SO 025 581 AUTHOR Hoepli, Nancy L., Ed. TITLE · Democracy and Market Economics by Jacqueline...

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Hoepli, Nancy L., Ed.Great Decisions [and] Great Decisions Activity Book.1994 Edition.Foreign Policy Association, New York, N.Y.ISBN-0-87124-155-2; ISBN-0-87124-156-0;ISSN-072-727X94145p.

Foreign Policy Association, c/o CUP Services, P.O.Box 6525, Ithaca, NY 14851; 800-477-5836 ($11).Guides Classroom Use Instructional Materials (ForLearner) (051) Guides Classroom Use TeachingGuides (For Teacher) (052)

MF01/PC06 Plus Postage.African History; *Developing Nations; Environment;Foreign Countries; *Foreign Policy; *GlobalEducation; *International Relations; InternationalTrade; Multicultural Education; Secondary Education;Social Studies; United States History; *WorldAffairs; World History

This book discusses foreign policy issues andprovides background information on current topics. This editionexamines the following major issues: (1) "Conflict in FormerYugoslavia: Quest for Solutions" (Susan L. Woodward); (2) "SouthAfrica: Forging a Democratic Union" (Jean Herskovits); (3)

"Environmental Crisis in Former Soviet Bloc: Whose Problem? WhoPays?" (William Sweet); (4) "Trade with the Pacific Rim: Pressure orCooperation?" (Jinny St. Goar); (5) "Defense: Redefining U.S. Needsand Priorities" (David C. Morrison); (6) "Argentina, Brazil, Chile:Democracy and Market Economics" (Jacqueline Mazza); (7) "Islam andPolitics: Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia" (Lawrence G. Potter); and (8)"New World Disorder? U.S. in Search of a Role" (James Chace). Theactivity book contains activities on each subject and six handoutmaster sheets pertaining to the world area under study. (EH)

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An Invitation

THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, which publishes the GREAT DECISIONS briefing book and sponsors

the nationwide Great Decisions discussion program, invites you to become a National Associate

of the Foreign Policy Association. Your participation will enable FPA, an independent, nonpartisan

educational organization, to carry out its mission, namely, to help Americans gain a better understand-

ing of U.S. foreign policy and to stimulate constructive and informed citizen participation in world

affairs.

To become a National Associate, please use the envelope that is bOnd into this book. Associates

will receive a membership card, FPA's most recent Headline Series ("Environmental Scarcity and

Global Security") and the catalogue of publications. Members' names will be listed in next year's

briefing book.

Great Decisions Discussion Groups

Enhance your knowledge of international events and meet others who share your interest inforeign policy. Join a GREAT DECISIONS discussion group in your community. Sponsors includethe League of Women Voters, UNA-USA chapters, "Y's," World Affairs Councils, churchesand synagogues, and libraries. Or start your own discussion group.

To start your own group:

1. Assemble a group of 8-12 people. Recruit your friends or find membersin neighborhood or civic groups, the library, church or synagogue. Put anotice in the local newspaper.

2. Purchase a copy of GREAT DECISIONS for each participant. Inquireabout the special program in Georgia.

3. Determine a meeting schedule. Many groups meet weekly or biweeklyafter the book's publication in January. Other groups prefer a fall meetingschedule or a monthly schedule throughout the year.

4. Select the leadership for the group. Some groups prefer to have thesame person lead all eight sessions, while others share responsibilitiesamong group members.

5. Designate one group member to collect opinion ballots and forwardthem to the Foreign Policy Association. Your opinions will be known bythe Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Members of Congress.

Do you have questions about starting, joining, leading or participating in a Great Decisionsgroup? Write or call the Community and College Programs Department at (800) 628-5754.

3

Printed by Ripon Community Printers,Ripon, Wisconsin

Cover design: Ed Bohon

Cover photo of Bosnian soldier:AP/Wide World Photos

©COPYRIGHT 1994 BY FOREIGN POLICY

ASSOCIATION, INC., 729 SEVENTH AVE-

NUE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10019. ALL

RIGHTS RESERVED. RESEARCHED AS OF

NOVEMBER 27, 1993. THE AUTHORS ARE

RESPONSIBLE FOR FACTUAL ACCURACY

AND FOR THE VIEWS EXPRESSED. FPA

ITSELF TAKES NO POSITION ON ISSUES OF

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. PRINTED IN THEUNITED STATES OF AMERICA. LIBRARYOF CONGRESS CARD NUMBER: 58-59828.

CONTENTS

I. Conflict in Former Yugoslavia:Quest for Solutions by Susan L. Woodward 3

2. South Africa:Forging a Democratic Union by Jean Herskovits 17

3. Environmental Crisis in Former Soviet Bloc:Whose Problem? Who Pays? by William Sweet 27

4. Trade with the Pacific Rim:Pressure or Cooperation? by Jinny St. Goar 39

5. Defense:Redefining U.S. Needs and Priorities by David C. Morrison 49

6. Argentina, Brazil, Chile:Democracy and Market Economics by Jacqueline Mazza 61

7. Islam and Politics:Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia by Lawrence G. Potter 71

8. New World Disorder?U.S. in Search of a Role by James Chace 83

Opinion Ballots15-16, 37-38, 59-60, 81-82

How to get more out of GREAT DECISIONS 91

Information sources and key organizations 92

Opinion ballots: 1993 results 93

Index to GREAT DECISIONStopics (1983-93) 95

No part of this book may be reproduced in any form,or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher.

4

INTRODUCTION

11

N 1993, the Foreign Policy Association celebrated its 75th birthday. Its founderswere internationalists. They understood the challenge and the opportunitypresented to Americans by our victory in World War I. Unfortunately in the

1920s the country failed to rise to that challenge. We refused to join the League ofNations, which President Woodrow Wilson had designed and, by turning inward.defaulted on the leadership role that had been thrust upon us. Barely a decade later,we paid an awful price for our neglect.

Seventy years later, having won the cold war, Americans face a similarchallenge. Once again, domestic concerns, some of them long neglected, cry forattention, and many believe they should be given primacy. Yet the world' of the1990s is very different from that of the 1920s. To illustrate, only 3% of our jobsthen were export-driven. Now, that figure has increased almost sixfold to 17%.Television, unknown in the 1920s, has become ubiquitous. Arguably, television gotus into Somalia and will get us out, obscuring what should have been the true policydebate about our goals there and what might have been done to achieve them.

The real question, now as in the1920s, is whether we can turn inwardwithout imperiling America's long-terminterests in the world. EducatedAmericans can help our leaders answerthat question. The national debate in thefall of 1993 over the North AmericanFree Trade Agreement demonstratedonce again the role of informed opinion.

Among the lessons to be learnedfrom President Clinton's Nafta victoryare the importance of Presidentialleadership, particularly in areas inwhich domestic interests clash withinternational interests, and the impor-tance of informed citizens who under-stand the issues and are willing to

express their views to their elected representatives.For 40 years, participants in the Foreign Policy Association's Great Decisions

program have been studying and discussing American foreign. policy and expressingtheir opinions. This year you have the opportunity to make your voice heard oneight major issues that will be facing the country during 1994. Bound into this bookyou will find a set of opinion ballots, with a duplicate set for couples who may besharing the book. All you need do is fill out the ballots and mail them to us beforeJune 30, 1994, in order to be sure that your views can be tabulated in time forpresentation to the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the nationalsecurity adviser, congressional leaders and the media.

In October 1993, I had the honor to present the National Opinion Ballot Reportto Deputy Secretary of State Clifton Wharton. In his acknowledging letter, he wrote:"Special thanks for the survey results. They will be very useful to me. The GreatDecisions program is such vital work. I only wish it could be replicated a hundred-fold...." A summary of the results of the 1993 National Opinion Ballot Reportappears on pages 93 and 94. Copies of the report are available free from FPA.

The 1994 Great Decisions program offers you the opportunity to take part in thenational foreign policy debate and to take a stand on the issues of importance to usall. I hope you will seize the opportunity.

FPA PRESIDENT John Temple Swingpresents the 1993 National Opinion BallotReport to Deputy Secretary of StateClifton Wharton

John Temple SwingPresidentForeign Policy Association

GREAT DECISIONS

EditorialAdvisory

Committee

CHAIRMAN

Richard H. UllmanProfessor of International Affairs,

The Woodrow Wilson Schoolof Public and International Affairs

Princeton University

Earl W. FoellFormer Editor in Chief

World Monitor and The ChristianScience Monitor

Christine R. LucasGreat Decisions Coordinator, Ohio

Program Officer,Cleveland Council on World Affairs

Ponchitta A. PierceTelevision Host and Producer

FPA Director

Sanford J. UngarDean, School of Communication,

The American University

Nancy L. HoepliFPA Editor in Chief

Ex officio

FOREIGNPOLICYASSOCIATION

1918

Paul FordChairman of the Board of Directors

John Temple SwingPresident

EDITOR IN CHIEF

Nancy L. Hoepli

SENIOR EDITORS

Ann R. MonjoK.M. Rohan

EDITORIAL INTERNAbby Safirstein

COPY EDITOR

James I. Bauer

DESIGN

K.M. Rohan

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Conflict in fo erYugoslavia: questfor solutionsThe conflict in Yugoslavia has increased global insecurityand raises questions about the leadership role of the U.S.in the post-cold-war world.

by Susan L. Woodward

TWO WOMEN AND A BABY, who fled Sarajevo, found refuge in Split, Croatia. Croatia andSlovenia subsequently closed their borders to refugees.

NLY WEEKS AFTER assuming officeas President of the U.S., WilliamJefferson Clinton declared the

war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Westernattempts to bring peace to the former Yu-goslavia "the most frustrating and com-plex foreign policy issue in the world to-day." Many observers share that senti-ment. Some try to reduce the complexityto a black-and-white struggle of goodand evil, democrats against Communists,Croats or Muslims against Serbs, victimsand aggressors. Others choose distance toavoid the wars' atrocities by distinguish-ing themselves from those Balkan peoplewith "ancient ethnic hatreds": they willfight no matter what we do, so leavethem alone until they exhaust themselvesfrom hatred and fighting and are readyagain for peace.

American foreign policy debate onBosnia-Herzegovina has swung betweenthese two views. One camp argues that.the U.S. has a moral obligation to stopthe killing of innocent civilians, the useof force to change state borders, and theviolation of fundamental human rights.They watch with horror the daily televi-sion pictures or newspaper reports of theblatant violation of the Geneva conven-tions on war, mass rapes of women, inhu-mane detention camps, bombardment ofcities, mortars lobbed into children'splaygrounds and breadlines of oldpeople, whole villages burned to theground, and the expulsion of people fromtheir homes on the basis of ethnicity. Ifwe have knowledge of such behavior anddo nothing, are we not also complicit? Isour own world safe if we allow defiance

of its basic values? The other camp pro-tests that this requires the U.S. to be aworld policeman, sending soldiers to diein other peoples' battles. The U.S. cannotdo everything. It must choose to inter-vene only in cases that directly affect itsvital national interests.

Secretary of State WarrenChristopher's statements have reflectedboth positions. Announcing a new Ad-ministration policy in February 1993, hesought to make Bosnia "a test case ofAmerica's ability to nurture democracyin the post-cold-war world." Less than amonth later, as a result of European resis-tance to his proposals for air strikes andthe apparent lack of enthusiasm on thepart of the American public, he calledBosnia "the intractable 'problem fromhell' that no one can be expected tosolve...less...a moral tragedy...andmore...a tribal feud that no outsidercould hope to settle."

The quest for solutions to the Yugo-slav conflict has been trapped betweenthese positions since late 1990 when warn-ings of violent disintegration became ur-gent. Humanitarian assistance has notachieved its goal of delivering relief tocivilians, and it has not prevented mas-sive refugee flows. The wars and cleans-ing of towns and villages to create pureethnic areas continue in the formerYugoslav republics of Bosnia-Herze-govina and Croatia. War threatens tospread to other republics and to destabi-lize an entire region of Europe for decades.

The post-cold-war worldThe failure of European powers and theU.S. to formulate a policy toward theconflict, let alone prevent or end thewars, has demonstrated serious deficien-cies in the European security regime andthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) and led to quarrels and strainsamong Western powers. Even the UnitedNations is facing a major crisis becausethe U.S. and Europe are attempting toavoid the security issues by deployinghumanitarian missions and peacekeepingtroops instead, and then balking at the fi-nancial costs.

The Yugoslav conflict has defied solu-tion in part because of its complexity oncethe multinational country broke apart on

SUSAN L WOODWARD is a visiting fellow atThe Brookings Institution. A former nationalfellow at the Hoover Institution, she has taughtat Yale, Williams, Mt. Holyoke andNorthwestern.

GREAT DECISIONS 1994

6

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the basis of national self-determinationfor Slovenia and Croatia. Yugoslavia islocated at a crossroads of civilizations,cultures, and spheres of economic andgeopolitical interest, punctuated by dis-putes over territory. Its population is com-posed of multiple ethnic and religiousgroups and social statuses. Finding a so-lution has also been complicated by thetransition in the international order. Sincethe end of the contest between a "freeworld" and Communist states, Westernpowers are unsure about which countriesand what values lie within their nationalinterest and what constitutes a threat totheir security. The U.S. has yet to find itsrole in the transition.

During the cold war, the indepen-dence of socialist Yugoslavia from Mos-cow and its neutrality in the Balkanswere thought to be critical to U.S. na-tional security and to NATO strategy.Military aid and financial guarantees ofYugoslavia's territorial integrity fol-lowed its break with the Soviet Union in1948 and continued until 1989, whenEast-West reconciliation left it without astrategic role.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia in1991 momentarily raised the specter of1914, that a conflict in the Balkans mightonce again ignite a world war by drawingin neighbors and then major powers. Eu-ropeans, who had recognized Slovene

and Croatian independence, placed thehighest priority on containing the war toprevent it from spreading beyondYugoslav borders.

The Bush Administration intermit-tently intervened in the Yugoslav conflictwhen it seemed necessary to preserveNATO or U.S. leadership in Europe, butit maintained the position, first taken in1989, that the U.S. had no national secu-rity interest in Yugoslavia. Former Secre-tary of Defense Dick Cheney recently re-iterated the views of President GeorgeBush and his chief military officer, Gen-eral Colin Powell: "No one could evertell us what the mission should be."

In 1992 presidential candidate Clinton

reacted with moral outrage at the BushAdministration's unwillingness to defendMuslim victims against Bosnian Serbaggression, and promised support forMuslims and the Bosnian government.But in 1993 the Clinton Administrationwavered when Europeans challenged it touse ground troops, for this required it toaddress the question of U.S. nationalinterests.

Great-Power quarrelsDespite plenty of warning, Europe andthe U.S. failed to forestall war. Quarrelsamong the NATO allies prevented themfrom taking early military action to stopthe war in Croatia or to give peace nego-tiators any credible threat with warringparties. The quarrels continued over theaims of a possible military intervention,the risks of sending troops where soldiersmight be killed, who would pay, and whowould have command and control. A UNSecurity Council resolution creating sixsafe havens in Bosnia-Herzegovina wasnot implemented. Proposals for extensivediplomatic but nonmilitary interventionseemed to require too much rethinking.Whereas the crisis of NATO came frominaction, the crisis of the UN comes fromthe operational inadequacies of some26,000 troops actually sent on peace-keeping and humanitarian missions inentirely different circumstances thanthose for which peacekeeping wasdesigned.

The failure to act in the Yugoslavcase, many now argue, has increased glo-bal insecurity, raising questions aboutwhat values and rules will be enforcedand who will take a leadership role in ini-tiating new forms of cooperation or inter-vention to prevent war in a post-cold-warorder.

Creation to breakupTHE CREATION OF Yugoslavia in 1918after World War I was the result of

nationalist struggles against the empiresof Austria, Hungary and Turkey duringthe 19th century. The Great Powers sit-ting at Versailles determined its composi-tion and constitution. Although they usedPresident Woodrow Wilson's principleof national self-determination to justifythe end of empires, they formed Yugosla-via as a multinational state. Thecountry's liberal democracy gave way to

dictatorship in the face of world depres-sion and constitutional quarrels, and thereturn to democracy in 1935 came in theshadow of German economic penetra-tion. In 1941 a German-led invasionsplintered Yugoslavia among occupyingarmies from Germany, Italy, Hungaryand Bulgaria, and multiple armies of na-tional resistance.

Yugoslavia was not a nation-state buta country composed of six "constituentnations"Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Mon-

4 GREAT DECISIONS 1994

FO E3 YUGOSLAVIA

tenegrins, Macedonians, and Muslims (inthe political, not religious, sense). Peoplebelonging to nations which had stateselsewhere, called nationalities, had cul-tural rights as minorities (the largest suchgroups were ethnic Albanians and Hun-garians, but there were many others suchas Jews, Bulgarians, Turks, Romaniansand Italians). Individuals who belongedto ethnic minorities without a nationalstatus (such as the seminomadic Romanyand Vlachs) did not have such rights.Many people lived in compact ethnic ornational communities and identified witha territory, but centuries of war, forced orinvited resettlements, economic migra-tion and rapid urbanization after 1945meant that cities, most towns, the plainsand former imperial borderlands wereethnically mixed. Intermarriage wascommon, and people had relatives or sec-ond homes in other republics. There wasan unusual richness of cultures:Habsburg, Venetian and Ottoman lega-cies; Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox,Muslim, Jewish and Protestant religions;overall Slavic dominance mixed with in-digenous and non-Slav traditions. Someareas of the country, such as the republicof Bosnia-Herzegovina, took pride intheir multicultural pluralism and toler-ance in living together in mixed commu-nities for centuries.

Federal vs. states' rightsTo accommodate the rights of its six na-tions to self-determination, Yugoslavia'sconstitution after 1945 was federal. Poli-tics revolved around the tug and pull be-tween states' rights and the powers of thefederal government. The country wascommitted to rights of national equalityand individual economic security. Butwhen hard times strained governmentbudgets, richer areas objected to the fed-erally mandated equal standard forwages, welfare programs, minority cul-tural rights, and quotas in public employ-ment, and to federal taxes for assistanceto poorer communities, the defense bud-get and military industries. Their demandfor less government regulation, local self-rule and homogeneous communities wassimultaneously antifederal. The govern-ment was far more decentralized than inthe U.S., but it shared the same commit-ment to extensive local control overschools, police and welfare. Because thecountry was composed of minorities (nonational, regional or occupational groupformed a numerical majority), the system

emphasized voting rights to protect mi-norities instead of majoritarian, competi-tive democracy.

In terms of how people saw them-selves, ethnicity was less important thanoccupation and urban or rural residenceand culture. Residents of cosmopolitancities had different prospects than thoseof heartland farming communities orpoorer mining and timbering towns in theinterior. Villagers had deep cultural andpsychological attachments to the land,and households survived periods of se-vere inflation and unemployment by rely-ing on their own production of food, onneighbors or on rural relatives. There wasgreat economic variety and inequalityamong the regions. For defense againstexternal invasion, national policy calledfor substantial military industries and lo-cal stockpiling of arms. A tradition of lo-cal militia and frontier defense created agun-owning culture in the interior. Thiswas reinforced after World War II by amilitary doctrine that called for the entirepopulation to be prepared to take armsagainst invaders.

Collapse of YugoslaviaThe collapse of Yugoslavia did not hap-pen overnight, although its acceleratingspeed made actions to stop it ever moredifficult. It was a long process of eco-nomic and political disintegration as a

result of efforts to democratize a socialisteconomy under extremely difficult inter-national conditions. Yugoslavia had ex-perienced a decade of austerity and re-forms aimed at paying its foreign debt byreorienting the economy to exports andWestern markets, and reversing the pro-gressive weakening of the government'scapacity to manage the economy due todecentralization. Liberalization and anti-inflationary policy prescribed by the In-ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) de-manded cuts in federal expenditures andhigher taxes.

As early as 1985, 1 million people,including 70% of youths under age 27,out of a work force of 7 million, were of-ficially unemployed. Economic austeritycombined with hyperinflation resulted indeclining living standards for 80% of thepopulation. Growing insecurity led toprotest actions, religious revival, scape-goating of ethnic groups or women, and adecline in civility.

Politicians quarreled with ever moreintransigence over taxes, public expendi-tures, access to foreign exchange, thepowers of legislatures and executives,and whether or how to reform the federalgovernment. Particularly contentious wasthe IMF demand for an independent cen-tral bank that would recentralize mon-etary policy and replace consensual vot-ing with majority decision. These crystal-

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TOPIC

1FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

lized in a debate between antifederalists,who wanted to keep primary economic

in the defense budget, and deadlocks infederal decisionmaking.

Slovenia and Croatia to pursue nationalindependence as a part of their own as-

power in the republics and even extendthe latter's legislative and judicial powers Sloven di 'iia dissociates'

sertion of national power and expandingspheres of interest after the cold war. The

to near-full sovereignty, and liberals,who believed that a market economy hadnot only to strengthen federal economic

In September 1989, the Slovene govern-ment declared its intention to "dissoci-ate" from Yugoslavia. The following

announcement by Serbian PresidentSlobodon Milosevic that if they seceded,he would insist that the republican bor-

capacity but -also to break down the po- January its Communist party withdrew ders be "rectified" went unheeded. Helitical barriers to capital and labor mobil- from the Yugoslav Communist party, the said a change conforming to the patternity within the country imposed by the re- only legal political party, which removed of Serb settlements would give Serbs thepublics. the last obstacle to multiparty elections. right also to form a national state. The

The declared goal of the Yugoslav Elections were held in the republics in U.S. continued to warn him against thefederal government by 1988-89 was full spring 1990, and they became vehicles violation of human rights in Serbia'sWesternization and an end to the socialist for nationalists in each republic to push province of Kosovo, where ethnic Alba-system. through programs that replaced the con- nians declared the goal of independence.

stitutional protections for national equal- The decision of Slovenia to hold a ref-Democracy and war ity with majority exclusivism. Consensus erendum on independence in December

War began with democratization. By was replaced by confrontation. Freedom 1990 and to veto federal elections that1987-88, politicians in the republics of of speech permitted intolerance. Small might have shown support forSlovenia and Serbia began openly to seek incidents and rumor fed paranoia among Markovic's reforms dealt the latter a se-popular support on the basis of national- people now placed in a minority position vere blow. In January 1991 the new fed-ism. They asserted their republics' right by the new constitutions. The Commu- eral presidency began to mediate the con-to national self-determination, to eco- nist system of public security collapsed; stitutional deadlock among republicannomic resources and to political control. many police formed paramilitary gangs leaders and an end to the civil violence inWhereas the Slovene goal was anti- affiliated with political parties or joined Croatia between the Croatian govern-federalist, claiming states' rights against criminal networks. Ethnic minorities ment and Serbian militants in the krajinafederal powers, the Serbian goal wasantiprovincial: it reclaimed states' rights

were treated as untrustworthy or disloyal,and some began to demand a restoration

region of Croatia. In this area, Serbs, rep-resenting less than one third their total

against the powers granted by the 1974 of rights or territorial autonomy in reac- number in Croatia but territorially con-constitution to its provinces of Vojvodina tion to government police action. centrated, had reacted with force againstand the rebellious Kosovo. The latter haddemanded independence on the basis of

,Economic shock therapy

discrimination. President FranjoTudjman had decided to replace all non-

nationality: 87% of the population were As the country was disintegrating politi- Croats in the police and security forcesAlbanians. Both leaders also used nation- cally, Western diplomats and bankers fo- because he considered them unreliable.alism to undercut or co-opt anti-Commu- cused on the federal government's eco- Members of the same political party asnist intellectuals and youths who were nomic reform. They were enthusiastic Bosnian Serbs, the Serbs in krajina beganusing nationalism to attack Communist over its recognition that foreign invest- to oppose Croatian plans for indepen-rule as a whole, especially from the right. ment and foreign-debt repayment re- dence, announced July 1990, and held a

At the same time, the international or- quired abandoning socialist property referendum demanding territorial au-der defining Yugoslav security was rights and welfare guarantees. They tonomy.changing. Between 1985 and 1989, new viewed the "shock therapy" program of The federal presidency moved to dis-forms of East-West cooperation and fur- 1989 as the only way to end hyper- arm all new security and paramilitaryther economic integration began to break inflation and the goal of rapid currency forces, ensure civilian authority over thedown the hostile military and trade blocs. convertibility as the best solution to the federal army, and end the creation of in-The two most western, antifederalist re- persistent trade deficit. Yugoslav prime dependent armies in Slovenia andpublics, Slovenia and Croatia, used the minister Ante Markovic had inspired Croatia. When the army began troopopening to increase ties with Central Eu- hope among liberals throughout the movements in January, the U.S. warnedrope, with which they shared cultural country that the economic crisis would that it opposed any attempt to hold theidentity as Roman Catholics and part of soon be over. But post-cold-war Euro- country together by force. Yet in Febru-the former Habsburg civilization. The pean politics intervened. ary, Slovenia and Croatia declared allrapprochement with Europe threatened to When the wall dividing Europe came federal laws invalid on their territory.isolate areas in Yugoslavia which were down, in place of incorporation into Eu- One faction of the army, after failing inlabeled Balkan, home of Eastern Ortho- rope, Yugoslavia was further excluded March to win a vote in the federal presi-dox and Muslim populations of the because it had not been part of either dency for emergency rule, allied itselfformer Ottoman sphere. These areas,such as Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina,were geographically farther from Europe

bloc. Western governments began to dis-tinguish between central and eastern Eu-rope, and this threatened to split the

with Milosevic.Only two months before Slovenia and

Croatia finally declared full indepen-and were facing more severe economic country down the middle. Individual dence, June 25, 1991, the Europeandecline. The army meanwhile was in- states such as Austria, Hungary and Ger- Community (EC) began a series of "fact-creasingly concerned about defense pre- many were beginning to give both moral finding" and "good offices" missions. Itsparedness, rising social discontent, cuts and clandestine military support to policy was to offer economic aid to the


FO IM YRSGOSaAVOA

Yugosl vian Civil War Time Line1989

Sept. 27 Slovenia declares intent to "dissociate" from Yugoslavia.

1990

Jan. 22

Dec. 23

June 25

July 7

Sept.

Congress rescinds Communist party's monopoly on politicalpower, setting stage for multiparty elections, held April-December.

Slovenes vote to secede from Yugoslavia should plans for aconfederation fail.

1991

Slovenia and Croatia declare independence from Yugoslavia;federal parliament sends in troops to prevent secessions.Brioni Accord, which establishes cease-fire in Slovenia, finalizedby EC.

EC establishes Conference on Yugoslavia, a peace conference tonegotiate a political settlement. UN imposes arms embargo onentire country on 25th.

1992

Feb. 21 UN passes resolution to send 14,400 peacekeepers to Croatia.March 1 Bosnians vote for independence; Bosnian Serbs threaten to secede

if referendum passed.April 4 1,200 UN peacekeepers arrive in Croatia; the next day Serbs

begin shelling Sarajevo.April 7 U.S. and EC recognize Bosnian independence; the U.S.

recognizes Croatia and Slovenia. (EC did so April 6.)April 27 Serbia and Montenegro announce that they alone constitute a new

Yugoslavia.

1992 (continued)

May 30 UN imposes economic and political sanctions on Yugoslavia inorder to end fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

July 2 Croats living in Bosnia declare an independent state comprisingnearly a third of Bosnian territory.

Aug.26-27 London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia held. Establishes

the standing International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia(ICFY), which creates the Statement of Principles, a set ofprovisions on which a peace plan can be based.

Sept. 22 UN withdraws Yugoslav seat, occupied by the Belgradegovernment.

Oct. 9 UN imposes a "no-fly zone" over Bosnia, prohibits all militaryaircraft flights.

1993

Jan. 30 All parties agree to principles in Vance-Owen plan, which callsfor UN-monitored cease-fire; the establishment of a centralgovernment with 3 Muslims, 3 Croats and 3 Serbs; and thecreation of 10 cantons with proportionate ethnic representation inthe government.

Feb. 22 UN mandates an International War Crimes Tribunal.April 7 "The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" admitted to UN.May 2 Karadzic is last to sign Vance-Owen peace plan. He later insists

that it is subject to ratification by a Serbian assembly, whichultimately rejects it.

Aug. 28 Muslim-led Bosnian parliament rejects the Owen-Stoltenbergplan; the Clinton Administration assures the UN that it wouldprovide half of the 50,000 new troops needed to enforce anypeace plan.

federal government on the condition thecountry remained together and stayed thecourse on radical economic reform.

EC Europeanists had seized on theopportunity to create a common foreignand security policy as they moved towardfinancial integration at Maastricht, Neth-erlands, in December 1991. Togetherwith the brand new crisis-managementinstitutions of the 51-member Confer-ence on Security and Cooperation in Eu-rope (CSCE), as Dutch foreign ministerHans van den Broek proclaimed in June,this was to be "Europe's hour." Instead,national disputes arose immediatelyamong the 12 EC members over whetherto interpose troops to stop the fighting inCroatia or to internationalize the conflictby recognizing Croatia and defining Serbopposition as aggression against the state.Prevented from military action by U.S.opposition to NATO involvement and al-ternatives proposed by France, the ECnever achieved a common policy, exceptmomentarily to concede to Germany onrecognitionand not before Britain andFrance had sought a substitute for EC ac-tion in the UN.

Continuing conflict within the Euro-Atlantic alliance and a priority of na-tional interests over multilateral goalsamong the 12 led EC governments to re-

'treat, demoralized at their diplomatic fail-ure but also defensive that there was no

security threat in Bosnia-Herzegovina,and therefore they should only devotehumanitarian aid to what they claimedwas, after all, a "civil war." To avoid thereal questions of Yugoslavia's place inthe new Europe, the security vacuum leftin the East and the Balkans, and the val-ues which Europe was willing to defend,they were redefining the border of Eu-rope in cultural terms, between economi-cally compatible, "civilized" states andpolitically unstable "barbarians" inclinedto use military force.

EC mediationOnly when the Yugoslav army moved todefend the state against Slovene takeoverof its international borders and customsposts did the EC offer to "facilitate politi-cal dialogue." Until that time Westernpolicy had focused on federal economicreform to repay debt and on the protec-tion of human rights when whole repub-lics were demanding full sovereignty orregions, self-rule. The effect of the ECmediation was to accelerate the pace ofdisintegration. EC negotiations, whichbegan June 29, 1991, effectively endedthe Yugoslav state.

With the Brioni Accord of July 7 es-tablishing a cease-fire in Slovenia, theEC shifted its attention to borders. Itmarginalized the federal government anddisregarded internal forces working

against disintegration and in favor ofcross-border relations, a constitutionalcompromise and further democratization.

The EC pronounced the army's actionsillegitimate and aggressive, and declaredthe borders of the republics legitimateinternational borders that could not bechanged by force. It recognized the rightof Slovenia and Croatia to national self-determination, and ignored the violentconsequences of this principle as a basisfor sovereignty in a multinational state andethnically mixed society. It made no ar-rangements to defend its decision on bor-ders against those who disagreed.

This precipitous end to internal effortsat negotiating the conflict deprivedYugoslavia's citizens of the time neededto develop alternatives or to hold newelections. The dismemberment of theYugoslav state provided the opening thatSerbia and others who were ready to fightfor different borders needed, and it forcedall those in the middle to alter their posi-tions overnight and to take sides betweenrepublican independence and a truncatedYugoslavia.

The EC demand for a three-monthmoratorium on Slovene and Croatian in-dependence in exchange for the army'sretreat to barracks and then fromSlovenia (and the Austrian border) intoCroatia only encouraged armed mobiliza-tion. By August-September, local con-

10 GREAT DECISIONS 1994 7

1OPICFORMER YUGOSLAVIA

flicts in ethnically mixed areas, fanned byright-wing paramilitary gangs of Croatsand Serbs, had drawn Croatian govern-ment forces and insurgent Serbs aided byarmy units into full-scale war. Macedoniadeclared independence. Kosovo renewedits declaration. Factions in the army com-mitted to Yugoslavia lost, and othersmade plans to create a rump Yugoslavia.And the three communal parties govern-

ing Bosnia-Herzegovina split, withBosnian Croats and Muslims opting forindependence and Bosnian Serbs declar-ing their intention to remain within Yu-goslavia. Following an EC-ordered refer-endum on Bosnian independence onMarch 1, 1992, the war to define the bor-ders of new states and gain internationalrecognition spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Yugoslays' three campsrr HE EC DECISION on borders divided1 former Yugoslays into three camps.

The first was composed of all thosepeople who were irrelevant to negotia-tions because they did not control armiesor represent states officially. These wereordinary citizens, civic groups, antiwarmovements and political groups oppos-ing ethnic apartheid. In the second campwere political leaders who claimed na-tional authority within the republicanborders that were declared legitimate.Their primary strategy was therefore tolook to foreign support and to expect theinternational community to defend thesanctity of republican borders. In thethird camp were politicians who disputedthose borders because their territorialclaims to national self-determinationcrossed those borders or were internal tothem. Their strategy was to gain eventualrecognition of their state by military con-trol, exclusionary nationalism and physi-cal expulsion to create ethnically domi-nant territories that would affirm thatnation's right to the land in an eventualreferendum.

Slovenia and CroatiaThe second camp's strategy worked forSlovenia. Influential foreign patrons,such as Austria and Germany, togetherwith successful propaganda to persuadeworld opinion that they were acting inself-defense to protect their endangereddemocracy, produced Brioni. But theirswas the easy case because, like theCzechs and Slovaks, Slovenia's manyconflicts with its neighbor Croatia did notinclude the border. The Italian commu-nity in Istria, split in two by the indepen-dence, had not yet begun to organize.

The Croatian case was more difficult.Although the EC recognized its bordersand considered Croatia's relations with

Serbs an internal matter of minorityrights, many countries such as Britain,France and the U.S. wanted to avoid aprecedent that could break up the SovietUnion or legitimize autonomy move-ments in West European countries.

As fighting in Croatia intensified, theU.S. and Britain rejected proposals byFrance and by a meeting of the Group ofSeven leading economic powers to sendin forces. In September 1991, the EC setup a peace conferencethe Hague Con-ference on Yugoslaviato negotiate acomprehensive political settlement for aconfederation of independent states. TheUN Security Council voted an arms em-bargo and in October sent an envoy,former U.S. Secretary of State CyrusVance, to explore conditions for settingup a peacekeeping operation. Germany,however, favored unilateral recognitionof Croatian sovereignty to international-ize the conflict and thus declare the Serbrebellion as external aggression.

After a five-month campaign, Ger-many got its way on December 16, 1991.The recognition of Slovene and Croatiansovereignty nullified the EC's HagueConference on Yugoslavia. Vance hadnegotiated a cessation of hostilities inCroatia in December which depended onan eventual political settlement. As a re-sult, the Vance Plan for a UN peacekeep-ing operation, adopted by the SecurityCouncil in February 1992, only froze thestatus quo. Placed in an "inkblot" patternat sites of armed confrontation, 14,000UN soldiers were to oversee the disarm-ing of Serb militia and the restoration ofcontrol over police and government tolocal majorities in four UN protected ar-eas (UNPAs). Instead, both sides viewthe UN as legitimating their claims to theterritorythe Croatian government tosovereignty within its republican borders,

and the Serbs to their right of self-deter-mination to choose their state.

Croatia lacks control of almost onethird of its territory recognized interna-tionally, and Serbs refuse to disarm be-cause of constant threats from Croatianleaders. Croatian President Tudjman hasbuilt an impressive army to 6O3front theSerbs, occasionally orders offensives toretake villages and land, and dares theUN to leave; Serb radicals hope to join acommon state with Bosnian Serbs afterthe partition of Bosnia.

Bosnia-HerzegovinaOf all those in the second camp, the gov-ernment of Bosnia-Herzegovina wasmost in need of international support forits territorial integrity. EC negotiatorLord Carrington, the UN Secretary Gen-eral Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his en-voy, Cyrus Vance, and Bosnian PresidentAlija Izetbegovic had all warned thatGerman-led EC recognition of Croatiaprior to a political settlement for thewhole country would lead to further war,particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina wasofficially composed of three politicalcommunities (nations)Serbs (32%),Croats (17%) and Muslims (43 %)within a Bosnian identity. Yugoslaviahad acted as the collective security guar-antor for its territorial integrity, the equalrights of its nations, its multiethnic cities,the quarter of its population which hadintermarried, and more than half itspopulation of 4.4 million living in mixedcommunities, who have been made refu-gees by campaigns to create ethnicallypure areas. The security of Bosnia-Herzegovina was unlikely without re-gional or international guarantees. Asearly as January 1991, the presidents ofCroatia (Tudjman) and Serbia(Milosevic) had agreed to partitionBosnia. Croatia claims Bosnian territo-ries historically (and the Croats in west-ern Herzegovina are Tudjman's mostloyal political base); Serbs claim land onthe basis of old settlements and privateownership of 63% of Bosnian land, andare allied with autonomist Serbs inCroatia. Both Croatia and Serbia con-sider Bosnian territory strategically es-sential to their independent states. At thesame time, all three nations withinBosnia have separate political projectsfor self-determination. Although theBosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat par-ties allied for independence in October


FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

1991, and the army in April 1992 joinedthe Serbs who had withdrawn to form aseparate republic within Bosnia, Muslimsand Croats now fight each other in terri-tories contested in central Bosnia, whileCroats and Serbs occasionally allyagainst Muslims.

Three plansFollowing the EC-required referendumon March 1, 1992, in which 63% ofBosnians opted for independence (mostSerbs boycotted), the EC began negotia-tions among the three national parties.Assuming that ethnic partition was mostlikely, it took as a talking point the pro-posal from Bosnian Serb leader RadovanKaradzic for ethnic cantonization. Beforethe three parties could move from agree-ment on basic principles, on March 18,1992, to their disagreements over themaps, the negotiations on the LisbonPlan were interrupted by recognition ofBosnia-Herzegovina. This time the U.S.preempted in favor of immediate recog-nition, granted April 6 by the EC andApril 7 by the U.S., so that the U.S. couldalso recognize Croatia and Slovenia andend its quarrel with the EC.

Vance-Owen peace planThe horrors of the Bosnian wars led theEC and UN to join forces in London inAugust 1992. They created a standingInternational Conference on the FormerYugoslavia to negotiate an overall peacesettlement, to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to create conditions forinternational enforcement. In contrast tothe EC's cantonization plan of March1992, the Vance-Owen peace plan ofJanuary 1993 attempted to protect Bos-nian sovereignty and territorial integritywith a decentralized government com-posed of 10 provinces. Although the ECand the UN Security Council supportedthe Vance-Owen peace plan, much of theAmerican press and the Clinton Adminis-tration (and the Bosnian Serbs) did not.They viewed it as unenforceable and asrewarding Bosnian Serbs for aggression,ethnic cleansing and bombardment ofcities to take territory.

The Bosnian government had suc-ceeded in its efforts to influence publicopinion and get support for a bettersettlement for the Muslim victims of thewar, but this sympathy did not bring mili-tary aid to reverse the Muslims' losses toBosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. Theplan with its commitment to a Bosnian

identity was abandoned in May of 1993.

Owen-Stoltenberg planA third peace plandrafted by LordOwen and Norwegian Foreign MinisterThorvald Stoltenberg in August 1993accepted the military fait accompli ofthree nationally exclusive ministates in aconfederation with each one's right tosecede. The Bosnian government wasunable to accept ethnic partition in whichMuslim areas make no viable state andBosnia-Herzegovina exists in name only.Refusing to sign this plan as it had previ-ous ones, it now faces its own autono-mists as well as exclusivist Muslimradicalization.

Economic sanctionsWestern efforts to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina included economic andmoral pressure. Economic sanctionsagainst the rump Federal Republic ofYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) foraiding Bosnian Serbs were imposed inMay 1992. They were stiffened in April1993 and enforcement was tightened inAugust. The Federal Republic of Yugo-slavia was suspended from the CSCE,diplomatically isolated, and barred fromsome activities of the UN. A War CrimesTribunal has been established and is tak-ing evidence under a UN Security Coun-cil mandate voted February 22, 1993. Butthe sanctions have thus far strengthenedMilosevic's power within Serbia andworsened the economic conditions thatare tinder for war, leading many to fearcivil war in Serbia and the Europeans to

propose their gradual lifting in exchangefor territory in Bosnia.

The fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina hasnot yet fully dispirited ethnic Albaniansin Kosovo, who also appear to expectinternational support for their oppositionto Serbian rule and for eventual indepen-dence.

The third campThe other sizeable group made vulner-able by the breakup of multinational Yu-goslavia were the Serbs living outside ofSerbia. The state created at Versailles in1919 granted Serbia its war objective toincorporate Serbs in one state only if itcombined with Slovenes and Croats; infederal Yugoslavia, 40% lived in otherrepublics. The fact that Croatia hadadopted some of the state symbols andterritorial claims of its Nazi-created fas-cist state of 1941-45, and that someMuslim groups had supported thatproject, created fears that World War IIwas still being fought. Thus, Germany'srole in early recognition of Croatia was aboon to Milosevic's brand of national-ism: nurturing Serbian paranoia of vic-timization, he claimed he was defendingSerbs against a repeat of the genocide inCroatia and Bosnia during World War H.Since Germany could not constitutionallyemploy military force and the U.S. hadrepeated frequently that it would be un-willing to use ground troops or to agreeto NATO action in Yugoslavia, this thirdcamp assessed correctly that it could actwithout fear of retaliation. Only muchlater did NATO, under U.S. pressure, de-

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FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

ploy a few ships in the Adriatic toenforce trade sanctions, create a "no-flyzone" in Bosnia-Herzegovina, andthreaten air strikes against Bosnian Serbartillery and supply routes.

The armyThe final actor in the third camp was thearmy. When a state dissolves withoutprior agreement on borders or dispositionof state assets, the organization respon-sible for defending the borders must finda new role or new loyalties. The Brioniagreement held the army responsible forusing force to change borders, and eachsuccessive negotiation required it to re-treat further into what remained of theformer country. Efforts by army units toplay a neutralizing role or to fight para-military gangs were discounted, and talksbetween the Bosnian government andarmy leadership over demobilization, re-tirements and housing in the fall of 1991were interrupted by the EC decisions onrecognition. Although the army had alsobegun to disintegrate among nationalgroups, the remaining core and the bulkof its heavy artillery, tanks, airpower andlogistical support went to aid local armiesof Serbs in Croatia and to form two newarmies, one of Bosnian Serbs and a newYugoslav Army.

The situation in late fall 1993 contin-ued to deteriorate. Political negotiationsover the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina hadstalled with the Bosnian government'srejection of the Owen-Stoltenberg plan.With the UN's humanitarian relief con-

voys often unable to reach villages undersiege or caught in the cross fire of rivalarmies, the prospect of mass starvation,disease and death from exposure in win-ter was all too real.

Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina had claimed a Serbian Re-public. Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovinahad created their own state of Herzeg-Bosnia, which would eventually joinCroatia. Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovinahad lost their hopes of a unitary sover-eign Bosnia and were subdividing intoautonomous regions and isolated citiesonly nominally protected by the UN.Quarrels between Montenegro andSerbia, which had joined in a new Fed-eral Republic of Yugoslavia in April1992, threatened a split. Albanian politi-cal aspirations in Kosovo and westernMacedonia were growing, and Mace-donia remained unrecognized by the U.S.and other countries because of Greek ob-jections to its name. Numerous autono-mist movements had emerged withinSerbia and within Croatia.

The partition of Bosnia creates prob-lems in the rest of the country. IfTudjman can incorporate Bosnian territo-ries, what claim does he have on Serb-held areas in Croatia? If the republicanborders do not hold, what legitimacy isthere for Serbian rule over Kosovo andVojvodina, or what principle will preventradicals on both sides from war? Even ifthe Solomonic choice in Bosnia is ap-plied to Kosovo, as many have arguedfor some time, its partition would be at

OF (OURSE,I FEEL BAD ABOUT THE BALKAN SITUATION.BUT THEN I A5K MYSELF, WHAT

HAS BOSNIAEVER DONEFOR ME?

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least as bloody and contested. Some ex-perts doubt war can be contained withinBosnia-Herzegovina. If borders continueto be subject to contest and territories topartition, what is to stand in the way ofnot only greater Croatia and greaterSerbia, but also greater Albania andgreater Hungary?

RefugeesThe continuing flow of refugees also fa-vors continuation of war and lawlessness.This mechanism is less politically moti-vated, but also less controllable. In cen-tral Bosnia-Herzegovina, people expelledfrom their villages elsewhere (especiallyeastern Bosnia by Serbs, but also fromneighboring villages by Croats) and whohave nowhere else to go are providingcannon fodder for government forces.Slovenia and Croatia closed their bordersto refugees in AugustSeptember 1992(and therefore passage to other countriesas well). A partition of Bosnia could re-quire the forced resettlement of a millionor more persons. Population exchangesare taking place (mostly involuntarily)within the UNPAs in Croatia. Most ofthe 600,000 refugees in Serbia arehoused in family homes, and have be-come the source of increasingly open ten-sions. In AprilJune 1993, Serbia beganto disqualify anyone from Serbian areasin Bosnia (56 communes) or the Croatiankrajina (20 communes) as refugees, un-less eligible for Red Cross aid, so as toforce them to return home.

Albania and Greece have been in con-tinuous conflict over Albanian refugeesin Greece (and lately Greeks from Alba-nia wishing to enter Greece) for morethan two years.

Should fighting erupt in Macedonia,this will bottle up refugees there or sendthem into Bulgaria or Serbia. GreekPrime Minister Andreas Papandreou hassaid he will close the border withMacedonia if it does not give up thename because to Greeks this implies ithas territorial aspirations to the northernprovince of Macedonia in Greece.

Another consequence of war has beenastounding unemployment, from Slo-venia to Macedonia. In the early stages,the unemployed provided ready fightersbecause they were promised pay andbenefits. Outside immediate war zones,they vote for xenophobic, right-wingradicals and exacerbate ethnic tensionswith gang fights, crime and terrorizingminorities. Armies no longer have the


FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

option or resources to screen for psycho-logically unsuited recruits, so that "inci-dents" which can escalate into armedconfrontations are on the rise (includingin Serbia).

While pensioners in Serbia are com-mitting suicide and civilians trapped inBosnian towns under siege are starvingto death, the collapse of economies andcurrencies under either war or sanctionsis feeding radicalization (support formilitant solutions), real ethnic conflict,and a reign of war profiteers, sanctionrunners, criminal syndicates and general-ized terror. Whereas the wars began witha breakdown of civil authority and a lo-calized scramble to control stockpiles ofweapons and military equipment, createparamilitaries and expel political en-emies, the economic hardship has led tonew sources of local rebellion, such assoldiers or local politicians.

The international community is cur-rently tolerating extensive police repres-sion in the region to keep order, but suchrepression actually encourages the likeli-hood that small incidents can escalate.Government budgets go to the war effortand building new arms industries. Thecalculation is that Western recession andpolitical barriers against Yugoslav tradewill continue and that the surest exportmarket lies in rearmament and local warspredicted throughout the region. Thetransition to market economies anddemocratic governments is at a standstill,and has been harshly damaged in neigh-boring countries, such as Bulgaria, Alba-nia, Romania and Hungary. No interna-tional compensation exists for the eco-nomic and social burden of refugees, theinterruption of the only overland trans-portation between Europe and the MiddleEast, the cost of building new routesaround Yugoslavia, and the billions lostin regional trade, in enforcing sanctionsand in economic decline.

International complicityThe Yugoslav conflict demonstrates thetendency of nationalist conflict to esca-late out of control when there is no coun-terbalance. International interventionhelped marginalize domestic counter-weights. By taking sides of particular na-tional groups, specifying victims and ag-gressors, it accepted the nationalist argu-ments.

The international community has notyet confronted the clash of norms that itsactions have encouraged. Which takes

SARAJEVO: ONCE A HOME, now a base for firing mortar rounds into the surroundingneighborhood.

precedence when they are in conflict,self-determination or the sanctity of bor-ders? noninterference or human rights?Resolution of the conflict between theright to national self-determination and amultinational environment has been rel-egated to the category of internal affairs.The world denounces the genocidal ac-tions of ethnic cleansing with one hand,and accepts the inevitability of ethnicconflict and nationally exclusive stateswith the other. Political negotiations andhumanitarian aid have focused, more-over, on single contests, forgetting thatthe dissolution of a state and wars overits successor-states mean they are inter-related.

A global conference?The Geneva negotiators now propose aglobal conference, recognizing yet againthat no settlement can be reached in oneregion independently of the others, butthe difficulty is how to incorporate newrepresentatives who can propose compro-mises, save face and begin the restorationof civil order. The importance of thiscannot be underestimated because na-tional groups spill over international, aswell as internal, borders throughout theregion. Any aggrieved minority can ap-peal for assistance to members of its "na-tion" in a neighboring province or state,and they feel obliged to respond. Russiannationalists, for whom the plight of Serbsevokes that of Russians outside Russiaand tensions with the autonomous repub-

lics, have sent mercenaries; northern Eu-ropean countries have aided Slovenia andCroatia; and many Islamic countries havehelped Bosnia-Herzegovina. The morethe Bosnian conflict is portrayed as a reli-gious war, the more it can destabilizemoderate, secular governments in theMiddle East under pressure from Islamicfundamentalists. As long as borders arenot settled, the process of reversal cannotbegin. Only open borders can reassureminorities that they are not trapped innational states and provide the economiccooperation necessary to viable states.

When the EC internationalized the in-ternal republican borders of former Yu-goslavia without recognizing inevitabledisputes or guaranteeing those bordersmilitarily, it gave advantage to those witharms. The massive production and pur-chase of weapons for cold-war defensebecame available for internal war in anonaligned country patronized by bothsuperpowers. The elaborate civil defenseprovided stocks of weapons and trainingfor local militia, rival political parties andcitizens' self-protection. Weapons dis-carded by NATO and the former Sovietbloc's military alliance, the Warsaw Pact,flowed in. Western powers sought toavoid military involvement by armingcombatants within the country. Through-out the region there are surplus arms andmercenaries left over from superpowercompetition. Demobilized soldiers andofficers whose pay and amenities are fall-ing rapidly are selling off stocks of weap-


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ons that arms and force reductions havesaid must go. Governments continue tosell weapons in order to keep defense in-dustries going, slow the appearance ofmass unemployment, keep open marketsbeing claimed by Western powers, andfinance imports when Western markets

remain protectionist. Western powerscontinue to ignore the need to incorporatearmies and states of former Yugoslaviainto European security cooperation or toget control of the flow of arms. TheBalkans remain a black hole in Europeansecurity considerations.

U.S. foreign policyUS. FOREIGN POLICY toward theconflict in Yugoslavia began in

1989. Between 1989 and 1991 the BushAdministration crossed the country off itsstrategic agenda. It welcomed Europeaninitiatives in 1991, and began to define apost-cold-war policy in which regionalorganizations would be responsible formanaging regional conflicts. By mid-1992, the Group of Seven and the UNhad declared this doctrine. In its cam-paign to recognize Bosnian sovereigntythe U.S. made no commitments, for itspurpose was to restore unity with its Eu-ropean allies over Croatia and Slovenia.Throughout shifts in policy, the BushAdministration remained consistent thatthe U.S. would not commit military forceto a place where it saw no vital interests.Taking the lead back from Europe afterthe April 1992 recognition, the U.S.pressed through the UN for sanctionsagainst Serbia and Montenegro and fortheir diplomatic isolation. But it retainedits distance, insisting on humanitarian aidto relieve suffering and the CSCE hu-man-rights mechanisms as twin pillars ofany intervention.

Presidential candidate Clinton took upthe cause of Muslim victims in theBosnian war during the 1992 electioncampaign, accusing the Bush Administra-tion of moral defeatism. Upon taking of-fice, however, he discovered that few op-tions remained for effective interventionas long as his Administration, too, wasunwilling to commit ground troops to helpbring peace. In February 1993, he pro-posed lifting the arms embargoso thatthe Bosnian government could arm todefend itself on a more "level playingfield" against heavy artillery held byBosnian Serbsand to aid that fight withselective bombing by U.S. planes. TheEuropeans oppose both "lift and strike"options, however, because they have sol-diers on the ground in UN forces protect-ing humanitarian convoys and relief work-ers and because lifting the embargo wouldbe merely symbolic unless arms were ac-tually delivered to landlocked Bosnia.They would in any case prolong the war.

In defending Muslims against Serbaggressors, moreover, the Clinton Ad-ministration played into the nationalistframework instead of protecting the neu-

tral, international norms necessary toBosnian sovereignty and all the victims(Muslim and non-Muslim) who supportthat cause. Insisting on a better Muslimdeal in the Vance-Owen peace planweakened the plan's authority and gaveBosnian Serbs an excuse to defeat it. En-couraging patron-client relations in thebargaining over Bosniadelegating theBosnian Croats to Germany, introducinga Russian interlocutor into the negotia-tions for Bosnian Serbs, and becomingpatron to the Bosnian Muslimshad theeffect of introducing major-power inter-ests and conflict into the quest for solu-tions, including a Russian threat of vetoin the UN Security Council. Like the pre-vious Administration, it chose to rationits resources and attention with a policyof national interest, defining economicreform and democratization in Russiawithin that category and Bosnia-Herzegovina of no strategic importance.In April it countered Russian proposals toreinvigorate peace negotiations throughthe UN by organizing a joint-action pro-gram of humanitarian aid and indicatingwillingness to commit troops to enforcewhatever peace agreement was reachedby Bosnian parties. Its efforts then turnedto improving relief to Muslims trappedby Serbian siege in eastern Bosniantowns, such as Srebrenica, with an airliftthat has lasted longer and is more exten-sive than the Berlin airlift of 1948. InAugust it persuaded NATO to threatenair strikes on Bosnian Serb forces andsupply routes if they did not end thestrangulation of Sarajevo.

U.S. airplanes based in Germany cur-rently drop parcels of food and medicinesto towns trapped by fighting throughoutBosnia-Herzegovina. Presidents Bushand Clinton have both warned SerbianPresident Milosevic officially that theU.S. will act should fighting begin in itsprovince of Kosovo and endanger theAlbanian population. UN troops inMacedonia include 325 U.S. soldierswho monitor activities in hopes of pre-venting war by early warning. PresidentClinton continues to support his February1993 policy to use air strikes againstBosnian Serbs and to lift the arms em-bargo. (A U.S.-sponsored resolution tolift the arms embargo in favor of theBosnian Muslims was defeated in June1993 in the UN Security Council.) Re-flecting concern about domestic politicalopposition, the President conditionallycommitted the U.S. to providing half of


FORMER YUGOSLAVIAtr p

the 50,000 or more peacekeeping troops ing interruption of regional economies tarian disaster will worsen, a new ap-needed according to UN and U.S. mili- and the negative example of global lead- proach at diplomatic negotiations is un-tary assessments to enforce a peace ership have broad and direct implications avoidable. Nationally exclusive statessettlement for Bosnia-Herzegovina, but for this country's global power. The de- and partition are unstable outcomes. U.S.congressional opposition is strong and mands on humanitarian missions will in- policy scuttled previous negotiations onmounting in light of U.S. casualties in crease; already the UN considers with- Bosnia, and it can veto any effort to alterSomalia. drawing because of the danger and lack UN sanctions. U.S. leadership will be

Few believe that the package of cur- of cooperation from warring groups. broadly welcomed by most countries inrent U.S. actions constitutes a policy. As More likely than an alternative European the world.a stopgap between forces for and against response is worsening conflict among Con: Leaders in Yugoslavia whointervention, responding with humanitar- Western powers. Segregating moral con- have gained what they want warn ofian relief, moral condemnation of Serbs cerns into humanitarian relief without atopening a "Pandora's box." More talksand sanctions on Serbia, it appears to ad- tention to the political causes is not a pro- without willingness to stop fighting ondress domestic vacillation between moral ductive policy. the ground may only lose more timeoutrage and disinterest. It proposes no 2. Mobilize an international ground without saving lives. If citizens withinsolution to the problem of national self- operation to stop the war in Bosnia- the former country are not given a hear-determination in multiethnic communi- Herzegovina and provide a transi- ing and if the warriors are not given waysties while it exacerbates the economic tional authority. to save face, a peace conference may notausterity and political instability that con- Pro: Parties on the ground are unable produce anything new. Western powerstributed to the war and its spread. Four to stop the war alone. Without some out- would have to take far more initiative onState Department officials have resigned side force, escalation is likely. Although political questions than they have beenin protest of the Bush Administration for diplomatic activity with a credible threat willing to take so far.doing little to defend Bosnian sover- in 1990-91 might have sufficed, the fight- 4. Initiate a far-ranging policy re-eignty and of the Clinton Administration ing has created such distrust, as well as view of the role of Western policy andfor abandoning the Muslims it champi- political and economic collapse, that an international organizations in theoned. But Secretary Christopher insists outside force is necessary. The popula- causes of such wars and lead its alliesthat television pictures should not be the tion wants an end to the war and will in institutional and policy reforms"North Star" of U.S. foreign policy. welcome an international force that is aimed at effective prevention.There is little discussion of ways to pre- neutral and helps local groups restore ba- Pro: The Yugoslav conflict is a para-vent such conflicts before it is too late sic security so that civil order can be re- digm for many other conflicts which canelsewhere or to enforce international law built. Instead of mass tragedy still to still be prevented. The international com-and security for citizens fated to live in come, Western moral conscience and munity exacerbated the domestic conflictcountries of no national interest to the U.S. credibility can still be restored and because it did not understand the situa-major powers. Current options suggest also give pause to those who believe the tion and because it is not prepared forthe harsh lesson of early mistakes and the international community will not inter- post-cold-war conflict. Unless there is adifficult reconceptualization that will vene to defend international norms with- reconceptualization of peacekeeping andhave to occur. out the threat of Soviet response or the peacemaking, of procedures for recogniz-

loss of a strategic resource (such as oil). ing new states and negotiating theU.S. policy options In light of Somalia and the prospect of breakup of old states, and of means to

I. Continue present policy, includ- many more impending conflicts like the limit arms flows and refugees, then theing support for UN humanitarian aid,verbal backing for the Muslims in

former Yugoslavia, there is also an in-centive for the military to use this oppor-

moral, political and financial costs of fu-ture conflicts will rise. Because the U.S.

Bosnia-Herzegovina, plans to pros- tunity to mount such an operation. The does care about the free-market andecute war criminals and genocide, and latter should include substantial civil and democratic transformation of formereconomic sanctions on Serbia and police components. Communist states such as Russia, it doesMontenegro, but otherwise stay out of Con: An ill-conceived intervention not want to repeat the mistakes of thethe conflict. could pose great dangers. It could exacer- Yugoslav transition. U.S. leadership in

Pro: The Yugoslav war is a European bate the conflict or give warring parties a the world is at stake in the former Yugo-problem of no vital interest to the U.S. new enemy and cause. International op- slavia, even if Washington chooses not toAmerica should do what it can through erations are poor at disarming and demo- act militarily.the UN to support the victims and protect bilizing parties who have not given up Con: The Administration was electedcivilians, but it should not risk soldiers' their war aims. Countries are not in the to solve domestic problems. Such an ef-lives and the possibility of a long-term position to provide either the necessary fort would require major political re-quagmire except where its global power troops or finance the costs because of sources which could divert it from thatis at stake. current commitments and impending task. Moreover, a multilateral review will

Con: These measures have failed to ones of greater importance. not succeed; it must be part of an inter-stop the war or produce a political agree- 3. Support a new global peace con- national effort to reshape multilateral in-ment. The fighting will likely continue,with unknown but ominous threats to

ference on the former Yugoslavia andsee the talks through to conclusion.

stitutions and concepts of security. A bet-ter route to a post-cold-war world is

Western security. European security is an Pro: Since few countries want to be- through national interest and unstructuredAmerican vital interest, and the continu- come involved militarily and the humani- evolution. 15


13

TOPICFORMER YUGOSLAVIA

SSFION

DONS

1. What does global leadership mean inthis new period? What are the obligationsof the U.S. to create a new order as it didin 1944-49? What are the costs and risksif it does not take on a leadership role incooperation with other countries?

2. What will be the consequences forinternational peace and security if no onetakes on the responsibility to write andenforce the rules of an internationalcommunity and to initiate new forms ofcooperation?

3. Do Western governments have an ob-ligation to help former socialist countriesintegrate into the West and to cooperatewith them on economic and security rela-tions? Do they have an interest in doingso?

4. Americans live in a pluralistic, multi-ethnic, multicultural society. What canthey do to ease the difficulties of multi-ethnic states so that human rights, regard-less of ethnic background, are protected?so that ethnic groups can preserve theiridentities without requiring political au-tonomy? so that peoples can enjoy rightsto self-determination without destroyingnation-states or the rights of others?

5. The international community acceptsthe right of intervention to protectuniversal human rights. How can it doso without violating the right of peoplesto noninterference in their internalaffairs?

6. What are the implications for U.S.global leadership if NATO fails? if theUN goes into crisis? Are there betterways to organize European and interna-tional security?

7. UN Secretary General BoutrosBoutros-Ghali, in a 1992 report entitled

An Agenda for Peace, urged UN memberstates to think more about preventive di-plomacy. What actions can the U.S. taketo institutionalize preventive diplomacy?Should current thinking about interven-tion, nonmilitary influence and the role ofmilitary force change? Are there ob-stacles to discussing prevention inAmerican politics?

8. The Clinton Administration aims to"enlarge" the sphere of market-orienteddemocracies, and it emphasizes thispolicy toward Russia. What help can theU.S. and Western countries give? Willthe policy work if only a few countriesat a time are selected? Can such anapproach harm the process of democra-tization?

9. Should the U.S. be concerned by theemergence of national states, ethnicapartheid and racist or nationalist vio-lence in Europe and elsewhere? Howdoes it affect this country? What can andshould be done?

CES

Christopher, Warren, Statement by the secretary of state to theSenate Foreign Relations Committee, November 4, 1993.Available from the Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Departmentof State. See General Resources on p. 92.

