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Transcript of Smart Power Appiled to the Long War
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Winning the Long War:
Applying the United States Governments Smart Power in Current and Future Conflicts
Colonel John Tien, USA Lieutenant Colonel Todd Desgrosseilliers, USMC Lieutenant Colonel Gwyn Armfield, USAF 28 May 2008 Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government National Security Program
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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of Harvard University, the United States Government, or the Department of Defense.
2008 Colonel John Tien, USA Lieutenant Colonel Todd Desgrosseilliers, USMC Lieutenant Colonel Gwyn Armfield, USAF
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Contents
Page
PREFACEI
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..IV
Chapter 1 - Introduction ..1
Chapter 2 - Smart Power and its Role in Fourth Generation Warfare,
Lieutenant Colonel Todd S. Desgrosseilliers USMC .6
Chapter 3 - The Moral Advantage in Fourth Generation Warfare:
Smart Power, Strategic Communications,
and Winning the Decisive Battle in the Long War,
Lieutenant Colonel Todd S. Desgrosseilliers USMC..................14
Chapter 4 - InterDependent Smart Power at the Regional-Level,
Lieutenant Colonel Gwyn Armfield, USAF............39
Chapter 5 - Showcasing Americas Smart Power through Nation-Building
at the Local-Level: Accomplishments and Limitations,
Colonel John Tien, USA..59
Chapter 6 - Conclusion 83
ENDNOTES.....85
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....93 BIOGRAPHIES OF AUTHORS 101
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List of Tables Table 1 Successful and Unsuccessful Practices............17
Table 2 Twenty-Eight Articles......18
Table 3 Comparison of State and Defense Departments Personnel and
Budget..............44
Table 4 FY 2007 Tal Afar District Budget ..63
List of Figures Figure 1 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines Vision for Success Card (Front)...20
Figure 2 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines Vision for Success Card (Back)22
Figure 3 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines Virtue Ethics Card (Front)24
Figure 4 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines Virtue Ethics Card (Back).....24
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Preface Our experiences in the Global War on Terror encouraged us to propose to understand
modern warfare as it applies to our current and possible future conflicts. Strategy is complicated
- similar to three-dimensional chess. We found it challenging to limit our examination of smart
power as a strategy for fourth generation warfare to the scope of this paper. Our conclusions
probably oversimplify a very complex topic. Our intention is not to minimize the importance of
the kinetic aspects of our trade, but to provide possible alternatives to augment physical
destruction for a specific environment that harbors an amorphous enemy.
In our research we found that warfare has evolved from an industrial-based to an
information-based activity. This evolution has produced a generational change in warfare. The
United States Government is struggling in its efforts to defeat radical Islamist ideology because,
in Iraq and elsewhere, it is in the midst of a fourth generation conflict that it is trying to win with
second and third generation tactics and strategy. Its current approach places too much emphasis
on the enemys physical destruction. The decisive battle in this new generation of warfare is the
moral element, not the physical element, and its center of gravity is the information environment.
So far, fourth generation warfare has defied an operational construct. Therefore, success in this
new generation of warfare means the United States must win the decisive battle at the strategic
and tactical levels of war. Our thesis states that the United States Government has been slow to
adapt to the worlds new threats and challenges. We believe the U.S. military should counter the
enemy at its own game by optimizing Americas smart power and embody core democratic
values in all that we do once in conflict and preferably, prior to conflict. Emerging operational
concepts that support it should include more interagency interdependence within the joint
operational environment. Unfortunately, this mentality does not influence the contemporary
employment alternatives on the battlefield.
A Cold War hierarchy and organization is not relevant in a world where we are engaged
in a continuous war against terrorism being fought through a series of limited engagements.
Today, a smart power strategy comes closer to relevance. Throughout this process of
examination, one question consistently came to our collective consciousness: Why does our
Nation consciously avoid combining capabilities to create a more interdependent and balanced
interagency and joint force? We propose to answer these questions - using our tactical
experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan as the foundation - to take the strategic idea of Smart Power
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as articulated by Harvard Professor Joseph Nye and provide operational perspective to make a
concrete and specific movement toward implementing his theory in the Long War.
