SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICALIMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN ATTITUDESTOWARD ANIMALS

Alan R. DrengsonVictoria, British Columbia

Many of the preconceived and superstitious beliefs about ani­mals held in the 19th-century West probably grew out of thefears and anxieties of colonial Europeans living in places newto them. Europe had been free of almost all large wild animalsfor several centuries by the time colonials arrived on theAmerican and African continents and on the sub-continent ofIndia. Moreover, during the 19th century the industrializingWest was a society often characterized by its own oppressivefantasies and fears of repressed human sexual energic~s. Asthese energies wen: turned toward achievements in the worldsof the wild kingdoms, both the indigenous natives and animalscame to be seen as life-threatening enemies. The white sl~tt1ers

of course knew that they were the invaders, often taking theresources and territory of other peoples with violence, hatredand the conflict that this provokes.

In our century, popular fiction expressed a similar brutal atti­tude in the various gorilla stories and wild animal "safari"-typefilms. The king of all animal fantasies was perlpps King Kong,the world's largest and most ferocious film ape. The big whitehunter and the great film apes have shown similar tastes inmany film episodt:s. The "movie gorillas," after all, were notunintelligent; they were, in fact, shown to be far more intelli­gent than most WI~sterners would have been willing to allow.These ferocious movie apes, and the various stories of killerapes, were re-echoed in fiction and film stor~es about killerbeasts of every kind: wolves, coyotes, grizzlies, tigers, sharks,rats, bats, birds, snakes and so on. In reading this sort ofliterature, and in viewing these types of films, one gets theimpression that there has been a continuous war betweenhumans and the other animals of the earth.

popularexpressionsoiabrutalattitude

The Journal ofTranspersonal Psychology, 1980, Vol. 12, No.1 63

natureseen

ascompetitive

struggle

gentleand

reclusiveanimals

The determination with which animals have been pursued anderadicated displays something that goes beyond mere eco­nomic drives, for fear, hatred and even fanaticism are in evi­dence. In many ways this curious phase of our history seemscharacterized by large doses of psychological projection. Tar­zan's apes have a culture that is too human to be missed(Burroughs, 1976). Their raids against the African blacks dis­play levels of brutality and violence similar to that shown byWestern society in its contacts with various indigenous"hostiles." The evolutionary theory that was popularly mis­understood as Darwinism saw nature as "red in fang andclaw." The struggle for survival, dominance and superioritywas seen everywhere. Nature was seen as one continuouscompetitive struggle, just as human society. The gorilla seemedan apt symbol for this conception of natural violence, given itswild, human-like appearance and size. In stories and on thescreen, gorillas were usually shown as fighting or attackinghumans.

Recent field studies of animal behavior reveal that this view ofthe gorilla's "violent" nature is very much overdrawn (Lorenz,1974; Montague, 1973). At best it simply predisposed people to"see" what they wanted or feared to see. At worst it led them todestroy and to actually extinguish hundreds of irreplaceableand valuable animal species.

It was inevitable that sooner or later someone such as GeorgeSchaller (l963, 1964) would set out for the dense forests ofAfrica intent upon studying the behavior of free living gorillasin their native habitat. Schaller pioneered field studies of theselarge primates. Until his work, most of our knowledge of thegorilla and ofthe other great apes was based on hearsay, rumorand observations of apes in captivity.

Schaller's studies revealed that the gorilla is one of the mostpassive, gentle and placid animals in the wild kingdom. Re­clusive and shy, they keep to themselves hidden in the forests,roving their territory in small interrelated bands.

Before spending time with the gorillas, Schaller was concernedfor his safety with them, as stories from nearby natives indi­cated the gorilla to be a violent and dangerous animal, given tounpredictable rages and charged attacks. However, in all of histime with the mountain gorillas, Schaller was never once se­riously threatened. On the contrary, after they got used to hispresence, some gorillas even tolerated being in the same treewith him.