Djilas, Aleksa, The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity andCommunist Revolution 1919-1953. Cambridge, Mass.,Harvard University Press, 1991. $39.95. 259 pp.

Drakulic, Slavenka, The Balkan Express: Fragments fromthe Other Side of War. New York, Norton, 1993. $208 pp.

"Europe and the Balkans." Current History, November 1993.The entire issue is devoted to the region.

Glenny, Misha, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third BalkanWar. New York, Penguin, 1993. $10.00. 208 pp.

Goodby, James E., "Peacekeeping in the New Europe." TheWashington Quarterly, Spring 1992, pp. 153-71.

Remington, Robin, "The Federal Dilemma in Yugoslavia."Current History, December 1990, pp. 405+.

Rusinow, Dennison, "Yugoslavia: Balkan Breakup?" ForeignPolicy, Summer 1991, pp. 143-59.

U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 1993.Washington, D.C., American Council for Nationalities Service,1993. $10.00. 160 pp.

Zametica, John, "The Yugoslav Conflict." Adelphi Paper 270.London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer1992.

ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF NATIONALITIES, City College ofNew York, Convent Ave. at 138th St., New York, N.Y. 10031;(212) 650-7000. Run by the City College of New York's his-tory department, this organization examines ethnic interactionsin Eurasia and Eastern Europe and distributes the Analysis ofCurrent Events, single-topic opinion essays. Contact ProfessorHenry Huttenbach at (212) 650-7476.

INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE (IRC), 386 Park Ave. South,New York, N.Y. 10016; (212) 679-0010. Founded in 1933 atthe request of Albert Einstein, IRC helps refugees fleeing frompolitical, religious and racial persecution, as well as uprootedvictims of war and famine.

REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL, 220 I St., N.E., Suite 240, Washing-ton, D.C. 20003; (202) 547-3785. Monitors and analyzesrefugee crises to develop and promote strategies and solutionsthat address specific refugee needs and raise to prominence theissue of refugees and their plight.


OPINION BALLOTSHow to use the Opinion &gigots: For your convenience, there are two copies of each opinion ballot. Please cut out and mail oneballot only. To have your vote counted, please mail ballots by June 30, 1994. Send ballots to:

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, 729 SEVENTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10019M-IMM11111111111111111111111111111111 111111-11111-111111-1M 11111-1111111111-111111111111-1111111111111-111111111111-1111,111111111-111111111-1111111111111-1111-111

TOPIC Conflict in I Conflict in IPI

I Former Yugoslavia I Former YugoslaviaII I

ISSUE A. In its policy toward the former Yugoslavia, the IU.S. should: I ISSUE A. In its policy toward the former Yugoslavia, the I

I U.S. should:YES NO 1

1 1. Avoid future involvement in what is

I essentially a European problem. II 2. Support UN humanitarian aid,

Iprosecution of war criminals and I

1 economic sanctions.

0 3. Arm the Muslims and use air power I 3. Arm the Muslims and use air powerIto protect them from attack. I to protect them from attack. 0 II4. Mobilize an international ground 1 4. Mobilize an international ground 11

1 operation to stop the war in I operation to stop the war in I11

Bosnia-Herzegovina.1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I

1 5. Support a new global peace 1 5. Support a new global peace

I conference on the former Yugoslavia. 0 I conference on the former Yugoslavia. Ii 6. Lead allies in institutional and 6. Lead allies in institutional and IO

policy reforms to prevent future policy reforms to prevent future I"Yugoslavias." CI I "Yugoslavias."

I 7. Other, or comment I 7. Other, or commentI

I 1 II II First three digits of your zip code: I

I First three digits of your zip code:

IDate: / /1994 Ballot continues on reverse side... I Date: / /1994 Ballot continues on reverse side... I:wwmommmilmommommmommimisamsommoissiumwmININIE im w w IN 1.11i

I0 I I1

TOPIC I TOPIC II 9 South Africa I 2 South AfricaI I Ig ISSUE A. In its economic relations with South Africa, the ISSUE A. In its economic relations with South Africa, the I

U.S. should: U.S. should:IYES NO I YES NO I

I 1. Provide grants and loans to jump- I 1. Provide grants and loans to jump- 1start the economy. CI I start the economy. U

2. Encourage international financial I 2. Encourage international financial IP

institutions to provide funds. CI I institutions to provide funds. II 3. Encourage the U.S. private sector

113. Encourage the U.S. p

to trade with and invest in Southprivate sector 1

to trade with and invest in SouthI Africa. CI U I Africa. III

I Iany other country. 0i 4. Treat South Africa no differently I 4. Treat South Africa no differently I

than than any other country. III5. Other, or comment 1 5. Other, or commentI 11 I I

I III II 1

First three digits of your zip code:1111

First three digits of your zip code:

IDate: / /1994 Ballot continues on reverse side... I Date: / /1994 Ballot continues on reverse side...

SIMIIIIIIIIEIIIIIIIIIIIIMIIIIIIIII-IMI 1.-... immarlimmuemmerem-mtem-imuomm_vm mum ms me me um milGREAT DECISIONS 1994 15

TOPIC

YES NO

1. Avoid future involvement in what isessentially a European problem. CI I

2. Support UN humanitarian aid, Iprosecution of war criminals andeconomic sanctions. C:1 Li I

18

OPINION BALLOTS

11111-11111-10111111111M-111111-1111111111-MM-MM-1111-110-1111-111111-11111

I In planning future GREAT DECISIONS programs, we would find ithelpful to know more about participants and would appreciate youranswers to the questions below.

A. How many years have you participated in the GREAT DECISIONSprogram (that is, attended one or more discussion sessions)?

I 1. This is the first year I have participated.2. I participated in one previous year.

I 3. I participated in more than one previous year.a B. What is your age?

1. 17 or under 2. 18 to 30 3. 31 to 45I 4.46 to 60 5.61 or overC. Your sex?

(a 1. Female2. Male

D. Have you been abroad during the last four years?I C3 1. Yes

2. NoIE. What is the highest level of formal education you have completed?

1. Some high school 2. High school degreeI 3. Some college 4. College graduateI 5. Advanced degree

IF. How often are you asked for your opinion on foreign policy matters?1. Often 2. Sometimes 1:1 3. Hardly ever

G. One final question. Would you say you have or have not changed yourI opinion in a fairly significant way as a result of taking part in theGREAT DECISIONS program?

1. Have 121 2. Have not 3. Uncertain


ill. MOM 1111111111111111111111 111111111111111111. M

1111-11111 IN-WWII III 1111111WM IM III III III EMIII In planning future GREAT DECISIONS programs, we would find it I

helpful to know more about participants and would appreciate i111 your answers to the questions below.

III

III

IIIII

A. How many years have you participated in the GREAT DECISIONSprogram (that is, attended one or more discussion sessions)?O 1. This is the first year I have participated.

2. I participated in one previous year.3.1 participated in more than one previous year.

B. What is your age?1. 17 or under 0 2. 18 to 30 3. 31 to 454.46 to 60 5. 61 or over

C. Your sex?1. Female

CI 2. MaleD. Have you been abroad during the last four years?

U 1. Yes2. No

I

IIIII

E. What is the highest level of formal education you have completed?1. Some high school 2. High school degree3. Some college 4. College graduate5. Advanced degree

F. How often are you asked for your opinion on foreign policy matters? I1. Often 2. Sometimes 3. Hardly ever

G. One final question. Would you say you have or have not changed youropinion in a fairly significant way as a result of taking part in theGREAT DECISIONS program?

2. Have not 3. UncertainCI 1. Have


1

11

ISSUE B. With respect to South Africa's democratictransition, the U.S. should (choose one):

1. Provide technical assistance, for example pollwatchers.

2. Play no role, direct or indirect.

ISSUE B. With respect to South Africa's democratictransition, the U.S. should (choose one):

1. Provide technical assistance, for example pollwatchers.

2. Play no role, direct or indirect.


I

III

19

SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa:forging ademocratic unionAs all South Africans prepare to go to the polls for the firsttime, economic uncertainty and violence cloud a time ofhope. Why should Americans help? What can they do?

by Jean Herskovits

AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS supporters pull aside a campaign banner reading "vote forfreedom, peace and democracy" to watch ANC president Nelson Mandela address a rally ofsome 80,000 people in Durban, South Africa.

66 OUTH AFRICA'S appointmentwith destiny is on track,"Nelson Mandela, president of

the African National Congress (ANC),declared in September 1993. His countryhad just passed a point of no return: sometwo dozen parties had agreed to giveblacks their first say in South Africa'sgovernance.

On November 17 the negotiatorsmade another stunning breakthrough:they agreed on the basic principles of apost-apartheid constitution. Truly revolu-tionary for South Africa were a Bill ofRights, a structure of nine regions withseparate, if limited, powers from those of

the central government, and a new con-stitutional court independent of govern-ment control.

But the defining moment for SouthAfrica's nonracial democracy still liesahead. On April 27, 1994, for the firsttime all voting-age South Africansblack as well as whitewill be eligibleto cast ballots. The government they pro-duce will be a transitional one with a for-midable challenge: to write a final consti-tution and to run the country at the sametime. It will be a government of nationalunity, with representatives in the cabinetfrom every party that receives at least 5%of the vote.

Excitement and apprehension sur-round the event. Can there be "free andfair" elections in a country so long en-gulfed in violence, where the majorityhas been disenfranchised? Mandela told apress conference in New York, "I am 75

years of age. I have not voted in mycountry. I am not allowed to vote. I donot know what happens inside the votingbooth. If I do not know how to vote...youcan imagine the position of millions inmy country." These were the words ofthe man widely expected to take over asSouth Africa's first democratically cho-sen president. Because they have beensystematically excluded from learningabout, let alone participating in, demo-cratic processes, blacks approach April atan overwhelming disadvantage.

Dangers also loom. Unemploymentfor blacks in a stagnant economy hasreached almost 50%. Years of protest andpolice violence have left young blacks incities without schooling, vocational train-ing or jobsbut with weapons. Extrem-ists, white and black, threaten to derail apeaceful transition.

This is not just another electionnotfor South Africa, Africa or the world. ForAmericans its success is a matter of deepconcern. Despite major differences be-tween the racial problems of South Af-rica and the U.S., there are enough paral-lels between the two to make events thereresonate here. African Americans feel aspecial tie, and they are not alone. Livingin the most multiracial country in theworld, Americans have a stake in SouthAfrica's achieving justice across racialand ethnic lines.

Americans know from experience thatchanging laws and securing the vote forall do not eradicate racial injustice. Butthey are a vital beginning. South Africansask three things from Americans: first, tohelp provide voter education and trainingfor political parties denied earlier chancesto contest elections; second, to trade withand invest in South Africa's economynow that all have joined in the call to liftsanctions; and third, to assist in recon-struction, breaking down walls to bringabout a fully integrated society andeconomy.

Challenges to apartheidAlthough it had been on the United Na-tions' agenda since 1952, apartheid seized

JEAN HERSKOVITS is professor of history atthe State University of New York at Purchaseand has written extensively on Africa.


101ICSOUTH AFRICA

A brief historySOUTH AFRICA'S HISTORY did not begin with the arrival in1652 of the Dutch East India Company's agents, sent toprovide fresh food for ships en route to the Orient in

search of riches. Since time immemorial hunters and gatherershad lived near the Cape, and by A.D.300 the ancestors oftoday's Bantu-speaking majority had already begun to farmsouth of the Limpopo River. From there they moved south. An-cestors of such groups as the Xhosa and Zulu settled along thefertile east coast; the forebears of the modern-day Sotho andTswana went to the dry plateau to the north and west.

The Dutch settlers, who were predominantly male, startedanother significant population group, the Cape Coloured,through racial mixing. Over time, French and German Protes-tants fleeing religious persecution at home joined the Dutchpopulation. Their language evolved into a variant of Dutch theycalled Afrikaans, and they began calling themselves Afrikaners.

Until the end of the 18th century these groups lived in a kindof equilibrium, not without racial discrimination but with onlyscattered conflict. Never pleased to obey the authorities in CapeTown, the growing settler population began to move east andnorth. Each family of trekboers (Dutch for migrant farmers)took along a few slaves. To sustain life on the frontier, eachadult male claimed 6,000 acres for himself and his family.

The trekboers were not the only growing population in thearea. The Bantu-speakers increased and gradually moved southand west. Under the authority of their chiefs, numerous groupssettled unoccupied land, farming and raising cattle. But landwas not limitless, and clashes with the trekboers over land andcattle raged for decades.

And then the BritishThe next wave of colonizers were the British, fresh from theirvictories in the Napoleonic wars. By 1806 they were in theCape to stay. The laws they imposed and their modern views,including opposition to the slave trade and later slavery itself,drove fresh bands of Boer, or Afrikaner, families, their Biblesin hand, trekking across formidable mountains in covered wag-ons. In the 1830s they reached present-day Natal, where theyfound seemingly empty land laid waste by the great Zulu war-rior Shaka and his successors.

The British wanted above all to establish an orderly frontierthat was inexpensive to maintain. But nothing the British did,including annexing territory or abandoning it, which infuriatedAfricans and Afrikaners alike, brought peace to the frontier.

The discovery of South Africa's mineral wealth opened anew chapter in that nation's history, equal in significance to theZulu-driven disarray among Africans and the expanding Euro-pean presence. Diamonds, found in 1867, drove the demand formigrant labor. The men, who were forced to leave their familiesbehind, could be strictly controlled. This pernicious practice,followed later in the gold mines, drained able-bodied malesfrom the entire region. Not only was South African societydivided, but deprivation of the black majority became institu-tionalized.

Gold was discovered in 1886 along the Transvaal'sWitwatersrand, and it heightened British interest in South Af-rica. In the "Scramble for Africa," the rivals included a recently

unified and muscle-flexing Germany, whose sympathies werewith the Boers.

Anglo-Boer warHaving defeated the Zulu in 1879 (but not without first suffer-ing a humiliating defeat at their hands) and having split them upinto 13 "kingdoms," the British turned to the Boers. By geo-graphical accident the latter controlled both diamond fields andgold reefs.The British triumphed in the Anglo-Boer War of1899-1902, in which the African majority were virtual bystand-ers, though often victims.

The British compensated the defeated Boers by forming anindependent Union of South Africa, which they freed in 1910.Every subsequent prime minister was an Afrikaner, eventhough English-speaking South Africans retained economicpower for a long time. The irony, which only a few noted at thetime, was that the Africans, whose war it had not been, were thelosers.

As early as 1913 legislation was passed that, with lateramendments, consigned nearly 90% of South Africa's people toa mere 13% of the land. Africans were generally prohibitedfrom owning land outside the "tribal reserves." The twin con-cepts of a divided society and institutionalized deprivation ofthe majority were thus imprinted on the economy.

What limited political rights blacks had were whittled away.Africans protested, and in 1912 the ANC was founded and be-gan its decades-long campaign of peaceful opposition to dis-criminatory treatment. It made a point of drawing leaders andfollowers from the entire country, regardless of the legacy of19th-century warfare, in an effort to unite the opposition.

Afrikaners, still defensive toward English-speaking whiteswho dominated the cities and the economy, organized to protecttheir language and culture. In the 1930s, working through a se-cret society called the Broederbond, they fashioned plans toseize control of government

Apartheid comes and staysAfrikaner nationalist leaders unexpectedly attained their goal bya slim margin in the 1948 (whites-only) election, which waswon by their National party. For the next 45 years the Nationalparty charted South Africa's course. It called its ideology apart-heid (separateness).

Apartheid, which carried the earlier concepts of dividingsociety and institutionalizing deprivation to their extreme, dif-fered from earlier discrimination in two ways. First, it charted acourse to deny permanently political and economic equality toblacks. The second difference was one of degree: apartheidtheory required color-coded control of all aspects of life. Lawsdictated how and where people couldor, if black, could notmove and under what regulations. They prohibited protest andprescribed ever-more stringent punishments for violations: longprison sentences and the innovative "banning" of people andpublications to remove them from public sight and influence.Attempts to organize resistance were very broadly defined as"Communist" and later "terrorist," and those found guilty wereseverely punished, at times tortured or killed.

In their homelands policy the Afrikaners carved up the 13%of "African" land, gerrymandered to exclude fertile areas, sub-soil resources and cities, to isolate blacks even further. Theyperfected divide-and-rule tactics, applying them systematicallyand mercilessly to all aspects of blacks' lives.


SOUTH AF RIC0 p i

the world's attention on March 21, 1960,when police in Sharpeville shot into a

Gatsha Buthelezi, had in his student daysbeen a member of the ANC. He decided

_§

crowd of peaceful African demonstrators,killing 69. In the severe clampdown that

in the early 1970s (with ANC concur-rence) on a course that would allow him

,Y,lil''' t I-. mo. - I

followed, the government closed off to to fight apartheid from within. By refus- '-'-,-4-,.)," -'

6

.`-s>blacks all nonviolent avenues of resin- ing full independence for KwaZulu, he g 1J)*) 4

tance. The ANC, now banned from oper- prevented the Zulu from being denation- g4,' ~,',-

ating inside South Africa after almost 50 alized by the South African government. Nyt° q

years of peaceful protest, turned to armed Having created the homeland, South 2 astruggle. A young, charismatic leader Africa's apartheid leaders could hardly ' 1.--,All

formed the ANC's "armed wing," forbid political activity there. Working . _ ,2 , T

Umkhonto we Sizwe, meaning Spear of initially through a cultural organization,the Nation. His name was Nelson called Inkatha (much as the Afrikaners t

Mandela, and his daring efforts to build had done decades earlier with the ' Q.

an underground organization made him aspecial target of the government. He and

Broederbond), Buthelezi and otherscould organize for political purposes, an

...";;.

3

his colleagues were swept up in policeraids that led to a trial and imprisonment

option barred to others. He was even ableto hold political rallies in Soweto. He did

, -

'f,ov

for sabotage and treason in 1964. not break with the ANC until 1979. CHIEF BUTHELEZI, chief minister of KwaZuluThe government also banned the Pan- and president of the Inkatha Freedom party,

Africanist Congress (PAC), a breakaway Soweto has joined with the white right in opposition to

movement from the ANC, formed in the When the Portuguese colonies of de Klerk and Mandela.

late 1950s over differences in strategyand ideology, and it, too, turned to vio-

Mozambique and Angola suddenly gainedindependence in 1975 following a mili-

shortage of skilled labor and, for the firsttime, net white emigration, mainly of

lent resistance. Whereas the ANC had tary coup in Portugal, young black South professionals and skilled managers. Andbeen open to all races, including mem- Africans saw that resistance could in fact there were signs of a split in Afrikaner-bers of the largely white South African bring results. The government's attempt dom. Whereas the government was con-Communist party, those who formed the to force Afrikaans on blacks in second- sidering reforming apartheid to keepPAC believed that the struggle in South ary school (ignoring how Afrikaners itself in power, a growing number ofAfrica should be African-led. These dif- themselves had resented having the En- Afrikaners insisted that any change wasferences between the ANC and PAC per- glish language imposed on them decades unacceptable.sisted in exile and after their return to earlier) lit the fuse that led to protests in The international climate was increas-South Africa in 1990. the black township of Soweto. The So- ingly hostile. South Africa's government

For more than a decade after weto explosion was heard around the warned of a "total onslaught" at theSharpeville, black resistance appeared world. Biko was beaten to death in 1977 hands of communism. The claim was un-shattered. The protest movement was re- by the South African police and became founded but it provided the excuse forvitalized by a dynamic young leader a martyr of the antiapartheid movement. P.W. Botha, defense minister from 1966named Steve Biko, who picked up For the children, as the young of the until becoming prime minister in 1978, tostrands of PAC thinking and merged townships came to be called, the events increase greatly the role of the military inthem with ideas of black pride coming of 1976 in Soweto set an example. They government.from the American civil-rights move- would refuse to cooperate, no matter how Botha told his constituents it was timement to form the Black Consciousness many were jailed, maimed or killed by the to "adapt or die," meaning that while pre-movement. Despite legal obstacles, the police or the military. Following ANC serving Afrikaner power remained hismovement gained momentum among policy, they would make the townships goal, the means would be more flexible.students and in the black townships, "ungovernable," and insist on "liberation This meant abandoning "petty" apartheidwhich provided the urban labor essential before education." Over a decade later the symbols and practices not essential to pre-

to the white community. urban youth, now called young lions and serving white power; bringing English-Meanwhile, the government went

ahead with its apartheid plans and laws.It formalized the ethnically defined

largely jobless, are among the most im-patient and radical ANC supporters, de-manding concrete material and political

speaking South Africans into the National

homelands into so-called nations. Eventhough no one but South Africa would

rewards for their years of sacrifice. KEY TO ACRONYMS

recognize them, four, starting with the Apartheid falters ANC African National Congress

Xhosa's Transkei, accepted indepen- By the late 1970s South Africa's CODESA Convention for a Democratic

dence, buttressing the government's ar- Afrikaner rulers faced threats on many South Africa

gument that apartheid was working. fronts, all largely because of apartheid. COSATU Congress of South AfricanHowever, KwaZulu, carved out of Internal resistance could not be perma- Trade Unions

Natal province as a homeland for the nently quelled. The economy was in IFP Inkatha Freedom partyZulu who played such a significant rolein the country's history, would not coop-

trouble because of the expense of admin-istering apartheid laws, a 10% inflation

PAC Pan-Africanist Congress

erate. Its leader, Chief Mangosuthu rate, a burgeoning black population, a UDF United Democratic Front


2219

SOUTH AFRICA

party; and wooing big business. Mean- Inkatha claimed national support but member countries, to assess the situationwhile, government policy encouraged eth- was overwhelmingly Zulu, even drawing in South Africa. After months of inter-nic and class divisions among blacks andruthlessly suppressed dissidents.

on Zulu military tradition to bolster pride,though evoking that history made others

viewing South Africans inside the coun-try and in exile, they produced a "negoti-

During the 1970s the black trade uneasy. Confrontations between UDF ating concept," only to have their effortunion movement got back on its feet, and and Inkatha supporters in Natal, how- torpedoed by South Africa's invasion ofin 1973 a series of uncoordinated strikes ever, were not ethnic; those fighting were three neighboring countries.had made headlines. The unions contin- all Zulu, and the clashes beganand The Eminent Persons Group recom-ued organizing against heavy odds, and continueover future political power. mended economic sanctions; at the sameby 1979 the government concluded thatthe only way it could control black labor lirepression, repeal time, demonstrators, organized by the

black lobbying organization TransAfrica,was to legalize the unions. Protest escalated in the townships. Strikes in Washington, DC, and on American

This reform did not produce a docile complemented bus and school boycotts. college campuses demanded the sameblack labor force. Instead, by 1986 over a Policemen beat, tear-gassed and shot thing. In 1986, the Congress, under pres-million blacks had gained experience indemocracy through membership in their

stone-hurling young blacks who came inwave after wave, while Western television

sure from black and white constituents,overrode President Ronald Reagan's veto

unions. New popularly chosen leaders cameras recorded it all for their nightly and passed the Comprehensive Anti-produced victories at the bargaining table newscasts. Apartheid Act. The law made the U.S.that improved wages and working condi- The government imposed a state of the pace setter in imposing sanctions andtions. They also introduced a newand emergency in much of the country from exerting other pressures on apartheid.legalmilitancy with a political edge. July 1985 to March 1986. It imposed an- Violence in the townships continued,

When in 1983 the government pro- other in June which applied everywhere and protesters began attacking people inposed constitutional and political re- and indefinitely. Historian Leonard the townships they suspected of collabo-forms, it only fueled black rage. Shifting Thompson called it "legalized tyranny." rating with the regime. Rent strikes, busfrom a white prime minister to a white The policesupported by thousands of strikes and school strikes increased asstate president with increased powers soldiers with armored vehiclesarrested protest expanded. The government re-mattered little to those who were still and tortured at will; hit squads assassi- sponded with further repression.unrepresented; moreover, creating a nated antiapartheid activists. The govern- Then, in 1989, P.W. Botha resignedthree-chamber legislaturea dominant ment banned, detained and tortured some; the presidency two weeks after sufferingwhite one and two others for Asians and it tried others for sweepingly defined trea- a stroke, and the National party caucusColouredswas an insult to Africans. son, to be executed or die in jail under replaced him with F.W. de Klerk, an

The so-called reforms invigorated mysterious circumstances. Children as Afrikaner of impeccable credentials. De-black resistance in the townships. This young as eight were imprisoned, but the scribed by his more liberal brothertime there was new coordination: some youth especially would not give up. Willem as "a veritable Mr. National575 groups of many kinds, sizes and As a conciliatory gesture, the govern- party," no one expected him to bringraces sent a thousand delegates to form ment by mid-1986 had repealed some revolutionary change. As longtime ob-the United Democratic Front (UDF),which would coordinate opposition to

segregationist laws, but its move was toolittle and certainly too late. Multiracial

server of Africa, Marina Ottaway, puts it,like all the party's reformers, he tried "to

apartheid inside the country. Its goal was political parties could now exist; interra- change the system enough to make it ac-a unified, democratic, nonracial South cial sex and marriage were allowed; cer- ceptable but not so much that essentialAfrica, based on the Freedom Charter tain jobs were no longer for whites only; principles were violated." But this was awhich the ANC had adopted in 1955. some public facilities were desegregated; different time, and the "line separating

Despite mounting arrests, detentions blacks were starting to move unchal- the abandonment of old goals from theand bannings, the government could not lenged into some previously white urban use of new means to attain old goals wasdestroy the UDF, nor could it destroy all areas. But there were no improvements in getting thinner and thinner." In retrospectits leaders because they were so numer- education or health services, and blacks it seems that the Afrikaners had ex-ous: churchmen like then-Bishop continued to be uprooted and moved hausted their options, but at the time noDesmond Tutu, the Reverend Frank about at the government's whim. Open- one believed they could not continueChikane and the Reverend Allan Boesak; ing up political rights to all was out of the adapting as they had before.women's leaders like Albertina Sisulu question.(whose husband was imprisoned with Apartheid crumblesNelson Mandela); labor leaders like Cyril Sanctions' As suddenly as the Berlin Wall cameRamaphosa; and many others. When the government clamped down on down, South Africa faced a new future.

The UDF included almost all those the international media in 1985, the On February 2, de Klerk announced thatmilitantly opposing the regime with the viewing public in Europe, and especially he would unban the ANC, the PAC andexception of two groups. One contained the U.S, had already become incensed by other antiapartheid organizations. Thebelievers in Black Consciousness, whowere against including whites. The other

what they had seen on nightly newscasts,and were forcing governments to act. In

following week came the long-demandedrelease of Mandela. In the months that

group was Inkatha, which had severed the winter and spring of 1986 the Corn- followed, exuberant crowds and politicalcommunication with ANC's exile leader- monwealth sent a seven-member Emi- leaders alike hailed the ANC leader as heship in 1979. nent Persons Group, drawn from its traveled his country and the world to


thank those who had long supported himand his cause.

While the blacks were euphoric, mostwhites accepted the fact that the unthink-able had happened. A few greeted thechange with enthusiasm, some with re-lief, many with apprehension. Only thoseon the Afrikaner far right denouncedwhat de Klerk had done, calling him atraitor, and vowed to oppose all change,by violence if necessary.

Transition challengesHopes for a smooth, rapid transition to anall-inclusive democracy based on justiceand equity were unrealistic. The politicaland economic landscape was too deeplyscarred by the long history of racial op-pression. Trust, essential to solving prob-lems, was rare and even suspect. Repealof apartheid laws, unimaginable a shorttime before, was only a starting point.

Blacks and whites had huge adjust-ments to make. Both the ANC and thePAC would have to shift from havingbeen a liberation movement in exile, withan armed wing, to being a political party.Their leaders were not prepared. First, noone expected the opportunity to comewhen it did, and second, the changecould only be made inside South Africa,where the exiled movements had limitedaccess.Who would lead in this newphaseapart from Mandela whom allaccepted? The ANC had substantial in-ternational recognition, but the struggle,most agreed, had been won not by theexiles but inside the country, where theUDF and all the local organizations itembraced had claims of their own. So didanother organization which was alsosympathetic to the ANC: the Congress ofSouth African Trade Unions (Cosatu),the labor federation that in December1985 had brought together some threedozen labor movements, largely but notexclusively black, and pulled consider-able economic and political weight.

Challenging the ANC and its allieswere Chief Buthelezi and the (renamed)Inkatha Freedom party (IFP) on one side,and on the other, the smaller black con-sciousness groups, principally theAzanian People's Organization and thePAC. At stake was more than a role innegotiations; it was future politicalstrength.

The National party also faced chal-lengeson its right, from the Conserva-tive party, which consolidated the parlia-mentary opposition, and from extra-

parliamentary, paramilitary groups, nota-bly the Afrikaner Resistance Movement.The National party had enormous advan-tages over the ANC: experience in orga-nizing a party, holding elections and run-ning a government. It also had institu-tional strength: a bureaucracy and secu-rity forces, though those posedchallenges to de Klerk as well. TheAfrikaner-dominated civil service fearedfor its secure jobs; the security forces,whose role in policymaking P.W. Bothahad inflated, had long fought the ANCand other enemies, at times extralegally,and did not relish change.

The ANC had financial and genera-tional problems to contend with. No pre-dominantly black political organizationcould hope to match the resources of anywhite one, especially the National party.The ANC did not rush to change into apolitical party for precisely that reason:much of its support came from overseas,as it had through the years of exile, andSouth African law did not allow foreignfunding of political parties.

The generational problem was espe-cially difficult. Leaders from the 1950sand 1960s with decades of jail or exilebehind them had made obvious sacrificesfor the cause; so had the younger ones ofthe 1980s who opposed apartheid frominside the country; and so had the chil-dren, whose education was not in the

classroom but facing down armed menand vehicles in the townships. Out ofsuch different experiences and eras camedifferent strategiesand different expec-tations.

Mandela, de Klerk negotiateWith Mandela's release and publicknowledge that de Klerk had taken theextraordinary step of conducting discus-sions with Mandela before he was freed,it was clear that the ANC and the Na-tional partyand those two menwouldbe central to working out South Africa'sconstitutional future.

Formal negotiations were slow incoming, however. It was not until De-cember 1991 that the Convention for aDemocratic South Africa (Codesa)opened with an angry attack by Mandelaon de Klerk' s integrity and actions,which stunned the delegations of the 19participating political organizations.

The ANC and National party had dif-ferent agendas. De Klerk, all agreed, wasno revolutionary; he hoped to continueby other means what his party had doneso successfully for so long: maintainAfrikaner dominance regardless of insti-tutional changes. Mandela and the ANChad a conflicting goal: a genuinely demo-cratic South Africa and an end to whitepolitical and economic control underpower-sharing or any other guise.

NOBEL PEACE PRIZE winners ANC President Nelson Mandela and South African President F.Wde Klerk conferred in Washington, D.C., in September. They were joined by Foreign MinisterPik Botha.


2421

SOUTH AFRICA

The Economy

OUTH AFRICA FACES two hard truths as 1994 begins: (1) it isalmost impossible to make serious economic policy dur-ing an election campaign, and (2) "no country has made a

successful transition to democracy while its citizens' incomeswere going down," as Bruce Scott, professor of business ad-ministration at the Harvard Business School, has noted. No oneseriously doubts that a major overhaul of economic practice andpolicy are essential. A successful transition, according to arange of South Africans assessing the challenge, has to produce"a stable democracy, based on a stable social fabric with risingincomes which are reasonably distributed." This is the chal-lenge facing the Transitional Executive Council and the govern-ment of national unity that will be chosen in April.

Despite its human resources and mineral reserves, and itsinfrastructural and financial advantages, South Africa'seconomy has stalled, with real wages declining for over a de-cade. International financial pressures and sanctions have ag-gravated this situation, but lifting them will not remedy it be-cause the principal cause has been apartheid. It distorted theeconomy, devouring public funds to run its multiple bureaucra-cies and the security apparatus that supported it.

Apartheid's legacyApartheid barred blacks (meaning all who were not white)from owning homes or other property in "white South Africa"until 1980. It largely restricted Africans to the least skilledoccupations through "job reservation" until the late 1970s,effectively blocking managerial or entrepreneurial opportuni-ties. Blacks were barred from trading or manufacturing inwhite areas, and were restricted even in black ones. Influxcontrol kept most Africans living outside urban areas, oftencommuting long distances to do whatever jobs were allowedthem. The result was not only injustice but structural distor-tions in the economy.

The inequalities between the different groups are vast: percapita income of South Africa's 5 million whites is almost 10times that of the 28.3 million Africans, 4.5 times that of the3.3 million Coloureds and 3 times that of the 1 million Asians.Nearly 50% of the employable work force in the formaleconomy are without jobs, and they are overwhelmingly black(by comparison, 8% of the white work force is unemployed ).Half the blacks who can work are not in the formal economy.And only 3% of those who finish school are now finding jobs.

South Africa's per capita gross domestic product, stagnant inthe second half of the 1970s, declined in the 1980s, with popu-lation growth outstripping economic growth. At this criticaltime, real income continues declining for blacks, but it is alsofalling for whites, who enjoyed full employment until 1985.

Blacks are experiencing what Bob Tucker, a South Africaneconomic activist, calls "aggravated relative deprivation." Col-liding with rising expectations, this reality poses dangers toblack political leadership and the transition itself. And it aggra-vates whites' apprehension that if violence increases, their stan-dard of living will decline further.

Mandela joined de Klerk in asking for foreign investment,but investmentdomestic or foreignwill not be forthcoming

unless there is confidence in the country's stability. Given thedecades of institutionalized deprivation, redressing the imbal-ances is essential. As Harry Oppenheimer, a leader in the SouthAfrican business community, put it in a June interview with theLondon Financial Times, "It's extremely dangerous to be ruledby people who have no material stake in the country. We've gotto see that people in the majority have as large a share in thematerial assets of the country as we can." The challenge is howto do that in a short time, and in the face of the educational andother deprivations apartheid has inflicted.

Clear prioritiesAmong the most urgent economic and social needs are labor-intensive projects and housing for blacks, especially in urbanareas. These are among the priorities in restructuring theeconomy proposed by South Africans and by such outsiders asthe World Bank. They will require both public and private re-sources.

Unlike many other countries, South Africa has great unusedcapacity. For example, it could generate 30% more electricitywithout building a single new power plant or transmission line.It would simply need to reopen nine plants.

Reducing expenditures on multiple bureaucracies created by 1

apartheid and the inefficient state-owned industries designed tokeep whites fully employed would free funds for a public-works program to extend infrastructurepower lines, roads,pipe-borne waterto long-neglected black areas and to main-tain existing services where whites and other blacks live. Ruralareas, in particular, need help to promote more labor-intensiveagriculture open to blacks on land of their own. Such assistancewould provide work, lessen the rush to the cities and improvefood-production efficiency.

Education and healthEducation and health care for blacks are also high priorities,including building clinics and schools as well as adding class-rooms. Because of the 15-year disruption in black-urban educa-tion, this need is one of the most pressing. Other problems willtake longer to solve: training teachers, offering blacks an educa-tion equal to what whites have had, and establishing vocationalschools. In the short term, the private sector especially can un-dertake training programs in cooperation with labor unions,upgrading the work force in its own and its employees' interest.Reorienting South Africa's economy from dependence on min-eral exports and increasingly toward the export of manufacturedgoods is also critical to future growth. Policies to implementthis goal can complement those that redress social and eco-nomic inequities. A revived and expanding economy is criticalto promoting political stability, curbing violence and labor un-rest, and ending capital flight in a new South Africa.

Interviewed in June 1993, the finance minister, Derek Keys,said, "We need to reinvent society in the same way as it wasreinvented with the empowerment of the Afrikaner in the1930s." But this time it cannot be at the expense of any segmentof the population, and the nation's land, wealth and opportuni-ties will have to be redistributed far more equitably than whenblacks were excluded 60 years ago. South Africa will need allits people's creativity and goodwill to succeed with justice andto benefit the country as a whole. Never has it been clearer thatSouth Africans share a single destiny: there can be no prosper-ity for any group without the prosperity of all.


SOUTH AFRICA

What bedeviled successful negotia-tions, according to Ottaway, was that"behind the barrage of confusing ver-biage that gave the illusion of progress,the parties remained rooted in their initialpositions, convinced that in the end theycould obtain what they wanted and avoida compromise." They also disagreed fun-damentally on what was to be negotiated,on the timetable for transition and on theinstitutions that would function during it.

Furthermore, the presumption on thepart of both the ANC and the Nationalparty that only they mattered to the out-come did not encourage other parties inthe negotiationslet alone those optingto remain outsideto support either side.Thus the two were alternately lone an-tagonists or lone partners instead of coa-lition-builders for the future.

Boipatong massacreThe ANC broke off the talks in June 1992following a massacre in Boipatong, atownship south of Johannesburg wheremany ANC supporters lived and wheremore than 40 died at the hands of neigh-boring Inkatha migrant laborers, wholived in single-sex hostels. The ANCcharged police complicity and held thegovernment responsible. A scandal a yearbefore, dubbed Inkathagate, had exposedgovernment and police support of Inkatha,confirming what the ANC had long main-tained. It saw the Boipatong events asfurther proof of that collaboration.

The collapse of the negotiations sur-prised no one. De Klerk had securedthrough a referendum in March an over-whelming white mandate for his negoti-ating position, which bolstered hisparty's confidence that it could imposethe outcome it wished. This in turn com-pounded the suspicions and tensions gen-erated in the talks. Meanwhile blacks inthe townships were directing theirmounting rage not only at governmentand police targets but even the ANCleadership for its willingness to negotiate.

South Africa's hopes were beingdashed by the stagnant economy andmounting violence. Like the earlierKwaZulu-Natal-based attacks and coun-terattacks between members of Inkathaand the UDF, it was a struggle for power.Observers called it tribal warfareZuluvs. Xhosa. Some claimed that it demon-strated enduring ethnic divisions, with allZulu favoring the Inkatha Freedom partyand all Xhosa, the ANC. This ignored notonly present ANC membership but its

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founding principle. ANC leaders in the pasthad included Zulu as well as Xhosa (andSotho and others), notably 1960 NobelPeace Prize winner Chief Albert Lutuli.

In the wake of Inkathagate, in Sep-tember 1991, the government, the ANCand others held a National Peace Confer-ence to devise a code of conduct to pre-vent violence and machinery for investi-gating and diminishing it. Violence con-tinued, and given the mounting anger,frustration and bitterness in the monthsthat followed the events at Boipatong, itwas something of a miracle that the con-stitutional negotiations resumed.

The negotiators in the renewedtalksno longer called Codesatackledtheir task with fresh realism and serious-ness. All recognized that neither the dete-riorating economy nor the endemic vio-lence could be reversed without progresstoward a political settlement.

Despite an armed attack by theAfrikaner Resistance Movement on thesite of the talks in June 1993, the delega-tions worked on transitional arrangementsand, in July, set April 27, 1994, as the date

to

5.

for South Africa's first universal suffrageelections. The Inkatha Freedom party andthe Conservative party walked out of thetalks in protest.

In drafting the principles to be incor-porated in a new South African constitu-tion, the negotiators had to resolve dis-agreements about fundamentals. How toprotect the rights of minorities was one;another was whether and to what extentthe government should be centralized.Positions taken grew out of the history ofapartheid: the ANC saw the issue of mi-nority rights as a National-party- Inkathaeffort to curtail again the power of theong-oppressed majority and to preservesome "homelands." As long as minoritieswere defined in "group" terms, the ANCsaw unacceptable continuity with apart-heid doctrine. Yet ANC and other demo-crats have long recognized the need toprotect against tyranny of the majority.Negotiations produced basic agreementon an ANC-proposed bill of rights to en-sure such protection for all, but as indi-viduals, not groups. Agreement also fol-lowed on proportional representation in


I0IIC7 SOUTH AFRICA

the legislature so that all voices would beheard.

The form of the future governmentproved even more challenging. SouthAfrica appears to be an excellent candi-date for federal arrangements, given itssize and diversity. Here again, however,the legacy of apartheid skewed the issue."One man, one vote in a unitary state"had long been an opposition cry. It meantthat South Africa must be one indivisiblecountry reincorporating the homelands.For that reason, compromise on the issueof federalism was more difficult than itmight otherwise have been.

Those favoring federal arrangementsincluded people who believed that inSouth Africa there should be checks onthe central government. They also recog-nized a worldwide trend away from cen-tralized power. But advocates of federal-ism also included whites who wantedcontinued dominance in "their" areas andAfricans who wanted to maintain somesemblance of "homeland" existence andpower. Among those favoring federal ar-rangements were the National party andInkatha; on this issue the ANC was theone making concessions. What it will notaccept are ethnically or racially definedgeographic units. The negotiators eventu-ally agreed to reincorporate the home-lands and approved a nine-region mapfor South Africa consisting of Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging, NorthernTransvaal, Eastern Transvaal, KwaZulu/Natal, Orange Free State, Eastern Cape,Western Cape, Northern Cape and NorthWest.

Point of no returnIn September came the long-hoped-forbreakthrough: agreement on a Transi-tional Executive Council, in which allnegotiating parties will have a represen-tative and in which blacks for the firsttime will have an active role in makingor blockingpolicy. The council hasoversight of the civil service, the budget,the police and the army and responsibil-ity for creating the all-important indepen-dent electoral commission to run theelection and the independent media com-mission to assure equal media access forall parties. The ease with which imple-menting legislation cleared the Parlia-ment (despite a Conservative party walk-out) made it clear to all that South Africahad, at last, reached the point of no returnon its way to democracy.

On September 24, 1993, the day after

Parliament passed the Transitional Ex-ecutive Council enabling legislation,Mandela asked the world, in a historicaddress at the UN, to lift economic sanc-tions. F.W. de Klerk, the first South Afri-can head of state to enter the UN, cameto plead the same cause.

The 1993 Nobel Peace Prize wasawarded to them jointly in recognition oftheir courage in seizing the historic mo-ment despite mutual distrust.

Election challengesThe November 17 watershed agreementon a postelection interim constitutiondoes not eliminate dangers in the monthsleading to the election. The most seriousis violence; it has claimed almost 10,000victims in the last three years.The graphof political violence, observers note, hasspiked whenever there was progress to-ward democracy. Announcement of theelection date brought one surge, andagreement on the Transitional ExecutiveCouncil, another. The optimistic viewholds that, though violence is bound torise as elections approach, as soon as thenational unity government has beenelected, it will be able to reverse thetrend.

Other dangers could also lead to vio-lence and disruption. Organizations thatrefuse to participate in the process andhave their own political agendas may tryto delay or derail the transition. Particu-larly threatening was the refusal to

participate in the multiparty negotiationsby the IFP and the white right, whichalong with some of the homelandpartieshad formed the Freedom Alli-ance in October 1993. Whether theywould come to realize that staying outof the process will marginalize and di-minish, not enhance, their hopes of hav-ing a role in the new government wasnot certain.

Among the steps being considered tolessen violence is the creation of a na-tional peacekeeping force. Its duties, notyet precisely defined, would be, first, toensure as peaceful an election as pos-sible. Because blacks have no confidencein the South African police or the armedforces, there is urgent need to create a re-liable and credible force, responsible tocivilian authority and composed of expe-rienced personnel and trainees proposedby the various parties. Accomplishingthat in a very short time is a dauntingtask. The immediate challenge will be toidentify and integrate successfully thosewho come from suspect government ser-vices and homeland police forces withthose from liberation armies.

The reintegration of several "indepen-dent" homelands and their participationin the transition may pose another prob-lem. Bophuthatswana and Ciskei con-tinue to offer resistance. The reason ap-pears to be power and, as is also the casewith KwaZulu, they have appealed toethnic identity to rally support.

The U.S.and South Africa

AMERICANS HAVE ENTERED this decade

with a renewed commitment to aforeign policy that fosters democracyaround the world. Achieving this hasproved in many countries to be morecomplex than expected. The process inAfrica has been accompanied as fre-quently by conflict as by harmoniousproblem-solving. In some cases, super-power control for decades restrained im-pulses to both freedom and violence. Butin others, superpower competition bol-stered oppressive regimes and aggravatedpolarizing rivalries.

In South Africa, Eastern-bloc supportfor the ANC and PAC (when recogni-tion, let alone support, was denied them

by the U.S. and its allies) for a time made(the U.S. relationship with the apartheidgovernment ambiguous. But under popu-lar pressure the Congress forced the U.S.to impose economic sanctions in 1986.Whether one argues that sanctions had agood or bad effect (few argue now thatthey had no effect), all agree that theycontributed in some measure toapartheid's demise.

Under pressure from stockholders andsubsequently trade sanctions, the major-ity of American companies pulled out ofSouth Africa, often amid heated argu-ments about whether withdrawingandabandoning efforts to integrate the work-place and provide social and educational


SOUTH AFRICATom-7

benefits to their workerswould domore good than harm.

Following the establishment of theTransitional Executive Council and thecall to lift sanctions by both Mandela andde Klerk, South Africans look to the U.S.to assist in their transition to nonracialdemocracy.

American policy is to help, howeverpossible. The Clinton Administration andthe Congress acknowledge that help isalso in the U.S. interest. On the very daythat Mandela spoke at the UN, the U.S.Senate approved unanimously legislationto support the democratic transition. Itrepeals most sanctions and provides forlifting the rest once the new governmentis installed after the April elections.President Clinton signed the bill on No-vember 23.

Further provisions of the bill call forthe U.S. to support the strengthening ofSouth African party and electoral ma-chinery and voter education, and to en-courage banks and international financialinstitutions, especially the World Bank,to make available to South Africa sub-stantial funds to help revive theeconomy. The Congress and the Presi-dent also urged states, localities and pri-vate institutions to rescind expeditiouslytheir own sanctions on South Africa.

The U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment conducts an $80 millionbilateral assistance program for educa-tional and other projects and to help withelection preparations. U.S. assistance isrestricted to nongovernmental activitiesand, in the case of political party trainingand other education, excludes support ofpolitical parties that have previously par-ticipated in elections or that refuse to re-nounce violence.

Of importance in utilizing U.S. aidhave been nonprofit organizations, includ-ing the Washington, D.C.-based NationalDemocratic Institute for InternationalAffairs and the International RepublicanInstitute. Both have considerable experi-ence internationally in voter and political-party education and in election observa-tion, and they are running joint, non-partisan programs in South Africa.

With help from American and otherforeign donors, the number of domesticnongovernmental organizations active inSouth Africa is large, their outreach isvaried and their efforts are central. Thisprovides Americans in the private sectorwith many opportunities (apart from busi-ness ventures) to work with South Afri-

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can counterparts. One important exampleis the South Africa Free Elections Fund(SAFE), an organization calling on thebusiness community, foundations and in-dividuals to raise $10 million to be usedto educate the majority electorate. It isworking through people and organizationsin South Africa "with proven track recordsof using and accounting for foreign con-tributions at the grass-roots level."

U.S. policy optionsAlthough there is broad U.S. support forSouth African democracy, there are dif-ferences over the nature of that help.Among the options being debated:

The U.S. government should providegrants and loans to South Africa tojump-start the ailing economy and as-sist with socioeconomic reconstruction.

Pro: A strong infusion of outside aidfrom the U.S. and the rest of the interna-tional community is necessary to helpSouth Africa mobilize its vast human andphysical resources and create a stable cli-mate that will attract investors.

Con: The U.S. government can ill-afford to provide economic aid at a timeof pressing domestic needs. What help isforthcoming must come from the U.S.private sector and from abroad.

The U.S. government should en-courage trade and investment, but itsrole should be limited to that of afacilitator.

Pro: Trade and investment will domore than outside aid to revive the SouthAfrican economy. A 5% growth rate inSouth Africa's trade would yield $3 bil-lion a year, far more than any possibleforeign assistance.

Con: South Africa's social needs areat least as pressing as its economic needs.The U.S. must take an active role to helpSouth Africans achieve enough progressto ensure that the democratic experimentdoes not fail.

The U.S. is not responsible forSouth Africa's democratic transition.If it fails and civil war breaks out, theU.S. should do nothing.

Pro: In such a crisis, the U.S. shouldmake no move, overt or covert: thiswould be an internal matter for SouthAfricans to resolve.

Con: The U.S. should do all in itspower to avert such an outcome. TheClinton Administration, the Congress,business interests and nongovernmentalorganizations should do whatever theycan to assist South Africa's democratictransition. They should all, quietly if notopenly, make clear to South Africans thatparticipating in the election, acceptingthe results and building a South Africafree of political violence are of thegreatest importance at home and abroad.And any who threaten this outcome mustknow that, should they persist, they willbe denied international support.

o.

28GREAT DECISIONS 1994 25

TOPIC

2 SOUTH AFRICA

DISCUSSHONMOM

1. Is there a domestic political interest inthe U.S. in the successful transition todemocracy in South Africa? In whatways would a stable democracy there af-fect the U.S.?

2. What role can the U.S. play to assist asuccessful transition to democracy inSouth Africa? Should the emphasis be on

government, business or voluntary ef-forts? Should the priority be on votereducation or economic reconstruction?

3. If some political parties or groups inSouth Africa refuse to accept the out-come of the April election, what stepscould or should the U.S. take? Would themost effective and appropriate responsebe bilateral or multilateral, or no responseat all?

4. How can a more equitable distributionof wealth from the white minority to thewhole community be achieved without

precipitating large-scale emigration ofskilled whites who are needed to imple-ment economic development?

5. Will the Bill of Rights and the consti-tutional court be enough to ensure thewhite minority protection against a back-lash by the black majority for their pastdeprivation of human rights?

6. Is educational reform an area wherethe U.S. can make a contribution inSouth Africa? Could there be a role forthe Peace Corps in supplying teachers orfilling other needs?

wakorwes ANDCD-U RCES

Benson, Mary, Nelson Mandela: The Man and the Move-ment. New York, Norton, 1986. 273 pp. $8.95 (paper). A long-time friend writes about Mandela's life and his role in the Afri-can National Congress.

Lelyveld, Joseph, Move Your Shadow: South Africa, Blackand White. New York, Times Books, 1985. 384 pp. $18.95.Former New York Times bureau chief in South Africa makesSouth Africa come alive.

Lodge, Tom, and Nasson, Bill, et al., All, Here, and Now:Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s (South AfricaUPDATE Series). New York, Ford Foundation-Foreign PolicyAssociation, 1991. 414 pp. $12.95 (paper). Appends key docu-ments and interviews. In the same series see Robert Schrire,Adapt or Die: The End of White Politics in South Africa(1991. 247 pp. $10.95, paper).

MacLeod, Scott, "South Africa on the Edge," The New YorkReview of Books,. February 11, 1993. pp. 24-29. Time's bu-reau chief in South Africa details F.W. de Klerk's political his-tory, outlook, goals for his party and approach to governing.

Mandela, Nelson, "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy." For-eign Affairs, November/December 1993, pp. 86-97.

Marx, Anthony W., Lessons of Struggle: South African In-ternal Opposition, 1960-1990. New York, Oxford UniversityPress, 1992. 384 pp. $16.95 (paper). Sets the history of largelyblack opposition in its several ideological frameworks.

Mkhondo, Rich, Reporting South Africa. Portsmouth, N.H.,Heinemann, 1993. 194 pp. $13.95 (paper). Reuters' South Af-rica correspondent covers events from 1990-93.

Moose, George E., A copy of the September 30, 1993,testimony by the assistant secretary for African affairs beforethe subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Com-mittee is available from the Office of South African Affairs,

Room 4238, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Ottaway, Marina, South Africa: The Struggle for a New Or-der. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1993. 250pp. $14.95 (paper). Describes the first phase of South Africa'spolitical transition from 1990 to 1992.

Thompson, Leonard B., A History of South Africa. New Ha-ven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1992. 352 pp. $15.00 (pa-per). One of the foremost historians of South Africa begins withprehistory and ends with apartheid in crisis.

AFRICA FUND, 1948 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10038; (212)962-1210. Since 1966, the Africa Fund has worked for an in-formed U.S. policy toward southern Africa, publicizing and aid-ing victims of apartheid and political injustice. Publishes sev-eral periodicals, with other information available.

AFRICAN-AMERICAN INSTITUTE, 833 United Nations Plaza, NewYork, N.Y. 10017; (212) 949-5666. The African-AmericanInstitute seeks to foster development in Africa, primarilythrough strengthening its human resources, and to promotemutual understanding between Americans and Africans. Publi-cations include Africa Report (4/year).

AFRICAN GOVERNANCE PROGRAM, The Carter Center, EmoryUniversity, 1 Copen Hill, Atlanta, GA 30307; (404) 420-5186.

Seeks to provide a forum for issues of management, develop-ment and governance in Africa. Publications include AfricaDemos, published bimonthly.

AFRICAN STUDIES CENTER, Boston University, 270 Bay State Rd.,Boston, Mass. 02215; (617) 353-7306. African Outreach Pro-gram; (617) 353-7303/3673. Recognized as a national re-source center by the U.S. Department of Education, the studiescenter is committeed to teaching, research and publications onAfrica. African Outreach Program provides information, mate-rials and services to schools, libraries, museums, the media andcommunity groups.

WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA, 110 Maryland Ave. NE, Suite112, Washington, DC 20002. Established in 1972 as anantiapartheid organization, it encourages U.S. policies that pro-mote political justice in Africa. It publishes Washington Noteson Africa (3/year) and has speakers available.


EAST BLOC'S CRISIS

Environmental crisis informer Soviet bloc: whoseproblem? who pays?What are the prospects for overcoming environmentalproblems at least as serious as those the U.S. and Europeexperienced 30 years ago?

by William Sweet

THE LENIN STEEL WORKS in Magnitogorsk, built in the heyday of Stalin's industrialization drive,is now part of the Russian rust belt. It pollutes an area twice the size of Delaware.

URING SOVIET RULE, the environ-ment stirred an odd mix ofpassionsarrogance, reverence

and scientific curiosity. A brutally domi-neering attitude toward the physical andbiological environment coexisted uneas-ily with a reverence for Mother Nature,rooted in Slavic traditions, and a scien-tific interest in understanding ecologicalsystems. The utopian mission of creatinga new and more just society on the basisof subjugating nature resulted finally inwidespread damage to the environment.Yet, paradoxically, the Soviets were alsoamong the first to propose setting asidenatural preserves for conservation andresearch, as Murray Feshbach and AlfredFriendly Jr. note in Ecocide in theU.S.S.R.: Health and Nature Under Siege.

Communist leader Vladimir Lenin en-dorsed the idea of preserves, and by 1920

the new Soviet nation had passed lawsregulating land, timber, wildlife, fish andwater. Yet these remained for the mostpart dead letters, and by the early 1930sthe environment was falling prey to col-lectivization and breakneck industrializa-tion. A chronic and well-founded senseof emergencyworld war, civil war, for-eign intervention, Hitler-style fascism,more world war, the atomic bomb, coldwarall kept the lieutenants of Sovietdictator Joseph Stalin firmly convincedthat one couldn't make an omelette with-out breaking some eggs, to quote formerPremier Nikita S. Khrushchev.

Stalin's system of production quotas,to be achieved regardless of human orenvironmental costs, far outlived the ty-rant. And so, in the late 1950s and early1960s, when the Soviet governmentstarted passing legislation supposedly

guaranteeing comprehensive environmen-tal protection, the effect was minimal. Thepowerful and autonomous productionministries thwarted efforts at coordina-tion, and when fines were imposed forviolations of environmental regulations,the ministries simply passed the costs backto the government. In effect, the state gaveback with one hand what it took away withthe other. "Instead of serving as a refereebetween polluters and conservationists,"Soviet expert Marshall Goldman ofWellesley College observed, "the state[was] the manufacturer."

Monitoring of the environment wasalso very weak, and even when signifi-cant data were available, they often werenot released. Ze' ev Wolfson, a formerSoviet environmental dissident who pub-lished a pioneering exposé of the situa-tion in the U.S.S.R., compared "Socialistnature" to a "lady of the very highestprinciples." In both cases, "she never ex-poses herself to strangers."

Environmental activismWolfson wrote The Destruction of Na-ture in the Soviet Union under the penname of Boris Komarov, and it was pub-lished in the samizdat (underground)press in 1978. At that time he was a voicein the wilderness. A campaign to protectLake Baykal, a huge freshwater body ofpristine purity in remote Siberia, waslaunched in the 1960s (and continues to-day), but this was an apple-pie issue, atfairly safe remove from the U.S.S.R.'sindustrial and agricultural jugulars.

Much closer to the capital was the cam-paign launched in the early 1980s to pre-vent erection of a 28-kilometer-long dikesystem in the harbor of Leningrad (nowagain St. Petersburg) to prevent periodicflooding. After the first barriers went upin 1984, they caused a 60% reduction inthe flow of saltwater into the harbor, ablossoming of blue-green algae to sixtimes the normal level, and a buildup ofnitrates, phosphorus, heavy metals andbiological contaminants. Much of thispollution was deposited in the harbor bythe river Neva, which passes through St.Petersburg picking up waste from the cityand some 500 factories.

The campaign to save St. Petersburg'sharbor was coordinated by an organiza-

VVILLIAM SWEET has been a staff writer forPhysics Today, a monthly magazine publishedby the American Institute of Physics, for 10years. He writes primarily about nuclear armscontrol, science and the environment.


ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS

tion called Delta. Initially it met withsharp repression, but it since has forcedthe city government to halt construction,pending further analyses of the dam'simpact on local water quality. Mean-while, the city's drinking water has gonefrom bad to worse and recently was de-scribed by a correspondent for Toronto'sGlobe and Mail as "always smelly andsometimes brown." The correspondentreported that most children in St. Peters-burg are believed to suffer from skin al-lergies as a result of the contaminationand most foreigners who drink the waterget sick.

A more successful environmental ini-tiative was a massive letter and petitiondrive organized in 1986 by scientists. Itpersuaded the government to shelveplans to divert several northward-flowingSiberian rivers to provide irrigation forthe cotton fields of the Central Asian re-publics. And in 1987 a grass-roots move-ment killed a big dam project in Latvia.

By that time Soviet Premier MikhailS. Gorbachev's campaigns for glasnost(openness) and perestroika (economicrestructuring) were in full swing, and mili-tant environmental protests were becom-ing almost matter of course all over thecountry. In Volgograd (then Stalingrad),plans for a pesticide plant in the Red Armydistrict prompted an organizing effort in1987 that soon turned broadly political.Protests in Krasnoyarsk in far-off south-ern Siberia in 1989 won postponement ofa plan to reprocess spent reactor fuels. InMay 1990, 10,000 miners in the Donbasregion struck when toxic gases seepinginto a coal mine caused casualties amongworkers. And at Semipalatinsk, protestagainst radioactive pollution fromnuclear-weapons testing prompted theKazakh government to ban further under-ground testing there in 1991.

Political environmentalismBy 1990 the movement to clean up theenvironment had turned overtly politicalin much of Eastern Europe and the SovietUnion, and it was feeding the processesthat would lead to the dissolution first ofthe Soviet bloc* (see glossary) and thenof the Soviet state itself. Although gov-ernments initially viewed environmentalactivism as relatively nonsubversive, ac-tivists increasingly considered the politi-cal system itself the ultimate source ofecological damage. Thus, when the firstfreely contested elections in Soviet his-tory were held in 1989-90, environmen-

talists won in 17 of the 37 races they en-tered in Odessa; 16 Ecology Club mem-bers won all their races in Volgograd.

In the former Czechoslovakia, Charter77, which spearheaded the independenceand human-rights movements, publisheda number of important samizdat reportson the environment in the 1980s, includ-ing a major study done by the country'sacademy of sciences. In Hungary, the"environmental movement was the van-guard of the organized opposition thattoppled the country's Communist re-gime," in the estimation of one scholar."Mass protest against [Hungary's] Nagy-maros Dam was instrumental in thedevelopment of an effective politicalopposition," another says.

Throughout the Soviet bloc, environ-mental issues and disasters came to lightas a result of the opening that was takingplace but they also served as occasions forfurther opening, mass mobilization anddemocratization. The most dramatic casein point was the explosion at the Cherno-byl nuclear power plant in Ukraine in1986, which forced the evacuation of tensof thousands of people and contaminated

hundreds of square miles. The world'sworst civilian nuclear accident, its conse-quences were felt far beyond Sovietborders. And because of Gorbachev'sglasnost policy, the government could notkeep the accident secret. The repercus-sions soon went further than any Sovietleader would have liked, feeding separat-ist and nationalist longings in Ukraine,Belarus, Lithuania and Kazakhstan.

As revolution swept the whole Sovietbloc, economic crises and political issuesloomed so large they eclipsed the envi-ronment, and it was unclear whether en-vironmentalism was destined to have amajor impact in the newly emerged soci-eties or whether its role was merely cata-lytic. By mid-1991, it appeared that envi-ronmental politics had become sub-merged in the general political opposi-tion, and "reforms in health and ecologyadministration became a sideshow to themain event," according to Feshbach andFriendly. One reason the future of envi-ronmentalism was so uncertain was thatthe complexity of the situation far sur-passed that in the advanced industrialcountries and in the Third World.

Defining the crisisTHE U.S.S.R. finally established anenvironmental ministry, Goskom-

priroda, in 1988. Grossly underfunded,understaffed and faced with daunting prob-lems, its first chief, Fyodor Morgun, lastedonly 15 months. The second, NikolaiVorontsov, a highly regarded biologistand the first non-Communist to hold aministerial position, lasted somewhatlonger. The current minister is ViktorDanilov-Danilyan. Russia's PresidentBoris N. Yeltsin also has an environmen-tal and health counselor, Alexei Yablokov,a respected specialist with an independentreputation. Yablokov and Danilov-Danilyan, as well as their European coun-terparts, face a formidable task.

Despite meager resources, the Sovietgovernment produced some studies in itsfinal years that began to come to termswith the environmental crisis facing thecountry, though they may in some caseshave been based on questionable scien-tific methods. A study by the Ministry ofPublic Health, for example, found corre-lations between fertilizer production andcertain cancers and blood and cardiovas-cular diseases; between nonferrous-metalproduction and skin diseases and child-hood cancers; between pesticides anddeath and disease rates for children.

