a tilt eastwards towards the Pacific.

In the decade ahead, there will be a strengthening of Chinese air and sea defence capabilities and a growing emphasis on building closer economic and political ties with the littoral states on the Maritime Silk Road. But, as the United States will remain a Pacific power, effective management of the US–China relationship into the future will be the critical issue for maintaining global peace and security.

No SCS escalation - Asymmetric interdependence and economic geography make war un-strategic for ChinaPietrucha 15 – Mike Pietrucha, Military advisor and Author at the War on the Rocks, Nov 4 2015(“THE ECONOMICS OF WAR WITH CHINA: THIS WILL HURT YOU MORE THAN IT HURTS ME,” War on the Rocks, Available on http://warontherocks.com/2015/11/the-economics-of-war-with-china-this-will-hurt-you-more-than-it-hurts-me/, Accessed 6/30/16, AJ)

The ongoing competition between the People’s Republic of China and the United States in the Pacific is at a low simmer. Despite public friction over the U.S. Navy’s freedom of navigation operations, Chinese island construction in the S outh China Sea, and massive Chinese cyberespionage, relations between U nited States and China are not particularly adversarial . The United States has a vested interest in the status quo, a position that some Chinese writers view as an unfair and unrealistic constraint on Chinese ambition. Yet relations have not degenerated into the kind of brinkmanship typical of U.S.–Soviet relations in the 1980s, or even U.S.–Russian relations today. The robust trade relationship between the United States and China dwarfs the limited trade between the United States

and the Soviet Union, lead ing many analysts to conclude that open conflict today is unrealistic because of a presumed equal economic impact on both sides. A cursory analysis reveals

that the reality is entirely different: Sino–American economic ties are asymmetrically interdependent rather than mutually dependent. This would strongly favor the United States in any conflict.

Even within the Department of Defense, there are occasional traces of the opinion that the economic ties between the two nations would effectively prevent any open war. Under this assumption, the interdependence of the two nations acts as a barrier to escalation . This position is not new. British parliamentarian Richard Cobden wrote extensively about economic coercion and the obsolescence of British military might, starting some 30 years before the Civil War broke out in the United States. In 1909, Sir Norman Angell published the Great Illusion, arguing that European economic interdependence effectively rendered militarism obsolete. Five years later, the tinderbox that was early 20th-century Europe exploded into the most devastating war in over 250 years. Even when the Great War ground to a halt, it set the stage for a worse one only 21 years later. The willingness to slug it out with economic partners was not limited to Europe, either. In the Pacific, the United States was Japan’s largest trading partner in 1940 when Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. In 1940 the trade volume between the United States and Japan had been on a steady increase throughout the Great Depression despite the U.S. embargo on scrap metal. In fact, Japan set itself on a course for war with virtually all of its major trading partners, more or less simultaneously.

Clearly, there are some credible doubts about the very idea that economic interdependence will prevent big wars. In many cases, warfare erupts between countries sharing borders over which trade routinely flows in peacetime. As world trade relationships have become increasingly globalized, the possibility exists that conflict could erupt with significant disruptive effects beyond the proximate combatants — similar to the effects observed from the Tanker War in the Persian Gulf. But we should not bank on the idea that trade interdependence will forestall conflict. The emergence of an effective global trade network may ensure that while markets may be disrupted, they can be rapidly reconstituted.

With respect to Sino–American trade, the economic effects of open warfare are heavily biased against China . For the exchange of goods, China’s top trade partners are the United States, Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Germany, respectively. This places China in the center of a trade network that is dominated by countries which maintain a formal defense alliance with the United States. With the exception of Hong Kong, China’s top trade partners have a formal defense treaty with the United States. In fact, countries that have a bilateral (Japan, Korea) or multilateral (ANZUS, NATO) defense agreement with the United States account for over 44 percent of Chinese exports and are a source for over 45 percent of the country’s imports. In contrast, the top five partners for the United States (goods only) are Canada, China, Mexico, Japan, and Germany, with China accounting for 9 percent of our imports and 22 percent of our exports. That is a major trade imbalance, even before allied nations are taken into account. In 2014, the United States imported over $467 billion worth of goods from China while exporting $124 billion.

The goods exchanged are likewise not symmetrical . The main products that the United States receives from China are computers, broadcasting equipment, phones, office machine parts and furniture, while exporting soybeans, aircraft, automobiles, integrated circuits, and raw cotton. Viewed in total, China gets raw materials and the products of advanced, and complex manufacturing, while the United States gets consumer goods. The United States imports consumer goods that are assembled in China from parts not manufactured there — as the supply chain analysis for the iPhone reveals.

The United States thus has the upper hand in a cessation of trade goods , but also in terms of economic geography. Because of the extremely limited capacity of its cross-border links, China is effectively an island nation, and is hemmed in by unfavorable maritime terrain that the United States can exploit. The United States has also been described as an island nation by strategic theorists, but of its four coasts, two are entirely out of China’s reach, leaving only the Pacific and Alaskan coasts subject to China’s very limited power projection capability. Operating in the Eastern Pacific, outside their air defense and missile umbrella, would be extremely challenging for China in the face of overwhelming U.S. air and maritime superiority. Conversely, because of the maritime chokepoints stretching from the Straits of Malacca to Japan, China’s maritime trade can be interdicted by an offshore control or strategic interdiction campaign from well outside the ability of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to credibly project power.

China won’t escalate – causes China economic collapsePietrucha 15 – Mike Pietrucha, Military advisor and Author at the War on the Rocks, Nov 4 2015(“THE ECONOMICS OF WAR WITH CHINA: THIS WILL HURT YOU MORE THAN IT HURTS ME,” War on the Rocks, Available on http://warontherocks.com/2015/11/the-economics-of-war-with-china-this-will-hurt-you-more-than-it-hurts-me/, Accessed 6/30/16, AJ)

In the event of actual hostilities, commercial interests will do much of the interdiction work for the United States. Maritime insurance policies do not typically cover either ship hulls or cargos in a war zone and additional riders must be purchased at substantial cost, if available at all. Besides Chinese-flagged vessels, commercial carriers might be unwilling to travel to Chinese ports at all, particularly if the United States conducts a modern offensive mining campaign. In such a case, the flow of raw materials, particularly energy , to China (particularly energy) could come to a shuddering halt , while the United States suffers a much more limited effect . China is dependent on ocean movement for over 96 percent of its foreign trade , with no viable overland

alternatives. A maritime interdiction effort would interrupt the majority of China’s international trade from the majority of trading partners and cut 90 percent of total petroleum imports, leaving China with an unprecedented oil crisis and a shortfall of more than half of the country’s total oil consumption.

China war hurts the economies of adversaries but resiliency solves collapse.Pietrucha 15 – Mike Pietrucha, Military advisor and Author at the War on the Rocks, Nov 4 2015(“THE ECONOMICS OF WAR WITH CHINA: THIS WILL HURT YOU MORE THAN IT HURTS ME,” War on the Rocks, Available on http://warontherocks.com/2015/11/the-economics-of-war-with-china-this-will-hurt-you-more-than-it-hurts-me/, Accessed 6/30/16, AJ)

Nevertheless, while Japan and Korea would suffer from a loss of trade with China , they are not in the same position whereby outside trade is easily interdicted . If a conflict erupted, maritime traffic which would normally pass through the Straits of Malacca will have to take the long way around, possibly doubling voyage time to avoid the waters adjoining the Chinese coast; but those trade routes need not pass through Chinese waters. Trade from the Americas need not deviate at all. Korea is more exposed to Chinese countermaritime efforts than Japan, given that some ports in both countries face China. However , the majority of South Korea’s port facilities border the Sea of Japan and not the Yellow Sea, which is shared with China and potentially very dangerous sailing. Japan’s ports largely face east and an interdiction effort by China would prove challenging. Again, the effect of a maritime threat is asymmetrical because both Korea and Japan have ready access to “friendly” waters while China does not .

The United States is not similarly constrained . The Pacific coast is not geographically hemmed in and the nearest island owned by an Asian country is Ostrov Mednyy, some 2500 nautical miles from Neah Bay, Washington. If the PRC could somehow force the closure of all 29 West Coast ports, it would affect barely a quarter of international trade. While significant, periodic labor disruptions have demonstrated

that an effective West Coast port shutdown is not an economic catastrophe for the United States. From an energy standpoint, West Coast ports import about 40 million barrels of fuels and crude oil per month, barely 14 percent of the total U.S. import demand and 7 percent of the actual domestic consumption .

Chinese ports are comparatively far more vulnerable. Of the top ten container ports in the world, seven are Chinese. Los Angeles and Long Beach rank 19th and 21st with New York at 27th. Chinese ports are also transshipment centers, meaning that a large volume of traffic stops there and is then loaded on another ship headed to another destination. This makes Chinese ports vulnerable (from a business standpoint) to interdiction in a way that West Coast ports are not. It is likely that shipping trends will realign rather than transit through a war zone and this realignment may have lasting consequences. Normally, market forces drive a slow shift in transportation patterns, while a crisis could drive rapid changes. In early 2015, as the West Coast port dispute between the Pacific Maritime Association and the union continued, Vancouver saw a 15-percent jump in traffic in a month as the shipping market realigned away from U.S. ports.

No Asia War — deterrence and interdependence. Dibb 14 — Paul Dibb, Emeritus Professor of strategic studies at The Australian National University, former deputy secretary for Defence, 2014 (“Why A Major War In Asia Is Unlikely,” Economy Watch, March 31st, Accessible Online at http://www.economywatch.com/features/why-a-major-war-in-asia-is-unlikely.31-03.html, Accessed On 07-11-2016)

Even so, there are two major reasons why a major power war in Asia is unlikely . First, there is the iron discipline of nuclear deterrence , which has prevented a major war for almost 70 years , even at the most dangerous heights of the Cold War. An all-out nuclear war between the US and China would involve the deaths of hundreds of millions of people on both sides in a matter of hours . For all intents and purposes, they would cease to exist as modern functioning societies. This is an existential threat unlike any faced by humankind previously. Once

nuclear weapons are used it would be practically impossible to avoid full-blown escalation.

The second factor is the unprecedented economic and technological interdependence that now intertwines virtually every economy in the region . Assertions that globalisation was even deeper in 1914 are simply untrue . Global supply chains for almost every product consumed in the Asia Pacific make every country in the region critically vulnerable to the outbreak of war . And that includes China as much — or even more so — as any other country. China is now crucially dependent on imports for its economic security (for example, it accounts for 60 per cent of global seaborne iron ore trade).

So, as the doyen of US international relations studies Professor Joseph Nye of Harvard University argues, we should be wary of analysts wielding historical analogies , particularly if they have a whiff of inevitability. War , he observes, is never inevitable , though the belief that it is can become one of its causes.

Interdependence and deterrence check conflict and miscalcJennings 6/6, Ralph – graduated from UC Berkeley with a mass communications degree, reporter for Forbes, previous reporter for Reuters, tracks Taiwanese companies and local economies, recently expanded towards China and other Asian countries, 2016 (“Why Odds Of War In The Contested South China Sea Are Near Zero,” June 6, 2016, accessible online at http://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2016/06/06/why-odds-of-war-in-the-contested-south-china-sea-are-near-zero/#77dc1d6f35e0, accessed July 11, 2016//AW)

Fear of conflict has obvious merit . Vietnam fired on two Chinese ships in 1974 and in 1988 China killed 74 Vietnamese sailors as it sank or demolished three ships. Two years ago Chinese and Vietnamese boats sparred after Beijing allowed a Chinese state oil company to park a rig off Vietnam’s coast. China’s militarization of some of the sea’s approximately 500 islets among the various archipelagos raises more concern, prompt ing weaker claimants such as the Philippines t o seek help from the U nited St ates or start buy ing more weapons . But those upsets are oddball incidents, nothing near routine . No one wants a war despite the maddening erosion of their claims and the economic opportunity they represent. First, the countries claiming the S outh C hina S ea have been leaving their stuff there a long time and coast guards from other places know where it is, reducing odds of a mishap . China and the United States both move in “predictable” ways and military commanders from each side have probably ordered no shooting except in “extreme” cases, says Denny Roy, senior fellow with the East-West Center think tank in Honolulu. The idea is the United States could strike on behalf of its old colony the Philippines as the two sides have increased defense cooperation since 2014. But the United States, China and other Asian countries with maritime claims depend on one another too much economically to get into an armed struggle, says Lin Chong-pin, a retired strategic studies professor in Taiwan. Interdependence has surged since the Global Financial Crisis seven years ago, he says. China, he adds, since 1982 has advocated struggle without a reaching a breaking point. “ The unprecedented magnitude of interdependence of powers in the world and especially after the great recession 20 09 is such that they wouldn’t want a war, ” Lin says.

Economic interdependence checks SCS conflictGorjee 15, Mehraj Uddin, professor at Aligarh Muslim University in India, 2015 (“US-China Strategic Cooperation Or Strategic Competition: An Overview,” Eurasia Review, December 10, 2015, accessible online at http://www.eurasiareview.com/10122015-us-china-strategic-cooperation-or-strategic-competition-an-overview/, accessed July 11, 2016//AW)

Despite all these threats — perceived or actual — China has deliberately sought to maintain good relations with the United States. It due to the fact that China’s leadership are aware of the fact that maintaining good relationship with the United States and downplaying the negative trends w ill be more beneficial for the China’s interests in the long run . Thus for the time being, China’s leadership has adopted Deng Xiaoping’s advice – “be calm, keep low profile, hide your capacities and bide your time” as the guiding principle of their approach towards the US.11

For the United States too, the relationship with China is extremely important irrespective of whether China is seen as strategic partner or a competitor. China’s growing economic and military power, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a nuclear weapons state, and a regional power with significant influence in Asia is something which the US cannot ignore . Moreover, the economic links forged between the two states in the last two decades p rovides strong foundation to the relationship. In spite of some trade and economic frictions between the two, both sides benefit from these economic links and neither would like to see deterioration in the relationship which would undermine these benefits. As Brookings Institute scholars Richard Bush and Michael O’ Hanlon noted, “ Most hypothetical causes of war between the United States and China turn out, upon inspection, to have little or no basis . The two countries will not duke it out simply to settle the question of who will ‘run the world’ in the twenty-first century”.12 They further argue that especially t he economic cooperation create a potent incentive for cooperative and sensible behavior between the two countries.13

Just RhetoricNo SCS War — no bloc formation and threats are just rhetoric. Yilmaz 15 — Serafettin Yilmaz, Ph.D. from the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University, 2015 (“The South China Sea Dispute: Protracted but Warless,” Issue Briefings, Vol. 2, Accessible Online at https://storage.googleapis.com/scstt/publications/Issue-Briefings-2015-2-Yilmaz.pdf, Accessed On 07-11-2016)

Conclusion

It seems that the dispute in South China Sea will be a protracted one, but it will fall short of escalating into a major war for two major reasons . First, there has been no bloc formation in the region because of the nature of the dispute , which involves not a

pair of actors but multiple parties with conflicting interests. This ensures that any confrontation remains local and small in scale albeit without any resolution in sight. Second, one can observe an obvious discrepancy between actors’ rhetoric and actions , especially as far as overlapping EEZ boundaries and historical island reclamation and development activities are concerned. This takes away most of the legitimacy sought by the parties in the international arena to reinforce their own arguments . Thus, the simultaneous lack of bloc formation and policy integrity have had a conflicting impact on the geopolitics of the SCS by, on the one hand, preventing a quick resolution, which causes the disputes to drag on, and on the

other hand, forestalling escalation of the conflict into an armed confrontation in the SCS .