Schaller's studies and those ofother ethologists have again and

64 The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 1980, Vol. 12, No.1

again demonstrated that the behavior of animals living freeand wild differs markedly from those in captivity. Free-livinganimal species rarely engage in intraspecific violence. Theirterritorial clashes are more bluster and ritual than a fight to thedeath. Moreover, free-living animals, mammals and especiallyprimates, are far more intelligent and aware than inheritors of19th-century humbug have been inclined to think. Part of thereason for any existing blindness is related to the assertivecharacter of our culture during and since industrialization. Itwas widely thought and felt that the earth was a human prov­ince to do with as man wished. But doubts about this arrogantposition surfaced in various forms.

The Frankenstein story, for example, revealed human insen­sitivity and the failure to control natural forces in the form of agothic tale. The monster was the creation of a technology andmind-set which isolated humans from the rest of the biosphere,at the same time as it tended to desensitize them to the suffer­ings of their fellow beings. Given that humans are often thecause of much of this suffering, and given also that Wl~ knowthis, especially at a sub-conscious level, it is only to be expectedthat this would find expression in allegoric tales.

In the nineteenth century the machine-made monster was asymbol of human arrogance and fear. Today, l:ln often-usedsymbol of our alienated, dehumanized state is the computer,which has come to stand for the human mind sans feeling in amultitude of sci-fi stories and films. In 2001 the malevolentcomputer's cognitive circuits are disconnected-only then ishuman entry into the "Godhead" possible and rebirth assured.2001 is a film metaphor for the birth of a new type of person, ahumanity that has transcended its own technology, a humanityconscious of its own native potentials.

The computer, in such films as 2001, can be seen as a symbolfor the modern rational mind-not the full-blooded reason ofaPlato, but more the narrowed logical functioning of recipemathematics. The rational mind of a computer follows lines ofthought to their logical conclusion, no matter what kind ofabsurdity this might lead to. If the logical conclusion is "kill thehibernating astronauts," then that is what will be done. Thecomputer in 2001 is, beyond a certain point, obsessional andparanoid.

This "rational mind" also depicts the triumph of scientifictechnology and finds its philosophical echoes in reductionist,positivistic behaviorism. To the degree that this perspeetivemakes us insensitive to other humans and other forms oflire, italso blinds us to the inexpressible mystery oflife as revealed in

assertivecharacterofindustrialculture

themindsansfeeling

Social and psychological implications ofattitudes toward animals 65

sensitiveawareness

ofother

formsof

life

our immediate experience. Nevertheless, the positivistic em­phasis on a methodical gathering of information laid thegroundwork for recent field studies of the gorilla and otheranimals.

How far we can be led to narrowed relationships with other lifeforms, even with family pets such as dogs, can be brought outby considering the views expressed in a recent book on dogtraining. Charles P. Eisenmann (1971) has claimed that theusual theories and methods of dog training are based on19th-century Pavlovian theories of conditioning that assumethat the dog has only minimal intelligence. Essentially, theyrepresent a 19th-century mechanistic approach. The dog'snervous system is conditioned to react automatically withoutthe intervention of thought or consciousness. As a result of thisapproach, there is a tendency not to be open to increasing ourawareness of the dog's range of sensitivities and its potentialsfor intelligent behavior. Habit, routine, and other attention­deadening processes may tend to make one even less sensitive.But this is hardly strange, for even in daily interpersonal rela­tionships anyone can be inattentive, unperceptive and insen­sitive, or less than whole-hearted.

My own perception of the differences between sensitiveawareness and automaton-like insensitivity involving otherforms of life has centered around dogs. Human relationshipswith dogs can at times be characterized by a sort of paradox.One may be inclined to think that dogs are not very aware; thatthey do not understand very much; that they are simply con­ditioned to react to appropriate stimuli or by means of instinct;and yet one mayfeel that they do understand much more thanwe think. Dog-training methods often seem to incline us tothink that their understanding is rudimentary at best. Theanimal is conditioned over and over to behave in a certain wayto a single command, and soon the behavior becomes me­chanical, unthinking, rate. We may rarely consider the animalto be capable of intelligent behavior, perhaps because we tendto associate intelligence with the verbal competence andthought processes that language makes possible. This in itselftends to affect our perception of animal intelligence adversely.If we assume that the animal, in this case the dog (or ape), isnot capable of intelligent behavior or creative response, thenour attitude will tend to discourage its notice, development andenhancement, in self-fulfilling expectation. If we approachedour children in the same way, this attitude would tend to stunttheir growth as well.

