Solmsen, Friedrich_Anaximander's Infinite. Traces and Influences_1962_AGPh, 44, 2, Pp. 109-131

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A N A X I M A N D E R ' S I N F I N I T E : TR G ES A N D I N F L U E N C E S

by FRIEDRICH S O L M S E N

The Third Book of Aristotle's Physics embodies bis doctrine ofthe Infinite1. A s so often in this work, b is own views emerge gra-dually from an examination of the opinions advanced b y bis pre-decessors. He tries to be fair and understanding. The Presocratics

had good reasons for introducing th e apeiron into ph y sicalthought,and there is something ευλογον even about the tendency to treatit s a principle ( αρχή)2 . For if it were not given this place, difficul-ties would arise: some other entity would have to serve s prin-ciple for the Infinite, and this would lead to the absurd conceptionof an Infinite that has an αρχή and a πέρας, i. e. limits. Therefore,καθάττερ λέγομεν, ου ταύτης αρχή, αλλ* αυτή των άλλων είναιδοκεΐ και περιέχειν άπαντα και πάντα κυβερ νά ν , ως φασιν όσοι μη

ποιουσιν παρά το ά π ε ι ρ ο ν αλλάς αιτίας, οϊον νουν ή φιλία ν3

. It willbe well to put here also the immediately following sentences w hichbring this train of thought to an end: και τουτ' είναι το θ ε ί ο ν(seil, δοκεΐ) 'άθάνατον γαρ και άνώλεθρον, ώσπερ φησίν Αναξίμαν-δ ρ ο ς και οί πλείστοι των φυσιολόγων.

In the clauses beginning with όσοι and ώσπερ Aristotle givesindications regarding the authors or Sponsors of these thoughts.The only individual thinker mentioned by name is Anaximander.

He would to Aristotle's mind be a good spokesman of those whoinvested th e Infinite with th e august character of an α ρ χή 4 . It willnevertheless be necessary to ask whether Aristotle here presentsexcerpts from Anaximander's treatise or whether he has produceda kind of cento from the works of different physicists5.1Seeesp. Phys. III, 4—8.2 III , 4.202b36—203bl5. Besides the physicists proper Aristotle also includes

the Pythagoreans and Plato in this survey of opinions. εύλόγω$ δ ε κ σ ΐ αρχήν αυτό

τιθέασι πάντες 203b4.3 203blOff .4 Cf. THEOPHRASTUS in DIELS-KRANZ, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (9th ed .

Berlin 1960) 12A9 and 9a.6 Strong arguments for the intrinsic unity and authenticity of this sequenco

of thoughts are given by WERNER JAEGER, The Theology of the Early Greck Philoso-

phers, Oxford 1947, 19ff. an d CHARLES H . K A H N , Festschrift Ernst Kapp , H a m b u r g1958, 19ff,

8 Arch. Gesch. Philosophie Dd. 44

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110 Friedr ich Solmsen

W o shall not lose sight of this question.But it seems better firstto t u r n to another passage in Book III where Aristotle, againprcscnl ing Sta tement s celebrating the άπειρον, includes an item

which is absent from the former passage. This second passage isfouiui at a j unc tu re where the analysis of the concept and thecri t ical discussion with the earlier thinkers have been carried m u c hfartlier, and it is in a critical spirit that Aristotle now returns tothose who have made such 'solemn' Statements about the άπειρον.H e has jus t shownhow wrongit would be to identify, or in any wayt o associate, the concept of the Infinite with that of the "whole"(το όλον) 6. The whole must have form and boundary, a τ τ έ ρ α ς .Y et such an erroneous identification of the whole and the Infiniteunderlies, in Aristotle's opinion, some of the early speculations aboutthe άπειρον and has inspired some descriptions of it: έντευ θέ νγελαμβάνουσι την σεμνότητα κοττά του απείρου, το πάντα περιέχειν καιτο παν εν έαυτω έ χ ε ι ν, δια το έ χ ε ι ν τινά ομοιότητα τω δλω7. InAristotle's own view the άπειρον is nothing to be solemn about. Itis "unknowable" (άγνωστοv), and it has more in common withmatter than with f o r m ; και ου π ε ρ ι έ χ ε ι , άλλα περιέχεται f j άπειρον8.Το the end of the chapter (6) he goes on exposing the fallacies in-volved in the identification of άπειρον and όλον (or το παν).

The earlier passage furnishes us with the words περιέχειν άπαντακαι πάντα κυβερνάν. Here we find (το) πάντα περιέχειν και (το) πανεν έαυτω Ιχειν. The two cola of the later passage are clearly intendedto illustrate the solemnity which Aristotle considers unwarranted.But it can hardly be denied that the descriptions of the άπειρονincluded in the earlier passage are just s solemn — if πάνταπεριέχειν is solemn now it must be solemn also in the other chapter,

and nobody would wish to maintain that to treat the Infinite sαρχή, to speak of it s αθάνατοv and άνώλεθρον, or to say that itπάντα κυβερνά is less solemn than the phrase common to bothpassages. The earlier passage has its very definite ethos and at-mosphere; by a momentary evocation Aristotle here brings themback. By now it seems possible-perhaps even likely-that one earlythinker was particularly enthusiastic about the άπειρον and thatit is he from whom Aristotle quotes on both occasions.

6 6.206b33ff . ; esp. 207a8ff .7

Ibid. a l S f f . The δια clause explains the εντεύθεν. We need more than acomma before έ π ε ί (18) and less than a period before ou (17).

8 a21, 24f.






Anaximander's Infinite: Traces and Influences Hl

However we must examine the second passage somewhat moreclosely. Of the two το the former evidently has the function of adouble colon or a quotation mark; the second must either have the

same function or be the article of παν. Some manuscripts of thePhysics—including the best and presumably oldes t—omit thewordsκαι το παν εν έαυτφ έ χ ε ι ν 9. But this omission is obviously due to thehomoeoteleuton and there can be no serious doubt that the phrase isa part of Aristotle's text. Still it is well bear in mind that not allmanuscripts are present to attest the wording of this clause. Ifwe find an alternative wording, this will not have to contend withthe unanimous testimony of all manuscripts.

The alternative wording may seem to diverge only in minutiaebut s there is now some hope that we may here recover the authen-tic words of one of the earliest thinkers we surely need not apolo-gize for pondering every syllable. Simplicius10, paraphrasingAristotle's argument and following him into his exposure of themistaken identification, writes και ουτω$ λοιπόν τα τω δλω υπάρ-χοντα του απείρου κατηγοροϋσι, το περιέχειν πάντα και πάνταε ν έαυτω εχει ν . Themistius11 too reproduces the thought of ourpassage: ήδη και σεμνύνουσι το άπειρ ο ν , α τω δλω προσήκει καιτω παντι ταύτα επί το άπειρον μεταφέροντες, το πάντα περιέχεινκαι το πάντα εχει ν εν έαυτω. The sequence of the relevant words inboth commentators suggests that they may take a certain liberty;yet we must not therefore regard it s immaterial that both haveπάντα where the available manuscripts of Aristotle have παν orτο παν12.

Let us apply the 'pragmatic test' to πάντα and see how it worksout. Accepting πάντα, we are in a position to reconstruct a sentenceof which the άπειρον would be the logical or the grammatical sub-ject and which would run s follows: (α )πάντα ε ν έαυτω έ χ ε ι και

9 The words are lacking in E and V. On the value of E (= Par.gr. 1853, saec.

X. ineuntis) see W. D. ROSS, Aristotle's Physics, Oxford 1936, 113ff. ("specialimportance" s "sole representative of one family"). I should mention, althoughI would not make too much of it, that there are instances in which E (or V) alonc

agrees with an ancient commentator (see ibid. 103f f . ) .10Comm. in Arist. Graeca IX ad loc. (502, 2 7 f f . ) .