US RetreatingUS is retreating in the SCS – we recognized their artificial islandsCheng 15 – Dean Cheng, Journalist for Breaking Defense, November 29th 2015(“US ‘Steadily Retreating’ in South China Sea Dispute,” Breaking Defense, http://breakingdefense.com/2015/11/us-steadily-retreating-in-south-china-sea-dispute/, Accessed 6/29/16, AJ)

Reality now seems to be mirroring fiction, as the Administration steadily obscures what it means by the “rebalance” to Asia in the six weeks leading to the next episode of the “Star Wars” franchise. American B-52s and the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier battlegroup both operated in the South China Sea recently, providing ample opportunity to conduct operations within 12 nautical miles of China’s artificial islands, and clearly sending the message to Beijing and the world of the seriousness with which the United States takes freedom of the seas.960117-N-7729M-002 (December 20, 1995).... The U.S. Navy's aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) conducts a weapons on-load with the ammunition ship USS Santa Barbara (AE 28) in the waters off the Virginia-Carolina coast, following her post deployment yard period, at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, in Portsmouth, Virginia. Official U.S. Navy Photo by Photographer's Mate 2nd. Class Michael Tuemler

USS Roosevelt

After a stymied ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, where China battled hard to stop the group from taking any stance on the South China Sea, Southeast Asia is clearly becoming the focal point of growing tensions between the United States and the People’s R epublic of China. As China continues to challenge the United States on the competing principles of sovereignty and freedom of the seas, the reefs, spits, rocks, and islands in the Spratlys have become the center of the battle

For the Chinese, the point is simple. As a Chinese admiral observed recently in London, “The South China Sea, as the name indicates, is a sea area that belongs to China. And the sea from the Han dynasty a long time ago where the Chinese people have been working and producing from the sea.” The issue is one of sovereignty, not only over the land and submerged features, but the waters, the “blue soil” that is encompassed within the “nine-dash line,” now more prominently noted in recent Chinese maps.

For the United States, the point is almost equally straightforward. Washington takes no position on the disputes over sovereignty in the South China Sea, but it is firmly committed to the principle of freedom of the seas. All states may use the high seas as they see fit, as they are free for use by all. Conversely, no state may arbitrarily seek to lay claim to swathes of the ocean—and reefs do not exert any justification for territorial claims, even if one builds an artificial island atop it.

Ostensibly as a show of commitment to the principle of freedom of the seas, the USS Theodore Roosevelt operated in the South China Sea, providing a perfect venue for Secretary of Defense Carter to make a speech on this issue. This comes a fortnight after the Administration finally authorized a US ship to transit waters near China’s artificial islands, five months after it stated that American ships would sail where they wished, and three years after the last freedom of navigation operation (FONOP).

Unfortunately , if several recent reports are to be believed, these American ship transits are demonstrating not strength, but weakness .

As it turns out, the USS Lassen reportedly did not engage in a FONOPS to demonstrate that the islands China has built exert no right to territorial waters reaching out 12 nautical miles. Instead, the U.S. ship reportedly conducted “innocent passage ,” turning off its radars and grounding its helicopters as it transited within 12 nautical miles of the islands. Undertaking “innocent passage” is done only in another nation’s territorial waters.

In short, the United States, by its actions, may have actually recognized China’s claims. If the reports are correct, the United S tates treated the artificial island atop Subi Reef as though it were a naturally occurring feature , and therefore entitled to a 12 nautical mile band of territorial water. This is precisely the opposite of what had been announced. Further obscuring the message, Administration sources are now claiming that it was both a FONOP and “innocent passage,” because the American ship was transiting waters near other islands occupied by various other claimants as well as going near Subi Reef. It would appear that the Administration was more intent on placating domestic concerns (e.g., the Senate Armed Services Committee) than in sending a clear signal.

Now, according to reports, the USS Theodore Roosevelt did not even sail within 200 nautical miles of the Chinese islands, instead avoiding the waters around them entirely. Similarly, the American B-52s underscoring freedom of navigation in the South China Sea took care to never approach more than 15 nautical miles from the artificial Chinese islands.

It is the final step in a pivot of American statements and actions that have charted a steadily retreating course . It has proceeded like this:

from Secretary of Defense Carter’s declaration at Shangri-La this May that “the United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, as U.S. forces do all over the world;”

to the revelation to the Senate Armed Services Committee this summer that the United States, in fact, has not sailed or operated near China’s artificial islands for three years;

to the apparent concession on international law, five months later, by the Lassen’s “innocent passage” transit, effectively acceding to the Chinese version on the key principle of freedom of the seas;

to the apparent decision to have the USS Theodore Roosevelt and American B-52s avoid those waters and airspace altogether, a message that is being sent less than a month after the Lassen

Like it or not, the message that the White House is now repeatedly sending is that the United States, in fact, accepts that the Chinese artificial islands should be treated as national territory , like a natural feature . In short, the U nited S tates is acceding to China’s efforts to close off portions of the open ocean . Teddy Roosevelt’s catch-phrase, of course, was “Speak softly, but carry a big stick.” To deliver this craven message via the routing of a ship named for him adds a grotesquely ironic twist to the decision.

No SCS conflict - confrontation severely outweighs the benefits.Li and Yanzhou 15 – Xue Li, Director of the Department of International Strategy at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Xu Yanzhou, doctorate from Durham University (UK) in December 2014 and studies international responsibility, South China Sea disputes, and Chinese foreign policy, June 19th 2015(“The US and China won’t see Military Conflict over the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-us-and-china-wont-see-military-conflict-over-the-south-china-sea/, Accessed 7/1/16, AJ)

As a global hegemon, the U nited States’ main interest lies in maintaining the current international order as well as peace and stability. Regarding the South China Sea, U.S. interests include ensuring peace and stability, freedom of commercial navigation, and military activities in exclusive economic zones. Maintaining the current balance of power is considered to be a key condition for securing these interests—and a rising China determined to strengthen its hold on South China Sea territory is viewed as a threat to the current balance of power. In response, the U.S. launched its “rebalance to Asia” strategy. In practice, the U.S. has on the one hand strengthened its military presence in Asia-Pacific, while on the other hand supporting ASEAN countries, particularly ASEAN claimants to South China Sea territories.

This position has included high-profile rhetoric by U.S. officials. In 2010, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton spoke at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi about the South China Sea, remarks that aligned the U.S. with Southeast Asia’s approach to the disputes. At the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta explained how the United States will rebalance its force posture as part of playing a “deeper and more enduring partnership role” in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel called out China’s “destabilizing, unilateral activities asserting its claims in the South China Sea.” His remarks also came at the Shangri-La dialogue, while China’s HY-981 oil rig was deployed in the waters around the Paracel Islands. In 2015, U.S. officials have openly pressured China to scale back its construction work in the Spratly islands and have sent aircraft to patrol over islands in the Spratly that are controlled by China. These measures have brought global attention to the South China Sea.

However, if we look at the practical significance of the remarks, there are several limiting factors. The interests at stake in the South China Sea are not core national interests for the United

States. Meanwhile, the U.S.-Philippine alliance is not as important as the U.S.-Japan alliance , and U.S. ties with other ASEAN countries are even weaker . Given U.S.-China

mutual economic dependence and China’s comprehensive national strength, the United States is unlikely to go so far as hav ing a military confrontation with China over the S outh China

Sea. Barack Obama, the ‘peace president’ who withdrew the U.S. military from Iraq and Afghanistan, is even less likely to fight with China for the South China Sea.

As for the U.S. interests in the region, Washington is surely aware that China has not affected the freedom of commercial navigation in these waters so far. And as I noted in

my earlier piece, Beijing is developing its stance and could eventually recognize the legality of military activities in another country’s EEZ (see, for example, the China-Russia joint military exercise in the Mediterranean).

Yet when it comes to China’s large-scale land reclamation in the Spratly Islands (and on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands), Washington worries that Beijing will conduct a series of activities to strengthen its claims on the South China Sea, such as establishing an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) or advocating that others respect a 200-nautical mile (370 km) EEZ from its islands. Meanwhile, the 2014 oil rig incident taught Washington that ASEAN claimants and even ASEAN as a whole could hardly play any effective role in dealing with China’s land reclamation. Hence, the U.S. has no better choice than to become directly involved in this issue.

At the beginning, the United States tried to stop China through private diplomatic mediation, yet it soon realized that this approach was not effective in persuading China. So Washington started to tackle the issue in a more aggressive way, such as encouraging India, Japan, ASEAN, the G7, and the European Union to pressure Beijing internationally. Domestically, U.S. officials from different departments and different levels have opposed China’s ‘changing the status quo’ in this area.

Since 2015, Washington has increased its pressure on China. It sent the USS Fort Worth, a littoral combat ship, to sail in waters near the Spratly area controlled by Vietnam in early May. U.S. official are also considering sending naval and air patrols within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands controlled by China.

Washington has recognized that it could hardly stop China’s construction in Spratly Islands. Therefore, it has opted to portray Beijing as a challenger to the status quo, at the same time moving to prevent China from establishing a South China Sea ADIZ and an EEZ of 200 nautical miles around its artificial islands. This was the logic behind the U.S. sending a P-8A surveillance plane with reporters on board to approach three artificial island built by China. China issued eight warnings to the plane; the U.S. responded by saying the plane was flying through international airspace.

Afterwards, U.S. Defense Department spokesman, Army Col. Steve Warren, said there could be a potential “freedom of navigation” exercise within 12 nautical miles of the artificial islands. If this approach were adopted, it would back China into a corner; hence it’s a unlikely the Obama administration will make that move.

As the U.S. involvement in the South China Sea becomes more aggressive and high-profile, the dynamic relationship between China and the United States comes to affect other layers of the dispute (for example, relations between China and ASEAN claimants or China and ASEAN in general). To some extent, the South China Sea dispute has developed into a balance of power tug-of-war between the U.S. and China, yet both sides will not take the risk of military confrontation . As Foreign Minister Wang Yi put it in a recent meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, “as for the differences, our attitude is it is okay to have differences as long as we could avoid

misunderstanding, and even more importantly, avoid miscalculation .”

For its part, China is determined to build artificial islands and several airstrips in the Spratlys, which I argue would help promote the resolution of SCS disputes. But it’s worth noting that if China establishes an ADIZ and advocates a 200 nautical miles EEZ (as the U.S. fears), it would push ASEAN claimants and even non-claimants to stand by the United States. Obviously, the potential consequences contradict with China’s “One Belt, One Road” strategy.

In February 2014, in response to reports by Japan’s Asahi Shimbun that a South China Sea ADIZ was imminent, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs hinted that China would not necessarily impose an ADIZ. “The Chinese side has yet to feel any air security threat from the ASEAN countries and is optimistic about its relations with the neighboring countries and the general situation in the South China Sea region,” a spokesperson said.

Since the “Belt and Road” is Beijing’s primary strategic agenda for the coming years, it is crucial for China to strengthen its economic relationship with ASEAN on the one hand while reducing ASEAN claimants’ security concerns on the other hand. As a result, it should accelerate the adjustment of its South China Sea policy; clarify China’s stand on the issue, and propose China’s blueprint for resolving the disputes.

The South China Sea dispute has developed a seasonal pattern, where the first half of the year is focused on conflicts, and the second half tends to emphasize cooperation. Considering its timing at the peak of ‘conflict season,’ the Shangri-La Dialogue serves as a hot spot. Since 2012, the Shangri-La Dialogue has become a platform for the U.S. and China to tussle on the South China Sea, with the U.S. being proactive and China reactive. (Incidentally, this partly explains why China is upgrading Xiangshan Forum as an alternative dialogue platform). This year was no exception, as the U.S. worked hard to draw the world’s attention to the Shangri-La Dialogue this year

Empirically DisprovenReputation costs stop SCS war—no fighting since 88 despite escalating tensionsHuang, 15(5/13, Chin-Hao, Political Science Professor-Yale, “Security Dimensions of China’s Relations with Southeast Asia,” Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Huang_Written%20Testimony_5.13.2015%20Hearing.pdf)

In the last few months, with many of the claimant states fortifying their claims in the South China Sea, it is curious that the conflict remains of relatively low frequency and intensity . What does restraint mean in practice, especially with regard to the absence of the use of force by claimant states in the South China Sea? Any proposal to militarize the dispute with the use of force contains great risk because an attempt to change any one aspect could open a Pandora’s Box of issues and bring the rival claimant states to the brink of war. The use of force also carries enormous social repercussions and costs that once triggered would amount to major status-loss,

tarnished image and reputation regionally and globally . This aversion to be an outlier and pariah state in the international community alters the claimant states’ consideration on the use of force in settling the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. In particular, for China, the desire to attain the status of a major power also

restrains its policy options on the maritime disputes . The identity of major powers has

had different status markers. In contemporary international politics, major powers are often seen as those leading and upholding international institutions that contribute to stable interstate relations and global governance, as opposed to major powers of the past that rely purely on military conquests. This incentivizes China to uphold or at least not disrupt the status quo and to give pause or even abandon militarist tendencies. Even in such a high-tension , anarchic security environment, restraint by each of the claimant states may thus help explain why there have been no battle-related deaths between two armed forces in the South China Sea since the Fiery Cross confrontation in 1988. Instead, the claimant states have engaged with one another in other forms low-level contestation. In each year from 1994 to 2013 (see Graph 1 below), the number of incidents, including but not limited to surveillance, arrests, seizures, and expelling remained under double-digits. 1999 saw a total of seven incidents and clashes – the highest number during that timeframe – that occurred between claimant states in the South China Sea. Cumulatively, the Philippines accounted for 14 incidents involving the deployment of its naval vessels and surveillance planes, nearly twice as many times as China’s instigation in such incidents. For a region with what appears to be intensifying regional rivalries , it is remarkably surprising to see the low levels of incidents and minor clashes, let alone direct military confrontation .

No EscalationNo escalation – China and other states are choosing civilian deployments to ensure stabilityHuang, 15(5/13, Chin-Hao, Political Science Professor-Yale, “Security Dimensions of China’s Relations with Southeast Asia,” Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Huang_Written%20Testimony_5.13.2015%20Hearing.pdf)

More important, China’s more recent approach to enforcing its claims in the South China Sea has relied on the Coast Guard and other civilian agencies, rather than resorting to the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) forces. The Bureau of Fisheries Administration has increased the number of fleets in the South China Sea and Coast Guard patrols in the high seas have increased as well. But, to date, Beijing remains wary of deploying naval assets to defend its territorial claims, unlike in the late 1980s and early 1990s where it used armed forces

as a first resort to resolve its competing claims in the South China Sea. Internally, a number of recent changes occurred to shape the decision-making processes with regards to the South China Sea. The establishment of a Central Leading Small Group on the Protection of Maritime Interests in 2012 drew senior officials from the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), and the PLA Navy. Most notably, a majority of the officials in the working group represent civilian agencies and interests and serve as a counterweight to armed and naval forces in the decision-making process. At the National People’s Congress in March 2012, Chinese officials also formalized plans to restructure China’s main maritime law enforcement agencies. In particular, four of the major maritime law enforcement forces (e.g., SOA maritime surveillance forces; MPS coast guard forces; MOA fishery enforcement forces, and custom administration’s maritime antismuggling police) will be merged as part of SOA with operations supervised by MPS. Relying on these civilian agencies appears to be a deliberate choice and suggests that China has sought to limit the potential for escalation through how it chooses to enforce its claims to maritime rights . On the other hand, an explicit shift to using naval assets – and replacing them with civilian and other law enforcement agencies – against fishing vessels and naval forces from other claimant states in the South China Sea would point to greater Chinese assertiveness. Interestingly, the Philippines and Vietnam, two of the key claimant states in the South China Sea, have also been placing greater efforts to build up their coast guards (see Table 1 below) and exercise a greater degree of restraint from deploying their naval forces, all the while military expenditures on hard naval and military assets remain relatively constant in the last ten years from 2005-2014, as measured through defense spending as percentage of key Southeast Asian government’s spending (see Graph 2 below). The Philippines’ Coast Guard, for example, will expand to 10,000 personnel by 2016 and its operational budget of nearly $100 million for 2014. Additionally, the Philippine Coast Guard will continue to make new acquisitions of patrol and coastal combatant equipment from Japan, Australia, and the United States in the coming years. Likewise, Vietnam’s National Assembly recently allocated nearly $750 million from its 2013 State and Central budget for its fisheries surveillance and coast guard forces. Joint training of regional coast guards with countries like Japan has also taken place or is in the planning phases.