In Eastern Europe, visitors to theformer German Democratic Republicoften were struck most by the noxious

GLOSSARY

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (EC): Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain.

GROUP OF SEVEN: Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and U.S.

SOVIET BLOC (1949-91): Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania andSoviet Union. The Soviet Union has been replaced by 15 independent republics: I

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.


ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS.- IDP

fumes emitted by the Trabant andWartburg cars, which burned a mixture

containment that allows small incrementsof excess pressure to lift the reactor's lid. q

of oil and gasoline and lacked any kindof emission-control devices. The Bunachemical plant in the East German city of

The second type of reactor manufac-tured in the U.S.S.R., the VVER, moreclosely resembles the pressurized water '

6

Halle was found to be discharging 20 ki-lograms of mercury a day-10 times asmuch as a comparable plant in WestGermany's chemical-infested Ludwigs-hafen, itself no environmental Eden, dis-charged in a year. When the Germanysunited, East Germany's one reactor corn-

reactors standard in the U.S., France andGermany. The VVERs also have beenfound to suffer from many design andconstruction inadequacies, and the olderversions have been determined to begrossly defective.

In addition to the RBMKs still operat-

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plex was immediately shut down by thefederal German nuclear authorities.

In the Bulgarian industrial town ofKuklen, children were found to have somuch lead in their blood that they wouldhave been immediately rushed to a hospi-tal in the U.S. for emergency treatment,according to an American toxicologist.

ing at Chernobyl, RBMK reactors arealso in use near St. Petersburg in Russia,and in Lithuania. VVER 230s, an oldermodel considered almost as defective asthe RBMK, operate in Slovakia, in Bul-garia, and in Russia.

The consensus among reactor expertsoutside the former Soviet bloc is that all

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A reporter for The New York Timesvisited a Romanian town, Copsa Mica,

the Chernobyl-type reactors should bepermanently closed as soon as possible

, ,-_-__ dt....- %

Ili,. rt 'where "every growing thing in this once- and that the VVERs should be shut down AFTER THE CHERNOBYL accident, a worker ingentle valley look[ed] as if it [had] been or substantially upgraded. The optimal a market in Kiev, Russia, checks produce fordipped in ink" as a result of a plant in thetown that produced black powder used inmanufacturing rubber.

and cheaper course of action, accordingto the latest outside assessment, would beto turn off as many reactors as possible

possible radiation before it can be sold to thepublic.

rather than fix them, and undertake en- 1957, an enormous chemical explosionNuclear reactors ergy conservation or install new,'highly spread intensely radioactive materialsOne of the more urgent environmental efficient gas turbines to produce needed over a large area but it remained a deepproblems facing the new political au- energy. However, government officials secret until it was discovered by the dissi-thorities in the former Soviet republics do not believe they can do without dent scientist Zhores Medvedev and de-and Eastern Europeand certainly one nuclear-generated electricity, and upgrad- scribed in his book, The Nuclear Disasterthat is of greatest concern to West Euro- ing the nuclear reactors would cost tens in the Urals (New York, Norton, 1979),peansis a direct by-product of the of billions of dollars. Foreign aid on that 20 years later. A second took place inChernobyl catastrophe. Though the So- scale has so far not been forthcoming. 1967 at Lake Karachay, where materialsviet leadership tried to blame the accident Therefore, it is likely that the former So- with roughly 25 times the total radioac-solely on errors by the plant's operators, viet and East European governments will tive content of the Chernobyl debris hadwho were put on trial, convicted and adopt none of the recommended strate- been dumped over a period of decades.jailed, independent studies done outside gies and instead settle for makeshift rem- Evaporation caused by a drought thatthe Soviet bloc quickly determined that edies that keep millions of people seri- year left highly reactive dusts exposed,the reactor design itself was seriously ously at risk. In October 1993, the Ukrai- which winds suddenly blew into the sur-defectiveso defective that a similar re- nian government announced it would rounding area, subjecting people as far asactor would never have been licensed in continue to operate the undamaged 50 miles away to serious levels of radia-any other advanced industrial country. Chernobyl units, despite earlier promises tion. U.S. visitors to the site in 1990

The Chernobyl-type RBMK reactor to close them. found radiation levels at the edge of thesomewhat resembles the first plants con-structed in the U.S. to produce plutonium

Much less is known about the radioac-tive hazards associated with the former

lake high enough to supply a lethal doseto a human in an hour.

for nuclear weapons. It almost certainly U.S.S.R.'s nuclear weapon-making com- Given the large size of the former So-was designed, at least in part, to provide plex, but what little is known suggests viet nuclear arsenal, the desperation andthe U.S.S.R. with a fallback plutonium- that the dangers are even worse than even recklessness with which it was as-producing capacity in addition to that in those connected with power reactors. sembled, and the carelessness of generalits bomb-making complex. Among the There have been numerous disclosures environmental practices in the U.S.S.R.,RBMK's main defects are a "positive during the past two years, for example, it seems safe to conclude that the cost ofvoid coefficient," meaning that in certain that the U.S.S.R. disposed of radioactive satisfactorily dismantling the Sovietoperating regimes its energy increases wastes and reactors from submarines at bomb complex will be even greater thanwith loss of water and higher tempera- seaa situation that outside experts are what the U.S. expects to spend on itstures; poorly designed control rods that just beginning to evaluate. complex. That job, which is still afflictedare too slow and, in the event of emer- Two major accidents have occurred at with intractable technical and politicalgency insertion, initially add rather thansubtract energy; and a poorly designed

a facility producing material for nuclearwarheads near Chelyabinsk, in Russia. In

problems, is expected to cost upward of$200 billion.


3ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS

Aral Sea: the ultimate horrorOTHER INLAND WATERS such as the Caspian Sea and the Sea of Azov have sufferedsimilar abuse, but it is the Aral Sea that stands out as the former Soviet Union's

worst water-mismanagement debacle. Diversion of water to Central Asia for intenseirrigation of cotton fields depleted the rivers that fed the sea. Over a number of de-cades the seaoriginally larger than Lake Huronshrank by two thirds. In 1989 itactually separated into two lakes. Because of the chronic overuse of pesticides, defo-liants and fertilizers, toxic runoff has contaminated rivers running into the sea, includ-ing important sources of drinking water. Winds have carried mineral salts from theexposed seabed to fertile fields up to a thousand miles away. High rates of typhoid,cholera, hepatitis and cancer of the digestive system as well as high infant mortality,have been registered among inhabitants along its shores.

Water qualityOne of the intrinsically unfortunate as-pects of nuclear energy, from an environ-mental point of view, is that reactorplants require copious amounts of cool-ing water and therefore almost all aresituated on major water arteries. In theevent of a meltdown, the imminent dan-ger is that huge amounts of radiation willimmediately enter water systems, render-ing them unusable for possibly thousandsof years. The violent explosion atChernobyl dispersed 80 million curies ofradiation over the entire globe, but ironi-cally a less "catastrophic" meltdownmight have sent the whole radioactiveload downriver to the Black Sea.

The condition of waterways in theformer Soviet bloc is bad enough, with-out conjuring up such nightmare sce-narios. Yablokov recently told a leadingFrench science magazine, La Recherche,that 75% of Russia's surface water isdangerous to drink and that 50% of thecountry's drinking water is substandard.The Volga river in Russia, slowed bysome 10 major dams and reservoirs, isreported to be "a turgid stream." TheDnister, the chief source of drinking wa-ter for Odessa, is said to be contaminatedwith agricultural chemicalssix timesabove prescribed limitsfrom farms inUkraine and Moldova.

Yablokov has been especially criticalof the overuse of pesticides and thebuilding of big dams, although he doesforesee a role for small ones. He isquoted in La Recherche as saying,"Calculations show that the value of allthe electric energy produced by one ofthe oldest electric stations on theVolgathat of Rybinskis many timessmaller than the benefit one would haveobtained from the sale of agriculturalproducts grown on the lands of the plainflooded."

The quality of Russia's huge inland

lakes appears to be even worse than thesituation which the U.S. Great Lakeswere in a generation ago. The Black Sea,fed by the Danube, Dnister, Dnieper,Don and Kuban, has been deemed byWorld Bank officials to be one of theworld's most polluted bodies of water. Alocal joke has it that the famous sanitari-ums in the Crimea should be renamed"crimatoria." The Black Sea has beencontaminated by untreated wastes fromcities on the Turkish coast; poorly treatedwastes from cities like Odessa, Rostov,Constanta and Miropol; by fertilizers andpesticides from all the littoral countries;all kinds of industrial pollutants from oilrefining, chemical and metallurgicalplants, pulp and paper mills and coal; anddischarges from boats. Upstream damshave reduced flushing action, which hasled to increased salinization and eu-trophication from fertilizers and domesticsewage, including detergents. Between1986 and 1992, the fish catch from theBlack Sea decreased from 900,000 tonsto 100,000 tons.

Serious water problems are to be foundthroughout the former Soviet sphere. Yetthe situation is not entirely grim. Somenatural habitats in parts of Eastern Europeare better preserved than in Western Eu-rope, La Recherche reported, because ofsomewhat less intense utilization of wa-terways. And, it noted, especially in Hun-gary and Russia, there is a large commu-nity of hydrology experts. The first hydro-logical atlas for Europe was published, infact, in the U.S.S.R.

"The Danube and the Tisza in Hungaryare significantly cleaner [as of the mid-1980s] of faecal bacteria than the Rhinein the Netherlands or the Tejo in Portu-gal," according to an article published bythe Organization for Economic Coopera-tion and Development (OECD), andHungary's Lake Balaton, the largest fresh-water lake in Eastern Europe, has recently

become swimmable again. Fish began toreappear in the Moscow River in the late1970s.

Soil and forestsWith some exceptions, the degradation ofland and losses of biological resourcesprobably are not worse in Eastern Europethan in the OECD countries, according totheir magazine. The situation may beworse in the former Soviet states where,"by unhappy coincidence, the major pol-lution sources...are located in agricul-tural areas," as a writer for the World-watch Institute in Washington, D.C.,noted. "The worst culprits are the metal-lurgical centers."

One happy side effect of economicstagnation and underconsumption in theformer Soviet bloc has been the relativelylow use of packaging and containers, ac-cording to Soviet analyst D.J. Peterson ofthe RAND/UCLA Center for SovietStudies in Santa Monica. It is safe to saythat household wastes have taken a muchsmaller toll on the environment therethan in any of the advanced industrialcountries. The flip side of that coin, how-ever, is that as economic growth resumesand a much larger consumer culture de-velops, the burden will become greater.

There probably is no satisfactory in-ventory at the present time of hazardoustoxic waste dumps in the former Sovietrepublics. But judging from the situationin what was East Germany, where Ger-man authorities have identified 15,000such sites requiring evaluation, the num-ber is sure to be very large.

Historically, the greatest damage tosoils and forests has been the result ofoverly ambitious development policies.In the 1950s, Khrushchev's virgin-landsprogram to put into cultivation 100 mil-lion acres of marginal land in Kazakhstanled to a tripling of harvests, but recklessdevelopment caused wanton erosion. Bythe early 1960s, according to a recent ar-ticle in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-tists, half the virgin lands had beenruined or severely damaged. "Millions ofhectares of the Kazakhstan steppe, thegrand Central Asian prairie, were plowedfor wheat fields. Irreplaceable naturalpastures were destroyed." ThoughKazakhstan became one of the U.S.S.R.'sprincipal domestic sources of wheat, itsfields produced a worthwhile harvestonly about a third of the time. This wasonly partly due to frequent droughts.

The decision to turn most of the land



over to growing cotton in Uzbekistan ledto similar results there as well as in theneighboring regions of Turkmenistan andKazakhstan. "While a corrupt party elitewaxed rich off mythical cotton [or, as wesay in the U.S., 'king cotton']," Feshbachand Friendly report, "the real crop wasravaging the land."

Among other things, the growth ofwheat and cotton impoverished ruraldiets, while the wide use of defoliants toease harvesting and of pesticidesincluding the illegal but widespread useof DDTdirectly threatened humanhealth and endangered other species. Be-tween 1976 and 1983, use of pesticidesgrew 70% in the U.S.S.R., while itdropped 60% in the U.S.

Other common abusive agriculturalpractices have included heavy use of fer-tilizers such as phosphates, ammonia, ni-trites and chlorinated hydrocarbons, andcareless use of heavy equipment, leadingto compacting of soil and loss ofporousness, according to Peterson.

In forestry, as a result of continuousand unrestrained harvesting, hundreds ofthousands of acres in Siberia have turned

into barren landscapes and a significantproportion of the evergreens may be per-manently lost. Cedar forests in thePrimorskiy and Khabarovsk regions ofRussia have been reduced more than20% by clearing in the last 20 years.

Air pollutionAir quality in the former Soviet bloc, likewater quality, presents a complicated pic-ture that looks different depending onpoints of reference. In the estimation ofauthors for the OECD Observer, qualityis very poor if judged by local standards,but those often are stricter than the onesprevailing in OECD countries. If com-pared with worst situations in OECDcountries, air quality seems a lot less dire.Thus, for smoke, ash and dust, Pragueand Bucharest are worse than Brussels orFrankfurt but better than Athens; forsmoke, Budapest is one of the least pol-luted cities in Europe, and Warsaw is bet-ter than Madrid or Athens.

Largely because of automobiles, emis-sions of nitrogen oxides in the U.S. wereabout twice those in the U.S.S.R., ac-cording to Peterson, while Soviet emis-

sions of sulfur dioxide were about twoand half times those in the U.S. But theU.S.S.R., with one tenth as many cars asthe U.S., and half the gross national prod-uct, still produced about the same totalquantity of air pollutants. (Soviet mea-surement practices probably led toundercounts of the amount of pollutionperhaps by 30% to 50%.)

In the Czech and Slovak republics,where about 60% of all energy comesfrom some 30 plants fired by dirty browncoal with little or no emission-controltechnology, sulfur dioxide and nitrousoxide combine in the air to create acidrain "of a virulency unknown in the U.S.and rivaled on the European continentonly in Poland," as a writer put it in TheAmicus Journal, a magazine publishedby the Natural Resources Defense Coun-cil (NRDC) in New York.

In Poland's Katowice region, withsome 40 coal mines, use of hard coal fordomestic heating and industry puts largeamounts of sulfur dioxide and dust intothe air. In northern Bohemia, where sul-fur-dioxide emissions have exceededstandards one third of the time and some-

GREAT DECISIONS 19943 4

31

10PIC

3 ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS

times by several factors of ten, local resi-dents receive compensation known as"burial money."

Energy-inefficient open-hearth fur-naces account for over half of the steelproduction in the former East-bloc coun-tries, which largely explains why sulfur-dioxide emissions there continued to risein the 1980s, even as they declined nearly25% in Western Europe. "Poland's Up-

per Silesia, Czechoslovakia's NorthernBohemia, the southern provinces of east-ern Germany and the Ukraine's DonetsBasin are today's equivalents of indus-trial areas such as the Ruhr or Pittsburghhalf a century ago," in the estimation ofStanley J. Kabala, a scholar at the Uni-versity of Pittsburgh and author of theWorld Bank's first major study of envi-ronmental problems in Poland.

Resourcesand solutions

THE ENVIRONMENTAL problems con-fronting the new regimes in the

former Soviet and East European nationsand the costs of the environmentalcleanup are staggering. What special re-sources do they have at their disposal asthey attempt to find solutions?

Energy reservesRussia and a few of the other formerSoviet states have inherited enormous en-ergy reserves, most importantly oil andnatural gas, and so energy policy willcontinue to be critical to the economic andenvironmental future of the successor-states. In the U.S.S.R., the energy sectorabsorbed 40% of industrial investment,and fuels accounted for half of its exportsto its satellites, which were almost totallydependent on it for oil and gas.

By the mid-1980s, Russia's most ac-cessible oil reserves had been exploited,and just when Gorbachev took office, oilproduction had begun to drop, giving riseto an acute sense of crisis. "How the statekept alive, how it got from day to day,was a mystery," says former WashingtonPost correspondent David Remnick (withbenefit of hindsight) in his acclaimedLenin's Tomb (New York, RandomHouse, 1993). "If not for the plunderingof Soviet oil fields and the worldwideenergy crisis, the economy might havecollapsed even before it did; and by theearly 1980s, KGB [Soviet secret police]reports declared that the cushion of oilprofits was all but gone....The economywas doomed." Coincidentally, the coal ofthe Don river basin also was nearly ex-hausted, and the plentiful Siberian re-serves were difficult to access.

With the collapse of the U.S.S.R. andthe liberalization of Russia and some ofthe other successor-states, the way is

clear for an infusion of capitalist technol-ogy, which undoubtedly will greatly has-ten and facilitate the exploitation of themore inaccessible reserves. At the sametime, giant new fields have been discov-ered in the vicinity of the Caspian Seaand in Kazakhstan. These are being ex-plored and developed by Chevron andElf Aquitaine, among others, as well asby Russian companies that officials hopewill reduce dependence on outsiders.

The Kazakh government purports tobe especially interested in the ecological,technological and social aspects of agree-ments with the multinational oil compa-nies, but as The Bulletin of the AtomicScientists recently put it, there is a "bigdifference between the government'sclaim to be keeping an 'all-watchful eye'over foreign trade and the real state ofKazakhstan's economic climate." WhenKazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaevwith great fanfare called for heightenedsurveillance of foreign companies in June1993, the writer noted that "sadly, thesame initiative was announced [the yearbefore] as well."

Conversion to natural gas and the ex-porting of natural gas present major op-portunities for Russia, which owns roughlytwo fifths of known global reserves. Al-most all of Russia's gas is in remoteSiberia, however, and so large amounts ofcapital are needed for construction of eco-logically sound pipelines and storage fa-cilities. Capital also is needed for conver-sion of domestic power plants, productionfacilities and home furnaces.

Conservation and stabilizationConservation offers even greater eco-nomic benefits. Proceeding from the fa-mous principle that "Communism is So-viet power plus electrificatibn of the

whole country," the former Soviet blocwas profligate with energy. The amountof energy the bloc countries used per unitof production was more than twice thatof the average OECD country. And thiscould not be attributed just to climate: theSoviet bloc's usage was two-and-a-halftimes that of Sweden or Finland per unitof output. Poland'sto take an extremecasewas five times that of the U.S.,which is considered a wasteful countryby many standards.

And so, even without greater relianceon nuclear energy, there ought in principleto be ample room for energy conservationin the Soviet-bloc countries. As a generalrule more energy-efficient technologyshould also be cleaner technology and atthe same time provide large economicpayoffs as well as environmental benefits.But here again large amounts of capitalare needed, and at present it is unclearwhere that capital might come from.

Generation of domestic savings willof course depend on stabilization of theeconomy (above all defeating "hyper-inflation"), the creation of a solid bank-ing system and money markets, the en-actment of laws that protect private prop-erty and especially productive invest-ment, and legislation that specifies liabil-ity for past environmental damage andenvironmental cleanups that new private-sector owners of companies would incur.

In an analysis of the liability problempublished by the Washington, D.C.based Resources for the Future, in Janu-ary 1993, James Boyd recommended thecreation of "liability pools" (somewhatlike the U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency's Superfund for cleanup of toxic-waste sites) rather than trying to assign li-ability via litigation on the basis of newlyawarded property rights. The former Eastbloc economies "are not currently robustenough to support large resource expen-ditures aimed at the resolution of legaldisputes," Boyd concluded.

The dire economic situation in theformer Soviet nations seems to be com-parable to the Great Depression in theU.S. in the 1930s and is, as Boyd takesinto account, the major constraint onremediation proposals. John EdwinMroz, president of the Institute for East-West Studies, reported in Foreign Affairs( America and the World 1992-93) thatRussia's gross domestic product (GDP)in 1992 was 65% of its 1989 level andthat inflation was running at 1,300% peryear. Industrial output was down nearly


ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS0 I C

3

30% and exports were off some 50%from the previous year.

The situation in Ukraine may be even. worse. There, total output dropped 30%in the two years from early 1991 to early1993 alone, and the currency has"collapsed."

Asset strippingThere is the unsettling sense that Russiaand the other successor-states are keep-ing themselves alive mainly by strippingtheir assets and redistributing them. Thatis the impression whether it is a questionof mineral resources, Russia's space pro-gram and the nuclear establishment, orart treasures and antiques from the czaristera.

The situation is worst of course in thecountries where civil wars are taking place.Take Armenia. A visitor reported in theNRC Handelsblad of Rotterdam in early1993 that one family, the Grigoryans, had"spent last winter around a homemadefurnace and with 1,100 pounds of pota-toes in the basement. They fed the furnacewith diesel oil that they had buried in bigcans under the house years back, 'just incase."'

From all reports, the local impressionis that in stripping and selling resources,whatever the asset, some "mafia" or an-other inevitably is the winner. It thereforeneeds to be emphasized that there also issomething inevitable and necessary aboutthe process, despite its excesses. The in-dustrial sector as a whole, like the energysubsector, was overdeveloped in theformer Soviet-bloc countries. As a pro-portion of GDP, the industrial sector wasabout twice as large as the service sector,whereas in the OECD countries the ratiois the opposite. And so, when one readsof how everybody in Russia is making aruble selling something, and nobody isputting any money into producing any-thing new, it is useful to remember thatselling is the part of the economy thatmost needs developing.

Agricultural reformIn the agricultural sector, the obviousneed is to reduce the collectivized shareand increase the scope for private owner-ship and production. This, together withthe end of artificially low prices for food,ought to provide a very considerablestimulus to production. At least in theory,private ownership should also lead tomore care for the land and greater interestin ecologically sound agricultural tech-

niques and tech-nologies. More-over, to the ex-tent that publichealth is consid-ered an aspect ofthe overall envi-ronmental situa-tion, it should benoted that im-proved agricul-tural productionwill also lead tomuch better gen-eral nutrition aspeople get thevegetables thatare often in shortsupply.

Still, in agriculture as in industry, thetransition to private production is notwithout its pitfalls for the environment.Not every agricultural problem in theformer Soviet bloc could be attributed tothe overuse of chemical fertilizers, pesti-cides and defoliants or to the remote andimpersonal government production agen-cies. A lot of damage also was caused by

AS MUCH AS 75% of the surface water in Russia is dangerous to drink InNorilsk, engineers monitor the water quality.

traditional practices such as the use ofhuge quantities of liquid manure frompig and chicken farms, and old-fashionedovergrazing.

Presented with the opportunity to makea ruble for a change, it is not a foregoneconclusion that the Russian or Romanianfarmer will always select the option that isecologically most farsighted.

A global concernTHE ENVIRONMENTAL problems of theformer Soviet and East European na-

tions are of course not merely their prob-lems. Together those countries accountfor about a quarter of global carbon-diox-ide emissions and contribute mightily tothe global warming threat. The East Eu-ropean countries "export" roughly threequarters of their sulfur-dioxide emissions(though they also import a large share ofthe sulfur dioxide that ends up in theirair).Thanks to Chernobyl, everybody ap-preciates the dangers another accidentwould pose for Western Europe. And na-tional ecological treasures like LakeBaykal are no more mere "national" pos-sessions than Niagara Falls or the GreatBarrier Reef.

The very large, monopolistic indus-tries that were characteristic of theformer Soviet bloc represent an espe-cially difficult aspect of environmentalimprovement. The company Spolchemiein the Czech Republic's Usti nad Labem,for example, pollutes air and water withmercury, chlorine and other highly toxicchemicals. Even with planned improve-ments over a five-year period, half its

production still will not meet EuropeanCommunity (EC)* standards. But it is theonly plant of its kind in the country.

Yablokov told La Recherche that "theegoism of the big ministries has disap-peared to a great extent but it has givenway to a local egoism. The centralizationof the economy and the instability of re-lations between the federal and regionalorgans have had the effect that today lo-cal authorities often make decisions thatare advantageous for their region butdangerous for the rest of the country." Onthe other hand, Kabala, an expert on theEast European countries, thinks "nowthat they have regained full national sov-ereignty, the countries of the region aremore inclined to cooperate with eachother than they were as 'fraternal allies'in the Soviet sphere."

Capital needsIn a meeting this writer held in early Oc-tober 1993 with a group of Russian envi-ronmental leaders visiting the U.S., thestriking thing was that they were unani-mous in calling, above all, for more pri-vate investment in ecologically sound


I OP IC

3ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS

projects in Russia. This was not a groupthat opposed growth. Anatoly V.Lebedev, an independent writer fromVladivostok and a member of thePrimorskiy Regional Soviet, complainedthat a forestry grant provided by the U.S.Agency for International Development(AID) only supported researchwhich,he said, they already had in abundancerather than environmentally sound forestindustries, which is what they hadsought. Mark L. Borozin, editor of theweekly Green World in Moscow and anadviser to Russia's Ministry of Environ-mental Protection, complained that theadvanced industrial countries were con-spiring to prevent Russia from getting thebest available technology, including en-vironmental know-how. His view ap-peared to be shared by the whole group.

Obviously, the need for capital andtechnology is great. Yablokov has quotedestimates that $100 billion would beneeded to clean Russia's water; $50 bil-lion to $70 billion to clean up nuclearpollutants; and restoring the Volga basinalone could cost $300 billion, he said.Poland's Ministry of Environmental Pro-tection estimated in 1990 that bringingthe country into compliance with ECstandards by the year 2000 and achieving"sustainable economic development" by2020 would cost $260 billion.

Seen in the light of these estimates,the international aid provided or prom-ised so far has been small. The WorldBank has lent Poland $150 million for aconservation project and $100 million to

upgrade highly polluting chemical plantsand power stations; it has lent Hungary$300 million for energy efficiency andclean-fuels projects. Together with theUnited Nations Environment Programand the UN Development Program, theWorld Bank is supporting a Black Seaproject in which the six littoral countrieswill spend $30 million over three years ina collaborative cleanup program. TheGroup of Seven major industrial coun-tries has pledged $75 million toward areactor upgrade program, supported bytechnical assistance from France, Ger-many and the U.S. Franco-Germannuclear offices are being established inMoscow and Kiev, and similar centersare planned as a result of congressionalappropriations promoted by SenatorsSam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Richard Lugar(R-Ind.), which earmarked $400 millionin fiscal year 1992 and again in fiscalyear 1993 to assist with the dismantlingof nuclear weapons. But most of thatmoney has so far been spent on equip-ment in the U.S., and establishment ofthe centers at the end of 1993 still washostage to the political crisis in Russiaand to Ukraine's refusal to make a clearcommitment to sign the NuclearNonproliferation Treaty of 1968.

Meeting in Lucerne, Switzerland, inApril 1993, 50 environmental 'ministersfrom Europe, Japan, Canada and the U.S.endorsed a World Bank/OECD environ-mental action plan for Eastern Europe.The plan designates clean air as the firstpriority, pure drinking water the sec-

ondthe opposite of what was advo-cated by the Russian visitors, whoclaimed that declining industrial produc-tion already was taking care of the airand prevention of further irreversibledamage, the third. The emphasis was onsmall-scale approaches; the Western gov-ernments pledged $30 million towardpreparation of loans and projects.

Legal & contractual remediesMonies provided former Soviet nationsunder the U.S. Freedom Support Act fordemocratic institutions may also contrib-ute to the solution of environmental prob-lems. But in light of the huge capitalneeds of the former Soviet-bloc nationsand the obvious reluctance of the Groupof Seven countries to provide aid on thescale desired, it may be well to think alsoin terms of nonmonetary approaches.

One possibility is to formulate legisla-tion in advanced industrial countriesregulating the behavior of their compa-nies operating in the former Soviet-bloccountries. The EC-reportedly has beenpreparing a code of conduct for WestEuropean investors.

Another approach is to negotiate debt-for-environmental-improvement deals, inwhich individual countries are promiseddebt relief in exchange for firm commit-ments to make specific environmentalupgrades. One objection is that suchdeals are very difficult to negotiate andinevitably give rise to acrimony that canturn out to be counterproductive.

A similar but still broader approach

Magnitogorsk Russia's Gary

THE RUSSIAN CITY of Magnitogorsk is a steel town built inthe heyday of Stalin's heavy industrialization drive.Magnitogorsk was producing 10% of the U.S.S.R.'s steel

in 1939, it produced 50% of the steel used in Russian tanks dur-ing the Great Patriotic War (World War H), and even at the endof the 1980s was making about as much steel as all of Britain.

First described in 1943 by a disillusioned American expatri-ate, John Scott, Magnitogorsk more recently was the subject ofa study by a young Princeton historian, Stephen Kotkin."Magnitogorsk is part of a Soviet rust belt yet to undergo thewrenching adjustments already inflicted upon cities of theAmerican rust belt," such as Gary, Indiana, Kotkin observes. Itis representative of 1,000 similar cities with a total populationof about 100 million--complete with "obsolete industry, eco-logical devastation, dilapidated or nonexistent infrastructure,declining living standards and deteriorating health."

Yet it also "is a city without restaurants and cafes, withouttake-out eateries, all-night convenience stores or supermarkets.

It is a city in which disposable diapers or food processors, notto mention personal computers, seem like artifacts of a science-fictional world....

"At the same time, Magnitogorsk is a working-class citywithout unemployment or even the fear of being laid off, with-out a sizable and visible underclass, without a conspicuous eliteor wealthy class, or for that matter without any manifest per-sonal wealth at all. It is a city without traffic jams and parkingnightmaresindeed there are few cars. It is a city without gunsand other lethal weapons, where murder and other violentcrimes are uncommon and, even more strikingly, uncelebratedevents. It is a city where people do not fear walking alone atnight, where children can be left to play outside without thethreat of being kidnapped...."

But Magnitogorsk also is a city, Kotkin goes on to say, inwhich the average life expectancy of a man upon retirement isthree years, in which one third of the adult population and twothirds of the children suffer respiratory diseases, and in whichfour out of ten babies are born with abnormalities.

From Stephen Kotkin's Steeltown, U.S.S.R. (Berkeley, Univer-sity of California Press, 1991).



would be to attach environmental condi-tions to virtually every kind of aid to theformer Soviet bloc. The inseparability ofthe economic and environmental crises inthe former Soviet and East Europeancountries is a powerful argument in favorof that approach.

Role of NGOsDuring the last 10 years of the Soviet era,scientists associated with nongovernmen-tal organizations (NGOs) such as theFederation of American Scientists andthe Natural Resources Defense Councildeveloped contacts with sympathetic fig-ures in the U.S.S.R. and started somepioneering pilot projects. NRDC, for ex-ample, managed to open several jointlyoperated stations for monitoring nucleartests in the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and it evengot the Soviet military to cooperate in pi-lot detection of nuclear warheads oncruise missiles aboard U.S.S.R. ships.Such projects showed that even under anauthoritarian regime and during whatRussians now call "the years of stagna-tion," skilled and dedicated people couldbe found who were capable of makingworthwhile things happen.

Since 1991 the Institute for Soviet-American Relations (ISAR), based nearWashington, D.C., has organized ex-changes of environmentalists betweenthe U.S. and the former Soviet countries.It has helped found an international clear-inghouse on the former Soviet Union'senvironment with the Social EcologicalUnion, an umbrella organization for 300groups from the former Soviet Union co-ordinated by Maria Cherkasova. Withsupport from the National Endowmentfor Democracy, based in Washington,D.C. and World Learning (formerly theExperiment in International Living),ISAR has got 135 former Soviet Uniongroups linked up to electronic mail.ISAR has also started a grants programwith support from AID, with $2 millionto spend over two years. AID has givenISAR another $1 million to organize aone-year NGO cooperation program.

The National Audubon Society alsohas initiated some joint projects. One, inwhich Audubon's Alaska office is takingthe lead, aims to establish an internationalpark on Russia's side of the land bridgethat once linked Asia and North America.Native peoples on both sides of the divideare participating in the design of theproject, which is geared to the preserva-tion of natural habitats. Another Audubon

initiative, the Amurriver basin projecta sister of its PlatteRiver Project in theU.S.protectshabitats of migrat-ing storks andcranes.

Cooperation bynongovernmentaland private-sectororganizations neednot always be aone-way street. Me-chanical Technol-ogy Inc., a com-pany based in Co-lumbus, Ohio, hasordered a line of nuc ear waste process-ing equipment from the Central ScientificResearch Laboratory in Russia. The Rus-sian technology involves growing alfalfaon radioactive contaminated soil so thatthe alfalfa can act as a biological pump,drawing heavy metals out of the earth.Then the plant material is passed throughan electromagnetic membrane to removethe contaminants. According to the Ohiocompany, the processing equipment canbe obtained at a fraction of what it wouldcost in the U.S. and may be an economi-cal method of cleaning low-level radia-tion from large contaminated areas.

U.S. policy options1. The U.S. should provide large-

scale financial assistance to the formerSoviet-bloc countries to clean up theenvironment.

Pro: The former Soviet republics andtheir East European neighbors urgentlyneed environment-friendly technologyfor upgrading their nuclear reactors orconverting to gas to supply their energyneeds; for emission-control devices forfactories and vehicles; for cleaner indus-trial processes and water and air filtrationsystems. Unless large amounts of outsidecapital are forthcoming, there is no waythe former Soviet-bloc countries can af-ford the technology.

Con: It is questionable whether politi-cal support can be found in the U.S. forsuch a strategy. Moreover, large grantsand loans inevitably would require theU.S. as donor to make strategic decisionsabout which environmental problemsmost urgently need to be addressed, akind of interventionism that could arousenationalist resentments in some of theformer Soviet-bloc nations.

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2. The U.S. should support the ef-forts of NGOs to assist in cleaning upthe environment in the former Soviet-bloc countries.

Pro: Outside countries will neverdonate enough money to make a seriousdent in the former Soviet bloc's environ-mental crisis. Providing relatively open-ended support for nongovernmentalorganizations and private enterprises hasthe advantage of involving grass-rootsorganizations in the former Sovietrepublics and Eastern Europe in deci-sions about which problems to attack andhow.

Con: NGO assistance can never becommensurate with the scale of the prob-lems afflicting the former Soviet-bloccountries.

The ex-Soviet-bloc countries have anopportunity to learn from the mistakesmade in the West during the last few de-cades and to make more rapid progressthan Europe and the U.S. achieved in the1970s and 1980s, according to much ofthe recent literature published in the Westabout the crisis. But the U.S. and Europewere able to attack their environmentalproblems with relatively stable institu-tions, not having to build new social andpolitical organizations from the groundup. Furthermore, the idea of "leapfrog-ging history" has played a not-altogether-benign role in Russian thought, from Pe-ter the Great to Lenin to Stalin. Perhapsthen it would be better for environmen-talists in the U.S. to use what influencethey have to stress the virtues of the"small is beautiful" approachto en-courage their counterparts in the formerSoviet bloc to think realistically aboutwhat positive advances can be achievedcarefully, in small steps.



DEICUSSIONQUESTICDNS

1. To what extent should aid-donorcountries have a say in determining envi-ronmental standards and priorities for theformer Soviet-bloc countries?

2. Do you favor making environmentalimprovements a condition for debt reliefto former Soviet-bloc countries?

3. What level of capital assistance wouldit be appropriate and feasible to offer theformer Soviet-bloc states? For example,would you favor earmarking 1% of cur-

rent defense spending in the seven most-advanced industrial countries for envi-ronmental aid, primarily in the formerSoviet Union and Eastern Europe?

4. Are nuclear weapons an environmen-tal problem? Should Ukraine, which hasnuclear weapons, be required to sign theNuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968as a condition for receiving help withother environmental problems?

5. Should investors in the former Sovietbloc be required to adhere to codes ofconduct, including an obligation to ob-serve environmentally sound practices?

6. Is there any way of making the bestenvironmental technology more available

to the former Communist countries giventhe fact that technology in the capitalistcountries is privately owned? For ex-ample, should the U.S. government forceChevron to give Kazakhstan the mostadvanced oil-drilling technology?

7. To what extent might the former So-viet-bloc states be able to "leapfrog" his-tory and achieve very rapid improvementin the environment, adopting the latesttechnology and avoiding some of themistakes the advanced industrial coun-tries made? Given Russia's past experi-ence with leapfrogging, most recently theLeninist attempt to skip the capitalistphase of historical development, shouldthe Russians be encouraged to attemptsuch jumps again?

"Bitter Conflicts: Wars Engulf Moscow's Dying Empire."World Press Review, October 1993, pp. 8-14. A survey of themost severe conflicts that sheds light on the impact of extremedeprivation; situations could be portents of worse to come.

Feshbach, Murray, and Friendly Jr., Alfred, Ecocide in theU.S.S.R.: Health and Nature Under Siege. New York, BasicBooks, 1992. 267 pp. $24.00. Written by an expert on Soviethealth data and a journalist, the book takes a very broad view ofthe environment. As the title implies, it is slightly dated.

French, Hilary E., "Green Revolutions: Environmental Recon-struction in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union."Woridwatch Paper No. 99. Washington, D.C., WorldwatchInstitute,1990. 62 pp. $5.00. Also somewhat out of date, butcontains some useful comparative data.

Hamilton, John Maxwell, "Will Pollution Kill the Revolution?"The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1991, pp. 12-18.Primarily on Poland and the former Czechoslovakia, but despitelimited scope, informative and insightful.

Kabala, Stanley J., "The Environmental Morass in Eastern Eu-rope." Current History, November 1991, pp. 384-89. By aleading expert on Poland's environment, this analysis has anauthoritative ring.

Kopkind, Andrew, "From Russia With Love and Squalor." TheNation, January 18, 1993, pp. 11 62. A journalist's portrait oflife in Russia a year after democratization.

Medvedev, Grigori, The Truth About Chernobyl. New York,Basic Books, 1991. 267 pp. $ 12.00. Somewhat technical, butwritten by an insider who provides much insight into the regu-latory and political background of the accident.

Peterson, D.J., Troubled Lands: The Legacy of Soviet Envi-ronmental Destruction. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press/Washington, RAND, 1993. 276 pp. $19.95 (paper). A thoroughand useful documentation based on interviews, Soviet officialpapers and press reports.

Zagalsky, Leonid, ed., "Kazakhstan." The Bulletin of the.Atomic Scientists, October 1993, pp. 14-47. With contribu-tions by former Soviet authors, provides much insight into agri-cultural and oil development, as well as the political context.

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, 257 Park Ave. S., New York,N.Y 10010; (212) 505-2100. EDF draws on science, econom-ics and law to create workable solutions to today's environmen-tal problems and publishes the EDF newsletter.

GREENPEACE U.S A., 1436 U St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009;(202) 462-1177. A nonprofit, international environment groupdedicated to dramatizing environmental injustices and usingresearch, lobbying and grass-roots activism to effect change.

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL (NRDC), 40 West 20th St,New York, N.Y. 10011; (212) 727-2700. An independent or-ganization strong in environmental litigation and regulation inthe U.S. It pioneered environmental projects in the U.S.S.R. andcurrently has a number of projects in Russia and Ukraine. Pub-lishes The Amicus Journal (4/year) and Newsline (5/year).

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (WRI), 1709 New York Ave., N.W.,7th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20006; (202) 638-6300. An in-dependent research institution, WRI provides data on globalresources and environmental conditions, studies emerging is-sues and helps develop appropriate policy responses.

WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE, 1776 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.,Washington, D.C. 20036; (202) 452-1999. The WorldwatchInstitute is an independent, nonprofit research organization thatinforms policymakers and the public about the interdependenceof the world economy and its environmental support systems.Publications include Woridwatch Paper, annual State of theWorld report and the bimonthly World Watch magazine.


39

OPINION BALLOTS

40

Date: / /1994 Ballot continues on reverse side... Date: / /1994 Ballot continues on reverse side...

TOPIC in TOPIC

4 Trade with Pacific Rim j 4 Trade with Pacific Rim

ee digits of your zip code: I

11ISSUE A. In its trade negotiations with the Pacific Rim, I ISSUE A. In its trade negotiations with the Pacific Rim, I

Date: / /1994 Ballot continues on reverse side... Date: / /1994 Ballot continues on reverse side...

TOPIC in TOPIC

4 Trade with Pacific Rim j 4 Trade with Pacific Rimthe U.S. should:

11ISSUE A. In its trade negotiations with the Pacific Rim, I ISSUE A. In its trade negotiations with the Pacific Rim, Ithe U.S. should: the U.S. should: I

I 1. Pursue freer trade with allYES NO I1 economies of the region. 0 I

I 2. Correct trade imbalances by the II use of quotas, voluntary export

I restraints and other barriers. 0 I1

I 3. Tie trade agreements with China Iand Indonesia to respect forI human rights. II 4. Tie trade with Taiwan to 1I guarantees for intellectual II property rights. II 5. Lift the trade embargo on Vietnam. II 6. Other, or comment I

I

00I

I111

IIi

1. Pursue freer trade with allYES NO

economies of the region.

I2. Correct trade imbalances by theuse of quotas, voluntary exportrestraints and other barriers.

3. Tie trade agreements with Chinaand Indonesia to respect for

Ihuman rights.4. Tie trade with Taiwan to

guarantees for intellectualproperty rights.

5. Lift the trade embargo on Vietnam.

6. Other, or comment

1. Pursue freer trade with allYES NO

economies of the region.

I2. Correct trade imbalances by theuse of quotas, voluntary exportrestraints and other barriers.

3. Tie trade agreements with Chinaand Indonesia to respect for

Ihuman rights.4. Tie trade with Taiwan to

guarantees for intellectualproperty rights.

5. Lift the trade embargo on Vietnam.

6. Other, or comment

I III I i

IFirst three digits of your zip code: : First three digits of your zip code:

the U.S. should: II 1. Pursue freer trade with all

YES NO I1 economies of the region. 0 II 2. Correct trade imbalances by the II use of quotas, voluntary export

I restraints and other barriers. 0 I1

I 3. Tie trade agreements with China Iand Indonesia to respect forI human rights. II 4. Tie trade with Taiwan to 1I guarantees for intellectual II property rights. II 5. Lift the trade embargo on Vietnam. II 6. Other, or comment I

IDate: / /1994 Ballot continues on reverse side... I Date: / /1994 Ballot continues on reverse side... INum 111_. mot. .1.1.1 Ix No el


I III I i

IFirst three digits of your zip code: : First three digits of your zip code:

40

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OPINION BALLOTS

38 GREAT DECISIONS 1994 4138 GREAT DECISIONS 1994

. NI 11 NUM = M M IIIII-IMM-IMMI MUM M NUN IIIII NMI

I I II ISSUE B. Would it be appropriate for the U.S. to channel I ISSUE B. Would it be appropriate fur the U.S. to channel 111

I aid for environmental cleanup through citizen groups? I aid for environmental cleanup through citizen groups? I1. Yes. 1

1. Yes. II 0 2. No. I 2. No. II I ll

0 ISSUE C. To combat the environmental damage caused I ISSUE C. To combat the environmental damage caused III by the policies of the former Soviet-bloc countries, the I by the policies of the former Soviet-bloc countries, the II U.S. should urge those countries to give the highest pri- I U.S. should urge those countries to give the highest pri- II ority to (check one only): I ority to (check one only): I

1. Reducing air pollution. I 1. Reducing air pollution. II 2. Upgrading nuclear reactors to meet interim- 2. Upgrading nuclear reactors to meet interna- II tional standards. I

1tional standards. I

I 3. "Denuclearizing" energy-intensive econo-mies. 1

3. "Denuclearizing" energy-intensive econo-mies. I

1 4. Eliminating or reducing nuclear weapons and I 4. Eliminating or reducing nuclear weapons and III providing for their safe disposal. I providing for their safe disposal. I0 5. Cleaning up and restoring the quality of in-

111

5. Cleaning upteational bodies of water in and around the

and restoring the quality of in 1temational bodies of water in and around thernIformer Soviet bloc. I former Soviet bloc. II 6. Other, or comment 1 6. Other, or comment IIl I I

;II

II

I I I1111 IN M a 11111111111111111111a a a 11111111111101M a a MIIIIIIIIIIIIIN a a a IN M11111111111111111111M a a a a a MI!

III I

ISSUE B. In its trade negotiations with Japan, the U.S.I

should: I should:Ii ISSUE B. In its trade negotiations with Japan, the U.S.

IYES NO I YES NO III I

1. Press for a share of the JapaneseI

armket for U.S. exports, industry I market for U.S. exports, industry Iill1 . Press for a share of the Japanese

I by industry. 1 by industry. 1:1 II I I

Japanese economy. 1:11 12. Press for structural changes in the

Japanese economy. II 2. Press for structural changes in the

I3. Offer to make structural changes in 1 3. Offer to make structural changes inthe U.S. economy (e.g., increase 1 the U.S. economy (e.g., increase I

I savings and investment) in exchange I savings and investment) in exchange Ieconomy. I for structural changes in the Japanese I

ID economy. IZIIllfor structural changes in the Japanese

I 1 1about a trade imbalance

with Japan since the U.S. has trade I 4. Not worry ance Iwith Japan since the U.S. has tradeI 4. Not worry about a trade imbalance

II surpluses with other countries. CII 0 1 surpluses with other countries. 0 I1

5. Other, or comment 1 5. Other, or comment 1I

I I II I I0 I II I Iii I IIc....".._.-mr....-..............11.......w..............111

TRADE 4

Trade with thePacific Rim: pressureor cooperation?As a trading partner, Asia is one and one-half times aslarge as Europe and growing rapidly. So is the U.S. tradedeficit with the region.

by Jinny St. Goar

"As Asia advances, so must we. For to-day, no region in the world is more im-portant to the U.S. than Asia....That iswhy President Clinton has called for aNew Pacific Community, built on threecore elements: shared prosperity, sharedstrength, and a shared commitment todemocratic values."

Secretary of State Warren ChristopherAddress at University of Washington,

Seattle, November 17, 1993

"----"F THE 20TH CENTURY was the "Ameri-can century," as the founder of Time,Life and Fortune Henry R. Luce so

modestly dubbed it, then the 21st centurywill belong to the countries of the PacificRim, at least in the world view of the U.S.

"Fast-forward" describes the growthof the region's economies. Consider theneeds of typical consumers in China, forexample. In the late 1970s, they werelooking for a sewing machine, a bicycleand an electric fan. By the 1980s, accord-ing to a Hong Kong-based market re-search firm, Chinese consumers mighthave aspired to a TV, a refrigerator and awashing machine. In the 1990s, the Chi-nese have a new trio of desires: a VCR, amotorcycle and a telephone.

For the 1.2 billion people in China,these changes in buying patterns indicatea quickly rising standard of living and aneconomy that is scrambling to meet thesedemands. As a whole, the economies ofthe Pacific region are growing more thansix times as fast as the 24 leading indus-trial economies did last year. Most of

JINNY ST. GOAR is a writer on economics andfinance with a particular interest in Asia.

East Asia has been growing at a rate ofmore than 6% a year for a generation.Imagine the changes in the U.S. from thestart of the 20th century through thepresent being compressed into one or twodecades for a picture of economic devel-opment in Asia.

The Pacific Rim economies (Austra-lia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan,South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand,the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thai-land and Vietnam) offer vital markets forU.S. goodsmarkets that account formore than 2.4 million American jobs. In1960, U.S. trade with Asia was less thanhalf the volume of U.S. trade with Eu-rope. Three decades later, the total ofAmerican exports to and imports fromAsia, now up to $344 billion, dwarfedthose crossing the Atlanticby 50%.Although Canada is the U.S.'s largesttrading partner, the combined U.S. tradewith Canada and Mexico in 1992 wasonly $265 billion, also greatly overshad-owed by U.S. trade with Asia.

Because several of the Asian-Pacificeconomies are growing at more thantwice the rate of the U.S. and its industri-alized trading partners in Europe, Wash-ington can anticipate an even greater pro-portion of its trade flowing across the Pa-cific Ocean in the coming years. For thePacific Rim, international trade has beencritical to its vitality.

AT THE NOVEMBER SUMMIT of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, PresidentClinton, with President Fidel Ramos of the Philippines on his right and Prime Minister JeanChretien of Canada on his left, led the other Pacific Rim leaders on a walk before sitting downto six hours of meetings.


1OPIC

4 PACIFIC RIM

The Pacific Rim:an overview

WHEN HE STRESSED the need to in-crease employment in the industri-

alized economies, President Bill Clintondefined a top priority in his foreignpolicy. Clearly this Administration seesexports to growing economies as a ve-hicle for job creation. At the same timethe U.S. has a history of close diplomaticrelations with Japan, South Korea, thePhilippines, Australia, Taiwan and Thai-landrelations that cannot be entirelygiven over to banging on entry-portdoors for trade access. The region alsoincludes two of the world's most worri-some nuclear powersChina, whichtested nuclear weapons as recently asOctober 1993, and North Korea, whichrefuses international inspections of itsnuclear facilities.

The end of the cold war threw intoquestion the terms of all U.S. alliances,and those relationships have not all beenclearly redefined. As recently as 1987,when the U.S. trade deficit with Japanpeaked at $56 billion, the Soviet strategicbuildup in the Pacific was viewed as athreat. For four decades, a rough trade-

off was premised on Pacific Rim coun-tries resisting the Soviet Union and thePeople's Republic of China and the U.S.playing a strategic balancing role, offer-ing its nuclear umbrella to Japan andSouth Korea. The U.S. also contributedto the region's conventional defense, pro-vided economic and military assistanceand allowed relatively unhindered accessto American markets. But U.S. economicinterests no longer take a back seat. Andwithout those trade-offs, the pressure torectify imbalances increases.

Asians are selling far more to Ameri-cans than they are buying. The U.S. had atrade deficit of $87 billion with the re-gion in 1992, representing the differencebetween exports to and imports fromAsia. Since the U.S. buys more fromAsia than it sells to Asia, the imbalance iswidely understood as a deficiency of do-mestic U.S. producers to meet the de-mands of American consumers. Viewedin a different light, the deficit also repre-sents the transfer of U.S. buying poweroverseas and an attendant loss of jobs athome.

AVERAGE GROWTH OF GNP PER CAPITA, 1965-90

East Asia

HPAES*

South Asia

Middle East andMediterranean

Sub-Saharan Africa

OECD economies

Latin America andCaribbean

0 1 2 3 4 5

GNP per capita growth rate (percent)

6

*The eight "high-performing Asian economies": Japan, Hong Kong, Republic of Korea,Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand

SOURCE THE EAST ASIAN ANRACIE SUMMARY, WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH REPORT, SEPTEMBER 1093

This shortfall in 1992 was all the morefrustrating because the U.S. had a globaldeficit for that year of only $84.3 billion,indicating that the rest of the world wasbuying more from the U.S. than it wasselling to Americans by a margin of $2.7billion. The persistence of the recessionin Europe, however, changed that globalsurplus in the first seven months of 1993to a deficit of $6.2 billion.

Japan accounts for about 40% of thetotal U.S. trade deficitor around $50billionwhich has gradually increasedover the past three years. But in 1992,China's trade surplus with the U.S. bal-looned by 50% to $18 billion, and it con-tinued at about that level in 1993. A largeelement of the growth of China's exportsto the U.S. can be attributed to Taiwanand Hong Kong having shifted produc-tion to the People's Republic of China. In1987, the combined surplus of the "threeChinas" with the U.S. was $28 billion,the same level as in 1992.

Within the region, four newly indus-trialized economies, often described as the"Four Tigers"(Taiwan, South Korea,Hong Kong and Singapore) account foranother $11 billion of the U.S. shortfall.Hong Kong and Singapore are notable fortheir lack of trade barriers. Hong Kong isthe only Asian trading partner with whichthe U.S. has turned its traditional tradedeficit into a positive balance in 1993.

Six countries form the loose entityknown as Asean, the Association ofSouth East Asian Nations: Indonesia,Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,Thailand and the small Sultanate ofBrunei. Founded in 1967, Asean is theU.S.'s fourth largest trading partner, with320 million people. Its trade surplus withthe U.S. was $12 billion in 1992.

Australia, whose economy has grownat much the same pace as the U.S.economy, is the only Pacific Rim countrywith which the U.S. has always had atrade surplus. In 1992 that amounted to$5.2 billion, roughly the same as in thefirst half of 1993. Recently New Zealand,which traditionally has had a trade deficitwith the U.S., also had a small surplus.

The U.S. has had an embargo on tradewith Vietnam since 1975: no U.S. enter-prises have been allowed to trade directlywith Vietnam or manufacture there. Dur-ing his first year President Clinton liftedthe embargo slightly by agreeing to letthe World Bank, the International Mon-etary Fund and the Asian DevelopmentBank lend to Vietnam. U.S. companies


PACIFIC RIMOPIC

4can now bid on internationally fundeddevelopment projects, but they are stillprohibited from selling their goods di-rectly or manufacturing in Vietnam.

Since 1986, echoing the SovietUnion's economic reforms, Vietnam hasmoved gradually toward a market-oriented economy. As in China, politi-cal reform has not kept pace with thechanging Vietnamese economy. The 72million people (twice the population ofSouth Korea) are hard-working and lit-erate. The country's natural resources arealso enviable, among them: anthracitecoal, the potential for hydroelectricpower, timber, agriculture, fisheries, andoffshore oil.

Sources of trade tensionsFundamental differences between Eastand West have made trade conflicts par-ticularly intractable. This became appar-ent in the 1980s between the U.S. andJapan, but similar problems have arisenin the 1990s with South Korea, Taiwan,Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Theprimary U.S. complaint with respect toJapan has been the concentration of own-ership and additional cross-ownership inconglomerates, or keiretsu, that make theJapanese economy a restricted club. Addto that Japan's emphasis on productionrather than consumption, and the result isan economy that sells vigorously to theU.S. (and to Europe, as well) and buysconsiderably less from the U.S.

Tensions with the Japanese over tradeissues have intensified. The term "Japan-bashing" has become shorthand for U.S.politicians' diatribes about the trade defi-cit and the declining fortunes of U.S. in-dustries that compete directly with Japan.The Japanese, for their part, claim thattheir markets are open to U.S. goods, butthat the quality of those goods is not ap-pealing to the Japanese consumer.

Some observers have suggested thatthese acrimonious words will soon beechoed in exchanges between the U.S.and other Asian nations. Until now, U.S.trade negotiators have focused mainly onJapan, but U.S. policymakers are startingto grapple with the rest of the region'scontribution to the U.S. trade deficit.

Trade issues worry U.S. policymakersfor another reason. The trade surplusesfor several Pacific Rim economies havecoincided with significant increases indefense spendingin China, the Philip-pines, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysiaand Indonesia. And those funds are going

611;(L'ilV

to air and naval resources, which seem tobe geared to the projection of powerrather than the protection of borders. Thesettlement of trade disputes and generaleasing of tensions in the Pacific Rim areahave become all the more pressing.

Population and geographyThe Asian-Pacific region has a history ofrelying on trade for its growth. Twoforces have shaped this orientation, eachwith complications for the region. First,population pressures in China have en-couraged 30 million Chinese to emigrateduring the last two centuries. But theoverseas Chinese have retained strongcultural ties and have created a vast net-work of business relationships, particu-larly in Southeast Asia. In Thailand,roughly 50% of the capital city's 8 mil-lion residents are of Chinese descent. TheChinese of Malaysia constitute the lion'sshare of the country's merchant class.

Indonesia, like Malaysia, a predomi-nantly Muslim country, shares Malay-sia's unease about the potentially dividedloyalties of their ethnic Chinese merchantclass. In these two Islamic countries, cer-tain social and economic privileges arestill reserved for the bumiputra (sons ofthe soil), the ethnic Malay and Indone-siansan explicit slight to these coun-tries' ethnic Chinese citizens. Nonethe-less, the entrepreneurial spirit of the over-seas Chinese has been a major contribu-tor to the dynamism of Asia.

Another force that promotes trading isa quirk of nature's endowment. Many ofthe countries are island-nations driven tointernational commerce by necessity.Japan is the outstanding exampleanarchipelago poor in certain naturalresources and rich in culture and humanenergy. Indonesia, the region's second-most-populous country (after China) with188 million people, is another island-nation as are the Philippines, Taiwan,Singapore and Hong Kong.

U.S. trade partnersThe island of Taiwan became the ref-

uge for the Nationalist Chinese, or theKuomintang, who lost their civil war onthe mainland to Mao Zedung and theCommunists in 1949. For three decadesthe U.S. recognized Taiwan, or the Re-public of China, as the only legitimateChinese government. Since the openingof U.S. diplomatic relations with Beijingin late 1978, Taiwan has been in an awk-ward position: a loyal U.S. ally who hasbeen slighted. The second-largest sourceof investment capital for the Pacific Rim,Taiwan remains a diplomatic outsider asits trading partners prefer not to alienatethe region's behemoth, China.

Traditionally, Taiwan exported foot-wear, clothing, plastics, umbrellas andtravel accessories to the U.S. However,Taiwanese traders moved such lightmanufacturing concerns first to SoutheastAsian lower-wage countries, and more


PACIFIC RIM

SELECTED STATISTICS

1993 Population(millions)

1991 GDP(billions)

1992 Volume oftrade with U.S.

(billions)

1992 U.S.trade deficit

(billions)

japan 1.24.R $2,360.7 $144.9 $49

Taiwan 20.9 $180.1 $40 $9.4

China 1,178 NA $33 $18.3

South Korea 44.6 $280.8 $31.3 $2

Singapore 2.8 $39.9 $20.9 $1.7

Hong Kong 5.8 $71.0 $8.1* $0.2*

Australia 17.8 $277.2 $12.6 +$5.2

Thailand 57.2 $88.0 $11.5 $3.5

Indonesia 187.6 $115.0 $7.2 $1.7

*1991 figures

recently to mainland China, concentrat-ing on developing high-technologyindustries, such as electronics, on Tai-wan. Recently, Taiwan has started toshift its investments in China towardmore technology-intensive industries, in-cluding chemicals, building materials,automobiles and electronic products andcomponents.

The economic liberalization policiesof the 1980s in the People's Republic ofChina spawned rapid growth, fulfillingfor many Chairman Deng Xiao-ping'sslogan "To get rich is glorious." But thedifficult transition from a plannedeconomy to a market economy also fos-tered the uncontrolled inflation in the late1980s that culminated in the democracyprotests in Tiananmen Square. Similarinflationary conditions developed in1993. The situation is further compli-cated by 89-year-old Chairman Deng'sdeclining health and the eventual transi-tion of power.

Under a 1992 agreement aimed atopening Chinese markets, the U.S. wasgiven assurances that all trade-relatedlaws and regulations in China would bepublished, and that the Chinese centralgovernment would try to standardize thetreatment of imports, no matter wheregoods arrive. Furthermore, the Chinesepledged to end the export of goods manu-factured by prison labor.

South Korea recently elected its firstcivilian president, Kim Young Sam, re-flecting South Koreans' greater confi-dence in their still precarious position of

abutting Communist North Korea. Sincethe inconclusive war on the Korean pen-insula in the early 1950s, the U.S. hasmaintained troops in South Korea-re-cently at the level of 37,000 strong. Thehost country has agreed to pay more ofthe U.S. defense costs there. In 1991 bothNorth and South Korea became membersof the United Nations. The South Kore-ans established diplomatic relations withChina in August 1992.

The South Korean economy has beenmarked by a state-directed policy of in-dustrialization and the presence of thechaebols, the Korean counterpart to theJapanese keiretsu. These conglomeratestend to be vertically integrated, meaningthe corporate entity embraces units thatcontribute all parts of a production pro-cess, cutting off opportunities for outsidesuppliers. Certain barriers to trade havebeen lifted within the last two years.President Kim has proposed reforms thatwould move South Korea toward a moreliberal, market-based economic system, atransition that is not yet complete.

As a frontier land settled by mainlyBritish immigrants, Australia tradition-ally oriented its diplomacy and trade to-ward Europe and the U.S. but in the mid-1980s began shifting gears to carve outa more Asian identity. Australia's Laborparty has controlled national politics forthe last decade, putting the country outof sync with the Republican WhiteHouse in the 1980s. Labor held on tothe prime minister's portfolio in March1993, giving the Australians the hope of

working closely with the Clinton Ad-ministration.

Thailand, a constitutional monarchyand the only country in Southeast Asiathat has never been colonized, waslargely controlled by the military untilthe late 1980s. Failed coup attempts bythe military in 1985 and 1992 have sig-naled the maturing of Thai democracy,evidence of a burgeoning middle class. Astrong ally to the U.S. throughout theVietnam War, Thailand has had notablyclose diplomatic relations with Chinasince the late 1970s, largely because ofthe two countries' common fear of Viet-nam. The Thais have also been eager forthe U.S. to serve as a counterweight tothe Japanese in trade relations.

The U.S. trade deficit with Thailandincreased by almost 40% in the firstseven months of 1993, indicating thatThailand could join China in a specialcategory of newly emerging problempartners.

Indonesia is the only Asian memberof the Organization of Petroleum Export-ing Countries (OPEC) and is the world'sbiggest exporter of liquid natural gas. In1993 at age 72, President Suharto startedhis sixth term in office and chose a cabi-net of younger officials to groom the nextgeneration of leaders. The U.S. has raisedconcerns about the treatment of tradeunions and the Indonesian government'shandling of the East Timorese separatistmovement.

With about 125 million people,roughly half the population of the U.S.,Japan has a gross national product(GNP) of about 60% that of the U.S.Since 1955, the end of the post-WorldWar II occupation by the U.S., Japan hashad a parliamentary democracy, domi-nated by the Liberal Democratic party(LDP). Reflecting the country's roots as anation of rice farmers, votes from agri-cultural regions have carried more weightthan urban votes, and a system of landsubsidies protects the rice paddies, artifi-cially inflating the value of urban land aswell. The voters' rejection of the LDPlast year is expected to introduce politicalreforms that could change the traditionalbalance of power in favor of the cities.

Japan's rate of economic growth hadconsistently exceeded that of the U.S.until the country moved into a full-blownrecession in 1993. Corporate profits de-clined to such an extent that Japanesecompanies laid off workers in 1993. Thisfurther dampens the prospects for a


PACIFIC RIM,o,4

Regional trade cooperationIN REFERRING TO the Pacific Rim, policymakers occasionallyinclude all countries that border the world's largest ocean,not just the U.S. and Asia. Canada is already part of the

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, andAPEC's 15 member economies recently agreed to admit threemore countries, Mexico, Chile and Papua New Guinea.

