Social Trust and Cyber-trust Denise Anthony Sociology ISTS.
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Transcript of Social Trust and Cyber-trust Denise Anthony Sociology ISTS.
Social Trust and Cyber-trust
Denise AnthonySociology
ISTS
Outline• What is trust?
• Why is trust relevant for cyber security?– Problems of Trust
• Periods of social change
• Collective Goods
• Internet: new institutional environment
• Defining trust
• Trust Online – 2 experimental studies– Trust in exchange
– Trust in distributed groups
• Implications for trustable systems and reliable networks
What is trust?
Sociology of Trust
Bob asks to borrow $10 from Alice
Sociology of Trust
Bob asks to borrow $10 from Alice
If Alice trusts Bob…• Alice expects Bob to repay $10
Sociology of Trust
Bob asks to borrow $10 from Alice
If Alice trusts Bob…• Alice expects Bob to repay $10
• Alice lends $10 to Bob• Alice risks losing $10 (or more); Alice getting $10 back
depends on Bob’s behavior• Alice does not know for sure if or when Bob will repay $10
(trust makes Alice feel certain)
Sociology of Trust
• Expectations by one actor about another actor’s (future) behavior
• 3 part relation: A trusts B to do X (Hardin 1991, 2000)
Sociology of Trust
When A trusts B to do X (e.g., repay $10),
A takes action Y (e.g., lending $10) 1. A is vulnerable
• Risk of loss of Y (or more)• A’s outcome depends on B’s behavior
2. A is uncertain about B doing X (info prob)• Reliability – will B do X? for A?• Capability – can B do X?
Sociology of Trust
Bob asks to borrow $10 from Alice
Alice trusts Bob…• Alice expects Bob to repay $10
• Alice lends $10 to Bob• vulnerability: Alice risks losing $10 (or more); Alice getting
$10 back depends on Bob’s behavior
• Alice is uncertain about Bob doing X (though trust makes A feel certain)
• Capability – can B do X? Does Bob have an income? • Reliability – will B do X? (for A?)
Why is trust relevant for cyber-security?
Trust (and related mechanisms) necessary* for cooperation & exchange under
conditions of uncertainty and vulnerability
* Trust is not necessary, but is sufficient for cooperation/exchange
Social Change = problems of trust
• Industrial Revolution– Demographic shifts:
• immigration • movement to cities
– interaction with unknown individuals
– new forms of organization: • Factories - wages• bureaucracy
– New mechanisms to facilitate exchange (Zucker, Shapiro) – new type of trust, beyond interpersonal• Credit scoring by banks• Licensing, regulation, etc
Collective Goods = problem of trust/coop
• Common pool resource systems (Ostrom 1990)– Fisheries, water resources– Tragedy of commons (Hardin 1968)
• Collective action problem (Olson 1965)– Produce collective good all value – clean
air– Free rider problem: common interests ≠
collective action– Collective action requires selective
incentives
Collective Goods = problems of trust
• Collective/Public Goods– Non-rival
• My use does not impede your use • Fuel (rival) vs newspaper (non-rival)
– Non-excludable• Once produced, all can access• Clean air, live music, roadways
– Cannot be produced by an individual• Costly (space travel)• Impossible (group discussion)
• Internet is new environment– Communication, Exchange, Cooperation
• eBay, Amazon, Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia
• Cannot rely on existing mechanisms for reliable interaction– Who is trustworthy?– How know who interacting with?
• What signals reliability? Capability?– Evidence of problems, fraud, crime
Why is trust relevant for cyber-security?
Why is trust relevant for cyber-security?
Internet: collective good• Costly (impossible?) to produce individually
• Infrastructure owned/maintained by many diverse private and public entities;
• Vast resource investments onto infrastructure by diverse public and private entities (states, corps, orgs, individuals)
• Non-rival: given expanding bandwidth, my use does not inhibit your use
• Non-excludable (more or less): if network is open, then available to all
• Individual actions affect integrity of the system• Viruses; Unauthorized access; Non-reporting of problems
• Cooperation necessary to ensure integrity, deal with problems
T4T Experimental Study
Trust on Internet• What information matters for
“trusting” online vendors re: secure transactions?