We would like to acknowledge Lieutenant General Tad Olestrom USAF (ret) and
Professor Joseph Nye for their guidance during this papers research and development, for their
assistance in forming our thoughts, and in preparing the papers content. We would also like to
thank Marie Danziger for her assistance refining and focusing our topic. Finally, we would like
to thank Professor Peter Bergen for providing valuable feedback on our drafts to improve the
finished document.
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Executive Summary
Title: Winning the Long War of Ideas: Applying Americas Smart Power in Current and Future Conflicts Thesis: While the United States Government has been slow to adapt to the worlds new threats
and challenges, the U.S. military should now counter the enemy at its own game by optimizing
Americas smart power and embody core democratic values in all that we do once in conflict and
preferably, prior to conflict.
Thesis Question: How should the United States Government Operationalize the strategic
concept of Smart Power to current and future conflicts?
Discussion: Americas public standing in the world is possibly at its lowest point in its 231 year
history. As a result, foreign policy experts, media leaders, and academics are looking for a new
framework. Who will send the next long telegram? Who will be the new Mr. X? What will and
should be the new driving principles for how America acts abroad? Based on their on-the-ground
experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the three authors from three different military services
believe that Smart Power provides that answer. Smart Power is the result of combining
persuasive hard power with soft power that attracts or entices others to a desired end state.
Smart Power, however, is conceptual and thus, amorphous. The authors offer pragmatic steps on
how the United States Government can quickly Operationalize Smart Power for America to
succeed in the struggle against Islamic radicalism. This is an umbrella paper focusing on three
areas:
1) How to regain the initiative in the information environment by incorporating its hard
and soft tactical actions into smarter and more effective strategic communications.
2) How to synchronize State and Defense Departments efforts at the regional level.
3) How nation-building at the tactical level will continue to be a useful application of the
United States governments smart power in Iraq.
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Summary of Chapters and Recommendations:
The Moral Advantage in Fourth Generation Warfare: Smart Power, Strategic
Communications, and Winning the Decisive Battle in the Long War by Lieutenant Colonel
Todd Desgrosseilliers, United States Marine Corps. During the second half of the last century
modern warfare stirred with corresponding political, economic, social, and technological
developments - evolving from an industrial-based to an information-based activity. This
evolutionary process produced sharp changes in the way the United States opponents conduct
war in this century. The latest shift - fourth generation warfare - is both a battle of arms and a
battle of ideas. The United States Governments current approach to this emerging generation of
warfare lacks a proper grand strategy and places too much emphasis on the enemys physical
destruction. Lieutenant Colonel Desgrosseilliers explores how while killing committed
opponents remains an important result in warfare, the decisive battle in fourth generation warfare
is the moral element, not the physical element. Its center of gravity is the hearts and minds of
foreign and domestic populations. However, in an Information Age these are greatly influenced
through the information environment. The Long War is further handicapped by a failure of other
elements of United States national power diplomatic, information, and economic to capitalize
on tactical successes to generate lasting strategic results. Ultimately, success in fourth
generation warfare is more about undermining the enemys messages by persuading and
convincing moderate or indifferent populations than it is about killing and destroying the
extremists. Victory resides in linking words and deeds through effective strategic
communications. Therefore the United States Government must:
Adopt a Grand Strategy that coincides with U.S. national values and principles that aligns broader national security policy, strategic objectives, and links strategic and
tactical messages and actions.
Focus on the decisive, moral element to win hearts and minds by adopting a virtue ethic that augments and develops conscience (moral integrity), rules of common
morality, and codes of professional ethics. Link words and deeds by incorporating
this ethic into all messages and actions.
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Incorporate - down to the battalion-level within the Department of Defense - all elements of the information environment and corresponding resources under a
Strategic Communications Section.
Legislate greater interagency interdependence and integration not cooperation and inter-operability - that enables public diplomacy and strategic communication to
utilize all instruments of national power and the most current research data to disrupt
and neutralize its enemies messages.