However, even if dogs (or apes and other animals) can "thinkfor themselves" (which is perhaps the wrong phrase), they do

66 The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 1980, Vol. 12, No.1

not seem to be preoccupied by thoughts. Since, as far as weknow, they do not have language, they probably do not have acontinuous stream of thoughts with which to be preoccupied inthe ways in which humans often are. Nor do they seem to betroubled by long-range desires or fears. When a dog is hungry,it eats; and when it is sleepy, it sleeps. There is nothing de­ceptive about dogs; their feelings are always completely in theopen. One who takes the trouble to carefully watch his or herdog will soon become convinced of this. Moreover, dogs tendto reflect the moods and feelings of their human associates andthey often reflect these same feelings back to humans. Forexample, human fear can incline an animal to either attack orto flee. If you fear a strange dog you meet on the street and it iswithin a critical distance, it will be aware of this fear, and,given certain actions on your part, will probably retreat; how­ever, if its territory is threatened, or if it is cornered, it willlikely attack.

Most of us remember t11at as children we were quite open tothe feelings of our pets. In many respects dogs are emotionallyvery much like two- or three-year-old humans. Both dogs andyoung children have a free-flowing, flexible awareness that isnot usually troubled by distorting beliefs and theories, but ismore occupied by interacting with humans, animals andthings. As childf\~n we may have thought that our dogs feltprecisely what we felt when we were happy, frightened or sad.As an adult I have from time to time been reminded of howextremely sensitive animals are to feelings in the house. Once,when particularly distraught over a series of unhappy incidentsinvolving serious :illness, moving, accidents, and the death of afriend, I wept in sorrow. Our dog responded to my sorrowimmediately, and he did everything he could to sympathizewith and to comfort me. I later tried to get a similar responsefrom him by feigning sadness, even sobbing loudly. No re­sponse. He looked at me with eyes that said, "Who do youthink you're fooling?" As adults we often dismiss this imme­diacy of feelings and emotions, especially where animals areconcerned. We tend to be preoccupied by thoughts, by relivingthe past and anticipating the future. We may worry about ourjobs, our children, our bills, about all manner of things. Suchindulgences may ll~ad us to miss much of what is now going onaround us, to lose contact with or to ignore our own deeperfeelings.

It requires effort Ito become attuned, sensitive and compas­sionate to the feeLings and sufferings of others. We may beinclined, as a result of the ways in which we are often raised, tounderstand only our own suffering, to feel only our own diffi­culties. The difficulties of others tend to remain abstractions.

humanemotions,feelings,andsensitivityofpets

Social and psychological implications ofattitudes toward animals 67

Cartesianconception

ofanimals

asmachines

alienationfrom

largerworld

ofsentient

beings

How far the human world, the great apes and animals gener­ally, have suffered from the results of this desensitization isnearly beyond comprehension.

Some Western philosophers have seriously asked at timeswhether we can ever know how another person feels, orwhether we can even know that another person is able to think,or is conscious. Many philosophers and psychologists haveheld that animals certainly cannot think and do not have adiversity of emotions. Rene Descartes doubted that animalshave any feelings or thoughts. To him, finally, they were seenas machines ofthe natural world provided for our pleasure andexploitation. Only humans, after all, have souls, and only be­ings with souls are capable of self-awareness, emotions,feelings, reflections, purposes, suffering and joy. Animals haveno inner life, no more feeling than does an engine. Cartesianskepticism inevitably spilled into the human realm and Des­cartes himself was led to ask early in the Meditations (1954,15-30) whether he could know if any other human body pos­sessed a souL Since reason was supreme for Descartes, the onlybasis he could have for judging whether others thought or feltwas by analogy with his own mind as revealed in purposefulaction. In short, one cannot know this in any immediate orfeelingful way; one can only infer it on the basis of evidence.Later, Wittgenstein's work in Philosophical Investigations(1953) attempted to refute these positions.

These doubts, which were expressed philosophically, even­tually found their way into popular literature and film. Themore general doubts of recent times afe probably also a re­sponse by humans to meet the demands of specialized occu­pations in an industrialized technology. If asked today whereconsciousness resides, we are inclined to point to the brain. Tobe sure, when we develop ourselves almost exclusively as in­tellect, we can become like the imagined computing machinesdepicted in films and stories. This is truly the height of aliena­tion: to be divorced from one's own feelings, to be out of touchwith one's whole experience, to be cut off from the larger worldof sentient beings, no longer responsive to their feelings, nolonger awar;e of their being.