• How reduce uncertainty about “B” doing “X”? – A is uncertain about B doing X (info prob)
• Reliability – will B do X? for A?• Capability – can B do X
Three types of Trust
1. Interpersonal trust (Fine, Gambetta, Hardin)
Trust in a specific actor based on reliability:• Past experience• Relationship and/or social ties• Reputation – social networks
(Capability of B to do X is assumed to be 100%)
Three types of Trust
Capability• Certification• Licensing /
Accreditation• Audits• Organizational
position, role, situation
Reliability• Incentives for B to
do X– Laws, contracts,
insurance• BBB seal – past
behavior• Reputation – history
2. Institutional trust (Zucker, Heimer)
3rd Party ‘Assurance’ mechanisms (Yamigishi) -
assure capability or reliability or both
Types of TrustDimensions of Information
for Reducing Uncertainty in Trust Dilemmas
CONTENT of Information
SOURCE of Information
Interpersonal Institutional
Reliability(Motivation)
Direct experienceReputation: history of past reliable behavior
Assurance mechanisms: norms, threat of peer
sanctions
Record of past behavior
Assurance mechanisms:
contracts, laws, criminal and civil
penalties
CapabilityObserved evidence of
ability
Reputation: performance history
Licensure and accreditation bodies
Certification
T4T Experimental Study
Institutional Trust on Internet• What information matters for
“trusting” online vendors re:secure transactions– Content: reliability or capability?
• History: reputation systems; feedback• Capability: certifications; tech systems;
oversight– Source: Institutional third party or other
consumers?• Independent 3rd party, non-profit• Consumer ratings from customers
• Make purchase decisions from a series of vendors on a simulated website: What’sThePrice.com
• For each vendor, decide whether to make a purchase or not, at given price (EXIT game)– Content and Source of information about
vendor– Other factors: price of good, rating of
vendor
• Not real purchases or actual products
T4T Experimental Study
Price information about item for sale:1) Vendor Suggested Price: Vendor claims that this
price is the fair market value
2) Actual Value Range: Verified estimate that value of the item is within this range.
Vendor rating based on varying information:
INFORMATION ON THE VENDOR
1 2 3 4 5
LOW HIGH
CONTENT: Capability versus Reliability
Vendor has capability to conduct secure online
transactions vs. vendor has history of conducting secure
online transactions
SOURCE: Peers versus Institutional Third Party
Information about Vendor (capability vs. reliability) comes from Peers (other consumers)
versus Institutionalized 3rd party
Institutional3rd Party Peers
Reliability
Center for OnlinePurchase
Reporting www.COPR.org
Your independentsource for reliable
information!
BuyReliable.org
Reliable information from consumers like
you!
Capability
Center for Secure Online
Transactions www.CSOT.org Your source for
independent security information!
BuySecure.orgUse the power of
consumer feedback for
online security!
T4T Experimental Setting• Between subjects design (R1 n=73
subjects) [and within subjects (R2 n=61)]– Subjects paid $5-20, mean=$12; – 12 minutes
• Additional factors– Price of item: cheap ($15) vs
expensive ($88)– Quality rating of vendor on 1-5 scale:
• low (3) vs Medium (4) vs High (5)
T4T Experimental Setting• R1: Between subjects design
– 12 rounds: 73*12=876 observations– 68% women (n=50)– 60% white (n=44)
• Influence of information– CONTENT (reliability vs. capability) and – SOURCE (Institutional 3rd party vs. consumer
rating)– Controlling for: price, rating level, and
individual characteristics• On making a purchase (i.e., trusting
vendor)
T4T Exit Game R1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Low Medium High
Rating of Vendor
Lik
elih
oo
d o
f P
urc
ha
se
Cheap Expensive
Rating p<.01Price p<.01
Price*Rating p<.05
Role of Information Content(Vendors Rated 4 or 5)
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Reliability Capability
Lik
elih
oo
d o
f P
urc
has
e
Cheap Expensive
Price p<.01Content N.S
Price*Reliability N.S.
Role of Information Source (Vendors Rated 4 or 5)
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Institutional Source Consumers
Lik
elih
oo
d o
f P
urc
ha
se
Cheap Expensive
Price p<.01Source p<.05
Price*Institution N.S.
Implications for Technology and Trust
• Want ‘assurance’ that system trustworthy– Third party assurance not other
consumers– No difference between
capability/reliability• Many Users already ‘trust’
infrastructure– Rely on reputation of company– Familiarity with system increases ‘trust’– Expectation that technology is secure
Limitations of Experiment
• Other aspects of Vendor • More info about actual products
• Still to do:– More subject characteristics
(e.g.,experience)– Within subjects comparisons
Three types of Trust
3. System-level Trust (Giddens)
– Multiple, overlapping mechanisms:• Institutional assurance mechanisms
– Laws, regulations, contracts
• Institutional organizations, roles– Professional groups, accrediting agencies
• Economic incentives & reputation• Social norms and cultural values
– Situational expectations, assumptions
• Experience– Individual knowledge and experience
PLACE: Privacy in Location Aware
Computing Environments Study
New IT enables:• Distributed groups and shared
resources (commons)– wikis– sensor-networks in community spaces
• How ensure/manage privacy and security?– Sensors in room, but actors have
different preferences for privacy– Group wiki with private information
PLACE Experimental Study
1. Does an individual’s own privacy behavior affect behavior toward group privacy?
2. Do people use others’ privacy behavior as a signal of trustworthiness? (i.e., does others’ privacy affect behavior toward group privacy?)