That reflects a deep consensus among Chinese strategists Huang, 15(5/13, Chin-Hao, Political Science Professor-Yale, “Security Dimensions of China’s Relations with Southeast Asia,” Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Huang_Written%20Testimony_5.13.2015%20Hearing.pdf)

More important, in China, a number of influential military strategists have also concurred with the need for more robust civilian forces and agencies to help patrol the maritime borders in the South China Sea. In “Notes on Maritime Security Strategy in the New Period in the New Century,” for example, a notable article published in China’s most prestigious military journal, 中国军事科学 [China Military Science] argues, “to safeguard the EEZ, it is not usual to employ military forces. If military forces are employed, they will often expand the scope of the incident, causing the situation to become more and more complicated … To resolve such problems, many countries have coast guards.” Moreover, the piece is quite emphatic in stating that negotiation has been and will remain China’s approach to maritime territorial disputes, asserting that “Since the founding of the new China, under the direction of Mao … Deng … Jiang … and Hu … the Chinese government has used the foreign policy instruments of ‘negotiations, declarations of differences, and adopting measures to build trust’ … which has yielded obvious successes … resolving to a large extent the problems of maritime rivalry and preventing hidden dangers.” The article, published in such a high profile journal on a topic of great sensitivity, reflects the emerging consensus in China’s senior military leadership circle .

China ModeratingChina moderating—not escalating—on SCSHuang, 15(5/13, Chin-Hao, Political Science Professor-Yale, “Security Dimensions of China’s Relations with Southeast Asia,” Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Huang_Written%20Testimony_5.13.2015%20Hearing.pdf)

A number of analyses published in China have also been advocating for continuing China’s moderate and non-confrontational stance, and also to work with ASEAN partners for a measured resolution to the South China Sea conflict. For example, such views are evident in an analysis with the title “On the ‘Seeking Joint Development’ Issue in the South China Sea,” published in in the official journal, 海洋 开发与管理 [Ocean Development and Management] of the State Oceanic Administration. The expert suggests, “a policy of ‘joint development’ will help to realize our major objective in the South Sea, and will thus have major significance for our country’s social and economic development.” In a surprisingly candid appraisal of the current situation prevailing in the South China Sea, the author notes: “As China’s comprehensive national strength has increased along with its military capabilities and its requirements for energy resources, so ASEAN states’ anxiety about a China threat has been increasing by the day since independently they have no prospect to balance against China. … [They have taken steps] to unite together in order to cope with China …[But China] has openly stated that it will not be the first to resort to the use of force in the South Sea dispute.” This observation is significant in that it concedes that Beijing needs to heed ASEAN’s anxieties and work collaboratively especially when there is a regional consensus to do so. Most notably, China’s turn in Southeast Asia toward moderation was part of broader evaluation of China’s policies toward the countries and organizations along its periphery. A high-level, closed-door two-day meeting on this subject in late October 2013—the first such meeting known to specialists—was attended by all members of the party’s standing committee. After the meeting closed, Xinhua news agency reported on a speech delivered by Chinese President Xi Jinping, though the full deliberations of the meeting remained unavailable. Subsequent official media and experts noted the problems China faced along its eastern periphery, suggesting that the new tack toward Southeast Asia is designed to ease the problems in the South China Sea, especially through working with ASEAN members to set aside the sovereignty question and instead focus on ways to manage and jointly develop and govern the global commons in the South China Sea.

A2 MiscalcNo SCS miscalc - Empirics prove. Increased presence of CG ships actually results in less potential for conflict. Stashwick, 15Steven, spent 10 years on active duty as a U.S. naval officer, made several deployments to the Western Pacific, and completed graduate studies in international relations at the University of Chicago. He is a Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve.2015 (“South China Sea: Conflict Escalation and ‘Miscalculation’ Myths,” The Diplomat, September 25, 2015, Accessible Online at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-china-sea-conflict-escalation-and-miscalculation-myths/, Accessed 6/30/16, DSF)

In Asia, there is recent and dramatic precedent for restraint , even after an unambiguously hostile local event, which belies theoretical arguments about the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation. When the South Korean warship Cheonan was sunk in 2010 , South Korea determined that North Korea was responsible. Far from a mere ‘incident’ of the sort worried over in the South China Sea, this was a belligerent act against South Korea’s armed forces. And yet, there was no miscalculation-fueled conflict spiral, and instead a strategically calibrated response.It remains unknown whether the sinking of the Cheonan was ordered by the North Koreans (they continue to deny any responsibility), the act of a renegade, or, perhaps least plausibly, an accident. What is clear is that despite a sunken ship and 46 sailors killed, the incident did not spiral out of control. This suggests that South Korea’s political calculus did not view militarily punishing North Korea worth the risk of a renewed – and potentially nuclear – war, which is to say that an extraordinary but tactical-level event did not trump strategic preferences.

Even so, some take the miscalculation -escalation dynamic so far as to suggest that incidents between fishing vessels and coast guards in the S outh C hina S ea might lead to war. In view of the Cold War record and the recent Cheonan example, such

propositions are drastically overstated . It is conceivable that a state already resolved to escalate a dispute militarily might view a local maritime incident as a convenient casus belli. But in that emphatically calculated case, no institutional impediments to such incidents would prevent the hostility.

On the contrary, the prevalence of coast guards and fishing vessels is actually a sign of restraint . For a front so often considered a “flashpoint,” it is notable how few incidents in the

South China Sea are between naval assets. This is not accident or luck, but instead suggests that regional players deliberately use lightly armed coast guard and other para-military “white hull” vessels to enforce their claims. Because these units do not have the ability to escalate force the way warships do, it in fact signals their desire to avoid escalation . And while “gray hull ” naval vessels may be just over the horizon providing an implicit

threat of force, they can also provide a further constraint on potential incidents; their very presence compels parties to consider how far to escalate without inviting more serious responses.

As in the Cold War, parties in the South China Sea have sought diplomatic mitigation of maritime incidents, principally through the perennially-stalled Code of Conduct, the year-old Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), and the bilateral Military Maritime Consultative Agreement between the U.S. and China. But underpinning concerns about miscalculation and escalation, and mitigation efforts like CUES, is the idea that by avoiding incidents the region will avoid war. This belief is dangerous insofar as it conflates the symptoms of the disputes (incidents at sea) with the terms of the dispute itself (maritime rights and sovereignty). Incidents and the activities that precipitate them help establish new and accepted regional norms and “facts on the ground” (bloodlessly, if inelegantly). In that sense, avoiding incidents sets back the de facto resolution of the disputes. Since the balance of these evolving norms and facts on the ground appears to favor China’s efforts (e.g., using its coast guard to eject fishing vessels from disputed waters and island reclamation projects), it is neither surprising that China’s regional rivals propose institutional remedies like CUES and the Code of Conduct, nor that China only agrees to them after negotiating away any legally binding provisions.

The record suggests that miscalculation concerns over incidents in the maritime realm are exaggerated and can artificially increase tensions , raise threat perceptions , an d justify arms build-ups . Whether an incident is deliberate, or a

true organic accident, if it occurs within a dispute context where neither side desires armed conflict, it will not escalate at the strategic level. However, because of the very seriousness of that perceived escalation threat, the miscalculation narrative can also motivate positive diplomatic efforts like INCSEA, DMA, and now CUES (not to overstate their realistic contribution to resolving disputes).

Further, for all its conceptual and historical problems, and not least its potential to feed narratives of aggression, another possible advantage of focusing on “miscalculation” in the South China Sea is that it allows countries to maintain ambiguity about the real terms of dispute. Avoiding war is a distinct objective from “solving” disputes; war is a dispute resolution mechanism after all. But if peace is the priority, ambiguity may be preferable if all that clarity reveals is just how intractable those disputes may be. Clarity can rob governments of the flexibility to equivocate to their domestic audiences (and competitors) and force a choice between escalating a conflict and backing down from their claims. Then open conflict might become more realistic. Conversely, if all parties are more or less content to live with ambiguity in the region’s maritime claims, then a somewhat mutually dissatisfying peace prevails, but peace nonetheless .

Everyone wants to win, but as long as everyone also wants to avoid losing even more, occasional incidents do not have to fuel strategic tension .

A2 ResourcesNo energy war – trends and structural incentives ensure cooperation Huang, 15(5/13, Chin-Hao, Political Science Professor-Yale, “Security Dimensions of China’s Relations with Southeast Asia,” Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Huang_Written%20Testimony_5.13.2015%20Hearing.pdf)

Vietnam contests China’s occupation of the Paracels even though it lost the battle there against China in 1974, and as such, Hanoi ignores any potential jurisdiction emanating from those features in the Paracels themselves and cites that the Chinese oil rig violates its own coastline’s EEZ of 200 nautical miles. Interestingly, maritime jurisdiction flows from sovereignty over land territory, not the reverse. If Vietnam has no jurisdiction in those particular features in the Paracels (e.g., Triton Island), then it has limited administrative role over the Paracels. Claims of violation of Vietnam’s EEZ may thus be an effort to blur the juridical waters and gain regional and international support for a rather weak sovereignty claim on Hanoi’s part. It appears that China’s tit-for-tat strategy stems from Vietnam’s decision to license oil blocks and concessions in the disputed waters, a number of which took place in the mid- to late-1990s. For example, Vietnam awarded concessions and contracts to at least nine international, major oil and natural gas exploration companies during that period. In the last few years, Vietnam had also invited ExxonMobil to develop the Ca Voi Xanh gas field in the contested Blocks 117, 118 and 119 in the South China Sea, all of which are in close proximity to where the Chinese Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig was operating (and hence the islands and features that China has been occupying since 1974). Vietnam has also ongoing joint cooperation and development projects with India’s ONGC Videsh Limited (Block 128), Russia’s Gazprom (Blocks 129-133), and ExxonMobil (Blocks 156-158). What is perhaps most interesting is that these major oil and gas blocks lie in Vietnam’s continental shelf, but a number of them also overlap with China’s actual territorial waters, given its longstanding presence on a number of the islands and features in the Paracels. Moreover, if ramming by fishing boats constitutes as the “use of force,” then both China and Vietnam, engaged in such low-intensity, tit-for-tat strategy during the oil rig incident, appear to have violated UNCLOS. Their behavior also violates such regional norms and agreements as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia and the 2002 ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which bound all claimant states to resolve the territorial and jurisdictional disputes through peaceful means and to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes. 10 The extent to which the oil rig imbroglio generated heightened concerns about China’s aggressive territorial ambitions in the South China Sea thus needs to be more carefully analyzed. As discussed, the presence of the oil rig in of itself did not reflect a fundamental shift toward a more zero-sum attitude toward maritime affairs in the South China Sea. And, with regard to

the ramming incidents, both sides deployed civilian and fishing ships first , instead of their naval assets to counter and respond to each other’s fishing boats and vessels. The incident escalated bilateral and regional tensions but fell short of drawing in military forces to settle the dispute. Moreover, pundits are quick to point out that as a rising economic powerhouse, China has a voracious appetite for oil, and as such it is taking all means necessary to compete against and eliminate regional rivals and claimant states from gaining access to the oil and other natural resources found in the sea bed of the South China Sea. If such logic holds, then China should be expected to take on more aggressive, unilateral, and coercive measures to protect and pursue its material interests across the entire South China Sea. Contrary to conventional wisdom, however, the data and analysis from the U.S. E nergy Information Agency estimates that most fields containing discovered oil and natural gas are clustered in the uncontested parts of the S outh

China Sea, close to shorelines of the coastal countries, and not near the contested outposts in the

Spratlys or the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea (see Graph 3 above). The South China Sea may have additional oil and other resources like natural gas in underexplored areas, with an estimate of around 12 billion barrels of oil and 160 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, or just about 3 to 4 percent of the world’s undiscovered conventional oil and gas resources (see Graph 4 above). These resources, however, are not considered commercial reserves at this time, and extracting them bear extremely high costs and risks and are not deemed economically feasible. Interestingly, in Reed Bank, an area in the South China Sea that is claimed by the Philippines, China, Taiwan, and Vietnam and that has nearly one-fifth of the undiscovered resources, the Philippines and China have initiated discussions for joint exploration of the area . While the underlying tensions between the two claimant states have yet to resolved – each side still maintains some form of jurisdiction over Reed Bank – the initial discussions for joint development is a modest approach to shelve territorial disputes temporarily and to focus on joint development .

A2 Core InterestIts not viewed as a core interestHuang, 15(5/13, Chin-Hao, Political Science Professor-Yale, “Security Dimensions of China’s Relations with Southeast Asia,” Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Huang_Written%20Testimony_5.13.2015%20Hearing.pdf)

Relatedly, in 2010, it was reported that China had labeled the South China Sea as a

“core interest,” on par with sensitive territorial issues like Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan. Yet, to date, no senior Chinese leader has ever publicly described the South China Sea as a core interest , although it may have been discussed in one or more private meetings between U.S. and Chinese officials. An official report in Xinhua in 2011 indicated that China “has indisputable sovereignty over the (South China) sea’s islands and surrounding waters, which is part of China’s core interests.” In this 7 context, the article to territorial sovereignty over the islands and the related 12nautical mile territorial waters (maritime space over which states exercise immediate sovereignty under UNCLOS), and not to the South China Sea as a whole, furthering the point on the limitations of its nine-dash line claims. Senior Chinese leaders have subsequently reaffirmed that China’s approach to the disputes in the South China Sea should remain based on the former Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping’s guideline of “sovereignty is ours, set aside disputes, pursue joint development.” Shortly after a summit in July 2011 of Southeast Asian leaders, for example, a high-profile and authoritative collection of essays and thoughts by senior officials affirming Deng’s guiding principles on the South China Sea was publicly released, providing key insights into subtle but important signs of moderation a further effort to reduce tensions.

Counter Deterrence CP

NoteThis CP can probably work in the ECS too if you just unhiglight the one SCS portion in the CP and then change the text of the CP.

Answers to this CP can also be found in Pressure CP answers since both say deterrence bad.

1NC - SCSText: The United States federal government should substantially increase its deployment of Expeditionary Mobile Bases in the South China Sea.

Solves Chinese aggression through deterrence and restrained power projection.Barno & Bensahel 6/14 – David Barno and Nora Bensahel, Lt. General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) is a Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, and Dr. Nora Bensahel is a Distinguished Scholar in Residence, at the School of International Service at American University. Both also serve as Nonresident Senior Fellows at the Atlantic Council., June 14 2016(“A Guide to stepping it up in the South China Sea,” War on the Rocks, http://warontherocks.com/2016/06/a-guide-to-stepping-it-up-in-the-south-china-sea/, Accessed 6/30/16, AJ)

Build floating U.S. bases in the South China Sea. The United S tates could respond to Beijing ’s artificial islands by building temporary afloat bases that would sustain a greater U.S. and international presence . It could position one or more Expeditionary Mobile Bases (ESBs, formerly called Afloat Staging Bases) in the S outh C hina S ea , which could act as small, mobile floating bases that can project power in a number of ways, including basing helicopters and special operations forces. The United States could also re-energize the development of the long-studied Joint Mobile Offshore Base

(JMOB). In the future, a series of JMOBs could serve as mobile forward sea bases (like multiple

joined oil platforms) in the region, large enough to support large fixed wing air transports and stationing hundreds or even thousands of troops. The Chinese are assessing this capability as well, but have achieved much the same effect by their island-building program.

