Somalia Emergency Operation 10812.0 “Food Aid for Emergency …€¦ · The Somalia Food Security...

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1 Somalia Emergency Operation 10812.0 “Food Aid for Emergency Relief and Protection of Livelihoods” Duration of project 12 months (1 April 2009 – 31 March 2010) Number of beneficiaries 3,530,000 WFP food tonnage 503,021 mt WFP food cost US$207,937,976 Total cost to WFP US$482,529,259 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY With a population of 7.5 million, 1 Somalia is mired in one of the most dire and complex emergencies in the world. The Somalia Food Security Analysis Unit (FSAU) and the Famine Early-Warning System Network (FEWSNET) report that Somalia is facing an unprecedented urban and rural food crisis, with nutrition and food security deteriorating to levels not seen since the famine of the early 1990s. Some 43 percent of the total population of the country, some 3.2 million people, are in need of emergency livelihood and life-saving assistance at least until June 2009, representing an increase of 75 percent since January 2008. 2 The population is increasingly struggling to cope with a devastating combination of conflict, massive displacement, drought, high food prices, devaluation of the Somali shilling and hyperinflation. The first to suffer, children constitute one of the most vulnerable groups. Lack of infrastructure and basic social services, along with poor infant feeding practices and limited access to nutritional foods have exacerbated malnutrition. 200,000 children (or 1 child in 6) are acutely malnourished, 3 while global acute malnutrition rates have reached 25 percent in some areas of Somalia. 4 A new President has been elected and a new Transitional Federal Government (TFG) installed. WFP will engage with TFG authorities in the areas under its control and as its policies and programmes are formulated. Nevetheless, the country has been without a functioning Government for 18 years, and escalating conflict due to a complex anti-government insurgency continues to lead to alarming rates of displacement. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, there are over 1.3 million internally displaced people 5 with many facing critical levels of malnutrition. According to the FSAU, civil insecurity is fuelling an economic crisis, which is causing human suffering and is having a devastating impact on the general population and humanitarian situation. Insecurity is severely limiting the movement of goods, restricting trade and access, and continues to hamper humanitarian access and space. With an increasing number of attacks on aid workers over the past year, the operating environment in Somalia has deteriorated and forced several United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to suspend operations. High food prices, the decline of the Somali shilling and low local food production due to conflict, three years of drought and successive failed harvests are further limiting access to food. The prices of imported rice and local cereals increased between 200 percent and 400 percent in the first 6 months of 2008. According to the FSAU, cereal prices declined from October 2008, but were still 350-825 percent above normal in January 2009, placing basic commodities beyond the reach of the poor and pushing the country towards total economic collapse. 1 Estimate based on United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2005 figures. 2 FSAU, FEWSNET, and its partners’ post-Deyr 2008/09 seasonal assessment. 3 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 2008. 4 Food Security Analysis Unit (FSAU), 2008. 5 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2008.

Transcript of Somalia Emergency Operation 10812.0 “Food Aid for Emergency …€¦ · The Somalia Food Security...

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Somalia Emergency Operation 10812.0 “Food Aid for Emergency Relief and Protection of Livelihoods”

Duration of project 12 months (1 April 2009 – 31 March 2010) Number of beneficiaries 3,530,000WFP food tonnage 503,021 mt WFP food cost US$207,937,976 Total cost to WFP US$482,529,259

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY With a population of 7.5 million,1 Somalia is mired in one of the most dire and complex emergencies in the world. The Somalia Food Security Analysis Unit (FSAU) and the Famine Early-Warning System Network (FEWSNET) report that Somalia is facing an unprecedented urban and rural food crisis, with nutrition and food security deteriorating to levels not seen since the famine of the early 1990s. Some 43 percent of the total population of the country, some 3.2 million people, are in need of emergency livelihood and life-saving assistance at least until June 2009, representing an increase of 75 percent since January 2008.2

The population is increasingly struggling to cope with a devastating combination of conflict, massive displacement, drought, high food prices, devaluation of the Somali shilling and hyperinflation. The first to suffer, children constitute one of the most vulnerable groups. Lack of infrastructure and basic social services, along with poor infant feeding practices and limited access to nutritional foods have exacerbated malnutrition. 200,000 children (or 1 child in 6) are acutely malnourished,3 while global acute malnutrition rates have reached 25 percent in some areas of Somalia.4

A new President has been elected and a new Transitional Federal Government (TFG) installed. WFP will engage with TFG authorities in the areas under its control and as its policies and programmes are formulated. Nevetheless, the country has been without a functioning Government for 18 years, and escalating conflict due to a complex anti-government insurgency continues to lead to alarming rates of displacement. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, there are over 1.3 million internally displaced people5 with many facing critical levels of malnutrition. According to the FSAU, civil insecurity is fuelling an economic crisis, which is causing human suffering and is having a devastating impact on the general population and humanitarian situation. Insecurity is severely limiting the movement of goods, restricting trade and access, and continues to hamper humanitarian access and space. With an increasing number of attacks on aid workers over the past year, the operating environment in Somalia has deteriorated and forced several United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to suspend operations. High food prices, the decline of the Somali shilling and low local food production due to conflict, three years of drought and successive failed harvests are further limiting access to food. The prices of imported rice and local cereals increased between 200 percent and 400 percent in the first 6 months of 2008. According to the FSAU, cereal prices declined from October 2008, but were still 350-825 percent above normal in January 2009, placing basic commodities beyond the reach of the poor and pushing the country towards total economic collapse. 1 Estimate based on United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2005 figures. 2 FSAU, FEWSNET, and its partners’ post-Deyr 2008/09 seasonal assessment. 3 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 2008. 4 Food Security Analysis Unit (FSAU), 2008. 5 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2008.

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In 2008, WFP scaled up emergency food assistance, primarily in south-central Somalia, to reach 2.4 million people with emergency food assistance under its protracted relief and recovery operation 10191.1 “Food aid for relief and protection of livelihoods”. To do this, WFP has modified its approach to adapt to the deteriorating humanitarian context in Somalia. The changes include:

� an innovative security model designed to enable the delivery of assistance in an unpredictable security environment, involving an enhanced security presence on the ground with community liaison to ensure that the food reaches vulnerable populations;

� an emergency nutrition approach developed in 2008 with the Somalia nutrition cluster to address the alarming rates of global acute malnutrition;

� a rapid response unit located in Wajir, Kenya, which is ready for immediate deployment to Somalia to enhance capacity on the ground; and

� naval escorts to accompany all ships carrying humanitarian cargo at a time when piracy is on an unprecedented upswing.

These new approaches have proven to be successful. With over 200 staff members already working inside Somalia, and with plans to expand operations, WFP remains one of the few agencies on the ground in Somalia capable of reaching the most vulnerable populations. CARE International has handed the responsibility of feeding 1 million people to WFP, expanding the number of WFP beneficiaries to 3.5 million people by 1 April 2009. There are complementarities among the humanitarian and development activities of the United Nations in Somalia. Progress or otherwise in the peace process impacts on the typologies and focus of WFP activities in Somalia. While the main objective of this WFP operation is to save lives, WFP will adopt a flexible approach to seek out opportunities to engage in recovery and livelihood support. In line with the WFP Strategic Plan (2008-2011), the overall objectives of this emergency operation are to save lives and protect livelihoods in emergency and early recovery (Strategic Objective 1) while helping to prevent potential transition situations from collapsing (Strategic Objective 3). General food distributions and emergency nutrition assistance will contribute to save lives by ensuring adequate food consumption. WFP assistance will also support the re-establishment of livelihoods of targeted households through its recovery activities.