11Ibid. V (95.12ff.). The third commentator, Philoponus, offers nothing that is

relevant.12 If the second το in Aristotle's text were to be the article we could regard the

first s introducing the entire quotation and there would be a presumption thatthe clauses were continuous in the original text. But possibilities of haplographiaand haplologia would also enter into the question.

8*






]\2 Friedrich Solmscn

(ά)τταντα π ε ρ ι έ χ ε ι κ α ΐ (ά)τταντα κυβερνςί. What better result couldw o vv i s h ? The recons t ruc ted sentence i s a perfect tricolon, aperfec t c l imax , and probably also a perfect description of the

άπειρο ν si

t wasconceived

by Anax imander .Kirk

andRaven,

\ v h i l i ! t h i n k i n g i t possible that Aristotle combined τ τ ε ρ ι έ χ ε ι ν άττανταand ττάντα κ υ β ε ρ ν ά ν from different sources, admit neverthelesst h a t "the w h o l e phrase may form a single rhythmical unit"13. Ift h i s could be said w h i l e only tw o members of the period werek n o w n it s h o u l d be evident that the sentence s it now Standsfo rms a rhythmical or stylistic unit - s well s a unit of thought14.

Tliere is one diff icul ty. Two of our cola, πάντα π ε ρ ι έ χ ε ι andπάντα εν έαυτω έ χ ε ι strike the modern reader s tautological. Thism ay well be the reason why the tricolon has never yet been recon-s t ructed and why in particular Anaximander's paternity has neverbeen considered for the colon πάντα ε ν έαυτω έ χ ε ι . Α tricolon tw oof w h o s e members are identical in meaning would exhibit a climaxof dubious honesty. In the prose of the earliest thikers we do notexpect to find stylistic tricks or redundancy of expression. Are wethen to dismiss the idea of a tricolon and rather suppose that theauthor, perhaps resuming a point he had made previously, phrased

h is thought differently on the later occasion?In truth πάντα εν έαυτω έ χ ε ι v and πάντα π ε ρ ι έ χ ε ι ν are not two

alternative ways of expressing the same idea. περιέχειν means morethan to "include in oneself". The dictionary15 offers us a largechoice of meanings: encompass, embrace, surround, comprise,comprehend, surpass, excell, overcome, protect. Each of these verbssuggests more than the physical presence of one entity withinanother. Vlastos16 has taught us to regard Parmenides' άμφι$

13 G. S. K I R K and C. E. R A V E N , The Presocr. Philosophers, Cambridge 1957, 115.14 I prefer the climactic arrangement of the three cola, although it would not be

unthinkable that Anaximander chose the anticlimactic sequence. Themistius andSimpl ic ius probably found ιτάντα in their Aristotelian text. By the rules of recensiow e s h ou l d be jus t i f ied to adopt πάντα for each of the three xlauses but άπαντα,even if not supported by recensio, deserves very serious consideration.

15 See esp. L I D D E L L and SCOTT s. v.16

Class. Phil. 42 (1947) 172 f f . and n. 153. He refers to P A R M . B 8.13 and 10.5—7.In his opinion περιέχειν s used by Anaximander implies a 'safeguarding'. In Anaxi-

menes B2 the verb is a synonym, or something very close to a synonym, of συγκρα-τεϊν. Serious reasons militate against the authenticity of this fragment; howeverK. R E I N H A R D T admits (Kosmos und Sympathie, Munich 1926, 209ff . ) that in a textreflecting Stoic thought we could expect συνέχειν rather than περιέχειν. The airof Anaximenes, being a successor of Anaximander's άπειρον (Vorsokr. 13A7), wouldlegitimately inherit th e περιέχειν. C f. J A E G E R , op. cit. 202 n.39 and 42.






Anaximander's Infinite: Traces and Influences 113

έ έ ρ γ ε ι ν s the equivalent of Anaximander's π ε ρ ι έ χ ε ι v: the formerexpression means "to hold the limits (πείρατα)" and thereby toexercize a control which, Vlastos argues, is a divine prerogative.

Physical and spatial connotations, while present in π ερ ιέχει ν , donot exhaust its content. The word indicates a control, aprecedence,a superiority. We shall presently see that later thinkers not onlypreserved these nuances of meaning but deveioped them and usedthem in establishing new relations between concepts. Π ε ρ ι έ χ ε ι ν ,we may now say, Stands half-way between εν έαυτω εχ ε ι ν andκυβερνάν, overlapping the former inasmuch s both mean "to con-tain" and the latter inasmuch s both entail the notion of control.

It would not be easy to find a better intermediary or mediator.When Aristotle says φαμέν το μεν π ε ρ ι έ χ ο ν του είδους είναι , το δε

περιεχόμενον τή$ Ολης17, he vindicates the precedence or axiologicalpriority of the π ε ρ ι έ χ ο ν over the περιεχόμενον. W e must of coursenot read this Aristotelian doctrine into Anaximander. My reasonfor referring to it is that it helps us to understand why Aristotlequotes π ερ ιέχε ι ν άπαντα along with πάντα κυβερνάν where he isanxious to illustr te the conception of the Infinite s an αρχή18.Here the first part of our tricolon could not have served his purpose.Conversely, in the later passage where he has to explain why somethinkers are prone to identify the Infinite with the whole, ενέαυτω εχ ε ι ν and π ερ ιέχε ι ν present themselves s the concepts appli-cable (or actually applied) to ^oth, whereas it would have beenpointless to quote πάντα κυβερ νά, since nobody would think of thewhole in the role of a helmsman. Thus it is reasonable to assume

that Aristotle on both occasions quotes from the same text, select-ing each time the items germane to the development of his ownargument.

The next point to be made is that the tricolon certainly does notlack σεμνότη$. If it reaches its climax in the clause πάντα κυβερ νά,no large step is needed to arrive from here at the predicate orpredicates by which the Infinite acquires divine Status. In poetryit was customary to describe the gods s steering or sitting on the

17De caelo IV , 4.312al2f.; cf. 3.310b7—10. Aristotle refers to the Infinite s

π ε ρ ι έ χ ο ν also de caelo III, 5.303t>12 and de gen. et corr . II, 5.332a25.18 It is probably not the π ε ρ ι έ χ ε ι ν but the πάντα π ε ρ ι έ χ ε ι ν which qualif ies some-

thing s αρχή; cf.Melaph. K I,1059b25ff.: (το 6v and το εν) μάλιστ' αν ύποληφθείηπ ε ρ ι έ χ ε ι ν τα δντα πάντα κ α ΐ μάλιστα άρχαΐ$ έ ο ι κ έ ν α ι δ ι α το είναι πρώτα τη φύσει .For π ε ρ ι έ χ ε ι ν s describing th e relation of the whole and its parts cf. PL. , Pann.

145b.






114 Fr iedr ich Solmscn

h c l m s m a n ' s b e n ch , and A n a x i m a n d e r ' s language was, s Theophra-s tus obscrvcd, ττοιητικώτερον19.