Within this diverse region, the relatively young APEC forumis the most all-encompassing organization. When APEC waslaunched in late 1989, largely at the initiative of the Australians,it provided a forum for regional leaders to exchange ideas abouttrade, investment and development. Several Asian economieshad already moved into their recent phase of double-digitgrowth rates. At the same time, regional tensions over the oneplace of armed conflict, Cambodia, eased as the Vietnameseofficially withdrew their troops from this neighboring countryin September 1989. Within two years of its founding, APEChad invited the "three Chinas" to jointhe People's Republic,Taiwan and Hong Kongalthough the three Indochinese coun-tries (Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) are still not included.

Now a permanent secretariat has been set up in Singapore.Secretary of State Christopher has described APEC as "the cor-nerstone of regional economic cooperation" and trade liberal-ization. It is the first organization to embody the Asian-Pacific"community."

The U.S. chaired the group's fourth annual ministerial meet-ing in Seattle in November 1993, where the representativesbroke new ground by agreeing to reduce certain tariffs as a spurto the current multilateral trade negotiations under GATT.APEC has been vocal in its support for the General Agreementon Tariffs and Trade, the multilateral organization set up in1947 to reduce tariffs and promote trade globally.To develop acomparable set of rules and a governing body that commandsrespect could take time, but the benefits could be great. For ex-ample, APEC could help contain U.S.-Japanese trade frictions,suggests Garry Woodard, a former Australian diplomat who

now heads the Australian Institute of International Affairs.To a large extent, a more open enrollment for APEC mem-

bers hinges on whether Asians feel left out of other trade rela-tionships. Free-trade agreements, by definition, discriminateagainst those who are not included. As for the North AmericanFree Trade Agreement (Nafta) between the U.S., Canada andMexico, some of the smaller Asian nations are concerned thatNafta will draw investment capital away.

Some APEC members, the Australians for example, haveraised concerns about Nafta diminishing the market for theirexports. But Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating has em-phasized that the reduction could amount to only about 4%.Some large Australian or Japanese companies would be morelikely to take advantage of Nafta by manufacturing goods inMexico for sale in the U.S. The Singaporeans are more con-cerned that the strong opposition to Nafta in the U.S. signaled arising tide of protectionism. By the same token, a failure by theparties to GATT to conclude the long-overdue Uruguay Roundof negotiations could also trigger protectionism, promptingAsians to react defensively.

Next to APEC, the most inclusive organization is the EastAsian Economic Group, more a forum for discussion than along-established entity with accepted rules. Malaysian PrimeMinister Mahathir Mohamad started this group in 1991, explic-itly excluding the U.S. because of his irritation with Americans'attention to human rights abuses in other countries.

Asian trade pactUnder the terms of the Asean free-trade agreement (AFTA)launched in January 1993, the six members agreed to start low-ering tariffs to a range from 5% to 0 by 2008. But since theagreement was signed in early 1992, a new prime minister hastaken the helm in Thailand and a new cabinet was appointed inIndonesia. The agreement is not legally binding, nor is it so firmthat reluctant participants cannot wriggle out. The signersagreed to differing paces of tariff reductions. But AFTA's mostfundamental limitation is the fact that most Asean exports go toJapan, Europe and the U.S., whereas intra-Asean trade has re-mained at about 20% of the six countries' total since 1980.

recovery as Japanese consumers becomemore reluctant to spend. But Japan re-mains a powerful exporter. The Japaneserecession has exacerbated the U.S. tradeimbalance by shrinking the market therefor U.S. goods.

The industrial composition of the U.S.and Japanese economies is so similar(even though Japan now manufactures anumber of products the U.S. no longermakes) that competition in trade is al-most inevitable. But in part because Ja-pan has a narrower base of natural re-sources than the U.S., the Japanese havespecialized intensively in certain engi-neering-based sectors of the economywith good results in export markets: elec-trical machinery, transportation equip-ment, precision machinery, computers,subway cars and machine tools. TheJapanese have taken advantage of a

slightly longer workweek than theAmericansabout four hours longer,which adds up to 200 hours a year. TheJapanese import most raw materials formanufacturing and are almost entirelydependent on foreign sources for oil andother energy supplies. Food, fuel and rawmaterials constituted 35% of U.S. exportsto Japan in 1992, while the U.S. importeda negligible volume in these categoriesfrom Japan.

As the Japanese standard of livingrose rapidly after World War II, manu-facturing moved abroad in several wavesin search of lower wages. Most recently,between 1985 and 1990, when the yenappreciated sharply due to American ef-forts to curb the growing U.S. trade defi-cit, the Japanese placed almost $600 bil-lion in direct investments throughoutEast Asia and the U.S.

By several measures, Japan buys lessabroad than other industrialized nations.The Japanese import about one third asmany manufactured goods as eitherAmericans or Germans. Moreover, for-eign firms of any origin have accountedfor a tiny fraction of sales in Japanabout 1%, as compared with 10% in theU.S. or 18% in Germanyindicating notonly a low level of imports but also thecontrol of those imports by Japanesefirms.

Japan's average tariff for industrialproducts is comparable to that of the U.S.and the European Community, the 12-nation common marketabout 5.3%.But obstacles to trade evidently exist,given the low level of imports. The Japa-nese occasionally acknowledge theselimits, if only obliquely. For example,last year, Japan continued a 22-year ban


4643

PACIFIC RIM

on the import of U.S. apples, citing inad-equate U.S. technology to control insects.Since American-grown apples cost abouthalf what Japanese apples do, the realreason for the ban seemed transparent.

Much like Americans, the Japaneserecently chose a member of a new gen-eration as their leader, 55-year-old PrimeMinister Morihiro Hosokawa, the firstnon-LDP prime minister since WorldWar II. But Hosokawa's election in mid-summer probably will not change a fewfundamentals of U.S.-Japanese traderelations.

In late September Hosokawa's agri-culture minister was forced by an unusu-ally poor rice harvest to announceJapan's first imports of this staple, lead-ing to momentary optimism about theprospects for trade reform in Japan. Butshortly thereafter, the agriculture ministrysaid that any rice imports would only betemporarya harsh message for Japa-nese consumers who pay $45 to $50 forthe 20-pound bag of rice that sells for $6to $7 in the U.S.

The Japanese bureaucracy has alwaysbeen important in trade negotiations, inparticular the ministry of finance, theministry of international trade and indus-try (known as MITI) and the ForeignMinistry. Because decisionmaking isreached through consensus, the respon-sible person remains a shadowy figure."For some time, American trade repre-sentatives and other emissaries have beenattempting to identify 'the right people to

talk with.' ... They do not exist," wrotethe Dutch journalist Karel van Wolferenlast fall.

The overwhelming impression of theJapanese trade negotiating posture in1993 has been generated by a few testyencounters. In its first months, theClinton Administration was perceived asmore protectionist than its predecessor.By May, Japan was pressuring its indus-trialized trading partners in Europe to

endorse the principles of free trade andcondemn numerical targets. The Japanesemade no excuses for this effort to embar-rass the Clinton Administration intobacking off from its tough threats. Andeven after the change in government withHosokawa's accession to power, at around of trade talks in September, TheWall Street Journal reported that "theJapanese side reverted to standard bro-mides about Japan already being 'themost open economy in the world.'"

There is a peculiar wrinkle to some ofJapan's posturing in trade talks. The gov-ernment uses foreign pressure to presslegislators to accept politically unpalat-able but ultimately desirable change. In-voking this force in April, the formerJapanese Prime Minister KiichiMiyazawa did not mince words, leadingThe Washington Post to announce in itsheadline: "Japanese Invite Trade Hard-Line: Tough U.S. Stance Could SpurChange, Prime Minister Says."

Japan's trade relations with the U.S.have been colored by dependence on theU.S. for its security needs. But severallandmarks indicate the Japanese are tak-ing on greater responsibility in the inter-national arena. They helped to negotiatepeace in Cambodia and to finance thewar in the Persian Gulf, and they aremaking a strong bid for a permanent seaton the Security Council at the UnitedNations.

Trade imbalances:is there a cure?

WHAT DOES THE continuing U.S. tradedeficit with the Pacific Rim signify

for the economy? There are several waysto look at trade deficits. At one end of thespectrum, free-market economists in theU.S. argue that the American trade prob-lem has little to do with individual part-ners' laws and practices. Rather the im-balance has more to do with a shortcom-ing in U.S. savings and an excess of U.S.consumption. In simple terms, this meansthat the U.S. has greater purchasingpower than producing power, as the U.S.rate of savings has been too low to fundthe production of all the goods thatAmericans demand. What counts is notthe trade deficit, which usually refers to

so-called merchandise trade in raw mate-rials, agricultural products and manufac-tured goods. Instead, the critical compo-nent is the current-account deficit, whichis the excess of all U.S. payments for im-ports of goods and services over Ameri-can export earnings from goods and ser-vices. From the trade in services, the U.S.enjoyed a $60 billion global surplus in1992 compared with its $110 billion mer-chandise deficit. The services include in-surance, tourism, interest and dividendson investment, educating foreign studentsat U.S. universities and other intangibles.

According to economists of thisschool, a straightforward solution to re-ducing the current-account deficit is


47

PACIFIC RIMo F

4within reach of Americans: boost domes-tic savings to meet the investment needsof the U.S. By curbing the acquisitive in-stincts of Americans, and in particulardoing without some imported goods, thesavings could be put to productive usethat would create long-term jobs at home.But those goals would only be reachedby the broadest strokes of economic re-form, according to this school of thought,such as decreasing the budget deficit, in-creasing incentives for investment andeliminating the double taxation of corpo-rate dividends to increase savings. Japanhas urged the U.S. to take such steps.

At the other end of the spectrum areeconomists more closely identified withthe Clinton Administration. They, too,accept the current-account deficit as amore accurate reflection of reality thanthe merchandise trade deficit. But theytend to focus on the current-accountdeficit's drain on jobs in the U.S.

This perspective favors various de-grees of government intervention in thefree flow of international trade. In thisview, the range of levers to steer the cur-rent-account deficit closer to balanceinclude the management of currency-exchange rates, industry-specific tradetargets that are also known as sectoraltargets, or broader macroeconomic goalssuch as working to stimulate foreignconsumption or to curb the U.S. federalgovernment deficit to free up investmentcapital.

Public debateA key issue in the public debate on U.S.relations with the Pacific Rim is how tostrike a balance between U.S. economicinterests and U.S. concern for the promo-tion of human rights, democracy and re-gional stability and security. The debateis colored by the public's perception ofthe issues.

Just before President Clinton arrivedin Tokyo to meet with six leaders of theindustrialized world in July 1993, a star-tling 64% of Japanese polled describedrelations with the U.S. as "unfriendly"startling, in part, because at the same time,70% of Americans described relationsbetween the two countries as "friendly."This annual survey also found that 45%of Americans believe that Japanese com-panies are competing "unfairly," the high-est percentage since the poll was first con-ducted in 1985. And 85% of the Japanesebelieve the U.S. is blaming Japan for itsown economic problems.

The tensions in public debate are notrestricted to U.S.-Japanese relations. TheU.S. and China have argued over Chi-nese weapons sales abroad so vigorouslythat in August 1993 the U.S. placed atwo-year ban on the sale of certain high-technology goods to 10 Chinese aero-space companies, despite the ban's re-ducing the volume of U.S. exports. InNovember, in a goodwill gesture, theAdministration agreed to sell China an$8 million supercomputer. And whenMalaysian Prime Minister Mahathir boy-cotted the November meeting of APEC,it was because of Washington's cool re-sponse to the Asians-only economicgrouping he has promoted and a desire todraw attention to his small nation.

Easing access for U.S. exportsRecognizing that trade imbalances are atwo-way street, the U.S. has occasionallysought a two-track approachseeking toimprove access for U.S. goods to theAsian markets while restraining Asianexports. When the U.S. trade deficit withJapan grew sharply in the early 1980s,from $12 billion in 1980 to $33 billion in1984, the U.S. sought several unilateralconcessions by the Japanesea patternthat is beginning to emerge in U.S. traderelations with other Asian nations. Salesof U.S. products covered by certain ofthese agreements increased by about 25%annually thereafter until the recession of1990, slowing to about 9% through 1991.In total, U.S. sales to Japan of forest

products, medical equipment and phar-maceuticals, electronics and telecommu-nications systems increased from $1.2billion in 1985 to about $3.6 billion in1991.

In search of redress for persistenttrade deficits in the late 1980s, the U.S.Congress created what is known as Super301. This set up an ongoing review ofother countries' trade practices that cul-minates in a yearly list identifying "prior-ity practices" of "priority countries." Thefirst list came out in May 1989. The Japa-nese were cited for their exclusionarypractices in buying satellites andsupercomputers for public use, as well assome technical barriers to trade in forestproducts. It was widely expected thatSouth Korea and Taiwan would also beon the dreaded list. But not long beforeMay 1989 both countries had loweredcertain trade barriers. A year later, theU.S. and Japan signed agreements onsupercomputers, satellites and woodproducts.

The unwelcome designation as a pri-ority offender on the Super 301 is a tradeweapon that the Clinton Administrationhas revived, after the Bush Administra-tion intentionally let it lapse. In March1993, U.S.-Taiwanese trade talks brokedown over the question of intellectualproperty rights, an evolving body of lawregulating the commerce of ideasinthis case, primarily the "stealing" of soft-ware. The Taiwanese legislature was ad-vised to pass legislation "acceptable to

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the U.S. or else." The threat was to list Just before the Clinton Administration policy, the concerned parties include theTaiwan as a "Super 301" priority of- reached its decision on MFN status for management and employees of export-fender, with the prospect of 100% tariffs China in late May, the Chinese released a generating enterpriseswho do not al-on electronic goods. By April, the U.S. long-imprisoned dissident. There are still ways speak with one voice; the variouswas mollified, and Taiwan was listed some 3,000 political prisoners languish- agencies of the federal bureaucracy withonly as a second-class offender. ing in jails. an interest in or hand on trade policy; the

In 1989, President Bush had proposeda series of talks about structural barriers i i itranng Asian exportsRes A t U.S. Congress; the press; and public

opinion.in the Japanese economy that hinder im- Efforts to restrain Asian exports to the Industry associations, such as the U.S.ports, including business practices, gov- U.S. seem to have proven the squeezed- chipmakers' group, have been importanternment spending priorities and laws. balloon maxim of economics: when a catalysts in calling attention to tradeThe Japanese stipulated that they, too,would identify shortcomings in U.S.

market is artificially curbed, it reveals it-self elsewhere. Since 1981, Japan has had

practices that work to their collective dis-advantage. Organized labor has fre-

business practices, government activities, voluntary export restraints on cars quently worked in concert with industryU.S. savings habits and the educational shipped to the U.S. During these past 12 on trade issues. Although labor unionssystem that contribute to the trade imbal- years, the annual production of automo- only represent about 20% of the U.S.ance. These trade negotiations broke new biles in the U.S. by Japanese manufactur- work force, they still speak for the lion'sground in covering issues that had never ers alone or in partnership with an share of employees in industries that arebefore been considered the concerns of American enterprise grew from none to struggling to compete globallytheforeign governments. 1.4 million units in 1992. automakers and the steelmakers, for ex-

In another case of searching for a rem-edy for allegedly unfair trade practices,the U.S. manufacturers of semiconduc-

In 1985, President Ronald Reagancalled for the removal of the voluntaryexport limits on Japanese cars. The Japa-

ample. Within the federal bureaucracy,export-oriented industries have tradition-ally had the ear of the Commerce Depart-

tors, the silicon chips that are the basic nese government nevertheless decided to ment. Recently three Commerce rulingsbuilding-blocks of computers, corn- extend these rules and to raise the limit to on trade matters that favored U.S. com-plained formally about their Japanese 2.3 million cars, a ceiling that has stuck panies at the expense of foreign competi-counterparts. Prior to the chip talks and since then. The value of Japanese exports tors were overturned by either a U.S. -the imposition of retaliatory tariffs on to the U.S. has risen slightly, even though based or an international court. In oneJapanese electronic goods, U.S. semicon- the ceiling has not been reached. case, the court went so far as to order theductors claimed only 8.6% of the Japa- return of penalties to a Japanese ballnese market, while claiming 56% of thenese to trade negotiations bearing company.worldwide market outside Japan. By late Presidential candidate Clinton promised The U.S. Trade Representative, the1992, U.S. chipmakers had reached their a new understanding of trade as an inte- country's chief negotiator, also tends to20% market share in Japan. This increase gral part of creating jobs and as the listen to an industry's perspective. Inprobably created about 114,000 new jobs center of his foreign policy. Early in his fact, because of the success of semicon-in the U.S. during the past six years. Administration, Clinton identified four ductor manufacturers in gaining access to

While job-creation has been the pri- factors bearing on the U.S. international Japan, speculation now centers on whichmary goal of the Clinton Administra- position: the federal budget deficit; industry will push next for a similar mar-tion's trade policy, the President has also worker productivity; technology policy; ket-opening agreement in Japan or else-explicitly tied the U.S. emphasis on hu- and the emergence of trade issues from where.man rights to trade issues. In renewing under the blanket of security concerns. The U.S. Congress also gives voice tostandard trade privileges (dubbed mis- The extent to which the Clinton Admin- exporters' concerns and to the concernsleadingly most-favored nation or MFN istration can secure its trading partners' of those companies' employees. As anstatus) for China in June 1993, Clinton cooperation depends in part on which institution, Congress has typically been adeclared that 1994's renewal will be con- domestic interest group is pushing or vehicle for protectionist sentiment. Thetingent on progress on human rights. The pulling, and how hard. Members of Congress from large auto-U.S. also threatened the Indonesians with While the Clinton Administration has producing states, such as Michigan andpunitive trade tariffs for their handling of revived the Super 301 designations, the Missouri, have been particularly outspo-a separatist movement in East Timor. U.S. trade team has backed away from ken in favor of restraining Japanese ex-

The clout the U.S. wields in both automatic retaliatory measures in the ports and promoting U.S. exports. Thiscases comes from serving as a ready mar- event that industry market-share targets congressional posture has proved usefulket for Chinese and Indonesian goods. In are not met. The U.S. is pressing the at times to the interests of free trade. Whenother words, the U.S. trade deficit Japanese to increase imports from all talks have come to an impasse, U.S. ne-provides an incentive to the Chinese and countries to soften the image of selfish- gotiators have been able to remind athe Indonesians to be cautious. Last year,in fact, the Chinese went out of their way

ness. As a senior U.S. trade official re-marked in describing the Administra-

reluctant party of a more severe alterna-tive pending in the halls of Congress.

to steer contracts to U.S. business enter- tion's policy, "Nothing is sacrosanct; Popular opinion in the U.S. is re-prises and permitted 100% foreign- anything is possible. We're not con- flected in the congressional inclinationownership ventures. The impact on Indo- strained by particular ideologies." toward protectionism. People who be-nesia is not yet clear, but, the U.S. pres- Ideology, maybe not, but interest lieve they have lost their jobs because ofsure has achieved some results in China. groups, certainly. With respect to trade foreign competition are much easier to


0I IPACIFIC RIM

identify than those who benefit from in-ternational trade. But perhaps even moreto the point, protectionist sentiment ebbsand flows with the unemployment rate.The slow-paced recovery over the lasttwo years after a recession marked bymassive lay-offs by some of thecountry's largest employersamongthem General Motors and IBMengen-dered a collective sense of the fragility ofthe American economy.

U.S. trade policy optionsWhat should be the balance betweenpressure and cooperation in formulatingU.S. trade policy with respect to the Pa-cific Rim?t=1 1. Should the U.S. try to pressurethose Pacific Rim countries with whichit runs a trade deficit to open theirmarkets to U.S. goods by threatening toimpose quotas or other trade barriers?

Yes: Trade barriers maintained by Ja-pan and other Pacific Rim economies aredepriving American exporters of a levelplaying field and workers of viable em-ployment. Making some structuralchanges in the U.S. economy may be inorder, but the benefits will take time toshow up. In the meantime, the U.S.should use persuasion and, if necessary,threats to open markets for its exports.

No: Focusing on barriers, rather thanlooking for avenues of cooperation, onlyalienates partners whose markets are im-portant to us. Trade barriers, moreover,don't work: obstacles can spur the tar-geted country to export higher valuegoods to the U.S., or the exporters simplymove their enterprises to another country,entirely circumventing the barrier. TheU.S. should instead focus on the struc-tural problems in the U.S. economy thatcontribute to trade deficits, target moredirectly the ways that government caneffectively help foster job creation and, inits relations with trade partners, follow apolicy of inclusion and engagementrather than exclusion.

2. What domestic policies would bemost beneficial in restoring balance toU.S. trade relations with Asia? Cuttingthe federal budget deficit? Encourag-ing savings and discouraging con-sumption? Promoting export-oriented"industries of the future"? Or shouldall three areas be emphasized equally?

Proponents of cutting the federal bud-get would argue that its ballooning hasgobbled up investment capital that shouldbe working to make U.S. industry more

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111,AT THE APEC MEETING in Seattle, U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor (left) confers withU.S. Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown.

competitive. Those who would prefer toemphasize savings and discourage con-sumption would contend that the low rateof savings in this country compared withothers contributes to the trade deficit.People who doubt the centrality of sav-ings and consumption would point to thespecific trade barriersthe raising orlowering thereofand their impact onthe balance. And those who raise an eye-brow at industrial policy would contendthat government has rarely succeeded inpicking winners in a free-marketeconomy.

3. Should the U.S. use trade topressure countries, in particular Chinaand Indonesia, on human rights andarms control issues?

Yes: The record shows that the Chi-nese respond to threats to their trade sta-tus with the U.S. by easing the repressionof antigovernment activism. Similar pres-sure should be effective in the case of In-donesia: because its exports to the U.S.(and the U.S. trade deficit) are growing,Indonesia will want to protect its export-ers by complying with U.S. demands torespect human rights.

No: Pressure on either human-rightsor arms-control issues may work to alimited extent but at the expense of moreimportant goals. A preferable policy is toexpand trade, investment and economiccooperation with the rest of the PacificRim. Economic growth has been moreeffective in spawning political reformand democratization, notably in countries

such as South Korea, Thailand and, up toa point, China, than U.S. pressure andthreats of retaliation. Only one Chinesedissident was released prior to the re-newal of the country's MFN status, a to-ken gesture. The cause of human rightsin China would be better advanced byactively promoting U.S. service indus-tries there. This would have the addedbenefit of reducing the U.S. current-account deficit.

Similarly arms control issues are notvulnerable to trade pressures. Any coun-try looking to buy weapons will succeedon the open market. Unilateral U.S. at-tempts to curb those purchases only hurtsthe U.S. defense industry.

4. Should the U.S. end the tradeembargo on Vietnam?

Yes: The U.S. is the only country thatmaintains a trade embargo and its lever-age is limited. The boycott hurts U.S.businesses, which are rapidly losing op-portunities to invest and trade with thismarket of 72 million, more than it doesVietnam. More contacts could help openVietnamese society and increase thepressure on the Vietnamese governmentto improve its human rights practices.

No: The Vietnamese government is adictatorship with which the U.S. has anumber of unresolved issues, includingaccounting for American servicemenwho were missing in action in the Viet-nam War. Lifting the embargo would de-prive U.S. negotiators of their most effec-tive leverage. ffi


5047

PACIFIC RIM

DISCUSEONQ SMON

1. What are some of the differences be-tween Asia and the U.S. that cause diffi-culties in business relationships? Whatcontributes to an understanding of thosedifferences?

2. Which are more important in creatingtrade imbalances: the large economicforces, such as how much we save orspend; or the more detailed trans-

actions between individual businesses?

3. Is there a relationship between in-creased arms purchases and tradesurplusses in the Pacific Basin?

4. Who wins most from freer trade?Who loses most? In the U.S.? In Asia?

5. The U.S. has tried various measures toincrease its exports to Japan. What hasworked most effectively: punitive tariffs?promoting export-oriented industries? ordemanding market-share targets for indi-vidual industries? Which measure seemsthe most fair?

6. Which remedies would be most effec-tive in setting the imbalanced trade rela-tionship between the U.S. and Japan onan even keel: currency revaluation orstructural changes to the U.S. and/or theJapanese economies?

7. Should trade negotiations with thePeople's Republic of China be tied to thecountry's record on human rights? Shouldpressure or cooperation be the guidingprinciples in negotiations with Taiwanover intellectual property rights? Shouldthe U.S. try to restrain the arms race inAsia through trade talks? Should the tradeembargo with Vietnam be lifted?

D

CMCES

Bergsten, C. Fred, and Noland, Marcus, Reconcilable Differ-ences?: United States-Japan Economic Conflict. Washing-ton, D.C., Institute for International Economics, 1993. 271 pp.$19.95 (paper) The authors, an APEC adviser and a senioreconomist for the Council of Economic Advisers, propose rem-edies to trade frictions that draw on elements of managed trade.

Burstein, Daniel, Turning the Tables: A Machiavellian Strat-egy for Dealing with Japan. New York, Simon & Schuster,1993. 256 pp. $22.00. The Librarian of Congress discusses thegrowing interdependence of the U.S. and Japanese economiesand suggests ways to make the most of their disparate strengths.

Denoon, David B.H., Real Reciprocity: Balancing U.S. Eco-nomic and Security Policies in the Pacific Basin. New York,Council on Foreign Relations, 1993. 110 pp. $14.95 (paper).The author favors neither gradualism nor protectionism but agive-and-take over security and trade issues.

Drucker, Peter F., "The End of Japan, Inc.?" Foreign Affairs,Spring 1993, pp. 10-15. Professor Drucker argues that thebreakdown of government-guided economic policy in Japanwill result in tougher competition.

Goldstein, Steven M., "China at the Crossroads: Reform AfterTiananmen." Headline Series No. 298. New York, ForeignPolicy Association, 1992. 128 pp. $11.25. Professor Goldsteinsummarizes the significance of Tiananmen Square in relationto China's reform movement and examines Sino-Americanrelations.

Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Eco-nomic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000.New York, Random House, 1987. 677 pp. $15.00 (paper). Auseful perspective on where trade policies can lead nations by aYale professor. He believes that, having reached a stage ofoverextension, the U.S. is likely to decline as a Great Power.

Klare, Michael T., "The Next Great Arms Race." Foreign Af-fairs, Summer 1993, pp. 136-152. Hampshire College Profes-sor Klare sees economic growth as possibly propelling regionalpowers into conflicting claims over resources and waterways.

Sesser, Stan, "Opium War Redux." The New Yorker, Septem-ber 13, 1993, pp. 78-89. A close look at how trade restrictionswork, and how U.S. trade negotiators have set aside healthconcerns.

Spero, Joan E., "The New Centrality of Economics: The U.S.and the Asia-Pacific Region." U.S. Department of State Dis-patch, October 18, 1993, pp. 728-32. The under secretary foreconomic affairs explains the linkage between domestic eco-nomic strength and U.S. foreign policy and details America'sstakes in the Pacific.

ASIA RESOURCE CENTER, P.O. Box 15275, Washington, D.C.20003; (202) 547-1114. Provides information on the peoples,cultures and effects of U.S. policy in Asia and the Pacific. Of-fers reports, studies, audiovisuals, issue summaries, press ser-vices, curriculum material or training, speakers bureau and staffmembers to speak.

THE CLAREMONT INSTITUTE, 250 West First St., Suite 330,Claremont, Calif. 91711; (909) 621-6825. The Asian StudiesCenter of the Claremont Institute for the Study of Statesman-ship and Political Philosophy is a conservative research organi-zation that publishes books, reports and studies.

EAST-WEST CENTER, 1777 East-West Rd., Honolulu, Hawaii 96848;(808) 944-7111. A major research institution founded by theU.S. Congress that focuses on economic, social, cultural, politi-cal and environmental issues affecting the Asia-Pacific-U.S.region. Publishes newsletters, reports and curricular material.

PACIFIC BASIN INSTITUTE, 7 East Mission St., Suite C, Santa Bar-bara, Calif. 93101; (805) 687-2378. Promotes U.S. interestand understanding in the Pacific region and strengthens trans-Pacific communication. Publishes brochures and distributes aten-part documentary entitled "The Pacific Century," with ac-companying text and workbook.


51

DEFENSE PRIORITIES

Defense: redef ngU.S. needs andprioritiesWith the evaporation of the Soviet threat, U.S. militarypolicymakers are struggling to revamp forces and doctrinessuitable to an ambiguous post-cold-war era.

by David C. Morrison

0

2

N6

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LES ASPIN (left) and General Cohn L. Powell, Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff, testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee in April 1993 on the subjectof the fiscal 1994 defense posture.

URING A RECENT off-the-recordconversation with a reporter inhis Pentagon office, a Defense

Department official remarked, only half-facetiously, that the U.S. military estab-lishment confronted an institutionally di-sastrous "threat meltdown."

For four decades, American armedforces had based their budgets, weaponsprojects and war plans on the most chal-lenging and apocalyptic of scenarios:global conventional and nuclear war withthe Soviet Union. This "Soviet threat"seemed as immutable as a law of physics.For Americans born after the onset of thecold war it was almost impossible to con-ceive of a global political system notdominated by the bipolar ideological and

military confrontation between Washing-ton and Moscow.

In a succession of head-spinningevents, however, beginning with thecrumbling of the Berlin Wall in 1989 andculminating in the formal dissolution ofthe Warsaw Pact and then the SovietUnion itself in 1991, this central rationalefor the huge standing force that the U.S.had rebuilt for the Korean War and hadmaintained ever after simply meltedaway.

Not long ago, the Soviet Unionfielded some 3.5 million active-dutytroops. But Russia's armed forces havetoday shrunk to 1.2 million. The road toreform in Russia is rocky and rife withuncertainty, of course, but even the rise

of a hostile and aggressive regime inMoscow would not affect this new equa-tion, at least for the foreseeable future.

Says retired Army Lt. Gen. WilliamE. Odom, former director of the NationalSecurity Agency: "The decay in theformer Soviet military is so greatthat...they're not going to be a problemfor anyone except themselves and theirimmediate neighbors."

emilitarizationThis unexpected geopolitical tectonic shifthas major consequences for all. Most no-tably, the relentless superpower nucleararms race has ground to a halt. For de-cades, the Soviet Union and the U.S.aimed tens of thousands of nuclear war-heads at each other, poised to unleash glo-bal Armageddon at a moment's notice.

Washington and Moscow have nowretired the vast bulk of their tactical, orshort-range, nuclear weaponry. Under thestrategic arms reduction treaty (Start II),both powers are committed to reducingtheir arsenals of long-range weapons to3,500 warheads apiece by 2003 orsooner.

That still represents an annihilatingmilitary potential; some observers arguethat much deeper nuclear arms reductionsare in order. And there is reason to worryabout what might happen to the manyundismantled nuclear weapons crowdingdepots in a former Soviet Union roiled bypolitical turmoil. But the dire nuclearhair-trigger, at least, has been uncockedfor now.

The so-called new world order has notnecessarily benefited everyone, however.Much has been written about the disloca-tions afflicting the former Soviet Unionin the cold war's wake. An estimated25% of Soviet gross domestic product(GDP), after all, was dedicated to de-fense. Rather less well-recognized is howprofoundly the U.S., too, was militarizedby the superpower stand-off.

Until the Korean War of 1950-53, theU.S. had never supported a large stand-ing military. And yet, in 1987, a post-Vietnam peak year, almost 8 millionAmericans drew a paycheck from theDefense Department in one fashion oranotheras full-time soldiers, Pentagonbureaucrats, defense industry workers orregularly drilling military reservists.

DAVID C. PAORRISON is national .securitycorrespondent for National Journal, a weeklymagazine of government and politics publishedin Washington, D.C.


DEFENSE

These cold warriors ac-counted for an astonishing6.5% of the U.S. workforce.

That's a lot of "ricebowls." And many of thosenational security rice bowlsare now being shattered.U.S. military spending issliding from roughly $300billion a year in fiscal year1990 to about $250 billionby 1998. Of that, approxi-mately $45 billion is bud-geted for weapons pur-chases in fiscal 1994. Noquestion, that is a lot ofmoney compared to whatmost nations spend onarms. All the same, it is only half the sumthat the U.S. devoted to buying militaryhardware in the mid-1980s.

As a result, the arms industry is under-going an unprecedented shake-out. Asmany as 2.5 million defense workers mayhave to find new work by the decade'sclose. The same goes for tens of thou-sands of troops as the armed forces de-cline from the 2.2 million personnel kepton active duty in the 1980s to 1.4 millionby the end of the decade (see box on p.57).

Congress and the executive branch arethus floating a plethora of programs de-signed to ease the conversion of indus-tries and to retrain workers for civilianproduction.

The personnel drawdown is but one ofa dizzying range of readjustments withwhich the Pentagon must now grapple.Gone, for instance, are the days whenanticommunism served as the primary oreven sole rationale for U.S. military in-tervention overseas.

The December 1989 invasion ofPanama to depose strongman Manuel A.Noriega, strikingly, was the first large-scale military incursion since World WarII that the U.S. did not justify in terms ofcountering Soviet penetration. Even theU.S. naval patrols launched in the PersianGulf in 1987 to fend off Iranian attackson Kuwaiti oil tankers were sold to Con-gress largely as driven by a need to offsetthe Soviet presence in the Gulf.

The national interest propelling the1991 Persian Gulf war that pushed Iraqout of Kuwait could not have been morestraightforwardprotecting the petro-leum that nourishes industrial society.But few analysts expect a reprise of the

0 1993 BOK-AKRON BEACON JOURNAL

unique circumstances that fostered theunprecedentedly broad allied coalitionthat triumphed so handily over Iraq.

New roles and missionsWhile trimming back to force levels notseen since before the Korean War, theU.S. military is thus also now compelledto reinvent itself, to identify a new set ofjustifying roles and missions for a worldsuddenly transformed.

Reporting the results of a protractedPentagon study, the so-called Bottom-UpReview, Defense Secretary Les Aspinlast September listed what he termed thefour primary "dangers that face the U.S.now in the post-cold-war, post-Sovietworld."

First, is the "unpredictable challenge"of stemming the proliferation of nuclearweapons. Second, is the "regional dan-gers" posed by a "handful of bad guys"in developing nations that "can threatenAmerican interests or American allies."Third, is "dangers to democracy," or en-suring that the former Soviet republicsand other emerging states follow a peace-ful path to reform. And, fourth, Aspinsaid, is "something that we've never re-ally explicitly addressed before,... thedangers of a weak economy."

This hodge-podge of priorities seemsa far cry from the simpler era when thechallenges confronting the Pentagoncould be neatly summed up in its annualthreat booklet, Soviet Military Power. Nowonder President Bill Clinton was re-cently moved to remark, with mock nos-talgia, "Gosh, I miss the cold war."

The question is, does an increasinglyintrospective American public have thestomach to play the role of the world's

sole surviving superpower?In off-the-record com-

ments tendered last May,Peter Tarnoff, the under-secretary of state for politi-cal affairs, spoke of "set-ting limits on the amount ofAmerican engagement...around the world."

Those remarks werepromptly repudiated by theWhite House. In fact, theClinton Administration hasset for itself a potentiallyexpansive foreign policygoalthe "enlargement" ofthe democratic spherearound the globe. But, na-tional security adviser An-

thony Lake cautioned in explaining thispolicy, "there will be relatively few [in-stances] that justify our military interven-tion."

If anything, though, even as the totalforce shrinks, U.S. troops are more activeplayers on the global stage now than theygenerally were while "containing" theSoviet Union. This frenzy of activity hasbeen prompted largely by a shift in focusto new, nontraditional military missions,most prominently international peace-keeping and humanitarian relief.

Peacetime engagementMilitary relief and rescue missions arenothing new. But the scale and promi-nence of such endeavors today are nov-elties, as witnessed by the injection ofU.S. troops into famine- and civil war-wracked Somalia in December 1992. Thefielding of a handful of U.S. "tripwire"troops to Macedonia in war-torn formerYugoslavia in 1992 might also foretellthe deployment of a far larger force tokeep the peace in Bosnia, should a peaceever be agreed upon there.

When U.S. forces ended up in actualcombat in Somalia, seeking to hunt downclan leader Mohammed Farah Aidid, thispeacekeeping task became a "peacemak-ing," or "peace enforcement" mission.After all, when there is no peace to keep,outside forces, should they choose to in-volve themselves, will have to makepeace. The Pentagon subsumes all suchmissions under the rubric simply of"peace operations."

Although engulfed in controversy, thishigh-profile peacekeeping role seems tobe here to stay. This year, for the firsttime, the Pentagon inserted a line item in


DE FE SSEOPIC

5

its annual budget to cover peacekeeping,humanitarian assistance and disaster re-lief. And the U.S. Atlantic Command,one of the five U.S. regional commandsthat cover the planet, is being rejiggeredto act as the lead agency to plan andcarry out such missions.

If some elements in the Pentagon havetheir waymost notably the Army Corpsof Engineers and the Special Operationsforces, meaning the Green Berets andother commando unitsthe militarycould wind up adopting an even more-expansive version of the humanitarianmission.

Called "peacetime engagement," theidea, as the Army put it in a recent report,is to use the "coordinated application ofpolitical, economic, informational andmilitary means to promote stability andto counteract violence worldwide."

In other words, the U.S. militarywould act in troubled nations as a devel-

opment agencyerecting bridges, damsand other elements of economic infra-structureand as a tutor in Americandemocratic valuesinstilling overseasmilitaries with the virtues of civilian con-trol, for example.

That's a tall orderto play not onlyglobal policeman but also global handy-man and global schoolmarm. While thePentagon leadership has not formally re-jected "peacetime engagement" in itsmost broadly defined form, neither has itformally embraced it. Meanwhile, theconcept continues to crop up in Armydoctrine manuals.

In any event, this is precisely the sortof policy question now being debatedand decided in Washington. How muchcan the nation afford to spend on themilitary in an era of general belt-tighten-ing? And precisely what sort of tasks canand should be assigned to this post-cold-war force?

How much is enough?THE waning days of previous Ameri-can warsWorld War II, Korea,

Vietnamhave typically been markedby mounting anticipation of a "peace

dividend" as the fiscal resources directedagainst a military foe are refocused ondomestic needs.

Similarly, many Americans want their

peace dividend now that the long, costlycold war is finally over and won. In1990, the U.S. budgeted $301.3 billionfor national defense. In 1993, the figurewas $273 billion. And, by 1997, newspending on national security is slated tobottom out at $246 billion, before start-ing to edge upward again.

While not as deep a cut as somewould like to see, at better than $50 bil-lion the defense reduction between 1990and 1997 is no small potatoesespe-cially when the defense budget's trajec-tory is viewed in terms of inflation-ad-justed dollars. In "constant" dollar terms,the Pentagon stands to lose more than$100 billion, or better than 30% of its ac-tual spending power from 1990-97. But,still, why hasn't the U.S. realized a richerpeace dividend? The reasons, largely,have to do with the peculiar exigencies offederal budgeting.

For one thing, the federal budget defi-cit in 1992 climbed to a whopping $290billion, an all-time high. This year, fiscal1994, the deficit will still run about $253billion. This seemingly unstemmable tideof red ink means that you would have towipe out the entire Defense Department,totally abolishing the military, to elimi-nate the budget deficit. In this light, onemight say that our peace dividend has al-

Arms and the PresidentsU.S. defense outlays as a share of GDP

12Truman Eisenhower Kennedy Johnson

11.9%

9.1%

Nixon Ford Carter Reagan Bush C inton

6.3%

-12

10

8

6

FY 19944.1%

FY 19981, 3.0% -4

2

1950 1955 1960 1965

Source: Department of Defense

I 1

1970 1975 1980

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ready long been used up, thanks to deficitspending.

For another thing, Pentagon plannershave tended to build unrealistic expecta-tions of future spending growth into theirbudget projections for future years. As aresult, much Pentagon budget cuttingconsists of whittling these inflated expec-tations about spending down to some-thing approaching fiscal reality.

In his last budget, submitted in Janu-ary 1992, for example, President GeorgeBush forebast a 1997 defense budget of$290.6 billion. President Clinton's firstbudget, submitted in March 1993, fore-sees spending at least $40 billion less ondefense in 1997. As the oft-quoted clichéhas it, it's hard to cram 10 pounds of de-fense program into a 5-pound budgetbag.

After conducting his exhaustive Bot-tom-Up Review of the future defenseprogram, for instance, Aspin discoveredthat his new, ostensibly leaner-and-meaner plan would exceed the $1.2 tril-lion that the Clinton Administrationplanned to spend from fiscal 1995-99 by$13 billion. Military forces are expensiveto maintain, and they always seem to costmore than planners expect.

Finally, as witnessed by the fierce re-sistance with which communities andtheir representatives on Capitol Hill greetPentagon efforts to shutter costly militarybases that no longer serve any purpose,military spending is resistant to sharpcuts because it represents jobs and votes.

The wheels of the electoral systemtend to be greased with the fat of govern-ment largesse, the bulk of which is ren-dered at the Pentagon in the form of mili-tary installations, weapons contracts andNational Guard armories.Members of Congress maydemand a "peace divi-dend," but when shrinkingmilitary budgets tightenbelts in their home dis-tricts, they leap into thelegislative trenches to de-fend their piece of the porkbarrel.

It may thus turn out, asformer Defense SecretaryDick Cheney was fond ofsaying, that the "dividendof peace is peace," andlittle more. If nothing else,though, the relative burdenof defense is undeniably onthe wane. During the Ko-

rean War, 11.9% of U.S. GDP was con-sumed by the military. At the apex of thebuildup under President Ronald Reagan,Pentagon spending accounted for 6.3%of GDP. By 1998, however, only 3% ofAmerican GDP will go for defense.

Hollow forces?Defense in America is more than a bul-wark of national interests and security. Itis also a jobs program. Over and aboveany objective assessment of the futuregeopolitical lay of the land, this fact ofdomestic political life will likely deter-mine the floor below which defense bud-gets and force levels will not be allowedto fall.

Besides which, as always, there isconsiderable disagreement over howmuch is enough for defense. "TheClinton defense budget plan for fiscalyear 1994 and beyond is adequate tomeet the defense needs of the era andsupport forces planned for that period,"according to Ronald V. Dellums (D-Ca-lif.), the liberal chairman of the HouseArmed Services Committee. "Providinglarger forces and budgets than thoseplanned would not materially improveour national security, and could in factimpair it by impeding economic growth,"he says.

On the other hand, Rep. Jim Kolbe(R-Ariz.), blasted the 1994 defense billbecause it "will leave our proud fightingforces naked, without adequate resourcesor manpower. I oppose this legislationbecause of the size and timing of the cutsto the military," he added, "cuts leadingto the 'hollow forces' reminiscent of theCarter Administration."

As with the question of overall mili-

tary spending, opinions differ on howimmediately the hollowness threat reallylooms. But few experts argue seriouslythat preserving readiness will not pose amajor challenge in the years ahead.

After all, preserving readinessor themilitary's ability to pull up its socks andrush off to war at a moment's noticeisthe most venerated of sacred militarycows in Washington. "The worst thingthat can happen to a man with a greeneyeshade is to fall off his stool," SenateArmed Services Committee stalwart JohnMcCain (R-Ariz.) says of the defensebudget cutters. "The price of going hol-low is body bags."

"Right now, we've got the best, mostready force in the world," Defense Secre-tary Aspin asserted in May 1993. But "tokeep it that way," he said, "we're goingto have to do something that has provedvery, very difficult in the past, and that is,we're going to have to maintain readi-ness during a major drawdown of ourforces."

As Aspin and others have pointedlyobserved, this cannot be done withoutshedding now-unneeded cold-war infra-structuremost notoriously, excess mili-tary bases. That's no mean feat. Shuttingdown these facilities is a traumatic pros-pect for the communities in which theyare located, necessitating the establish-ment of an elaborate base closure com-mission process and strict rules of theroad to keep affected Members of Con-gress from keeping unnecessary bases inoperation indefinitely.

The danger is that disproportionatecuts in the Pentagon's operations andmaintenance (O&M) budget, the easiestwedge of the defense budget to cut, will

slice into readiness. If so,training hours would be re-duced, and so, also, combatreadiness. Stocks of ammu-nition and spare partswould dwindle, and themaintenance of militaryreal estate and hardwarewould be deferred. Saggingmorale, sapped by laggingpay and overstretchedforces, could eat into reen-listment rates and the re-cruitment of top-quality en-listeesvital factors for an

NV SO e001. k0 S 510OR l'EFENSE CONVERSION

.1all-volunteer military.

The good news is thatthough the O&M accountgrew more slowly during

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the Reagan buildup thanspending on weapons pro-curement did, it also lostcomparatively less groundin the budget fall-off initi-ated in the mid-1980s. Di-vided by the number of ac-tive-duty troops, in fact,O&M spending has grownby 28% in real, after-infla-tion terms from fiscal 1980to 1993. Bear in mind thatthe active-duty force is alsosome 10% smaller todaythan in 1980.

And that means that "wecan make additional cuts inO&M in the future, as thesize of the military isbrought down," Steven M.Kosiak, a senior analystwith the private DefenseBudget Project, judges. But, he cau-tioned, "these cuts will have to behandled very, very carefully."

No more nukesPerhaps the most striking aspect of thenew geopolitical era upon which the U.S.is embarked is the way in which nuclearweaponry, so long the very centerpiece ofthe cold war, has receded into the wood-work.

In 1991, the Strategic Air Commandcommissioned 21 "defense intellectuals,"most of them boasting prior service in thenuclear weapons complex, to ponder therole of "nuclear weapons in the newworld order." This panel seemed deter-mined to pursue atomic business asusual. It proposed letting Russia, whosenuclear testing grounds have been shutdown by nationalist pressures in theneighboring republic of Kazakhstan, testits warheads in Nevada. It also suggestedhaving Washington, which has no operat-ing tritium reactor, buy that perishablehydrogen warhead fuel from Moscow.

Even if Russia reduced its atomic arse-nal to only a few hundred warheads, thepanel urged, the U.S. should retain thou-sands of them to keep "future major pow-ers like Germany and Japan from believ-ing they, too, should acquire nuclear weap-ons." And though Washington pledged16 years ago never to employ atomic armsagainst a non-nuclear adversary that hassigned the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty,this panel argued for the creation of a"Nuclear Expeditionary Force" for useagainst Chinese or "Third World targets."

REPRINTED WITH SPECIAL PERMISSION Of KING FEATURES SYNDICATE

In the end, however, this report was adead letter. While concern remains aboutthe atomic ambitions of nations such asIran and North Korea, the superpowernuclear arms race is indisputably a relicof history. Besides Russia, three otherformer Soviet republics still have nuclearweapons on their soil. Belarus has al-ready begun dismantling these arms, withU.S. aid. The situation is more compli-cated with Kazakhstan and Ukraine, bothof which hope to parlay their currentnuclear status into enhanced recognitionand aid from the outside world.

Pursuant to a 1991 directive fromPresident George Bush, all but some1,600 tactical nuclear weapons are beingretired. For the first time since the 1950s,therefore, the Army and the MarineCorps deploy no nuclear weapons andNavy ships now routinely patrol with nonukes aboard. Meanwhile, the arsenal oflong-range, strategic weapons is slated tofall from more than 12,000 to no morethan 3,500 by the turn of the century.

The nuclear weapons production com-plex, managed by the Energy Depart-ment, has not generated any tritium gasfor nuclear warheads since 1988, nor anyplutonium "pits," the explosive core ofatomic weaponry, since 1989. Indeed, itsmajor activities today are cleaning up thetoxic legacy of a half-century of bombbuilding and dismantling thousands ofretired atomic warheads. In 1994, theEnergy Department will spend $5.5 bil-lion on environmental compliance andwaste management, and only $3.8 billionon weapons activities.

Nor has the U.S. tested anuclear weapon at its un-derground proving site inNevada since September1992. In July 1993, Presi-dent Clinton extended acongressionally imposedtest moratorium for another15 months, a step towardsecuring a ComprehensiveTest Ban by 1996.

U.S. restraint in thisarenaalong with that ofsuch other acknowledgednuclear powers as Britain,France and Russiais de-pendent on no other nationexploding nuclear test de-vices. In October 1993,China ignored the entreatiesof more than 20 nations inconducting a nuclear test.

But even if the Administration wanted tofollow suit with a test of its ownandthe 1994 budget contains $320 million tosupport just that optionstiff congres-sional opposition is likely to stay itshand.

The U.S. nuclear test moratorium andthe prospect of enactment of a compre-hensive test ban, proponents argue, set anexample for potential proliferators. More-over, there is no compelling need to testnow that the U.S. is out of the business ofproducing new nuclear warheads, testingfoes contend. Warhead reliability andsafety modifications can be modeled oncomputers, obviating the need for explo-sive testing.

Others are not persuaded by this logic.The Center for Security Policy, a hard-lineWashington think tank, for instance, urgesClinton "to reestablish a modest but nec-essary underground test program. Doingotherwise," it says, "will not measurablyaffect proliferation; it will, however, causepossibly catastrophic damage to the long-run safety, reliability and effectiveness ofthe U.S. arsenal."

The fate of another centerpiece of thecold-war nuclear arms racethe Strate-gic Defense Initiative (SDI) or "StarWars"is more ambiguous. In May1993, after ten years of research costingsome $30 billion, Aspin announced thedemise of the Pentagon's SDI Organiza-tion, which is to be replaced by a Ballis-tic Missile Defense Organization. Con-gress cut the funding level by $1 billionto $3 billion and the main focus will shiftfrom striving to defend the continental


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U.S. against long-range missile attack toshielding U.S. troops and overseas com-bat operations against shorter-range mis-siles. Research on means to defend theU.S. itself will continue, but at lower lev-els of effort than in the past.

"Assuming some deployment of the-ater defenses for crises abroad, the U.S.will be in the curious position of beingready to defend its allies against missileattack, but incapable of doing so for itsown citizens," the conservative HeritageFoundation charges.

Not so, retorts Dave McCurdy, a HouseArmed Services Committee Democratfrom Oklahoma. Clinton's "plan is theright answer to the missile threats weface," McCurdy says. "And the politicaland strategic context will not support any-thing more ambitious."

One thing we can probably count on,whatever name it goes by, the ever-controversial Star Wars program is sure tocontinue to provide an element of conten-tious continuity to the defense debate ofthe 1990s.

Searching for missionsIN RETROSPECT, one of the most strikingaspects of the cold war was the sheer

size of the overseas troop presence thathelped underwrite the 40-year policy ofcontaining the Soviet Union.

Until quite recently, almost 1 millionAmericans served overseas on Pentagon-related missions. With 100 major U.S.basesi.e., those boasting more than 500troopslocated in some 50 countries,and hundreds of more minor sites scat-tered around the globe, that figure in-cludes 450,000 troops, 391,000 militaryfamily members and 152,000 civilianPentagon employees.

Those numbers, needless to say, areheaded downward. The most dramaticdrawdown is in Europe where U.S. ser-vicemen and women are streaming homefrom garrisons that have been maintainedsince World War II. In 1988, a year be-fore the Berlin Wall tumbled down, thePentagon supported more than 300,000active-duty personnel on the ground inEurope. That contingent is rapidly head-ing toward a force 100,000 strong.

Sink much below that level, someanalysts contend, and the U.S. contribu-tion to the 16-nation North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) will ap-proximate that of tiny Belgium or Den-mark. In that case, they warn, the U.S.would become a marginal player in amilitary machine dominated by Germanforces.

So what? responds another school ofthought, which holds that NATO has out-lived its usefulness. Many Americans"believe that NATO is a cold-war institu-tion whose relevance has now passed andthat our military presence in Europe isnothing more than a cold-war hangover,"Sen. William V. Roth Jr. (R-Del.) re-

cently observed. "If nothing is done tochange this perception and to place theAlliance on a new course, I have nodoubt that U.S. support for our militarypresence in Europe will wither, prompt-ing congressional action to reduce trooplevels and ultimately the alliance willexist in name only."

Proponents of a powerful U.S. role inNATO argue that the alliance provides acrucial forum for American involvementin European affairs, while affording le-verage in other arenas of dispute, such astrade. And, these NATO boosters add,the alliance is a source of stability in anera of geopolitical upheaval on a conti-nent that has already sucked the U.S. intotwo major wars this century.

"The U.S. will not be able to pursuedomestic renewal successfully withoutpeace and stability in Europe," ManfredWorner, NATO's secretary general,cautions.

At the same time, the savage outbreakof communal butchery in the former Yu-goslavia, and Western Europe's ditheringas to what to do to stop it, has raised someserious questions about the nature of"peace and stability" in Europe and whatrole NATO might realistically play in thefuture. These concerns dovetail with thelong-running "burdensharing" issue, orthe suspicion on this side of the Atlanticthat the U.S. shoulders more than its fairshare of global military duties.

"Our European friends need to, I

think, be ready to assume more of theburden than they've indicated thus farthat they would," Sen. Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) argued during a recent SenateArmed Services Committee hearing."We have to keep in mind that we can'tfurnish the manpower and the armies to

police difficult and bloody conflictsthroughout the world."

The larger West European powerssurely could pay more for the commondefenseFrance, in fact, is increasingspending, while Britain is cutting backbut their leaders face the same domesticpolitical constraints on post-cold-warmilitary spending as do their Americancounterparts. If burdensharing resent-ments among the American people even-tually prompt Washington to reduce itsinvolvement in NATO, it is unlikely thatthe alliance would survive.

Meanwhile, ironically, the formerWarsaw Pact states of Eastern Europe areclamoring to join NATO but are beingput off for now with promises of in-creased defense cooperation. There isgood reason for caution. Could a much-expanded NATO survive as an effectivemilitary organization, or would it justturn into an ineffectual European "talkingshop"? Similarly, can NATO effectivelyinvolve itself in "out of area" conflicts,not involving the strict territorial defenseof its member-nations, as some have saidit should? Or would such involvementgenerate controversies that would simplytear the alliance apart?

The evolution of NATO will be oneof the most closely watched defensepolicy dramas of the 1990s.

Pacific overturesAs in Europe, the nations of Asia aregiven to worries that the U.S., a powerfulPacific presence since World War II, isnow poised to withdraw into some sort ofFortress America. In fact, total U.S.forces in the vast Pacific region are slatedto fall from 390,000 today to 350,000 bythe turn of the century. That's only a10% reduction, a fraction of the dramaticU.S. drawdown in Europe.

But U.S. forces "forward-based" onforeign soil in Asia have already fallenby 28% from the cold-war peak, down toabout 98,000 personnel, the vast bulk ofthem stationed in Japan and South Korea.

Russia may have exited the Pacificstage, for the time being. But, from thevantage of various Asian capitals, newthreats are springing up to takeMoscow's place. China is the powerwary Asian nations are watching mostclosely. Fueled by an economy that isballooning by better than 12% annually,China's military budget in 1991 markeda 50% increase over its defense spendingin 1989.


DEFENSE

Mightily impressed by the U.S.'shigh-technology trouncing of Iraq in1991, China's generals are investing theirnew-found wealth in upgrading their 3million-strong forces with modern equip-ment, much of it purchased from Russiaat bargain-basement prices.

"Now that the Soviet menace is gone,China is a menace," Kigoaki Kikuchi,formerly Japan's ambassador to theUnited Nations (UN) and now an adviserto the Foreign Ministry, asserts. "AndNorth Korea is a menace. And somepeople believe South Korea is, too."

This vague sense of unease is mutual."Even after unification [with North Ko-rea], South Korea should maintain somekind of military alliance with the U.S.,"Ahn Byung-joon, a political science pro-fessor at Yonsei University in Seoul,said. "Korea is a place where the militaryinterests of the great powers intersect. Tobe blunt, we need U.S. forces as a con-straint on Japanese military capabilities,as well as on China's."

Washington has the perfect resume toact as honest broker, Ahn added, because"it so happens that the U.S. is the leasthated of the Pacific powers. The U.S. isless interested in territorial ambitions andonly in maintaining a balance of power."

Indeed, U.S. officials have repeatedlystressed their willingness to play this bal-ancing role in a region that annually con-sumes $140 billion in U.S. exports, orone third of the total.

Elsewhere, Washington is also lower-ing its military profile. As mandated bythe 1979 Panama Canal Treaty, the head-quarters of the U.S. Southern Command,with its 10,000 American troops, must berelocated by 1999. Under the glide pathplanned by the Pentagon, only 5,000 U.S.soldiers will remain by the end of 1995.But no final decision has yet been madeabout the future location of the SouthernCommand. Most likely, it will end upshifting to southern Florida.

In contrast with other parts of theworld, the U.S. military presence is actu-ally increasing in the Persian Gulftojust over 20,000. Besides the massive in-frastructure it already boasts in SaudiArabia, Washington has recently signeddefense pacts with Bahrain, Kuwait andQatar, while renewing an existing agree-ment with Oman.

The details remain secret, but thesepost-Gulf war accords are said to providefor the "pre-positioning" of military gear,naval and air access and joint training

U.S. MARINES BEGIN a raid on Mogadishu's Bakara market. The raid, dubbed OperationNutcracker, swept the large market in Somalia's capital for arms and munitions.

exercises. Thanks to Arab sensitivitiesabout hosting a conspicuous Americanpresence, much of the gear for a futureU.S. intervention in the region is de-ployed on special cargo ships afloat inthe Indian Ocean.

Pax AmericanaIn the immediate wake of the Gulf war,with its promise of a multilateral newworld order coordinated through a newlyaggressive UN, enthusiasm ran high forpeacekeeping as a major mission for theU.S. military. UN Secretary GeneralBoutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 bid to cre-ate a permanent, standing UN peacekeep-ing force was even accorded a respectfulhearing in Washington.

More recently, however, this enthusi-asm has begun to dim, snuffed out, asmuch as anything else, by an October 3debacle in Mogadishu, Somalia, in which18 U.S. servicemen died trying to trackdown clan leader Mohammed FarahAidid.

Following the smashing victory in thePersian Gulf, U.S. commentators werefond of proclaiming that the U.S. hadfinally overcome the "Vietnam syn-drome." In fact, the conduct of thatconflict, marked as it was by a clearlystated set of military goals and a steadfastemphasis on keeping U.S. casualties toan absolute minimum, showed that the

Vietnam syndrome is alive and well.Among other things, this means a hy-

persensitivity to the prospect of Ameri-can deaths in overseas interventions. Itseems unlikely that a President will everagain be able to secure reelection afterpresiding over 15,000 combat deaths dur-ing his first term, as did President Rich-ard M. Nixon in 1972.

"This is not an abstract intellectualexercise," Gen. Colin L. Powell, the out-going chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, said of peacekeeping missions inhis valedictory address last September."It is nothing less than sending youngAmerican sons and daughters off to a for-eign land to fight other sons and daugh-ters, perhaps to kill them and to bekilled.... We are not committing merce-naries. We are committing sons anddaughters."

Drawing on the lessons of Vietnam,just like his predecessor, the new Chair-man of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. JohnShalikashvili also has no use for the in-crementalism that marked the Americanstyle of warfare in Vietnam.

"I believe," he said in his confirmationtestimony, "that whether we are fightingDesert Storm to defend vital interests ofours or whether we are committingforces to lesser interests, might...they behtimanitarian operations or whatnot, thatwe use decisive force. And by decisive I


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mean that we bring to the table enoughforce to decide the outcome in our fa-vor."

This mindset, in turn, means an ex-ceedingly high threshold for U.S. militaryinvolvement in overseas adventures, how-ever ostensibly noble the cause. Last Sep-tember, therefore, troubled by the erup-tion into urban warfare of what was meantto be a food relief operation in Somaliaand anxious about potential involvementin securing peace in Bosnia, the ClintonAdministration narrowed the terms forparticipation in future UN missions.

U.S. intervention would have to bejustified by clear U.S. national interests,the new policy states, and only in care-fully delineated circumstances would thePentagon outright cede command of itstroops to UN control.

Unconventional missionsIn 1988, Congress tapped the Pentagon toserve as the "lead agency" in the cam-paign to interdict illegal narcotics at thenation's borders. Even so, in 1989, theDefense Department requested no fund-ing to carry out this mission. The nextyear, however, shortly after the BerlinWall had so abruptly tumbled down, themilitary asked for $1.2 billion with whichto wage its "war on drugs."

A sixth of that sum, interestingly, wasto fund the Midwestern portion of the AirForce's Over-the-Horizon Backscatterradar network. Originally conceived as adevice designed to detect nuclear cruise

missiles fired from Soviet submarines,the Backscatter was now being sold as ameans to spot drug couriers wingingacross the Gulf of Mexico.

Congress has since cancelled theBackscatter radar. And the cocaine inter-diction campaign has never proven allthat effective. The Administration thusappears inclined to tilt the drug war's fo-cus more toward treatment and otherhomefront efforts.

Meanwhile, a host of other non-traditional missions are being urged uponthe Pentagon. "An unprecedented oppor-tunity exists to use Defense Departmentresourcesparticularly the talent andskills of men and women in uniformtomeet some of our pressing domesticneeds," Senate Armed Services Commit-tee chairman Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), one ofWashington's most vociferous boostersof unconventional roles for the military,has written.

Among other missions, Nunn hassaid, military medical teams could con-duct childhood immunization drives inour cities, combat engineers could re-spond to national and civil emergenciesand the 400,000 African-American and90,000 Hispanic men and women in uni-form could serve as "role models" forminority youth. "I would like to see ourmilitary people out in the schools visitingpeople for an hour or two every week,"Nunn asserts.

Casting about for post-cold-war rolesand missions, the armed services do not

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V 31MEMBERS OF THE GERMAN AIR FORCE load pallets of flour onto U.S. Air Force C-130 transportplanes. The cargo was airlifted to Sarajevo as part of Operation Provide Promise.

need all that much prompting from Capi-tol Hill to put themselves forward as so-cial service agencies. In its annual reportto Congress two years ago, the Air Forcetouted the 120 overseas relief and rescuemissions it had conducted since 1947. "Aresponse does not necessarily have to belethal," that service said. "A helping handor a clenched fistairpower can, andhas, delivered both."