Given the severe nature of the crisis, 96 percent of WFP assistance will be channelled through relief interventions. General food distributions will target 1,319,000 rural people in crisis as well as 1,553,000 urban poor and internally displaced people. Other relief interventions will include emergency school feeding for 93,000 children and nutrition programmes for 475,000 pregnant and lactating women and children under 3; beneficiaries may receive general food distributions as well as school feeding and supplementary feeding. WFP will support 90,000 vulnerable people through recovery activities including food for work/assets, food for training and institutional feeding. Nearly 85 percent of the beneficiaries will be located in southern and central Somalia, with the remaining beneficiaries in Somaliland and Puntland in the north.

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1. SITUATION ANALYSIS AND SCENARIO (a) The overall context

1. Somalia, with an estimated population of 7.5 million6 is classified as a least-developed country

(LDC), a low-income food-deficit country (LIFDC) and is among the poorest and most food-insecure countries in the world. Somalia is particularly vulnerable to recurring natural disasters (floods, drought and animal disease epidemics).7 Livestock and agriculture are the most important sectors, with the former normally accounting for about 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and about 65 percent of export earnings.

2. Somalia has been without a central government for 18 years (1991–2009). While a new

parliament, a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and an elected president were established in 2006, the humanitarian situation in Somalia has dramatically deteriorated over the past two years. Following the Ethiopian Government’s military intervention in support of the TFG’s fight against the Islamic Court Union in December 2006, conflict and violence have escalated, especially in the south and central area, resulting into an unprecedented movement of people from Mogadishu. In January 2009, the Somalia’s Transitional Federal Parliament voted in favour of an expansion of an additional 275 seats to be allocated to members of civil society and opposition. The expanded Transitional Federal Parliament subsequently elected a new President who pledged to support a Government of National Unity based on inclusion, tolerance and political cooperation.

3. In the north, the unilaterally-declared independent Republic of Somaliland and the autonomous

Puntland State of Somalia are more stable with de facto government institutions and basic mechanisms of administration. However, insecurity and deep poverty persist, with food security deteriorating rapidly due to inflation and drought. In late 2008, suicide bombings in these regions targeted United Nations and local government offices, killing tens of people, including United Nations staff. Puntland is widely believed to be the base from which most pirates operate in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. Thus Somalia remains a country in humanitarian crisis where the security situation is dangerous, fluid and unpredictable.

4. Conflict and civil insecurity have intensified in 2008 resulting in massive population

displacement, human rights abuses (such as human smuggling, child recruitment, rape, arbitrary arrests and detentions), disrupting trade and economic activities, and promoting inflation. Humanitarian access has been seriously curtailed by the presence of over 300 checkpoints in south-central Somalia, attacks on humanitarian convoys and the abduction and killing of aid workers. In 2008, 25 aid workers were killed in Somalia, including two WFP staff and 17 aid workers have been kidnapped. Another two WFP staff were killed in January 2009. As a result, several international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have suspended their operations in Somalia, at a time when the population is facing the worst catastrophe in decades.

Internally Displaced People (IDPs)

5. It is estimated that 1.3 million people have been displaced as a result of the fighting since mid-2007. Violence in Mogadishu alone has resulted in the displacement of 1,020,000 people since February 2007; in addition, there are 275,000 protracted IDPs (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees - UNHCR).8 According to FSAU,9 the Shabelle Region is hosting the

6 UNDP, 2005. 7 Godiah, L. M. (2008) An evaluation of the national market profile in Somalia. Prepared for the WFP Regional Bureau for Eastern and Southern Africa. 8 UNHCR. 9 FSAU, “Food Security and Nutrition Brief”, 12 September 2008.

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largest concentration of IDPs from Mogadishu, totalling nearly half a million people. This dramatic rise in the number of IDPs continues to increase the pressure on already over-stretched resources. Host communities are struggling to preserve livelihoods despite droughts and the continuous influx of IDPs. Further displacement continues at an alarming rate. With no effective government and an escalating conflict, there is no immediate prospect of a durable solution for the IDPs.

Education

6. Somalia has one of the lowest school enrolment and literacy rates in the world, especially for girls. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF),10 only 28 percent of school-age children (6-13 years) are enrolled in primary school. While the south and central regions recorded the lowest enrolment rate at 22 percent (and Mogadishu 38 percent), Puntland and Somaliland were slightly higher at 36 percent and 39 percent respectively.11 Equal access to education of both boys and girls remains a major challenge. According to UNICEF,12 an estimated 62 percent of students in primary schools are boys - only 38 percent are girls.

Gender and Child Protection

7. Health and education indicators are both more negative for women. Women also tend to be disproportionately represented in all food-insecure groups in Somalia.13 The escalating conflict has increased the incidence of sexual and gender-based violence and there is very little support for victims (counselling, medical treatment or obstetric care) or law enforcement mechanisms for women who have been raped. Children are also facing a wide range of protection issues, including recruitment of child soldiers by all parties to the conflict, landmines and child labour. Almost half of Somali children (49 percent) are engaged in child labour. WFP gives special attention to the safety and security of its beneficiaries when designing its food assistance strategy and distribution modalities.

(b) The food security and nutrition situation 8. The food security situation has drastically deteriorated in all areas in Somalia as a result of a

combination of consecutive poor harvests due to protracted drought, continuing conflict, further displacement and hyperinflation in food prices. According to the findings of the FSAU post Gu (August 2008) assessment, 43 percent of the total population, or around 3.2 million people, are identified as facing either a humanitarian emergency (HE)14 or an acute food and livelihood crisis (AFLC)15 and are in need of emergency assistance.16 Both rural and urban households have been affected by this crisis. The 3.2 million population comprises: a) 1.3 million IDPs affected by the food price crisis; b) 1.2 million rural poor (680,000 rural poor categorized as facing a HE; another 535,000 facing an AFLC); and c) 705,000 urban poor (nearly one-fifth of the total urban population) living in main towns and rural settlements who have fallen into AFLC or HE categories. The largest concentrations of rural populations in crisis are in the south (66 percent) and central (29 percent) regions. Most of the rural populations in crisis are agro-pastoralists (49

10 UNICEF, “Primary school survey for the 2005/2006 school year”. 11 Somalia Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) 2009. 12 UNICEF 2006/07 Primary School Survey. 13 Penny A. (2008) Identification of a Livelihood Strategy and Programme to Address Underlying Causes of Food Insecurity in Somalia. 14 Humanitarian emergency: Severe lack of access to food with excess mortality, very high and increasing malnutrition, and irreversible livelihood asset stripping (FSAU Somalia). 15 Acute food and livelihood crisis: Highly stressed and critical lack of food access with high and above usual malnutrition and accelerated depletion of livelihood assets that, if continued, will slide the population into Phase 4 or 5 of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and/or likely result in chronic poverty (FSAU - Somalia). 16 See Annex 4D for the description and response framework for each of the FSAU phase classifications.

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percent) and pastoralists (40 percent). The severity and depth of the rural crisis is greatest in the Galgadud, Mudug, Hiran and Middle Shabelle regions. Parts of Somaliland and Puntland, once relatively stable, are now heading towards a humanitarian emergency.

Impact of the drought

9. Somalia has been afflicted by a succession of failed harvests due to an exceptionally severe and prolonged drought. FSAU and its partners conducted an assessment of the annual Gu17 and Deyr 2008/0918 seasons and reported below-normal rainfall and serious consequences for livestock and crop production. Livestock condition was reported to be poor in many areas and abnormal migration continuing in many parts of the country. There are indications of a declining trend in herd sizes. Particularly worrying is the situation in parts of south and central Somalia, especially in the Central, Hiran and Bakol regions, where agro-pastoralists and pastoralists have lost their livelihoods and exhausted their coping mechanisms. The below-normal rainfall has resulted in another year of below-normal annual cereal production and an overall annual cereal availability deficit of 120,000 mt.