W o probably necd no longer worry about the possibility thatAris to t l c in the f irs t of our passages produced a cento of thoughtsan d q u o t a t i o n s taken f rom di f ferent earlier thinkers. Anaximanderis th e only philosopher whom he mentions by name and there aretfood reasons to doubt that any other Presocratic would speak insuch solemn words about the άπειρον. As far s we can form anopinion on the basis of the fragmentary mateiial, Anaximanderis the only thinker for whom the άπειρον itself was the enduring

and all-encompassing entity, the power in control of all that comest o pass in the Universe. Several later physicists accepted the con-cept of in f in i ty from him and gave it a place in their own accounts.But the place is never again the central and dominating one.InAnaximenes the quality of άπειρον attaches to the air, in Melissusto Being, in Empedocles to iheSphairos

20. Anaxagoras explains at

the beginningof his treatise in what sense he uses the word and towhat entities he applies it. By his time matters had become more

complicated inasmuch s a new variety of the Infinite, the infinitelysmall, had been brought into the discussion. We cannot here followup all these developments but think it appropriate to quote oneof Anaxagoras' Statements: και το γε περιέχον άπειρον εστί τοπλήθος21. This is a remarkable 'conversion' of Anaximander'soriginal proposition. In good philological language we may say thatthe άπειρον, instead of continuing to be the subject, comes to f inditself in the position of an adjective or predicate. I should of

course not press this observation to the point of maintaining that19 See A9. On the divinity of το άπειρον see J A E G E R , op. dt. 30f f . ; K A H N , loc.

dt. 19 n. 1. V LASTO S, Philos. Quart. (1952) 113 doubts that θείον (Phys. 203bl3)is Anaximander's word. It is possible that Aristotle here states the thought in hisown language. On άίδιο$ , αθάνατος, άνώλεθρο$ see now K A H N , Anaximander and the

History o f Greek Cosmology, New York 1960,43. I agree with Kahn that "at leastthe Homeric άγήρω$ must be his" (i.e. Anaximander's), although Hippolytus(All. 1; B2) is the only authority for it; but this would indeed be the minimum.Actually αθάνατος καΐ άγήρως is a Homeric combination; cf. L I E S E L O T T E S O L M S E N

in Lexikon des fr hgriech. Epos, G ttingen 1955, s. v. άγήρω$ ("immer mit άθάνατο$verbunden, au er HES. Theog. 955").

For κυβερνάν and words ofsimilar meaning in the poetsseeesp. E D U A R D F R A E N K E L ,Aeschylus' Agamemnon, Oxford 1950,2, 108ff. where many illustrations are pro-vided. Fraenkel accepts the ancient exegesis of δαιμόνων . . . σέλμα σεμνόν ήμένων(Α g. 182) s embodying the helmsman image. Note the word σεμνόν in this passage.

20 Vorsokr. 13A5.6.7 (1).9f.; 30A2ff.; 31B28.21

Ibid. 59Blf.; cf. B2.







after Anaximander it could never again be used s subject. Still,the trend of the development will be ciaer. In the later thinkers itwas entities other than the άπειρ οι that occupied the place of the

principle (to use this convenient term); those who believed ininfinity would either attach this concept to one of these otherentities or set up some other kind of relationship between theά π ε ι ρ ο ν and the pivotal ideas of their System.

In the later history of physical thought each of the predicatesthat figure in our tricolon was treated with the respect and care dueto a precious heirloom. In examining some phases of their later fatewe shall find ample support for our contention that for Greek

feeling there is a considerable difference between πάντα εν έαυ-τω εχειν and πάντα περιέχειν. For the κυβερνάν motif Aristotle inthe passage which forms our starting point gives us a very valuable'lead'22. When Empedocles and Anaxagoras introduced a 'movingcause' this cause took over the task of steering; ever after we mayhave to look to the movers for this function which Anaximander'sallpowerful deity combined with the two others.

Even when a Stoic argument (preserved in Cicero's de naturadeorum) leads us from the primae incoataeque naturae to the universanatura and having reached the latter declares its perfection:universam naturam nulla res potest impedire propterea quod omnis

naturas ipsa cohibet et continet2*, it would be rash to regard cohibere

and continere s mere Synonyms. However, it is not quite easyto decide which Greek word (or concept) is rendered by eachof the Latin verbs. Fortunately another Stoic argument (likewise

reported by Cicero) leaves even in its Latin Version no doubt s tothe meaning of its terms: mundus quoniam omnia complexus estneque est quicquam quod non insit in eo perfectus undique est

2*. The

'perfect' and divine entity must still legitimate itself s such byshowing that it fulfils the condition of πάντα εν έαυτω εχειν swell s of πάντα περιέχει ν25 . The Infinite has ceded its titles to theCosmos. Cosmic piety would not easily havecome to terms with an

22 203bl2.23 Cic., de nat. deor. II, 35.24

Ibid., 38. The thought is surrounded by arguments for which Chrysippus is

named s author.26 For κυβερνάν in Stoic though see C L E A N T H E S ' hymn (S/. V. F. 1.537.2). The

only fragment which shows the Aoyos in this role (CuRYS., ibid.3.390) has norelation to cosmology.






1]6 Friedrich Solmscn

"n l l -cncompass ing" I n f i n i t e . However it was not the Stoics butPla to and Aristotle who transfered th e titles.

In the Timacus this process is well u n d e r way. W e might expectt o f i n d ττάντα h e r e used with reference to the entire amount of thee l e m r n t s t h a t b u i l d u p Plato's Cosmos, and in the case of the πάνταεν έαυτω ε χ ε ι ν mot i f this expectation is in fac t borne out: τωνδε δη τεττάρων εν όλον εκαστον εϊληφεν ή του κόσμου σύστασηεκ γαρ πυρός παντός υδα/τός τε και αέρος κ αι γης συνέστησεναυτόν ό συνιστάς, μέρος ουδ / > ουδέ δύναμιν έξωθεν υπολιπών, τάδεδιαν οηθείς, πρώτον μεν ίνα όλον δτι μάλιστα ζωον τέλεον εκ τελέων

των μερών ε ϊ η , προς δετούτοις εν, . . ., έ τ ι δεϊν ' άγήροον καιάνοσο νή . . . 2 β . The passage also shows that the concept and the qualitiesof the 'wh o l e ' (το όλον) which Aristotle denies to the Infiniteassociate t h em s e l v es very readily with the C o s m o s27 . The principleof the l imit and the idea of boundaries — probably first se t up by the ·P y t h a gor e a ns in Opposition to the unlimi ted —have w o n a completevic tory even in cosmology28.

As we have already said, π ε ρ ι έ χ ε ι ν is a concept of less distinctly

or less exclusively physical connotations than εν έαυτω εχειν.Plato's Cosmos does 'embrace' everything, but since to 'embrace'is not the same s to 'contain', a separate — a n d entirely different —a r g u m e n t s needed to establish this thesis. This argument makesno reference to the total amount of the elements or of other materialcons t i tuen ts or ingredients of the world. Giving the π ε ρ ι έ χ ε ι ν motifa new turn, Plato asserts that the Cosmos s a living being embracesall other genera of living beings29. This thesis is proved with the

help of the model-copy (παράδειγμα-εικών) relationship betweenthe intelligible and the physical Cosmos. Anaximander had not yetknown of the relations obtaining between Forms and copies; norcan he have used the word γένος in its Platonic significance.

2 6 Tim. 3 2 c 5 f f . Note the twb last predicates. Anaximander probably called theάττειρο ν imageing (άγήρω$) and immortal; et above n. 19. Regarding his word f o rthe latter concept we suffer from an embarras de richesse — in this of all authors!Plato hesitates to call his Cosmos immortal (introducing the word άνοσος in place

of it ?). Aristotle's Cosmos has of course again both qualities (de caelo I, 3.270blf.ά ί δ ι ο$ and άγήρατο$ are found between other and less exalted words).