The Army is no-less eager to profferthe helping hand as a raison d'être."While fighting our nation's wars re-mains the Army's principal mission," Lt.Col. Cole C. Kingseed wrote in the au-tumn 1992 issue of Parameters, the quar-terly journal of the U.S. Army War Col-lege, "...activities that contribute to thegeneral domestic welfare of assisted na-tions should become commonplace forthe Army in the post-cold-war environ-ment."

Critics fear that this diffusion of focuscould hamper combat readiness. "As youpull the military away from its primarymission, preparation for war, and turn ittoward humanitarian missions and civillaw enforcement missions and so on,...you weaken its combat capabilities,which is dangerous," Harry G. SummersJr., a retired Army colonel and militaryaffairs columnist, argues.

Summers frets about another, longer-range peril posed by turning to the armedforces to tackle educational decline, envi-ronmental devastation, world hunger andthe world's many other woes. "You mayalso weaken its traditional subservienceto civilian control," he says. "If you keepsaying [to the military], 'You can do itbetter than the civilians,' someone mayeventually pay attention."

Precisely that menace was raised in anow-notorious essay printed in the Win-ter 1992-93 issue of Parameters. Pennedby Air Force Lt. Col. Charles J. DunlapJr., the article posits a military coup inWashington in the year 2012, a putschprompted by too much responsibility fortoo many nonmilitary chores having beenloaded onto epauleted shoulders. If thepeople want us to run the country, thecoup leaders reason, why not go all theway?

"In truth, militaries ought to 'preparefor war' and leave the 'peace waging' tothose agencies of government whosemission is just that," Dunlap insists. But,then, who is to say precisely what mis-sions are appropriate for the military inthis uncertain new era?


DEFENSE 5

U.S. policy optionsAfter 40-some years of relative predict-ability in waging the cold war with theSoviet Union, the American armed forcessuddenly find themselves at a uniquejuncture where almost every element ofmilitary policybudgets, overseas de-ployments, roles and missionsis up forgrabs. Here are only a few of the policyoptions facing Washington as it charts apost-cold-war course for the Pentagon.

1. The U.S. must maintain forcesand bases overseas, even as it reducestheir numbers.

Pro: The Soviet Union may have col-lapsed, but it is still a dangerous worldout there. Twice this century, the U.S.has had to land troops in Europe to wagemajor wars. Three times this century, ithas fought conflicts in Asia. Overseasgarrisons are an insurance policy, deter-ring potential conflicts. For that reason,its allies want the U.S. to maintain a mili-tary presence. And there is good reasonto comply, considering the large volumeof U.S. trade with Asia and Europe andthe U.S. interest in maintaining globalstability.

Con: Now that the Soviet Union hascollapsed, it is time for the U.S. to stopplaying global policeman. We haveplenty of problems here at home that ur-gently demand our attention and dollars.There is no reason why the U.S. shouldhave "a dog in every fight." U.S. interestsare not directly served by maintainingtroops in Europe and Asia. Anyway, it istime that U.S. allies shouldered a greatershare of the burden of maintaining peace,stability and Western interests around theworld.

2. The U.S. national defense budgetshould be stabilized in the neighbor-hood of $250 billion a year.

Pro: The world remains a dangerousplace rife with powers that, though farsmaller than the Soviet Union, still posepotential threats to U.S. interests. To de-ter aggression and promote stability, $250billion is a comparatively small price topay. By the turn of the century, this coun-try will be devoting only 3% of total eco-nomic output to national defense.

Con: Currently planned reductions indefense spending do not begin to reflectthe geopolitical revolution of the pasthalf decade. Under the Administration'sproposal, the U.S. will still spend roughly70% as much on its armed forces as atthe peak of the cold war.

A Cold-War Juggernaut Adapts to the New World OrderThe defense blueprint that the Clinton Administration embraced last September pur-suant to in its "Bottom-Up Review" of post-cold-war military needs would continuethe reduction of force structure cutbacks that the Bush Administration had already setin train. This table compares key indicators of U.S. military might in fiscal 1986, apeak year in the Reagan buildup, to the force levels that Clinton inherited from Bushin 1993 and the military forces that the United States would possess at the turn of thecentury under the Bottom-Up Review. Cheaper to maintain, but less-readily deployed,reserve units train only one weekend per month and two weeks every summer. A di-vision contains 18,000 troops, typically, and an air wing, 72 aircraft.

1986 1993 1999Total Active Duty Troops 2.2 million 1.7 million 1.4 millionArmy

Active Divisions 18 14 10Reserve Divisions 10 8 5

NavyAircraft Carriers 14 13 12Major Warships 555 443 346

Air ForceActive Fighter Wings 24 16 13Reserve Fighter Wings 12 12 7

Marine CorpsActive Troops 199,000 182,000 174,000Reserve Troops 42,000 42,000 42,000

Nuclear ForcesBallistic Missile Submarines 37 22 18Strategic Bombers 228 201 184Land-based Missiles 1,007 787 500

( 1993 and 1999 figures are drawn from Bottom-Up Review briefing slides; 1986 numbers arederived from various Pentagon reports.)

3. The U.S. military should tackle awide range of unconventional chal-lenges, from disaster relief to stem-ming the flow of narcotics across U.S.borders.

Pro: The country cannot afford to al-low 1.4 million taxpayer-supported pro-fessionals to bunker down in garrisonsand train for potential conflicts that maynever happen when society has realneeds now. Many nontraditional mis-sions also serve double-duty as trainingfor more traditional combat operations.

Con: The armed forces' primary mis-sion is defending the U.S. and its inter-ests against armed attack. It is a long-held tradition in the U.S. that the armedforces should be wielded solely as a bul-wark against external threats. Over-burdening the armed forces with non-traditional missions will only ensure thatthey will come to woe when it comestime to go to war.

4. The U.S. should maintain itscurrent nuclear test moratorium andwork toward implementing a global

comprehensive test ban.Pro: The arms race is over. The U.S.

has plenty of tried-and-true nuclear war-heads with which to sustain deterrence ina post-cold-war world. Older warheadscan be rebuilt according to existing,tested designs. And, should modificationsfor safety purposes be needed, anychanges can be tested on computers. Byrejecting nuclear testing, as well as theproduction of new nuclear warheads,Washington can set a positive examplefor potential nuclear proliferators else-where in the world.

Con: The superpower nuclear armsrace may have ended for now, but a ca-pable nuclear deterrent is still needed in aworld in which potentially hostile nationsare seeking to acquire nuclear weaponry.There is no substitute for actual under-ground explosive tests to ensure the safety,reliability and effectiveness of the nucleararsenal. And there is no assurance thatpotential proliferators such as Iran andNorth Korea will be dissuaded by anAmerican refusal to continue testing.


DEFENSE

DESCUSSRON.QUESTIONS

1. Annual military spending is scheduledto fall by some $50 billion, to about $250billion a year. Does this provide a largeenough "peace dividend," or is theClinton Administration cutting toodeeply?

2. Asian leaders want American troopsto stay on in the region as an "honest bro-ker" to keep regional rivalries from spin-ning out of control. Would this serveAmerican national interests, as you con-ceive them, or not?

3. Even with the end of the cold war, the

Pentagon still plans to garrison 100,000troops in Western Europe and almost asmany at overseas bases in Asia. Someobservers say that we can safely bring allof our troops home now. What do youthink?

4. By testing a nuclear device last Octo-ber, China created a legal pretext for theU.S. to follow suit. Would U.S. nationalsecurity be best served by resumingnuclear testing or by sticking with themoratorium and eventually signing ontoa comprehensive test ban? Why?

5. The Clinton Administration has redi-rected the Strategic Defense Initiativeaway from providing anti-missile de-fenses for the continental US. and towardanti-tactical missile defenses in overseastheaters of war. Was this a wise policy

choice? Does America need defendingagainst missile attack?

6. Some policy analysts argue that theU.S., as the sole surviving superpower,has a humanitarian duty to intervenemilitarily in Bosnia, Haiti and other kill-ing fields around the world to stop thebloodshed. How aggressively should theU.S. pursue this peacekeeping and"peacemaking" mission?

7. Sen. Sam Nunn and others also wantthe military to tackle such domestic woesas drug trafficking, urban crime andchildhood immunization. Considering thelarge sums that taxpayers invest everyyear in these forces, why shouldn't themilitary help cope with problems here athome? Or do you think this is an inap-propriate use of the armed forces?

RINGS ANDS

Allison, Graham K., and Treverton, Gregory F., eds. Rethink-ing America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New WorldOrder. New York, Norton, 1992. 320 pp. $12.95 (paper). In 21essays, noted experts trace current and future militarychallenges.

Binkin, Martin, Who Will Fight the Next War? The Chang-ing Face of the American Military. Washington, D.C., TheBrookings Institution, 1993. 177 pp. $12.95 (paper). A leadingmilitary personnel expert assesses the all-volunteer force andthe career and combat prospects it offers for women, AfricanAmericans and reservist "weekend warriors."

Kruzel, Joseph, ed., American Defense Annual-1993. NewYork, Lexington Books, 1993. 384 pp. $19.95. Published byOhio State University's Mershon Center, this instructive com-pendium of articles covers the national security waterfront.

Luck, Edward C., "Making Peace," Foreign Policy, Winter1992-93, p. 137-55. The president of the United Nations Asso-ciation of the U.S.A. argues for humanitarian intervention as ameans to "build a stronger system of collective security."

Ravenal, Earl C., Designing Defense for a New World Order.Washington, D.C., Cato Institute, 1991. 82 pp. $9.95. Aban-doning the current policy of "collective security" for "strategicdisengagement," this former Pentagon official argues in this pro-vocative monograph, could yield a substantial peace dividend.

Summers, Harry G. Jr., On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis ofthe Gulf War. New York, Dell Publishing, 1992. $4.99. Thisretired Army colonel and military commentator explores theevolution of the U.S. military from Vietnam to the Persian Gulf.

Weisner, Jerome B.; Morrison, Philip and Tsipis, Kosta. "End-ing Overkill," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1993,pp. 12-23. Three liberal Massachusetts Institute of Technologysecurity experts contend that "the U.S. military budget could besharply cut while preserving a strong defense."

AMERICAN DEFENSE INSTITUTE, 1055 North Fairfax St., 2nd Floor,Alexandria, Va. 22314; (202) 544-4704.. Conducts research onmilitary issues and informs the public of the needs for a strongnational defense. Publishes a quarterly journal and newsletter.

CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, 1500 Massachusetts Ave.,N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005; (202) 862-0700. Providescurrent information on the U.S. military and supports an effec-tive defense system without excessive military spending. Pub-lishes the Defense Monitor magazine and offers a large rangeof additional reference material.

COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY,1601 Connecticut Ave., N.W.Suite 302, Washington, D.C. 20009; (202) 745-2450. Edu-cates the public on U.S. military issues and encourages debate onU.S. military policy. Offers curriculum material, reports andbooks, in addition to organizing workshops and seminars.

COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES, 30 Irving Pl., New York, N.Y.10003; (212) 420-1133. Conducts policy studies on nationalsecurity and military spending issues. Publishes annual report,Shopping for a Better World, as well as a monthly newsletter,and offers available speakers.

HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER, 1350 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Suite304, Washington, D.C. 20036; (202) 223-5956. Analyzesrecent developments in national and international security,concentrating on policy and technology. Publishes books, issuessummaries and reports, as well as having available speakers.

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE AND DISARMAMENT STUDIES, 675 Massa-chusetts Ave., 8th Floor, Cambridge, Mass. 02139; (617) 354-4337. Studies the nature of military forces in relation todisarmament. Publishes books and reports and offers availablespeakers.


OPINION BALLOTSHow to use the Opinion Ballots: For your convenience, there are two copies of each opinion ballot. Please cut out and mail oneballot only. To have your vote counted, please mail ballots by June 30, 1994. Send ballots to:

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, 729 SEVENTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10019MBE WIIIIIMMIFIll IM-11111-1111-111111i1M11-1111-1111rEVIE-1111-11111111111111-1M11/11111111111111E-1111 MI

II II TOPIC II 5 Defense Priorities I 5 Defense PrioritiesII II ISSUE A. From roughly $300 billion in 1990, the U.S. I ISSUE A. From roughly $300 billion in 1990, the U.S.p national defense budget is slated to decline to just over I national defense budget is slated to decline to just over

II$250 billion (in current dollars, not adjusted for infla- $250 billion (in current dollars, not adjusted for infla-tion) in 1998. This proposed level of defense spending is I tion) in 1998. This proposed level of defense spending is

111

0(choose one): I (choose one):

III 1. Too much. I 1. Too much.

111 2. Too little. N 2. Too little.3. Just about right. p 3. Just about right.

0II

III

II II II II II II II First three digits of your zip code: I First three digits of your zip code:

IDate: / /1994 Ballot continues on reverse side... I Date: / /1994 Ballot continues on reverse side...1.....a.... ..mmElmilli 111111MIMIN11111111111MMIIIIIIIIIII IIIII BIN MI ERII- RtM M

TOPIC

ECIECIDED

111

0

0

a

a

0 ITOPIC

ITOPICI

I 6 Argentina, Brazil, Chile I 6 Argentina, Brazil, ChileI ISSUE A. A. In its relations with Argentina, Brazil and ISSUE A. In its relations with Argentina, Brazil and0 Chile, the U.S. should: I Chile, the U.S. should:

YES NO I YES NO

I1. Strengthen economic and trade ties, I 1. Strengthen economic and trade ties,I particularly to increase U.S. exports I particularly to increase U.S. exports

0 to the region. I to the region.

I 2. Support the democratization process I 2. Support the democratization processto ensure that military dictatorship I

11

does not recur. III

3. Provide economic and technicalII

I assistance to address the growingproblem of poverty and social needs. I

II

I 4. Not intervene in the domestic affairs Iof the three countries. IIIofI

to ensure that military dictatorshipdoes not recur.

3. Provide economic and technicalassistance to address the growingproblem of poverty and social needs.

4. Not intervene in the domestic affairsthe three countries.

121

[I

15. Other, or comment I 5. Other, or comment

O. I0

First three digits of your zip code: I1

pDate: / /1994 Ballot continues on reverse side... 1licu - "- _-- -_s-- --" -_--- mum in_mtirm III =mum ....,...mum El us me ME al LI. Ell


Date: / /1994 Ballot continues on reverse side...


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0

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r-m-mmairso-orm-Nrurw-myromorm-lu- -.-..-Ersolsrmas ----- -- -- -- .1 lualrimului1 1 I0 ISSUE B. Concerning peacekeeping missions overseas, the 1 ISSUE B. Concerning peacekeeping missions overseas, the 1

U.S. should (choose one): I U.S. should (choose one):

0 1. Participate only in concert with the UN or other 1. Participate only in concert with the UN or othernations. I nations. 0.1

2. Take unilateral action if others refuse to act. I 2. Take unilateral action if others refuse to act. IIRegarding other aspects of peacekeeping missions, the U.S. I Regarding other aspects of peacekeeping missions, the U.S. I0 should: I should: I

YES NO I YES NO 0

I 1. Engage in such missions only when I 1. Engage in such missions only when IU.S. national interests are at stake. ID I U.S. national interests are at stake. 1

2. Commit troops only when peace can I 2. Commit troops only when peace can 0I be established quickly and with little

risk to American lives. I be established quickly and with little0risk to American lives. (-.)

I I I1 ISSUE C. With regard to the size of the post-cold-war military, I ISSUE C. With regard to the size of the post-cold-war military,I

I the U.S. should (choose one): I the U.S. should (choose one): Ii 1. Retain the 1.6 million-strong "base force" advo- 1. Retain the 1.6 million-strong "base force" advo- .cated by the Bush Administration. I cated by the Bush Administration. N!

I 2. Further reduce to 1.4 million active-duty troops, as I 2. Further reduce to 1.4 million active-duty troops, as!recommended by the Clinton Administration. I recommended by the Clinton Administration. O

I3. Cut back even further in recognition of the fact that 1 3. Cut back even further in recognition of the fact that Imilitary competitor has collapsed.our primary Irimary our primary military competitor has collapsed. I

ill4. Other, or comment I 4. Other, or comment a!

I III I Itumuli. ...u.m..........maa.IIIham.........ma..a.c.u.iII I 0

American Free Trade Agreement to include Chile and I American Free Trade Agreement to include Chile andISSUE B. Should the U.S. seek to expand the North

01ISSUE B. Should the U.S. seek to expand the North

1 other Latin American countries? I other Latin American countries? III I I0 1. Yes. I 1. Yes. I

Li 2. No. I1:1 2. No. 0

II I I0 I 0

1 II 1 0

I I1 II

1 1 0I 1 00 I 0

1 I1 I

I II 1 I1 1 II I 0I I IIlcm-m_.-.._.........-um_m_scumummillmmus-a....mmumm mot. sum ..,..1.1160 GREAT DECISIONS 1994

OPINION BALLOTS

63

LATIN AMERICA

Argentina, Brazil,Chile: democracy andmarket econo 'esA democratic revolution has transformed the SouthernCone countries. Argentina and Chile are enjoying aneconomic boom. But social and economic problems persist.

by Jacqueline Mazza

CHILE'S NEW PRESIDENT, Patricio Aylwin, waves after taking office March 11, 1990. At right isGen. Augusto Pinochet, who had ruled Chile since taking power in a military coup in 1973.

llUST OVER 10 years ago, the militaryruled the countries of Argentina,Brazil and Chile. Today, civilian gov-

ernments are installed in each of thethree countries; opposition groups openlycampaign and thrive. The press operatesfreely; open elections have been held.The dramatic "revolutions" in these threeSouthern Cone countries join LatinAmerica to a string of democratic revolu-tions around the worldin Eastern Eu-rope, Asia and Africa. There were fewTV cameras present to mark events inLatin America. No Berlin Wall cametumbling down to symbolize the end ofthe old era and the beginning of the new.But an era nearly as dramatic as that inEastern Europe has begun.

The new democratic age in the so-called ABC countries of Argentina, Bra-zil and Chile could not be more different

from the preceding period. Argentina,Brazil and Chile have had some of themost repressive military regimes in theWestern Hemisphere. The region hasbeen torn by polarized, antidemocraticpolitics on the left and right, consisting ofMarxism, populism and military dictator-ship. The most recent military regimesdominated a wide spectrum of dailylifeeconomic policy, industrial devel-opment, social services, education andpolice forces.

How did such all-encompassingauthoritarian rule give way to democ-racy? Each case represents a distinctivetransition to democracy, reflecting thecountry's history and the different natureof each government. Each case demon-strates that democracy rarely comes qui-etly but is born from crisis that calls intoquestion the viability of the regime.

64

CHILE

Transition by ballot boxOf the three countries, Chile surprisedLatin observers most by succumbing toone of the longest-running and strongestmilitary dictatorships in the region. Chilehad had a long tradition of democracywith a liberal constitution for over 150yearsbefore a coup against PresidentSalvador Allende in 1973 robbed thecountry of its democracy. Allende hadbeen elected by a small margin on aMarxist and populist platform. His radi-cal economic and social policies deeplydivided the country. Industries weretaken over by the government, and pri-vate property was expropriated. Longfood lines and rationing became com-monplace. The government went heavilyinto debt. It increased wages rapidly,which led to dramatically higher pricesand business bankruptcies. Chile, whichhad thrived as a result of political accom-modation, was engulfed in a spiralingpolitical crisis. As Arturo Valenzuela andPamela Constable explain in A Nation ofEnemies: Chile under Pinochet, "Conser-vatives openly plotted to overthrow thegovernment, while leftist groups de-manded that Allende surge ahead withthe revolution and arm workers for itsdefense." With tensions mounting, themilitary overthrew the government byforce on September 11, 1973.

General Augusto Pinochet led thecoup and soon installed himself as thehead of a military government. The mili-tary and security forces launched a brutalcampaign against Allende's supporters.Pinochet dissolved the Congress, bannedindependent political parties and closeddown the free press. He brought in a neweconomic team, the "Chicago boys," whohad studied at the University of Chicago,which is known for conservative, classi-cal capitalist economics. They introducedstrict free-market economic policies. Theeconomy experienced a boom basedheavily on foreign loans. A variety offactors, including overextended loans,subsequently led to economic difficulties.Chile's financial system went on theskids, and unemployment rose sharply, asdid poverty. Beginning in 1981, accord-ing to Chilean specialist ManuelGarreton, the Pinochet regime faced aJACQUELINE MAZZA is a consultant ininternational relations and economics inWashington, D.C.


0P/C

6 ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE

growing social crisis while critical sup- lifetime appointees. The constitution pro- which antagonized the Catholic Churchport for the regime from middle-class vided Pinochet with the power to appoint and the military and polarized politics inopponents of Allende began to erode. nine senators to the Congress. These Argentina. Populism drew on the largess

In the hope of shoring up its flanks,the military launched a new constitution

nonelected senators, together with theelected right-wing opposition, create "a

of the state to promote the interests of thelower and working classes. It had broad

in 1980, introducing a "protected democ- formidable barrier in the Senate to adop- appeal not only throughout Argentina butracy" and providing for a plebiscite on tion of a number of the government's in other Latin American countries as well.the current military regime in eight years. proposed changes in the constitution," Under Peron, the labor movement grewPinochet was convinced he had assured according to Chilean authority Brian to be one of the strongest and largest inthe continuity of his regime. Loveman. This antireform bloc has Latin America. The military deposed him

Over time, public protest against the thwarted not only changes to laws affect- in 1955, vowing to destroy Peronism.government for its handling of the ing the military but also reform of the Peronism was not destroyed, but poli-economy and for its repressive socialpolicies continued to grow. Beginning in

criminal justice system, electoral laws,labor and tax codes and the elimination

tics in Argentina continued to be highlycontentious. No constitutional govern-

1983, there were monthly demonstra- of the military-appointed senators. ment served out its term in the postwartions, the Catholic Church stepped up its Prosecutions of those accused of period. Juan Peron returned to power inactivism and citizen groups began to or- abuses under the regime have not made 1974, and his third wife, Isabel, who wasganize more openly. Civilian organiza-tions and 17 former political parties

much progress. In its most recent report,the human-rights organization Amnesty

vice-president, took over after he died.Economic disarray increased under her

banded together to launch a campaign to International finds that "the Supreme reign. Armed Communist terrorist groupsvote "No" in the 1988 plebiscite. What Court continued to approve the transfer intensified attacks, and right-wing vigi-Pinochet and his supporters had consid-ered impossible happened: Chileans

of investigations into past human-rightsviolations to the military courts; most

lantes, sanctioned by the government,took the law into their own hands. With

voted against the military dictatorship. cases remained unresolved and none of the country in chaos, a coalition of mili-International attention to the plebiscite those responsible was convicted." tary leaders, supported by a number of ci-was great, and Pinochet was compelled,by his own advisers, supporters and therules he had set up, to uphold the results

Progress was made, however, in the caseof the car-bombing deaths in Washington,D.C., of Allende's former ambassador to

vilian groups, staged a coup. Many ex-pected that the military would soon turnpower back to the civilians, but that did

of the No vote. A general election was the U.S., Orlando Letelier, and his assis- not happen.held in 1989 in which Patricio Aylwin tant. The accused were convicted in Chile. The military launched a violent cam-Az6car was elected president by a coali- Despite the tense relations with the paign, known as the Dirty War, againsttion of two major parties, the Socialistsand Christian Democrats, known as La

still powerful military, civilian govern-ment has continued to hold. There is

Communist guerrillas, union leaders,teachers, doctors and others suspected of

Concertacion. Pinochet remained head of broad civil support for the democratic opposing the regime. Political oppositionthe army, as provided for in the constitu- government. New presidential elections and a free press were silenced. Bookstion written by the military. were scheduled for the end of 1993. were burned, and sociology and philoso-

While the transition was tense, it wasconducted in a peaceful manner. Political

Concertacion is expected to win again,with Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle as their

phy could no longer be taught in the uni-versities.

parties, which became polarized during candidate, which would mark a second The military proved inept at handlingthe Allende years, collaborated to rebuild consecutive peaceful turnover of demo- the economy, and corruption was en-Chilean democracy. Civilian president cratic power. demic. They received huge loans, thenAylwin restored media freedom and rights squandered them and racked up increas-to political parties, and all but 40 of the ARGENTINA ing debt they could not repay. Inflationremaining 400 political prisoners werepardoned. The free-market economic poli- TransiTransition by mary eeadefeatmilitaryb

skyrocketed. A financial crisis ensued in1982, and banks collapsed. Civilian op-

cies set by the military regime were Chile's post-1973 political upheaval con- position to the military regime grew.largely continued, indicating overall trasts with Argentina's long history of po- Mothers of the thousands who "disap-agreement on the direction of economic litical instability and military intervention. peared" under the regime began march-policy between civilians and the military Since 1930, the military has taken con- ing in protest. (See box, p. 63.)regime. Greater efforts were made to di- trol of the government six times. Each In an effort to shore up faltering sup-rect government spending to the poor, and time, the military was not alone: many port, the military tried to recapture thea government commission was appointed civilian groups, who saw the military as a British-held Falkland (or Malvinas) Is-to investigate human-rights-abuse cases vehicle for restoring order and financial lands in 1982. By all accounts, the Argen-not covered by a general amnesty. stability, supported the coup. tine military fumbled the campaign in

Vestiges of the old regime remain,however, constraining a full restorationof democracy. Under the terms of the

Juan Perlin was a key figure in Argen-tine postwar politics. As a labor minister,he helped mobilize and politicize the

which thousands of young soldiers died.Military leaders misled the Argentinepeople by claiming successes, and then

1980 constitution and numerous supple- working class, who were generally out- shocked the nation by surrendering. Soonmental laws, the military retain extraordi- side of the political system. He won the thereafter, the military voluntarily handednarily broad powers. Pinochet packed the presidency first in 1946 and led a popu- over the government to civilians and per-Supreme Court with his supporters as list, some called it authoritarian, regime mitted elections for a new president.


ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILEI0 IC

6

People power: average citizensand the fight for democracy

"It was crucial that the whole world hear our anguish and helpus. Alone we are nothing..."

Mother of a disappeared youth, quoted in Jean-PierreBousquet, Las Locas de la Plaza del Mayo (The Madwomen ofthe Plaza del Mayo)

FOR YEARS under the military regime, mothers everywherein Argentina found that their children had mysteriously"disappeared," taken by government security forces or

masked men without a trace. Alone, they made the rounds ofgovernment ministries, police stations and courts to seek ananswer to where their children were. The dangers were great;they were warned if they tried to find their children, the childrenwould be killed. They also ran the risk that they themselveswould "disappear."

Despite the mothers' pleas, the military regime refused toprovide answers. On April 30, 1977, 14 mothers of the "disap-peared" banded together in the main square of Buenos Aires,the Plaza del Mayo, to protest in public. Maybe this time gov-ernment officials would listen. The next week there were 20,the week after that 30; by June, 100 showed up. They decidedto march in protest every week on Thursday afternoons. Thepolice harassed them at gunpoint and kicked them. At first themilitary regime ignored them, calling them "the crazy womenof the Plaza del Mayo." But the movement grew. Over 2,000gathered in the square in December 1977. International atten-tion now focused on a movement with one simple and compel-ling question: What have you done to our children? As themovement grew, more mothers were beaten and harassed; somewere killed. But their courage inspired other Argentines to be-gin protesting against the regime. By mid-1981, a general strikewas supported by 1 million Argentines. They helped underminecivil support for the regime, which collapsed by 1983. Onemother explained the initial motivation: "our desire to find oursons was stronger than our fright."

In Brazil and Chile, as well, civilian organizations playedimportant roles in the transition to democracy. Although clearlycitizens' movements did not bring down the regimes, they didplay a role in growing opposition to the military regimes and

the building of democracy. In Brazil, where voluntary associa-tions and political parties were generally considered weak, theCatholic Church, believed to be the most progressive in the re-gion, formed the early "single largest opposition force to mili-tary rule." Explains academic Ralph della Cava, "Unlike thelaity, Brazilian clergypriests and nunstook to the streetsagainst arbitrary acts of the regime." Local neighborhood reli-gious organizations called Christian-Based Communities(CBCs) were stronger in Brazil than in other countries in theregion. The CBCs were important in beginning to help organizea population intimidated by years of violent repression. CBCleaders ended up becoming activists in growing neighborhoodassociations, labor unions and peasant unions. Brazil authorityScott Mainwaring explains that while the political transitionprocess was largely controlled by elites, "grass-roots move-ments did have an impact on the situation, especially after1978."

In Chile, 17 political parties and numerous civic organiza-tions banded together in a campaign to vote "No" to GeneralPinochet in the 1989 plebiscite. The "No" campaign had littlemoney, but it did have an army of former local activists andtrade unionists, whose organizing skills had been dormant foryears. Activists began knocking on doors, donating their time,printing posters and helping turn old warehouses into rallyhalls. There were difficulties among the groups, which repre-sented a wide range of political views. More serious, there wasrepression and intimidation by government forces. The govern-ment imposed permanent "states of exception," allowing it todetain anyone for three weeks, censor the press and ban publicmeetings. The human-rights organization Americas Watchfound that there was "an extraordinary degree of intimidation"pervading the plebiscite. Despite firebombings of "No" cam-paign offices, harassment and beatings of volunteers, and break-ups of rallies, the armies of volunteers pressed on. One newrecruit was Ronald Ramm, an architect who became a localparty coordinator. He explained, "I've never been involved inpolitics, but I know what is right, and the time has come tounite against a dictator."

Citizen and nongovernmental organizations are continuingto flourish under democratic governments, contributing to theconsolidation of democracy and progress in economic and so-cial development. Environmental organizations, as well as thosepromoting indigenous rights or microenterprise development,have now become part of the political landscape.

Raul Alfonsin, representing the Radi-cal party, beat the Peronist candidate.Under the new civilian government,press controls were lifted and politicalopposition flourished. Alfonsin faced anenormous task: the economy was inshambles, political institutions wereweak, and the cost of military repressionhad been high. Alfonsin's poor manage-ment of the economy drew criticism: aplan for wage and price controls failed,and inflation spun out of control. On theother hand, he bucked the military bytaking strong actions to reduce defenseexpenditures and bring to trial the leadersof the Dirty War. Alfonsin weathered

three separate rebellions led by a ren-egade military faction known as thecarapintadas, the painted faces. The ci-vilian government, with the support ofthe military, held; military rule had beenclearly discredited.

In 1989, Peronist candidate Carlos SaulMenem was elected president. The eventmarked the first time in recent Argentinememory that power was passed peacefullyfrom one civilian elected president to an-other. Menem is currently leading a dra-matic free-market economic program,which has paid off by drastically cuttinginflation and spurring growth.

Argentina, like its neighbors, still

faces vestiges of authoritarian practicesthat stand in the way of a full consolida-tion of democracy. In addition to spo-radic actions by military factions, attacksand death threats have occurred againstjournalists criticizing President Menem.The leader of the journalists' union inArgentina reports that in the nearly fouryears of Menem's rule, 139 writers havereceived threats and 50 were physicallyassaulted.

Although Menem has been criticizedfor ruling by decree to get his economicprogram moving forward, the economicrevolution that he has brought to a coun-try racked by astronomical levels of in-


TOPIC ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE

flation has won him many supporters. much of its civilian support. A number of in the military had collaborated with ci-Menem's Peronist party got a clear ma- military leaders were anxious about their vilians to bring it about. Democratic elec-

jority in recent congressional elections. He declining public prestige and the toll that tions were put in place, press censorshiphas received the backing of former Presi- running a government was putting on the ended, and civil society opened up.dent Alfonsin of the opposition Radical armed forces' principal jobmilitary Brazilian democracy, though, hasparty to change the constitution to allow defense. Moderate elements of the mili- gone through serious challenges, height-two-term presidencies. This would perinit tary sought civilian allies in order to iso- ened by economic troubles. One of theMenem to run for a second term. late the hard-liners and restore the armed

forces to their principal role as a militarygreatest challenges was the corruptionscandal involving President Collor: he

BRAZIL institution.Beginning with the new military re-

was implicated in a $55 million graft andinfluence-peddling scheme and refused to

A long and gradual transition gime of Ernesto Geisel in 1974, Brazil resign. The Brazilian Congress success-Brazil, Latin America's largest and most underwent a long period of disentdo, or fully impeached and removed himapopulous country, also had a long history decompression. In contrast to Argentina feat unparalleled in the hemisphereof instability with weak political parties and Chile, elements of the Brazilian mili- without provoking a breakdown of theand institutions. Authoritarian military tary were directly involved in negotiating system. The new president, Itamarregimes alternated with civilian govern- and guiding the transition to democracy. Franco, faces formidable constraints inments for years. In the early 1960s, as Geisel helped lead a gradual liberaliza- stabilizing the Brazilian economy andsocial mobilization increased and the tion of the regime, granting political addressing one of the most unequal in-economy faltered, the military ousted rights slowly over time. First, congres- come distributions in the region.President Joao Goulart with substantial sional elections were permitted and press As in Argentina and Chile, the Brazil

popular backing and installed a military censorship was eased. Through this de- ian transition process is incomplete. Re-government. After a period of economic cade-long process, civilian groups, in storing the rule of law is clearly impera-stabilization, Brazil began a tremendous particular the Church through local tive. Human-rights groups report torturespurt of economic growth known as the Christian-Based Communities, pressured and ill-treatment by the police. Human-

Brazilian miracle, the government for further liberalization. rights workers, rural leaders and IndianIn the political sphere, hard-liners in The decompression process alternated leaders have been repeatedly threatened

the military were pushing to crack down back and forth, with the opposition push- with death. Another serious target is street

further on left-wing activity. The regime ing for a return of the rule of law and the children, gunned down to "clean up thedeveloped the region's most sophisti- military insisting on holding on to arbi- streets" or eliminate witnesses. Vigilantecated internal intelligence apparatus, the trary powers to keep control of the pro- "death squads" linked to the police andSNI, for spying on and torturing those it cess. An amnesty for those accused or financed by local merchants have beenconsidered opponents. The SNI had the convicted of political crimes since 1961, responsible for the deaths of thousands of

legal right to have an office in every gov- including the military, left and right, was street children. Estimates for 1992 areernment department, state company and approved by the Congress in 1979. As a that four children are murdered a day,university. The intense methods of polic- result of the new law, exiles flooded back 1,500 a year. Freedom House reporteding and the slowdown in the economic to Brazil. Opponents of liberalization that the judicial system, reflecting the"miracle" in later years cost the regime conducted a campaign of violence,

bombings and terrorism in 1980 and1981. In 1982, direct elections for the

political system as a whole, is "chroni-cally corrupt," although Freedom Housefinds the court displayed remarkable in-1 ,

5ss

state governorships were held.A key turning point came in 1985,

when for the first time in 21 years, theelectoral college voted in a civilian presi-

dependence in fending off Collor's at-tempts to manipulate the judicial process.

Brazil, like Argentina and Chile, isnow moving to "consolidate' democracy.

r,

x.

dent, Tancredo Neves, with Jose Sarneyas his vice-president. Both had good rela-tionships with the military. Neves diedsuddenly, and Sarney became the first ci-vilian president in 21 years. Civiliangroups led a broad-based campaign fordirect elections, Directas Ja. In 1989

All three face the challenge of keepingthe process going. Nonetheless, the suc-cesses during the transition period areundeniable. Press and political freedomshave been restored and free electionsheld for all levels of government.

Brazil saw its first direct presidentialelection. The winner was FernandoCollor de Mello, a relative unknown who

Challenges to democracyThere are a number of challenges con-fronting democracy-building in Argen-

_ led a coalition of conservative parties.Reflecting on the transition, Brazil expertThomas Skidmore notes, "No observer of

tina, Brazil and Chile: the role of themilitary; governance and corruption; andeconomic and social instability.

tamon contemporary Latin American politics Role of the Military. Keeping theBRAZIL'S FIRST directly elected president, could fail to be impressed by Brazil's military forces in the barracks and out ofFernando Collor de Mello, who wassuccessfully impeached and ousted following

relatively smooth transition away from a politics is particularly critical in the ABC

a corruption scandal. military-dominated regime." Moderates countries. Latin America specialist


ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILETOPIC

6Alfred Stepan points out that the keyconcerns of the military in the transitionphase are to retain their high level of spe-cial advantages and to avoid la revancha,or revenge, for years of human-rightsabuses. All three countries have agreedon some form of amnesty for the militaryfor past crimes. Only Argentina, underPresident Alfonsin, undertook trials oftop military officers. But no country hasavoided difficult confrontations with themilitary. They have faced, in various de-grees, shows of force by the military,coup rumors or, in Argentina's case,attacks by military factions.

Scholars differ on how great a threatthe militaries in Argentina, Brazil andChile now pose to civilian governments.With the decay of communism and theworldwide movement toward democ-racy, the international environment ismuch less supportive of military rule.Few would disagree, though, that giventhe record of past military intervention, itis an area that requires special vigilancein all three countries.e Governance and Corruption.Throughout Latin America, the twinproblems of establishing functioningdemocratic systems of government at alllevels and weeding out corruption havecome to the forefront. Corruption is notjust a phenomenon of civilian govern-ments; indeed, there was reportedlylarge-scale corruption under militarygovernments. But in more-open societieswith free presses, corruption is being ex-posed. In Brazil and Argentina, politicalleaders or their close associates havebeen tainted by corruption; in Brazil,there is a widening scandal involvingcongressional leaders. Judicial reformhas not kept pace with economic reform,imposing challenges for the periodahead. Privatization, according to a num-ber of analysts, could help wrest corrupt-ing power from state hands.

Economic and Social Instability.Improving conditions for the poor andeconomic performance overall are chal-lenges for all three countries. Currentproblems stem from a long history ofstate economic intervention and misman-agement, accentuated by the austerity andreform programs enacted under the newcivilian governments. According to theWorld Bank, Latin Americaand Brazilin particularhas among the mostunequal distributions of income in theworld. While Marxism has been discred-ited around the world, some fear that

-!ValikESto sCenjirm V;.; 31.:(.,

SANTIAGO, CHILE: Families of the "disappeared" holding photos of their missing relativesduring a Good Friday procession in 1988.

populist authoritarianism is a potentialtemptation in the region. It is the neweconomic and social challenges, many

scholars believe, that are the most press-ing and difficult ones faced by demo-cratic governments.

The economicrevolution

CHILE, ARGENTINA and to a lesserextent Brazil are undergoing an eco-

nomic, free-market "revolution" assweeping and as challenging as thedemocratic political revolution. What ex-actly is the relationship between the po-litical and economic revolutions in theABC countries and elsewhere? Shouldeconomic and political reform be pursuedtogether or are economic reform and sta-bility prerequisites for political reform?Some point to the former Soviet Union asan example of the error of opening up aclosed political system without first set-ting the economic house in order. Theynote that Chile pursued economic reformbefore tackling political reform. In Ar-gentina and Brazil it is the newly electeddemocratic governments that have under-taken economic reform along with politi-cal reforms. While it is difficult to gener-alize due to each country's unique eco-nomic and social conditions, many LatinAmericans countries, the ABC countries

included, start from a similar point: a re-jection of the old state-led economies andpopulism, which clearly failed them.

Old state-led economiesBeginning in the 1950s, nearly all ofLatin America moved to highly protec-tionist, state-led economies. The statebecame the "engine" and owner of indus-tries from steel mills, to airlines, to oilcompanies. The push to have the state,not the private sector, develop these in-dustries was based on a theory of devel-opment that argued that Third Worldcountries could only industrialize by acomprehensive strategy to keep foreigninvestors and competition out and use theeconomic largess of the state to createnational companies. A model called the"import substitution strategy" was devel-oped by Latin American economists.Under that strategy, protectionist wallswere kept high to keep out foreign com-petition, and the state created new indus-


ionic

6ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE

Argent Reg Dee3S009 @ODODC4

Population({Bra m11004o64

(JCIG) proli cbki4capita

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NRCO2,500

150 156.32,000

100 1,500

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0

LI Argentina J Brazil Chile

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12

10

Growth(pe cent change

8.7%

10.4%r

40

20

Inflation(percent average

1,009%

15%

1991Source: All data is from 1993 Economist Intelligence Unit Country Reports, except GDP per capita data, which is from the World Bank's World Development Report 1993.

tries to serve domestic markets and ex-port to foreign nations. The state played amajor role in industrial development andregulation. In many cases it created artifi-cially high exchange rates.

For a while the strategy seemed to beshowing some results. Huge steel andmanufacturing complexes were created.Brazil, in particular, had very high ratesof growthan average of 11% per yearfrom 1968 to 1974, and the region as awhole saw improvements in health, edu-cation and literacy. But import substitu-tion compelled governments to borrowheavily to feed state industries, and theresult was domestic products that oftencost more than foreign ones.

In the 1970s, the region, like the restof the world, was hit with two sharp oil-price increases. The billions of dollarsearned by the oil-rich countries were re-cycled through Western commercialbanks, and Latin America became a mainmarket for the lending of "petrodollars."Argentina, Brazil and Chile" becameregular clients. This new lending, com-bined with poor economic performanceand mismanagement, led to an explosivedebt and economic crisis in the region.Brazil had the largest debt in all of LatinAmerica, and Argentina was also a largedebtor. The growing state industries, withhigh subsidies, were becoming more andmore of a burden to maintain.

The lost decadeThe economic problems that were build-ing during the 1970s exploded in the1980s. The recession that hit the whole

world reverberated most strongly in thevulnerable developing countries. Argen-tina, Brazil and Chile found they couldnot pay their debts or maintain the costsof the heavily subsidized, often corrupt,state-led economies. Argentina and Bra-zil went through drastic cycles of "hyper-inflation," where the government keptprinting money to pay bills, which in turnpushed up prices (i.e., created inflation).They sought assistance from the multilat-eral development institutionsthe Inter-national Monetary Fund (IMF) and theWorld Bankbut these required strongausterity measures before they wouldlend Latin America more money. Struc-tural adjustment often meant balancingbudgets, cutting government work forces,selling off state companies and liberaliz-ing markets.

Rather than adapt to the slowdown ofthe 1970s, the Brazilian military regimeat first launched a big public-works pro-gram. They built huge hydroelectricplants, chemical industries, nuclear plants,etc. This was done without considering thedrain on the federal budget or the level offoreign debt acquired. The governmentbecame dependent on further borrowing.Luciano Martins explains: "The intentionwas artificially to sustain the hope of aneconomic miracle that would legitimizethe regime." But by mid-1982, the bill forthe free-spending policy arrived. Domes-tic interest rates rose to 300% per year,inflation was above 100%, industrial pro-duction fell 10%, and foreign debt rosesixfold from $12.6 billion in 1973 to al-most $80 billion in mid-1982. Brazil,

66 GREAT DECISIONS 19 94 69

close to defaulting on its foreign debt,went to the IMF for help. The austeritymedicine prescribed to contain inflationand the high level of debt was difficult toswallowsevere budget cuts, price in-creases for subsidized goods, currencydevaluation and wage cuts. The actions,as with all the Latin countries that neededto take the medicine, further deepenedrecession, and tens of thousands lost theirjobs, prices rose and wages declined.

In Argentina, the end of the Malvinaswar and the financial crisis brought downthe military regime. The new civilianpresident, Alfonsin, was not able to sta-bilize the economy. He tried several plansto control hyperinflation to no avail. In-flation peaked at 4,924% in 1989. Withinflation out of control, Argentina de-faulted on its international debts, and eco-nomic production fell. The New YorkTimes reported, "Not surprisingly, the Ar-gentine economy shrank 25% in the1980s, more than any other in LatinAmerica with the exception of Nicaraguaand Guyana."

Only Chile initiated reforms for devel-oping a private-sector-based economyduring this period. The military cut gov-ernment spending, laid off workers andreduced subsidies to industry. Whileshort-term costs were high, the founda-tion was laid for economic growth in thefuture.

Throughout Latin America, the burdenof austerity measures fell heaviest on thepoor, through higher prices and greaterunemployment. In Brazil the number ofpeople who were poor increased by 10

ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILEIOPir

6million during the 1980s to 35 million;more than 40% of the population lived onless than $2 a day. In the whole region,the 1980s became known as the "lost de-cade": not only did the Latin Americancountries not grow, they lost ground. Pov-erty increased steadily throughout the re-gion, aggravating already unequal distri-butions of income. Earlier progress ineducation and health conditions built upover decades fell behind.

Move to market economicsThe free-market transformation that isnow taking place in Argentina and Chile,in particular, and Brazil to a much lesserextent, is as dramatic as the democraticrevolution itself. Contrary to concerns ofeconomists that democratic governmentsmight not be able to undertake such po-litically difficult and risky reforms, theyhave made tough choices and borne thepain of economic reform. Of the ABCcountries, Chile is distinct in beginningthe reform process under a military gov-ernment.

Chile led the way in the 1980s and isoften cited as the region's success storyfor "neo-liberal" transformation. Chile'smarkets were opened to foreign competi-tion, and many state industries and ser-vices were privatized, including the so-cial security system. Chile is trying to bea "Latin American tiger," modeled afterthe export-led economies of SoutheastAsia. The government dismissed manystate employees and diversified exports,particularly wood and pulp products,fresh fruit and other agricultural prod-ucts, to reach new markets. Certain im-portant industries, such as copper mining,have remained in state hands.

Chile's hard work has paid off: in 1992,the nation registered an enviable 10.4%growth rate, one of the highest worldwide,with an unemployment level at an equallycoveted 4.5%. In early 1993, growthslowed to a still enviable 8.3% rate.

Chile's transformation, however, hascome with social costs. The poor havepaid the highest price for the adjustmenthigher food costs and reduced wages.About 40% of the population is below thepoverty line of $200 a month for a familyof four. But the new democratic govern-ment has launched strong antipoverty ef-forts, financed by a tax increase. The newfunds are concentrated on affordablehousing, health care, education andmicroenterprise development. Its anti-poverty strategy has been called one of

the world's best by the United Nations.Argentina's transformation went

through stages under current PresidentMenem. A Peronist, Menem surprisedthe nation by implementing a very non-Peronist program of free-market reform.By nearly all accounts, Argentina isimplementing one of the most far-reach-ing privatization and reform plans inLatin America. Nearly everything hasbeen privatizedthe state airlines, thetelephone company, the railroads andtelevision stations. Menem abolished 36regulatory agencies, lifted import restric-tions and cut the government work forceby 20%.

Menem's first economic plan was con-sidered bold but a bit haphazard. The turn-around came in the second phase undercurrent Finance Minister DomingoCavallo, who built a more comprehensiveplan of large privatizations, increased taxcollections and abolished export taxes. Akey move came in early 1991 with theadoption of a "convertibility" scheme,making one Argentine peso equivalent toone U.S. dollar. The major achievementhas been the dramatic decrease in infla-tion. Average annual consumer-price in-flation dropped from 2,314% in 1990 to24.9% in 1992. High growth rates havebeen achieved, with an average of 8.7%in 1992. Inflation in the single digits waspredicted for 1993. Decisions on eco-nomic reform were often taken by execu-tive decree, however, because of difficul-ties getting measures through the Argen-tine congress, and the speed and lack of

control over the process have offered op-portunities for corruption.

Of the three nations, Brazil's economicreforms are the slowest-moving and itseconomic performance in key areas ispoor. Many feel Brazil's commitment toreform is erratic. In the past seven years,Brazil has had five successive stabiliza-tion plans with varying success. Trade lib-eralization has been much slower andmore cautious than in either Argentina orChile. Brazil has the highest inflation ratein all of Latin America-1,009% in1992and one of the highest in theworld. The economy did not grow at allin 1992, although healthier economicgrowth was expected in 1993. Economicmanagement has been hampered by poorpolitical management. President Collor deMello ran into serious corruption charges,which cost him his job. In what has jok-ingly been called "economic musicalchairs," President Itamar Franco is on hisfourth finance minister in a little over ayear since taking office. This lack of con-tinuity has made economic policy diffi-cult. The most recent economic team un-der Fernando Cardoso is also having itsdifficulties.

As the tenth largest economy in theworld, though, Brazil clearly has a strongbase on which to build. Export growthand agriculture are areas of strength; autoproduction is at record levels. Brazil hasbeen trying to resurrect a standby agree-ment with the IMF, but the concern in thefall of 1993 was that the country was stillnot meeting the economic targets.

1 TT FinPRESIDENT CARLOS SAUL MENEM of Argentina (1) waves to the crowd during an IndependenceDay parade in Brasilia, as Brazil's President Itamar Franco looks on.


6 ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE

A pressing and serious problem con-fronting Brazil is deteriorating socialconditions. As the largest and most ethni-cally diverse of the Latin American coun-tries, Brazil has been facing an explosivesocial situation. Brazil has the highest percapita income in Latin America, but therichest 20% of Brazilians earn 26 timeswhat the poorest 20% earn. Brazil's 26:1ratio far exceeds the U.S. at 9:1 or Indiaat 5:1. Crime and poverty are seriousproblems. In the capital city of Rio de

Janeiro, where 5.5 million people live,everyday an average of 10 people arekilled and 100 cars are stolen.

Overall, a dramatic economic revolu-tion has occurred in Argentina and Chile,in particular. Some worry that a rise inexchange rates or shakiness in some port-folio investments could weaken eco-nomic performance. But so far, highgrowth rates and containment of hyper-inflation have rendered these countriesbig winners.

Reconnectingthe wort

THE TWIN ECONOMIC and political revo-lutions that Argentina, Chile and to a

lesser extent Brazil are undergoing havebrought forward a new relationship withthe outside world. Each one is participat-ing in an increasingly competitive inter-national marketplace as well as partici-pating in a more democratic communityof nations.

New international roleThe most visible sign of a change in theexternal relations of the Southern Cone isin the primacy of economic relations. Forthe free-market reforms enacted in theregion to work requires open trading rela-tions and borders open to investment.Foreign tradeboth inside and outsidethe regionis more actively encouraged.

The countries of the Southern Conenot only Argentina, Brazil and Chile, butalso the two smaller countries, Paraguayand Uruguayhave often had difficultrelations with each other. Nonetheless,four of these countries have set out tocreate a free-trade area. The Treaty ofAsuncion was signed in March 1991,establishing Mercosur, the Spanish acro-nym for the Southern Cone CommonMarket, among Argentina, Brazil, Para-guay and Uruguay. Mercosur's goal is toestablish a free-trade area by January 1,1995. Some trade barriers have come downand trade has increased. Mercosur alsoencourages the physical integration of thecountries, including the construction of anew superhighway and bridges, estab-lishing hydrofoil services, and promotingthe sharing of consulates abroad. In May1993, the presidents of Argentina andBrazil agreed to uphold the timetable andobjectives of Mercosur. The biggest issue

facing Mercosur is agreement on a com-mon external tariff for all four countries.

Chile is outside of Mercosur for themoment, although there is hope that itwill ultimately join. It has stayed out onthe grounds that the other countries' eco-nomic policies still have a long way to goto be compatible with its own. Chile hasprogressed steadily in creating interna-tional links with other countries pursuingfree-market policies. In the beginning of1992, a free-trade agreement betweenChile and Mexico came into force, with acommon 10% tariff between them that isto fall to zero by 1996. Chile has alsobeen invited to join the Asia-Pacific Eco-nomic Cooperation forum, one of therichest groups of trading nations in theworld. Japanese investors have been par-ticularly interested in the highly competi-tive Chilean economy. While the U.S. isstill the top exporter to Chile, Chile ex-ported slightly more to Japan (16.7%) in1992 than to the U.S. (16.1%). The mosttalked about free-trade area for Chile isone with the U.S. The Clinton Adminis-tration, like the Bush Administration be-fore it, has argued that Chile has madethe right reforms and is a prime candidatefor a free-trade agreement with the U.S.after the completion of the North Ameri-can Free Trade Agreement (Nafta).

Relations with the U.S.Past U.S. relations with the former mili-tary dictatorships of the Southern Conehave been rocky. Through most of thecold-war period, the U.S. sent a varietyof mixed messages to the Southern Conedictatorships. A number of Administra-tions embraced them. The Nixon Admin-istration provided the new Pinochet gov-

ernment with aid. The Carter Administra-tion canceled aid to Argentina over itshuman-rights violations, and its relationswith Brazil were icy due to its nuclearpolicy. The Reagan Administration de-cried the human-rights policies of theCarter Administration and largely sup-ported the Southern Cone dictatorships.However, in its later years, the ReaganAdministration took a stronger pro-democracy stand and supported aid forthe "No"-to-Pinochet campaign.

With the advent of democracy in theregion, better relations with all threecountries were restored. Under PresidentGeorge Bush, economic policy achievedprimacy. In 1990, the Enterprise for theAmericas Initiative was announced, set-ting the long-term goal of creating a free-trade area from Alaska to Tierra delFuego. In addition to trade, the initiativehas two other components: debt and in-vestment. Specifically, the debt initiativeprovided relief from debt owed to theU.S. government, and the investment ini-tiative created a new Multilateral Invest-ment Fund with U.S., Japanese, Euro-pean and Latin American contributions topromote private-sector development inthe region. Chile has already receiveddebt-relief under the Brady plan (namedfor a former Treasury secretary) and theEnterprise for the Americas Initiative,and plans are now being made for MIFaid to Chile and Argentina. On balance,Latin America scholar AbrahamLowenthal argues, "Latin America's in-terest in prospective regional partnershipswas aroused, but the U.S. under Bushwas not able to deliver much."Lowenthal explains the shortfall as beinglargely due to domestic difficulties facingthe U.S., including recession and opposi-tion among domestic groups to invest-ment south of the border.

President Bill Clinton faces a new op-portunity in relations with Argentina, Bra-zil and Chile. A State Department officialannounced in a May 1993 speech that"President Clinton is committed to forg-ing a true partnership of the AmericasaWestern Hemisphere community of de-mocraciesto strengthen democratic in-stitutions, to defend human rights, to fightfor social justice, to support economicreform and free markets, and to protectthe environment." The Administration hasresponded to threats against new democ-racies in Haiti and Guatemala.

The Clinton Administration has indi-cated that it intends to move forward


ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILETOPIC

6with free-trade agreements with Chile,Argentina and then Venezuela afterNafta's adoption. President Clinton out-lined the overall vision in a speech to theU.S. Chamber of Commerce: "The realjob gains from Nafta come when we takethat agreement (Nafta)...to Chile, to Ar-gentina, to Colombia, to Venezuela, tothe other market-oriented democracies inLatin America and create a consumermarket of 700 million people, soon to beover 1 billion people in the next century."There are a number of more-sector-spe-cific subsidies of agricultural products.Intellectual property rightsthe protec-tion of U.S. patents and copyrights in for-eign marketshave been an importantconcern, particularly in Brazil. At thesame time, environmental differences arelikely to increase, particularly with re-gard to Brazil, which holds the world'slargest remaining reserves of tropical for-est, rapidly being destroyed.

After years of acrimony, U.S.-LatinAmerican relations are in a much stron-ger position. As Secretary of State War-ren Christopher explained, "there is anunprecedented convergence of goals andvalues among all the people of theAmericas." Similar sentiments are ech-oed by Latin American leaders. Argen-tine President Menem stated in 1993 that"Never before have relations between theU.S. and Argentina been better."

Just how far greater regional ties cango in the short term is debatable.Lowenthal concludes: "There is greaterconvergence in the Americas, North andSouth, on political values and economicfundamentals than ever before, but ahemispheric political community is farfrom achievement."

U.S. policy optionsShould the U.S. move forward with

free-trade agreements with the South-ern Cone countries?

Yes: Argentina, Brazil and Chile areamong the most dynamic economies ofSouth America. The Chilean economypresents none of the major concerns asso-ciated with Mexico. It is much smaller,the immigration problem is nonexistent,it offers an important export market forU.S. goods and services and a windowonto the larger South American market.Argentina, as a larger economy, offerseven greater export possibilities.

Most important, free-trade arrange-ments would help consolidate the demo-cratic transitions in these countries and

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shore up badly bruised relations withLatin America over the difficult fight inthe U.S. over Nafta.

No: The divisiveness of the Nafta de-bate in Congress and the country demon-strates that Americans are deeply dividedover the merits of opening up free tradewith the low-wage developing countriesto the south. The U.S. should not offermore incentives for companies to investoutside the U.S. when its own workersare in such trouble. The Nafta agreementshould not be extended to other countriesuntil the U.S. has strengthened its owneconomy. There are other ways for theU.S. to offer its support to the democra-cies of the Southern Cone than by mort-gaging its own economic future.

Should the U.S. do more to supportthe democratic transitions in Argen-tina, Brazil and Chile?

Yes: With almost two thirds of thepopulation of South America, thesecountries are a linchpin for the whole re-gion. The military uprisings, the instabil-ity arising from corruption scandals, and

72

the pressing social needs of the ABCcountries demonstrate that the demo-cratic process is fragile. The U.S. needsto indicate its support for strengtheningcivilian rule through targeted economicassistance in key areas, trade and invest-ment promotion, greater contacts withregional militaries and social organiza-tions, and diplomatic support. The U.S.cannot just wait until a crisis arises, for inmany cases that is too late.

No: Democracy-building is an impor:tant foreign policy priority, but the U.S.cannot afford to be totally involved in alldemocracies. The U.S. is currently over-whelmed with international crises aroundthe globe: Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, theformer Soviet Union. Should a crisiserupt in any of these countries, the U.S.would surely be there leading the fight torestore democracy, as it has done in,Gua-temala and Haiti. Actions in the absenceof a crisis are unnecessary and stretchdiplomatic resources. Given all the otherworld crises, the Southern Cone cannotbe an immediate priority for the U.S.


ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE

EONOHS

1. The Southern Cone countries have ahistory of political instability and militaryintervention. How firmly is democracyrooted in these three countries? Is there adanger of reversal in any of thecountries?

2. If the military overthrew the presentgovernment in Argentina, Brazil or

Chile, hOw should the U.S. react? Shouldthe U.S. send in troops? Send warships toenforce an embargo, as it did in the caseof Haiti?

3. If your children or parents had beentortured and killed under a military dicta-torship, would you have supported grant-ing amnesty to the torturers? Did Argen-tina, Brazil and Chile take too soft a lineon military crimes or did they have littlechoice?

4. Now that the cold war has ended, doesthe U.S. have any national interests at

stake in Latin America? Should the U.S.maintain a special relationship with Ar-gentina, Brazil and Chile?

5. Do you believe that the same concernsabout a free-trade area with Mexico arevalid for a free-trade area with Chile, orArgentina or Brazil? Are the implicationsfor U.S. jobs the same?

6. What would be the advantagesordisadvantagesfor the U.S. of establish-ing a free-trade area with Chile, as pro-posed, and later including Argentina andBrazil?

Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: 1993Report. Washington, D.C., Inter-American DevelopmentBank, 1993. 308 pp. $16.95. Comprehensive yearbook review-ing recent economic and social trends in each of the LatinAmerican countries.

Loveman, Brian, "Mision Cumplida? Civil-Military Relationsand the Chilean Political Transition." Journal of Inter-Ameri-can Studies and World Affairs, Fall 1991, pp. 35-74. (Avail-able from The North-South Center/The University of Miami,P.O. Box 248205, Coral Gables, Fla. 33124-3027.) The authorargues that the transition is incomplete and more needs to bedone to assert true civilian rule.

Lowenthal, Abraham F., "Latin America: Ready for Partner-ship?" Foreign Affairs (America and the World 1992/93),pp. 74-92. The author points out the heavy stake the U.S. has inthe success of democracy and market economics in LatinAmerica.

Nash, Nathaniel C., "Argentines Escape an Economic Mire: ASuccess Story, Yes, but No Miracle." The New York Times,July 25, 1993, p. 10. Article discusses Argentina's daring eco-nomic program.

O'Donnell, Guillermo, Schmitter, Philippe C., and Whitehead,Laurence, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: LatinAmerica. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press,1986. 256 pp. $12.50. Classic volume on transitions to democ-racy in the region, with chapters on Argentina, Brazil and Chile.

Stepan, Alfred, ed., Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Tran-sition and Consolidation. New York, Oxford University Press,1989. 424 pp. $16.95. Volume addresses range of issues in Bra-zilian transition, including the role of the Catholic Church andnongovernmental organizations.

Valenzuela, Arturo, and Constable, Pamela, A Nation of En-emies: Chile under Pinochet. New York, Norton, 1991. 367

pp. $12.95. A compelling and readable description of social andpolitical developments in Chile from the dictatorship throughthe democratic transition, focusing on the role of key social groups.

Wharton, Clifton R., Jr., "Forging a True Partnership of theAmericas." U.S. Department of State Dispatch, May 3, 1993,pp. 305-7. Address by the deputy secretary of state before theCouncil of the Americas.

LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION, University of Pittsburgh,946 William Pitt Union, Pittsburgh, Penna. 15260; (412) 648-7929. Analyzes Latin American issues and encourages train-ing, teaching and continued research. Publishes Latin AmericanResearch Review, in addition to a quarterly newsletter, LASAForum.

NORTH AMERICAN CONGRESS ON LATIN AMERICA, 475 RiversideDr., Suite 454, New York, N.Y 10115; (212) 870-3146. Re-searches Latin American and Caribbean developments, as wellas U.S. policy toward the region. Publishes Report on theAmericas magazine five times a year.

TULANE UNIVERSITY, CENTER FOR LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES,105

Hebert Bldg., New Orleans, La. 70118; (504) 865-5164.Conducts research on Latin America, including contemporary

affairs. Offers reference materials, training, conferences, audio-visuals and a biannual newsletter, Tolas.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, CENTER FOR LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, 319Grinter Hall, Gainesville, Fla. 32611; (904) 392-0375.

Promotes teaching and research on Latin America and theCaribbean. Sponsors conferences and offers curriculum mate-rial and a newsletter; has staff available to speak.

UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO, LATIN AMERICA DATA BASE, LATINAMERICAN INSTITUTE, 801 Yale, N.E., Albuquerque, New Mex.87131; (505) 277-6839. Monitors Latin American wire ser-vices and print media and produces four on-line publications.

WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, 110 Maryland Ave.,N.E., Suite 404, Washington, D.0 20002; (202) 544-8045.

Works for the development of a foreign policy that facilitateshuman rights, democracy and peace in the region. Publishes aquarterly newsletter, Enlace, reports and studies, and organizesconferences, workshops and seminars.


EGYPT, ALGERIA and TUNISIA

Islam and politics:Egypt, Algeria andTunisiaThree North African governments are under siege byIslamic militants. Why is this happening? How will it end?

by Lawrence G. Potter

I

.4111111111.16NEW YORK CITY, JULY 2, 1993: Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman (center) surrenders to U.S.immigration officials. Some of his followers were implicated in the World Trade Centerbombing.

N FEBRUARY 26, 1993, the WorldTrade Center in New York Citywas bombed, leaving six dead

and over a thousand injured. The attackappears to have been the work of Islamicradicals inspired by a blind Egyptiancleric, Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman. Theattack shattered Americans' illusions thatdistance somehow guaranteed them im-munity to the volatile mix of religion and

politics that has long plagued the MiddleEast.

Seven months later, on September 13,the leaders of Israel and the PalestineLiberation Organization (PLO) met withPresident Bill Clinton on the WhiteHouse lawn and shook hands, opening anew chapter in Middle Eastern history.

The two epic events were directly re-lated to the rising tide of political Islam

74

Orc7

and its violent fringe groups. A drivingforce behind the Israeli-Palestinian rec-onciliation was a concern shared by lead-ers of both Israel and the PLO that timewas running out. If they did not act soon,they feared, growing support for Islamicforces that reject the peace process couldpermanently block the way. A commonsense of vulnerability that they them-selves could be overthrown by Islamicmilitants now has united leaders as dif-ferent as Saudi Arabia's King Fand,Syria's President Hafez al-Assad andEgypt's President Hosni Mubarak.

The peace agreement between Israeland the PLO has almost universal sup-port among Middle Eastern governments.And for now, at least, those opposed torule by religious activistsas in Iranstillprevail in the Middle East. Nevertheless,this may be changing. Those supportingIslamic rule have been growing in num-bers. The resurgence has been particu-larly dramatic in three North Africancountries, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia.Until recently, governments in those na-tions had sought accommodation withsome Islamic opposition groups, but nowthey are locked in deadly confrontation.

What accounts for this religious re-vival throughout the Islamic world, inparticular in North Africa? Why has itsometimes taken a violent turn? U.S.policymakers face a dilemma in respond-ing to this phenomenon. They are accus-tomed to dealing with sovereign states,not transnational movements. The West"is even more apprehensive about Islamthan it was about communism, becausewhile it knows how to deal with materialchallenges, it has no idea how to goabout facing a spiritual challenge," ac-cording to Hassan al-Turabi, head ofSudan's National Islamic Front.

In the new Middle East, the ClintonAdministration must decide how to helpits allies in the region deal with the threatof militant Islam. At the same time itmust consider how strongly to pressthose governments to implement U.S.foreign policy priorities such as democ-racy and human rights.

Roots of revivalThe Islamic resurgence is part of abroader worldwide movement in whichpeople, disaffected from their govern-

LAWRENCE G. POTTER, a longtime contributorto GREAT DECISIONS, holds a Ph.D. in MiddleEastern History from Columbia Universityand is currently teaching at Tufts University.


0 P C

7 ISLAM AND POLITICS

SELECTED INDICATORS tries, gained favor. Islamic modernism'sprimary appeal was to the educated elite,however, and by World War I they wereturning to new definitions of politicalidentity. Islamic modernism had failed asa political force, but it exerted an Intel-lectual influence on later reformers.

The modern Middle EastThe post-World War I breakup of theOttoman Empire, which had ruled largeparts of the Middle East and North Africafor five centuries, gave rise to a numberof new states. Creations of Europeanpowers, some of these countries, likeLebanon, Iraq and Jordan, had no his-torical basis and found it difficult to forgea sense of national identity. People foundthemselves arbitrarily joined with mem-bers of different religious, tribal andlinguistic groups. Their only commondenominators were Islam or "Arabness."

European influence peaked in the pe-riod between World Wars I and II. TheBritish in Egypt, Palestine, Transjordanand Iraq, and the French in North Africa(Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia), Syriaand Lebanon, exercised hegemony overmuch of the region. Of the major coun-tries in the Middle East, only twoPersia (renamed Iran in 1935) and Tur-keyretained their independence.

The most powerful ideological currentat that time was secular nationalism, asexemplified by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk(president of Turkey, 1923-38) and RezaPahlavi (shah of Iran, 1925-41). Bothmen did much to modernize their coun-tries' economies and military establish-ments. In the process they created a widegap between the ruling elite and thepeople, between leaders and the more re-ligious masses. Although the shah for-bade the veiling of women and sup-pressed the ulema, the clergy retained thepopular allegiance of most Iranians, asdemonstrated at the time of the revolu-tion in 1978-79.

The Muslim Brotherhood, founded inEgypt in 1928, was the first modern Is-lamic movement to attract mass support.This movement emphasized that Islamwas more than a religion: it was a com-prehensive system for conducting one'slife. By combining social activism with arejection of the materialism of the Westand opposition to British imperialism, ithad broad appeal among the poor as wellas the urban middle class. (It establishedschools, factories and mosques.)

After World War II, Arab socialism

was the prevailing political ideology inEgypt, Algeria and other Arab countries.This did not prevent the new elite frominvoking Islam to justify secular goals,which showed the strong continuing in-fluence of Islamic modernism. PresidentGamal Abdel Nasser (1956-70), for ex-ample, regularly obtained legal decrees(fatwas) from the ulema to give his poli-cies the tincture of religious legitimacy.The Muslim Brotherhood was suppressedin 1954 after being accused of trying toassassinate Nasser but has continued tobe an important force in Egyptian politicsdown to the present day.

The end of ideologyIsrael's defeat of the armies of Egypt,Jordan and Syria in the Six-Day War of1967 was a bitter blow to Arab self-es-teem. It resulted in the loss of the WestBank of the Jordan river and the easternpart of the city of Jerusalem, which hadbeen under Jordanian administration fortwo decades. It also set off a period ofsoul-searching as to what had gonewrong. The ineptitude of Arab armieswas revealed, and many Arabs felt theirgovernments had failed them. The Pales-tinians, seeking their own state, con-cluded that it was time to take mattersinto their own hands, and some turned toterrorism to gain the world's attention.

Many others in the region concludedthat Israel had won because Jews weremore faithful than they were to their reli-gious tradition. Islam, Muslims believed,had led them to a glorious civilization inthe past, and, if properly followed, coulddo so again. Muslims' disillusionmentwith their leaders went hand in hand witha general disenchantment with the Westand all of its "isms," including liberalism,capitalism, socialism and communism. Intheir search for a guiding ideology, manyrediscovered Islam: it provided a com-prehensive, culturally authentic world-view that was not tainted by associationwith the West.

Some Muslim successes, such as the

EGYPT ALGERIA TUNISIA

Population(millions) 58.3 27.3 8.6

Per CapitaGNP (SU.S.) $620 $2,020 $1,510

Life expectancy(years) 60 66 68

Literacy 45% 52% 62%

Populationgrowth rate 2.3% 2.7% 1.9%

ments and feeling threatened by the ero-sion of traditional values, turn to religionas a source of identity. This has occurredamong Hindus in India, Jews in Israeland Eastern Orthodox Christians in Rus-sia. The process of modernization, whichtook centuries in the West, has been com-pressed in much of the rest of the world,including the Middle East and North Af-rica. "The contemporary Islamic revivalis a special response to the particular con-ditions of the late 20th century and mustbe seen in the context of the conflicts andchallenges of the modern world," accord-ing to Professor John 0. Voll of the Uni-versity of New Hampshire.

Historically, there have been periodiccalls by Muslims for renewal and re-form of the faith. The present revivalhad its roots in the late 18th century,when the Wahhabis, a militant group inthe Arabian peninsula, sought to purifyIslam by going back to its origins, inter-preting the Koran (Quran), consideredthe Word of God, literally and abandon-ing devotional practices not sanctionedby the Prophet Muhammad. In the 19thcentury, Europeans conquered much ofthe Islamic world, and this stimulated aprofound debate among Muslims as tothe reasons for their powerlessness.Many concluded that their political de-cline was rooted in a lack of faith. Theyregarded the time when Muhammad es-tablished a state in 7th-century Arabiaand united religious and political leader-ship as a "Golden Age," and they soughtto recapture it.

In the late 1800s a number of otherreform movements sprang up, led by so-called Islamic modernists. These were laypolitical thinkers, not religious scholars,or ulema, who tried to strengthen the Is-lamic community by emphasizing thecompatibility of Islam with reason andscience. Also at this time the idea of pan-Islam, or a political union of Islamic coun-

_

KEY TO ACRONYMS

FIS: Islamic Salvation Front (Algerian)

FLN: National Liberation Front(Algerian)

MTI: Islamic Tendency Movement(Tunisian)

PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization


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creditable performance by Arab armies intheir war with Israel in 1973 and the as-sociated Arab oil embargo (which causedturmoil in the West), were signs that thefortunes of the Islamic world were on theupswing at last. The Iranian revolution atthe end of the decade appeared to demon-strate that Islamic forces could triumphover those of an impious, autocratic rulerclosely allied with the U.S.

FundamentalistsIslamic fundamentalism is a term that hasbeen loosely applied to the Islamic reli-gious revival, to Islam as a politicalforce, and to terrorism conducted in thename of Islam. The word fundamentalisthas also been used to describe suchwidely dissimilar governments as thoseof Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Libya, whosepeople practice the predominant Sunniform of the Islamic religion. Iran, whosepeople belong to the minority Shiitebranch of the faith, has also been calledfundamentalist.

The word fundamentalism (which hasno equivalent in Arabic) originated as aterm to describe a small group of Ameri-can Protestant evangelicals in the early20th century who rejected liberalism andmodernity. Indeed, "fundamentalism... isone of the responses of organized reli-gion to the unique challenges posed totraditional societies and belief systems bymodernity," according to R. ScottAppleby, associate director of The Fun-damentalism Project of the AmericanAcademy of Arts and Sciences. "[Funda-mentalists] are dedicated, sometimes

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fierce, opponents of the modern world'selevation of human reason, materialgoods and historical processes to thelevel of ultimate meaning and value." Aterm currently in favor among Muslimgroups themselves and used by outsideexperts is Islamist.

Many Islamists would like to see theSharia, or Islamic law, replace Westernlegal codes. This medieval law code,whose main sources are the Koran and thepractices (Sunna) and traditions (Hadith)of the Prophet, however, fails to addressexplicitly a multitude of contemporaryissues. Nevertheless it has been inter-preted, for example, to forbid the paymentof interest on bank accounts and, in SaudiArabia, to ban women from driving. Al-though the Koran prohibits usury, it doesnot call for veiling and seclusion ofwomen. These are practices that arose inthe early Islamic community.

The Islamic revival is manifested in agenuine increase in personal religiosityamong many Muslims. This is evident inthe increased adoption of "Islamic" garb,including beards for men and veiling forwomen, the banning of alcohol and risingmosque attendance. At the same time,there have been mounting protestsagainst Western cultural influence, in-cluding sexually suggestive clothing,magazines and movies. A tendency to re-ject the West and to blame their troubleson Westerners is common among Islam-ists. In the Middle East today, Islam hasmoved from what had for decades ap-peared to be a peripheral position to anundeniably central one.

Sanaa 0 Miles 500

Radical IslamA majority of Islamists seek to changetheir societies peacefully; those who ad-vocate violence are in the minority. Someemploy violence in response to govern-ment repression; when denied electoralvictories, as in Algeria, they may take uparms. Islamic radicals believe that leadersand governments who do not share theirinterpretation of the Sharia are illegiti-mate, and they are obliged to wage holywar (jihad) against them. Such senti-ments, and objections to the spread ofmodern ways in Saudi Arabia, lay behindthe attempted takeover of the GreatMosque in Mecca in November 1979.

Islamic radicals regard the West asseeking to dominate Muslims and see

Israel as an oppressive outpost of colo-nialism. Activists, such as the Hezbollah,or Party of God, in Lebanon (thought tobe behind the bombing of the U.S. Ma-rine barracks in Beirut in October 1983),believe they have a religious duty towage war on infidels and have persis-tently opposed peace with Israel.

Although they attract attention, Islamicradicals are no more typical of most Mus-lims than Provisional Irish RepublicanArmy terrorists are of most Irish Catho-lics. "There is indeed an Islamic revolu-tion occurring in many parts of the Mus-lim world," according to Professor JohnL. Esposito of Georgetown University."However, the most significant and per-vasive revolution is not that of bombs andhostages, but of clinics and schools. It isdominated by social activists (teachers,doctors, lawyers, dentists) and preachers


ISLAM AND POLITICS

rather than warriors. The battle is oftenone of the pen, tongue and heart ratherthan the sword. Radicalism and terrorism,though capturing the headlines, are a verysmall though at times deadly part of a phe-nomenon characterized more by a broad-based religiosocial revolution which hasaffected most Muslim societies."

Islam vs. the WestThe Islamic revival came as a great sur-prise to Western analysts, who had be-lieved that as a nation modernizes therole of religion recedes. It also came as ashock to the regional leadership and theelites, schooled in the West, who did notsee the storm gathering before their eyesand found themselves prime targets. Theoverthrow of the shah of Iran in 1979 bya coalition of forces led by the Shiitecleric, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,provided graphic evidence that a reli-gious resurgence was under way. Thiswas followed by the assassination ofEgyptian President Anwar al-Sadat(1970-81) by a secret organization thatcalled itself Holy War. Partly out of fearthat Iran would export its revolution,most Arab states and the U.S. backedIraq in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. Thewar ended in a stalemate, much to the re-lief of countries that feared an Iranianvictory, and the Iranian revolution hasnot been replicated elsewhere.

After the defeat of Iraq by a UnitedNations coalition in the Persian Gulf warof 1991, the power of Islamic groups(some of which had supported IraqiPresident Saddam Hussein) seemedslight next to the victorious armies of the"moderate" Arab states such as Egypt

and Saudi Arabia. However, the risingpopular demand for participation in thepolitical process has benefited Islamists.With the revolution in communicationstechnology helping to turn the world intoa global village, Middle Easterners areaware of political changes in the nextcountry and the next continent, and theyfeel they are due for a change them-selves. Participation in the political sys-tem is the rallying cry of Islamists andanathema to most governments.

Given the opportunity, most Islamistswill participate in elections, and theyhave already joined parliaments in Jor-dan, Yemen, Kuwait and Lebanon. Is-lamic groups offer the only alternative toautocracy in many Middle Eastern coun-tries where there are no viable secularopposition parties. In Algeria, the IslamicSalvation Front won almost half thevotes cast in parliamentary elections inDecember 1991 and would probablyhave won the runoff elections in January1992, if the military had not canceledthem. In Jordan, on the other hand, Is-lamists were trounced in elections lastNovember.

Some more-secular Middle Easternersbelieve governments should invite Islam-ists to share power so that the impracti-cality of their programs will be revealedand they will be forced to share blame forunpopular pcilicies. This is already hap-pening in Iran. Others are opposed, fear-ing that, if given power, Islamists wouldimpose an intolerant version of theSharia. "I believe freedom should not begiven to the enemies of freedom," saysHussein Amin, a former Egyptian ambas-sador to Algeria.

Islam in North AfricaTHE CONFRONTATION between Islam andthe state is particularly acute in North

Africa. In three case studies, strong simi-larities emerge: deteriorating economicconditions, the increasing politicization ofthe Islamists, and the fierce state response.

EGYPT

Islam vs. the stateThe present confrontation between Is-lamic forces and the Egyptian govern-ment has been building for two decades.After the death of Nasser in 1970, his

successor, Sadat, sought to legitimize hisown rule by appealing to Islam. Hecalled himself "The Believer President"and employed Islamic rhetoric and slo-gans. The 1973 war with Israel was por-trayed as a jihad; the battle cry of theEgyptian troops was Allahu Akbar (GodIs Great). Sadat also allowed the Mus-lim Brotherhood to function openly.Sadat calculated that the Islamic groupshe was cultivating would neutralize theinfluence of the leftists and Nasseriteswho opposed his pro-Western policies.

While Sadat's prestige rose abroad af-


ter the signing of the Camp David ac-cords (1978) and peace treaty with Israel(1979), his support within Egypt was rap-idly crumbling. His policies, which led toan "open-door" economy and a muchgreater U.S. presence, were criticized, aswas his support for the shah of Iran. In1979 he moved to assert greater controlover Islamic institutions, especiallymosques. His suppression of dissent,both religious and secular, led directly tohis assassination on October 6,1981.

The killers belonged to Holy War, anorganization whose members came fromall parts of Egyptian society, includingthe military, university students and radioand television workers. As the name im-plies, they believed they had to wage aHoly War against infidels, among themSadat. Their action was to be a first steptoward imposing Islamic rule in Egypt.

Mubarak: growing discontentIn an attempt to defuse Egyptian angerover poor economic and social condi-tions, Mubarak, the successor to Sadatand current president, gave Islamistsmore freedom to operate. He allowedMuslim Brotherhood supporters to runfor seats in parliament, and they werevery successful in local elections in 1987.While not a legal political party, theynow constitute the largest oppositionbloc. Muslim Brotherhood activists con-trol key professional syndicates, notablythose for lawyers, doctors, engineers andjournalists. They are also influential inthe media and the educational system, aswell as among student groups on cam-puses. The organization criticizes thegovernment for human-rights abuses,corruption and the lack of democracy. Ithas also denounced the violence of themilitants, although some suspect its sin-cerity in doing so.

While tolerating the mainstream Mus-lim Brotherhood, the Egyptian govern-ment has cracked down on the militantIslamic Group, which draws its inspira-tion from Sheik Abdel Rahman (atpresent imprisoned in New York City).

The Islamic Group, originally a stu-dent wing of the Muslim Brotherhood,later broke with it and established a baseof support in upper Egypt, particularly inthe town of Asyut, and in the slumsaround the capital city of Cairo. Thegroup propagates its ideas throughschools, clinics, mosques and the chari-ties it controls. Apart from its politicalagenda, the group provides social ser-

ISLAM AND POLITICSoric7

The U.S. and North AfricaTHE ISSUES CONFRONTING the U.S.how to deal with militantreligious groups, how strongly to encourage democracy,free elections and respect for human rightsapply to

countries both inside and outside the Islamic world. The coun-tries in these case studies, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia, haveeach had a different pattern of relations with the U.S.

U.S. ties with North Africa go back to the earliest days ofthe republic. Harassment of American ships by the corsairs (pi-rate ships) of the Barbary Coast was the original impetus be-hind the formation of the U.S. Navy. It also led to a treaty be-tween the U.S. and Algiers in 1795, under which the U.S.agreed to pay an annual tribute to safeguard its shipping. Simi-lar treaties followed with Tripoli (the capital of present-dayLibya) in 1796 and Tunis (1799). The annual tribute to Algierswas abolished in 1816, and Barbary piracy was suppressed afterjoint action by the European powers in 1819.

For the next 120 years, the U.S. had little reason to get in-volved in North Africa. With Algeria and Tunisia French colo-nies, and Egypt under British tutelage, the U.S. saw no reasonto interfere. Only during World War II, when U.S. troops weresent to help evict Axis forces, did many Americans learn aboutthe area. Not until the French territories reached independencewas there a pressing need to formulate policies toward them.

With the notable exception of Egypt, the U.S. did not haveimportant interests in North Africa during the cold war otherthan to exclude the Soviet Union and secure American lines ofcommunication in the Mediterranean. In the new Middle East,the fact is that Algeria and Tunisia are not particularly impor-tant to the U.S. The same cannot be said of the Islamicmovements.

In the past, U.S. ties with Algeria were coolit was re-garded as a Soviet client, strongly opposed to Israel and a lead-ing anti-imperialist at the UN and in Third World forums. Eco-nomic relations were another matter, however, with the U.S.importing oil and natural gas. Algeria played an important rolein negotiating an end to the Iranian hostage crisis in early 1981,for which the U.S. was grateful. But Algerians always chafed atthe U.S. preference for closer relations with its neighbor and ri-val, the pro-West Morocco.

U.S. relationS with Tunisia have traditionally been warm.The U.S. has provided about a third of independent Tunisia'seconomic and military assistance, although the amount is small(around $1.4 billion in the period 1957-90). Military aid wasaimed at fortifying the country against Libya. Tunisia underBourguiba was pro-West and closely tied to France. In October1985, an Israeli air raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis, Tunisia'scapital, provoked an anti-American outcry. For years the mainU.S. concern was the stability of the government. While thesuccession to Bourguiba was peaceful, social problems have notbeen solved, so Tunisia's future remains in question.

U.S. relations with Egypt, perhaps the most influential Arabcountry and closest U.S. ally in the Middle East, are anothermatter entirely. Ties were tense during the presidency ofNasser, a secular nationalist who promoted pan-Arabism andaccepted Soviet military support. But they blossomed underPresident Sadat, who broke with the Soviets and signed a peacetreaty with Israel. Sadat's assassination contributed to the U.S.perception of a serious "Islamic threat" to its interests in theMiddle East. Egypt has received $35 billion in U.S. financialassistance since 1975.

The U.S. regards President Mubarak as a key force for mod-eration. Many Americans have noted, however, that in order todefuse explosive tensions between the Cairo government andIslamists, Egypt will have to make reforms.

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IN THE CROWD OF IMMIGRANTS BELOW, THE TERRORISTABU BEN FOTWA EL FADWA EL FATINEW IS CARRYING AHUGE E3OMB STRAPPED T01-115 WAIST. CAN YOU FIND ABU?IF YOU CAN DO IT IN UNDER 20 SEC_ONDS,SCORE10Q UNDER 40SECONDS,SCORE 50. ANY LONGER AND YOU ARE DEAD MEAT!

ANSWER "----awciv-eMAITATO*1144,NAVA

78

BY WRIGHT FOR THE PALM BEACH POST


,7 ISLAM AND POLITICS

vices where the government's are lack- month, and some 23% of the population Islamists, who had built their own net-ing: for example, it supplied rapid relief live in absolute poverty, according to the work of private mosques, blamed theafter a major earthquake struck Cairo in United Nations Development Program. secular elite who had governed them for1992. The New York Times, reflecting a corn- a quarter of a century for depriving them

In 1993 the Islamic Group stepped up monly held view, editorialized: "Mr. of the fruits of independence.its struggle with the state. It battled with Mubarak's inbred, bureaucratic and unre-Coptic Christians, an important minority, sponsive regime has lost touch with the Riots and reformsin Asyut, and attacked security officials needs and feelings of large numbers of The government of Col. Chad li Benjedidand cabinet ministers throughout the ordinary Egyptians. The Islamic insur- (1979-92) attempted to impose economiccountry. Nobel Prize winner Naguib gency, fueled by the fiery rhetoric of reforms and introduce limited democrati-Mahfouz, whose novel, The Children ofOur Street, was considered disrespectful

Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and others,has survived repression and grown as

zation. However, the measures employedwere not aggressive enough to make a

of Islam, is reportedly at the top of its much through government incompetence real difference. By 1988, when consumerdeath list. The Islamic Group has also as through fundamentalist fanaticism. subsidies were sharply curtailed, morewarned foreign tourists not to visit Egypt,and several have been killed. As a result,

In January 1993, Mubarak said that hewas trying to spare Egypt the fate of Al-

than a quarter of the work force was un-employed. "By the end of the 1980s there

tourism, Egypt's largest employer and geria. His strategy is evidently to deny was an enormous gap between revolu-foreign-exchange earner, experienced a Islamists a role in the political process. But tionary rhetoric and the oppressive nature30% to 40% drop-off in business in the by lumping all Islamists together, he risks of Algeria's domestic political economicfirst half of 1993. alienating voices for moderation. Muslim order," according to Professor John P.

Brotherhood leaders warn that any crack- Entelis of Fordham University.The crackdown down will only swell the ranks of the mili- The result was major rioting in Octo-By October 1993 over 200 people had tants, something the government wants to ber 1988. Some dubbed this the couscousbeen killed in politically related violence,and the government responded force-

avoid. revolt, a reference to the staple food thenin short supply. The government soon re-

fully, rounding up thousands of suspects. ALGERIA gained control, and Benjedid institutedSince October 1992 militants have been unprecedented changes to permit politicaltried in military courts, ensuring that their Democracy aaborted pluralism. The monopoly of the FLN oncases will be heard rapidly without possi- In Algeria, a French colony from 1830 to senior government and military posts wasbility of appeal or problems with proce- 1962, Islam provided a focus of identity ended. A new constitution of Februarydural rights. Last August, a civilian court distinct from that of the colonizer, espe- 1989 guaranteed freedom of expressionacquitted all those charged with assassi- cially during the bitter war for indepen- and the right to form political associa-nating the speaker of parliament in 1990, dence (1954-62). Afterward, the state tions. In July 1989, a multiparty politicalfinding that some confessions had been embarked on a socialist course under the system was approved that gave the firstobtained by torture. In June 1993, the leadership of the military and the domi- opportunity for the opposition, includingfirst executions of Islamists in a de- nant political party, the National Libera- the Islamists, to demonstrate theircadesince the trial of Sadat's murder- tion Front (FLN), which had led the strength. Algeria briefly became the fre-erstook place. struggle against the French. Under est country in the Arab world.

Many Egyptians disapprove of the Houari Boumediene (1965-78), the stateviolence. After the assassination of a po- had healthy revenues from the sale of oil Rise of the FISlice general in March 1993 in upper and natural gas and was able to provide These riots and reforms presaged the riseEgypt, thousands of mourners attended jobs and economic progress while exert- of a politically powerful Islamic move-his funeral in protest. Some charge that ing close control over society. It moni- ment in Algeria. The Islamic SalvationEgypt's Islamist organizations are just as tored Islamic activities through its Minis- Front (FIS), led by Abbasi Madani, a uni-authoritarian as the government. Accord- try of Religious Affairs, which adminis- versity professor, quickly became theing to sociologist Sami Zubaida, "Far tered an estimated 5,000 mosques. dominant political force in the country.from being popular organizations, the Is- As in Iran, the state acquired the trap- The FIS emphasized the necessity oflamic associations constitute the instru- pings of a modernized nation, but the cul- winning political power so it could insti-ment by which the Islamist current con- tural identity of most Algerians lay in Is- tute Islamic government. Its style wastrols and directs the masses. They do not lam. When oil revenues plunged from populist. "The leaders of the FIS...speakencourage or foster autonomous popular $13 billion per year in 1985 to $8 billion a religious language, but this language isorganization or action, but treat the thereafter, the economy deteriorated and not theologicalit is political, social andmasses as objects of religious reform and discontent mounted. The lack of jobs, sti- economic," according to the Algerian so-control." fling bureaucracy, poor education and ciologist Lahouari Addi. Like the Mus-

Most observers believe that military government control of the media led to lim Brotherhood in Egypt, the FIS car-measures alone will not eradicate the demands for more freedom. ried out social-welfare activities. (It ob-problem. The support for the Islamists As in other Islamic countries, this tained significant funding from Saudiarises from popular frustration with malaise has been increasingly expressed Arabia and the Persian Gulf states, butrigged elections, poor job prospects and a in a return to religion. The Iranian revo- this dried up due to Algerians' supportlow standard of living. The average sal- lution provided a strong source of inspi- for Saddam Hussein during the Persianary of a government employee is $50 a ration for the dispossessed and dispirited. Gulf war.)


ISLAM AND POUTICSTOPIC

7The FIS won a major victory in the

June 1990 municipal and provincial elec-tions, completely overshadowing theFLN. In December 1991 parliamentaryelections, it won 188 seats out of 430.One of the losing candidates, Be laidAbdessalam (a well-known former cabi-net minister), complained afterward, "Iwasn't beaten by a political party, I wasbeaten by God."

The FIS victory represented a massivevote of no confidence in the Benjedidgovernment. It did not necessarily meana majority of Algerians wanted an Is-lamic government. Algeria has a longlegacy of secularism, yet no strong secu-lar party contested the election. In fact,due to low turnout, less than a quarter ofregistered voters actually cast ballots forthe FIS, and, compared to the 1990 elec-tions, the FIS received over a millionfewer votes.

Runoff elections were scheduled forJanuary 1992, with the FIS expected towin a parliamentary majority. However,before they could take place, the militarystepped in and pressured the president toresign, annulled the elections and out-lawed the FIS. Since then, Algeria hasbeen governed by a military-dominatedHigh State Council.

The 'dirty war'What would have happened if the elec-tions had been held and the FIS had woncontrol of parliament? Would it have re-spected the demo-cratic process that .2led it to power? No Aone knows. It isclear that the FISwould have triedto establish theSharia as thesource of law andwould have madesocial equality inemployment andhousing a priority.It would likelyhave imposed "Is-lamic standards"on women to en-sure their mod-esty. Whether itwould have re-spected the rightsof secular Algeri-ans is an openquestion.

Since January

- 'I111111111

1992, the Algerian government has beenlocked in an escalating struggle with theFIS, now transformed into a guerrillaarmy whose strength is estimated at10,000 to 15,000. (Included are some1,000 Algerian veterans of the war inAfghanistan.) The FIS has launchedattacks against security forces, top gov-ernment officials and leading intellectu-als. The government is routinely resort-ing to torture in retaliation. In April 1993,in an admission of defeat, the govern-ment sent 15,000 troops to occupyAlgiers. "This is an increasingly dirtywar, one in which both sides havedecided that normal rules of decencycannot prevail," according to FrancisGhiles of the London Financial Times.

The government is no closer to solv-ing the major social and economic prob-lems that led people to vote against it inthe first place. Much support for the FISnow seems to come from those disgustedwith the government's inability to stimu-late economic growth and restart the po-litical process. Even junior officers in themilitary have collaborated with the Is-lamists in some attacks. "Algerians areincreasingly weary and cynical. There iswidespread despair at the inability andlack of will among the country's leadersto do anything more than remain inpower through force," commented TheMiddle East magazine.

Unlike Iran, where revolution wascarried out in the streets, Algerian Islam-

ists were on the brink of winning powerfairly, only to have it taken away fromthem. By the fall of 1993, the FIS wastorn by internal disputes and accused bythe government of assassinating a num-ber of public figures, including, in Au-gust,. a former prime minister. The FIShas now set up a leadership in exile. Sofar the government has resisted pressureto negotiate with the FIS, and prospectsfor an end to the strife, which has re-sulted in over 2,000 deaths since January1992, are poor.

TUNISIA

Continuing standoffTunisia, like Algeria part of FrenchNorth Africa, was a protectorate from1883 until 1956. After independence, un-der the leadership of President HabibBourguiba, who had led the nationalstruggle against the French, Tunisia de-nied Islamists a role in state policy.Bourguiba governed through a mass or-ganization, the Neo-Destour party (laterrenamed the Destourian Socialist party).After three decades in power and withsocial unrest growing, Bourguiba wasousted in 1987 by Zine al-Abidine BenAli, the current president.

Ben Ali took steps to introduce de-mocracy and permitted Islamists morefreedom, but he did not allow them to runfor office. Like Sadat and Mubarak inEgypt, Ben Ali employed Islamic slogans

and symbols towin Islamist sup-port; he observedRamadan (Islam'sannual month offasting from dawnto sunset), andposters portrayedhim in the whiterobes of a hajji(one who hasmade a pilgrimageto Mecca) duringthe 1989 election.

As in Egyptand Algeria, whensocial discontentmounted in Tuni-sia in the 1980s,Islamic groupsbecame the focusof opposition tothe government.They accused theFrench-speaking

ra-

JANUARY 10, 1992: Tens of thousands gathered for Friday prayers at a mtheir leaders predict an FIS victory in the upcoming election. The necanceled.

80

osque in Algiers to hearxt day the election was


TOPIC


elite, whom Bourguiba had promoted, ofbetraying the country and demanded theimposition of Islamic law. Their leader,Rgshid Ghannoushi, founded the mostimportant of the Islamic groups, the Is-lamic Tendency Movement (MTI) in1981.

Ghannoushi's group started out as asupposedly nonpolitical Koran Preserva-tion Society, but was subsequently trans-formed into a political movement. Draw-ing members from a broad spectrum ofsociety, Ghannoushi addressed their con-cernsnotably jobs, political participa-tion and a rejection of Western culturalimperialism. He took his message tomosques and university campuses, wheremore and more students adopted "Is-lamic" garb.

Ben Ali's accession to power and hiscall for a multiparty system encouragedthe Islamists. However, the success ofMTI supporters running as independentsin the 1989 elections, and the strongshowing of the FIS in Algerian electionsthe following year, frightened the Tunisgovernment. Ben Ali refused to legalizethe MTI (in 1989 it changed its name tothe Renaissance party), which preventedit from participating in elections. Heclaimed that doing so could lead to an Is-lamic state that would not respect therights of secularly oriented Tunisians. Inparticular, it might try to undo the Per-

sonal Status Code, which guaranteedwomen's rights. (The pronouncements ofthe MTI on the subject of democracywere ambiguous; some members clearlyopposed it.)

The government's refusal to permitthe Renaissance party to participateopenly in political life has led to theradicalization of the movement and in-creasingly violent confrontations with thestate. In its crackdown, the governmenthas been accused by Amnesty Interna-tional of abusing human rights, particu-larly those of women whose relativeswere partisans of the Renaissance party.

As in Algeria, hopes of political lib-eralization in Tunisia were raised andthen dashed. Ben Ali has not introducedthe democracy he promised upon takingoffice, and he rules in a dictatorial man-ner like his predecessor. He is expectedto be a candidate in the March 1994presidential elections and has hinted thatthe five legal opposition parties (notincluding the Islamists, who appear tohave popular support) will be allowedto join parliament. As in Egypt and Al-geria, the secular opposition in Tunisiaso far has failed to offer a viable alter-native. As in Egypt, tourism is a keysector of Tunisia's economy, providingsome 20% of foreign revenues, and anyescalation of the unrest would have seri-ous consequences.

The U.S. Islamand North Africa

AFTER THE LANDMARK reconciliationbetween Israel and the PLO last Sep-

tember, Middle East politics, and U.S.foreign policy, will no longer be thesame. Although not a party to the secrettalks that produced the agreement, theU.S. and President Clinton are to be themain guarantors of the most significantregional peace pact since the EgyptianIsraeli peace treaty of 1979. The normal-ization of relations between Israel andneighboring Arab statesJordan, Syriaand Lebanonwhich is expected to fol-low in the near future, would remove asignificant source of tension within theregion.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union

in 1991, the strategic significance of theMiddle Easta long-time rationale forU.S. involvementhas been reduced.Tensions between the U.S. and states thatwere formerly regarded as Soviet clients,such as Algeria and Syria, have dissi-pated. The former Soviet threat, how-ever, has now been replaced in the mindsof many by "Islamic fundamentalism."Although the settlement with the Pales-tinians was reached over the Islamists'objections, it will not necessarily resultin any decline in support for Islam. "TheArab-Israeli conflict did not make theIslamic movement," according toProfessor Richard W. Bulliet of Colum-bia University, "and peace between

Arabs and Israelis will not break it."How to deal with a transnational phe-

nomenon like Islam is causing consterna-tion among policymakers. The U.S. ap-pears to have little leverage on the Mus-lim masses. What can, or should, theU.S. do?

U.S. dilemmasPresident Clinton noted at the UN onSeptember 27 that "the end of the coldwar did not bring us to the millennium ofpeace. Indeed, it simply removed the lidfrom many caldrons of ethnic, religiousand territorial animosity." He might haveadded that some of the most threateningcaldrons are in the Middle East andNorth Africa.

So far the Administration has madefew policy pronouncements regarding theIslamic world. Anthony Lake, the Presi-dent's national security adviser, notedlast September that "we will extend everyexpression of friendship to those of theIslamic faith who abide in peace and tol-erance. But we will provide every resis-tance to militants who distort Islamicdoctrines and seek to expand their influ-ence by force."

The Administration has taken a firmstand against what it terms the "backlashstates," such as Iran and Iraq, that itcharges are likely to sponsor terrorismand trade in weapons of mass destruc-tion. It seeks to isolate them and, if di-rectly threatened, strike back. The U.S.appears to have endorsed the idea, pro-moted by Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia,that Iran and Sudan are the main instiga-tors of Islamic militancy. The role of for-eign support is a complex one to assess,however, since the countries where theIslamists operate have enough internalproblems to account for religiously in-spired unrest.

President Mubarak has claimed thatthe World Trade Center bombing couldhave been avoided had the U.S. listenedto his warnings that Islamic extremistswere operating here. He has also seemedto suggest that the U.S. created a mon-ster when it encouraged fundamentalistMuslims in Afghanistan to take up armsand fight the Soviets. An estimated20,000 to 30,000 Arab volunteers pouredinto Afghanistan, inspired by thoughtsof Holy War. Some 6,000 of them wereinvolved in the fighting that eventuallyforced the Soviets out and contributedto the success of U.S. policy. Now secu-rity officials in Algeria, Tunisia and


ISLAM AND POLITICSOPIC

7Egypt complain that these so-calledAfghans have returned home to stir uptrouble.

U.S. policy optionsThere are three major questions to be ad-dressed by U.S. policymakers as theysearch for a way to deal with Islam andpolitics in three North African nations.

1. Is the Islamic revival a threat toU.S. interests?

Judith Miller, a writer for The NewYork Times, believes the rise of militantIslamic governments "would be a catas-trophe for democrats and Western-minded Arabs in the region." In her view,the Clinton Administration should rejectthe assumption that Islamic forces aredestined to come to power in the MiddleEast, and the U.S. should reaffirm its be-lief in the necessity of keeping temporaland spiritual power separate.

Professor Esposito believes the Is-lamic revival should be regarded more asa challenge to the West's complacencythan as a threat to be feared. He com-ments, "movements are more often moti-vated by objection to specific Westernpolicies than by cultural hostility....U.S.presence and policy, not a genetic hatredfor Americans, is often the primary moti-vating force behind acts against Ameri-can government, business and militaryinterests." He urges that Americans makea greater effort to differentiate betweenIslamic movementsthose that are mod-erate and those that are extremist. "U.S.perception of a monolithic 'Islamicthreat' often contributes to support forrepressive governments in the Muslimworld and thus to the creation of a self-fulfilling prophecy."

2. Should the U.S. continue to sup-port friendly governments if they op-pose free elections and violate humanrights?

Past Administrations have regardedstability and the willingness to work withthe West as the main criteria for regionalallies. Despite the shortcomings of theEgyptian and Saudi Arabian govern-ments, many Americans believe they aremore likely to contribute to stability inthe Middle East than Islamists who, ifgiven power, might impose an intolerant,anti-Western order. On the other hand, ifthe U.S. wants to encourage free elec-tions, it must be prepared to accept theincreasing number of Islamists elected tooffice. By not condemning the overturnof election results in Algeria in 1991, the

as.. t

\1

zs

TANKS PATROL DOWNTOWN ALGIERS in October 1988 after a week of rioting by youths andIslamists protesting declining living standards. President Benjedid responded by planning areferendum on political and economic reforms.

U.S. appeared to side with the forces ofrepression. The U.S. also has not criti-cized the October 1993 referendum (apatently unfair single-candidate contest)which guaranteed President Mubarak an-other six years in power. "So long as theIslamist movements are given no voice inpolitics, there can be no surprise thattheir rhetoric will be shrill and theirstance uncompromising," according toBoston University political scientistAugustus Richard Norton. "In contrast,well-designed strategies of political in-clusion hold great promise for facilitatingessential political change."

Human rights are a concern of the op-position in all Middle Eastern countries,and what they see as U.S. reticence onthis subject leads Islamists to charge thatthe U.S. is employing a double standard.Secretary of State Warren M. Christo-pher has noted that respect for humanrights generally leads to peaceful andstable countries, and he has served noticethat the U.S. would hold countries to auniversal standard. Does this mean thatthe U.S. is prepared to put pressure onEgypt, which has been accused of serioushuman rights violations by internationalwatchdog groups?

3. Should the U.S. attach strings onaid to Egypt (currently running at $2billion per year)?

Should the U.S. insist that the Egyp-tian government eliminate corruption andmake greater economic reforms beforemore money is advanced? Or is Egypt'scontribution to the peace process and re-

gional stability so valuable that economicmismanagement and corruption there canbe tolerated?

Observers are unanimous that the ap-peal of Islamic movements would beblunted if the economic situation in theirrespective countries improved. This willsoon be put to the test in Gaza and theWest Bank, where an infusion of cash,along with a recognized political role,may reduce the appeal of Hamas, a radi-cal Palestinian group that has opposedpeace with Israel.

* * *

Former President Jimmy Carter, who hasbeen deeply involved with Middle Eastpolitics for over a decade, recently com-plained that Americans' "obsession" withIslam is unfair. He told newsmen, "Ithink there is too much of an inclinationin this country to look on Muslims as in-herently terrorist or inherently against theWest. I don't see that when I meet thesepeople." With peace in prospect for theIsraelis and Palestinians, more energyand resources should be released to ad-dress the grievances that have bred mal-aise throughout the Middle East.

Although a religious revival amongmainstream Muslims is likely to con-tinue, the introduction of political andeconomic reforms would help undercutthe rationale for religiously inspired vio-lence against governments throughoutthe region, many of whom have close tiesto the U.S.

GREAT D,ECISIONS 1994

8279

TOPIC


1. Should the U.S. press the Mubarakgovernment harder to introduce demo-cratic reforms and respect human rights?Or should it refrain from criticizing avaluable friend who helped bring aboutthe Israeli-Palestinian settlement?

2. According to Saudi Arabia's KingFand, "the prevailing democratic systemin the world is not suitable for us in thisregion, for our peoples' composition andtraits are different from the traits of thatworld." Do you agree or disagree?

3. Algeria briefly enjoyed a multipartypolitical system. Was the subdued U.S.response to the cancellation of the Alge-rian elections consistent with Americansupport of democracy?

4. Some observers see the rise of mili-tant Islamic groups as a danger to theU.S. Others do not consider the variousIslamic political movements a threat but,they warn, if the U.S. continues to sup-port authoritarian governments, it willend up radicalizing moderates. What areyour views?

5. What accounts for the widespreadsupport Islamist groups have attracted inNorth Africa and elsewhere in theMiddle East? In Egypt and Algeria, con-

frontation between the government andIslamists has recently replaced coopera-tion. Could this have been avoided?What would reverse the trend?

6. Do you think the reconciliation be-tween Israel and the P.L.O. will dampenor stimulate the Islamic resurgence?

7. Author Salman Rushdie has com-plained that if "the mullahs get all theheadlines while progressive, modernizingvoices are treated as minor and mar-ginal... then the fundamentalists are be-ing allowed to set the agenda." Have theviews of the nonviolent majority of Mus-lims been overlooked? Who is to blamefor the stereotype of the Islamic funda-mentalist as a bomb-throwing terrorist?

Appleby, R. Scott, "The Dynamics of Religious Fundamental-ism." Headline Series No. 301. New York, Foreign PolicyAssociation, 1994 (forthcoming). 72 pp. $5.95.

Bulliet, Richard W., "The Future of the Islamic Movement."Foreign Affairs, November/December 1993, pp. 38-44. Theauthor examines the Islamic movement's role in the PLO-Israeli peace process.

Esposito, John L., The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?New York, Oxford University Press, 1992. 243 pp. $9.95.Leading expert explores diversity of the Islamic resurgence andseeks to refute Western notions of a hostile, monolithic Islam.

Hadar, Leon T., "What Green Peril?" and Miller, Judith, "TheChallenge of Radical Islam." Foreign Affairs, Spring 1993, pp.27-56. Two opposing views of the challenges posed by Islamicfundamentalism.

Haddad, Yvonne Y., Voll, John 0., and Esposito, John L., eds.,The Contemporary Islamic Revival: A Critical Survey andBibliography. New York, Greenwood Press, 1991. 230 pp.$55.00. Very useful annotated bibliography. Each editor con-tributes an excellent introductory essay.

Lake, Anthony, "From Containment to Enlargement." U.S.Department of State Dispatch, September 27, 1993, pp. 658-64. Remarks by President Clinton's national security adviser onSeptember 21, 1993, on the Administration's approach to for-eign policy.

Mortimer, Robert A., "Algeria: The Clash between Islam, De-mocracy, and the Military." Current History, January 1993,pp. 37-41. A leading observer reviews the political situation inthe wake of the military takeover of January 1992.

Muslih, Muhammad, and Norton, Augustus Richard, "PoliticalTides in the Arab World." Headline Series No. 296. NewYork, Foreign Policy Association, 1991. 72 pp. $5.95.

Salm* Ghassan, "Islam and the West." Foreign Policy,Spring 1993, pp. 22-37. Discusses vulnerability of Middle Eastgovernments to the Islamist challenge and suggests possibleWestern responses.

Zartman, I. William, and Habeeb, William M., eds., Polity andSociety in Contemporary North Africa. Boulder, Colo.,Westview Press, 1993. 285 pp. $59.50. Overview of the trans-formations in North Africa since independence and current re-ligious, economic, demographic and political trends.

AMERICA-MIDEAST EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING SERVICES, 110017th St., N.W., Washington, DC 20036; (202) 785-0022.

Amideast seeks to increase understanding between the U.S.,the Middle East and North Africa through education, informa-tion and development programs. Experts available to speak.

AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL TRUST, P.O. Box 53062, Washington,DC 20009; (202) 939-6050. A research and educational insti-tution dedicated to issues on the Middle East and North Africa.Publishes Washington Report on Middle East Affairs monthly.

MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE, 1761 N. St., N.W., Washington, DC20036; (202) 785-1141. MEI serves as a resource center pro-viding information on recent developments. Publishes TheMiddle East Journal quarterly.

MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, 1232 N.Cherry Ave., University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721; (602)621-5850. MESA is a nonprofit, nonpartisan membership or-ganization comprised of academics, students and others inter-ested in the Middle East and North Africa.

NATIONAL COUNCIL ON U.S.-ARAB RELATIONS, 1735 I St., N.W.,Suite 515, Washington, DC 20006; (202) 293-0801. PromotesU.S. understanding of Islam and the Arab world through visitsto the region. Offers a wide range of audiovisuals, books,reports, curriculum materials, as well as speakers.


83

OPINION BALLOTSHow to use the Opinion Ballots: For your convenience, there are two copies of each opinion ballot. Please cut out and mail oneballot only. To have your vote counted, please mail ballots by June 30, 1994. Send ballots to:

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, 729 SEVENTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10019

M-11111-11-11MM11111MMI-11111M1-11-MIMI-1110M-11111-MIIIIIM111-1111-111011MIM-111111BWIE111111-101111-1111-M1-.P I 00 TOPIC I TOPIC I0 7 Islam and Politics 1 7 Islam and Politics O

I 1 O

I ISSUE A. In its relations with Egypt, Algeria and Tuni- I ISSUE A. In its relations with Egypt, Algeria and Tuni- Ip sia, the U.S. should give its highest priority to (check one I sia, the U.S. should give its highest priority to (check one 111

only): I only): I

111

Israeli peace process.Israeli peace process. II 1. Supporting governments that back Arab- 1. Supporting governments that back Arab-

2. Promoting free elections. I 2. Promoting free elections.

0 3. Supporting human rights. I 3. Supporting human rights. 0I4. Encouraging economic and social reforms. I 4. Encouraging economic and social reforms. 00 5. Supporting repression of Islamic movements. III 5. Supporting repression of Islamic movements.I6. Other, or comment I 6. Other, or comment I0 I I0 I 0I 1 40 I IIII I 1

I I 01 1 4111 :0

First three digits of your zip code:II First three digits of your zip code:

IDate: / /1994 Ballot continues on reverse side... I Date: / /1994 Ballot continues on reverse side... II

1.1.......................11...........................0I .

I I II TOPIC TOPIC II 8 New World Disorder? I 8 New World Disorder? 0I 1 IIISSUE A. To further the national interest, the U.S. I ISSUE A. To further the national interest, the U.S, 1

II should (choose one): I should (choose one): I0 1 I1 1. Expand NATO to include nations from the I 1. Expand NATO to include nations from the 0O

former Warsaw Pact. I former Warsaw Pact.

I 2. Maintain NATO as it is. I 2. Maintain NATO as it is.

I 3. Withdraw from NATO. I 3. Withdraw from NATO. I1 I II 1 1

1 I 00 I I0 1 U

0 I 11

1 1 4I 1 II 4

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84

OPINION BALLOTS

r III IN - IN III 111811111881111111 MI1111111111111111111 11111 11111 MI WIN III M 111 IN 181-1111 MIN III IN El -.l I 1IISSUE B. With regard to the Islamic revival, do you con- ISSUE B. With regard to the Islamic revival, do you con- !I sider it a threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East? I sider it a threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East? II I I1. Yes. I Cl 1. Yes. II I 0ID 2. No. 10 2. No.111 I II I II I 0I I II I II I II I II I II I I

I 0I I II I 0Il I I

I II I II II I 0F..........................111......................u. !I IlI

IIIIIIIIIl.!I

IiI16......-.1....-.-.1.-...-.-.1.11..................... el

I1

III

IIIIIII

ISSUE B. In East Asia and the Western Pacific, the U.S.should:

YES NO

1. Maintain the present military andnaval posture in the region.

2. Withdraw troops from South Koreaand Japan while maintaining presentnaval posture in the region. 10

3. Reduce present military and navalposture in the region. Cl

4. Negotiate overall arms reductionswith the other powers of the region. 0

ISSUE C. With regard to America's democratic mission,the U.S. should:

YES NO

1. Restore democracy in Haiti. 0 02. Deploy U.S. forces to act as

Peacekeepers under United Nationscommand. U 0

3. Deploy U.S. forces to act aspeacekeepers under U.S. command. 0 U

IIIIIIIII111

IIIIIIIIIIII

ISSUE B. In East Asia and the Western Pacific, the U.S.should:

YES NO

1. Maintain the present military andnaval posture in the region. 0 10

2. Withdraw troops from South Koreaand Japan while maintaining presentnaval posture in the region. U 10

3. Reduce present military and navalposture in the region. 0 U

4. Negotiate overall arms reductionswith the other powers of the region. 0 0

ISSUE C. With regard to America's democratic mission,the U.S. should:

YES NO

1. Restore democracy in Haiti. 0 02. Deploy U.S. forces to act as

peacekeepers under United Nationscommand. U CI

3. Deploy U.S. forces to act aspeacekeepers under U.S. command. 0 0


ESSAY

New world disorder?U.S. in search of a role

10PIC

8

In the post-cold-war world, America's vital interests are likely to remain the stability ofEurope, the balance of power in East Asia and the Western Pacific, and the economicand military security of North America. These interests must be tied to the largerinterest of promoting global growth and equity.

66

by James Chace

T WOULD BE AN

irony of fate ifmy Administra-

tion had to deal chieflywith foreign affairs"sosaid Woodrow Wilson in1913 as he left Princeton,N.J., for his first inaugu-ration in Washington,D.C. President WilliamJefferson Clinton mightwell have echoed thesewords as he boarded theplane from Little Rock,Arkansas, to the WhiteHouse in January 1993.Bedevilled by an endlesswar in the former Yugo-slavia, a humanitarianmission gone sour in Somalia, seemingly intractableauthoritarianism in Haiti and the threatened erosion of the inter-national trading system, the President and his aides spent muchof their first year in office struggling to define U.S. goals.

The cold war, after all, had provided two superpowers withthe means to control vast areas of the globe. It was a bipolarworld that enforced stability within respective spheres of influ-ence. With the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991, however,the simmering conflicts that had never been resolved after thebreakdown of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empiresboiled over.With the further retreat of Russian power, newlyemancipated countries on the periphery of the former SovietUnion came into conflict with one another. In Georgia, in Ar-menia, in Central Asia, ethnic and religious conflict is likely tobe quelled only if Russia asserts a neo-imperial role, and as

JOSEPH FERRIS. 0 1993 BY THE NEW YORK TIMES CO. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION.

1993 drew to a closethat was precisely whatwas happening.

Haiti: setbackfor democracyFor the U.S., tur-

moil was also ragingwithin its own sphereof influence. In Haiti,the unwillingness ofthe military to stepdown and restore thefreely elected populistpresident, Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide,posed a dangerousproblem for an Ameri-can government that

had always preferred stability in the Caribbean-Central Ameri-can region. Even if the Clinton Administration had wanted toleave Haiti to the Haitians, that was not advisable because ofthe likelihood that continued political and economic repressionwould lead to new boatloads of refugees streaming to Floridianshores. In addition, there was a significant Haitian minority inNew York City and Miami, Florida, that would continue topress Washington to reinstate Aristide, by force if necessary.

To this end, the Clinton Administration believed it had anagreement, signed July 3, 1993, with the Haitian military that

TO STIMULATE DISCUSSION and debate, the Foreign Policy Associationinvited James Chace, Henry Luce Professor in Freedom of Inquiry andExpression at Bard College, and editor of World Policy Journal, towrite this essay. The views expressed are those of the author. FPA itselftakes no position on issues of foreign policy.


UNIT 1... TRIMSA 2111IN PROGRESSIN BOSNIA... A WOIN SOMALIA...A 218IN RUSSIA.W..A 214IN 'TI...

NEW WORLD DISORDER?

O TRIBUN

would allow Aristide to return to power; but when an Americantroopship appeared off Port-au-Prince carrying more than 200American "combat engineers and technical advisers" who wereto train and "professionalize" the Haitian military, it wasgreeted by scores of civilians shouting anti-Aristide slogans andbrandishing automatic weapons. In response, the Administra-tion had the ship turn back and found itself once again hopingthat increased economic pressure would bring the military toheel.

Finally, in Somalia, the ostensibly humanitarian mission offeeding a starving populationwhich the departing PresidentGeorge Bush had willed as a dubious legacy to his successorhad turned into a political and military nightmare. Clinton'speople had initially endorsed the policy of United Nations Sec-retary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who had decided thatSomali clan leader, General Mohammed Farah Aidid, should bepursued and punished for killing on June 5, 1993, 24 Pakistanisoldiers who were in Mogadishu as part of the UN peacekeep-ing force. By the fall, Washington was rethinking this policybut had apparently not communicated this to the U.S. com-mander there, who had final approval over the use of U.S.troops as part of the UN mission. On October 3-4, U.S. ArmyRangers found themselves surrounded by about 400 of Aidid'smen. Within hours, television screens were displaying picturesof corpses of American soldiers being dragged through thestreets.

Somalia: U.S. to pull outFor the Clinton Administration, enough was enough. On Oc-

tober 7, the President announced that 15,000 reinforcementswould be sent to Somalia to protect our soldiers, but also thatU.S. military personnel would be withdrawn by March 31,1994. Our motives, he explained, were pure and our hands wereclean. But with no discernible national interest involved,Clinton was finally prepared to seek a political solution to whathad always been a political problem. The tragedy of Somaliaresulted from warring military and political factions; the suffer-ing of the Somalia people did not result from a natural disasterlike a famine but rather from a political disaster. Once Somaliahad ceased to be even remotely important as a staging ground

for cold-war rivalries in East Africa and the U.S. and the SovietUnion had stopped giving aid to its dictator, it disintegrated.But the U.S. had never admitted that what brought us into So-malia probably required nothing less than a neocolonial UNtrusteeship.

Nafta victoryWhile the U.S. may prefer to forsake the use of force in So-

malia, Haiti and the remnants of the Communist empire, Wash-ington nonetheless has no intention of withdrawing from theworld. Clinton's successful campaign to gain congressionalendorsement for an open-trading system through passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) testified to hisinternationalist commitment. But at the end of the first year of anew Administration, it was also apparent that the President hadsignally failed to define America's missionunless it be tocontain chaos and to make the world safe for democracy, fol-lowing once again in the footsteps of President Wilsonor, asnational security adviser Anthony Lake put it when asked todefine what comes to mind when Clinton's foreign policy ismentioned, "pragmatic neo-Wilsonian."

Attitudes, not policiesOn another occasion, Lake spoke of the Administration's

strategy as the "enlargement of the world's free community ofmarket democracies." Such a policy, however, is likely to provequixotic: there are market economies, especially in Asia, thatare not by America's definition democratic, just as there aredemocracies that are committed to a very large measure of cen-tralized control, as in India. Other than Lake's high-mindedneo-Wilsonianism, there was nothing said that would clearlydelineate the central contours of American foreign policy.When Secretary of State Warren Christopher testified before theSenate Foreign Relations Committee on November 4, 1993, heoffered familiar nostrums of the "overarching priorities" ofAmerican foreign policy: "the security of our nation," "theprosperity of our people," and the advancement of "our demo-cratic values."

But these are attitudes not policies. Without even a roughroadmap to lead us safely into a new internationalism thatavoids either a latter-day Pax Americana or an illusionary isola-tionism, the signal absence of an articulated foreign policy canonly contribute to disorder abroad and confusion at home.

National interestsWhat are America's national interests? Are they so diffi-

cult to define for a broad public? To what extent are theylong-standing and to what extent have they changed in a worldwhere the linkages between domestic and foreign policies, asPresident Clinton himself has pointed out, have becomeindivisible?

As most Americans now recognize, the U.S. emerged fromthe cold war geopolitically dominant but economically im-paired. With the 12-nation European Community (EC) politi-cally divided and Japan still in the shadow of its wartime atroci-ties, neither has been able to assume global responsibilities


NEW WORLD DISORDER?TOP!

8commensurate with itseconomic strength; yetwith the disappearanceof the Soviet threat bothhave been increasinglyunwilling to followWashington's everycommand. Without eco-nomic strength to matchits military might, anyAmerican claim to beanything but a militarysuperpower is a hollowone.

American foreignpolicy in the 1990s willtherefore have to chooseits goals and targetsmuch more carefully. Innewspaper columnistWalter Lippmann's defi-nition, it will have tobring into balance, with a fair surplus of power in reserve, thenation's commitments and the nation's capabilities. The U.S.may be the only truly global power at the end of the 20th cen-turybut neither the American people nor their political lead-ers are likely to regard this as an unmixed blessing.

In little more than a decade the U.S. has gone from being acreditor nation to a debtor nation that owes the world almosthalf a trillion dollars. To finance our standard of living weprinted money from 1967 to 1979; from 1980 to the present, weborrowed money, both from abroad, and now increasingly fromourselves. This money has not and does not go into investmentand savings. It finances consumer buying, our VCRs and ourwalking shoes. In 1985 we deliberately drove down the value ofthe dollar in order to get rid of our trade deficit, but we have notsucceeded. What we have to learn is that you cannot repair aneconomy with a weak currency.

So in considering any new foreign policy agenda in defenseof our national interests, we have to keep in mind that the U.S.must first and foremost restore its economy to solvency.America's fiscal deficit$290.3 billion for fiscal year 1992has to be reduced not merely in the short term but also over thelong haul. This the President understands, although his programto do so is modest enough by any standard. Solvency, however,is not only about a balanced budget. It is about means and ends.It is about strengthening the fabric of American society in orderto allow the nation to meet its obligations.

Three prioritiesAbsent the Soviet threat, America's primary national inter-

ests are and are likely to remain (1) the stability of Europe; (2)the balance of power in East Asia and the Western Pacific; and(3) the securityeconomic and militaryof North America.

In the defense of these interests, we can reassure the Europe-ans, both politically and militarily, that we will not permit any

THE WHITE HOUSE

THE HISTORIC RECONCILIATION between the Israelis and the Palestinians, a goal ofDemocratic and Republican Administrations, was marked on September 13, 1993,on the south lawn of the White House. President Clinton looked on as Yitzhak Rabin,prime minister of Israel, and Yasir Arafat, chairman of the Palestine LiberationOrganization, shook hands.

one nation so to domi-nate the Continent as toendanger the generalpeace; we can continueto play a central role asa holder of the balanceof power in East Asiaand the Western Pacific;and we can attempt toextend a free-tradingzone throughout theWestern Hemisphere.

To the extent that theWest depends onMiddle Eastern-PersianGulf oil, we are alsoconcerned that the freeflow of oil be availableat reasonable prices tothe outside world; forthat reason we shouldbe prepared to play a

role in ensuring the stability of the Persian Gulf. And for bothmoral and strategic reasons we remain committed to the secu-rity of Israel, a functioning democracy that shares our basicvalues.

Our commitment to democratic values compels us to dowhat we can to promote democracy abroad, recognizing thatour ability to create democratic regimes is highly circum-scribed. No American foreign policy can be successful over thelong term without such a moral component. But our democraticmission today is not so much a Wilsonian export of democracyas the effort to create the broad conditions under which democ-racy can take hold.

These interests and these strategies, in turn, are tied to alarger goal of global economic growth and equity. To this end,the U.S. can strive to prevent the world from falling into hostiletrading blocs and to ensure that the rules of international tradeand investment will help support the existence of social democ-racy and social peace.

Germany, dominant power in EuropeIn sketching out the contours of the new Europe, which will

now require the integration of the newly emancipated nations ofwhat was once Soviet-controlled Europe, the economic andpolitical weight of Germany inevitably dominates the land-scape. As the great British economist John Maynard Keyneswrote of Germany in 1914: "Round Germany as a central sup-port the rest of the European economic system grouped itself,and on the prosperity and enterprise of Germany, the prosperityof the rest of the Continent mainly depended....The whole ofEurope east of the Rhine thus fell into the German industrialorbit, and its economic life was adjusted accordingly." The Ger-man question is not who will dominate Central Europe, forsurely Germany will do so, but whether the new Europe canaccommodate a unified Germany.


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8 NEW WORLD DISORDER?