10. In addition to poor rainfall, the lack of irrigation infrastructure systems combined with high input

costs (especially fuel), poor tillage and pest damage have precipitated the decline in cereal production. Dwindling rangeland and water resources are also increasing competition among clans, further escalating the already high incidence of resource-based conflict. According to FSAU, the limited availability of locally-produced cereals on the markets contributed to the rise of local cereals prices across the country.

High Food Prices, Devaluation of the Somali Shilling and Hyper-Inflation

11. FSAU reports prices of imported rice and local cereals increased between 200 percent and 400 percent in the first 6 months of 2008. In the December post Deyr analysis,19 FSAU stated that despite a decline from October 2008, food prices are still 350-825 percent above normal price levels and are likely to increase over the coming months. In December 2008, the highest maize and sorghum prices were recorded in the Jubas, Beletweyn, Luq and Hudur.

12. High food prices are the result of combined factors, including consecutive seasons of poor cereal

crop production, the devaluation of the Somali Shilling (SoSh), hyperinflation and increased demand for local cereals. Global high food prices have also contributed significantly to cereal price increases in Somalia. With food commodity needs far outpacing agricultural production, Somalia imports 60 percent of its cereal needs. The Famine Early-Warning System Network (FEWS-NET) compared the impact of high food prices within the Greater Horn of Africa countries and showed that Somalia was the worst affected. Nominal prices of staple foods in the capital cities showed that the cost of staple foods increased by 95 percent in Addis Ababa, 100 percent in Djibouti City and 64 percent in Nairobi, while they soared by almost 300 percent in Mogadishu between September 2007 and August 2008.20

13. Since incomes have not kept pace with rising food and non-food prices, the purchasing power of the urban poor has significantly decreased. To cope with the hyperinflation and meet their basic food needs, poor urban households have adopted a number of coping mechanisms including reducing quantities of food purchased, switching to cheaper cereals, skipping meals, selling essential livelihood assets and seeking additional remittances. As these mechanisms are now

17 FSAU Somalia Food Security and Nutrition Special Brief - Post Gu '08 Analysis, September, 2008 18 FSAU Somalia Food Security and Nutrition Special Brief - Post Deyr '08/09 Analysis, February, 2009. Note that the from the Gu (major) rains are typically April to July and the Deyr (minor) rains are typically between September to November. 19 Ibid 20 FEWS-NET. “Brief on food security and nutrition conditions in the Greater Horn of Africa, October 2008.”

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exhausted, most urban households find themselves severely indebted, vulnerable to any future food price increases and significantly reliant on food assistance.

Impact of the Crisis on Nutrition and Health

14. Based on 17 representative nutrition assessments conducted from October to December 2008, FSAU and partners estimated the number of acutely malnourished children under 5 to be 200,000, of which 60,000 are estimated to be severely malnourished. This means 1 in 6 children in Somalia is acutely malnourished and 1 in 20 is severely malnourished. Global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates in most of south and central Somalia are above the emergency threshold of 15 percent. The rates of severe acute malnutrition (SAM) were also unacceptably high with 12 surveys reporting above 2 percent.

15. The rural areas of most concern are the Golis/Guban livelihood zone in the northwest regions,

Hawd livelihood zone in the central regions bordering Ethiopia, Bakool region and Gedo region. The nutritional situation of IDPs is also of great concern, with the highest rates of acute and severe malnutrition reported in Bossasso IDPs in December 2008. Protracted IDPs in Galkayo, Garowe, Hargeisa, Berbera and Burao are also facing chronically high levels of acute malnutrition, exacerbated by the urban food price crisis, given their reliance on purchase for food access.

16. In addition to inadequate access to food both in terms of quantity and quality, other factors such

as poor household access to clean water, inadequate sanitation and health services, inappropriate feeding practices and acute watery diarrhoea have exacerbated GAM rates. Partners engaged under the water and sanitation cluster have been extremely challenged in providing large-scale assistance and have been primarily focused on water trucking during the dry season, water piping to the largest IDP settlements, and cholera prevention and response.

The Status of the Tuberculosis (TB) - HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Somalia

17. The protracted humanitarian situation in Somalia increases the likelihood of HIV infection within the population. While there is no sero-surveillance data to assess prevalence levels among the general population or population groups considered most at-risk to HIV infection, surveys conducted in 2004 and 2007 among women aged 15-25 attending antenatal care showed relatively higher prevalence in Somaliland (1.7 percent), followed by Puntland (0.5 percent).21 Data collection in south and central regions is still ongoing. Co-infection with HIV among TB patients is estimated at 4.5 percent. Prevalence among patients with sexually transmitted diseases was 6.3 percent and was higher among males (7.4 percent) compared to females (5.4 percent).

(c) Scenario 18. FSAU has identified 3.2 million rural and urban people, IDPs and other vulnerable groups facing

an acute food and livelihood crisis or humanitarian emergency. Given the scaling up of WFP’s response and the difficulty to predict food needs beyond a 12-month period, WFP opted for an emergency operation (EMOP) to respond to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Somalia. WFP plans to assist food-insecure communities for a period of 12 months. This EMOP assumes that food security will show some improvement with the next Gu harvest in August 2009 and will result in a 15 percent reduction of beneficiaries requiring relief assistance (IDPs, urban and rural poor) from August 2009 to March 2010.

21 World Health Organization (WHO), in collaboration with the national authorities, UNDP, UNAIDS and other partners, with support from the World Bank.

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19. Given that conditions in Somalia are fluid and unpredictable, provisions must be made to adapt WFP’s response to the evolving environment. In particular, the outcome of the United Nations peace effort to establish civil order in the country will affect the implementation of the proposed EMOP. Under a worst-case scenario for which contingency planning is required, the deterioration of the current conflict into a civil war, or droughts or floods could lead to additional large-scale food shortages. .A continuation of the global food crisis or a further income shock precipitated by the global financial crisis could push more urban poor into destitution. WFP will closely monitor events and will examine weather forecast information. If necessary, WFP would adjust this EMOP with budget revisions to cope with additional food requirements.

POLICIES, CAPACITIES AND ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS Policies, capacities and actions of the government 20. Without a functioning national government since 1991, central and regional governing authorities

are weak and under-resourced. In many geographic areas, the TFG has been replaced by either the Islamic Court Union or the Al Shabab.22 Basic service provision is practically non-existent, especially in education and health, contributing to low school enrolment rates and very poor health indicators. Livelihoods and the economy as a whole are vulnerable to internal factors such as the disruption of trade, conflict, drought, flooding, fighting, and to external factors such as the interruption of remittance inflows or bans on the import of livestock from Somalia. Humanitarian emergencies are cyclical, hindering economic growth and development. There are no formal safety nets in Somalia. WFP will engage with the newly-formed TFG as it becomes established and formulates its policies and programmes.

Policies, capacities and actions of other actors 21. In Somaliland and Puntland, there is a governmental system in place that allows WFP contact

with regional authorities to plan and implement projects. WFP works mainly with the ministries of health, education and planning. In the absence of a stable government in south-central Somalia, WFP directly coordinates with local authorities, village elders, women’s groups, cooperating partners and other members of civil society.

Coordination 22. The coordination and monitoring of humanitarian and development assistance is maintained

primarily through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). The following nine clusters have been established in Somalia: i) food aid; ii) agriculture and livelihood; iii) water and sanitation; iv) health; v) nutrition; vi) protection; vii) education viii) logistics, and ix) shelter. WFP leads the food aid and logistics clusters and is also actively involved in other clusters such as the nutrition and water and sanitation clusters. Cluster leads are accountable for sectoral response plans, the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) - leading interagency assessment missions, identifying priority needs, and facilitating the planning of common responses to the affected populations. To minimize duplication and ensure harmonization of coordination structures, IASC clusters are embedded within the Somalia Support Secretariat Sectoral Committees.23 WFP also supports the United Nations Transition Plan (UNTP), intended to bring United Nations agencies, funds and programmes together to better coordinate recovery activities inside Somalia.