Interdependent Smart Power at the Regional Level by Lieutenant Colonel Gwyn Armfield,
United States Air Force. The Center for Strategic and International Studies Smart Power
Commission found that combining hard and soft power, when and if it occurs happens either at
a relatively low level or at the very highest levels of government.1 Lieutenant Colonel Armfield
explores how to combine the hard power of the United States Department of Defense and the soft
power of the United States Department of State to fill a gap in the United States governments
ability to synchronize efforts at the regional level. Understanding this issue begins with
understanding the differences between State and Defense. As the two major players in United
States foreign policy, State and Defense, share few similarities. With vastly different cultural
genomes, wildly disparate budgets and personnel strength and organizational structures with no
similarities, State and Defense are not designed to interoperate. However, the current fight,
likely to continue for a generation, will demand that these instruments of hard and soft power
evolve rapidly to meet the critical needs of America. Lacking an interagency Goldwater-
Nichols type reform, progress can still be made toward filling the gap of coordination at the
regional level using current structures and authorities. Great examples of bottom-up interagency
success exist at United States Central Commands Interagency Task Force for Irregular Warfare
where various agencies work together to synchronize appropriate authorities to obtain holistic
effects (kinetic and non-kinetic) in the Middle-East for our nation2. This is but one example
where state and defense work interdependently to conduct the nations mission in a Joint
Interagency Coordination Group construct. Solutions also exist to mitigate other issues such as
Defense overreach into development aid and States lack of effective operational leaders to direct
such projects:
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Collaborate for success at the regional levelUnited States Governments regional leaders must talk to each other on a frequent, deliberate basis. Develop an effective
regional planning/execution capability enabling COCOMs and Assistant Secretaries of
State to work together as peers
Decentralize State Departments operational planning/execution capability to the regional level
Showcasing Americas Smart Power through Nation-Building at the Local-Level:
Accomplishments and Limitations by Colonel John Tien, United States Army. Colonel Tien
uses his tactical experiences from 2006-2007 in Iraq to demonstrate how nation-building at the
tactical level was and will continue to be a useful application of the United States governments
smart power in Iraq. Colonel Tien admits, however, that the United States military can advance
smart power applications only so far and that the United States government should and must
adapt its civilian deployment capacity in order to leverage the United States governments full
smart power capabilities in Iraq and other future such scenarios. According to the Center for
Strategic and International Studies Commission on Smart Power, more thought should also be
put into sequencing and integrating hard and soft power instruments, particularly in the same
operating theater. Some elements of this approach are already occurring in the conduct of
ongoing counterinsurgency, nation building, and counterterrorism operations tasks that depend
critically but only partially on hard power.3 In an attempt to defeat Al-Qaedas efforts to win
over the people, Colonel Tiens battalion used a variety of effective nation-building operations to
improve the life of the average Iraqi and demonstrate that Americas ideals of good governance,
lawful civil society, and economic prosperity were indeed a better choice for the Iraqi people
than what Al-Qaeda was offering. He uses the Iraqi cities of Tal Afar and Ramadi as case
studies to show not only what can be done, but also to show what must change in order to fully
apply all levers of the United States government. For Colonel Tiens U.S. Army Soldiers on the
ground in Iraq, they faced the issue of hard and soft power integration every day. For instance, in
the same neighborhood that a company commander ordered a massive cordon and search to
capture a known suicide bomber, that same twenty-eight year old captain exhibited amazing
public diplomacy one month later in establishing a highly effective neighborhood council. For
these United States service members, it meant becoming more of a statesman and less of a
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soldier. As The Economist so aptly put it in describing todays Soldier, the model soldier should
be less science-fiction Terminator and more intellectual for the graduate level of war,
preferably a linguist, with a sense of history and anthropology.4
Colonel Tien concludes that the US Government must:
Increase personnel staffing by at least 10 percent in the departments of United States Agency for International Development (USAID), State, Justice, Treasury, Commerce,
and Agriculture so that: (1) we can continue to man brigade-level embedded Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (ePRTs); (2) create similar ePRTs for battalions that have large
(greater than 500,000 population) civilian footprints; and (3) enable greatly increased
USAID presence and microfinance programs at the local level.
Change the way we view economic development in Iraq and other post- and pre-conflict areas especially in terms of USAID microfinance capability and reach. For Iraq, two
billion dollars versus the current $100 million allocated is needed to truly transform
Iraqs local economies and create the irreversible momentum needed in the next two
years in Iraq.