The great advantage of ESBs and JMOBs is that they can support a wide range of less provocative non-combat operations , such as maritime domain awareness, search and rescue, counter-piracy, and humanitarian relief . Crewing both platforms with a combination of Coast Guard and civilian sailors — potentially from other countries as well as from the United States — could reduce the risk that China would see this as a stark military escalation. It could provide a valuable dual-use capability for the United States, supporting important missions on a regular basis (including the Coast Guard patrols mentioned above), but also enabling the United States to rapidly improve its regional power projection capabilities in the event of a conflict.

2NC – Deterrence Deterrence is the only effective method to promote freedom of navigation.Freedberg 6-3, Sydney Freedberg, Deputy Editor for Breaking Defense, 6-3-16(“US must Do More in South China Sea, urges Sen. McCain,” Breaking Defense, http://breakingdefense.com/2016/06/us-must-do-more-in-south-china-sea-urges-sen-mccain/, Accessed 7-1-16, AJ)

SINGAPORE: In a clear message to the Obama Administration , our Pacific partners and to

China, Sen. John McCain says the US military is not doing enough to challenge Chinese claims in the strategic S outh China Sea. Nor is the US doing enough to ratify the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade pact, a vital economic objective in the region, the senator said on the eve of the Shangri-La conference here.

“We have not,” McCain said bluntly when I asked him after his speech here whether the US had done enough Freedom Of Navigation Operations (FONOP) to challenge China’s claims. “We have sort of made it a signal event when we sailed a destroyer within the 12-mile limit” — the “territorial sea” claimed by China around its islets — “and at one point the Department of Defense wouldn’t even acknowledge we had done that.

“We should make it clear that these are international waters and filling in islands is in violation of international law ,” McCain said. “I would like to see both air and ship transiting the areas around these islands as just a normal routine.”

A2 Counter Deterrence CP

2AC - Deterrence FailsDeterrence fails – it results in a violent action-reaction cycle that increases possibility for conflict.Dong 13 – Wang Dong, associate professor of School of International Studies and director of the Center for Northeast Asian Strategic Studies at Peking University, January 17 2013(“Addressing the US-China Security Dilemma,” Carnegie Endownment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/17/addressing-u.s.-china-security-dilemma, Accessed 6/30/16, AJ)

But many analysts now agree that increasing strategic distrust between China and the U nited States in recent years has posed significant challenges not only to U.S.-China relations but also to regional peace and security at large. Since the end of 2009, the United States and China have drifted

apart. The two powers are increasingly trapped in an action-reaction cycle , so much so that many lament that the U nited States and China are doomed for a “strategic collision.”

Underlying the growing strategic distrust is an emerging security dilemma —a situation in which one state’s efforts to enhance its own security will lead others to feel less secure—between Beijing and Washington. Both the Chinese public and elite believe that the Obama administration’s pivot or rebalancing to Asia is a thinly veiled attempt to restrain and counterbalance, if not encircle or contain , a rising China . And many U.S. officials and analysts perceive an increasingly assertive China that does not shy away from flexing its muscles, “bullying” its neighbors, and pursuing its “narrow” interests relentlessly.

Numerous moves by the Obama administration have all been perceived in China as evidence of U.S. hostility toward Beijing. These moves have included deploying U.S. Marines to Darwin, Australia; asserting U.S. interests in freedom of navigation in the South China Sea; bolstering military alliances with the Philippines, Japan, and Australia; enhancing security cooperation with Vietnam and India; improving bilateral relations with Myanmar; and beefing up the United States’ ballistic missile defense systems in East Asia.

Going forward, the United States will continue to hedge against the rise of China and perceived Chinese assertiveness. It will strengthen its deterrence posture, build up its forward deployment, and reinforce military alliances and security partnerships in Asia. Yet, because of the almost-inevitable shrinking of the U.S. defense budget, it remains to be seen whether Washington can match its rhetoric with action.

Interestingly, quite a number of American analysts have become critical of the Obama administration’s handling of the U.S. pivot or rebalancing to Asia, particularly of the way it was rolled out. Now, even the administration officials have acknowledged that too much emphasis was initially put on the military and security aspects of the pivot. In that sense, the U.S. rebalancing strategy itself needs to be “rebalanced.” It is likely that the second Obama administration will recalibrate its approach by putting more emphasis on economic cooperation and people-to-people exchanges in the Asia-Pacific, including with China.

The way the Chinese leadership transition is structured and institutionalized ensures continuity and predictability in China’s foreign policy. Around the time President Obama was elected to a second term, the Chinese leadership

too changed. At the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of China, a new Standing Committee of the Politburo was elected. Xi Jinping, who has been China’s vice president since 2008, assumed the positions of general secretary of the Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission. He and Executive Vice Premier Li Keqiang, respectively, will almost certainly assume the presidency and premiership at the National People’s Congress meeting next March.

Both men have been in senior leadership positions for many years. Other members of the top leadership have also been in senior posts for quite some time. The new Chinese leadership will maintain strong consensuses on major domestic and foreign policy agendas, which prioritize the continuation of deeper reform and China’s peaceful development.

Looking ahead, the U.S.-China relationship is entering a challenging period. How the relationship between China and the United States is to be managed is a question that will define the strategic landscape of the Asia-Pacific in the twenty-first century. China and the United States should not allow themselves to be engulfed by mutual hostility and suspicion, blindness to the effects their actions have on the relationship, misperceptions, and the fatalistic pessimism inherent in a hardcore realist mentality. Rather, they should accurately gauge each other’s strategic intentions and try to increase mutual strategic understanding and trust through candid discussion and exchanges at the highest level of leadership.

2AC – Solvency DeficitDeterrence destroys all possibility of cooperation with China.Larter 4-6, David Larter, Journalist for the Navy Times, 4-6-16(“4-Star Admiral wants to confront china: White house says not so fast,” Navy Times, http://www.navytimes.com/story/military/2016/04/06/4-star-admiral-wants-confront-china-white-house-says-not-so-fast/82472290/, Accessed 7/1/16, AJ)

The U.S. military ’s top commander in the Pacific is arguing behind closed doors for a more confrontational approach to counter and reverse China’s strategic gains in the S outh

China Sea, appeals that have met resistance from the White House at nearly every turn.Adm. Harry Harris is proposing a muscular U.S. response to China's island-building that may include launching aircraft and conducting military operations within 12 miles of these man-made islands, as part of an effort to stop what he has called the "Great Wall of Sand" before it extends within 140 miles from the Philippines' capital, sources say.

Harris and his U.S. Pacific Command have been waging a persistent campaign in public and in private over the past several months to raise the profile of China's land grab, accusing China outright in February of militarizing the South China Sea

But the Obama administration , with just nine months left in office , is looking to work with China on a host of other issues from nuclear non-proliferation to an ambitious trade agenda, experts say, and would prefer not to rock the South China Sea boat, even going so far as to muzzle Harris and other military leaders in the run-up to a security summit.

“They want to get out of office with a minimum of fuss and a maximum of cooperation with China ,” said Jerry Hendrix, a retired Navy captain and defense strategy analyst with the Center for a New American Security.

The White House has sought to tamp down on rhetoric from Harris and other military leaders, who are warning that China is consolidating its gains to solidify sovereignty claims to most of the South China Sea.

National Security Adviser Susan Rice imposed a gag order on military leaders over the disputed South China Sea in the weeks running up to the last week's high-level nuclear summit, according to two defense officials who asked for anonymity to discuss policy deliberations. China's president, Xi Jinping, attended the summit, held in Washington, and met privately with President Obama.

The order was part of the notes from a March 18 National Security Council meeting and included a request from Rice to avoid public comments on China's recent actions in the South China Sea, said a defense official familiar with the meeting readout.

In issuing the gag order, Rice intended to give Presidents Obama and Xi Jinping "maximum political maneuvering space" during their one-on-one meeting during the global Nuclear Summit held March 31 through April 1, the official said.

“Sometimes it’s OK to talk about the facts and point out what China is doing, and other times it's not,” the official familiar with the memo said. “Meanwhile, the Chinese have been absolutely consistent in their messaging.”

The NSC dictum has had a “chilling effect” within the Pentagon that discouraged leaders from talking publicly about the South China Sea at all, even beyond the presidential summit, according to a second defense official familiar with operational planning. Push-back from the NSC has become normal in cases where it thinks leaders have crossed the line into baiting the Chinese into hard-line positions, sources said.

Military leaders interpreted this as an order to stay silent on China's assertive moves to control most of the South China Sea, said both defense officials, prompting concern that the paltry U.S. response may embolden the Chinese and worry U.S. allies in the region, like Japan and the Philippines, who feel bullied.

China, which has been constructing islands and airstrips atop reefs and rocky outcroppings in the Spratly Islands, sees the South China Sea as Chinese territory. President Xi told Obama during their meeting at the nuclear summit that China would not accept any behavior in the disguise of freedom of navigation that violates its sovereignty, according to a Reuters report. The two world leaders did agree to work together on nuclear and cyber security issues.

Experts say administrations often direct military leaders to tone down their rhetoric ahead of major talks, but the current directive comes at a difficult juncture. U.S. leaders are struggling to find an effective approach to stopping the island-building without triggering a confrontation.

Maritime Transparency CP

NotesThis CP can be used for both the SCS and the ECS as the awareness system can be used universally. You could try to run one CP that does both the SCS and ECS but it would have to be two separate planks with two separate coalitions (one for the ECS and one for the SCS). Establishing one coalition obviously wouldn’t work since many countries don’t have strategic interests in the ECS and vice versa.

The Thiele solvency evidence from the 1NC ECS shell is repeated in 2NC solvency since it can also apply to SCS as a general solvency advocate.

1NC - SCSText: The United States federal government should establish a shared maritime domain awareness system between The People’s Republic of China, Vietnam, The Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and the United States.

MDA solves – results in transparency that engenders cooperation and shared capacity-building effortsJackson et. Al. 16 – Van Jackson, Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS and Associate Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Mira Rapp-Hooper, Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS. She is formerly a fellow with the CSIS Asia Program and director of the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Paul Scharre, Senior Fellow and Director of the 20YY Future of Warfare Initiative at CNAS, Harry Krejsa, Research Associate with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS, Jeff Chism, Commander in the U.S. Navy, March 2016(“Networked Transparency: Constructing a Common Operational Picture of the South China Sea,” Center for a New American Security, http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS%20Report-COP-160331.pdf, Accessed 6/30/16, AJ)

This report proposes that enhanced, shared maritime domain awareness (MDA) – that is, a near-realtime understanding of air and sea activities – in the South China Sea is a realistic means of addressing some of the underlying and proximate problems facing this strategic waterway. A maritime domain awareness architecture may engender cooperation in a region devoid of trust, prevent misunderstandings, encourage operational transparency, and lead to capacity-building efforts that contribute to the regional public good . This study explores how advances in commercial technology services, regional information-sharing, and security cooperation can contribute to enhanced regional security. We believe these advances can do so by moving the region closer to establishing a common, layered, and regularly updated picture of air and maritime activity in the South China Sea – a common operational picture (COP) for a tempestuous domain.

The U.S. military has long relied on a common operational picture to enable command and control linking strategic decisionmakers located at headquarters elements and operational units located in the field. A COP amounts to a visualization tool for situational awareness, described more narrowly by the military as “a single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness .” 5 This domain-agnostic military definition conveys that a COP is a tool for maintaining situational awareness, but not how situational awareness occurs. That requires the confidence-building, technical capacity, and commitment to stability-promoting transparency that this report explores.

1NC – ECSText: The United States federal government should establish a shared maritime domain awareness system between The People’s Republic of China, Japan, and the United States.

MDA solves and is feasible – results in transparency that engenders cooperation and trustThiele 15 – Ralph Thiele, Chairman of the Political-Military Society (pmg), Berlin, Germany and CEO at StratByrd Consulting, May 2015(“Fostering Coopeartion in East Asia via Maritime Domain Awareness,” Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/190785/346_Thiele_SCOC.pdf, Accessed 7/1/16, AJ)

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) addresses the collection, fusion and dissemination of enormous quantities of data , information and knowledge drawn from military forces, government agencies, international coalition partners and forces, and commercial entities. Eventually, the depth of information collected from these various

sources will be weaved together to enrich a comprehensive common operational picture that is envisioned to be shared among many users . Consequently, this concept offers attractive components to building a regime based multilateralism .

Three key components support MDA: data, information and knowledge. Once integrated these components create a substantive, layered presentation of the global maritime environment. Particularly the timely fusing of maritime information is an initial priority. Obviously, there are many sources of information, from open source white shipping such as AIS10, commercially available databases such as Lloyds, to comprehensive Intelligence fused pictures, representing national, and coalition interests. Incremental gains in data , information and knowledge sharing allow for growing transparency, trust and operational co-operation as mutual confidence builds . The purpose of MDA is to generate actionable knowledge. Sharing Knowledge is absolutely essential if this growing network is to effectively detect, identify and track the most dangerous threats, including terrorists, WMD, narcotics, piracy, mass migrations, and arms traffickers. It is also very beneficial with view to a plenitude of business, logistical and administrative tasks. Awareness generated through knowledge sharing and networking will enhance understanding of the global maritime environment, including adjacent ungoverned areas in which terrorists operate or hybrid warfare takes place. The challenge will be to effectively integrate and fuse the various inputs to achieve the synergies offered by a comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness picture, while being responsive to the information needs of participating agencies.

Situational awareness is the prerequisite of maritime domain security. And it offers the implementation and further development of technologies that serve the prosperity of the region well, i.e. platform, sensor, communication, collaboration and evaluation technologies. Today technological developments such as space based systems, over the horizon radar,

and near shore and harbour acoustics can be incorporated into a layered approach to increase security. Integral to enhancing MDA are screening technologies used for verification of shipments and people prior to their departure from foreign ports.

To identify and address growth potential, industry and academia have been discussing already ways in which technology, based on advanced modelling and simulation tools can be used to identify threats and determine potential impacts. Technological advances may offer some solutions to difficult challenges encountered in the MDA development effort. Areas where technology can directly contribute to enhancing MDA are in the improved detection and tracking of vessels and crafts, the ability to monitor the movement of people and cargo, and enabling appropriate access to the myriad databases and information sources which can make valuable contributions in detection and prevention.

2NC – SolvencyMDA solves the AFF and is feasible – tech developmentsThiele 15 – Ralph Thiele, Chairman of the Political-Military Society (pmg), Berlin, Germany and CEO at StratByrd Consulting, May 2015(“Fostering Coopeartion in East Asia via Maritime Domain Awareness,” Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/190785/346_Thiele_SCOC.pdf, Accessed 7/1/16, AJ)

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) addresses the collection, fusion and dissemination of enormous quantities of data , information and knowledge drawn from military forces, government agencies, international coalition partners and forces, and commercial entities. Eventually, the depth of information collected from these various

sources will be weaved together to enrich a comprehensive common operational picture that is envisioned to be shared among many users . Consequently, this concept offers attractive components to building a regime based multilateralism .

Three key components support MDA: data, information and knowledge. Once integrated these components create a substantive, layered presentation of the global maritime environment. Particularly the timely fusing of maritime information is an initial priority. Obviously, there are many sources of information, from open source white shipping such as AIS10, commercially available databases such as Lloyds, to comprehensive Intelligence fused pictures, representing national, and coalition interests. Incremental gains in data , information and knowledge sharing allow for growing transparency, trust and operational co-operation as mutual confidence builds . The purpose of MDA is to generate actionable knowledge. Sharing Knowledge is absolutely essential if this growing network is to effectively detect, identify and track the most dangerous threats, including terrorists, WMD, narcotics, piracy, mass migrations, and arms traffickers. It is also very beneficial with view to a plenitude of business, logistical and administrative tasks. Awareness generated through knowledge sharing and networking will enhance understanding of the global maritime environment, including adjacent ungoverned areas in which terrorists operate or hybrid warfare takes place. The challenge will be to effectively integrate and fuse the various inputs to achieve the synergies offered by a comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness picture, while being responsive to the information needs of participating agencies.