22 A militant extremist group operating in Somalia. 23 The Somali Support Secretariat is responsible for providing secretariat support to the Somali authorities and the international community.

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23. Through the 2009 CAP, United Nations agencies and NGO partners have requested a total of US$919 million to support those in need in Somalia in 2009. Out of this amount, US$544 million is related to food assistance. On 10 February 2009, US$10 million were allocated to various agencies from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) to support priority life-saving programmes, including water and nutrition, livelihoods support and the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) in Somalia.

OBJECTIVES OF WFP ASSISTANCE 24. In line with the WFP Strategic Plan (2008-2011), the overall objectives of the EMOP are to:

• save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies (Strategic Objective 1). Goals: “to save lives in emergencies and reduce acute malnutrition caused by shocks to below emergency levels; protect livelihoods and enhance self-reliance in emergencies and early recovery; and reach IDPs and other vulnerable groups whose food and nutrition security has been adversely affected by shocks”.

• help to prevent potential transition situations from collapsing (Strategic Objective 3). Goals: “to support the return of IDPs through food and nutrition assistance; and to support the re-establishment of the livelihoods and food and nutrition security of communities and families affected by shocks”.

The following outcome level results are expected: • Reduced acute malnutrition in children under 5 in targeted, emergency-affected populations

in Somalia (Strategic Objective 1, goal “to save lives in emergencies and ), through general food assistance, supplementary feeding and mother-and-child health and nutrition (MCHN) programmes;

• Improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted emergency-affected households (Strategic Objective 1), through MCHN, targeted supplementary feeding programme and emergency school feeding; and

• Adequate food consumption over assistance period for targeted households and communities (Strategic Objective 3), through selective safety nets, such as food for work and assets, food for training, institutional feeding.

BENEFICIARIES AND TARGETING Targeting methodology 25. The FSAU determines the food security phase of each livelihood zones within each district based

on a number of indicators including malnutrition rates, mortality, disease, food access/availability, dietary diversity, coping strategies, access to water, physical insecurity, displacement, and livelihood assets. The information provided by these assessments, however, is at a high level of aggregation and only indicates where food insecurity exists at the district level. Therefore, further refinement and verification is required for WFP programming purposes in order to pinpoint the precise numbers, locations and identities of the vulnerable populations. To determine whether the entire population of a livelihood zone in a specific district will be considered for general food distributions, the following conditions must be met: i) the total of those affected by HE and AFLC combined is greater than 50 percent of the population of this livelihood and; ii) the crop or/and livestock production is considered a failure and; iii) malnutrition rates are above 15 percent.

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26. According to a study carried out by the Feinstein International Center in March 2008,24

mechanisms for geographic targeting of rural populations are reasonably adequate, particularly at the district and livelihood zone level. However, it points out that the selection of villages within districts and livelihood zones is not adequately transparent and is based on limited information about the food security status and population size. In light of the study’s findings, WFP will refine its targeting mechanisms in 2009 and implement a more transparent targeting system at the village level, based on village population data and political and socio-economic vulnerability indicators, such as livelihoods, clan status, access to water, schools and hospitals. However, household-level targeting is only possible with adequate security. It is also generally acknowledged that there is likely to be food sharing among households, particularly in pastoralist areas.

27. Targeting mechanisms in urban areas varies. In the highly insecure and politicized environment of

Mogadishu, WFP uses a self-targeting mechanism for its general food distributions. Wet feeding is believed to be the best modality to reach the most vulnerable households and prevent redistribution among community members. In other urban centres, the urban poor are targeted through the supplementary feeding programme (SFP) centres. In Bossaso, the urban poor are identified by a local committee composed of religious leaders, elders, women and youth group representatives, a community administrator and a councillor.

Beneficiaries 28. According to the findings of FSAU assessments conducted in August and December 2008,25 there

is an ongoing and sustained humanitarian crisis in Somalia, with 43 percent of the total population in need of emergency livelihood and life-saving assistance at least until June 2009. Based on the FSAU recommendations, WFP plans to reach, under this EMOP, a total of 3.5 million beneficiaries, including 1 million people previously covered by CARE International. WFP will address the basic needs of the following beneficiary groups identified through needs assessments and further verified through stakeholder meetings:

• IDPs (food-insecure, newly-displaced and protracted IDPs); • Rural populations identified by FSAU as being in a state of Humanitarian Emergency

(HE) or Acute Food and Livelihood Crisis (AFLC); • Poor urban populations26 identified by FSAU as being in a state of HE or AFLC

mostly as a result of high food prices and hyper-inflation; • Pregnant and nursing mothers and children under 5; • Primary school children, especially in chronically food-insecure areas in the north; • Vulnerable groups including people living with HIV (PLHIV) and tuberculosis (TB)

patients, orphans and elderly people. 29. General food distributions will be targeted to an estimated 2,872,000 people (or 80 percent of the

total beneficiaries), mostly in central and south Somalia. This includes 896,000 IDPs, who are primarily concentrated in the Banadir, Middle and Lower Shabelle, and Galgadug regions. IDP numbers are regularly updated by UNHCR27 and WFP targets IDPs based on adjustments for based on assessments of food need. In addition, 1,976,000 people identified as facing a HE or an AFLC will also benefit from general food distributions as recommended by FSAU. Among this target group, 1,319,000 people live in rural areas and 657,000 are located in urban centres.28 The

24 Feinstein International Center: “Targeting in Complex Emergencies: Somalia Country Case Study”. Susanne Jaspars and Daniel Maxwell, July 2008. 25 FSAU Somalia Food Security and Nutrition Special Brief - Post Gu ‘08 Analysis, September, 2008 and Post Deyr '08/09 Analysis, February, 2009. 26 FSAU urban population data is based on UNDP definition of urban centres which includes the district and regional capitals. 27 WFP is targeting 896,000 IDPs from the total number of IDPs based on an assessment of the IDPs’ food needs. 28 WFP is targeting

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areas identified by FSAU as most food-insecure include the central and southern regions (Bay, Bakol, Jubas, Lower Shabelle, parts of Gedo and Middle Shabelle), as well as the northern areas of Somaliland and Puntland. These numbers are based on both the post Gu harvest assessment conducted by FSAU and its partners in August 2008 and findings from more recent surveys, including the post Deyr harvest analysis conducted in December 2008/January 2009 confirmed the same trends. WFP makes adjustments to the FSAU beneficiary figures for the planning figures in this EMOP: adjustments are made for each livehood group in each district and zone based on factors such as availability and economic access to basic food commodities, impact of recurrent crises on the durable assets of particular livelihood groups and whether food is a viable intervention for particular groups. The beneficiary numbers will be updated twice a year, after each FSAU seasonal harvest assessments.

30. In response to soaring malnutrition rates, a new emergency nutrition approach was adopted in

Somalia to better address malnutrition. A targeted SFP will support 110,000 moderately malnourished children aged 6-59 months. WFP aims to cover at least 50 percent of the 200,000 moderately malnourished children under 5 identified by FSAU during the nutrition assessments conducted between October and December 2008,29 as ongoing insecurity prevents from accessing a number of areas with high prevalence of acute malnutrition. As security conditions improve, this target can be revised. Children will be screened and referred to a SFP using mid-upper arm circumference measurements (MUAC).30 They will be admitted on the basis of weight and height measurements.31

31. WFP will also support 365,000 children under 3 and pregnant and lactating women through blanket supplementary feeding under the MCHN programme. Pregnant women are targeted from the second trimester of pregnancy until 6 months after birth. All children less than 3 years of age and pregnant and lactating women living in areas/camps where the GAM rate is over 15 percent will be considered for the MCHN programme. Findings from the regular nutrition assessments conducted by FSAU and its partners will inform the geographical targeting. Distribution lists will be scrutinized to minimize the possibility of overlap between the targeted SFP and the MCHN programme.