27 See above p. 110.28 The later Presocratics, unwilling to accept Parmenides' doctrines that the

v is bounded, had gone back to Anaximander's belief in Infinity. It is the moreimportant for Plato to show that the Cosmos contains everything.

29 See esp. 3 3 b 2 f f . , 39e5, and also 31a3ff. (however, εντό$ εαυτού εχειν 31al =εν έαυτω περιλάβων εχειν 30c8; cf. άπαντ' εν αυτω γένη . . . εχειν 41b8f.)·







Aristotle gives us in de caelo new proofs of the doctrine that theentire substance of all elements is contained in this Cosmos30.His proofs differ from Plato's in that they are based on charao

teristic properties of the elements, most notably on the connectionof each with its specific 'cosmic place'. However, to be precise,Aristotle works out his proofs not so much with reference to theκόσμος s to the ουρανός, and while it is true that he has the Cosmosin mind, it still is worth considering what he means by the wordουρανός. The chapters in question include a passage where Aristotlehimself distinguishes three meanings of ουρανός. The word, he hereexplains, is sometimes used s relating to the circumference of our

world and sometimes s relating to το συνεχές σώμα τη εσχάτηπεριφορά, i. e. to the entire celestial area extending s it does fromthe outermost circumference to the moon31. What concerns us isthe third meaning: ουρανός is also used of all that is within, andenclosed by, the heavenly circumference, in other words of theentire Cosmos. We must quote the decisive sentence of the thirddefinition: (ουρανός is) το περιεχόμενον σώμα υπό της εσχάτηςπεριφοράς 32 . It is of ουρανός in this sense — in the sense of Cosmos —that Aristotle now asserts and proves το όλον το υπό της εσχάτηςπεριεχόμενον περιφοράς εξ άπαντος ανάγκη συνεστάναι του φυσικούκαι αισθητού σώματος33. The sentence makes clear that it is theCosmos which consists of the entire physical material. Let ushowever also note that the sentence describes the Cosmos sπεριεχόμενον. Evidently the περιέχο ν or πάντα περιέχο ν must besomething different, and our sentence in fact specifies it s thecircumference of the world. Thus it emerges that while for Aristotle

the Cosmos πάντα ε ν έαυτώ έ χ ε ι , it is the circumference of it whichπάντα περιέχει.

What matters in particular is that Aristotle has separated thesetwo heirlooms and allotted them to different claimants. It wouldhowever not be wise to assume on the strength of this passage thathe could identify the περιέχο ν only with the outermost circum-ference of our world. He would probably not have been averse to

regarding his "first body" (the aelher) s encompassing every-80

De caelo I, 8 and esp. 9. For Aristotle, s for Plato, the proofs that our Cosmos"contains everything" establish at the same time the thesis that there is no otherCosmos besides ours. The section of special interest to us begins at I, 9.278b8.

81Ibid. 278bll—15, 16—18.

82Ibid. 19 f. The identy of ovpccvos with όλον and παν (20) is again notcworthy.

83Ibid. 21 f.






118 Friedrich Solmsen

t h i n g . In a c t u n l f ac t h c ncvc r uses this term of i t but only formula tesw h a t wo m i g h t considcr a corol lary of such a doctrine, namely that

l ho movement of tliis body encompasses ( π ε ρ ι έ χ ε ι ) all othercos in ic i no vo me n t s : (αυτή ή κίνησις) των άλλων πέρα$. το γαρτέλος των περιεχό ντω ν εστί, κ α ΐ αυτή τέλειος ούσα π ε ρ ι έ χ ε ι τά ςατελείς και τά ς έχουσας πέρας κ α ΐ παολαν . . . των μεν αΙτία τηςαρχής , των δε δεχόμενη την παολαν34. At any rate, the πάνταπεριέχο ν is for Aristotle not the Cosmos but a part or phase of it .In a ll pe r t i nen t passages he uses περιέχειν not, like Plato, withiv fe rence to classes or gener a but in a good physical or even spatial

sense. The Stoics seem to have returned to Plato's decision thatthe ' c on t a in ing ' s well s the 'encompassing' should be associatedw i t h th e Cosmos.

W e may add one more observation with regard to Aristotle. Atthe beginning of the Meteorologica he distinguishes between whatfor short we may call the inner Cosmos consisting of the fourelements or elementary strata (in the sequence fire, air, water,ear th ) and the outer Cosmos. The subject of this treatise will be

the inner Cosmos,yet Aristotle here at the beginning of the inquiryemphasizes that all physical processes that come to pass in it arecaused by the eternal movements of the outer Cosmos. The latterare the αρχή κινήσεως, the "first cause", and thus it can be saidthat the entire 'capacity' (δύναμις) of the inner Cosmos κυβερ-νάται εκείθεν35. Evidently, then, the power of κυβερνάν πάντα andthat of πάντα περιέχειν reside once more in the same entities, seil,the first body and its movements, and it is only the πάντα εν έαυτω

εχειν which must attach itself to the Cosmos s a whole.Plato does not use the word κυβερνάν in cosmological con-

texts36. Yet while the reappearance of Anaximander's words isundoubtedly a matter of considerable interest and significance, weneed not be altogether guided by them. We may be grateful toAristotle because on one occasion he employs the word κυβερνάν;

34De caelo II, 1.284a5ff. In the words not included in our quotation Aristotle

gives this movement of the first body the character of an αρχή; fo r to say of itthat it has neither αρχή nor -nipccs amounts to this (cf. again the Physics passage2 0 3 b 6 f f . ) .

35Meteor. I, 2.339a22f. (on δύναμη see H. D. P. LEE'S note ad loc., LOEB-

edition, London-Cambridge, Mass., 1952). Cf. also the Implementation of the ideain de gen. et corr. II, 10.

36 See however Phil. 28d8f. f o r the διοπ<υβερνδν of vo s and φρόνησις in thecosmology of earlier thinkers. Cf. also Polit. 272e4, Critias 109c2f.






Anaximander's Infinite: Traces and Inf luences 119

but we would after all even without the help of this passage beable to teil in which part ofbis physical world the power of direct-ing events is concentrated. Nor is it difficult to say which power

'steers' in Plato's Cosmos.The only entity that Plato would entrustwith this task is the world-soul. In the Laws he speaks ofitscosmicruie s a παιδαγωγεΐν37. There is a difference between παιδαγω-γεΐν and κυβερνάνbut it is essentially a difference of ethos (it wouldof course also be pertinent to say that the world-soul sconceivedby Plato directs cosmic events in ways formerly unknow n) . Platoneeds the world-soul, a non-physical reality, to keep the Cosmosunder control; he also, s we have seen, uses π ε ρ ι έ χ ε ι ν in a non-

physical sense. It is only in Aristotle that the three venerable capa-cities originally associated with the άπειρο ν become completelyabsorbed into the physical organization of the Cosmos38.

We now return to Aristotle's Physics. In the meantime we havelearned something about the place of the άπειρο ν in laterPre-socratic thought, and what we have learned suggests that Aristotleoverstated his case when in the passage from which he started hesays that all physicists posit the Infinite s αρχή 39 . He makes thesame assertion also earlier in that chapter, although he therequalifies it by affirming that the physicists — in fact again "allphysicists" — do not posit the Infinite s such "but provide a sub-stratum for it" (ύποτιθέασιν έτέραν φύσιν τω άπειρω), which meansthat they introduce fire, or air, or something eise in the role of aninfinite body40. Here he very probably means to include Anaxi-mander with the physicists who gave the Infinite a substratum41.If so, he again overstates his case but this time it is in the oppositedirection; for while in the other passage he imposes Anaximander 'sconception of αρχή upon the rest of the physicists, he here forcesAnaximander into conformity with the others. We must not allow

37Legg. X, 897b2; note also άγει 896e8 (897a5).