Situational awareness is the prerequisite of maritime domain security. And it offers the implementation and further development of technologies that serve the prosperity of the region well, i.e. platform, sensor, communication, collaboration and evaluation technologies. Today technological developments such as space based systems, over the horizon radar,

and near shore and harbour acoustics can be incorporated into a layered approach to increase security. Integral to enhancing MDA are screening technologies used for verification of shipments and people prior to their departure from foreign ports.

To identify and address growth potential, industry and academia have been discussing already ways in which technology, based on advanced modelling and simulation tools can be used to identify threats and determine potential impacts. Technological advances may offer some solutions to difficult challenges encountered in the MDA development effort. Areas where technology can directly contribute to enhancing MDA are in the improved detection and tracking of vessels and crafts, the ability to monitor the movement of people and

cargo, and enabling appropriate access to the myriad databases and information sources which can make valuable contributions in detection and prevention.

MDA solves – Europe provesThiele 15 – Ralph Thiele, Chairman of the Political-Military Society (pmg), Berlin, Germany and CEO at StratByrd Consulting, May 2015(“Fostering Coopeartion in East Asia via Maritime Domain Awareness,” Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/190785/346_Thiele_SCOC.pdf, Accessed 7/1/16, AJ)How can a maritime regime be built to common security challenges in the absence of a resolution to competing territorial claims, to promote coordinated efforts in tackling transnational crimes such as piracy and the smuggling of people and goods as well as threats to the maritime environment such as overfishing and oil spills? Regional maritime regime building has been successful in Europe as seen in reasonably successful and comprehensive multilateral institutions for the Baltic, the North, and the Mediterranean Sea . In East Asia such a solution would require multilateral regionalism, a collaborative diplomatic process aiming to resolve the various territorial disputes without coercion. In sharp contrast, no comprehensive, multilateral maritime regime has been initiated in East Asian Seas. Here the delimitation of maritime space has evolved as a bilateral bargaining game since the adoption of UNCLOS in 1982.

China for example has insisted on bilateral negotiations to resolve these disputes. It has used all available channels to assert its position, although unilateral or bilateral efforts clearly don´t make sense with view to the interwoven character of maritime issues in East Asia. Establishing an effective regional maritime order would require the full engagement of all parties involved to include the U.S., China, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN. At the Symposium on New Maritime Security Architecture in East Asia held in Tokyo on January 30, 2015, Ken SATO, President of the Institute for International Policy Studies, proposed the idea of an "Asian Maritime Organization for Security and Cooperation” (AMOSC), pointing out that there is no regional organization with maritime domain awareness, while such an organization is most urgently required for tackling the given challenges.10 Obviously the concept of maritime domain awareness bears potential. And this potential should be explored. The smooth exchange of information related to maritime incidents, for example, could facilitate emergency cooperation as in the case of the tragic loss of Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 in 2014. How can collaborative situation awareness be achieved? To this end it is of interest to look at a relevant development in Europe. In October 2009, the European Commission set guiding principles on how to achieve integration of maritime surveillance – a 'Common Information Sharing Environment for the surveillance of the European Union domain' ('CISE')11. It aims at creating a political, cultural, legal and technical environment to enable sharing between existing and future surveillance systems and networks. Such interoperability will be established in a decentralized way using modern technologies. It will give all concerned authorities access to the information they need for their missions at sea based on the 'need-to-know' and 'responsibility-to-share' principle.

With CISE Maritime surveillance professionals will have access to more relevant information within their existing systems and on their existing screens if maritime surveillance systems will be connected across sectors and borders at national and EU level. The idea is that information and knowledge will be exchanged near real time wherever possible and necessary. What is needed in particular is that civil and military authorities – to include coast guards and navies – will share relevant information with each other. Exactly this will be one of the main priority areas for further work. The European approach to maritime

domain awareness could well serve as reference how to approach the complex issue in East Asia .12

CP solves – current MDA is positive but insufficient. Jackson et. Al. 16 – Van Jackson, Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS and Associate Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Mira Rapp-Hooper, Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS. She is formerly a fellow with the CSIS Asia Program and director of the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Paul Scharre, Senior Fellow and Director of the 20YY Future of Warfare Initiative at CNAS, Harry Krejsa, Research Associate with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS, Jeff Chism, Commander in the U.S. Navy, March 2016(“Networked Transparency: Constructing a Common Operational Picture of the South China Sea,” Center for a New American Security, http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS%20Report-COP-160331.pdf, Accessed 6/30/16, AJ)

As the Pentagon’s Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy advertises, the United States is already doing much to improve the maritime awareness capacity of select Southeast Asian countries. The United S tates has aided Malaysia with coastal surveillance radar stations. It is providing assistance constructing the Philippines Coast Watch System . It is transferring a number of small patrol vessels to the Philippines. And it is supporting Indonesia’s effort to enhance MDA through a number of activities. But these efforts are a pittance compared with what is needed for actionable situational awareness . Most maritime Southeast Asian militaries still lack aerial reconnaissance, rudimentary electronic warfare and signals intelligence , and airborne early warning capabilities; all have only limited maritime patrol and reconnaissance capacity. Current U.S. efforts improve regional capability only on the margins.

2NC – Say YesConcert nations facilitate MDA – similar goals.Jackson et. Al. 16 – Van Jackson, Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS and Associate Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Mira Rapp-Hooper, Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS. She is formerly a fellow with the CSIS Asia Program and director of the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Paul Scharre, Senior Fellow and Director of the 20YY Future of Warfare Initiative at CNAS, Harry Krejsa, Research Associate with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS, Jeff Chism, Commander in the U.S. Navy, March 2016(“Networked Transparency: Constructing a Common Operational Picture of the South China Sea,” Center for a New American Security, http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS%20Report-COP-160331.pdf, Accessed 6/30/16, AJ)

The United S tates is not the only external power interested in South China Sea transparency or in improving the maritime security capacity of ASEAN nations. Several U.S. allies and partners – Australia, India, Japan, and even South Korea (hereinafter the

“Concert Nations”) – have their own defense relations in Southeast Asia as well and make use of their local ties to advance their respective interests, which include promoting exports to support their respective defense industrial bases . At best, the involvement of outside powers in this manner is inefficient and risks duplication of effort while potentially neglecting strategically important maritime security requirements of recipient governments.

South China Sea military and coast guard operations, arms sales and financing, and access agreements involving outside powers all need to be coordinated and deconflicted . Rather than toil independently and in occasional competition with others, the U nited States can leverage the willingness that Concert Nations have already shown to share the overall burden of building maritime awareness capacity in the S outh China Sea and more efficiently determine where its own contributions are most needed.

2NC – Transparency KeySCS war likely and spills over to all regional conflicts – lack of transparency is the key issue.Jackson et. Al. 16 – Van Jackson, Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS and Associate Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Mira Rapp-Hooper, Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS. She is formerly a fellow with the CSIS Asia Program and director of the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Paul Scharre, Senior Fellow and Director of the 20YY Future of Warfare Initiative at CNAS, Harry Krejsa, Research Associate with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS, Jeff Chism, Commander in the U.S. Navy, March 2016(“Networked Transparency: Constructing a Common Operational Picture of the South China Sea,” Center for a New American Security, http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS%20Report-COP-160331.pdf, Accessed 6/30/16, AJ)

Yet underlying these resource and sovereignty tensions is something even more pernicious: The South China

Sea is an opaque, low-information environment. Most South China Sea islets are hundreds of miles from shore, making it especially difficult for governments and commercial entities to monitor events at sea when they occur . This dearth of situational awareness worsens regional competition in the South China Sea. The region is already rife with rapid military modernization, resurgent nationalism, the blurring of economic and security interests , and heightened geopolitical wrangling with China (by great and small powers alike). Left unchecked, these pressures make conflict more likely by tempting major military accidents and crises that could drag down the economic and political future of the region.

These negative trends converging in the South China Sea also create missed opportunities among regional stakeholders for positive gains. South China Sea stakeholders have many transnational and economic interests of growing importance in common – from counterpiracy to maritime commerce and disaster response – but the competitive nature of the S outh China Sea today impedes collective action to solve shared problems. States have trouble engaging in cooperation, even when it would advance shared interests. This challenges the foundations of a stable regional order . The more states believe they live in an anarchical neighborhood, the more likely the region sees the worst of geopolitics: security dilemmas, arms races, and policies motivated by fear and greed rather than reason and restraint.

A2 Maritime Transparency CP

2AC – No SolvencyMDA doesn’t resolve key tensions between claimant states – the issue is not lack of knowledge but deliberate provocations.Fuchs 4-11 – Michael Fuchs, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, and was most recently Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 4-11-16(“How to Turn Down the Heat in the South China Sea,” Defense One, http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/04/how-turn-heat-down-south-china-sea/127375/, Accessed 7/1/16, AJ)

On April 5, Indonesia blew up 23 Malaysian and Vietnamese fishing vessels in a public display to deter others from illegally fishing in its waters. That was one day after Vietnamese state media announced that Vietnamese authorities detained a Chinese vessel accused of illegally entering Vietnamese waters . And that same week , a Chinese Coast Guard vessel forcefully freed a Chinese fishing vessel from Indonesian authorities that had detained the vessel.

This is the new normal in the South China Sea .

While this strategic patch of ocean has long seen international maritime incidents – even deadly ones – the pace has climbed rapidly in recent years.

Tensions have risen as China has taken more frequent and provocative steps to assert its authority over claimed waters, and its regional neighbors have begun to push back. In 2014, China deployed a massive oil rig in disputed waters with Vietnam, leading to clashes between vessels. Between 2013 and 2015, China dredged enough sand from the bottom of the South China Sea to build more than 2,900 acres of new land, on which it appears to be constructing bases. And ships from China and the Philippines have squared off near Scarborough Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, and elsewhere.

The incidents between claimant countries are occurring alongside an emerging U.S.-China confrontation in the South China Sea, with vessels from both countries increasingly challenging one another, as illustrated by journalist Helene Cooper on her recent voyage.

CP doesn’t solve adjudication of disputes or enforcement.Fuchs 4-11 – Michael Fuchs, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, and was most recently Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 4-11-16(“How to Turn Down the Heat in the South China Sea,” Defense One, http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/04/how-turn-heat-down-south-china-sea/127375/, Accessed 7/1/16, AJ)

Second, countries must take the very difficult step of living up to their commitments not to respond to incursions into perceived sovereign waters with force, but instead only with diplomacy . While the parties have already signed up to this in principle in the 2002

Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, the new hub would help make this work by providing an opportunity for the relevant countries to monitor and respond to each incident in real time and to immediately negotiate de-escalation.

Third, the countries must agree to apply the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea to all vessels . The CUES, a 2014 agreement whose 21 signatories include all the relevant South China Sea parties, establishes guidelines for preventing incidents between navies and avoiding escalation when incidents occur. It’s a step forward that would go much further if applied to the more incident-prone Coast Guard and fishing vessels.

Fourth, the countries must construct a mechanism for adjudicating these incidents , for deciding how to proceed once an incident has occurred. Most effective would be a new mechanism comprised of and administered by representatives from the five claimant countries. The mechanism might be based at the maritime domain awareness hub, where real-time information could allow much quicker decisions to determine a way forward.

Say NoNo one will say yes – fierce nationalism and territorial disputes.Kaplan 2-6 - Robert Kaplan, South China Sea author and expert and author for Business Insider, 2-6-16(“The South China Sea will be the Battleground of the Future,” Business Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/why-the-south-china-sea-is-so-crucial-2015-2, Accessed 7-1-16, AJ)

In the interim, the South China Sea has become an armed camp , even as the scramble for reefs is

mostly over. China has confiscated twelve geographical features, Taiwan one, the Vietnamese twenty- one, the Malaysians five, and the Philippines nine. In other words,

facts have already been created on the ground.

Perhaps there can still be sharing arrangements for the oil and natural gas fields. But here it is unclear what , for instance, countries with contentious claims coupled with especially tense diplomatic relations like Vietnam and China will agree upon .

Take the Spratly s, with significant oil and natural gas deposits, which are claimed in full by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and in part by Malaysia , the Philippines, and Brunei. China has built concrete helipads and military structures on seven reefs and shoals.

On Mischief Reef, which China occupied under the nose of the Philippine navy in the 1990s, China has constructed a three-story building and five octagonal concrete structures, all for military use.

On Johnson Reef, China put up a structure armed with high-powered machine guns . Taiwan occupies Itu Aba Island, on which it has constructed dozens of buildings for military use, protected by hundreds of troops and twenty coastal guns.

Vietnam occupies twenty-one islands on which it has built runways, piers, barracks, storage tanks, and gun emplacements. Malaysia and the Philippines, as stated, have five and nine sites respectively, occupied by naval detachments.

Anyone who speculates that with globalization, territorial boundaries and fights for territory have lost their meaning should behold the South China Sea.

MDA fails – intelligence is perceived as military modernization – their authorJackson et. Al. 16 – Van Jackson, Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS and Associate Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Mira Rapp-Hooper, Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS. She is formerly a fellow with the CSIS Asia Program and director of the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Paul Scharre, Senior Fellow and Director of the 20YY Future of Warfare Initiative at CNAS, Harry Krejsa, Research Associate with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS, Jeff Chism, Commander in the U.S. Navy, March 2016(“Networked Transparency: Constructing a Common Operational Picture of the South China Sea,” Center for a New American Security,

http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS%20Report-COP-160331.pdf, Accessed 6/30/16, AJ)

Southeast Asian countries are eager to acquire MDA capabilities for their own security needs close to their shores but are not necessarily convinced of the utility of sharing this information with their neighbors to create a common picture of the South China Sea. This hesitation , which risks MDA efforts being seen as yet another destabilizing example of military modernization , has at least two sources. First, regional states have deep concerns about sharing information with their neighbors, including those with whom they have positive relations . Second, Southeast Asian countries have hesitations about the political ends toward which a common operating picture may be directed. If policymakers are to implement a truly collaborative MDA system in the region, they must understand and surmount both obstacles.

The first of these political hurdles is not unique to Southeast Asia. Sensitive intelligence- and information-sharing can be a challenge even among long-standing allies – after 60 years of close ties, the United States and Japan are still working to improve their intelligence-sharing. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines and Thailand have formal treaties with the United States, but these states do not have close defense ties to each other. Regional trends have encouraged new alignments, including a new partnership between the Philippines and Vietnam, but this is only a first step toward deeper defense cooperation. Even as regional states increase the frequency and nature of their military interactions, they may hesitate to share sensitive maritime information. Intelligence-sharing has a unique ability to reveal state weaknesses as well as strengths.

A second, less common political hurdle also presents itself in Southeast Asia. Regional states have complex security and economic relationships with China , and therefore to the political goals that a South China Sea common operating picture would serve. As negative trends in the South China Sea have accelerated, U.S. policymakers have searched for ways to support regional partners and are themselves increasingly interested in providing countries with MDA capabilities. Improved maritime domain awareness can give partners the ability to monitor events at sea, deter and dissuade gray-zone coercion, and may even engender deeper regional understandings if maritime information-sharing begets broader patterns of cooperation. These capabilities are appropriate for engaging all manner of regional threats and challenges. The United States’ interest in supporting them, however, has an added, if unspoken, motivation: MDA can help partners deter and defend their own interests against a rising China.