32. The most vulnerable groups (people living with HIV/AIDS, orphans, elderly) will receive WFP

support through institutions and centres as a continuation of work from the protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) 10191.1. WFP will target centres, which are supported by partners within the framework of the Global Fund TB Program and the Somalia HIV/AIDS Working Group.

33. In addition, WFP will support 65,000 people through food-for-work and assets (FFW/A) and

food-for-training (FFT) activities. Communities identified by FSAU as generally food-insecure (GFI) or facing AFLC will be targeted if they do not already benefit from general food distributions. Households (female-headed, elderly and/or destitute) will be selected in consultation with community representatives. FFW/A activities will include canal rehabilitation, dam de-silting, construction of soil and water conservation structures, school, clinic and road rehabilitation and sanitation projects. FFT activities such as income generation, literacy and numeracy training will increasingly focus women.32 Finally, the emergency school feeding (ESF) programme will provide an alternate distribution mechanism to ensure that 93,000 children enrolled in 350 schools in HE and AFLC areas have access to food.

29 FSAU Somalia Food Security and Nutrition Special Brief - Post Deyr '08/09 Analysis, February, 2009. 30 MUAC between 115 and 125mm. 31 Weight and height =>-3 <-2 Z-score will be the admission criteria. 32 In 2008, 60 percent of the FFT participants were women.

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34. Table 1 summarizes beneficiary numbers by type of intervention. TABLE 1: TOTAL BENEFICIARIES BY TYPE OF INTERVENTION Type of Intervention Male

/ Boy Female /

Girl Total****

RELIEF General food distributions* (Rural, Urban, IDP, incentive for MCHN and SFP)

1,407,000 1,465,000 2,872,000

Emergency school feeding (ESF) 56,000 37,000 93,000 Emergency school feeding – Girl’s take-home ration 37,000 37,000 Mother-and-child health and nutrition (MCHN) 179,000 186,000 365,000 Targeted supplementary feeding programme (SFP) 54,000 56,000 110,000 RECOVERY Food for work and assets / training (beneficiaries, not participants**)

32,000 33,000 65,000

Institutional feeding*** 12,000 13,000 25,000 TOTAL 1,740,000 1,790,000 3,530,000 Total excluding potential double-counting of MCHN/SFP beneficiaries 1,507,000 1,548,000 3,055,000 * General food distributions target 1,319,000 beneficiaries in rural areas, 656,500 urban poor, 896,000 IDPs and 500 family members of MCHN/SFP beneficiaries. ** One household is composed of six family members. *** Beneficiaries will receive a family ration based on an average household size of six. **** FSAU provides figures of population in humanitarian and livelihood crisis. It does not include the Borderline food insecure (BFI) population figures. In BFI areas, WFP with its partners implement institutional feeding programmes for vulnerable groups (TB, Orphans, AIDS patients), ESF (including take-home ration for girls) and FFW. MCHN and SFP programmes provide individual nutrition rations to malnourished children and pregnant and lactating mothers as well as a family protection ration. 475,000 beneficiaries of MCHN and SFP (children and women) could potentially qualify as relief beneficiaries for GFD.

NUTRITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RATIONS 35. General Food Distributions (GFD): The general food ration has been designed to translate into

quantities that are practical for monthly distributions, while providing the required 2100 kcal per person per day. The addition of 69 grams of corn-soya blend (CSB), which is fortified with micronutrients, is to help address soaring malnutrition rates. IDPs and urban poor will receive a food ration every month on the premise that their access to food remains limited and is little-influenced by seasonality. However, the rural poor will be assisted for seven months when food access and availability is lowest: no food distribution is planned for the rural population in the south during the two main harvests and in the north during the Gu and the Deyr rainy seasons when livestock production is high. Most general distributions will be in the form of dry rations, with the exception of a wet feeding programme for 80,000 IDPs and poor local residents in Mogadishu.

36. Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programme: WFP will provide to moderately malnourished

children aged 6-59 months a ration made of CSB, oil and sugar for 90 days, or Supplementary Plumpy™, a ready-to-use supplementary food (RUSF) for 60 days. RUSFs were introduced as a pilot in 25 clinics in 2008 but have not yet been tested on a large scale in Somalia. If the pilot is successful and resources available, WFP will introduce Supplementary Plumpy in all SFPs during 2009. However, WFP has also planned for a contingency stock of CSB in case Supplementary Plumpy is not widely accepted. A family ration will be given for three months to families of moderately malnourished children to protect the high-value commodity ration (the RUSF or CSB)

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targeting the malnourished child, after which an additional one-month discharge ration will be provided to the family.

37. MCHN programme: Pregnant and lactating women as well as vulnerable children aged 6-24

months will receive comprehensive health and nutrition services including food and micronutrient supplementation, immunizations, growth monitoring, and health and nutrition education. WFP will provide beneficiaries with CSB, oil and sugar through MCHN clinics supported by the local government, UNICEF and international NGOs. An incentive of a one-month family ration will also be provided to pregnant women who opt to deliver in clinics.

38. Support to Therapeutic Feeding Programme: While UNICEF is responsible for managing

therapeutic feeding centres (TFCs), WFP will complement UNICEF’s efforts by providing an incentive discharge ration and a caregiver ration. This activity has been included under the general food distributions.

39. Institutional Feeding: The institutional feeding programme focuses on people with increased

nutrition demands - PLHIV and TB patients among others - by providing a family ration of cereals, pulses, oil, CSB and salt through clinics and social service institutions. The ration has been designed to provide an increased energy and micronutrient intake (2,209 kcal per day per person) in order to maintain body weight and address micronutrient deficiencies.

40. Emergency School Feeding (ESF): School children will receive porridge for breakfast and pulses

and cereals for lunch. In order to address the extremely low girls’ school enrolment rate and improve household food consumption, girls will be given an incentive take-home ration consisting of 3.6 kg of vegetable oil per month.

41. Food for Work/Assets/Training: Where appropriate, and security permitting, WFP will aim to

continue FFW/A and FFT activities, especially in the north. The FFW/A and FFT ration will correspond to the ration given under the general food distributions.

TABLE 2: RATIONS, BY ACTIVITY

Ration Sizes (g/person/day)

Activity Cereal Pulse Veg.

oil CSB Sugar Salt RUSF

Total number

of Feeding

Days

Energy (kcal)

RELIEF GFD 417 56 20 69 0 5 0 360 2,086 ESF 150 30 20 50 20 5 0 250 1,070 MCHN 0 0 20 250 17 0 0 360 1,185 SFP (regular) 0 0 20 250 17 0 0 360 1,185 SFP (RUSF pilot) 0 0 0 0 0 0 92 360 500 Girl’s Take-Home Ration 20 177 RECOVERY

Institutional Feeding 400 50 30 100 0 4 0 360 2,209 FFW/A and FFT 417 56 20 69 0 5 0 360 2,086

42. With the exception of ESF, which is based on a 10-month school year, all activities are planned for 12 months, though the average individual project period is 3 to 6 months, after which an evaluation is conducted to decide upon continuation or reallocation of resources towards worse-off areas.