38 Even the arguments by which Aristotle proves that the Cosmos "containseverything" have a more distinctly 'physical' character than those used by Platofor the same purpose. (p. 116). Plato reconstructs a λογισμός of the Demiurgc,

assuming that he must have aimed at perfection and completeness, whercasAristotle operates with φνσικαΐ υποθέσεις regarding the natural places of the ele-ments.

™ III, 4. 203b4ff.40

Ibid. 203a3ff., 16 f f .41

Ibid. 18 οίον ύδωρ ή αέρα ή το μεταξύ τούτων (ύποτιθέασιν). In contex t sof this kind, the phrase μεταξύ τούτων is, s a ruie, a referencc to Anaximander ' sSystem. C f. the judic ious disquisition in K I R K - R A V E N , op. cif. ll f f .






120" Friedrich Solmsen

oursclves to bc i n f luenccd by thcse manipulations. Anaximander isan d r o m a i n s th c on ly physicist for whom the άπειρον s such w as

the pr inc ip lc and thc ccntral subject of physical thought.Tl i i s bc ing the Situat ion, it seems reasonable to ask whether

Ar is to l le does not also elsewhere in Book III look to Anaximanderfor descr ipt ions of the άπειρον. Every φασίν an d λέγουσιν of thesec hn p t t T s i nus t be scrutinized on the assumption that Anaximanderis 1 1 ic best, a i though not of course the only, candidate. This approachwill n ot yield results of mathematical certainty but in the caseo f a t h i n k e r s important — and a t the same time s poorly known—s A n a x i m a n d e r even possible additions to his scanty legacy are

worth recording.

T he following is a passage of the kind: συμβαίνει δε τουναντίονείναι άπειρον ή ως λέγουσιν ου γαρ ου μηδέν έξω , αλλ' ου αεί τιέ ξωτούτο άπειρον εστί ν42. Aristotle's own opinion, seil, that of theI n f i n i t e some part is always left 'beyond', rests on the principles ofi n f i n i t e division and infinite addition whose exposition he has justconcluded . It is the contrary of what "they say". What they say is

ev ident ly that there is μηδέν (or ουδέν) έ ξω του απείρου. Thisvvould strike us s a corollary of the Statement: (το άπειρον) πάνταεν έαυτω έ χ ε ι . Anaximander would have reasons for formulatingthe corollary and for excluding every possibility that anythingm i g h t enter the άπειρον f rom the outside, interfering with its pro-cesses and upsetting their mutual balance43. All οντά are withinthe i n f i n i t e body44. If Anaximander said that outside was μηδέν(or ουδέν ) , the ontological signif icance of his Statement would belatent rather than explicit; the word bearing emphasis would beμηδέν, while εστίν, being unnecessary, was probably omitted. Buta reader approaching Anaximander's treatise with an ontologicalbias could with perfect justification conclude ουδέν γα ρ εστίν ή

42 III, 6. 206b33f f . For a superficial Interpretation there might seem to be nod i f fe rence between λέγουσι here and two lines below where it means "people call"(Ross, op. dt. 368). It was not a fortunate thought to find in this popul r use or

misuse of language — a ring called άπειρον because in turning it you reach nodivision or end — a clue for Anaximander's idea. Not this language but the thoughti n t r o d u c e d by the former λέγουσι has a standing in the philosophical tradition.

43 Cf. VLASTOS, Class. Phil. 42 (1947) 172.44 The authenticity of the word οντά in Bl is not above doubt. I should agree

with J A K G E R , op. dt. 197.2 that it "in all probability reflects the true language ofthis early thinker".







εσται άλλο παρέξ του εοντο$45 and could call what is outside μη δν.Neither of these momentous departures involved materially theslightest modification of Anaximander's scheine. Even μηδέν

δ'ουκ εστίν46 could be deduced from what he had said, and in thisinstance too Parmenides merely changed the accents and thearticulation.

In this case too the Cosmos inherits the description of the In-finite. Plato's Demiurge is very careful to leave μέρος ουδέν ουδέδύναμιν έξωθεν of his Cosmos, and Aristotle, while needing noDemiurge, himself takes care to make sure ότι οΰτ' εστίν έξω οΰτ'έγχωρεΐ γενέσθαι σώματος oyxov ο υδε ν ός .47 The most effective way

of dismissing a venerable old conception is to present a new sready and qualified to serve in all its functions.

In Plato and in Aristotle the ο υδέν έξω and the πάντα εν έαυτωέ χ ε ι are so closely tied up with one another that it is difficult tosay which of them is the corollary of the other. The two proposi-tions are the obverse and the reverse of the same coin. Quite cer-tainly the idea that the Cosmos included everything was new,bold, revolutionary, and perhaps even paradoxical; who propounded

it had to make every effort to provide the strongest proofs notonly that nothing was, but even that nothing could be outside theboundary of the Cosmos. For many generations the opposite viewhad prevailed. But let us not therefore suppose that Anaximander'sSituation was essentially different. His thesis was no less new andno less daring; he too had every reason to make perfectly sure —and perfectly clear — that when he spoke of the άπειρον s "in-cluding everything" (or including "all that is") he meant to re-ject the possibility that anything at all could exist outside it48.We may feel inclined to suggest that if he had had a concept ofspace he could have made his point more easily by stating that

45 P A R M . (Vorsokr. 28) B8.37. Cf. LIDDELL and SCOTT s. v. παρέκ " s prep.1).. . outside ...2) besides, except." There was "nothing outside11 that could join—or interfere with — τα οντά; cf. Parm. B8.7, 12f.« P A R M . B6.2.47

For PLATO see Tim. 32c7ff . ; cf . 33c2,3,7 (on c6 see below p. 128). C O R N F O R D ' Scommentary shows that these early sections of Plato's cosmology embody manyvariations on Presocratic themes (Plato's Cosmology, London 1937, 53f f . ) · ForARISTOTLE se e de caelo I, 9.279a6,16 (the proofs which here come to an end re-peatedly make clear that no άπειρον is possible, e. g. 8 .277a20ff . ) · Cf.also Metaph.

Δ 4, 1022a4.48 Aristotle's arguments at 206b33 are directed not simply against a thoughi

but against a specific wording of this thought.






122 F r i e d r i c h Solmsen

Ihe cn t i r c space of Ihc Univcrse is occupicd by the άττειρον . Actu-al ly tho conccpt of spacc could not have served Anaximander's

pur pose ; bis conccrn was vvith "things", τα οντά.1 t would bc rash to deny that other Presocratics could use the

phrusc μηδέν ?ξω of the Inf in i te or of something that they con-sidered i n f in i t e (e. g. o f the παν). Since Aristotle in these chapterst onds to force other physicists into line with Anaximander,he maywell by an arbitrary Interpretation elicit from one or the other oft hem a view regarding the ά π ε ι ρ ο ν49 . Even so Anaximander'sckiinis remain the strongest. We may indulge in the experiment of

imagining what effect a Statement like μηδέν έξω αυτού wouldhav e in the accounts of, say, Melissus, Empedocles, or Anaxago-ras50. It would produce a jarring note. The reason for this is less.easy to define but we may try to approximate it. Once the con-cepts of the πάν and the άπειρονhad been 'grasped', it was point-less to state that the former included everything and that there wasnoth ing outside the latter. Without preliminary disquisitionsphilosophers could now focus upon το παν or τα πάντα. The έ ξω

would now be used of the Infinite itself s surrounding the Cosmos.and s seen from it51, and if a μηδένor μη δν required consideration—or rejection — it would be that which threatened to arise betweenthe πάντα: τοο παντό$ δ'ουδέν κενεόν πόθεν ο5ν τ ί κ' έπέλθοι;52.