East China Sea

Yes Conflict

Great power warChina will initiate conflict – decimates US-Japan relationsWhite, 14Hugh, is professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. His book The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power was published in the US last year by Oxford University Press. , 2014 (“A Great War in the East China Sea: Why China and Japan Could Fight,” The National Interest, July 15, 2014, Accessible Online at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/great-war-the-east-china-sea-why-china-japan-could-fight-10877, Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)

Few people believe that either China or Japan would deliberately start a war in the East China Sea. Most analysts assume that an armed clash could only occur through accident, misunderstanding or unauthorized acts by junior officers acting without, or even against, orders. These are not remote possibilities, of course. They already make the risk of war dangerously high. But we underestimate how high that risk really is if we think this is the only way a war could begin. I think there is a real possibility that fighting might be started deliberately by one side or the other, and unless we understand the circumstances that might prompt that step from either side, we will not be able to take steps to avoid them. First, we must be clear that neither side is at all likely to deliberately start a fight over possession of the disputed islands themselves, or even of the resources that might lie around them. They are not worth a military conflict to anyone. But the dispute has never been about territory. The islands are simply tokens in a contest to define the roles and status of Asia’s great powers over coming decade s. These are issues over which states might well choose to start a war. Let’s start with China. As I have argued elsewhere, China’s primary aim is to strengthen its leadership in Asia and undermine America’s . The best way to do that without confronting America too directly is to weaken the alliances and partnerships that underpin U.S. regional leadership. It therefore wants to persuade U.S. allies that Washington is no longer willing to stand up for them against the growing power of China. (Whether Beijing would be right to assume that without U.S. support they would more willingly accept Chinese leadership is a separate question, of course. As far as Japan is concerned, I think they are probably wrong, but that is a separate issue.) Beijing has clearly decided that the Senkaku /Diaoyu dispute provides a perfect opportunity to demonstrate America’s wavering commitment to its allies . So far, they seem to have been right. China’s threatening military actions around the islands have stoked Japanese anxieties about whethe r, in the event of a clash, Am erica would provide military support. Washington has done exactly as Beijing hoped, by sending distinctly mixed messages about what it might do in a crisis. This has indeed undermined Japanese confidence in the alliance. The risk here is that China might decide to take this approach one step further. Clearly, all of Japan’s fears would be realized, and the U.S.-Japanese alliance would be dealt a much more serious blow if a clash actually occurred around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and America did indeed fail to come to Japan’s aid. There must be a big temptation for Beijing to put America’s position in Asia to this much sterner test, in the hope that

it will crack. Of course, that would only be a temptation if Beijing was very confident that Washington would indeed let Japan down. I think Beijing probably is quite confident of that, because they assume that Washington recognizes that America could not win an East China Sea conflict, and would be deterred from starting one for fear that it would escalate toward a nuclear exchange (I have explained this reasoning here). But Beijing must know that a really determined U.S. president might have the nerve to stare them down anyway. That gives Beijing a motive to move sooner rather than later in testing U.S. resolve. They have a motive to bring on a clash with Japan—perhaps by deliberately staging an “accidental” exchange of fir e —while there is someone in the White House who they think will not have that kind of nerve. Someone like President Obama. Obama’s reluctance to engage in Libya, Syria, Ukraine and Iraq and the evident ambivalence about the much-hyped “pivot” to Asia may encourage Beijing to think that Obama’s presidency offers them a window of opportunity that will close after the next election if the new president is bolder —or more reckless . If so, China’s leaders might be tempted to stage an incident against Japan while Obama is still in the White House. The obvious way to reduce this risk is for the president to state clearly that America would support Japan militarily in any clash over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which is exactly what Obama said in Tokyo in late April. If a statement like this carries real credibility, it should deter Beijing from starting a clash. But if not—if it looks like a bluff or a rash statement made without careful consideration of what a war with China might mean—then China might expect that Obama would back down if put to the test. That could then actually encourage China to stage a clash.

Japan could unilaterally escalateWhite, 14Hugh, is professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. His book The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power was published in the US last year by Oxford University Press. , 2014 (“A Great War in the East China Sea: Why China and Japan Could Fight,” The National Interest, July 15, 2014, Accessible Online at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/great-war-the-east-china-sea-why-china-japan-could-fight-10877, Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)

What about Japan? Is there any risk that Tokyo might decide deliberately to start an armed clash with China? On the face of it this seems a much less likely possibility, but it cannot be dismissed completely. Japan’s leaders might decide that the ir interests would be served by bringing on a clash and settling the question of U.S. commitment to Japan’s security once and for all. They could well think that time is not on their side . After all, if they are worried today that America might not be willing to confront China on their behalf , how much less confident can they be about what would happen if they clashed with China five or ten years from now? That might lead them to think that it would be better to bring a conflict on now, hoping that Washington would step forward with a robust military response

which would force China to back off and drop its challenge to U.S. leadership in Asia, while restoring Japanese confidence in America’s security guarantees . Students of history will see some echoes here of the thinking which brought Japan to Pearl Harbour in 1941. Of course, Japan’s leaders would recognize the real possibility that America would fail a test of its commitment. But they might think Japan would be better off knowing now that America will not protect them from China , rather than remaining uncertain . It is not hard to imagine Japanese leaders like Shinzo Abe concluding that if Japan must in the future stand on its own against China without U.S. support, the sooner this becomes clear, the better. And the sooner Japan can start to take the necessary steps to defend itself independently, the better.

Goes nuclear – China’s young leadership never lived through the cold war and take nuke escalation lightly. White, 14Hugh, professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. His book The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power was published in the US last year by Oxford University Press. , 2014 (“Asia's Nightmare Scenario: A War in the East China Sea Over the Senkakus,” The National Interest, July 5, 2014, Accessible Online at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/asias-nightmare-scenario-war-the-east-china-sea-over-the-10805?page=2, Accessed 7/1/16, DSF)

At the top of this ladder of escalation looms the possibility of an intercontinental nuclear exchange, which would, or at least should, weigh heavily on both side’s calculations right from the start. During the Cold War, the possibility of a large-scale nuclear exchange affected the calculations of the superpowers whenever there was a risk of even the smallest-scale skirmishes between their forces. That was because each superpower recognized how hard it would be to contain an escalating conflict before it reached the nuclear level, because they both saw the danger that neither of them would back down and accept defeat even to avoid a nuclear exchange. War was avoided because both sides understood that their opponents were as grimly resolved as they were.

Tensions go nuclear – it’s a question of resolve and China wins. White, 14Hugh, professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. His book The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power was published in the US last year by Oxford University Press. , 2014 (“Asia's Nightmare Scenario: A War in the East China Sea Over the Senkakus,” The National Interest, July 5, 2014, Accessible Online at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/asias-nightmare-scenario-war-the-east-china-sea-over-the-10805?page=2, Accessed 7/1/16, DSF)

Can we say the same of America and China today? There has perhaps been a tendency among American strategists to overlook the importance of the nuclear dimension of any US-China conflict. They underestimate the significance of China’s nuclear forces because they are so much smaller than the Soviet’s were during the Cold War, or than America’s are today. But that does not make negligible . They can still destroy American cities , and kill millions of Americans , and it would be a desperate gamble to try to destroy them with a disarming first strike. That means we have to pay a lot of attention to the question of China’s resolve. China of course faces huge risks from America’s much greater forces, but its strategists may well calculate that on balance the nuclear factor favors China, because it plays to what they may see as China’s decisive advantage over the US in an E ast C hina S ea scenario: the balance of resolve . Let me explain. When two adversaries are relatively evenly balanced in their ability to hurt one another, the advantages lies with the one with greater resolve. More precisely, in the contest of wills that drives any escalating conflict , th e advantage lies with the side that can persuade its opponent that it has the greater resolve, and will thus not step back and accept defeat before the escalating conflict has cost the other side more than it is willing to pay . If one side is confident that the other believes it has more resolve, that side will be confident that the other will back off first, and will thus be more willing to enter a conflict, and more willing to escalate it. If the operational balance is as I have suggested here, then this is the situation Washington would face in a conflict with China in support of Japan over the Senkakus. The outcome would depend on the balance of resolve. It would only be wise for America to enter a conflict with China if Washington was confident both that Beijing was less resolved to win than they were, and that Beijing understood this. Only then could Washington be confident that Beijing would accept defeat before the conflict had escalated right out of control, and cost America more than the objectives at stake were worth. So which side has the greater resolve? Is America more committed to preserving the primacy it has enjoyed in Asia for over a century than China is to restore the primacy it enjoyed for centuries before that? I think the answer is probably no. We cannot assume that China is any less determined to change the Asian order than America is to preserve it . Nor can we simply assume that China’s leaders would be too nervous about domestic stability in China to allow a conflict with the US to escalate. On the contrary, public option might well stop Beijing from retreating just as much as US opinion would stop Washington – and probably more so. Ultimately it is a simple question of geography. What happens in Asia , and the waters around Asia, re ally matters to China, just the way what happens in the Caribbean really matters to America . If we assume that America cares more about the Caribbean than China, we should equally accept that China cares more about the Western Pacific that America. And most importantly, this is probably the way China sees the balance of resolve. That makes China a very dangerous adversary.

Escalation nowChina has been steadily escalating for the last year – one more aggressive move could draw in the US. CFR, 6/29Council on Foreign Relations, 2016 (“Tensions in the East China Sea,” Conflict Tracker, Center for Preventative Action (CPA), June 29th, 2016, Available Online at: http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/conflict/tensions-in-the-east-china-sea, Accessed 6/29/16, DSF)

In June 2015, the Japanese government revealed that China came closer to Japan’s exclusive economic zone ( EEZ ) by establishing natural gas projects along the border between the two countries. Chinese and Japanese naval and air patrol vessels continue to operate closely in the area, making the risk of a miscalculation that could lead to an armed confrontation a real danger. To maintain its strategic advantage, China has converted naval warships of considerable size and capability to coast guard vessels, These actions, as well as Chinese coast guards’ constant patrolling, present serious concerns for Japan. In 2015, Chinese aircrafts approached Japan’s airspace more than 570 times , causing the Japanese government to scramble in response. There has been a sharp increase in the number of jet fighter scrambles in the past year; Japan’s air force recorded a 16 percent increase in airspace incursions, which represents the second highest number of interactions since the 1980s. Aside from a brief period after World War II when the United States controlled the territory, the Senkaku/Daioyu islands have formally been a part of Japanese territory since 1895, although owned by a private Japanese citizen. China began to assert claims over the Senkaku/Daioyu islands in the 1970s. Tensions resurfaced in September 2012 when Japan purchased three of the disputed islands from the private owner. The economically significant islands, which are northeast of Taiwan, have potential oil and natural gas reserves, are near prominent shipping routes, and are surrounded by rich fishing areas. Each country claims to have economic rights in an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of two hundred nautical miles, but that space overlaps because the sea only spans three hundred and sixty nautical miles. After China discovered natural gas near the overlapping EEZ-claimed area in 1995, Japan objected to any drilling in the area due to the fact that the oil reserve could be connected to a field that spans into the disputed zone. In April 2014, President Barack Obama became the first U.S. president to explicitly state that the disputed islands are covered by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, although the United States takes no formal position on their ultimate sovereignty. An accidental military incident or political miscalculation by China or Japan could embroil the United States in armed hostilities with China.

Bilateral discussions between Japan and China have been going on since 2012 – but tensions have still escalated. US action Key. CFR, 6/29Council on Foreign Relations, 2016 (“Tensions in the East China Sea,” Conflict Tracker, Center for Preventative Action (CPA), June 29th, 2016, Available Online at: http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/conflict/tensions-in-the-east-china-sea, Accessed 6/29/16, DSF)

Discussions between Japan and China to develop a crisis management mechanism tool began in 2012 . Talks stalled when tensions peaked in 2013 after China declared the establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone. After Japan and China signed a four-point consensus document laying out their differences concerning the disputed islands, bilateral discussions resumed in fall 2014 , bilateral discussions resumed in early 2015, aiming to implement the maritime and aerial communication mechanism. Ri sing nationalist sentiments and growing political mistrust heighten the potential for conflict and hinders the capacity for peaceful resolution of the dispute . Though Chinese and Japanese leaders have refrained from forcibly establishing control over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, unauthorized action by local commanders could result in the unintended escalation of hostilities. Through treaty commitments with Japan, a military confrontation could involve the U nited S tates . To preserve relations with China and continue cooperation on various issues, the United States has an interest in de-escalating tensions .

MiscalcECS has high potential for miscalc – civilians & human errorSmith, 13Sheila A., an expert on Japanese politics and foreign policy, is senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Vice chair of the U.S. advisors to the U.S.-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Exchange (CULCON), a bi-national advisory panel of government officials and private sector members. She teaches as an adjunct professor at the Asian Studies Department of Georgetown University and serves on the board of its Journal of Asian Affairs. She earned her MA and PhD degrees from the department of political science at Columbia University, 2013 (“A Sino-Japanese Clash in the East China Sea: Contingency Planning Memorancum No. 18,” Council on Foreign Relations Press, April 2013, Accessible Online at: http://www.cfr.org/japan/sino-japanese-clash-east-china-sea/p30504, Accessed on 6/29/16, DSF)

Although recent incidents have sensitized China and Japan to the risk of accidental and unintended military interactions, the danger will persist while emotions run high and their forces operate in close proximity . In stressful and ambiguous times, when decision-making is compressed by the speed of modern weapons systems, the risk of human error is higher. The 2001 collision between a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese fighter jet near Hainan Island is a case in point, as was the intrusion of a Chinese Han submarine in Japanese territorial waters in 2004. So-called rules of engagement (ROEs), intended to guide and control the behavior of local actors, are typically general in scope and leave room for personal interpretation that may lead to actions that escalate a crisis situation . Compounding the risk of unintended escalation between Chinese and Japanese air and naval units is the unpredictable involvement of third parties such as fishermen or civilian activists who may attempt to land on the islands . Their actions could precipitate an armed response by either side.

SolvencyUS action in Asia k2 stabilityAkaha, 14Tsuneo, Professor of International Policy Studies and Director of the Center for East Asian Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California, 2014 (“Reducing Tensions in East Asia,” The Diplomat, April 28, 2014, Accessible Online at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/reducing-tensions-in-east-asia/., Accessed: 6/30/2016, DSF)

Regional tensions and security threats, including the nuclear and missile development in North Korea, the territorial disputes in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Sea of Japan/East Sea are unlikely to disappear any time soon. To avoid potentially destructive consequences , Northeast Asian countries and their Southeast Asian counterparts must build a more effective mechanism for multilateral security cooperation that goes beyond the ASEAN- centered framework. Sadly, the prospects of such a framework emerging in the foreseeable future are rather remote . In the meantime, the U.S.-centric hub- and-spokes system will play an important role in keeping peace and stability in the region. Of course this will frustrate the efforts of some of the regional political leaders to reduce the presence and influence of the United States, but until Japan, China, Korea, Russia, and the United States can find a mutually acceptable framework to address their grievances and conflicting interests , the ASEAN- and U.S.-centered systems need to complement each other in preventing regional tension from reaching the threshold of hostilities. At the same time, the regional powers need to make further progress on economic cooperation, including the establishment of bilateral and multilateral trade and investment regimes to accelerate the process of economic integration. There is no question that such efforts will require mutual accommodation between Japan and its regional neighbors.

No Conflict

SquoSquo solves possible ECS conflictCFR, 16Council on Foreign Relations, 2016 (“China’s Maritime Disputes,” CFR, February 2016, Accessible Online at: http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/, Accessed 6/30/16, DSF)

If confrontation were to involve Japan in the East China Sea or the Philippines in the S outh C hina S ea , the United States would be obligated to consider military action under defense treaties. Experts note that Washington's defense commitments to Tokyo are stronger than those to Manila. Under its treaty obligations, the United States would have to defend Japan in the case of an armed attack; the U.S.-Philippine treaty holds both nations accountable for mutual support in the event of an “armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties.” Military action would represent a last resort, and would depend on the scale and circumstances of the escalation. In the event of armed conflict breaking out between China and Japan, the United States could also use crisis communication mechanisms outlined in the U.S.-China M ilitary M aritime C onsultative A greement (PDF) to encourage a stand-down of forces and facilitate communication between Tokyo and Beijing. Verbal declarations that communicate the seriousness of the dispute and convey support for an ally, as well as offers of military assistance , can also serve as essential “coercive de-escalation” measures during a crisis.