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43. A total of 503,021 mt of food commodities is required, as detailed in table 3 below. TABLE 3: TOTAL COMMODITY REQUIREMENTS FOR 1 YEAR (MT)

Type of Intervention Cereals Pulses Vegetable Oil

CSB Sugar Salt RUSF (Supplem-

entary Plumpy)

Total

RELIEF GFD 318,100 42,413 15,269 53,016 0 3,817 0 432,615 ESF (inc. take-home) 3,488 698 465 1,163 465 116 0 6,394 MCHN 0 0 2628 32,850 2233 0 0 37,712 SFP (regular) 0 0 434 5,434 370 0 0 6,238 SFP (RUSF pilot) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,544 1,544 RECOVERY FFW/A & FFT 9,750 1,300 468 1,625 0 117 0 13,260 Institutional Feeding 3,600 450 270 900 0 38 0 5,258

TOTAL 334,938 44,861 19,534 94,988 3,068 4,088 1,544 503,021

6. IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS 44. Food aid strategy: WFP has expanded its relief component from 67 percent in 2006 to over

95 percent in 2008. This shift from recovery to relief activities follows the recommendations from 2008 FSAU assessments that indicated that almost half of Somalia’s population is in either an AFLC or a HE.

45. Operational Capacity: WFP has made significant operational investments in-country over the

past years which have proven to be successful, placing WFP in a unique position to respond to the complex crisis in Somalia. With the significant planned scale-up of WFP activities in the areas of northern Gedo, Hiran, Galgadud and Mudug, previously covered by CARE, WFP will further expand its field presence to support increasing levels of food delivery, improve operational effectiveness, beneficiary targeting and monitoring in strategic locations. The expanded operational presence and increased staffing level will provide WFP with additional flexibility in Somalia and Kenya for quick responses to the highly fluid security situation and rapidly-changing beneficiary needs in Somalia.

46. At present, more than 60 percent of WFP’s 340 staff members including 25 internationals are

posted inside Somalia. All sub-offices have an international head of sub-office and deputy head of sub-office, two United Nations Volunteers and an international security officer. In addition, three international logistics officers are roaming in-country to provide support to all field offices. Currently, WFP has 5 sub-offices and 10 field offices and logistics hubs inside Somalia. Security permitting, two new sub-offices will be set up in the Galgadud and Mudug in central Somalia to support the areas taken over from CARE. WFP is also planning on upgrading the Garbahare office. To handle the increased tonnage in country, two new logistics hubs in south and central Somalia will be established. International and national staff presence will increase accordingly.

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47. To further augment operational capacity, WFP has established a rapid response unit (RRU) based in Wajir, Kenya with international and national staff, including 12 food aid monitors.33 Based within 60 to 90 minutes flying time to most operational areas, staff from the RRU will be called upon to monitor food distributions in areas where WFP recently took over from CARE until local security conditions allow a permanent staff presence and the establishment of new sub-offices. The RRU will also be expected to conduct post-distribution monitoring (PDM) in other regions. Recognizing clan sensitivities in the context of Somalia, WFP will deploy food aid monitors ensuring that they have the flexibility to work effectively in different parts of Somalia. The Wajir base will also serve as an additional UNHAS base and will allow WFP to quickly evacuate staff in the event of a major security incident in Somalia.

48. Participation: WFP has found that local community engagement is key in delivering food and

ensuring the safety of staff and beneficiaries. As part of the security strategy, WFP is enhancing its efforts to inform community leaders of WFP’s role and the different food aid programmes, while encouraging them to assist with security arrangements at distribution points. The active participation of local communities has also increased significantly from previous operations with the introduction of registration lists prepared by local communities and ration cards for most of the general food distributions. Where possible, ration cards will be issued in women’s names. WFP will also intensify the interaction with beneficiaries prior to distributions in order to provide them with detailed information on entitlements.

49. Partners: WFP currently works with 189 cooperating partners (CPs), mostly community-

based organizations (CBOs) given the few NGOs operating in Somalia. Alternate CPs have been identified in case backstopping is necessary. In light of the planned scale-up of WFP activities, the number of CPs will be expanded from 189 to 225, following strict selection criteria and performance evaluation. In order to strengthen its CPs’ implementation capacity, WFP plans to outsource a training cell34 in 2009. Its main objective will be to train both WFP and CP staff, and hence maintain the quality of WFP response in Somalia. Additionally, limited non-food items will be provided to assist WFP local partners with their communication and transport requirements. Collaborative arrangements with partners will continue to be articulated in letters of agreement, memoranda of understanding and field level agreements that specify respective responsibilities and tasks, including inputs, implementation schedules, monitoring and reporting requirements and performance indicators.

50. Logistics: Approximately 90 percent of WFP food deliveries are made by sea. While

Mombasa is the primary load port, Djibouti, Dar as Salaam and South African ports can also be used when necessary. A key challenge to sea transport is the threat of piracy, which reached an all-time high in 2008. Since November 2007, WFP has employed a system of naval escorts using naval assets provided by various governments, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union. The system has proven to be effective and no escorted WFP ship has been hijacked since then.

51. Ships primarily discharge from the Mogadishu port, while the Merka seasonal beach port is also heavily utilized. In addition, WFP has the option to use the El Ma'an beach port north of Mogadishu in case Mogadishu is blocked due to insecurity. The Kismayo port is used to deliver supplies to the Juba regions of southern Somalia, while the Berbera and Bossaso ports are utilized for northern Somalia.

33 33 percent of the food aid monitors are women, while 67 percent are men. WFP faces difficulties to recruit more women for field monitor positions due to cultural issues in Somalia. 34 A training cell is to be composed of programme, logistics and security experts who will be based inside of Somalia and will conduct specialized training primarily for WFP CP staff.

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52. Approximately 10 percent of deliveries are made overland from Nairobi and Mombasa to Somalia. However, road transport can potentially be disrupted due to the unreliable road networks inside Kenya and occasional border closures. WFP anticipates this by both pre-positioning at extended delivery points (EDPs) inside Somalia when possible, and by having contracts in place to supply areas using alternate routes from the Somali ports.

53. Direct deliveries are made to approximately 3,000 final distributions points (FDPs) and through 12 EDPs within Somalia, each equipped with logistics staff and commodity tracking systems. Commercial Somali transport companies are employed for ocean, overland, and inland transport through established WFP short-listing and contracting procedures. A bond system is in place for all transport carried out by the companies whereby WFP holds a 30 percent c.i.f35 financial bond in order to mitigate the risk of losses. In the event of any loss, the transporter is responsible for reimbursing 100 percent of the c.i.f value of the commodities.

54. Hundreds of security checkpoints remain a challenge to overland transport inside Somalia. New security arrangements for convoys are being devised locally to ensure neutral security from the point of loading to the distribution point.

55. WFP acts as the head of the Logistics Cluster for Somalia. The cluster identified an under-utilization of the larger agencies’ economies of scale by the smaller agencies. As such, through bilateral agreements, WFP has started transporting other agencies' cargo to and within Somalia. To date, commodities have been transported for nine agencies, while an EDP has been established by WFP at K-50 purely to cater for other agencies' cargo.

56. WFP Ethiopia country office has requested for the Somalia country office to assist in receiving, handling and transporting up to 20,000 mt per month through the Berbera port in Somaliland to Ethiopia. Cost sharing budgets, delegations of authority and augmentation of the Berbera office to handle the additional tonnage are to be completed by the Somalia and Ethiopia country offices with the support of WFP headquarters.

57. Procurement: WFP has purchased maize, pulses and CSB from Kenya, Uganda and South Africa under the previous operation. Through its ongoing market analysis, WFP is also actively reviewing the possibility of in-country purchases. For example, WFP purchased sugar in Somalia in 2008. WFP will encourage cash contributions from donors that can be used for local and regional procurement.

PERFORMANCE MONITORING

58. The monitoring is based on the results-based management compliant logical framework model in Annex 3 which lists the performance indicators according to the different expected results of the operation. Under the PRRO, guidelines and standard monitoring checklists focusing on process indicators were designed. The checklists were then field tested, refined and are now in use for all activities. A monthly distribution monitoring report is also produced.