PLACE Experimental Study• Members of geographically distributed
work teams• Secure project wiki with valuable
information – Rewards for finished project-maintaining
password– Incentives to sell password
• Subjects have info re:– Own privacy– Teammates privacy
• 6 rounds (different team configurations) and decide whether to sell password or not (n=110*6 = 660 observations)
PLACE Experimental Study
• Subject Privacy level– Based on questions regarding privacy
practices (lock door; facebook practices; willingness to share private info):• Rated as Private – Moderate – Open
• Teammates Privacy – Paired with 2 different teammates in
each round: teammates privacy level• Rated as Private – Moderate – Open
Personal Privacy and Trustworthiness
PrivacyBehavior
% willingto sell password P-value
Private 48.1F =2.56
p<.10
BonferroniPriv>Open
p<.10
Moderate 40.2
Open 35.6
Impact of others’ privacyon % willing to sell
Teammate 2=
Teammate 3
Open Moderate
PrivateP-value
Open 61% 46% ---T2:
p<.001
T3:p<.001
Moderate
--- 39% ---
Private 47% 33% 21%Logistic regression model, adjusted for own privacy level and size of incentive to sell, robust standard errors.
Interaction of Subject Privacy and Team-mates Privacy
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Teammates Open Teammates Private
Open Private
% W
illin
g t
o s
ell
pass
word
Subject Privacy Preferences
Implications for Technology and Trust• Users’ own privacy preferences matter for
group privacy behavior– more private, more likely to sell
• Others’ privacy preferences affect trust– More private, more trusted
• Interaction between subjects’ privacy and teammates privacy– Private Users seen by all as more trustworthy– Private users less trustworthy than Open– Private users distrust teammates much more
than Open users
• Users will use privacy preferences as “signals” of trustworthy behavior in group
• BUT, signals not associated with behavior
• Managing privacy in online group/commons may be more difficult than expect
• Social context matters as much (or more) than technology
Implications for Technology and Trust
The Case of Wikipedia• Wikipedia is collective good• What motivates contributions?
– Collective identity; selective incentives (reputation; sanctions)
• What are implications of motivations for contributing to Wikipedia for nature of content?– Number of contributions contributor
makes– Quality of content
• Survivability: extent of contributors content retained in Wikipedia
Wikipedia contributor motivations and content
1. Registered users will make more contributions than non-registered users
2. Registered users with many contributions will have higher reliability:
a) Registered users w/ fewer contributionsb) Non-registered (anonymous) users
4. Anonymous users will contribute less content per edit than registered users
5. Most anonymous users will contribute one time only
7. Reliability will decrease with number of contributions for anonymous users
Table 1. Population and Sample of Wikipedia Contributors by User Type and Language
LanguageUser Type
TotalRegistered Anonymous
FrenchPopulation
Sample5,6901,763
48,2111,729
53,9013,492
DutchPopulation
Sample2,8951,819
30,3221,747
33,2173,566
TotalPopulation
Sample8,5853,582
78,5333,476
87,1187,058
Wikipedia Contribution Characteristics by Type of User (unweighted)
Registered User
Anonymous User
Reliability 70.3 (28.4) 74.0** (29.5) F = 29.7**df = 1, 7,056
Log Edits 1.9** (1.4) 0.60 (.83) F = 2,058.0**df = 1, 7,056
Log Contribution size
6.9** (2.3) 4.5 (2.1) F = 1,955**df = 1, 7,056
Log Article Size 7.8 (1.1) 7.8 (1.3) F = 0.89df = 1, 7,056
French language .49 (.50) .50 (.50) F = 0.19df = 1, 7,056
Reliability by Wikipedia Contributors
1 edit 2+ edits0.65
0.66
0.67
0.68
0.69
0.7
0.71
0.72
0.73
0.74
0.75p<.01 p<.10
Reliability of Anonymous versus Registered Users by Number of Contributions*
ANONYMOUS REGISTERED
Number of contributions
Re
lia
bil
ity
Ra
te
.66
.68
.7.7
2.7
4.7
6%
Ret
aine
d
0 1 2 3 4log edits
Registered User Anonymous User
for Registered versus Anonymous UsersQuality (% retained) by Contributions (log edits)
The Case of Wikipedia• What are implications of motivations for
contributing to Wikipedia for nature of content?– Number of contributions
• Most anonymous users contribute once– Quality of content: Reliability (extent of
contributors content retained in Wikipedia)• Reliability increases with number of
contributions for registered users• Reliability decreases with number of
contributions for anonymous users• Good Samaritans (anonymous one-time
contributors) have highest reliability
• Wikipedia can provide high quality info
• Internet enables Open source production– Critical mass of contributors– Quantity effects quality
• Internet plus collective action mechanisms
• Other goods…
Implications