Congress BlocksCongress blocks quick executive action – means the US doesn’t get drawn in.Sracic, 14Paul, professor and Chair of the Department of Politics and International Relations at Youngstown State University in Ohio, where he also directs the Rigelhaupt Pre-Law Center, 2014 (“Will the U.S. Really Defend Japan?,” The Diplomat, July 26, 2014, Accessible Online at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/will-the-u-s-really-defend-japan/., Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)

At the same time China has been cleverly taking actions, such as setting up an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in area, which might call into question Japan’s administrative control over the Senkaku. So far, this has not altered the position of the Obama administration. Nor has it influenced Congress, which added a resolution to the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act stating “the unilateral action of a third party will not affect the United States’ acknowledgment of the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands.” This latter resolution is significant because, in the end, Congress may be the most important, and most vulnerable, institution when it comes to defending Japan. To understand why, it is helpful to look at the actual text of the U.S.-Japan treaty According to Article 5 of the treaty, each country is obligated “to meet common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes” (my emphasis). Lest one think that that this language was intended only to acknowledge Japan’s constitutional restrictions, a similar reference to constitutional demands is common in joint security arrangements entered into by the U.S. It is found, for example, in the NATO and SEATO treaties. According to the Congressional Research Service, the language was intended “to satisfy congressional concerns that the agreements could be interpreted as sanctioning the President to take military action in defense of treaty parties without additional congressional authorization.” This understanding is confirmed by 1973 The War Powers Resolution, which specifically states that presidential authority to unilaterally send troops into harm’s way shall not be inferred “from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities .” There is, of course, an ongoing legal controversy in the U.S. over the extent of war powers given to the president as commander and chief of the military. Obama’s position on this matter is far from clear. In response to a question from the Boston Globe back in 2008, candidate Obama explained “the President does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation.” In Libya in 2011, however, President Obama acted very differently, using American airpower to enforce a no-fly zone without seeking Congressional authorization. In Syria in 2013, however, the President refused to act without first consulting with the Congress. David Rothkopf wrote in Foreign Policy magazine that by going to Congress Obama had now made it “highly unlikely that at any time during the remainder of his term will he be able to initiate military action without seeking congressional approval.” If this is correct, then in the event of a battle in the E ast C hina S ea, Obama’s first reaction may not be to provide immediate military assistanc e. Instead , the president will request an authorization from Congress. Will this authorization be forthcoming? Based on the prior resolution, the answer appears to be yes. It is useful to recall that, at first, it seemed likely that Congress would support Obama’s call to use force in Syria. After all, both Obama and Republican House Speaker John Boehner supported this action. It

was only after Congress and the public began paying attention to what was actually happening in Syria that it became clear that the votes were not there. Of course one cannot directly compare Syria and Japan. In Syria, the U.S. was not sure whether it had friends on either side of the conflict. More importantly, no treaty obligations were involved. Still, as it was with in Syria, the U.S. public knows very little about the islands that are the subject of so much debate between Japan and China. In the event that open hostilities break out over the islands, this will quickly change. How will constituent phone calls and e-mails trend when voters learn that the U.S. government’s position is that it takes no position on which country has the more valid claim to the islands? Will the public support risking World War III (that is undoubtedly how it will be portrayed by those opposing action) to defend territory whose ultimate owner, according to the U.S. government, is in dispute?

MiscalcNo war - ECS miscalc empirically disprovenStashwick, 15Steven, 2015 (“South China Sea: Conflict Escalation and ‘Miscalculation’ Myths,” The Diplomat, September 25, 2015, Accessible Online at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-china-sea-conflict-escalation-and-miscalculation-myths/, Accessed 6/30/16, DSF)The threat of “miscalculation” is again in vogue. What was once a preoccupation of accidental war theorists has resurfaced in discussions about maritime disputes in Southeast Asia and Sino-U.S. relations. During the Cold War, policymakers and scholars worried about nuclear annihilation sparked by misinterpreted warnings, rogue officers, technical glitches in command and control systems, or a lower-level confrontation spiraling out of control . Absent the Cold War’s looming nuclear threat, today’s oft-repeated concerns focus on “miscalculation” causing a local or tactical-level incident between individual ships or aircraft (harassment, collision, interdiction, and so on) to lead to broader military confrontation. Some variation of this theme has been featured in public remarks by former U.S. Defense Secretaries Gates, Panetta, Hagel, and current Defense Secretary Carter, as well as Commanders of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and the U.S. Pacific Command, and was a topic of policymaker discussion going back at least to the 1996 Taiwan Strait incident. These concerns are likewise found in too many op-eds, reports, interviews, commentaries, and articles to count (see also here, here, here, and here, etc.) However, while history shows that strategic miscalculations can lead states to war, or dangerously close to it, evidence does not support the worry that miscalculation may cause a local or tactical-level incident to spiral out of control . To understand the risks associated with miscalculation, we must distinguish between miscalculation at the strategic level and miscalculation stemming from a localized incident between naval or air forces. At the strategic level – that is, a nation’s a priori willingness to escalate a conflict and use military force to achieve its objectives – no country starts a war expecting to lose . Yet, “most wars…end in the defeat of at least one nation which had expected victory,” implying all wars result from some degree of strategic miscalculation. That may be a plausible danger in Southeast Asia, but a distinct one. Instead, much of the discourse about localized maritime incidents in the South China Sea conflates strategic and local miscalculation risks, focusing on the latter’s potential to lead to a wider conflict. This concern over local miscalculation nonetheless reflects a longstanding view of the danger “incidents at sea” poses to peace stretching back to the Cold War. Both U.S. and Soviet leaderships were concerned that an incident between “peppery young ship captains ” could “ lead people to shoot a t each other with results that might…be impossible to control ,” in the words of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations in the 1970s. Back then, the U.S. and Soviets were openly adversarial and serious incidents between their ships and aircraft were almost commonplace. Yet despite explicit mutual, strategic, and existential antagonism between the U.S. and U.S.SR, none of the hundreds of maritime incidents that occurred over the four decades of the Cold War escalated into anything beyond a short diplomatic crisis. It is possible that they avoided a nuclear spiral in these incidents through diligent

diplomacy and luck. But more likely, it suggests that this type of maritime incident is insufficient on its own to lead to the worst-case scenarios envisioned . Mitigating the miscalculation concerns of officials and the extreme scenarios of some commentators is that these maritime incidents do not occur in a vacuum, de-coupled from explicit national interests. In a famous 1988 Cold War incident, Soviet vessels in the Black Sea shouldered the U.S. warships Yorktown and Caron (a controlled collision meant to push a ship off-course) while the latter were deliberately contesting what the U.S. deemed excessive Soviet legal claims over maritime rights. The Soviets knew the U.S. vessels were there to intentionally flout their claims, and the U.S. knew the Soviets would likely try to enforce them. Even if the firmness of the Soviet response was unanticipated (or deemed unlikely), there was no mystery to either side’s objectives. Thus,

neither side was going to start shooting in confusion; the Soviet vessels even radioed their intention to strike the U.S. ships. While not “safe” in the strictest sense (ships do not like to “swap paint” with each other), footage from the Yorktown and Caron being pushed shows the actions to be intense but deliberate, professionally executed, and clearly of an enforcement nature, rather than a prelude to combat. While a serious diplomatic incident, both sides understood the situation, which served to moderate concern over escalation. Similarly, a shouldering incident between the U.S. cruiser Cowpens and a Chinese warship in 2013 , while concerning to the U.S. from a safety-at-sea perspective, was understood to be motivated by Chinese sensitivities around testing their new aircraft carrier, not a precursor to hostilities.

No impact to ECS miscalcSieg, 12Linda, ,2012 (“Japan, China military conflict seen unlikely despite strain,” REUTERS, September 23, 2012, Accssible Online at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-japan-confrontation-idUSBRE88M0F220120923, Accessed on 6/30/16, DSF)

Hawkish Chinese commentators have urged Beijing to prepare for military conflict with Japan as tensions mount over disputed islands in the East China Sea, but most experts say chances the Asian rivals will decide to go to war are slim. A bigger risk is the possibility that an unintended maritime clash results in deaths and boosts pressure for retaliation, but even then Tokyo and Beijing are expected to seek to manage the row before it becomes a full-blown military confrontation . "That's the real risk - a maritime incident leading to a loss of life. If a Japanese or Chinese were killed, there would be a huge outpouring of nationalist sentiment," said Linda Jakobson, director of the East Asia Program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney. "But I still cannot seriously imagine it would lead to an attack on the other country . I do think rational minds would prevail ," she said, adding economic retaliation was more likely. A feud over the lonely islets in the East China Sea flared this month after Japan's government bought three of the islands from a private owner, triggering violent protests in China and threatening business between Asia's two biggest economies. Adding to the tensions, China sent more than 10 government patrol vessels to waters near the islands, known as the Diaoyu in China and the Senkaku in Japan, while Japan beefed up its Coast Guard patrols. Chinese media said 1,000 fishing boats have set sail for the area, although none has been sighted close by. Despite the diplomatic standoff and rising nationalist sentiment in China especially, experts agree neither Beijing nor Tokyo would intentionally escalate to a military confrontation what is already the worst crisis in bilateral ties in decades.

Economics Byrnes, 15Sholto, senior fellow at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia, 2015 (“Forget the doomsayers, a US-China conflict is unlikely,” The National Opinion, Septermber 8th, 2015, Accessible online at: http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/forget-the-doomsayers-a-us-china-conflict-is-unlikely#full, Accessed 6/30/16, DSF)

Unintended incidents are certainly possible with both the US and China increasing their armed forces in the region. Despite the predictions of hawkish doomsayers , however, the prospect of armed conflict between the two powers seems unlikely – not least as it is most certainly not in the interests of two countries tha t now have a trading relationship worth over $550 billion per year. But this is just as much because, as the US defence department paper puts it: “China is using a steady progression of small, incremental steps to increase its effective control over disputed areas and avoid escalation to military conflict.” Having read the paper in full, there is nothing in it that suggests the US could definitively put a stop to this “salami-slicing” approach. In the South China Sea, at least, there are no red lines.

US publicNo US-Sino war – US public and chinese leadershipDesker, 15Barry, Distinguished Fellow and Bakrie Professor of South-east Asia Policy, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2015 (“War unlikely even as US, China test waters in contested seas,” The Straits Times, October 31, 2015, Accessible online at: http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/war-unlikely-even-as-us-china-test-waters-in-contested-seas, Accessed 6/30/16, DSF)

However, as major powers, the US and China will focus on the management of their differences. Already, on Thursday, the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John Richardson, had a video conference with the Chief of the Chinese Navy, Admiral Wu Shengli. Although Adm Wu told Adm Richardson that there is a risk of "a minor incident that sparks war", significantly, both sides agreed to maintain the dialogue and to follow agreed protocols to prevent clashes. Scheduled port visits by US and Chinese ships and planned visits to China by senior US Navy officers remain on track. Regional claimant states hoping for a strong American response should bear in mind that it will be difficult to convince a weary American public to embark on another major overseas conflict . This factor, together with China's interest in avoiding war so that its leadership can continue to focus on economic development, make it unlikely that China and the US will miscalculate and head blindly into war . My assessment is contrary to the view of those scholars and policymakers who believe in the considerable risk of war as China, the rising power, challenges the dominance of the US, the global superpower.

Defend the Law CP

1NC – ECSText: The United States federal government should make a public announcement of commitment to a full-scale war in response to Chinese escalation against Japan and should coerce China and Japan to refer the case to an international court.

CP leads to China backing down, solves ECS conflictXu, 13Shirley, Contributing Writer at Prospect Journal of International Affairs at USCD, 2013 (“STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO THE SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS DISPUTE,” Prospect Journal of International Affairs at USCD, October 15, 2013, Accessible online at: https://prospectjournal.org/2013/10/15/strategic-responses-to-the-senkakudiaoyu-islands-dispute/, Accessed on 6/29/16, DSF)

If tension between China and Japan continues to escalate over sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, the United States is obligated to support Japan in the event of armed conflict due to the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty. War against China is a highly unfavorable outcome for the United States; however, repeated public statements by U.S. officials, including then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, have indicated firm recognition of Japanese administration of the islands, as well as reassurance that the United States will honor the treaty in the event of direct Chinese aggression. This could very well draw the United States into a regional conflict between China and Japan. Analysis of current and past diplomatic situations between China, Japan and the U nited S tates , along with existing strategies taken in the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute r eveal a common aversion to war despite repeated escalation and aggressive signaling by China . Due to thriving Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japanese economic ties, as well as recent efforts by the United States to create strong defense and development alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, it is in the best interest of all parties involved for Japan and China to seek a peaceful resolution of the dispute. While the U nited S tates has historically remained neutral regarding sovereignty of the islands, it plays an essential role in preventing the possible outbreak of war between China and Japan. Three potential strategies for the United States to avert fighting come to mind: 1. Appeasement of China with weak signaling and persuasion of Japan to relinquish claims. 2. Adherence to the defense treaty with Japan, no direct militarization of U.S. forces and public militarization of Japanese forces to form a trip-wire defense. 3. Adherence to the defense treaty with Japan, public announcement of commitment to a full-scale war in response to escalation and coercion of Japan and China to refer the case to an international court . Despite its potential for extreme escalation, the third strategy is proposed as the ideal strategy due to its resolute execution, high stakes and greater probability of quickly reaching a peaceful consensus.

2NC - Solvency

The CP establishes US credibility – k2 deter China escalationWhite, 14Hugh, is professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. His book The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power was published in the US last year by Oxford University Press. , 2014 (“A Great War in the East China Sea: Why China and Japan Could Fight,” The National Interest, July 15, 2014, Accessible Online at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/great-war-the-east-china-sea-why-china-japan-could-fight-10877, Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)

Obama’s reluctance to engage in Libya, Syria, Ukraine and Iraq and the evident ambivalence about the much-hyped “pivot” to Asia may encourage Beijing to think that Obama’s presidency offers them a window of opportunity that will close after the next election if the new president is bolder —or more reckless . If so, China’s leaders might be tempted to stage an incident against Japan while Obama is still in the White House. The obvious way to reduce this risk is for the president to state clearly that America would support Japan militarily in any clash over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which is exactly what Obama said in Tokyo in late April. If a statement like this carries real credibility, it should deter Beijing from starting a clash. But if not—if it looks like a bluff or a rash statement made without careful consideration of what a war with China might mean—then China might expect that Obama would back down if put to the test. That could then actually encourage China to stage a clash.

Obama tried taking the diplomatic middle ground – but conflict has only escalatedMcCurry & Branigan, 14Justin & Tania, Tokyo and China correspondents for the Guardian, 2014 (“Obama says US will defend Japan in island dispute with China,” The Guardian, April 24th, 2014, Accessible online at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/24/obama-in-japan-backs-status-quo-in-island-dispute-with-china, Accessed 7/1/16, DSF)

The US is duty-bound to come to Japan’s aid in the event of a conflict with China over a group of disputed islands in the E ast China Sea, Barack Obama declared at the start of a tour of Asia aimed at reassuring Washington’s allies in the face of threats to stability from North Korea and an increasingly assertive China . Obama went further than some analysts had expected in reassuring the Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe , that Japan’s dispute with China over the Senkakus – known

in China as the Diaoyu – were covered by the allies’ post-war security treaty . But he reiterated Washington’s refusal to take sides in the sovereignty dispute and called on China and Japan to resolve their differences through dialogue. “Our commitment to Japan’s security is absolute and article five [of the security treaty] covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku islands,” Obama said during a joint press conference with Abe. “We don’t take a position on final sovereignty on the Senkakus but historically they’ve been administered by Japan and should not be subject to change unilaterally. “My hope is that Chinese will continue to engage with the US and other countries. We don’t take a position on this piece of land or this piece of rock but we do take a position on the peaceful resolution of these disputes .”