59. Supported by the country office monitoring team, field staff will visit over 3,000 distribution

sites across Somalia to collect qualitative and quantitative data. This data will be analysed to measure progress and take corrective actions. WFP aims to monitor 50 percent of the FDPs on a monthly basis, despite the extremely challenging security situation.

35 C.i.f: cost, insurance and freight

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60. Monthly distribution reports, focusing on basic output indicators, are also submitted by WFP cooperating partner and are analysed and reconciled for accountability. WFP is working on strengthening the triangulation of data between the WFP monitoring reports and the monthly CP reports. An initial assessment of CPs has been undertaken and a review of performance and capacity will be done prior to renewing agreements and will be instrumental in strengthening performance.

61. Security permitting, WFP will collect primary outcome level and PDM data. A PDM system

is currently being finalized. WFP will continue to assess and align its monitoring system to changes in the humanitarian operating environment and develop tools that best respond to the information needs at different levels while paying particular attention to the staff safety and security on the ground. WFP is also committed to participating in joint food security assessments and nutritional surveys undertaken by FSAU, FEWS-NET, NGOs and United Nations agencies. WFP will undertake an evaluation of this EMOP before the next phase of assistance.

HANDOVER STRATEGY

62. Given the ongoing conflict and subsequent population displacement as well as the country’s vulnerability to recurrent natural disasters, substantial emergency food assistance will likely be necessary beyond 2009 in Somalia. In the absence of a sustainable and effective government or regional authority, it is unlikely that WFP will have the opportunity to plan a handover strategy and engage in long-term resource programming.

SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 63. Conditions in Somalia are fluid and unpredictable. Provisions must be made to frequently

adjust activities in response to changing security conditions. In addition to the outcome of the United Nations peace effort to establish civil order in the country, factors that can potentially disrupt activities under the proposed EMOP include: • an extension of international anti-terrorist operations to Somalia; • a deterioration of the current conflict into a civil war; • increased and unchecked maritime piracy or lack of naval escorts; and • further deterioration of the road networks.

64. In light of the significant increase in security incidents and threats towards aid workers and

United Nations staff in particular, WFP has developed a strategic management model to ensure operational continuity within the current Somali context, involving an enhanced security presence on the ground with community liaison to ensure that the food reaches vulnerable populations.

65. The WFP international head of security attends daily security briefs with the United Nations

Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) and is a prominent member of the United Nations Security Management Team (UNSMT) for Somalia. All established WFP offices in Somalia and Kenya are compliant with the minimum operating security standards (MOSS) and all UNDSS-required training is undertaken. WFP is in the process of preparing a business continuity plan (BCP) for all its offices and will update both its BCPs and its contingency plans on a quarterly basis. In addition, WFP in cooperation with UNDSS will establish five trauma centres in southern Somalia. International and key national staff will be required to complete a compulsory Safer and Secure Access to Field Environment for Somalia (SSAFE)

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training in Nairobi, while other national staff will receive a similar adapted training on the ground.

66. WFP is implementing additional security mitigating measures to complement the regular

UNDSS security mechanisms by placing an international security officer in each sub-office location. The international security officer is engaged in community relations efforts to sensitize the community and local leadership to WFP’s work in an effort to minimize risks for staff and facilitate humanitarian access. Local community leaders are also being asked to provide security support at distribution sites.

67. WFP is proposing to enhance the capacity of the security unit with the addition of a second

international security officer and a security information manager at the country office level, to provide additional internal capacity to analyze and communicate daily security developments in a timely manner. The addition of these positions will greatly enhance WFP’s ability to provide good quality information and analysis of security and political developments to managers at sub-office, country office, regional bureau and headquarters levels. Ultimately, it will ensure that WFP senior managers are well informed of security developments on the ground in order to make sound operational decisions in one of the most complex and volatile security environments in the world. The security unit will also continue to support communications efforts at the community level in Somalia to better protect staff and assistance on the ground.

68. The lack of reliable external security services also entails substantial expenditures for the

refurbishing and periodic upgrading of all offices and housing for United Nations staff to comply with MOSS. WFP will make capital investments and improvements including the building of a new complex in Hargeisa. These security enhancements have been programmed into the EMOP budget. The rule requiring the presence of two international staff members for overnight stays will also result in an extra staffing requirement for operating a sub-office.

69. Due to the unpredictable security situation, poor road conditions and consequent long travel

times, UNHAS is becoming the safest and most efficient mode of transport for WFP staff. However, reliance upon UNHAS inhibits travel and entails high transport and security-related costs as well as additional fees for the maintenance, security and management of the airstrips. Moreover, in most of Somalia, where the security situation is unstable, WFP cannot use its own vehicles as per United Nations regulations. The hiring of vehicles, as required by MOSS, results in extra rent and communications costs for WFP. The temporary nature of the rental precludes the installation of long-distance telecommunication equipment (high-frequency or HF radio). The absence of very high frequency (VHF) radio networks (and mobile phone networks outside of the main towns) means that satellite phones must be used, entailing high operating costs.

70. Of equal concern is the danger facing ships in Somali waters. Piracy off the coast of Somalia

increased by 25 percent in 2008 with 35 ships hijacked. Ransoms are usually requested and granted, making piracy a lucrative business. WFP has taken additional security measures to ensure that ships carrying humanitarian assistance reach their destinations in Somalia by requesting that governments provide naval escorts. With the dramatic rise in piracy in the last few months, shippers are now refusing to ship humanitarian aid to Somalia without escorts. WFP would be forced to suspend operations if food deliveries could no longer arrive by sea.36

36 90 percent of WFP food deliveries to Somalia are made by sea.

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RECOMMENDATION

71. The Executive Director and Director General FAO are requested to approve the proposed emergency operation (Somalia 10812.0), designed to benefit 3.5 million people over a one- year period, with a food cost of US$208 million and a total cost of US$483 million.

APPROVAL

………………………………………… ……………………………………………… Josette Sheeran Dr Jacques Diouf Executive Director Director-General United Nations World Food Programme Food and Agriculture Organization of the

United Nations Date: …………………………………... Date:………………………………………...

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ANNEX 1A

WFP PROJECT COST BREAKDOWN Quantity

(mt) Average

Cost per mt (US$)

Value (US $)

WFP COSTS A. Direct operational costs Commodity 37 - Cereals 334,938 249.99 83,731,151 - Pulses 44,861 709.08 31,810,038 - Vegetable Oil 19,534 1,473.94 28,791,944 - Corn Soya Blend (CSB) 94,988 592.53 56,283,713 - Ready-to-Use Supplementary Food (RUSF) 1,544 3,386.9 5,229,374 - Sugar 3068 571.87 1,754,497 - Salt 4,088 82.5 337,260

Total commodities 503,021 207,937,976 External transport 123.29 62,020,964 Landside transport 127.24 64,004,694 Sub-total for ITSH 141.52 71,188,565 Total LTSH 268.76 135,193,259 Other direct operational costs 9,078,045 Total direct operational costs 414,230,244 B. Direct support costs (see Annex II for details) Total direct support costs 36,731,680 C. Total WFP Direct Costs 450,961,924 D. Indirect Support Costs 7% 31,567,335TOTAL WFP COSTS 482,529,259

37 This is a notional food basket used for budgeting and approval purpose. The contents may vary depending on the availability of commodities.