Marx's descriptions of alienation were penetrating in this re­gard. His discussion perhaps unduly emphasizes characteris­tics of certain economic class systems, but is penetrating withrespect to industrial civilization. In contrast, the hunter-gath­ering peoples, who of necessity fished the salmon, killed thedeer and bear, nonetheless were not cut off from their ownfeelings and the natural world. Their stories, their rituals, their

68 The Journal ofTranspersonal Psychology, 1980, Vol. 12, No.1

cultural practices, their struggles with the elemental powers,are evidence of a deep awareness of their own being and thebeing of the creatures they pursued, They saw them as likethemselves, as conscious beings with personhood: one apolo­gized to the salmon for having to take them. Moreover, one'sancestors were animals whose forms adorned one's artifacts."Reason" dismisses such animism as superstitious and lackingin the dimensions of possibility open to industrial societies.

However, reason in this sense is not sufficient for life, nor, asHume pointed out, is it sufficient even to move the will. Butthen, Hume's reason aside, "reason" has reasons of its own foracting. The drive for consistency is one of its primary charac­teristics, and this is reflected in the conceived models of linearlogics. In contrast, human growth and the inner transforma­tions of the deeply religious or spiritual life all seem to denyconsistency of character over time. One grows, one changes,and, as Hegel pointed out, the growth of the spirit is dialectical;its movement describes a spiral through which opposites in­terpenetrate to form new states of being (Taylor, 1975). Marxclaimed to find the same dialectics in economics and in things.Heraclitus observed that nature is a harmony between thetension of opposites. The Pythagoreans, the first Western phi­losophers to see all of existence as a Cosmos, also spoke of theblending of opposites. Buddhist logic, which attempts to mapthe movements of consciousness as it expands to completewholeness, is dialectical (Streng, 1967). Moreover, as Plato'sexample shows, the master Socratic philosopher is not partialto a particular perspective and through dialectic is able to seethings from different angles; he/she is not trapped by a partic­ular viewpoint, for all attempts at description ultimately failto capture the whole of even one idea, let alone reality. Thisbecomes clear when the partialities of limited perspectives areexposed as Socrates and Plato expose them, Plato finally canonly speak metaphorically of the process leading to and thevision of the ultimate truth, or ultimate reality, for humanlanguages are very much limited by dualistic patterns ofthought which are entangled with the senses.

If we consider a number of the elements of recent Westernhistory, we can see better how our culture arrived at the nar­rowed perspectives that have plagued us for the last onehundred years, perspectives that tended to cut us off from thenatural world and led us to see it as populated by violentgorillas. Some of these elements are the following: Cartesianemphasis on mind as primarily a thinking capacity with a biastoward intellect; Humean empiricism as a narrow epistemol­ogy which sensationalized concepts and is biased toward the

philosophicalinfluencesofdualisticWesternthought

Social and psychological implications ofattitudes toward animals 69

a

pardblefor

transformationofhuman­

animalrelationships

gross senses, with a special tilt toward sight; a psychology thatdenied the significance of the inner life and emphasized be­havior; an emphasis in the larger society (reflected in educa­tion) on the aims of industrialization and human primacy,(and yet human expendability emerges as a twin feature in theform of efficient war machines); a fragmentation ofknowledgeby specialization, at the same time as there is a separation ofthe functions of knowledge from the capacities and the func­tions of the human self in its completeness; the virtual ignoringof the means to cultivate this whole self and a deep self­knowledge. These and other factors are part of a philosophywhich has promoted the development of a narrowed con­sciousness with very limited perspectives. In cutting itself offfrom the larger world of feelings, the larger world ofhumanity,and of animals, plants and their ecology, this consciousnessbecame an inauthentic consciousness prone to self-deceptionand self-induced ignorance, a consciousness about whichmuch existentialist literature has been written (Barrett, 1958;Kaufmann, 1956).