Fund and establish the Civilian Reserve Corps, Standby civilian force, and Active Response Corps. Legislation is currently pending in Congress with $250 million
requested in the 2009 Presidents budget. The current plan calls for 250 in the Active
Response Corps, 2000 in the Standby, and 2000 in the Civilian Reserve Corps.5 We must
appropriate and authorize these programs immediately for the current conflicts and
similar scenarios in the future.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction - Applying the United States Governments Smart Power in Current and Future Conflicts
Todays central question is not simply whether we are capturing or killing more terrorists than are being recruited and trained, but whether we are providing more opportunities than our enemies can destroy and whether we are addressing more grievances than they can record.
CSIS Smart Power Report
Americas public standing in the world is possibly at its lowest point in its 231 year
history. As a result, foreign policy experts, media leaders, and academics are looking for a new
framework. Who will send the next long telegram? Who will be the new Mr. X? What will and
should be the new driving principles for how the United States Government acts abroad? Based
on their on-the-ground experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the three authors from three
different military services believe that Smart Power provides that answer.
Smart Power, however, is conceptual and thus, amorphous. Usefully, it can be applied to
any action taken from what civilian and military personnel do on a street corner in Iraq to what
the Secretary of State says in a speech in London. However, there are gaps in real world
applications of how it works for the United States abroad.
The three authors will fill one of those gaps with real-world examples of what Smart
Power can accomplish on those foreign street corners. Perhaps, more importantly, they offer
recommendations on what and how the United States Government should move ahead in certain
programs to enable U.S. grand strategy as it moves forward in the Long War. In short, the United
States Government should optimize its smart power and embody core democratic values in its
foreign policy objectives particularly once in conflict and, preferably, prior to conflict.
While military application of hard power is needed to achieve a certain level of security,
the United States Government should combine this with soft power to succeed in the war of
ideas. In the recent Center for Strategic and International Studies Commission on Smart Power,
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Richard Armitage state, Smart power means developing an integrated
strategy, resource base and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and
soft powerToday, victory depends on attracting foreign populations to our side and helping
them to build capable, democratic states.6
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Secretary Robert Gates agrees and in particular called for the United States to review
resources allocated to its smart power and how it applies it at home and abroad. On November
27, 2007, he said in Manhattan, Kansas:
My message is that if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad. In short, based on my experience serving seven presidents, as a former Director of CIA and now as Secretary of Defense, I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use "soft" power and for better integrating it with "hard" power. One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more - these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success. Accomplishing all of these tasks will be necessary to meet the diverse challenges I have described.7
Understanding the context of the struggle we are in, of course, is critical. The United States is
locked in a struggle, but the enemy is defining the battlefield.
In the pages that follow, the three authors will examine the application of Smart Power
based on their experiences in the current conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and more broadly the
Long War against terror and other threats. The reader, however, should not view their
experiences through the prism of irregular warfare or even the current label of the Global War on
Terrorism. Instead, military officers and Americans in general, should understand that ultimately
the United States of America is locked in a struggle against ideas.
Unfortunately, the United States Government is currently dealing with a global
environment with an internal Cold War mindset that puts it at a significant disadvantage of
winning this struggle. This must change. The conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and throughout the
globe now and in the future, are not military or even purely insurgency revolutions, but are
religious, political, and social upheavals. In todays current parlance, we are fighting what
William Lind calls fourth generation warfare.
Lind said, all over the world, citizens of states are transferring their primary
allegiance away from the state to other things: to tribes, ethnic groups, religions, gangs,
ideologies and so on. The first three generations of warfare were conventional and even when
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they were unconventional in tactics; the heart of the matter was the survival or destruction of a
state. In fourth generation warfare, the war is fought not only on the ground of a nation-state, but
also in the boundless world of ideas - moral, political, and social. Fortunately, if applied
correctly, Smart Power can - and should - form the theoretical paradigm that the United States
Government assumes in its bid for victory on todays fourth generation warfare battlefield.
So far, fourth generation warfare defies an operational construct. Therefore, success in
warfares next evolution means the United States must win the decisive battle at the strategic and
tactical levels of war while it re-defines warfares operational art. It must do this by bridging the
gap between theory and practice adopting a grand strategy founded on the moral element that
employs smarter organized, integrated, and trained military forces. It must build forces that
possess the capability to blend hard and soft power and to seize the initiative in the information
environment to exploit inconsistencies in its enemys messages and actions. This will create an
informed combination of its coercive and attractive powers that morally undermines its enemys
purposes and eliminates their causes.