The emer-gence of Ger-many as thedominantpower in Eu-rope, coupledwith the disin-tegration of theSoviet em-pirewhilethis is some-

flE NAT° ALL'ES 5gouLDDECIDE Hoy To SAVE

thing to begrateful forwill force theU.S. to rethinkits view of thedirection ofEurope. Wehad expectedthat the ECwould deepen,and that the po-litical unity ofEurope would follow hard upon the single market that was tocome into being on January 1, 1993. We anticipated a Europeancentral bank and a European currency, and eventually a Euro-pean defense mechanism.

Nationalism and political fragmentationInstead, what we see are two parallel movementson the

one hand, increasing economic integration, not only in such in-stitutions as the European single market, but globally, withNafta and newly emerging Asian groupings, and, on the otherhand, growing fragmentation. But in Europe and the formerSoviet Union the forces of fragmentation are nowand arelikely to be for some time to comein the ascendancy. Thepolitical fragmentation in Europe inhibits further political unity;the shift toward market economies by the East European coun-tries and the former Soviet Union puts a further strain on anymovement to deepen the EC and thus to move it forward as theWest European leaders had hoped to do in the late 1980s.

Political fragmentation has followed in the wake of ethnic,cultural, religious and nationalist movements. On the one hand,how can the EC accommodate countries that are in danger ofsplitting apart? On the other hand, how can Europe excludecountries that aim to become like the West, for example Po-land, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia? Moreover,if you exclude countries such as Russia, Ukraine and Belarus,not to mention the Balkans, is there not a greater danger inhaving these countries outside a European polity than withinone?

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Economic integration stallsThe shape of things to come is therefore very different from

what anyone might have imagined a few years ago. The expec-tation that "Europe"the ECwould emerge as a political en-

tity, able to actin concert withthe U.S. andCanada on po-litical and eco-nomic issues,is increasinglyremote. Eventhough almostall the Euro-pean stateshave approvedthe 1992Maastrichttreaty estab-lishing a singlemarket, thelikelihood isthat Europewill not makemuch headwaytoward creat-ing a common

currency, a common central bank, or a common foreign policy.The German Central Bank's insistence on raising interest ratesto attract foreign capital in order to rebuild eastern Germany putpressure on the other members of the European Monetary Sys-tem (EMS), established in 1979, to shore up their own curren-cies. Recession and unemployment followed, and speculatorsforced the weakest of them to expend their foreign reserves tosupport currencies against the all-powerful deutsche mark. Fi-nally, the EMS cracked: London decided it couldn't afford totie the British pound to the German mark, Rome followed suit,and they abandoned the system in the wake of their devaluedcurrencies. A few months later, even France was forced to ex-pend so much of its reserves that the EMS had to be radicallymodified so that to all intents and purposes it no longer fulfilledthe function for which it was designed. German national pur-pose and power took precedence over the political constructionof Europe.

NATO: expensive fiction?As for the Western alliance, its behavior in the light of the

Yugoslav war has demonstrated its irrelevance. It seems likelythat history will record the failure of the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) to respond to the Bosnian conflict withmilitary force as evidence of the demise of an alliance thatlasted for almost half a century. Founded to deter the expansionof the Soviet Union and to shore up the Western economic andpolitical system, the Atlantic alliance was one of the signalachievements of that extraordinarily creative period in Ameri-can history that brought forth the 1944 Bretton Woods, N.H,.conference, which created the International Monetary Fund andthe World Bank, and later the Marshall Plan and the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization.

With the collapse of communism, the task of containing the


NEW WORLD DISORDER?TOPIC

8Soviet Union no longer existed. The new mission, many of usbelieved, would be to transform NATO into a broader organiza-tion that might eventually include the former members of theSoviet military alliance, known as the Warsaw Pact. In this re-spect, a transformed NATO would permit American and Rus-sian troops to remain in Europe, not as occupiers but as guaran-tors of the European order.

The primary purpose of the new security organization wouldbe to preserve the territorial status quo, except where changesare mutually agreed upon by both parties. Borders are notcarved in stone, but the greatest danger that faces post-cold-warEurope is rectification of borders by force rather than by nego-tiation. Aggression by any country against its neighbor couldthen be met with a united reponse from the organization as awhole.

Crisis in Bosnia-HerzegovinaThe expansion of Serbia to include large parts of

Bosnia-Herzegovinaa state whose sovereignty was recog-nized by all the members of NATOwould seem to fulfill therequirements of military intervention in the post-cold-warworld. It did not happen. On the other hand, if NATO's missionis not to contain military conflict across borders, then what roledoes NATO have to play?

The U.S. therefore finds itself in a dilemma. Had it takenunilateral military action in Bosnia, it would have underminedNATO, for it soon became clear that the other members ofNATO were unwilling to intervene militarily to enforce a settle-ment. Even had the Clinton Administration shown more resolvein its policy toward Serbia, rather than merely threatening tobomb Serbian positions and arm the Bosnians, it would nothave moved without at least some allied support. But that sup-port would not have had to entail a NATO action. It could havebeen a traditional coalition, similar to the one President Bushassembled to wage the Persian Gulf war.

Thus, the crisis in Bosnia revealed that NATO is little morethan an expensive fiction. By failing to push our allies into tak-ing concerted NATO ac-tion and by refusing toact unilaterally outsideNATO, Clinton mayhave "saved" NATOwhile at the same timedemonstrating its irrel-evance.

In the light of all this,what is the likely role ofthe U.S. in Europe?

The most self-defeat-ing posture for theClinton Administrationwould be to cling to thestatus quo. With NATOmoribund, security con-cerns are likely to bemet by coalitions that

will vary crisis by crisis. Moreover, if the U.S. remains con-cerned with European stability, as it should, it will have to keepsome bases and troops in Europe for an indefinite period.

In addition, Washington will have to seek allies willing touse arms to preserve borders from being changed by forcerather than negotiation. This could mean, for example, that theU.S., France and Russia would intervene in a Hungarian-Roma-nian conflict over the lost Hungarian lands now part of Roma-nian Transylvania. Even if done under a UN umbrella, it wouldbe a very traditional way of preserving the peace.

In this respect, the end of the 20th century might come toresemble the end of the 19th, and America's connection to aEurope increasingly threatened by authoritarian nationalismwould be frayed and tenuous, endangering European stabilityand America's role in the world.

APEC summitThe Administration believes the Asia-Pacific region to be

the most "lucrative terrain for American exports and jobs," asSecretary Christopher put it on the eve of Clinton's meeting inSeattle, Washington, with the leaders of the 15-member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Within APECare gathered together all of America's and Japan's major Asiantrading partners, including even China, Hong Kong and Tai-wan, representing more than half the world's total gross na-tional product (GNP). In 1992, even without formal ties, U.S.exports to the Pacific area totaled $120 billion, and accountedfor 2.4 million American jobs.

It is an encouraging sign that the U.S. is committed to play-ing a central role in preserving the balance of power in EastAsia and the Western Pacific among the four great powersChina, Japan, Russia and the U.S. In that part of the world,there are no supranational organizations that can help stabilizethe regionno NATO, no EC. The countries are too big andremain in a state of dynamic tension.

While APEC may be useful in encouraging the Asia-Pacificregion to open its markets, the organization is as yet little more

than a forum aimed atfostering market-drivengrowth and liberalizingtrade. But the problemsthat Asian economiespose for the U.S., and,indeed, for other highlyindustrialized econo-mies, is the unwilling-ness of Asians to spendtheir money. Exces-sively high savings actas a brake on the growthof the global economy,and it is no accident thatAmerica undergoescontinuing and risingtrade deficits with bothChina and Japan.

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1111

Chinese and human rightsWith a phenomenal growth rate, China is trying to manage a

transition to a market-driven economy while at the same timekeeping the political lid on. This policy is the conclusion theaging Chinese gerontocracy came to after the 1989 massacre inTiananmen Square. Punishing China for human-rights viola-tionsif it is done unilaterally by the U.S.is unlikely to havea great effect on the Chinese politicial scene, especially whenother countries, particularly Japan, are seeking access to theChinese market. On the other hand, China very much needs theAmerican market, as it continues to enjoy a sizable trade sur-plus with the U.S. At the same time, China is also increasing itsdefense budget, which causes profound uneasiness in Japan andRussia. By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Chinais likely to be the dominant power in Asia.

Relations with JapanJapan, in its turn, has extended its "yen-bloc" to Southeast

Asia and Thailandwhich is reminiscent of the Greater EastAsian Co-Prosperity Sphere Japan tried to construct during WorldWar II. At the same time, American fears of Japan's trade sur-plus of $49 billion a year contribute to anti-Japanese feelings inthe U.S. In fact, on a per capita basis, according to politicaleconomist Masuru Tamamoto, Japan now imports more fromAmerica than the U.S. imports from Japanabout $400 a yearas compared with about $370 a year. The U.S. trade deficit withJapan results in part from the fact that the population of the U.S.is twice that of Japan. Moreover, the Japanese consumer savesmore than does the American, and Americans buy Japanesemanufactured goods that are no longer made in the U.S.faxmachines, camcorders, industrial robots and high-quality luxurycars. In addition, trade imbalances with Japan and other coun-tries are aggravated by U.S. factories moving abroad. What weare now seeing is a relatively new phenomenon: global manufac-turing allows high-tech goods to be produced by low-wage coun-triesMalaysia, Thailand, the Philippines. In any case, it isunlikely that such trade balances can be righted by import quo-tas, local-content requirements or demands for a set percentageof the market. But the Clinton Administration's obsession withthe trade deficit has led it to continue making Japan a scapegoatfor America's economic malaise.

Russia, fearful of losing face in the region, refuses to com-pose its differences with Japan over the islands it seized at theend of World War II. But there is some reason to believe thatPresident Boris Yeltsin will try to do so, if he can without ag-gravating nationalist critics. China, in turn, is wary of Russia'sturmoil as Russia tries to convert to a market-driven economy.

Rx for Pax PacificaAlthough North Korea is not a major power, it nonetheless

poses the most immediate threat to Asian security by refusingto halt its nuclear program. This threatens not only South Koreaand the other nations of the region, but it could also spark Japa-nese rearmament, which would in itself upset the balance ofpower dramatically.

NEW WORLD DISORDER?

For the U.S., the closing of its bases in the Philippines, aswell as its need to reduce the defense budget, requires it to re-think its military posture in the Pacific, even if it does not radi-cally scale down its military and naval deployments in the re-gion. In short, Washington cannot impose a Pax Pacifica, evenif it wants to.

What probably ought to be done, at the very least, is for theU.S. to propose broad arms reductionsincluding nuclearweaponsamong all the powers of the region. Washingtonneed not encourage Japan to arm, as it has done in the past, butto disarm. America should engage China, Russia and theKoreas in this same effort. This means that the U.S. Navy mustalso be prepared to reduce the number of aircraft carrier battlegroups and that the U.S. Army further cut down on the numberof troops in South Korea and the garrisons in Japan. All this,however, must be part of an overall Asian initiative. But theUnited States cannotand should notwithdraw from theregion or the fragile balance of power will be destroyed.

North American concernsWho would deny that the region that should stand at the very

apex of U.S. interestsat any timeis North America. Rela-tions with Canada, whatever the tensions in the past, have neverresulted in open warfare in this century. But the depth of Cana-dian nationalism is often underestimated or ignored in Wash-ington, and the likelihood that Quebec will achieve indepen-dence by the end of the century cannot be discounted.

The U.S. role in the Caribbean/Central American/Mexicanregion has, of course, had a very different history. This has beena traditional U.S. sphere of influence since the 1820s, and whileour behavior toward the nations of this region has been far fromexemplary, the alternative is not withdrawal but wiser policies.

In Central America, at least, U.S. involvement is windingdown. In the future, Central America's economic problems canonly be resolved by sensible economic and fiscal policies of thegovernment involved, coupled with a willingness on our part tolower our trade barriers to its goods. The recourse to Marxisteconomics is probably deadbut the return to authoritarianismis likely, should the economies fail to deliver.

Nafta's impactAs a result of the passage of Nafta, trade barriers between

the U.S. and Mexico will fall. U.S. exports are also likely toincrease, and more exports will mean more jobs. Accordingto one study, from a base year of 1990, the agreement should,over five years, "create approximately 320,000 new jobs inthe U.S. and displace about 150,000 workers, resulting inabout 170,000 net new jobs." The long-term goal, to improvethe Mexican economy so that its workers begin to...earn wagescomparable with those of American and Canadian workers,which in turn should slow illegal emigration and offer aneven greater market for Canadian and U.S. goods, can onlytake place over time. It is a long-term goal, however, andperhaps the strongest argument made in favor of Nafta wasthe fact that a good deal of manufacturing from the north hadalready moved south, and in a global economy there was


NEW WORLD DISORDER?o P I C

8probably no effective way to prevent it. Nafta is also likely tolock in Mexico's market reforms, its new openness to foreigninvestment and foreign imports. Finally, insofar as Nafta maylead to a more prosperous, stable, and ultimately more demo-cratic, Mexico, the overall goals of North American securitywill be fulfilled, and the way will be open to extend the free-trading zone throughout the hemisphere.

Trading blocs and trade warsPerhaps the greatest danger the world faces is not small wars

and unsolvable conflicts, but rather its division into three greattrading blocs: Europe, East Asia and the Western Hemisphere.

Even before the unification of Germany, the EC's GNP wastwo-and-one-half times larger than Japan's. A new Europeanbloc would account for one fourth of the world product. ShouldEurope close its gates, the risks to the U.S. are huge, forAmerica sells one fourth of its products to Europe and has re-cently enjoyed a trade surplus with the EC. In a well-intentioned effort to stabilize Eastern Europe, as political ana-lyst Walter Russell Mead has pointed out, "Western Europe, ledby Germany, could establish something like Napoleon's pro-jected continental system. Eastern Europe and North Africawould supply the raw materials, certain agricultural products,and low-wage industrial labor. Western Europe would providecapital and host the high-value-added and high-tech indus-tries.... A Europe of this kind would inevitably put most of itscapital into its own backyard, and it would close its markets tocompetitors from the rest of the world. It would produce VCRsin Poland, not China; it would buy its wheat from Ukraine,rather than the Dakotas."

As for Japan, by the year 2000, Japan, with less than half thepopulation of the U.S., will likely have a GNP only 15%smaller. In this respect, danger would resultfrom an American determination to shutoutas much as possibleJapanese goodsfrom a North American market.

New challenges, new institutionsTo avoid trade wars and ensure global

prosperity, new international institutions andarrangements are needed to replace or aug-ment the existing international economic andfinancial system that was set up after WorldWar II at Bretton Woods under U.S. leader-ship. For example, we might consider re-viving the idea of an international trade or-ganizationsuggested originally by Keynes.It would do more than focus on lower tar-iffs as the U.S. preferred instrument, theGeneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT), does. GATT never has been ableto resolve questions of how to harmonizedifferences among economic policies or pro-vide rules of the road. A new trade organi-zation would be similar to America's inter-state commerce commission. It would work

to set up common rules for antidumping, subsidies, antitrustmechanisms and intellectual property.

Also needed is a more powerful coordination of internationalmonetary policies. The Bretton Woods institutions were set upwhen the dollar was world currency. But now America nolonger sets the pace of the world economy, which is subject tosudden shifts that threaten international economic stabilty. TheIMF alone is clearly inadequate to meet needs of a globaleconomy.

In search of new directionsDespite the EC's problems in establishing its own central

bank, we should nonetheless proceed to investigate the feasibil-ity of a world central bank to help stabilize currency shifts andthus help promote free trade. To deal with a global recession,for example, no international agency is now capable of strategicplanning and rapid action, and individual nation-states may notbe able to take action on a grand scale. In this respect, the rela-tionship between nation-states and the global economy is com-parable to that between firms and the nation-state.

There may be no single blueprint for the future, but the in-ability of President Clinton and his secretary of state to articu-late a comprehensible hierarchy of U.S. interests may well leadto a directionless America, increasingly embittered as U.S. pur-pose and power erode. There was a time, let us not forget, whenthe international order had to be rebuilt. Dean Acheson andGeneral George Marshall, John Maynard Keynes, Ernest Bevin,Lester Pearson, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, and laterKonrad Adenauer, were determined to remake the system. Theywere all, in Acheson's memorable phrase, present at the cre-ation. It would be a tragedy of world proportions if a new gen-eration were found to be present at the destruction.

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8 NEW WORLD DISORDER?

D1 SSENQUESTEONS

1. Should the U.S. urge NATO to incor-porate Hungary, Poland and the CzechRepublic? How would this affectNATO's mission? What do you thinkMoscow's reaction would be?

2. Do you think that the emergence ofGermany as the dominant power in Eu-rope is likely to be a threat to peace?How will that affect America's role inEurope?

3. If Europe does not make much pro-gress for the rest of the century towardunification, how would this phenomenonaffect America's role in Europe?

4. Do you think a unilateral reduction inour naval and military presence in EastAsia and the Western Pacific will seri-ously inhibit our role as the holder of thebalance of power in that region?

5. Secretary of State Warren Christophersaid in 1993 that "Western Europe is nolonger the dominant area of the world"and that Washington has to get over itsEurocentric view of diplomacy. Do youagree?

6. Do you believe the Clinton Adminis-tration should campaign for human rightsin China? How is this likely to affectAmerica's relationship with this greatpower?

7. If Japan loses confidence in the U.S.as the guarantor of its security, what arelikely to be the consequences for Japa-nese policy?

8. The bipolar world of the cold war,when the U.S. and the Soviet Union werethe only two superpowers, was a rela-tively stable one. Does it seem in retro-spect a more desirable world than the onein which we are now living?

Blumenthal, Sidney, "Why Are We in Somalia?" The NewYorker, October 25, 1993, pp. 48-60. A leading political col-umnist gives his view of the domestic American sources of U.S.involvement in Somalia.

Carr, Caleb, "The Consequences of Somalia." World PolicyJournal, Fall 1993, pp. 1-4. An uncompromising examinationby a military historian of America's alternatives in the Somaliconflict.

Chace, James, The Consequences of the Peace: The New In-ternationalism and American Foreign Policy. New York,Oxford University Press, 1993. 240 pp. $10.95 (paper). Thisshort book provides a sweeping overview of U.S. national inter-ests after the cold war.

Clinton, Bill, "Confronting the Challenges of a BroaderWorld." U.S. Department of State Dispatch, September 27,1993, pp. 649-53. President's address to the UN GeneralAssembly.

Danner, Mark, "Aristide." The New York Review of Books,November 4 and 18, and December 2, 1993. Indispensablebackground articles on the roots of America's Haitian imbro-glio, and an acute study of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, and Schott, Jeffrey J., "Prescription forGrowth." Foreign Policy, Winter 1993-94, pp. 104-14. A first-rate analysis of the advantages of Nafta for the U.S.

Mead, Walter Russell, "An American Grand Strategy." WorldPolicy Journal, Spring 1993, pp. 9-37. A rather unorthodox

foreign policy analyst sets forth his own worldview andAmerica's future global role.

Pfaff, William, The Wrath of Nations. New York, Simon andSchuster, 1993. 256 pp. $22.00. A leading columnist looks atthe turmoil in post-cold-war Europe and the Middle East andsees the waning of liberal internationalism.

Rizopoulos, Nicholas X., "A Third Balkan War?" WorldPolicy Journal, Summer 1993, pp. 1-6. The director of studiesat the Council on Foreign Relations pulls no punches in criticiz-ing the Clinton Administration zigzags in its policy toward theYugoslav war.

Tsurumi, Yoshi, "A Japanese-American Grand Bargain."World Policy Journal, Fall 1993, pp. 45-53. Tsurumi is a pro-fessor of international business who believes that the U.S. mis-represents its economic difficulties with Japan.


OW VCD @g4 Gno OUT Dg@lig,-(D

OPINION B LLOTSVote for the foreign policy of your choice!

You can make your opinions count by filling in a ballot after you read and discusseach topic. If you prefer to wait until you have finished discussing all eight topics, youcan use the ballot envelope that is bound into this book to mail your ballots to theForeign Policy Association.

Either way, please send your ballots no later than the June 30th cutoff date in order tohave your opinions included in the final National Opinion Ballot Report. The BallotReport will be prepared by FPA with the advice of a public opinion analyst and will bepresented to the White House, the Departments of State and Defense, and members ofCongress, as well as the nation's media.

1994 ACTIVITY BOOK...The 1994 edition of the Great Decisions Activity Book hasbeen prepared by Amon A. Diggs. Mr. Diggs has been a high school social studiesteacher for 30 years. A graduate of the University of Illinois with an MS degree fromQueens College (CUNY), he received the University of Chicago's OutstandingTeacher Award in 1990. Designed to be used with the 1994 edition of the GREATDECISIONS briefing book, the Activity Book provides learning objectives, teachingstrategies, decisionmaking exercises, role-playing activities and handouts that can bereproduced for classroom use. (40 pp., $11.95 plus $3.00 for postage and handling,prepaid.)

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TELEVISION...A series of eight half-hour television programs on the 1994 GREATDECISIONS topics is being coproduced with the Georgetown University School ofForeign Service. The series will present different points of view on each of the topicsby recognized experts. Peter F. Krogh, dean of the School of Foreign Service, willanchor the series.

The first program will be made available to public television stations, via satellite, inthe beginning of February. Check your local PBS affiliate or the newspaper for theexact dates and times when the eight programs will be aired. Videotapes of the serieswill be available from FPA in March 1994. (Set of 8 programs-72 VHS cassettes$70.00 plus $5.00 postage and handling, prepaid. Also available, Tape 1, with pro-grams 1-4, and Tape 2, with programs 5-8, for $37.00 each plus $3.00 postage andhandling, prepaid.) Single programs not available.

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GENERAL RESOURCES

Additional resource lists can be found atthe end of each topic, with questions for

discussion and suggested readings.

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH (AEI),

1150 17th St., NW, Washington, D.C. 20036; (202) 862-5800.A private research organization dedicated to "open and com-

petitive private enterprise" and "limited and public-spiritedgovernment." Publications: bimonthly journal, The AmericanEnterprise, and books.

AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, 1501 Cherry St., Phila-delphia, Pa. 19102; (215) 241-7000. Founded in 1917, AFSCcarries out development and education programs worldwide.Publications: bulletins, press releases, pamphlets and booksavailable on most international issues.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL U.S.A., 322 Eighth Ave., New York,N.Y. 10001; (212) 807-8400. Winner of the Nobel PeacePrize, AI works for the release of prisoners of conscience, fairand prompt trials for political prisoners and the end of tortureand executions. Publications include reports on the status of hu-man rights around the globe. For classroom materials, callNational Student Campaign (202) 775-5161.

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, Foreign Policy Studies Program,1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20036-2188;(202) 797-6000. Nonprofit research organization publishesbooks, papers and the quarterly Brookings Review to educatethe public on policy issues.

CENTER FOR TEACHING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, University ofDenver, 2201 S. Gaylord St., Denver, Colo. 80208-0268; (303)871-3106. CTIR offers graduate courses, conducts teacher in-service workshops, publishes curriculum materials, and offersconsultation services. For catalogue of publications, call: (303)871-2164.

CHOICES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY EDUCATION PROJECT, Center forForeign Policy Development, Brown University, Box 1948,Providence, R.I. 02912; (401) 863-3155. The project providescurricula, including reproducible mini-units, for high schooland college teachers on foreign policy issues; the center offersworkshops, institutes and in-service programs for high schoolteachers.

EDUCATORS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, 23 Garden St., Cam-bridge, Mass. 02138; (617) 492-1764. A national educationalorganization offering programs and curricula to help youngpeople become involved in the global society. Publishes text-books and handbooks designed for teachers and students em-phasizing critical thinking, multiple perspectives, nonviolentconflict resolution, decisionmaking and social responsibility.

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NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE SOCIAL STUDIES, 3501 Newark St.,NW, Washington, D.C. 20016-3167; (202) 966-7840. NCSSis a service organization that provides leadership in social stud-ies education; its more than 25,000 members include institu-tions and elementary, secondary and college teachers.

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY, 1101 15th St., N.W.,Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20005; (202) 293-9072. Private,nonprofit organization created to strengthen democratic institu-tions around the world through nongovernmental efforts. Quar-terly Journal of Democracy covers democratic movementsand newly established democracies around the world.

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95

OPINION BALLOT 1993 RESULTS°

TOPIC 1: U.S. IN A NEW WORLDIssue A. The principal international role of the U.S. should be to:

Take the lead in solving international problems. 7%

Work through organizations such as theUN to solve global problems. 79%Participate in solving international problemsonly when they affect Americans directly. 7%

Issue B. The domestic policy priority of the U.S. should be to:(readers were asked to rank the following in order of importance)

Hone its competitive edge in the global economy. 12%

Address social problems (education, health, crime). 31%Stimulate the economy. 25%Reduce the budget deficit. 29%Maintain its military strength. 3%

TOPIC 2: UNITED NATIONS

Issue A. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

The UN should be givenpower by the U.S. andother member states tobe the world policeman.

The UN should haveintervened more strongly,and sooner, in the formerYugoslavia.

The UN should haveintervened more strongly,and sooner, in Somalia.

The U.S. should hold troopsin readiness for use by theUN as peacekeepers.

The U.S. should keeptroops trained and inreadiness for use by theUN in peace-enforcement.

The U.S. should immediatelypay what it owes the UN forpeacekeeping and theregular budget.

If a government is sus-pected of buildingnuclear, chemical or germ-warfare weapons, andrefuses to permit surpriseinspection of the factories,the UN should imposesanctions and, if necessary,take military action. 46% 35%

If human rights are beingseriously violated any-where, resulting in injury ordeath to large numbers ofpeople, the UN should inter-vene whether or not thegovernment asks for help. 33% 38%

AGREE

27% 51% 11% 8%

40% 34% 16% 7%

43% 32% 14% 8%

42% 37% 10% 8%

42% 36% 9% 6%

42% 33% 12% 5%

AGREE WITH DISAGREE WITHRESERVATIONS DISAGREE RESERVATIONS

8% 4%

12% 6%

* Results of 35,800 ballots received as of June 30, 1993, andtabulated by Calculogic Corporation of New York City.

TOPIC 3: GERMANY'S ROLE

Issue A. Concerning the U.S. military commitment to NATO, theU.S. should:

Maintain its commitment to NATO and itspresent force level in Europe. 6%Maintain its commitment to NATO butreduce its force level in Europe. 68%Maintain its commitment to NATO butremove U.S. forces stationed in Europe. 17%Withdraw from NATO and removeU.S. forces stationed in Europe. 3%

Issue B. Concerning economic assistance to Eastern Europe, Rus-sia and the other former Soviet states, the U.S. should:

Increase its share of the burden becauseotherwise Germany and others will gainaccess to their resources and potentiallylucrative markets and the U.S. will lose out. 20%Maintain present levels of assistance and letGermany and others with more direct geographicand cultural ties assume most of the burden. 53%Decrease the current level of economic assistance. 9%

Issue C. Concerning European integration, to the extent that theU.S. has any influence in the matter it should:

Support European integration. 53%Discourage European integration. 2%Neither support nor discourageEuropean integration. 33%.1111

TOPIC 4: CHINA

Issue A. With regard to overall policy toward China, the U.S.should:

Condition future relations on China's endinghuman-rights abuses, eliminating trade barriersand halting sales of nuclear technology.Follow a course of "constructive engagement":continue negotiating with the government whilekeeping lines open to the dissidents.Maintain correct relations with the governmentto secure U.S. interests: leave China's future(including the question of economic and politicalliberalization) to the Chinese.

Issue B. Concerning trade with China, the U.S. should:Renew China's most-favored-nation statusunconditionally. 19%Renew China's most-favored-nation statusbut restrict it to exports produced by privateenterprise, not exports of state-owned industries. 27%Make renewal of China's most-favored-nationstatus conditional on Chinese concessions innontrade areas, for example human rights. 33%Refuse China most-favored-nation status. 3%

Issue C. How serious are the following obstacles to improved U.S.relations with China? (Percent answering "very serious")

China's sale of nuclear and missile technologyand conventional weapons 63%Trade issues, including Chinese "dumping" andtheft of technology 30%Ideological differences 9%Human-rights abuses by China 28%U.S. military sales to Taiwan 13%Differences over Hong Kong's future 12%

16%

47%

29%

96GREAT DECISIONS I 994 93

OPINION BALLOT 1993 RESULTS

TOPIC 5: TRADEIssue A. With regard to the North American free-trade agreementwith Mexico, the U.S. should:

YES NO

Support the agreement unconditionally. 17% 64%Condition support on Mexico'senforcement of environmental laws. 77% 10%

Condition support on Mexico'sprotection of human rights. 59% 20%

Condition support on Mexico'sholding of free, fair elections. 40% 35%

Break off negotiations. 5% 64%

Issue B. What trade policy is in the best interest of the U.S.?AGREE DISAGREE

Redouble efforts to bring multilateralnegotiations to a successful conclusion andproceed cautiously on regional trade agreements. 67% 8%

Give priority to developing a WesternHemisphere free-trade association. 47% 21%

Insist that trading partners "play by the rules,"penalizing those that do not, and negotiate bilateralagreements if necessary to open foreign markets. 64% 11%

Adopt a policy of managed trade, promotingimportant high-technology industries to makethe U.S. more competitive. 55% 16%

TOPIC 7: INDIA AND PAKISTANIssue A. With regard to the development and spread of nuclearweapons by India and Pakistan, the U.S. should:

Increase economic pressure on India and Pakistanand encourage other aid donors to withhold aid. 10%

Instead of relying on economic leverage, whichhas not been effective, promote a regional nuclear-free zone, which would include India and Pakistan. 38%

Acknowledge that it is too late to achieve anuclear freeze and work to rebuild U.S. influencein Pakistan and improve relations with India. 45%

Issue B. How would you rank U.S. policy interests in South Asia?(percentages of first choices)

Restrain nuclear proliferation. 42%

Promote self-determination for Kashmir. 3%

Protect human rights. 10%

Support democratic leaders and policies. 23%

Encourage privatization, trade and investment. 15%

Issue C. If forced to choose between them, which country shouldthe U.S. favor?

India 50%

Pakistan 9%

TOPIC 6: RUSSIA & CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICSIssue A. In its policy toward Russia, the U.S. should:

AGREE WITH DISAGREE WITHAGREE RESERVATIONS DISAGREE RESERVATIONS

Support Russia as the"first among equals" ofthe successor-states of theformer Soviet Union. 31% 47% 11% 4%

Avoid placing primaryemphasis on relations withRussia at the expense of theother successor-states. 29% 38% 19% 5%

Pay attention to other U.S.concerns now that the coldwar is over and let Russiatake care of itself. 8% 17% 24% 37%

Issue B. In its policy toward the Central Asian republics, the U.S.should:

AGREE WI DISAGREE WITHAGREE RESERVATS DISAGREE RESERVATIONS

Cultivate relations byextending economicaid and technical assis-tance to alleviate poverty. 37% 38% 10% 3%

Recognize that its owninfluence is limited andcontinue to provideprimarily technology,training and skills inagriculture and irrigation. 52% 29% 6% 2%

Rely on friends, suchas Turkey, that havecultural and geographicties to the region, topromote U.S. interests. 27% 36% 15% 9%

Make a long-term commit-ment to assisting CentralAsia's development throughdialogue with its governmentsand assistance and exchangeprograms. 42% 33% 9% 3%

TOPIC 8: CHILDREN AT RISKIssue A. To improve the lives of children throughout the world, theU.S. should:

AGREE WITH DISAGREE WITHAGREE RESERVATIONS DISAGREE RESERVATIONS

Ratify the UN Conventionon the Rights of the Child. 66% 22% 4% 4%

Shift international aid prior-ities to increase funding forchild survival and basic needs.53% 32% 7% 3%

Shift bilateral aid priorities inorder to direct more aid tothe neediest countries. 33% 41% 12% 4%

Resume funding for theUN Population Fund. 61% 21% 7% 4%

Restructure the U.S. Agencyfor International Developmentso that its focus is on sustain-able development and transfersecurity assistance programsto the State Department. 44% 29% 7% 5%

Issue B. To improve the lives of children in this country, the U.S.should:

YES NO

Apply the lessons learned from the internationalchild survival program, which emphasizedpreventive health care and mass healtheducation campaigns. 86% 2%

Increase investments in children's health andeducation programs, including Head Startand WIC. 82% 6%

Encourage a partnership between governmentand the private sector to improve children's lives. 79% 6%

Emphasize the role of the family and reducethe role of government. 57% 21%

Note: Percentages reported above may not add up to 100 becausesome participants did not mark particular ballots or volunteeredother responses not tabulated here.


Index to GREAT ECOSIONS Topics (1983-93)

AFRICA'92Africa South of the Sahara: Fresh Winds of Democracy?'89Horn of Africa: Empty Cornucopia?'87South Africa: Apartheid Under Siege'84South Africa: Can U.S. Policies Influence Change?'83Africa South of the Sahara: Poverty, Hunger & Refugees

ASIA'93China: New Reforms, Old Politics?'93India & Pakistan: Collision or Compromise?'91Japanese-U.S. Trade: Harmony or Discord?'90Vietnam, Cambodia and the U.S.: Return Engagement?'89China: Redefining the Revolution'88South Korea: The Future of Democracy'87Pacific Basin: Alliances, Trade & Bases'87Pakistan & Afghanistan: Storm Over Southwest Asia'85The Philippines: What Future for Democracy?'84China & the U.S.: Five Years After Normalization'83Southeast Asia: Asean & Its Communist Neighbors

FORMER SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE'93Russia & the Central Asian Republics: After Independence,

New Directions?'92Breakup of the Soviet Union: U.S. Dilemmas'91Nationalism's Revival: The Soviet Republics and Eastern

Europe'90U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe: End of an Era?'88The Soviet Union: Gorbachev's Reforms'85Soviet Leadership in Transition: What Impact on

Superpower Relations?'84The Soviet Union: Hard Choices for Moscow

& Washington'83U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Arms Race & Coexistence

LATIN AMERICA'92Latin America's New Course: Bridge to Closer U.S. Ties?'91Cuba: What Future for Castro and Communism?'90Nicaragua and El Salvador: War or Peace in Central

America?'89Latin American Debt: Living on Borrowed Time?'88Mexico & the U.S.: Ambivalent Allies'86Democracy in Latin America: Focus on Argentina & Brazil'85Revolutionary Cuba: Toward Accommodation or Conflict?'84Central America, Mexico & the U.S.: Discord Among

Neighbors'83Inter-American Security: Lessons from the South Atlantic

MIDDLE EAST'92Middle East After Desert Storm: As the Dust Settles'91The Middle East: New Frictions, New Alignments'90Palestinian Question: Is There a Solution?'89The Persian Gulf: Reassessing the U.S. Role'88U.S. & the Middle East: Dangerous Drift?'87Egypt & the U.S.: Uneasy Relations'86Israel & the U.S.: Friendship & Discord'85Iran-Iraq War: What Role for the U.S. in Persian Gulf?'84Saudi Arabia & Jordan: Kingdoms at the Crossroads?'83Lebanon: Shattered State in the Middle East

WESTERN EUROPE'93Germany's Role: in Europe? in the Atlantic Alliance?'91The New Europe: What Role for the U.S.?

'86European Community & the U.S.: Friction Among Friends'85Future of the Atlantic Alliance: Unity in Diversity?'83West Germany & the U.S.: What's Wrong With the

Alliance?

DEFENSE AND SECURITY'90Third World Arms Bazaar: Disaster for Sale?'89Arms Agreements: Too Little Too Late, or Too Much Too

Soon?'88Western Europe: Between the Superpowers'87Defense & the Federal Deficit: U.S. Needs, Soviet

Challenges'86`Star Wars' & the Geneva Talks: What Future for Arms

Control?'85U.S. Intelligence: The Role of Undercover Operations'84U.S. Security & World Peace: Allies, Arms & Diplomacy'83Nuclear Proliferation: Who's Next to Get the Bomb?

ECONOMIC ISSUES'93Trade & the Global Economy: Projecting U.S. Interests'90The U.S., Europe and Japan: Global Economy in Transition?'89Farmers, Food & the Global Supermarket'88U.S. Trade & Global Markets: Risks & Opportunities'87Foreign Investment in the U.S.: Selling of America?'86Third World Development: Old Problems, New Strategies?'85Budget Deficit, Trade & the Dollar: Economics of Foreign

Policy'84International Debt Crisis: Borrowers, Banks & the IMF'83Trade & Unemployment: Global Bread-and-Butter Issues

ENVIRONMENT'92Planet Earth: Dying Species, Disappearing Habitats'91Women, Population & the Environment: The Relationships,

the Challenges'90Global Warming & the Environment: Forecast Disaster?'88The Global Environment: Reassessing the Threat

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY'93U.S. in a New World: What Goals? What Priorities?'92U.S. Agenda for the '90s: Domestic Needs, Global Priorities'91Rethinking Foreign Aid: What Kind? How Much? For

Whom?'89Ethics in International Relations: Power & Morality'88U.S. Foreign Policy: Projecting U.S. Influence'87Constitution & Foreign Policy: Role of Law in International

Relations'86How Foreign Policy Is Made: The Case of Central America'85U.S. Intelligence: The Role of Undercover Operations

OTHER CRITICAL ISSUES'93UN: What Role in the New World?'93Children at Risk: Abroad and at Home'92The Refugee Crisis: How Should the U.S. Respond?'92The AIDS Pandemic: Global Scourge, U.S. Challenge'91Media's Role in Shaping Foreign Policy'90United Nations: New Life for an Aging Institution'89International Drug Traffic: An Unwinnable War?'87Dealing With Revolution: Iran, Nicaragua & the Philippines'86International Terrorism: In Search of a Response'86Religion in World Politics: Why the Resurgence?'85Population Growth: Critical North-South Issue?'84International Drug Traffic: Can It Be Stopped?


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Copyright 1994, Foreign Policy Association, 729 Seventh Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10019.

All rights reserved. The materials in this volume may be reproduced for classroom use or other educational purposesat the instance and inspiration of the individual teacher or discussion leader. Other than for such use, no part of thisvolume may be reproduced, stored, or transmitted by any meansmechanical, electronic, or otherwisewithoutwritten permission from the publisher.

Printed in the United States of America

ISBN 0-87124-156-0

105

CONTENTS

Page

Introduction 4

Activity Instructions

Topic 1 Conflict in former Yugoslavia: quest for solutions 5

Topic 2 South Africa: forging a democratic union 9

Topic 3 Environmental crisis in former Soviet bloc: whose problem? who pays? 14

Topic 4 Trade with the Pacific Rim: pressure or cooperation? 18

Topic 5 Defense: redefining U.S. needs and priorities 22

Topic 6 Argentina, Brazil, Chile: democracy and market economics 25

Topic 7 Islam and politics: Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia 29

Topic 8 New world disorder? U.S. in search of a role 32

Handout Mastersheets

Handout #1 Yugoslavia 35

Handout #2 South Africa 36

Handout #3 Environment 37

Handout #4 Pacific Rim 38

Handout #5 U.S. Defense 39

Handout #6 Argentina, Brazil and Chile 40

106

Introduction

As the Clinton Administration reaches the end of itsfirst year in office, political observers and citizensacross the U.S. are evaluating its performance. Therecord of the new President, like that of his predeces-sors, has been examined using a wide range of stan-dards that reflects each reviewer's particular interests,biases or political agenda.

Political pundits and others are also examining therecord of the U.S. performance in the "new worldorder." It has been two years since the collapse of theSoviet Union and the end of the cold-war bipolarworld. Unlike reviews of the presidency, evaluationsof the U.S. role in the world tend to be dispassionate.Discrediting or undermining a president for partisanpurposes because of his conduct of foreign affairs isconsidered unpatriotic. Politics, it is said, ends at thewater's edge. Since World War H, with some notableexceptions such as opposition to the Vietnam War orU.S. policy toward China, support for the conduct ofU.S. foreign affairs has cut across party lines. Almostall Americans want the U.S. to survive and to do wellin the world. They recognize that the U.S. is a militarysuperpower, that it has serious economic problems,that U.S. culture is popular worldwide and that U.S.values and ideals concerning democracy and humanrights are appealing and have evoked positive re-sponses among many peoples.

Creating grist for the current debate about U.S.foreign policy are the disagreement and uncertaintiesabout what role, responsibilities or commitments theU.S. should assume in the post-cold-war world. Thebewildering and unsettling changes since the collapse

4 ACTIVITY BOOK 1994

of the "evil empire" are evident to everyone in theglobal village. What is not clear is where the vitalinterests of the U.S. may lie.

Only when U.S. interests have been defined andmade clear to all can resources be allocated andpolicies formulated to ensure long-term survival andshort-term security in the world.

We believe that the 1994 edition of the GreatDecisions briefing book will help Americans defineand clarify vital U.S. interests in the world. Theturmoil in Yugoslavia and the environmental crisis inthe former Soviet bloc raise important questions abouthumanitarian aid and military intervention. The prob-lematical economic and political developmentsalongwith rising hopes and expectationsin nations such asArgentina, Brazil, Chile and South Africa, along withthe sizeable economic challenges from the PacificRim, present difficult questions for the U.S. withrespect to trade, industrial development, economicassistance, diplomacy and a host of other issues. Thedynamics of a worldwide, often misunderstood Is-lamic revival offer opportunity for new insight andunderstanding of this important global phenomenon.In addition, exploring the needs, priorities and role ofthe U.S. in the face of these and other foreign anddomestic issues in an organized, systematic way canprovide invaluable assistance in achieving an under-standing and an appreciation of the decisions that mustbe made in the coming years.

There is nothing more important for the U.S. than toseek to understand where our vital interests lie and toensure that they are protected.

Amon A. DiggsJanuary 1994

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ACTIVITIES

Conflict in former Yugoslavia:quest for solutions

What common bonds united the Yugoslav federation? What eth-nic, economic and political differences divided the country?

What led to Yugoslavia's breakup? Could similar circumstancesoccur elsewhere?

Should the U.S. intervene and try to end the conflict?

ARTICLE SUMMARY

THE complexity of the Yugoslav conflict has pro-duced confusion in U.S. foreign policy. Ameri-

can response has swung between moral outrage at the"humanitarian nightmare" of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a reluctance to become involvedmilitarily because U.S. national interests were not atstake. This ambivalence has inhibited the formulationof policy and led to the failure of even humanitarianactions.

The causes of the conflict, the author writes, havemore to do with the attempts to transform a socialistcountry into a market-oriented democracy and toincorporate it into Europe than they do with the ethnicand cultural makeup of former Yugoslavia. The wartherefore has forced the U.S. and Europe to confronttheir own disagreements and national competitionover economic and security relations in a post-cold-war world. Western attempts to mediate, based on oldthinking and instruments inappropriate to the conflict,have escalated the process of disintegration. Lackingare procedures and instruments to address conflictsover the principle of self-determination and over bor-ders within Europe, and national interests have pre-dominated over multilateral cooperation in Westernpolicies. In Yugoslavia, the forces for further disinte-gration and war are stronger than those for an end to thefighting or for its containment.

ACTIVITY ONE

OverviewIf today the world faces problems that are not some-how displayed in the tragedy unfolding in Yugoslavia,it would be difficult to imagine what they would be.Yugoslavia is a sobering example of the fragility of thepost-cold-war world and the relationships betweenpolitical, military and economic development; ethnic,social and occupational groups; and religious andnational communities. Yugoslavia was created by theGreat Powers after World War I. It was buffeted byworldwide depression, a multinational military occu-pation during World War II and a struggle to maintainneutrality during the cold war that followed.

Now the Yugoslav federation has disintegrated.Issues such as democratization, federalism, economicreform and the role ofgovernment in society have beensuperseded by arms sales, bombardments, "ethniccleansing," lawlessness and brigandry, military cam-paigns and political chicanery. The Western powers,including the U.S., have vacillated between concernand indifference, lacking the will, the means and theexperience to halt the disintegration.

The situation in Yugoslavia is complex. Federalistsin the former Yugoslavia had sought unsuccessfully tostrengthen democracy and liberalize the economythrough the national government in Belgrade. How-

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ever, Yugoslavia was in reality six nations in onefederal state, and opposition to federalism arose, basedon social class, ethnicity, personal wealth and eco-nomic or occupational status. Internally, the formerYugoslav republics are beset with overwhelming po-litical, military, economic and social problems. Move-ments espousing nationalism, political or militaryadventurism or the redress of old or new grievanceshave proliferated. Clashes between factions that cham-pion various public and private interests have broughtwar, destruction and death. Various external groups,including northern Europeans, Germans, Austrians,Russians, Hungarians, Albanians, Islamists, Italians,Greeks and others, are involved in promoting theirown agendas, and for the most part they have wors-ened the situation.

What are the basic causes of violence and divisionin this land? How have ethnic, religious, social andeconomic differences contributed to the breakup ofthis country? What consequences will the continuedstrife have? How do these events mirror issues andproblems in other parts of the world?

ObjectivesUpon completion, participants will be able to:

1. Describe the forces that divide and create de-struction in the former country of Yugoslavia.

2. Explain what will be required to bring peaceand stability to the region.

3. Compare problems and issues that have af-fected Yugoslavia with similar problems andissues elsewhere.

Materials"Handout on Yugoslavia" (page 35), chalk, chalk-board

TimeApproximately 45 minutes

ProcedureBegin the discussion by asking the participants todescribe the difficult problems the U.S. has facedrecently as a result of the Rodney King and ReginaldDenny incidents in Los Angeles. Ask for the partici-pants' reactions to Rodney King's widely quotedquery: "Can't we get along?" Ask whether or not they

believe that Americans are divided because ofracial orethnic tensions or other similar matters. Ask them todescribe aspects of American society that they believecause people to be united and to compare them withthose aspects of American society that cause them tobe divided. List the main points in two separate col-umns on the chalkboard labeled "U.S. Unity" and"U.S. Division." Ask participants to predict, on thebasis of what they have presented, if they believe thatthe U.S. could break up sometime in the near future.

Turn the discussion to the new Balkan states (for-merly Yugoslavia). Briefly describe the backgroundand history of the former Yugoslavia, including ageneral description of its cultural legacies and tradi-tions. Point out the highlights of its 20th century history.

Then divide the participants into four groups, ex-plaining to them that they are going to concentrate onfour states, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovinaand Yugoslavia. Assign each group a state, distributethe "Handout on Yugoslavia," and ask them to worktogether within their respective group to produce anup-to-date assessment of the situation in the state theyrepresent. Ask them to note the most serious condi-tions and problems at the present time, and ask them torecommend short-term measures that would providestability and alleviate the problems. Give them ap-proximately 10 minutes to complete this work.

Call them back together and ask each of them tosummarize the situation in their designated state. Out-line their findings on the chalkboard. After all four stateshave been described, ask them to compare conditionsand to assess which situations are the most difficult. Askthem to specify the problems in their state that areconnected with problems or issues in the other states.Get them to work together toward solving what theyconsider the major problems within each state by sug-gesting comprehensive, cooperative efforts and solu-tions. Ask them to suggest what resources would haveto be deployed to ensure a successful outcome.

End the discussion by asking if they believe thatwhat happened in Yugoslavia could happen elsewherein the world. Turn their attention to the notes on thechalkboard about unity and division in the U.S. Askthem to compare Yugoslavia and the U.S., and askthem if they believe the situations are similar. Askthem if what happened to Yugoslavia could happen tothe U.S. in their lifetimes. Ask them to state briefly thereasons they believe this could or could not happen.


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ACTIVITY TWO

OverviewAnyone seeking evidence that the U.S. and its NATOallies have not developed a cogent plan to deal withdifficult international issues in the post-cold-war eraneed look no further than the continuing tragedy inwhat was formerly Yugoslavia. Successor states tothat country have been ensnared in recurrent waves ofhatred, violence and nihilism as the U.S. and its friendshave displayed timidity and inconsistency in theirapproach to the problem. Neutral during the cold war,Yugoslavia was neither part of the Soviet bloc nor thefree world but was courted by both. Today, fewEuropeans or Americans seem to be sure of how tograpple with the situation there.

Furthermore, the violence and ethnic strife in formerYugoslavia threaten to spill over its borders. Therehave been serious delays and setbacks in democraticdevelopment and economic reforms in Hungary, Bul-garia, Romania and Albania. The increasing pressuresgenerated by floods of refugees have heightened ten-sion and conflict both within and among neighboringcountries. Economic damage has also been substan-tial. Added to the burdens of the refugee problem arebillions of dollars lost in regional trade, staggeringunemployment and the disruption of overland trans-portation between Europe and the Middle East. Thecost of building new routes around Yugoslavia will beconsiderable. Meanwhile, arms sales have helped re-juvenate military industries and slowed the post-cold-war conversion to other economic pursuits.

The U.S. finds itself in a particular dilemma. Uncer-tain of its role, the world's only military superpowerand the "winner" of the cold war promotes democracy,self-determination and human rights around the world.It is weighing the future of the NATO alliance and theeconomic and political development of Europe. TheClinton Administration has sought to cut back militaryspending in order to concentrate on domestic issuessuch as economic revitalization, health and educa-tional reform, racial divisiveness, urban decay, etc.

What role should the U.S. play in the continuingcrisis in Yugoslavia? What ideas or strategies shouldthe U.S. pursue for the area? How will U.S. action orinaction affect its relationship with Europe and thepromotion of its foreign policy goals in the world?How will the crisis in Yugoslavia affect U.S. domesticpriorities?


1. Discuss and compare the advantages and disad-vantages of U.S. efforts to intervene in thecrisis in Yugoslavia.

2. Assess and determine the role other nations andinternational organizations play in the conflict.

3. Describe the possible effect U.S. action inYugoslavia would have on American leader-ship in Europe.

4. Discuss the impact U.S. policy in Yugoslaviawill have on American domestic concerns andpriorities.

MaterialsChalk, chalkboard


ProcedureBegin the discussion by briefly outlining the seriousproblems that exist in the former Yugoslavia. Askparticipants what specific actions should be taken tobring immediate pressure to bear in order to resolvethese problems. List these actions on the chalkboard.

Write the following on the chalkboard: "Europe(NATO)," "U.S.," "United Nations." Ask participantsto develop a possible scenario in which one or more oftheseor any other national or international public orprivate entity, alone or in combinationcould suc-cessfully carry out the actions suggested by the groupto end the crisis in Yugoslavia. Ask them why this hasnot taken place before and what the U.S. could orshould do in order for this to occur. Describe the basicprinciples that the U.S. stands for in the worlddemocracy, self-determination and human rightsand ask them why they believe these principles wouldor would not make it possible for the U.S. to play asignificant role in trying to resolve the conflicts inYugoslavia. Ask them to agree on which principles orconcepts they believe apply to U.S. involvement ornoninvolvement in the struggle.

End the discussion by asking them what they be-lieve will happen if something is not done about thesituation in Yugoslavia and how they think this will

ACTIVITY BOOK 1994 7

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affect the conduct of U.S. foreign policy in Europe andthroughout the world.

Ask the participants what dangers the U.S. may faceif it decides to play a role in the tragedy and how U.S.actions would affect its relations with Europe and the

United Nations. Ask them what they believe will bethe economic, political and military price the U.S. mayhave to pay in order to play a significant role. Ask themif such expenditures arc worthwhile given the domes-tic needs and other U.S. international commitmentsand priorities.

GLOSSARY

Balkans. The Balkan Peninsula is a large, ethnically diverse

region in southeastern Europe consisting of all or parts ofAlbania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey and the former

Yugoslavia. This volatile mix of peoples and cultures in the

region has produced numerous intrastate and border conflicts,which continue up to the present time.

federalism. A system of government in which sovereignty is

divided between a central authority and component state au-

thorities. The central government most often handles the con-

cerns of the people as a whole, including foreign affairs,defense and commerce; the local entities retain other powers.

Geneva Conventions. Series of treaties signed (1864-1949) in

Geneva, Switzerland, that provide for the humane treatment of

combatants and civilians in wartime.

Great Powers. The victorious allies of World War IBritain,France, Italy and the U.S.

Habsburg dynasty. The ruling house of Austria from 1282 to

1918. It controlled large parts of Europe during its reign. In1867 the Habsburg empire was reorganized into the Austro-

Hungarian Empire, which was dissolved at the end of WorldWar I. Part of the former empire became Yugoslavia.

market economy. An economic system that relies on freecompetition, profit incentives and the principle of supply and

demand to determine which goods to produce, how to produce

them, and who will receive them once they have been pro-duced.

nation-state. A country that consists of people who are con-

scious of their common historical and cultural background and

who wish to perpetuate it within the framework of a state.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Military alli-ance created in 1949 linking the U.S., Canada, Belgium,Britain, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Den-

mark, Iceland, Italy and Portugal. Greece, Spain, Turkey and

Germany were subsequently admitted to the alliance. It wascreated to defend the North Atlantic allies against potentialCommunist aggression.

Ottoman dynasty. An Islamic empire based in Istanbul that was

ruled by the Ottoman Turks from 1300 to 1922. At their height

in the 16th and 17th centuries, the Ottomans ruled over an area

stretching from Algeria to the Persian Gulf and from Hungary

to Yemen.

Venetian dynasty. Rulers of this island-city came to dominate

the Adriatic region in the 9th century as a leading seapower.The zenith of the empire was reached in the 15th century when

it served as a link between Europe and Asia. It fell in 1797 to

Napoleon I who delivered Venice to Austrian rule.

Versailles. The site in France where the most important of the

five peace treaties ending World War Ithe Treaty ofVersailleswas signed. The victorious Great Powers forceddefeated Germany to admit war guilt and to accept limitations

on its rearmament. Germany also had to pay war reparations

and give up certain territories. The League of Nations, theforerunner of the United Nations, was also established underthis treaty.


South Africa:forging a democratic union

What are the aftereffects of apartheid and what problems do theycreate for South Africa's leaders?

Can a new multiracial government heal old wounds?

What stakes does the U.S. have in South Africa's democratictransition?

ARTICLE SUMMARY

SOUTH AFRICA has passed a point of no return. Theold system of apartheid is gone and the first all-

inclusive elections will be held on April 27, 1994.From its inception in 1948, advocates of apartheidstrove systematically to separate the majority blackpopulation from the minority white population. Inter-nal opposition to this system followed. The govern-ment banned the African National Congress and jailedits leaders, including Nelson Mandela, but the opposi-tion to apartheid continued to grow and led to violentconfrontations in the black townships. The outragedinternational community imposed economic sanctions,and foreign businesses divested themselves of theirholdings in. South Africa. In 1989 the situation came toa head. A new president, F.W. de Klerk, announcedplans to dismantle gradually the apartheid system.Mandela and de Klerk are currently members of atransitional government charged with finalizing a newconstitution with a bill of rights and addressingapartheid's legacya divided country, a stagnanteconomy and a largely unemployed majority. TheU.S. has declared its commitment to helping SouthAfrica make this transition. But what form should thathelp take? What are the best policies? The decisionsmade now may have profound effects on South Africa'sfuture.

ACTIVITY ONE

OverviewA nation long regarded as a pariah state by the interna-tional community, South Africa is no longer shunnedbut is being observed with amazement, excitement andapprehension as it moves through the last decade of the20th century. For many years the government of thismultiracial society used tyranny to uphold race as thedefining criterion for political, economic and socialwell-being. It has now embarked upon a course that notonly has put an end to legal apartheid and invited fullpolitical participation by the nonwhite majority, butalso seeks to eliminate the results of powerful traditionsof racism, violence, tyranny and economic exploitationthat were inspired and sanctioned by the whites-onlySouth African government and that still have a cripplingeffect on many aspects of South African life today.

The history of South Africa is replete with racialand ethnic unrest. In addition to struggles and conflictover language and culture, there have been violentrivalries concerning land, cattle and mineral rights aswell as political and economic power. The victory ofthe Nationalist party in 1948 enabled the Afrikaners tocodify and expand previous forms of discrimination toall aspects of life in order to deny political and eco-nomic equality to blacks. Separated from the land,


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restricted in movement, denied the right to protest ororganize and subjected to divide-and-rule tactics en-forced by state tyranny, blacks organized and foughtback through political activism and armed struggle.

International condemnation, economic sanctionsand U.S.-led divestment, coupled with increasing stateand individual violence and opposition from SouthAfrican whites and blacks, eventually brought an endto apartheid. South Africa is now attempting to rebuildand restructure its economy and society. Can SouthAfrica overcome its tumultuous past and become anopen, democratic, multiracial nation? What immedi-ate steps can be taken to ensure a successful transition?How can needs such as housing, education, job train-ing and health be managed in an uncertain period oftransition for the black majority? What role, if any,should the U.S. and the world play in these efforts?


1. Identify social, economic and political prob-lems that have developed as a result of thepolicy of apartheid in South Africa.

2. Explain the challenges South Africa faces as itattempts to reform and restructure the govern-ment.

3. Discuss and assess the role the internationalcommunity should play in order to assist thereform process.

MaterialsChalkboard, chalk


ProceduresAfter briefly describing apartheid, ask the participantsto speculate on how successful they believe SouthAfricans will be in reforming, restructuring and de-mocratizing their society. Ask them to list the mostdifficult problems they believe the country must over-come in order to be successful. Make sure they explainwhy they choose the problems they do. List all prob-lems on the chalkboard and, after the list is completed,

ask them to rank these problems from the most to theleast difficult to solve.

Divide the participants into the following groups:National party, Afrikaner Resistance Movement, Af-rican National Congress and the Inkatha Freedomparty. Ask them to develop specific positions andspecific proposals or demands concerning how thegroup would like to deal with the problems listed onthe chalkboard. Bring the groups together and, undercolumns on the chalkboard labeled "National Party,""Afrikaner Resistance Movement," "African NationalCongress" and "Inkatha Freedom Party," have eachpresent its ideas and demands. After the suggestionshave been summarized on the chalkboard, get them tocompare and contrast the ideas and approaches to eachproblem. Ask them to try to work out a consensus orcompromise on their goals. Ask them to determinewhether or not the issues, ideas and difficulties sug-gested are primarily political, social or economic innature. Ask them what help, if any, they might seekfrom outsiders, such as the U.S., multilateral organiza-tions or any other groups or individuals in order to helpresolve these issues. Get them to speculate as towhether or not outside help might be forthcoming andthe reasons why.

Review their progress in attempting to resolvedifferences over these issues. Ask participants what, ifany, patterns or principles could be used as a generalstatement of the difficulties connected with this pro-cess. Then turn back to their original ranking of theproblems. Ask them whether they still hold to the sameorder of difficulties and to explain the reasons whythey may or may not have changed their minds.

End the discussion by comparing what they havedone with what must be done in South Africa. Askthem if they understand why so many people in and outof South Africa are deeply concerned about the chancesfor success and the reasons why they believe there willor will not be progress toward the creation of a demo-cratic, multiracial society in that country.

ACTIVITY TWO

OverviewThe recent announcement that the 1993 Nobel Prizefor Peace has been jointly awarded to Prime MinisterF.W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela of South Africa


ACTIVITY BOOKTOPIC

stands out as another remarkable moment for a worldthat has recently witnessed one incredible change afteranother. South Africa is swiftly moving away frombeing a rigid, brutally segregated, whites-only societytoward becoming an open, integrated, multiracial demo-cratic society, and no one inside or outside this countryis quite certain, despite ambitious goals and objec-tives, what will happen. Violence, division, distrust,economic stagnation, extremism, ignorance and his-torical traditions cast a pall over hopes and dreams forSouth Africa's future.

The future of South Africa is important to the U.S.for several reasons. In the first place, the U.S. hasrecently shown a renewed commitment to democracyand self-determination in the world. South Africaoffers a dramatic opportunity to determine if people ofdifferent racial or ethnic backgrounds can live inpeace, harmony and equality in spite of a deeplytroubled past and profound social and economic prob-lems in the present. Many feel that the U.S., as theforeign country that contributed most to ending apart-heid, has a special obligation to assist in South Africa'stransition to democracy and economic stability. SouthAfrica's uncertain future may have a serious effect onracial politics in the U.S., especially in foreign affairs.African-Americans feel a special tie to events thereand were influential in pressuring the U.S. govern-ment to sanction South Africa. Future U.S. efforts,whether they succeed or fail, will be felt across theracial divide. In addition, the U.S., having emergedfrom a long period of severe legal and social segrega-tion only about 30 years ago, finds itself facing chal-lenges at home that are similar to those of SouthAfrica. While not as pronounced as conditions inSouth Africa, division, distrust, extremism, violence,ignorance and some historical traditions have contrib-uted to impediments to multiracial and multiethnicintegration and democratic progress here. As in SouthAfrica, economic stagnation has exacerbated theseproblems and has prompted warnings that the U.S. isheaded for serious social disintegration and unrest.Should we compare South Africa and its problems tosimilar problems in the U.S.? What differences existbetween the two? What can the U.S. do to help SouthAfrica move toward multiracial democracy? Whatroleif anyshould the U.S. play in such a transi-tion? How will U.S. actions in South Africa affect theU.S. position in the world? at home?


1. Describe and compare the problems and chal-lenges South Africa, the U.S. and other multi-racial, multiethnic societies face in attemptingto manage democratic reform.

2. Explain why the U.S. has a special stake inevents unfolding in South Africa.

3. Discuss which important principles and valueswill ensure that U.S. interests in democracy andself-determination can be sustained in the worldand at home.

Materials"Handout on South Africa" (page 36), chalkboard,chalk


ProceduresBegin the discussion by quoting from a famous speechby Dr. Martin Luther King: "I have a dream...a dreamdeeply rooted in the American dream." Ask the par-ticipants why this speech is famous and when it wasdelivered. Ask them what they believe constitutes theAmerican dream and why they believe African-Ameri-cans were willing to march on Washington, D.C., toprotest their treatment and denial of access to theAmerican dream in American society.

Ask the group to compare conditions in the U.S. in1963 to conditions in South Africa today.