At the end of chapter 4 Aristotle, wondering about the correctdefinition of the άπειρ ο ν , indicates several possibilities of connect-ing it with the 'intraversable' (το αδύνατον διεξελθεΐν, το άδιε-ξίτητον53. Here nothing suggests that he may be thinking of

definitions or descriptions advanced by others. Yet slightly later,while rejecting a view of the ά π ε ι ρ ο ν by which it would lose itsquantitative character and properties, he says: ούχ o rcos ούτεφασιν είναι οι φάσκοντε$ είναι το ά π ε ι ρ ο ν ούτε ήμεΐ$, αλλ' ώ$ άδιε-ξίτητον54. This opens up the possibility that in the early accountsthe Infinite was described s something that cannot be traversed.The possibility has a certain interest. In this instance it would

49

He does something of the sort with Anaxagoras at 5.205blff., and withMelissus at 6.207al5ff.50 MELISSUS Bl—7; EMP. B 17.32ff., 28; ANAXAG. Bl.51 Cf. ARCH Y TAS (Vorsokr. 47) A24.δ2 EMP. B14. Cf. MELISSUS B7.7.63 III, 4.204a2f f . LIDDELL and SCOTT fail to list 'intraversable' s the basic.

meaning of άδιεξίτητον.64 5 .204 a 9 f f . , esp. 13f.







obyiously be fu t e to look for anything similar in Plato's andAristotle's conception of the Cosmos; for with or without spacetravel, the bounded Cosmos is in principle traversable55. But thereare fascinating perspectives in the opposite direction — the con-cept of an άδιεξίτητον would throw light on Anaximander's debtto earlier speculation. A cosmological section of Hesiod's Theogony

presents a vision of the huge chasm which holds the "springs" andthe "boundaries" of heaven, earth, sea, and Tartarus. Describingthis chasm, the poet says: ουδέ κε πάντα τελεσφόρον ε ί $ ένιαυτόνοΟδα$ ΐκοιτ' ει πρώτα πνλέων εντοσθε γένοιτο56. Here is the ά δ ι ε -ξίτητον, at least in one of Aristotle's definitions: δ μόγις (διέξ οδ ο νέ χ ε ι ) 5 7 . Some of us have, even without using Aristotle s witnessfor the άδιεξίτητον motif, been inclined to look upon this passages an antecedent of Anaximander's άπειρ ο ν58 . Ι should not find

it difficult to believe that Anaximander, besides offering for hisάπειρον definitions of great speculative significance and of corre-sponding importance for the fu ture of physical thought, applied toit also designations of a less sophisticated kind, preserving ideasthat had originated in the Imagination of the poets. This ima-

55 The reappearance of the άδιεξίτητον motif in Zeno's paradoxes would ofcourse be noteworthy (Vorsokr. 29A25, 26 ? ) . On the other hand, it is not impossiblethat Aristotle at 204al3 has Zeno, rather than Anaximander or anyone eise, inmind. Our uncertainty is increased by the fact that άδιεξίτητον serves Aristotlehere s a kind of common denominator for his own definitions (a2ff.) and the viewsheld by the Champions of the άπειρον. If it were not for the possible links withearlier cosmological speculation, the passage could hardly be presented fo r serious

consideration.66Theog. 736ff . , esp. 740f .

67 204a5.58 I advanced this opinion in Stud. It. di filol. 24 (1950) 235ff. Seealso H E R M A N N

FR N K E L , Dichtung un d Philos. des fr hen Griechentums, N ew York 1951, 145;V L A ST O S , G nom on 27 (1955) 74. The hypothesis bas been questioned by G. S. K I R K ,Proc. Cambr. Philol. Soc. 18 4 (new ser. 4) 10 f f . Kirk may well be right in denyingHesiod's authorship of the passage and it is certainly true that the cosmologyofthese sections is not s logically consistent or s satisfactory s the doctrinesincorporated in the account of a physicist. Yet I do not see w hy this should be

fatal to my hypothesis. There is one point on which I disagree with Kirk. In m yopinion he insists too rigidly on distinguishing between πηγή "in the metaphoricalsense of origin" and a πηγή which only "feeds" but does not produceand which,therefore, should on no account be = γένεσι$. Surcly , so obvious a "metaphor"cannot be ruled out for the early period (note πηγή = γενέτωρ, X E N O P H . B30,

1.5D.-K).In any case, Aristotle's equation of the άπειρο ν with the άδιε ξίτητον shows how

closely the two conccpts were associated for Grcek fecling.







has been argued that Anaximander would not need the άπ ειρ ο υ ssource of supply for γένεση because bis scheine provided for abalance between production and destruction so that γένεση would

receive enough 'material' from φθ ορά6 4

. In other words, th e ar-gument which Aristotle later in Book III plays off against this'reason' (πίστις) would in essence be famili r already to Anaxi-mander: ούτε γαρ ϊνα ή γένεσις μη έ π ι λ ε ί τ τ η , άναγκαϊον ενεργείαά π ε ι ρ ο ν είναι σώμα αισθητό ν. ενδέχεται γαρ την θατέρου φθορά νθατέρου είναι γένεσιν, πεπερασμένου όντο$ του παντός65. That sucha balance operates in Anaximander's System is certainly true andthat this fact prima fade militates against attributing to him the

reason ίνα ή γένεση μη έπιλείπη must also be admitted. But weneed not therefore dismiss Aristotle's physical πίστις. It wouldsuffice to suppose that Aristotle understood the cessation ofγένεσις too literally and with too exclusive reference to the material.What the source of motion provides is not necessarily new material.This task is hardly in keeping with its nature. 'Steering' andfeeding are entirely different occupations. γένεσις would definitely—and most drastically — come to an end if the World-Soul ceased to

operate (the proof in the Phaedrus66

leaves no doubt about this) ,and yet it is not at all by providing new material that this soulpreserves the continuity of γένεσις.

What Plato says of his World-Soul would be true of all 'movingcauses\ There would be no γένεση without Strife and Love, nonewithout vo s, and none without the first heavenly movement ormovements of Aristotle's scheine67. Anaxagoras actually des-cribed an initial condition of rest s prevailing before the Operation

of his vo s, the principle which moves and by moving causes theformation of all things68. As a rule, and especially in the later Pre-socratics, the movements that are caused by the αρχή and thatproduce the physical entities are σύγκριση and διάκρισι$. We neednot project these specific processes back into Anaximander but I

64 Cf. esp. CHERNISS, Aristotle's Criticism of Presocr. Philos., Baltimore 1935,376 (W . K R A U S , Rh. Mus. 93 (1950) 366ff. raises similar objections).

65 III, 8.208a9ff. The last four words reflect of course Aristotle's own cosmo-

logical position.66

Phaedr. 245c5ff . , esp. d7f f . C f. also Legg. X , 895a6ff.67 See esp. Vorsokr. 31B17, 26, 35; 59B12f f . ; ARIST . , de gen. et corr. II, 10,

esp. 336a 23f f . (a34 ανάγκη . . . αεί μεν τι κι νεισθαι , ϊνα μη έπιλείπωσι ν αύται α ϊ

μεταβολαί, seil, γένεση and φ θ ο ρά ) ."Vorsokr. 59B1; ARIST . , Phys. VIII, 1. 250b24ff . Cf. P L A T O , Legg. X , 8%a(>.See m y discussion Harv. Sind, in Class. PhiloL 63 (1958) 27 5f f .