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ANNEX 1B

DIRECT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS (US$) Staff International professional staff 11,559,511National professional staff 1,513,031 National general service staff 5,198,206 Temporary assistance 351,835 Overtime 8,700 Incentives 2,721,365 International consultants 584,551 National consultants 47,100 United Nations Volunteers 810,441 Staff duty travel 4,279,200 Staff training and development 1,523,509 Sub-total 28,597,448

Office expenses and other recurring costs Rental facilities 310,960 Utilities (general) 322,500 Office supplies 363,500 Communication and IT services 790,592 Insurance 24,000 Equipment repair and maintenance 160,700 Vehicle maintenance and running costs 2,072,000 United Nations organizations services (WFP’s share of common United Nations cost in

Nairobi) 500,000

Other office expenses 1,519,830 Sub-total 6,064,082

Equipment and other fixed costs Vehicles 168,000 TC/ICT equipment 1,449,350 Furniture, tools and equipment 452,800 Sub-total 2,070,150Total direct support costs 36,731,680

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ANNEX 2: LIST OF ACRONYMS AFLC Acute food and livelihood crisis BFI Borderline food insecure BCP Business continuity plan CAP Consolidated Appeal Process CBO Community-based organization CP Cooperating partner CSB Corn-soya blend Deyr Minor rains - typically between September to November EDP Extended delivery point EMOP Emergency operation ESF Emergency school feeding FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FDP Final distribution point FEWS-NET Famine Early-Warning System Network FFT Food for training FFW/A Food for work and assets FSAU Food Security Analysis Unit - Somalia GAM Global acute malnutrition GDP Gross domestic product GFD General food distribution GFI Generally food insecure Gu Major rains - typically April to July HE Humanitarian emergency HF High frequency HIV / AIDS Human immunodeficiency virus / acquired immune deficiency syndrome IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee IDPs Internally displaced people LIFDC Low-income food-deficit country LTSH Landside transport, storage and handling MCHN Mother-and-child health and nutrition MUAC Mid-upper arm circumference MOSS Minimum operating security standards NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non governmental organization PDM Post-distribution monitoring PLHIV People living with HIV PRRO Protracted relief and recovery operation RRU Rapid response unit RUSF Ready-to-use supplementary food SAM Severe acute malnutrition SFP Supplementary feeding programme SO Strategic Objective SSAFE Safer and Secure Access to Field Environment (for Somalia) TB Tuberculosis TFG Transitional Federal Government UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNDSS United Nations Department of Safety and Security UNHAS United Nations Humanitarian Air Services UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNTP United Nations Transition Plan VHF Very high-frequency WHO World Health Organization

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Annex 3: Summary of Log Frame: Somalia EMOP 10812.0 Food Aid for Emergency Relief and Protection of Livelihoods in Somalia

Results-Chain (Logic Model) Performance Indicators Risks, Assumptions

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1: SAVE LIVES AND PROTECT LIVELIHOODS IN EMERGENCIESGoal 1: To save lives in emergencies and reduce acute malnutrition caused by shocks to below emergency levels.Goal 2: To protect livelihoods and enhance self-reliance in emergencies and early recovery.Goal 3: To reach refugees, internally displaced persons and other vulnerable groups and communities whose food and nutrition security has been adverselyaffected by shocks.Main tools: General food distribution, emergency nutrition assistance and emergency school feeding.Outcome 1.1

Reduced acute malnutrition in children under 5 in targeted,emergency-affected populations in Somalia (throughgeneral food assistance, supplementary feeding andmother-and-child health and nutrition programmes).

� Prevalence of acute malnutritionamong children under 5 (weight-for-height as percent) =<15 percent.

� >70 percent of moderatelymalnourished children admitted intoSFP cured.

� <3 percent of moderatelymalnourished children admitted intoSFP dead.

� <15 percent of moderatelymalnourished children admitted intoSFP default.

Outcome 1.2

Improved food consumption over assistance period fortargeted emergency-affected households (through motherchild health and nutrition programme and emergencyschool feeding).

� Household food consumptionscore.38

Armed conflicts or natural disasters do not furtherdisrupt food production and consumption.No outbreaks of further epidemic diseases (e.g.measles, cholera, avian flu etc.)Complementary non-food inputs such as water andsanitation provided by partners.Adequate number of qualified and motivated nutritionand health workers available.Basic nutritional and health facilities are availableand accessible to all targeted beneficiaries.Security situation will allow WFP and partners toimplement activities and monitor their effectiveness.

38 Target for household food consumption score to be added following completion of baseline survey

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Results-Chain (Logic Model) Performance Indicators Risks, Assumptions

Output 1.1

Food distributed in sufficient quantity and quality totargeted women, men, girls and boys under secureconditions.

� Number of women, men, girls andboys receiving food, by activity typeand as percent of planned (GFD:2,871,500; MCHN: 365,000, SFP:109,500; ESF onsite: 93,000; ESFTHR: 37,000).

� Tonnage of food distributed, by type,in mt and as percent of planneddistribution (GFD: 432,615; MCHN:37,712; SFP: 7,782; ESF: 6,394).

� Quantity of ready-to-usesupplementary food distributed in mtand as percent of planneddistribution (SFP: 1,544).

� Quantity of fortified food (CSB)distributed in mt and as percent ofplanned distribution (mt) (GFD:53,016; MCHN: 32,850; SFP: 5,434;ESF: 1,163).

� Number of security incidents duringfood distribution.39

� Number of schools assisted by WFP.� Number of feeding days in schools.

Security situation will allow WFP to expand itsnutrition programme and reach the most vulnerable,transport the food commodities and distribute totarget beneficiaries.WFP will have access to most parts of Somalia..Adequate number of appropriate partners available.Qualified staff willing to work for WFP Somalia.Food commodities available without major pipelinebreaks.

39 Number of security incidents to be compiled by WFP headquarters based on incident reports sent routinely by CO

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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3: RESTORE AND REBUILD LIVES AND LIVELIHOODS IN POST-CONFLICT, POST-DISASTER ORTRANSITION SITUATIONS

Goal 1: To support the return of refugees and IDPs through food and nutrition assistance.Goal 2: To support the re-establishment of the livelihoods and food and nutrition security of communities and families affected by shocks.Main tools: Food for work and assets, food for training, institutional feeding (TB, HIV/AIDS, orphanages, hospitals).

Outcome 3.1

Adequate food consumption over assistance period fortargeted households and communities (through food forwork and assets, food for training, institutional feeding).

� Household food consumptionscore.40

Armed conflicts or natural disasters do not furtherdisrupt food production and consumption.Basic nutritional and health facilities are availableand accessible to all targeted beneficiaries.Security situation will allow partners to implement,beneficiaries to participate and WFP to monitor theimplementation and effectiveness of the activities.

Output 3.1

Food distributed in sufficient quantity and quality totargeted women, men, girls and boys.

� Number of women, men, girls andboys receiving food, by activity typeand as percent of planned (FFW/A &FFT: 65,000, Institutional Feeding:25,000).

� Tonnage of food distributed, by typein mt and as percent of planneddistribution (FFW/A & FFT: 13,260;Institutional Feeding: 5,258).

� Quantity of fortified food (CSB)distributed in mt and as percent ofplanned distribution (FW/A & FFT:1,625; Institutional Feeding: 900).

Security situation will allow the United Nations tohave access to most parts of Somalia, and smoothtransportation and distribution of food to targetbeneficiaries.Adequate number of appropriate partners availableQualified staff willing to work for WFP Somalia.Food commodities available without major pipelinebreaks.Non food items available in sufficient quantity andquality.

40 Target for household food consumption score to be added following completion of baseline survey

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Output 3.2

Developed, built or restored livelihood assets by targetedcommunities.

� 46 community assets created orrestored (39 soil and waterconservation structures, 3 roads, 2irrigation canals and 2 farmrehabilitation projects) by targetedcommunities and individuals.

� 2,925 women and men trained inlivelihood-support income-generating activities.

Target communities willing to participate in assetcreation.Security situation will allow the United Nations tohave access to most parts of Somalia, and smoothtransportation and distribution of food to targetbeneficiaries.Adequate number of appropriate partners available.Qualified staff willing to work for WFP Somalia.Food commodities available without major pipelinebreaks.