Distribute the "Handout on South Africa" to theparticipants and give them about 10 minutes to com-plete it. When they have finished, open the discussionby asking them to compare the definition of U.S.segregation with that of apartheid in South Africa. Askthem to describe major differences between the two interms of demographics, social conditions, governmentpolicies and actions, and recent history. Ask them tocompare the steps being taken to bring about reformsin the two societies. Get them to determine whether ornot the U.S. has or should have a special role ininfluencing an end to apartheid in South Africa be-cause of its democratic principles, its prominence in

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the world and its racial problems. Ask them whateffect, if any, developments in South Africa will haveon U.S. racial problems and what influence, if any,U.S. racial problems will have on developments inSouth Africa.

Turn the discussion to recently published literatureand commentary that have stated that the U.S., despitethe elimination of legal and many social barriers to

racial integration, is a society that is dividing more andmore along racial and ethnic lines. Ask them if theybelieve this to be true and, if so, what conditions havecontributed to this development. Ask them what needsto be done to arrest this trend in order to avoid racialand ethnic conflicts and social disintegration. Askthem what they think this may or may not mean for thechances for far-reaching and difficult reforms andchanges that are planned for South Africa.

GLOSSARY

African National Congress (ANC). Created in 1909 to oppose

peacefully South African racial policies, the ANC turned to

militant opposition in 1960 after sustaining repeated, oftenviolent, attacks by the government. The South African govern-

ment banned the ANC in 1960.

Agency for International Development (AID). Established in

1961 under the U.S. State Department to coordinate nonmili-

tary assistance to developing nations. The Agency for Interna-

tional Development gives priority to programs in agriculture,

health, population planning, education and the environment.

British Commonwealth. A voluntary coalition of Britain,associated states and certain sovereign states that were former

dependencies. Founded in 1931, its purpose is consultation and

cooperation. No collective decisions are binding on members

and they may withdraw at any time. The British monarch isrecognized as the symbolic head and, while the commonwealth

states are linked economically, preferential tariffs were aban-

doned when Britain joined the Common Market in 1973.

Dutch East India Company. This company was chartered by

the States-General of the Netherlands in 1602 and granted a

monopoly on Dutch trade east of the Cape of Good Hope and

west of the Strait of Magellan. It subdued local rulers and drove

out competition to dominate trade. Its possessions became part

of the Dutch empire in the Far East in 1798.

Economic sanctions. Economic restraints imposed by outside

powers seeking to pressure a country, without using force, to

change its policies. Sanctions include embargoes, tariffs, quo-

tas and denial of credit.

far right. A political position favoring authoritarian rule. For

example, far-right governments often demand popular alle-giance to one leader who derives his or her power from themilitary.

Freedom Charter. This 1955 political platform of the African

National Congress (ANC) announced the goal of a democratic

state based on the will of the people, with no distinctions based

on color, race, sex or belief. It demanded that members of all

races be given the right to vote and to run for office.

gerrymandering. The practice of drawing the boundaries ofdistricts in such a way that a particular political party has anadvantage in elections.

infrastructure. The foundation on which a nation's economy,

including agriculture, trade and industry, dependsfor ex-ample, roads, railroads, ports and power facilities.

labor-intensive agriculture. Farming that relies primarily on

human labor rather than mechanical, technological or scien-tific methods to produce crops.

miscegenation. A mixture of races by inbreeding; or marriage

or cohabitation between members of different races.

Napoleon I. Emperor of France and commander of Frencharmies (1804-14). He is widely regarded as one of the greatest

conquerors of all times.

. National Endowment for Democracy.A private;U.S.-govern-u

ment-funded association that promotes worldwide develop-

ment of democratic values and human rights and freedomsthrough private-sector initiatives. It supports exchange visits,training programs and institution-building.


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GLOSSARY (cont.)

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2

Nobel Peace Prize.International prize awarded annually by the

Nobel Foundation in Stockholm for the promotion of peace.

per capita gross domestic product.The total value of goods and

services produced within a country in a given year (does not

include income earned abroad) divided by the population.

per capita income. National income per person, or the totalvalue of a country's goods and services divided by the total

population.

real wages. Real wages indicate the earnings of workersadjusted for changes in consumer prices. They are an index of

workers' standard of living. They also are an indication of real

output per unit of labor input (productivity).

Sharpeville. A town near Johannesburg. South African police

opened fire on blacks demonstrating against apartheid passlaws in March 1960 and killed 69. The massacre brought South

Africa close to civil war and precipitated international con-

demnation of the government.

Soweto. A black township near Johannesburg. A studentdemonstration against a government attempt to impose theAfrikaans language in education led to three days of riots in

Soweto; 236 non-whites were killed by police and 2 whites

were killed by rioters. The government withdrew the proposal.

torture. The infliction of severe pain as a means of punishment

or coercion.

tricameral parliament. A parliament that consists of threebodies or chambers.

111 tyranny. Coercive, arbitrary government that recognizes no

law or limitations.

World Bank. An international agency closely associated with

the International Monetary Fund. The World Bank was estab-

lished in 1944 to help countries devastated by World War II to

rebuild. Today it makes low-interest loans to developing na-

tions for economic development projects such as highways and

dams. Officially known as the International Bank for Recon-

struction and Development (IBRD), it is the largest interna-

tional lending agency of its kind and disburses about $15billion annually.


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Environmental crisis informer Soviet blocwhose problem? who pays?

How did Communist government policies affect the environment?

What priority should new governments in the former Soviet blocgive to environmental cleanup efforts?

How can the international community address globalenvironmental problems? Why have past efforts failed?

ARTICLE SUMMARY

THE former Soviet republics and East Europeannations face wide-scale environmental problems

at least as serious as those the U.S. and Europe expe-rienced 30 years ago. The damage in the former SovietUnion is the result of 60 years of abuse and neglect.Early government measures to protect the environ-ment from the effects of collectivization and rapidindustrialization were never enforced, and warningsby environmentalists were suppressed or largely ig-nored. When Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev inthe mid-1980s called for glasnost, or a more opensociety, environmental activists stepped up their pro-tests against government policies, contributing to thepolitical ferment that eventually toppled the SovietUnion. Currently the former Soviet bloc's most seri-ous and urgent environmental problem is dealing withdefective nuclear reactors, similar to the one atChernobyl that caused the worst nuclear catastrophe inhistory. Other environmental problems include seri-ous water pollution, degradation of land, losses ofbiological resources and air pollution. The economicand environmental recovery of the region will dependon new energy policies and on exploiting and con-serving energy reserves, namely oil and natural gas.New policies will require technology and large amountsof capital, which is in short supply. Russia especiallyis in need of loans, grants and private investment to

advance ecologically sound projects. The U.S. govern-ment, business and nongovernmental organizations mayall play a role, but the problems will not soon go away.

ACTIVITYOverviewSince the first international conference on the humanenvironment in Stockholm, Sweden, in 1972, pollu-tion of the environment and the destruction of theearth's ecosystem have been high on the world'sagenda. The recent Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro,Brazil, underscored the continuing universal concern.

While few people can agree on what, precisely,should be doneand by whommost feel that thepollution of the environment and the destruction of theecosystem of the earth must be stopped. Nearly allrecognize that the solution to many of these problemswill cost a great deal of money and effort.

One region where environmental degradation hastaken its greatest toll is the former Soviet bloc. Whilethe political, economic and social problems that hauntthis former empire are massive, the environmentalcrisis that it faces may be even greater, threatening thevery existence of the land and its people. By extension,it menaces the ecology of the entire globe.

With reckless disregard for health, human life andthe environment, the ambitious Stalinist programs for

14 ACTIVITY BOOK 19941 1.7

ACTIVITY BOOKTOPIC

3

rapid heavy industrialization and collectivization ofagriculture depleted natural resources, destroyed for-ests and agricultural areas and polluted waters andstreams. In many respects, present environmental condi-tions in the former empire are comparable with the situa-tion that existed in other industrial nations 30 years ago.

One of the most hazardous problems in the formerSoviet states involves civilian and military nuclearestablishments. Civilian nuclear reactors, substandardin design and poorly constructed, threaten the lives andsafety of people throughout the world. Some expertsare afraid that an accident even worse than theChernobyl disaster may occur in the near future unlessnuclear reactors are shut down or upgraded immedi-ately. In addition, while the complete story has notbeen forthcoming, there are indications that the indus-trial complex responsible for the manufacture ofnuclearweapons may present even greater dangers to theworld. At least three serious nuclear accidents haveoccurred since the late 1950s, causing tremendousdamage in and around the former Soviet states.

The massive cleanups and the reallocation andrestructuring of resources and priorities will require agreat deal of money. Where will funds be found?Given the difficulties faced by the former Sovietempire in converting to market economies, curbinghyperinflation and developing trade and investmentas well as dealing with other economic and socialproblemsmoney for environmental concerns is sim-ply not available in anywhere near the amount needed.Some assistance has been forthcoming from outsidethe former states. Nations, international organiza-tions, NGOs and others have pledged or sent funds,often with strings attached, to tackle the problems.How can the former Soviet bloc countries afford tomanage their affairs, develop political, economic andsocial harmony and solve the environmental crisis, aswell? What steps can be taken to ensure that themovement to a market economy will feature a moreenvironmentally sound approach? What role shouldnations, international organizations, NGOs and othersplay in working for solutions to these problems?


1. Discuss the severe environmental problemsthat exist in the former Soviet empire andexplain how these problems were created.

2. Discuss why the ex-Soviet bloc and many othernations find it difficult to deal effectively withmanaging and correcting environmental prob-lems.

3. Discuss possible ideas or programs that couldbe developed by the world community to assistin the management of the environmental crisisin the former Soviet empire or in other nationsaround the world.

Materials"Handout on the Environment" (page 37), chalk,chalkboard


ProcedureBegin the discussion by describing some current envi-ronmental problems, such as the depletion ofthe ozonelayer, the greenhouse effect, acid rain, etc. Ask partici-pants their views on these questions and get them toexpress whether or not they believe that the earth andits environment are endangered. Ask them what theybelieve are the most serious environmental challengesfacing the U.S. and what difficulties stand in the wayof correcting these problems. Ask them what theybelieve they should do to help solve environmentalproblems in the U.S.

Turn the discussion to the fOrmer Soviet empire.Ask them to summarize environmental problems thatexist there. Ask them to compare these problems withenvironmental difficulties in the U.S. Describe someof the social, political and economic changes that areoccurring in the former bloc and ask them what effectthey believe these changes will have on efforts to dosomething about the environmental crisis there. In-form the participants that, because of the gravity of thesituation, the precariousness of the transition to de-mocracy and market economics and the lack of avail-able resources, it may be necessary for other countriesto help solve this problem in order to prevent furtherenvironmental damage.

Write the names of four groups on the chalkboard:"Europe," "The United Nations," "The U.S." and"Nongovernmental organizations." Explain to the par-ticipants that they are to divide evenly into these


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3 ACTIVITY BOOK

groupsand any other group that they might sug-gestin order to produce ideas and programs on howto deal with this environmental crisis. Distribute the"Handout on the Environment." Ask them to worktogether within their group to prepare an action planfor what they believe needs to be done. Give themabout 10 minutes to complete this task.

Call them back together and ask each group topresent its views on what it believes to be the worstenvironmental situations in the former Soviet bloc. Besure that the groups provide reasons for their choices.Ask them whether or not they believe that the effectsof these problems are confined to the former Sovietbloc or if they pose a threat to the world at large. Askthem to offer suggestions on how to eliminate theseproblems and how they would arrange to provide the

necessary funds. Outline the views of each group onthe chalkboard and, when all the groups have finished,ask them to rank and evaluate the different viewpointsand solutions. Ask them which program they think isthe best and whether or not they would use its solutionsor combine them with others in order to address theproblem. Ask them to rank and evaluate their fundingideas and whether or not they should also be com-bined.

After they have finished their evaluation, ask themwhat they believe will happen to the world's environ-ment if their ideas or similar ones are not adopted.Have them explain and evaluate what role the U.S.should play in this matter. Ask them what, if anything,they should personally do with regard to this problemas citizens of the U.S. or as concerned individuals.


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GLOSSARY

DDT. A toxic insecticide developed during World War II to

improve agricultural production. It was banned from further

use during the 1970s by the U.S. government because ofdangers of residual effects on the ecosystem. Its use is contin-

ued in other parts of the world.

European Community (EC). A European economic union

created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 that eliminated internal

barriers to trade. The six original members were Belgium,France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Ger-

many. Since then, Britain, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spainand Portugal have joined. At the end of 1993 the EC became the

European Union.

Great Depression. A period of worldwide economic stagnation

and unemployment in the 1930s that was marked by severe

cutbacks in international trade and widespread default on loans

by sovereign borrowers. In the U.S., the Depression dated from

the stock market crash of 1929.

gross national product (GNP). The total value of a nation's

goods and services, including government expenditures andinvestments abroad, during a given period of time, usually one

year. Different methods of calculating national economic fac-

tors, such as currency-value changes, can lead to varyingfigures.

Group of Seven (G-7). The seven most economically devel-oped countries of the world: Britain, Canada, France, Ger-many, Italy, Japan and the U.S. The heads of state of thesecountries meet at yearly summits to discuss internationaleconomic and monetary developments as well as a wider range

of issues, such as terrorism and arms control. These summits

are also attended by the president ofthe European Community's

Council of Ministers.

Lenin, Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov. Founder and leader of theRussian Bolshevik party, he devised the strategy for the seizure

of power in the October 1917 revolution. He became thefounder and leader of the Soviet Union.

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). These private foun-

dations and voluntary associations, usually designed to dealwith specific issues or areas of concern, devote their efforts and

resources to addressing or influencing national or international

matters.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In addition to trying

to curb the spread of nuclear weapons, the treaty commits all

signatories to negotiate an end to the nuclear arms race and,

ultimately, to negotiate nuclear disarmament.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD). Organization launched in December 1960 to pro-mote economic growth, employment and improved standards

of living among member countries by encouraging coordi-nated policies. It seeks "to promote the sound and harmonious

development of the world economy and improve the lot of the

developing countries...." Its members include the U.S., theWest European countries, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.

Stalin, Joseph. The sole and undisputed head of the Commu-

nist party and leader of the Soviet Union from 1927 to 1953. He

ruled with rigid authoritarianism and through widespread use

of terror.

Third World. Economically less-developed nations of theworld, most of which gained independence after World War II.

During the cold war, the First World referred to the U.S. and

other countries with free-market economies and the SecondWorld to the Soviet Union and other Communist-bloc coun-

tries.

United Nations Development ProgramAn international agency

that coordinates and administers technical assistance provided

through the UN system to speed social and economicdevelopment in less-developed countries.

United Nations Environment Program. Established in 1972 to

facilitate international cooperation in all matters affecting the

human environment, to ensure that environmental problems of

wide international significance receive appropriategovernmental consideration and to promote the acquisition

and exchange of environmental knowledge.

U.S. Superfund. A program of the U.S. government that began

in 1986 and established deadlines and standards for the cleanup

of hazardous toxic waste sites in the U.S. It designates which

sites are considered the most serious toxic hazards in the nation

and provides the means to clean them up.

World Bank. See Glossary, Topic 2.


JOIlisst ACTIVITIESTOPIC

4

Trade with the Pacific Rim:pressure or cooperation?

What is the relationship between U.S. jobs and the rapidlyexpanding Pacific Rim economies?

What accounts for the U.S. trade deficit with the Pacific Rim?

How can the U.S. improve relations with the Pacific Rim?

ARTICLE SUMMARY

THE Clinton Administration has declared that "noregion in the world is more important to the U.S.

than Asia." It dramatized that point at the Novembermeeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperationforum in Seattle. U.S. trade with Asia is already oneand one-half times as large as U.S. trade with Europe.As the economies of the Pacific Rim countries growand their markets continue to expand, trade with thatregion will be even more important to Americans.Increasing the access of U.S. exports to overseasmarkets can lead to job growth and a reduction in thetrade deficit.

The article explores the prospects for trade with themajor Pacific Rim countries. It presents conflictingviews on the U.S. trade deficit and ways to reduce it,such as asking trade partners voluntarily to restrainexports, establishing lists of unfair trading practicesand imposing retaliatory tariffs. The article also raisesthe question of how much weight the architects oftrade policy should give to such traditional U.S. con-cerns as promoting human rights, democracy andregional stability and security. To what extent, forexample, should the U.S. apply pressure to its tradepartners? Should it tie improved trade relations toobservance of human rights? to respect for intellectualproperty rights? Has the time come to end the tradeembargo on Vietnam?

ACTIVITY ONE

OverviewWhen we think of popular ideas about the growth anddevelopment of the U.S., we invariably think of thedynamics of a westward movement of people andevents. The U.S., settled primarily by Europeans, wasformed by the westward movement ofpeople from theoriginal 13 colonies on the Atlantic seaboard to Pacificoutposts in Oregon, California, Alaska and Hawaii.What is often ignored by Americans is the eastwardmovement of people and ideas from the Pacific Rim tothe U.S. Most Asian-Americans came to the NewWorld across the Pacific. In recent years the pace ofAsian immigration has picked up.

The U.S. has been heavily involved in the Pacificregion for well over a century. It acquired the Philip-pines during the Spanish-American War and promul-gated the "Open Door" policy for China as the 20thcentury began. It had already annexed Hawaii, pur-chased Alaska and "opened up" Japan for U.S. trade.Other milestones of U.S. involvement in the Asian-Pacific area include the Pacific theater of World WarII, the Korean War and the long Indochina struggle.The flow of U.S. history appears to be away from itsEuropean past in the direction of a Pacific future. It isno mere coincidence that the Pacific state of Californiais presently the most populous in the nation and one ofthe major cultural and industrial centers of the U.S.


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The Pacific RimAustralia, China, Hong Kong,Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand,the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Viet-nampresents new challenges and opportunities forthe U.S. to address in the post-cold-war world. U.S.trade with the Pacific Rim, which is undergoing rapid,far-reaching economic growth and political develop-ment, is already larger than trade with Europe. TheU.S., beset by budget and trade deficits, persistentunemployment and social unrest, is anxious to expandits trade with the region. In addition to increasingexports, the U.S. is concerned about working with thePacific Rim countries to curb nuclear proliferation, topromulgate human rights and to promote democraticdevelopment.

As the Pacific Rim nations continue their remark-able growth and development, the U.S. may be hard-pressed to maintain a high level of influence in theregion. The U.S. needs to identify its principal goalsand the means to achieve them. What can it do in orderto have a role in shaping desired outcomes? Why havePacific Rim economies experienced rapid, dynamicchanges in recent years? What policies or events haveaccelerated this growth? How have these changesaffected relations with the U.S. and the world? Whatfuture problems and challenges can be anticipated inthe region?


1. Describe how and why Pacific Rim economiesare experiencing rapid and far-reaching growthand development at the present time.

2. Compare recent economic developments in thePacific Rim with those in other areas of theworld.

3. Discuss and evaluate what issues or problemsmust be taken into account to ensure that posi-tive economic and political growth continues inthe area.

Materials"Handout on the Pacific Rim" (page 38), The WorldAlmanac and Book of Facts 1994, chalk, chalkboard


ProcedureBegin the discussion by asking the participants what ismeant by "advanced industrial nation." Ask them togive reasons why some nations are advanced. Askthem what the advanced industrial nations have incommon and get them to determine which of thesetraits are most important. List their responses on thechalkboard.

Turn the discussion to "developing nations." Askthem how they would describe the major differencesbetween developing nations and advanced industrialnations. Ask them to explain what nations must do tobecome industrially advanced. List the responses onthe chalkboard as well. Take about 10 minutes for thispart of the activity.

Divide the participants into five equal groups rep-resenting the Asean countries, China, Japan, SouthKorea and Taiwan. Distribute the "Handout on thePacific Rim" and give them about 10 minutes to createa profile of their group.

After 10 minutes ask the participants to cometogether to report on their group. Ask them to give aneconomic and political profile of their nation or groupof nations and to explain why they believe it is eitherindustrially advanced, developing or stagnant. Getthem to state the reasons for their choice. Then askthem to predict what their group will be able to achieveover the next 25 years and to state how and why theybelieve this will happen. Summarize their reports onthe chalkboard and, when they have finished, ask allparticipants whether or not they agree with each analy-sis. Ask them to find similarities and differences amongthe nations. Ask them to determine whether or not theirrelationship with the U.S. is important to these nationsand how they might use this relationship as a measuringstick to compare the nations' futures. Ask them whatother factors should be considered in order to determinethe successes or failures each group can anticipate in thefuture. End the discussion by comparing their profileswith the characteristics of advanced or developingnations that they listed on the chalkboard at the begin-ning of the discussion. Ask them if they still like theearlier ideas they expressed or if they would like tochange or modify what they previously stated. End thediscussion by asking them if they can make a generalstatement about what causes nations to develop and tobecome advanced. Ask them what nations can or shoulddo in order to prevent their decline and fall.


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ACTIVITY TWO

OverviewMany people in and out of public life have begun toaccept the idea that possibly the most important adjust-ment the U.S. must make to succeed in the post-cold-war world will be a willingness on the part of Ameri-cans to reexamine old assumptions and to accept newways of thinking. This is particularly true in the caseof the U.S. economy. Americans are worried aboutjobs, budget and trade deficits, productivity, insuffi-cient savings and investment and the lack of a robustconfidence in business enterprise. A general uneasi-ness over the loss of jobs in the U.S. to overseasindustries and the failure to make the necessary adjust-ments to reverse course is growing. Rather than facethese issues head on, various Americans have blamedeach other, foreigners or any other convenient targetfor their problems. A good example of this is the"Japan bashing" that has occurred as the result of tradedifficulties between the U.S. and Japan.

In a very short time, the U.S. has gone from beinga creditor nation with a strong industrial base and atrade surplus to being a debtor nation that has experi-enced a remarkable decline in its industrial output anda trade deficit. Various segments of U.S. society,whether they are part of the government and its bu-reaucracy, export-generating enterprises, organizedlabor or members of the general public, have differingopinions as to what should or should not be done inorder to reverse current trends and to improve Ameri-can performance in trade and production. Some believethe U.S. should use various forms of pressure; othersfavor greater cooperation. According to others, the U.S.should concentrate on making serious domestic adjust-ments, such as cutting the federal budget deficit, encour-aging savings and discouraging consumption, and pro-moting export-oriented industries in order to make theU.S. more competitive in this vital region.

How do U.S. trade relations with Pacific Rimnations affect the U.S. economy? What approacheswill best help the U.S. improve trade relations withPacific Rim nations and address its domestic con-cerns? How do differences of politics or perceptionsinfluence the difficulties the U.S. has in this area? Towhich particular Pacific Rim economies, issues orpractices should the U.S. give priority? Which inter-estseconomic, political or militaryare more im-portant in the short term? the long term?


1. Explain the effects of U.S. trade relations withthe Pacific Rim on the U.S. economy.

2. Identify, describe and compare key Pacific Rimnations and situations that the U.S. must ad-dress in order to develop successful trade poli-cies for the area.

3. Describe and compare various approaches thatthe U.S. may try in order to improve its traderelations in the area.



ProcedureBegin the discussion by asking the participants to listthe major appliances (cameras, autos, televisions, etc.)their families possess. Ask them how many of theseitems were made by foreign or foreign-owned compa-nies and how many were American-made. Ask them tolist the countries that manufactured these products, ifthey can. Take a random sample from the group andwrite the results on the chalkboard. Ask them why theybelieve this situation is typical for most Americanfamilies. Explain to them that as late as the early 1960sAmericans bought fewer foreign goods and that U.S.industries manufactured many of these products. Askthem why they believe that U.S. industries no longerproduce many of the manufactured goods that Ameri-cans purchase today. Ask them to explain what eco-nomic effect this has had on the nation.

Write the following statistics on the chalkboard:1992 U.S. global trade deficit $84.3 billion1992 U.S. trade deficit with Asia $87 billion.

Ask them what these statistics say about U.S. traderelations with the Pacific Rim. Then turn their atten-tion to the "Selected Statistics" chart on page 42 of the1994 Great Decisions. Ask them to explain the generalinformation the chart gives them about Pacific Rimtrade. Ask them to target four economies or groups ofnations, based on their interpretation of the chart andon their understanding of the readings, and to develop

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ACTIVITY BOOK

a U.S. strategy on trade and other matters for each. Askthem to keep in mind that the purpose of their actionsis to improve economic conditions in the U.S.

Divide them into four groups and give them 10minutes to devise a strategy and plan of action toimprove trade relations with their targeted economy.Then call them back together and ask each group toreport on its strategy and plan of action. Summarizethe findings on the chalkboard. When all have re-ported, invite the entire group to comment on the ideasand strategies presented. Ask them to compare thestrategies and to determine whether or not the U.S. canor should adopt a comprehensive plan or set of prin-

TOPIC

4

ciples when approaching these matters. Ask them tospeculate on how difficult it would or would not be toget the following groups to agree to these approaches:American consumers, the American government,American investors, American businessmen, the gen-eral public. Ask them what laws or policies must beenacted in order get the American people to embracethe measures they have suggested.

End the discussion by asking what they believewould happen to the U.S. and its relations with thePacific Rim economies if their ideas were carried out.Close by asking them what will eventually happen tothe U.S. if it fails to take action regarding trade matterswith the Pacific Rim.

GLOSSARY

Asian Development Bank. A financial institution established

to promote investment and provide technical assistance foreconomic development in the Asian countries. Its members

include both the Asian countries and several nonregionalmembers such as the U.S. and the countries of Western Europe.

European Community (EC). See Glossary, Topic 3.

free-market economists. They believe in economic policies

that stress free competition, profits and the elimination of trade

barriers such as tariffs, quotas and duties.

gross national product (GNP). See Glossary, Topic 3.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). Founded in 1944, the

IMF is an international agency based in Washington, D.C. It

helps maintain stable exchange rates and acts as a lender of last

resort to countries with serious debt problems. In return forIMF loans, countries are usually required to make economicreforms and undertake austerity programs. The IMF is con-

trolled by the U.S. and other major Western powers and isclosely associated with the World Bank.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). A

cartel of oil-producing countries established in 1960 to unify

and coordinate their petroleum supply and pricing policies.OPEC members drastically raised oil prices in 1973 and 1979.

Tiananmen Square. A square in the heart of Beijing, the capital

of China, which was the site of pro-democracy protests in

spring 1989.



ACTIVITIESTOPIC

Defense: redefiningU.S. needs and priorities

Are the planned cuts in the defense budget too little or too much?

How much military force is enough in the post-cold-war world?

Should the U.S. military be assigned nontraditional roles, forexample, fighting the war on drugs?

ARTICLE SUMMARY

FOR more than 40 years, the American militarybased its budgets, weapons projects, war plans

indeed, its very reason for existenceon the challeng-ing and frightening possibility of global conventionaland nuclear war with the Soviet Union. The uncertainnew post-cold-war era now poses a novel range ofunexpected challenges for U.S. defense policymakers.What unconventional roles can the military appropri-ately be asked to shoulder to help the nation solve itsmany domestic problems? In the absence of the super-power nuclear arms race, what role do nuclear weap-ons play in this "new world order"? And, can the U.S.reduce its all-pervasive presence around the worldwithout leading other nations to believe that it iswithdrawing from its global responsibilities and thus,perhaps, sparking unwanted regional arms races? Theseand other pressing questions all call for answers as theU.S. national security establishment steers its waythrough the uncharted waters of a fractious, post-Soviet world.

ACTIVITY

OverviewOne of the important legacies that the U.S. mustaddress in the aftermath of the cold war is the question

of what are or should be the proper status and role forits military today. Since the Korean War ended in 1953the U.S. has maintained large defense forces in orderto contain the military threat from the Soviet Union.The U.S. had never before in peacetime maintained alarge standing army. In order to be prepared forconventional or nuclear war on a global scale, Ameri-can military leaders asked for and received a great dealof support and resources from the nation.

The almost unbelievable series of events, begin-ning with the removal of the Berlin Wall, which hadsymbolized the division of Europe into CommunistEast and free world West, and culminating with thedissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, not onlyended the cold war but raised the possibility of a"threat meltdown" for the U.S. military. Without thealmost daily apprehension about nuclear or conven-tional warfare with the Communist bloc, the U.S., theworld's only military superpower, is now obliged todefine new roles and missions for itself in a world thathas yet to be clearly understood or defined.

The U.S. Defense Department has identified nuclearproliferation, dangers to democracy, crises or threatsfrom a "handful of bad guys," such as Iraq and Libya,and problems stemming from a weak economy aspriorities that must be addressed. These priorities re-quire new thinking about the world and new strategies.


ACTIVITY BOOKTOPIC

5

How will the U.S. military be used to carry out theseobjectives? The unilateral U.S. invasion of Panama toremove "bad guy" Manuel Noriega in 1989 was thefirst large-scale U.S. military action since World WarII that was not directed at a Communist threat. Asecond was the Persian Gulf War, a multilateral opera-tion planned and executed to deal with another "badguy." The more recent humanitarian and militaryaction in Somalia, which featured close military coop-eration with the United Nations, has left the U.S. waryabout similar missions in the future.

Peacetime engagement of U.S. forces to promotepolitical and economic stability could require the U.S.military to act as a development agency, political tutorand global policeman in troubled nations and even athome. Some consideration has been given to using thearmed forces in the war on drugs. There have also beencalls for use of the military to battle violent crime andfor a larger "civilian" role for the military in Americandomestic life.

All of this would require profound changes inapproach and objectives for the U.S. military andaffect it as a fighting force. In addition, the Americanpublic is clamoring for the downsizing of government,deficit reduction and domestic reform, to be paid forwith a "peace dividend." This could require thedownscaling of the military to the point where itaffected military capability, morale, operations andmaintenance. Drastic changes in U.S. military mis-sions not only raise the possibility of diminishing U.S.security but also of doing harm to the military estab-lishment and its position in American society.

Redefining the objectives, role and requirementsfor the U.S. military will require political, diplomaticand economic skills. What role or roles should the U.S.military play in the new world order? How can the U.S.protect and project its interests as the world's onlysuperpower? What new, unconventional missionsifanyshould the U.S. military undertake abroad and athome? How far should the U.S. cut its military expen-ditures? How will this affect American society?


1. Discuss how the end of the cold war has af-fected the planning and use of U.S. militaryforces at home and abroad.

2. Describe how the role and status of the U.S.military may be seriously revised to deal withchanging world events and pressing domesticrequirements.

3. Explain the political and economic factors thatmust be considered in determining the futurerole and position of the military in Americansociety.

Materials"Handout on U.S. Defense" (page 39), chalk,chalkboard


ProcedureBegin the discussion by asking the participants whatthey believe are the greatest threats to world peacesince the Soviet Union has ceased to exist. Write theirresponses on the chalkboard and ask them to comparethese problems with the real or imagined problems thatexisted between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Pointout that the U.S. is now the world's only militarysuperpower and that many Americans are uncertainwhether we should maintain the same levels of spend-ing and preparedness on military matters that we didduring the cold war. Ask them their beliefs on thissubject and the reasons why they hold them.

Divide the participants into two groups according totheir beliefs: one group representing Americans whofavor reducing the role and status of the U.S. militaryand the other representing those who favor maintain-ing or strengthening it. If they are lopsided or unani-mous in their position, simply "volunteer" enoughparticipants to the opposing side to ensure that the twogroups are equal in number.

Ask them to work together to prepare their posi-tions. Distribute the "Handout on U.S. Defense" andgive the participants about 15 minutes to complete it.When they have finished, ask both groups for theirviews on the importance of the strategic global areasand the reasoning behind their military policy for eacharea. Summarize their arguments on the chalkboard.Ask them what actions they would take with regard tospending, size of forces, etc., in order to implementtheir policies.


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After both sides have presented their arguments,ask them to point out the areas where they agree ordisagree. Get them to summarize the ideas that under-lie the differences between the two positions and askthem what could happen to U.S. security and otherinterests if these ideas or assumptions are in error.

Ask them if they believe that "unconventional mis-sions"for instance, the use of U.S. military person-

nel to provide humanitarian or developmental ser-viceswould be a good compromise between the twopositions. Ask them how this might affect the conceptof civilian control over the military in the U.S. systemof government. Would it lead to the kind of concentra-tion of power and influence that President Dwight D.Eisenhower had in mind when he warned Americansin his farewell address to beware the "military-indus-trial complex"?

GLOSSARY

gross domestic product (GDP). The total value of goods and

services produced within a country in a given year (does not

include income earned abroad).

Korean War. This conflict between Communist and non-Communist forces in Korea began in June 1950 and centered

around the 38th parallel. The United Nations authorized mem-

ber nations to aid South Korea under the command of U.S.General Douglas MacArthur. Chinese forces joined the North

Korean army. Negotiations for a cease-fire to end the stalemate

were begun at Panmunjom in 1951 but were not successfuluntil July 1953. This was the first limited war fought by the U.S.

during the cold-war era.

military coup (coup d'etat). The violent overthrow or change

of an existing government by military force.

National Guard. The volunteer military forces retained by each

state in the U.S. to maintain internal order. The Second Amend-

ment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees each state the right to

keep its own militia. Financed largely by federal funds, theGuard may be called into federal service during wartime.

National Security Agency. Established in 1952, this secret

communications, crypotographical and intelligence agencyprotects worldwide American government secret communica-

tions and produces intelligence information derived from its

surveillance of secret communications of all foreign nations. It

serves as the principal secret code-maker and code-breaker of

the U.S. government.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). See Glossary,Topic 1.

Panama Canal Treaty. The 1977 treaty provided for the return

of the Canal Zone to Panama in 1999. The U.S. exercised its

right to protect the canal when U.S. forces invaded Panama in

December 1989.

Pentagon. This five-sided structure on the Virginia side of the

Potomac River adjacent to Washington, D.C., houses theprincipal executive offices of the U.S. Department of Defense.

Completed in 1943, it contains 17 miles of corridors andprovides office space for more than 30,000 persons.

Strategic Air Command. This specialized command of theU.S. Air Force, answerable directly to the President through the

Secretary of Defense, is designed to attack and destroy the vital

elements of an aggressor's war-making capabilities. It there-fore acts as a deterrent to all-out war.

Vietnam syndrome. U.S. participation in the Indochinese wars

of 1964-73 damaged civilian and military morale and made the

country reluctant ever again to dispatch U.S. forces to faraway

countries. The commitment and deployment of U.S. military

forces in the post-Vietnam era are seen in some quarters as

efforts to strengthen U.S. resolve.


127

A

a.4%

Argeniina, Brazil, Chile:democracy and market economics

Why did Argentina, Brazil and Chile send the militaryback to the barracks?

Are democracy and free-market economics firmly rootedin the Southern Cone?

What is the outlook for increased U.S. trade with the WesternHemisphere?

ARTICLE SUMMARY

A RGENTINA, Brazil and Chile are currently under-Pi. going dramatic political and economic change.Each country is, in its own distinctive way, sheddingthe vestiges of authoritarianism and adopting free-market economic policies. The article traces thesedevelopments in the so-called ABC countriesfromPinochet's military dictatorship in Chile to the 1988plebiscite that ousted him; from Peronism and milita-rism in Argentina to the ouster of the military after thecountry's defeat in the Falklands (Malvinas) War; andBrazil's long and gradual movement away from un-stable military regimes. These young democraciesface some common internal challenges, such as defin-ing the role of the military, weeding out corruption,and improving economic and social conditions. Poli-tics aside, they are also now undertaking major stepsto alter their economies. They began in the late 1980sto replace their highly protectionist, state-led econo-mies, which had brought them hyperinflation, debtand poverty, with more-competitive free-market sys-tems. Chile is the region's success story and is achiev-ing an economic growth rate comparable with that ofSoutheast Asia. Argentina has also successfully imple-mented some of the most profound privatization andreform plans in Latin America. Brazil has made theslowest progress in instituting reforms and still suffersfrom low economic performance in some key areas.These economic and political changes have created

new relationships both within the region and with theoutside world. A Southern Cone Common Market,Mercosur, has been formed, and the U.S. has indicatedit favors closer economic cooperation with its south-ern neighbors. The U.S. must decide whether it alsowishes to become involved in the ABC countries'democratic transition.

ACTIVITY ONE

OverviewThroughout their history U.S. citizens have often beenunaware of or simply uninterested in South America.How many people, for example, are familiar with thedemocratic revolutions that have taken place in Ar-gentina, Brazil and Chile over the past few years? Theanswer is probably fewer than those who have heard ofthe startling changes in Eastern Europe, South Africaand China. In spite of the outbreak of democracy andthe restructuring of the economic life of Argentina,Brazil and Chile, there have been few video images tocapture the popular imagination. Since these events donot bear directly on the dissolution of the Sovietempire or on the position of the U.S. as the world'sonly military superpower, they have not receivedattention commensurate with their importance.

In recent years the Southern Cone nations havebeen successfully tackling problems created by yearsof extensive mismanagement and corruption. Enor-


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mous foreign debts, cycles of hyperinflation, stagnanteconomic growth, recession and doubt underminedsociety and exacerbated existing economic and socialproblems. Argentina, Brazil and Chile have instituteddramatic changes in their economies and govern-ments. The adoption of strict free-market policies hashelped to bring about an economic boom and theprospect of continued growth and expansion. In addi-tion, these nations are poised to play a wider, moreprominent role in Western Hemispheric affairs and inrelations with the U.S. How were polarized,antidemocratic politics of the left and right, repressivemilitarism and authoritarian rule swept aside in thesethree countries and replaced by open, democraticpolitics and debate? What remaining problems andconditions may threaten these changes? What role willthese new societies play in the Western Hemisphereand in the world at large?


1. Describe the forces and events that have helpedArgentina, Brazil and Chile move from au-thoritarian governments to evolving prosper-ous democracies.

2. Describe problems in the three countries thatcould sidetrack continued economic and politi-cal reform.

3. Explore what could help Argentina, Brazil andChile improve their chances of successfullyreforming their societies.

Materials"Handout on Argentina, Brazil and Chile" (page 40),chalk, chalkboard


ProcedureBegin the discussion with a brief description of thedispute between President Harry Truman and GeneralDouglas MacArthur during the Korean War, which ledthe President to dismiss MacArthur. Ask them whatthe dismissal illustrates about the role of the military

in the U.S. system of government. Ask them if theybelieve that a military coup is a serious threat to U.S.society and to state what conditions would have toobtain in order for the military to seize control of thegovernment.

Distribute the "Handout on Argentina, Brazil andChile." Divide participants into three groups, eachrepresenting a country. Give them about 10 minutes togather the information asked for in the handout. Thenbring them back together and ask them to contrast therole and influence of the military in these countrieswith the situation in the U.S. Ask each group to pro-vide an analysis of the prospects for a regression tomilitary rule in each country. Ask them to cite examplesfrom the past or present that tend to support their ideas.Ask them what needs to be done to ensure that demo-cratic reform will continue to succeed and, also, howthey believe this could be brought about. Ask themwhat role economic and social conditions may play inthe continued growth of democracy. Record theirresponses to these questions on the chalkboard underthe general heading of "Conditions" and the subhead-ings of "Economic," "Social" and "Political."

End the discussion by asking them what the threecountries could do to gain greater understanding andappreciation in the U.S. and elsewhere of the changesthat are taking place in the Southern Cone countriesand the challenges these countries face for continuedsuccess in the near future.

ACTIVITY TWO

OverviewThe recent U.S. national debate about the North Ameri-can Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) was marked bydisagreement about how free trade between Mexico,Canada and the U.S. would affect U.S. jobs, produc-tion and the environment. Many Americans are stillapprehensive. At the same time, they are concernedabout the serious economic competition that the U.S.faces from Europe and Asia, and the increasing federalindebtedness. In private and public discourse, peoplefrom government, business, industry and labor havecalled for various measures to "get tough" with U.S.trading partners. If there is general agreement on anyaspect of this issue, it is that the U.S. is in a difficultposition and must persuade or coerce its major trading


ACTIVITY BOOKTOPIC

6

partners to give U.S. goods and services greater accessto their markets. Faced with the rapid economic growthand trading power of Pacific Rim nations and compe-tition from the European Community, the U.S. needsto reconsider its trade priorities and policies.

The Western Hemisphere offers the possibility forexpanding U.S. initiatives. While socioeconomic andpolitical problems still exist, the nations of Argentina,Brazil and Chile are open to new relationships with theoutside world. Measures such as the Southern ConeCommon Market (Mercosur) among Argentina, Bra-zil, Paraguay and Uruguay offer new opportunities forthe U.S. to explore, as does Nafta. The addition ofChile to Nafta could advance the long-term goal ofcreating the free-trade area from Alaska to Tierra delFuego proposed by President George Bush in hisEnterprise for the Americas Initiative.

What vital interests does the U.S. have in SouthAmerica? How should it respond to the recent trendtoward free-market economies in the Southern Conecountries? How should it react to obstacles to furtherprogress in the area? Should the U.S. support theexpansion of Nafta to include Chile, Argentina andBrazil?


1. Describe and evaluate the economic potentialof the emerging Southern Cone nations.

2. Discuss the significance of the Southern Conenations in U.S. trade policy.

3. Evaluate the effects the extension of Nafta tothe rest of the Western Hemisphere would haveon U.S. trade, jobs and industry.



ProcedureBegin the discussion by asking the participants to givereasons why they would or would not agree with theremark that Americans will do anything about LatinAmerica except read about it. Ask why many Ameri-cans have such little knowledge of or interest in manyof the countries and peoples of this region. Ask themto describe how this affects the U.S. and its people.Point out some of the ways the U.S. has been activelyinvolved in the area by briefly describing U.S. inter-ests and actions in Cuba, Central America, Haiti andthe war on drugs.

Turn the discussion to U.S. economic concerns.Briefly describe U.S. trade problems with Asia andEurope and the difficulties that must be faced in orderto improve U.S. performance in these regions. Thenask them to respond to the proposition that the U.S. cansolve some of its problems by entering into a free-tradeunion in the Western Hemisphere. Point out that Naftais a step in that direction.

Ask the participants to consider the future role ofArgentina, Brazil and Chile in economic matters. Askthem to describe the strengths and weaknesses of eachcountry and whether or not they believe each countrywill continue its positive economic development. Af-ter they have finished this evaluation, ask them if theU.S. should take on any special responsibilities orpolicies to guarantee or assist any ofthe three countriesto continue sound economic development.

End the discussion by asking them to summarizeeconomic and political reasons why they believe theU.S. should or should not forge partnerships withArgentina, Brazil and Chile. Ask them why the U.S.should or should not actively pursue the extension ofNafta to all countries in the Western Hemisphere.


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GLOSSARY

authoritarian military regimes. Concentrated power in thehands of a military leader or group of military leaders who are

not responsible to the people.

Berlin Wall. This wall dividing Communist East and non-Communist West Berlin was built in 1961 in order to slow the

escape of East Germans to freedom.

Christian Democrats. A Chilean Catholic party that contained

a left wing. It was supported by radicals in Chile from 1952

until it lost power to Salvador Allende in 1970. It was tolerated

by military leaders until 1977.

Communist guerrillas. Members of highly mobile, indepen-dent Communist bands whose war tactics are based on harass-

ment, sabotage and surprise attacks.

Freedom House. Has served as a clearinghouse and research

and document center devoted to the cause of freedom anddemocratic institutions since 1941. It conducts a worldwide

Survey of Freedom, and it maintains a speaker's bureau ofdissenters-in-exile.

Hyperinflation. An increase in the volume of money and credit

relative to available goods resulting in a major and continuing

rise in the general price level.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). See Glossary, Topic 4.

E Marxism. Based on the theories of Karl Marx and Friedrich

Engels, this economic philosophy calls for the rejection of free

competition and the profit motive and the creation of a centrally

controlled economy.

petrodollars. A term used to describe the huge amounts ofmoney earned by OPEC (see Glossary, Topic 4) after it raised

oil prices in the 1970s. Since OPEC would only take dollars in

payment for its oil, its members racked up billions of dollars

many more than they could spend within their countries.

plebiscite. A vote by people of a country or district expressing

an opinion for or against a proposal, such as a government or

constitution.

Socialists. A group that favors redistributing wealth, income

and power to the less well-off, particularly industrial workers,

through common ownership of factories, banks and the land,

that is, the "means of production."

Third World. See Glossary, Topic 3.

wage and price controls. The use of government-mandated

guidelines or caps on wages and prices to control inflation.



131

Islam and politics:Egypt Algeria and Tunisia

What conditions have contributed to the recent resurgence inIslamic fundamentalism?

What role will the Islamic revival play in the future of theMiddle East?

How does the religious revival affect U.S. interests and policies inthe Middle East? at home?

ARTICLE SUMMARY

THE article explores the reasons for the increasinginvolvement of Islamic groups in politics through-

out the Middle East and North Africa, using as casestudies Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia. It traces the rootsof religious revival in. the region over the past century,the post-World War II Muslim disillusionment withsocialism, liberalism and modernity, and the wide-spread return to Islam since the 1970s. The movementtoward Islam has for the most part been peaceful, withsuch major exceptions as the Iranian revolution andthe assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.The increased participation of Islamic groups in elec-tions is noted. Among the major reasons for theirpopularity are repressive governments, poverty andlack of jobs, and an absence of secular alternatives.The author weighs whether the Islamic revival repre-sents a threat to U.S. interests and also considersalternative policies for combating militant, anti-West-ern groups, including encouraging U.S. friends in theregion to undertake economic and social reforms.

ACTIVITY

OverviewMore and more people in the Middle East and otherdeveloping regions believe that preparing for the fu-ture means looking to the past. This sentiment is

surfacing with ever more frequency as a result of theoften unsettling changes that have occurred in the late20th century. Gradual modernization in the Westbrought prosperity and a sense of well-being to mil-lions. For Muslims of the Middle East things havebeen different. Modernization, in countries for themost part created and controlled by Europeans or theirsurrogates after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire,occurred in a short period of time and created widegaps between governments, leaders and the peoplethey ruled. Beset by a loss of self-esteem resultingfrom military defeats at the hands of the Israelis andangered by intrusions and threats to traditional Islamicvalues by an invading Western culture, more and moreIslamic intellectuals, clergy and laity turned to religionas a source of inspiration and identity. This Islamicresurgence is part of a broader movement that includesHindu, Eastern Orthodox, Jewish and Protestant con-stituencies around the world.

The internal strife and debate within Middle East-ern nations experiencing Islamic revival have helpedfuel profound political and moral concerns throughoutthe region and beyond. The end of the cold war and theprogress in the negotiations between the Arabs andIsraelis have created considerable opportunities forpeace in the area. However, there are also portents ofinstability. The U.S. and the West are apprehensiveabout the Islamist call for a return to the ways of the


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7 ACTIVITY BOOK

past and about recent incidents of terrorism and vio-lence associated with religious extremists.

The U.S. is committed to promoting democracy andhuman rights, but when it comes to North Africa'sIslamist movements, it has supported their repressionby authoritarian, pro-American governments. As theIslamic resurgence advances and recedes in nationssuch as Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia, the U.S. mustweigh the cost of defending religious freedom vs. thecost of defending authoritarian governments. Howwill the Islamic revival affect the future of the peopleof the Middle East? How will political, social andeconomic development affect this revival? What im-pact, if any, will the rapprochement between Arabsand Israelis have on this process? What role will U.S.policiesand cultureplay in these events?

Objectives.Upon completion, participants will be able to:

1. Explain why many communities in the MiddleEast are turning to Islam as a social, economicand political force.

2. Discuss the conditions that contributed to thedevelopment of Islam as a sociopolitical forcein the Middle East.

3. Discuss how current developments in the MiddleEast can or will affect U.S. policy and U.S.security.

MaterialsChalkboard, chalk


ProcedureBegin the discussion by asking the participants howthey would define "religion." List the world's majorreligions on the chalkboard and ask the class what rolethese movements play in the lives of most of theirfollowers throughout the world. Ask them to describethe influence of religion on the lives ofmost Americans.Cite the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution andask them to describe its purpose. Ask them what theybelieve would be the effect if it were repealed.

Then turn the discussion to Islam. Ask them whythere has been a renewed interest in and revival oftraditional Islam, particularly in the Middle East. Besure to have them suggest conditions, problems orissues in the modern world that have contributed to thisrevival. List the responses on the chalkboard and askparticipants to explain how or why Islamists believethat Islam will solve or ameliorate these problems.

Divide the participants into three groups represent-ing Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia. Tell them they have 10minutes to prepare brief descriptions of social, eco-nomic and political conditions in their nation and theapproaches Islamists have taken in dealing with theseissues. Ask them to explain how the Islamic movementbegan in their nation and to list the principles ofand themethods used by the Islamists to win support. Afterabout 10 minutes, call them back together and ask eachgroup to describe the situation in its nation, makingsure that they include descriptions of governmentpolicies and government reactions to the Islamists aswell as significant events that have occurred. Writetheir descriptions on the chalkboard and, when theyhave finished, ask them to compare the three countries.Get them to agree on the similarities and differencesbetween conditions in the three countries. Then askthem to compare these specific situations with thegeneral principles and ideas they discussed about therise of Islam at the beginning of the activity. Ask them,on the basis of what they have done, to predict anddescribe what they believe will be the principal role ofIslam in future conflicts and whether or not theybelieve other predominantly Islamic nations will fol-low similar patterns of religious revival and struggle.Ask them ifthey believe this will foster extremism andviolence throughout the area or if they believe, thatdifferences can be reconciled through peaceful means.Point out some of the recent developments in the peaceprocess between Arabs and Israelis and ask them tospeculate on how this will affect Islamic fundamental-ism in the region.

End the discussion by asking them what effects, ifany, the Islamic revival will have on future U.S.policies regarding the spread of democracy and humanrights, support for friendly governments or access tothe petroleum in the area. Ask them what, if anything,the U.S. can or should do to influence Islamic move-ments and to avoid becoming a target of hostility,violence or terrorism.


ACTIVITY BOOK

GLOSSARY

ionic

7

Amnesty International (AI). Winner of the Nobel Peace Prize,

Al works for the release of prisoners of conscience, fair andprompt trial for political prisoners, and the end of torture and

executions.

Axis forces. This coalition of armies in World War II (1939-

45) was headed by Germany, Italy and Japan. It was opposed

and defeated by the Allied powers, headed by the U.S., Britain,

China and the Soviet Union.

Camp David Accords. This popular name for the 1979 peace

treaty between Israel and Egypt was named for the U.S.presidential retreat in Maryland where agreement was reached.

Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt and agreed to negotiatePalestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Egypt

recognized the state of Israel.

capitalism. An economic system, based on open competition in

a free market, in which the means of production and distribu-

tion are privately owned and growth results from the accumu-

lation and reinvestment of profits.

communism. See Marxism, Topic 6.

cultural imperialism. When artifacts of one society, such as

music, cinema, fashion, etc., along with values and mores, are

transported to another society as a result of political or eco-nomic exchanges or commerce and threaten to overwhelm the

local culture, members of the latter may complain of cultural

imperialism.

Gaza. A densely populated, poverty-stricken strip of land on

the southeastern Mediterranean Sea that has been occupied by

Israel since 1967. Three quarters of the population are Palestin-

ian refugees.

global village. A term coined by a world-renowned communi-

cation theorist, Herbert Marshall McLuhan. He contended that

the electronic media, especially television, were transforming

the world technologically into a global village in which books

would become obsolete.

guerrilla army. Members of highly mobile, independent bands

whose war tactics are based on harassment, sabotage andsurprise attacks.

human rights. Usually defined in the West as the protection of

an individual's political and civil liberties (as in the U.S. Bill of

Rights). Sometimes this definition is broadened to includeeconomic and social rights, such as the right to adequate food

and shelter.

Iranian hostage crisis. In 1979, tensions between the U.S. and

the Islamic fundamentalist rulers in Iran rose when the exiled

shah was admitted into the U.S. for medicl treatment. InNovember 1979, Iranian students seized the U.S. embassy in

Teheran and held 63 members of the embassy staff hostage.They demanded the return of the shah to Iran. The hostagecrisis received almost continual television and press coverage

and contributed heavily to President Jimmy Carter's defeat in

the 1980 election. The hostages were released at the time of the

inauguration of his successor, Ronald Reagan.

Koran. The sacred book of Islam, it was revealed by Allah to

the Prophet Muhammad in separate revelations at Mecca and

Medina during the Prophet's life.

Mecca. The birthplace and perpetual shrine of Islam. Devotees

everywhere turn to face this holy city to perform the ritualprayer as established in the days of Muhammad.

Ottoman Empire. See Glossary, Topic 1: "Ottoman dynasty."

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Created by the Arab

League in 1964 as an umbrella organization for various Pales-

tinian groups, the PLO is the leading spokesman for thePalestinian cause. Its longtime leader is Yasir Arafat. It re-cently agreed to renounce terrorism and to recognize the right

of Israel to exist, and it is negotiating for Israeli withdrawalfrom Jericho and the Gaza Strip.

protectorate. A relationship by which a weaker state or politi-

cal entity places itself under the protection of a more powerful

state and accepts the direction of its foreign affairs by the latter,

while retaining some powers of self-government. This rela-

tionship developed as a result of expansionist policies under

European colonial rule in Africa and Asia.

secularism. The indifference to or the rejection of religion and

religious consideration in personal and public affairs.

socialism. See Glossary, Topic 6: "Socialists."

Third World. See Glossary, Topic 3.

United Nations Development Program. See Glossary,Topic 3.

West Bank. The territory west of the River Jordan, inhabited by

Palestinians, which was administered by Jordan from 1948 to

1967 and thereafter by Israel.


134

New world disorder?U.S. in search of a role

What is the role of the US. in the world after the cold war?

What are the vital interests of the U.S. and where do they lie?

What are the goals of the U.S. and how can it achieve them?

ARTICLE SUMMARY

THE final chapter is an essay by James Chace,editor of World Policy Journal and Henry Luce

Professor in Freedom of Inquiry and Expression atBard College. After taking the reader on a tour of thenew world disorder, including the trouble spots docu-mented in the first seven articles, Chace conducts asearch for the U.S. role in the post-cold-war world. Hecalls on the Clinton Administration to define U.S.national interests and provides some guidelines of hisown. According to Chace, America's vital interestsare likely to remain the stability of Europe, the balanceof power in East Asia and the Western Pacific, and theeconomic and military security of North America.These goals and the strategies devised to implementthem, Chace concludes, must be tied to the largerinterest of promoting global growth and equity.

ACTIVITY

OverviewThe proper role for the U.S. after the collapse of theSoviet Union in 1991 continues to be the subject ofintense debate. With the demise of the internationalorder created at the end of World War II, new tensionsand conflicts have emerged that require a rearrange-ment and redefinition of priorities and policies.

Recent U.S. difficulties with Haiti and Somalia

have caused U.S. leaders and the general public toquestion American interests and goals and how toachieve them. Should the U.S. promote democracyand provide humanitarian aid to the world? Should itdo so at the expense of American lives?

In the Balkans, NATO failed to respond to theforces of fragmentation. The political unity of Yugo-slavia has been undone by ethnic, cultural and na-tionalist movements that produce increasing levels ofdivision and discord. Some countries have split apart;others seek inclusion in Europe. Germany, Europe'sdominant power, has pursued monetary policies thathave caused division on the continent.

The Asian-Pacific region also poses problems andchallenges that must be considered when definingU.S. interests: U.S. trade imbalances with Japan andother area economies; concern over human rights inChina and nuclear programs in North Korea; questionsabout the proper level of U.S. military forces; Japa-nese rearmament; the future projection ofpower by thePeople's Republic of China; and Russia's role in theregion.

The world appears to be moving toward the creationof three great trading blocs, Europe, East Asia and theWestern Hemisphere. This could bring about an ex-pansion of global trade or lead to acrimonious tradewars that threaten global prosperity. The recently


ACTIVITY BOOKTOPIC

8

concluded North American Free Trade Agreementbetween the U.S., Canada and Mexico could encouragetrade and lead to a hemisphere-wide free-trade area.

How important is European stability to the U.S.?What are U.S. priorities in East Asia and the WesternPacific? What is required for the U.S. to promote andmaintain the economic and military security of NorthAmerica? How should the U.S. define its vital interests?


1. Describe present conditions and trends in Eu-rope, East Asia and North America.

2. Discuss how vital interests are defined andaddressed in the formulation of U.S. foreignpolicy.

3. Explain why they do or do not believe thatEuropean stability, the power balance in EastAsia and the Western Pacific, and North Ameri-can economic and military security are vitalinterests.



ProcedureBegin the discussion by asking the participants if theyagree with some Americans that the U.S. has a specialrole and mission in the world. Ask them what that roleand mission are and whether or not they believe theU.S. is carrying them out properly.

Write the following on the chalkboard: "Panama(General Noriega)," "Gulf War (Saddam Hussein),""Haiti (Jean-Bertrand Aristide)," and "Somalia(Mohammed Aidid)," and ask them what actions theU.S. took in these matters and what the purpose of theaction was. Write a very brief description of U.S.actions under each heading. Point out that these ac-tions are post-cold-war initiatives on the part of theU.S. Ask them to use only these initiatives to create ageneral description of what the basic policy and inter-ests of the U.S. appear to be in the post-cold-warworld. After they have done this, ask them if theybelieve that this represents the true vital interests of theU.S. and, if not, why the U.S. took the action that it did.

Turn the discussion to Europe, East Asia and theWestern Pacific, and the Western Hemisphere. Askthem to describe problems in each of these areas in turnand why they believe that they do or do not involve thevital interests of the U.S. Ask them to discuss what theU.S. should do in order to address these concerns. Askthem to compare these suggestions with the type ofactions described previously. Ask them whether theynow have a different view about why the U.S. tookthese actions. Ask them whether or not they believe theactions have helped or harmed our ability to define andformulate a foreign policy that centers around our vitalinterests. Ask them whether or not the U.S. shouldinvolve itself in similar activities in the future andunder what circumstances.

Turn the discussion to how foreign policy is formu-lated. Ask them what they believe can and must bedone to improve the level of debate and discussionabout foreign affairs and a consensus on U.S. vitalinterests. End the discussion by asking them what theycan do as individuals to help promote this process intheir community.


TOPIC

8 ACTIVITY BOOK

GLOSSARY

Austro-Hungarian Empire. See Glossary, Topic 1: "Habsburg

dynasty."

authoritarianism. The concentration of power in the hands of

a leader or group of leaders who is not responsible to the

people.

European Community (EC). See Glossary, Topic 3.

European Monetary System (EMS). Adopted by the EC in1979, the EMS established a European currency association

and a mechanism to prevent wide fluctuations among mem-

bers' currencies.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)An organi-

zation established in Geneva in 1947 to promote world trade

through the reduction of trade barriers. The 107 countriesparticipating in the talks represent over 80% of world trade.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). See Glossary, Topic 4.

Maastricht treaty. A treaty signed in December 1991 in theDutch city of Maastricht to complete the European Community's

economic integration by establishing a single currency and a

central bank. The treaty also calls for closer political integra-

tion, through common foreign and security policies. Ratifica-

tion of the treaty by the 12 member states led to the creation of

the European Union in 1993.

market economy. See Glossary, Topic 1.

Ottoman Empire. See Glossary, Topic 1: "Ottoman dynasty."

Pax Americana. Peace guaranteed by the U.S. as a militarysuperpower. America's overwhelming superiority makes itless likely that any nation will challenge it or launch a major

war.

Tiananmen Square. See Glossary, Topic 4.



13d

HANDOUT #1TOPIC

Handout onYugoslavia

Slovenia

1. List foreign patrons, if any.

Croatia

2. Are there major internal conflicts in this state?

3. State briefly the status of military activity.

Bosnia-Herzegovina Yugoslavia

4. Give name and terms of international accords applied to this situation.


TOPIC

2 HANDOUT #2

Handout on South Africa

SEGREGATION: separation of a race, class or ethnicgroup by enforced residence in a restricted area, bybarriers to social interaction, by separate educationalfacilities or other means

APARTHEID: a policy of segregation and politicaland economic discrimination against non-Europeangroups in the Republic of South Africa

1. How was this policy enforced in the past?

SEGREGATION APARTHEID

2. What specific reforms were instituted to help bring about changes in this policy?

SEGREGATION APARTHEID


Handout on the EnvironmentNAME OF YOUR GROUP (Check one)

0 Europe 0 United Nations CI U.S. II NGOs CI Other

1. List the environmental problems of the former Soviet bloc that you believe are the gravest threats to theearth, beginning with the most serious.

Most serious

Least serious

2. What measures or actions would your group like to see taken in order to eliminate these problems in theformer Soviet bloc?

3. Explain what role, if any, you would like to see your group play in dealing with this problem.

4. Explain who you believe should pay the costs of carrying out this program. Be sure to include why youbelieve they should pay.

.1.ACTIVITY BOOK 1994 37

38

Handout on the Pacific Rim

'our nation or group

ize of population

'ype of government

Describe the economic system

live the special features, if any, of your economic system

low does your average GNP growth compare with other world areas?

Vhat are the major reasons for this growth?

Describe the present trade policy of your nation or group

What is the status of your nation? (Check one.) 0 Industrial nation 0 Developing nation

live reasons for your choice.

1 g 1ACTIVITY BOOK 1994

2.

Handout on U.S. Defense

describe what you believe should be the proper U.S. military presence and role in the following areasietween now and the year 2000. Be sure to state the reason for your answer.

Europe (NATO):

['he Pacific Rim:

The Persian Gulf:

Central and South America:

kfrica:

In support of your answers above, describe why you would or would not increase or decrease your supportfor the following items:

Total amount of military spending

Number of military personnel on active duty

Money spent for retraining of defense workers and conversion of defense industries

Number of long-range nuclear missiles

4 a

Money

BOOK 1994 39

lOPIC

6 HANDOUT #6

Handout on Argentina, Brazil, Chile

CHECK YOUR COUNTRY CI Argentina CI Brazil 0 Chile

1. Describe the political traditions.

2. What conditions caused the military to seize control of the state?

3. What aspects of military rule contributed to removing the military from power?

4. What problems exist that might lead to a military seizure of power in the future?

5. What do you predict to be the chances for a return to military rule in the near future? (Choose one and givethe reasons for your choice.)

CI Very possible (likely to occur) 0 Possible (could occur) 0 Not very possible (unlikely to occur)


143

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