But perhaps, as the Taoist sage Lao Tzu (and others) havetaught, things can only move so far in one direction, for theyeventually reach the extreme, and then swing back toward theother pole. This was clearly illustrated in a recent televisionfilm documentary, The Amazing Apes. A man and a younggorilla sat on the ground facing one another. They were"signing" to each other by means of the hand signals taught tohuman deaf mutes. The scientist was teaching the gorilla ad­ditional vocabulary that the gorilla seemed very intent onlearning (Premack, 1972; Patterson, 1978). There was some­thing profoundly moving about this vignette. It displayedthe possibility of a cooperative relationship between humanand gorilla, one in which there develops a reciprocal con­sciousness. Indeed, this scene seemed almost a metaphor, orperhaps a parable, for transformed relationships between hu~

man and other forms of life on this planet. Here humans passbeyond the aggressive exploitation of another life-form andeven beyond the mere husbanding of a "resource." Here wassuggested the possibility ofa transformation ofrelationships inwhich the more highly evolved served the other in an effortto realize certain values. In this filmed interaction the teach~

ing process was not forced conditioning, but rather seemedbased on an understanding that had grown with, but had tran­scended the language being taught.

As the gorilla and the human researcher interacted andlearned from one another, it was clear that these two quitedifferent creatures were sharing a common awareness. Theirattentions were locked together in a concentrated effort to

70 The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 1980, Vol. 12, No.1

understand one another. In some respects the understandingseemed to be quite independent of the attempt to teach thegorilla sign language. One could sense a rapport between thesetwo beings, a humanizing of the human'through the exchange,and at the same time a stretching of the gorilla toward thehuman leveL

This scene suggested that as our societies grow ever moretechnologized there will be an ever increasing need for morecontacts and exchanges with other animals, for this may helpus to lessen the potential psychic damage of our technologies(Shepard, 1978). For, this kind of contact helps us to be intouch with our own feelings and heart, and this in tum helps usto approach the world in a no-harm way by means of sym­pathy, love and compassion. This, as has been said so well byRolling Thunder, brings a different kind ofunderstanding anda different quality of person:

It's not very easy for you people to understand these things becauseunderstanding is not knowing the kind of facts that your books andteachers talk about. I can tell you that understanding begins withlove and respect. It begins with respect for the Great Spirit, and theGreat Spirit is the life that is in all things~all the creatures and theplants and even the rocks and the minerals. All things-and I meanall things-have their own will and their own purpose; this is whatis to be respectf:d. Such respect is not a feeling or an attitude only.It's a way of life. Such respect means that we never stop realizingand never neglect to carry out our obligation to ourselves and ourenvironment (Boyd, 1974).

The filmed vigm:tte of scientist and gorilla also reminds one ofa theme that is woven through many Eastern philosophies, thatit is through silence that one comes to understand the ultimateteachings, the "teachings which cannot be taught" (TarthangTulku, 1975, 84--100). It is through an inner silence that wemay become receptive to, and have contact with th{, whole ofour awareness, the whole of our sources of understanding.These sources are not exhausted by the traditional Westernanalyses of the five senses, but also include such things as thecapacity to sense the feelings of another, the capacity to beaware of one's whole body at once, the capacity to extend one'sawareness beyond the self, the capacity to be flexibly receptive.It is possible in rdationships with animals, and ofcourse, otherpeople-especially when deep experiences are simply sharedwithout talk~to understand this learning in the presence of thesilence. This is illustrated in an East Indian story (Rajneesh,1976, 102-06), which I shall paraphrase:

A wealthy father sent his son to live with an enlightened Master.The son, Svetaketu, eventually became one of the Master's most