The CP’s fiat breaks the balance – k2 US action on ECSSracic, 14Paul, professor and Chair of the Department of Politics and International Relations at Youngstown State University in Ohio, where he also directs the Rigelhaupt Pre-Law Center, 2014 (“Will the U.S. Really Defend Japan?,” The Diplomat, July 26, 2014, Accessible Online at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/will-the-u-s-really-defend-japan/., Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)If the unthinkable happens, and the dispute in the East China Sea between Japan and China over the Senkaku islands (called the Diaoyu islands by the Chinese) escalates into a military conflict, will the U.S. military really come to the aid of Japan? This is certainly the implied position of the Obama administration, but would it be able to follow through on this commitment? If not, what impact will this have on future relations with Japan and in Asia? These are very important questions, yet no one is asking them; this is because no one thinks they need to be asked. On the surface, this is true. In late April 2014, President Obama twice stated that the disputed islands are, in his words, “administered by Japan and therefore fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.” The president’s statement affirmed a position that had already been articulated by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, current Secretary of State John Kerry, and former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta. It was, nevertheless, very well received in Japan, with one of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s advisors declaring it “the most reassuring statement that the nation has ever heard from the U.S.“ At the same time China has been cleverly taking actions, such as setting up an Air Defense Identification

Zone ( ADIZ ) in area, which might call into question Japan’s administrative control over the Senkaku. So far, this has not altered the position of the Obama administration. Nor has it influenced Congress , which added a resolution to the 2013 N ational Defense Authorization Act stating “the unilateral action of a third party will not affect the U nited S tates’ acknowledgment of the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands.” This latter resolution is significant because, in the end, Congress may be the most important, and most vulnerable, institution when it comes to defending Japan . To understand why, it is helpful to look at the actual text of the U.S.-

Japan treaty According to Article 5 of the treaty, each c ountry is obligated “to meet common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes” (my emphasis). Lest one think that that this language was intended only to acknowledge Japan’s constitutional restrictions, a similar reference to constitutional demands is common in joint security arrangements entered into by the U.S. It is found, for example, in the NATO and SEATO treaties. According to the Congressional Research

Service, the language was intended “to satisfy congressional concerns that the agreements could be interpreted as sanctioning the President to take military action in defense of treaty parties without additional congressional authorization.” This understanding is confirmed by 1973 The War Powers Resolution , which specifically states that presidential authority to unilaterally send troops into harm’s way shall not be inferred “ from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities .”

Pre-emptive escalation solvesXu, 13Shirley, Contributing Writer at Prospect Journal of International Affairs at USCD, 2013 (“STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO THE SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS DISPUTE,” Prospect Journal of International Affairs at USCD, October 15, 2013, Accessible online at: https://prospectjournal.org/2013/10/15/strategic-responses-to-the-senkakudiaoyu-islands-dispute/, Accessed on 6/29/16, DSF)

Logically, war is the least favorable outcome for all parties. The United States cannot escalate against China and successfully achieve the ideal result of Japanese sovereignty of Senkaku at the same time without committing to an unrestricted war. While potential gains of spearheading the winning side of such a war are equally great, waging a devastating war is by no means the best option. However, due to a binding treaty that compels the U nited S tates to defend Japan , the United States has already repeatedly signaled in public to China its willingness to respond with escalation in the event of further Chinese provocation. By accumulating significant audience costs, the abandonment of the United States’ defense obligation to Japan is unlikely . Thus, if China escalates, the U nited S tates has no choice but to escalate as well . W hile escalation is the best response for the U nited S tates to Chinese provocation in the conflict, war is the least ideal conclusion because of the aforementioned potential for extreme escalation as well as the likely destruction of essential economic and diplomatic interests in the Asia-Pacific. Rather than escalate for the sake of fighting a war, the United States should use escalation as a means to broker peace . For the United States, the islands at the center of the dispute offer little benefit. While the presence of oil in the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and surrounding seas has been a point of interest in this dispute, sources show an amount too insignificant to logically warrant such drama between Japan and China , let alone the intervention of the United States. While the Japan ese and Chinese view the disputed territories as important , they do so through a symbolic lens centered on national pride . Although the U nited S tates must escalate to honor its treaty obligations, it will not use escalation as a catalyst for direct warfare, but rather for the prevention of it.

The risk is worth it – de-escalates conflicts in the long termXu, 13

Shirley, Contributing Writer at Prospect Journal of International Affairs at USCD, 2013 (“STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO THE SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS DISPUTE,” Prospect Journal of International Affairs at USCD, October 15, 2013, Accessible online at: https://prospectjournal.org/2013/10/15/strategic-responses-to-the-senkakudiaoyu-islands-dispute/, Accessed on 6/29/16, DSF)

The Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes could potentially escalate into war. However, it is clear that war is not the preferred outcome for any of the parties involved . While the United States may be reluctant to intercede on behalf of Japan, it should not hesitate to oblige to its alliance when faced with the real possibility of armed conflict. B y elevating the risks of escalation and preparing for full-scale war, the United States exhibits a credible commitment to its diplomatic alliance with Japan . This forces China to tone down its hawkish rhetoric and stifles any potential expansionist desires. In reality, this high-risk, high-commitment strategy is feasible due to the China’s aversion to a full-scale regional war with the United States. Japan will have no choice but to comply with negotiations of peace due to the United States’ conditions of non-interference in the event of a war initiated by Japan. Thus, risking an all out war is actually the most effective manner to directing all parties toward serious and productive discussion toward a peace treaty.

2NC – NB - PTXThe CP is a hardline approach to china – taking Japan’s side definitively in the conflict. Avoids our link to ptx which is premised on the plan being seen as a concession to china.

2NC - NB – Japan Rearm DASquo weakens US-Japan relations, CP k2 solveSracic, 14Paul, professor and Chair of the Department of Politics and International Relations at Youngstown State University in Ohio, where he also directs the Rigelhaupt Pre-Law Center, 2014 (“Will the U.S. Really Defend Japan?,” The Diplomat, July 26, 2014, Accessible Online at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/will-the-u-s-really-defend-japan/., Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)

These questions should be bothering not only Japan’s friends in Washington, but also her leaders in Nagatachō. The Obama administration’s persistent assurances about section 5 coverage, insofar as they ignore the role of Congress , may be providing Japan with a false sense of security . At the same time, the continued insistence that the U.S. is neutral with regard to sovereignty over the islands has provided China with a valuable argument that it can exploit to influence U.S. public opinion. It may well be that China’s ultimate goal is not only to possess the islands , but more importantly to weaken the relationship between the U.S. and Japan . In the end, Obama and his advisors need to remember two things. First, international relations is as much about anticipating threats as it is with dealing with problems as they emerge. Second, even in the area of international relations, Congress matters . This may nowhere be truer than in the E ast C hina S ea.

CP avoids the disad Gertz, 15Bill, senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon. Prior to joining the Beacon he was a national security reporter, editor, and columnist for 27 years at the Washington Times. Bill is the author of six books, four of which were national bestsellers. His most recent book was The Failure Factory, a look at an out-of-control government bureaucracy that could have been a primer for the Tea Party, 2015 (“Obama Says U.S. Will Defend Japan’s Senkakus,” The Washington Free Beacon, Accessible Online at: http://freebeacon.com/national-security/obama-says-u-s-will-defend-japans-senkakus/, Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)

John Tkacik, a former China specialist with the State Department, said Obama’s statement was significant. The Senkakus have been a central concern of the U.S.- Japan alliance since the islands were handed over to Japan by the United States in 1972, he said. “Tokyo rightly considers the islands a touchstone of the alliance’s durability,” Tkacik said. “The tenor of President Obama’s reaffirmation of U.S. commitment to the alliance, and specifically the Senkakus, was at least as firm as past presidents, and actually may even be more explicit than any other president

personally has given,” he added. “It’s an indication that President Obama appreciates the gravity of the strain China’s aggressiveness in the Okinawa area has placed on the alliance .”

A2 Defend the Law CP

2AC - TL

CP already happenedGertz, 15Bill, senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon. Prior to joining the Beacon he was a national security reporter, editor, and columnist for 27 years at the Washington Times. Bill is the author of six books, four of which were national bestsellers. His most recent book was The Failure Factory, a look at an out-of-control government bureaucracy that could have been a primer for the Tea Party, 2015 (“Obama Says U.S. Will Defend Japan’s Senkakus,” The Washington Free Beacon, Accessible Online at: http://freebeacon.com/national-security/obama-says-u-s-will-defend-japans-senkakus/, Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)

President Obama on Tuesday invoked U.S. military defense guarantees for Japan’s disputed East China Sea islands that have been the target of coordinated Chinese military provocations since 2012. During a Rose Garden press conference with visiting Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Obama repeated a promise to defend the Senkaku Islands, a statement that is likely to anger China, which claims the uninhabited islands as its own , calling them the Diaoyu Islands. “I want to reiterate that our treaty commitment to Japan’s security is absolute, and that Article 5 covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including Senkaku Islands,” Obama said in a carefully crafted statement.

Japan DA isn’t a NB – the CP causes more china aggression Gertz, 15Bill, senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon. Prior to joining the Beacon he was a national security reporter, editor, and columnist for 27 years at the Washington Times. Bill is the author of six books, four of which were national bestsellers. His most recent book was The Failure Factory, a look at an out-of-control government bureaucracy that could have been a primer for the Tea Party, 2015 (“Obama Says U.S. Will Defend Japan’s Senkakus,” The Washington Free Beacon, Accessible Online at: http://freebeacon.com/national-security/obama-says-u-s-will-defend-japans-senkakus/, Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)

The announcement also comes amid revised U.S.-Japan defense guidelines that analysts say are designed to counter China’s regional aggression. The treaty article mentioned by the president is part of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty . It states that an armed attack on either country would prompt action “to meet the common danger.” Oth er lower-level U.S. officials have made the commitment in the past. But it was the second time in two years that Obama mentioned the military commitment , giving it more political weight. Chinese Embassy spokesman Zhu

Haiquan said the Diaoyu island and its affiliated islands “are China’s inherent territory.” “No matter what others say or do, the fact that the Diaoyu islands belong to China cannot be changed , and the determination and will of the Chinese government and people to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity will not be shaken ,” he said. Zhu said the U.S.-Japan alliance was forged during the Cold War. “We are firmly opposed to making use of this alliance against the interests of a third party including China,” he said. “We urge the U.S. side to be discreet with what it says and does, honor its commitment of not taking sides on issues concerning territorial sovereignty, and do more to promote regional peace and stability, instead of the other way around.”

Empirics flow aff – China thinks it’s a bluffWhite, 14Hugh, is professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. His book The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power was published in the US last year by Oxford University Press. , 2014 (“A Great War in the East China Sea: Why China and Japan Could Fight,” The National Interest, July 15, 2014, Accessible Online at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/great-war-the-east-china-sea-why-china-japan-could-fight-10877, Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)

Obama’s reluctance to engage in Libya, Syria, Ukraine and Iraq and the evident ambivalence about the much-hyped “pivot” to Asia may encourage Beijing to think that Obama’s presidency offers them a window of opportunity that will close after the next election if the new president is bolder—or more reckless. If so, China’s leaders might be tempted to stage an incident against Japan while Obama is still in the White House. The obvious way to reduce this risk is for the president to state clearly that America would support Japan militarily in any clash over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which is exactly what Obama said in Tokyo in late April. If a statement like this carries real credibility, it should deter Beijing from starting a clash. But if not—if it looks like a bluff or a rash statement made without careful consideration of what a war with China might mean—then China might expect that Obama would back down if put to the test. That could then actually encourage China to stage a clash. We can see why if we look back half a century. Shortly before the crisis broke in October 1962, Kennedy had publicly promised to prevent Moscow from deploying missiles to Cuba . Recent scholarship suggests that Khrushchev saw this as an opportunity to score an easy win over his younger and less experienced adversary. He believed Kennedy would not risk war to back up his promise, because Khrushchev did not believe that Soviet missiles in Cuba would materially affect U.S. security, and he didn’t believe Kennedy would think they would either. He therefore d ecided to call Kennedy’s bluff, make him back down, and gain a psychological and political advantage . That was why he sent the missiles to Cuba. In the event, of course, Kennedy turned out to be tougher — or more reckless—than Khrushchev had expected, and Khrushchev suffered the consequences. However, there is a risk that Beijing might respond—as

Khrushchev did to Kennedy—to Obama’s less-than-credible affirmation of U.S. support to Japan , seeing it as an opportunity to call his bluff and damage his, and America’s, credibility in Asia. The more Obama commits himself to support Japan, the worse it will look for America, and the better it will look for China, if he doesn’t. This suggests that Obama should be very wary about bold affirmations of commitment to defend Japan, unless he can be sure that China will believe them. The best and perhaps only way to do that is to persuade Beijing that their assumptions about how such a war would go are wrong. He needs to convince Beijing that America does indeed have credible military options to defeat China in an East China Sea conflict. To do that he needs to do more than just boast about America’s unmatched military power, because Beijing does not buy that line anymore. He needs to look carefully at how exactly America could prevail over China militarily. If, having done that, he believes there is a workable military option, he needs to say enough about it publicly to convince the Chinese of that. If not, of course, then he needs to rethink his whole strategy in Asia.

Hardline stance is the wrong approach – CP triggers nuke war. White, 14Hugh, professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. His book The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power was published in the US last year by Oxford University Press. , 2014 (“Asia's Nightmare Scenario: A War in the East China Sea Over the Senkakus,” The National Interest, July 5, 2014, Accessible Online at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/asias-nightmare-scenario-war-the-east-china-sea-over-the-10805?page=2, Accessed 7/1/16, DSF)

Can we say the same of America and China today? There has perhaps been a tendency among American strategists to overlook the importance of the nuclear dimension of any US-China conflict. They underestimate the significance of China’s nuclear forces because they are so much smaller than the Soviet’s were during the Cold War, or than America’s are today. But that does not make negligible . They can still destroy American cities , and kill millions of Americans , and it would be a desperate gamble to try to destroy them with a disarming first strike. That means we have to pay a lot of attention to the question of China’s resolve. China of course faces huge risks from America’s much greater forces, but its strategists may well calculate that on balance the nuclear factor favors China, because it plays to what they may see as China’s decisive advantage over the US in an E ast C hina S ea scenario: the balance of resolve . Let me explain. When two adversaries are relatively evenly balanced in their ability to hurt one another, the advantages lies with the one with greater resolve. More precisely, in the contest of wills that drives any escalating conflict , th e advantage lies with the side that can persuade its opponent that it has the greater resolve, and will thus not step back and accept defeat before the escalating conflict has cost the other side more than it is willing to pay . If one side is confident that the other believes it has more resolve, that side will be confident that the other will back off

first, and will thus be more willing to enter a conflict, and more willing to escalate it. If the operational balance is as I have suggested here, then this is the situation Washington would face in a conflict with China in support of Japan over the Senkakus. The outcome would depend on the balance of resolve. It would only be wise for America to enter a conflict with China if Washington was confident both that Beijing was less resolved to win than they were, and that Beijing understood this. Only then could Washington be confident that Beijing would accept defeat before the conflict had escalated right out of control, and cost America more than the objectives at stake were worth. So which side has the greater resolve? Is America more committed to preserving the primacy it has enjoyed in Asia for over a century than China is to restore the primacy it enjoyed for centuries before that? I think the answer is probably no. We cannot assume that China is any less determined to change the Asian order than America is to preserve it . Nor can we simply assume that China’s leaders would be too nervous about domestic stability in China to allow a conflict with the US to escalat e. On the contrary, public option might well stop Beijing from retreating just as much as US opinion would stop Washington – and probably more so. Ultimately it is a simple question of geography. What happens in Asia , and the waters around Asia, re ally matters to China, just the way what happens in the Caribbean really matters to America . If we assume that America cares more about the Caribbean than China, we should equally accept that China cares more about the Western Pacific that America. And most importantly, this is probably the way China sees the balance of resolve. That makes China a very dangerous adversary.