9 Arch. Gesch. Philosophie 1kl. 44






126 Friedrich Solmscn

do not sce w h y \ve sl iould hesitate to th ink that the άπειρον toocauscd a n d proserved the etcrnal motions which make the worlds

and every th ing in theni arise and pass away. It is hardly possibleto stcer w i t h o u t producing movements. Doxographic accountsderivod from Theophrastus actually ascribe an eternal motion toAn ax i man de r ' s άπειρο ν6 9. I should accept their Statements ssubstant ia l ly correct, at least in the sense that the Contents of theοπτειρον are in constant motion — this is not the same s to be-lievc that the άπ ειρον itself, and s a whole, per forms a movement,like locomotion or rotation70.

The World-Soul of the Phaedms is, like Anaximander's άπειρον,άγένητον και άνώλεθρον. Both are τοις άλλοι$ δσα κινείται αρχήκαι πηγή κινήσεως71 (πηγή may easily have been Anaximander's"more poetic" word which he used side by side with αρχή)72.Plato's point is that the soul, being a self-mover, is the best αρχήκινήσεως; yet the Inf ini te too might well have to be considered san υφ' αυτού κινούμενον. A fur ther item probably common to bothis the thought that without this principle everything would come to

a standstill, there being nothing όθεν κινηθέντα γενήσεται

73

. (Ana-ximander is unlikely to have used these words but in his Systemtoo nothing could come to be without the eternal movement inthe άπειρον).

It is tempting to carry the comparison between Plato's proof forthe World-Soul and Anaximander farther or to reconstruct some-thing like an archetype of Melissus', Plato's, and Aristotle's argu-ments that the principle cannot have come into being and cannot

pass away becauseit can have neither αρχήnor τέλος. The idea which

69 S I M P L in Phys. 41.17 Diels (άπειρον τίνα φύσιν ... ης την cdSiov κίνησιναίτίαν εϊναι τή$ των ουρανών γενέσεως) and in Vorsokr. 12Α9, 9a; H I P P O L . ibid.

All. 2. ARIST. , Phys. VIII, 1.250bl8 almost certainly refers also to Anaximander.70 Changing and steering are hardly possible without causing local motioa,

and I should adhere to this meaning of κίνησι$ also for Anaximander, althoughUvo K LSCHER (Hermes 81 (1953) 260 f f . ; 268) has reminded us that the wordcomprehends a variety of changes. Another question is whether Anaximander

specified any kind of 'mechanisrn' by which the άττειρον produces the processeswithin itself. I see neither a possibility nor indeed a need of reconstructing any-thing of the kind and should be perfectly willing to acquiesce in the wise con-clusions reached by K I R K and R A V E N , op. dt. 128.

71Phaedr. 245c9.

72 Cf. again H ES IO D , Theog. 738.73

Phaedr.245d7 (el).







underlies such attempts74 is probably sound. But I doubt whetherwe can do much more than state the probability that Anaximan-der's treatise included the archetype — or prototype — of thesearguments. Plato "refines" everything that he accepts. The reasonwhy he accepts so much is not simply that Anaximander's άπειρονwas an αρχή but that it was, like the World-Soul, an αρχή κινή-σεως. Still it is well to emphasize that for Anaximander the prin-ciple which causes or encompasses all movements is identical withthe πάντα εν έαυτω έχον. Anyone more famili r with Systems inwhich these principles were distinct might therefore be liable toerror when deciding how and why the Infinite ensured the con-tinuity of Becoming. If we are right in charging Aristotle with amistake of Interpretation he would have this excuse.

How completely and beautifully consistent an emphasis on thesource of motion is with the conception of immanent balance maybe learnt from the Timaeus. Movement and γένεση in the Cosmoswould, s Plato here points out, long ago have come to an end ifthere were no κινήσον75. In this context Plato finds the moving

force in the pressure exerted by the revolving circumference ofthe world: ή του παντός περίοδος . . . σφίγγει πάντα και κενήνχωράν ουδεμίαν έ α λείπεσθαι76. The pressure produces the move-ments άνω κάτω which in turn cause a constant regrouping andre-formation of the cosmic entities. Cherniss has acutely observedthat the revolution of the cosmic circumference is itself a mani-

74 See esp. K A R L R E I N H A R D T , Verm chtnis der Antike, G ttingen 1960, 255f .

and K A H N , Festschrift (see note 5) 23 f. Kahn may be right in holding that Aristotle'stext is closest to the Original·; for it is possible that Aristotle already 203b6 (or 7)begins to 'report' whereas the two others have the intention of doing better thanAnaximander. The argumentation of all three passages has a markedly 'conceptual·character which may strike us s post-Parmenidean but it is perhaps better not toyield to this impression and not to deny that Anaximander could argue in termsof αρχή and τέλο$ (or, rather, πέρα$, πεΐρα$). I should however allow for the possi-bility that his argument proceeded in a direction somewhat different from that ofthe later texts. After all he had to establish the idea of an άπειρον and may have

done so by arguing that nothing that had a beginning and an end could be the ever-lasting principle of things; what is needed is something without αρχή and πείρας,ergo an άπειρον which is αρχή and πείρας for everything eise. This thought, besidesbeing the prototype of our three texts, would also bring us close to ARIST., de caclo

II , 1.284.7—11 which may well include echoes of Anaximander's argument.

™ Tim. 58a2ff. ; 57e3.76

Tim. 58a4ff. Cf. F. M. C O R N F O R D ' S commcnts, Plato's Cosmology , London,1937, N ew York 1957, 242 f f .

8*






J 28 Friedr ich Solmscn

f c s l a t i o n o f t l i c world s o u l 7 7 . W i t h o u t the soul a n d w i t h o u t thisf i r s t co smic m o v c m e n t thc re would be no γένεσις. Yet Plato's

Cosn io s c o r t a i n l y h s i ts i m m a n e n t balance. Plato ha s done rela-t i v c l y l i t t l e to explain ho w it is maintained but he af f i rms itsOpe-r a t i o n , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y with th e 'autarky' o f t he Cosmos , a t theb c g i n n i n g o f his account78: οαττ|ει τε γαρ ο υδέ ν ουδέ ττροσήει ναντω ττοθεν — ουδέ γαρ ην αυτό γαρ Ιαυτω τροφήν την εαυτούφθίσιν τταρέχο ν κ α ΐ ττάντα ε ν έαυτω κ α ΐ υφ' εαυτού ιτάσχον κα ιδρών εκ τέχνης γέγονε; Anaximander's άπ ειρ ο ν was no t εκ τέχνη5,n o r had it come into being (γέγονε). 'Food' and 'waste' are not

l ikely to have been the terms by which he conveyed his belief inbalance, and whether he employed the pair δραν and πάσχειν mayalso be considered open to doubt. Both pairs of concepts, δραν —πάσχει ν and τροφή — φΟίσι$, are new ways of expressing what heexpressed by setting δίκη and τίσι$ against αδικία 79. Plato hereeschews words that have moral connotations. One of his pairs ismore abstract, the other more physical than the words attested forAnaximander. But it is only the philosophical language which has

become modernized. The original idea is fa i thfu l ly preserved.77

Anstaue*s Criticism of Plato and the Academy, Baltimore 1944, 448f f .78

Tim. 33c6ff.79

Vorsokr. 12B1.