lesseningthepotentialpsychicdamageoftechnologies

Social and psychological implications ofattitudes toward animals 71

beingwith

animalsand

openingto thewholeworld

learned and skilled pupils, and after several years it was time forhim to return home. His father was in the fields when he saw hisson returning. His son walked proudly, with his head held high,indicative of his superior learning. The father was worried, how­ever, by what he saw, and so when they met at home and weresitting by the fire in the evening, the father gently asked, "Has theMaster taught you that which cannot be taught?" The son was atfirst puzzled, but then replied after some thought, "Of course not,how could he teach me that which cannot be taught?" The fatherreplied that Masters have a way of creating a situation in whichthis important teaching can be learned. Then he said to his son,"You go back to the Master and ask him to teach you that whichcannot be taught." The son returned the next day and asked theMaster why he had not been taught"that which cannot be taught."The Master replied, "One must ask for it, then it can be done, notbefore." And so he said to the son, "You take 400 of my animalsand go far into the forest where you will see no human. And youstay with the animals until they are 1,000, then you may return tomy place." The son did as he was told. At first he would lecture theanimals on all of the things that he knew. He would recite sutras,and quote scriptures. He would philosophize to them. But as theypaid no attention to these things, he soon stopped talking. Beforevery long his walk began to change, his bearing altered, He beganto see and hear things he had missed before. He began to feelthings he had forgotten how to feel. Soon he lost all track of timeand many years passed. One day he realized that the animals wererestive, for now they numbered over 1,000, and it was time toreturn to the Master's farm. Svetaketu brought the animals backfrom the forest and let the animals back in their fields, and thenbegan dancing as he went to the Master's door. The Master sawhim coming and went to greet him. The Master said, "I see younow have learned that which cannot be taught." And Svetaketusaid: "Yes, I knew you would know, but I have come to thank youjust the same. I have come to dance my gratitude."

In this story it is being with the animals in their silence thatbrings the son to the realization of the larger world of fullconsciousness: a consciousness undivided by conflicts; a con­sciousness undivided by opposites and judgments; a con­sciousness unimpeded by conditioning and the past, undefiledby desire; a consciousness open to all sources of knowing, eventhose sources that are totally non-verbal and non-conceptual.The son had become a full human, had flowered into a totalperson; through his silence with the animals he had opened tothe whole world.

This story is an especially appropriate vehicle for describingthe ecologically sensitive and aware human, one whose con­sciousness reflects a planetary self-awareness. Upon seeing thegorilla and the scientist communicating silently with sign lan­guage, this story takes on an especially powerful character

72 The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 1980, Vol. 12, No.1

which clarifies the vision seen through this vignette. One isreminded of the Mahayana vision of the Bodhisattva, and thevow to work for the deliverance of all beings (Walpola, 1974).The vow and the work both ferment to bring the Bodhisattva tofull awareness, and through this the sentient world becomesmore fully aware of its own creative capacities. From such aperspective it is possible to see that the most highly developedconsciousness on this planet could be its most benign spirit.

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GARDNER, R. A. and GAR.DNER, B. T. Teaching sign language toa Chimpanzee. Science, 1969,165,664-672.

GROF, S. Realms of the human unconscious. New York: Dut­ton, 1976.

HALL, E. T. The hidden dimension. New York: Doubleday/Anchor, 1969.

KAUFMANN, W. Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre.New York: Meridian Books, 1956.

KUHN, T. The structure ofscientific revolutions. Chicago: Uni­versity of Chicago Press, 1971.

LORENZ, Konrad. On aggression. New York: Harcourt Brace,1974.

McKINLEY, D. and SHEPARD, P. (eds.) The subversive science.Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969.

MONTAGUE, A. Man and aggression. New York: Oxford, 1973.NICOLL, M. The new man. Baltimore: Penguin, 1973.OLLMAN, B. Alienation. London: Cambridge University Press,

1973.PATTERSON, F. Conversations with a gorilla. National Geo­

graphic, 1978 (Oct.) 438-465.POWELL, R. Zen and reality. New York: Viking, 1975.

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PREMACK, A. J. & PREMACK, D. Teaching language to anape. Scientific American, 1972,227,92-99.

RAJNEESH, B. S. Vedanta: Seven steps to samadhi. India: Raj­neesh Foundation, 1976.

ROSZAK, T. Person/Planet. New York: Harper and Row,1978.

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SCHALLER, G. B. The mountain gorilla: Ecology and behavior.Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973.

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SHEPARD, P. Thinking animals. New York: Viking, 1978.STRENG, FJ. Emptiness: A study in religious meaning. Nash­

ville: Abingdon Press, 1967.TAYLOR, C. Hegel. London: Cambridge University Press,

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Communications with the author and requests for reprints may beaddressed to Philosophy Department, University of Victoria, P.O.Box 1700, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada V8W 2Y2.

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