Appendix

^ have become aware of the possibility that Aristotle's eternalκίνησι$, which causes and "receives" the other cosmic m ovem ents (orchanges), preserves a pattern that originated with Anaximander. Atde caelo II, 1.284a 9 Aristotle calls this basic movement άπαυστος τονάπειρον χρόνον. The important role of time (χρόνος) in Anaximander'sscheme is famili r to us from his longest and most significant fragment(B 1). We also know that his άπειρον is eternal and "immortar. Itwould theref ore not be at all str nge if he applied the word άπειρον —or at any rate the concept — also to the time and duration of his Infinite.To convey this idea he may have spoken of an άπειρος χρόνος. Yet hecould also employ another word. In a doxographic account ultimatelyderived from Theophrastus80 (Tlutarch', Stromata 2) we read thatAnaximander άπεφήνατο την φθοράν γίγνεσθαι και πολύπρότερον τηνγένεσιν εξ απείρου αιώνος ανακυκλουμένων πάντων αυτών. Thewordαιών would be ideally suited to Anaximander's purpose. Festugiere81 hasshown that αιών — a poetic word — originally means "life" and that itacquires the meaning "eternity" when the early philosophers use it in

connection with enities whose "life" is in their scheme eternal. Festugierehimself mentions "monde" and "ciel" s instances of such entities. ItStands to reason that Anaximander's Infinite would be no less good anIllustration, if not indeed a better one; for there are not many earlyphysicists who regard the Cosmos or the Heaven s eternal82. And weneed not even think that what made Anaximander prefer the word αιώνwas his penchant for "poetic words". Rather, since the άπειρον was forhim alive and divine, αίών would be a perfectly appropriate word forthe life of his deity. The relation between this αιών of the Infinite andthe χρόνος operating in the cosmological scheme could again be definedby the verb περιέχειν. When Aristotle d e caelo I, 9.279a28ff . , after areference to the "ancients", who introduced the word αιών, defines its τον πάντα χρόνον καΐ την άπειρίαν περιέχον he maywell be inter-

preting and reviving an important idea of Anaximander83.

80 See Doxogmphi Graeci 132f.DIELS (Vorsokr. 12A10).81

Paro l a d e l passato 4 (1949) 172f f . , 176.82 Heraclitus is the first to come to mind and perhaps the only one about whom

we may be positive. It is not certain in what meaning he uses the word αΙών inB52. Recent Interpreters seem to favor the meaning "l i fe" (Κικκ, Heraclili^,

Cambridge 1954, XIII; "Lebenszeit", K R A N Z in Vorsokratiker), which makes mewonder how life can be visualized s a "king".

83 ARISTOTLE, ibid. (23) refers also to the other meaning ("life") of the wordand explains how it could be transferred to the eternal dura t ion of the Cosmos. At d ecae lo II, 1.283b28 he actually uses αΙών in the meaning of "life".






l 30 Λ p p cn d i χ

ITowcve r , αΙών by i t sc l f wou ld l i a rd ly ye t fo r Anaximander mean"ctcrnity" o r "cternal l i f e " . TJi is meaning wou ld result f rom i t s being

conplocl w i t h the r i gh t ad jec t i ve , and it is possible that the doxographico r p h i l o s o p h i c t r a d i t i o n has p r c s e rved this qua l i fye r . In the Stromataw e l u ive found άπειρος αίών. An o t h e r adjective that deserves conside-r a t i o n is cnrouonros, w h i c h occurs in a number o f passages that are closeto Anax imande r ' s original conception. T he World-Soul of the Timaeus

in some sense ce r t a in ly a descendant o f Anaximander's αρχή84 —θεία ν αρχήν ήρξατο άτταύστου καιεμφρονος βίου προςτον σύμπανταχρόνον. In the scheme of the Timaeus the soul, belonging s itdoes to the wor ld of becoming and having i tself just been "created",

canno t be given an αίών; Plato reserves this concept for the eternal"modcl"85. However, we have seen that βίος is practically a synonymof αιών. If Aristotle was able to go back to the original meaning ofαιών86, Plato would know it, one might say,a potiori. Aristotlerepeatedly re fe r s to an άπαυστο$ κίνησις which the Cosmos needsand wh i ch must characterize its primum mobile*

7.' It seems note-

w o r t h y that in two instances the af f i rmat ion of this etemal movementis preceded by a praise of the αρχαίοι and their wisdom88. In both oft h em we have reasons to believe that having bestowed this praise he

tries for a time to keep in close contact with this wisdom, paraphrasingsome of the "ancient" ideas. Unfortunately we cannot indicate preciselythe point where this contact ceases.

The evidence for άπαυστο$ includes two other interesting items. Itoccur s s adjective tο αιών and is used for the exaltation of the highestdeity in a passage of Aeschylus89, which I quote with Hermann's generallyaccepted corrections <δι'> αιώνος κρέων άπαύστου Ζευ$ .... The otherpassage is found in Parmenides90: άκίνητον μεγάλων εν πείρασι δεσμώνεστίν άναρκτον άπαυστον. It is ofcourse possible that the word ishere fo rthe f i r s t time used in a philosophical context —although it wouldbe ratherironical i f the adjective which Aristotle so of t en connects with κίνησιςwas in its f i r s t occurrence associated with the άκίνητον. Parmenides'language in this passage is certainly s "original" s his thought but itmakes sense to think that his linguistic originality lies not in his intro-

84 See above pp. 125 f f .85

Tim. 3 7 d l f f . , 5 f f .86

See above n. 83.87De caelo I, 9.279bl; II, 1.284a9; Phys. VIII, 1.250M3; 6.259b25; Metaph.

A7.1072a21. Cf. also PLATO, Crat. 417c5 (where φορά is used s an equivalent ofκίνησι$). The opposite idea is παΟλα κινήσεω$; cf. PL., Phaedr. 245c6; ARIST., decaelo II, 1.284a8, 11.

88De caelo I, 9 . 2 7 9 a 2 2 f f . ; II, 1.284a2ff .

89Suppl. 574.

90B8.27 (DlELS-KRANZ).






Appendix - 131

duction of this word but in his use of it s the opposite of άναρκτον. InAnaximander the opposite of "without beginning" would be "withoutend", i. e. άπειρον. But Parmenides has declared Being to be bounded,

and thus made it impossible for himself to call it άπειρονorάτελεύτητον91

.It would be significant if he transferred to Being an adjective whichAnaximander had applied to time or movement; even from the limitedmaterial that we have we can see that he often proceeds by reorganizing(or reaccenting) Anaximander's concepts92. Melissus, we may note, usesαρχή and τελευτή s opposites and s mutually complementary andassociates the άπειρον withwhat "hasnobeginning" (αρχήν ουκ έχε ι ) 9 3 .He is probably closer to Anaximander's pattern.

It may be true that not every occurrence ofάπαυστο$ here presented

creates a strong presumption for Anaximander's use of the word but thecombined testimony of Parmenides, Aeschylus, Plato and Aristotleamounts to something. Unfortunately the evidence points partly to αιώνs the noun which άπαυστο$ modified and partly to the idea of a never

ceasing movement. And it remains possible that άπειρ ος αιών in thedoxographer has preserved the original wording.

91 B8.30ff . , 42 f.92 For the relation between Anaximander and Parmenides, especially with

regard to ττέρα$ and άττειρο ν , cf . H E R M A N N FR N K E L , Wege und Formen fr hgriech.

Denkens, Munich 1955, 186ff., 193ff . On the points in question I consider myselfin complete agreement with Fr nkel, although I believe that m y study suggestsa somewhat different view of the άπειρον itself.

93 B2 , 4 ( I E L S - K R A N Z ) .

Professor Gregory Vlastos has kindly read this paper. His advice and criticism

have been most valuable.

Solmsen, Friedrich_Anaximander's Infinite. Traces and Influences_1962_AGPh, 44, 2, Pp. 109-131

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