Adding to this debate, U.S. Air Force Colonel (ret) John Boyd identified three
complementary levels of war that the United States must consider: the physical, the mental, and
the moral. He said that what works for you on the physical and sometimes mental level often
works against you on the moral level. In todays conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in our
struggles to identify ourselves relative to Islamist radicalism, the United States Government is
well positioned to win at the tactical level through physical domination and to a lesser extent the
mental level. However, because the United States Government committed itself to conduct war
physically on the tactic terrorism - and not morally through its words and deeds on those who
committed the act on 9/11 it is losing the war at the moral level. The decisive victory, however,
resides in the moral element.
Each of the authors has fought on these fourth generation warfare battlefields, physically,
mentally, and morally. They will show that the United States Government can usefully translate
smart power into real accomplishments on the ground, but more importantly, it can serve as a
strategic, operational, and tactical guide to United States Governmental polices and actions.
In the first and second chapters, United States Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Todd
Desgrosseilliers explores why the United States Government is struggling in its efforts to defeat
radical Islamist ideology. Primarily the United States Government conflates this struggle
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because it lacks a proper focus of effort. In Iraq and elsewhere, the United States is in the midst
of a fourth generation conflict that it is trying to win with second and third generation military
strategy and tactics. It lacks a grand strategy to disable organizations like Al Qaeda and its
leader Osama bin Laden. This difficulty is further enhanced by a failure of other elements of
U.S. national power diplomatic, information, and economic to capitalize on tactical successes
to generate lasting strategic results.
Based upon his experience in Iraqs Al Anbar Province from 2004-2007, he believes a
better understanding of warfares new demands will drive a willingness to adopt a Smart Power
grand strategy to adapt to them. This grand strategy in turn - will force major changes in how
the United States trains and educates its military and civilian personnel and how it organizes and
employs these forces in current and future conflicts. The United States must win hearts and
minds by using its smart power to convince local populations that it can protect them and
persuade them its success and their success is linked and mutual. Ultimately, success means the
United States Government must regain the initiative in the information environment by
incorporating its hard and soft tactical actions into smarter and more effective strategic
communications.
In the third chapter, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Gwyn Armfield examines Smart
Powers operational level. He served a special operations unit commander in United States
Central Command from 2005-2007 in addition to eight years of experience in interagency
counter terrorism. He examines how to translate Smart Power from theory to practice where the
United States Government needs it most at the regional level. His chapter is about combining
the power of the State Department and the Department of Defense to work at the regional level
despite vastly different cultural genomes, wildly disparate budgets, personnel strengths, and
dissimilar organizational structures.
The current fight - likely to continue for a generation - demands that these hard and soft
power instruments rapidly evolve to meet the United States Governments critical requirements
in the Long War. Specifically, the chapter explores the State Departments need to decentralize
operations and fill a major gap between their mother ship headquarters in Washington, D.C.
and the hundreds of United States embassies throughout the world. The State Department must
expand its soft power at the regional level to balance the Defense Departments combatant
commanders regional and monolithic hard power presence.
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Lieutenant Colonel Armfield recommends specific actions to restore balance - enabling
smart power planning and implementation to work with a regional approach. The United States
Government possesses ample authorities to effectively employ the inter-agency, but it cannot
micromanage it from Washington, D.C. where the solutions to regional issues will always
maintain a bias toward solving the problem of the day inside the beltway. However, the State
Department and the Department of Defense must use available resources and authorities to re-
group and to form teams that focus on regional issues. Only then will the strategic
recommendations from the Smart Power Commission translate into enhanced influence for
America and for the international community.
In the last chapter, U.S. Army Colonel John Tien uses his tactical experiences from 2006-
2007 in Iraq to demonstrate how nation-building at the tactical level was and will continue as a
useful application of the United States Governments Smart Power in Iraq. Colonel Tien admits,
however, that the United States military can advance Smart Power applications only so far.
Therefore the United States Government must adapt its civilian deployment capacity to leverage
the United States Governments full Smart Power capabilities in Iraq and other similar future
scenarios. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies Commission on Smart
Power, more thought should also be put into sequencing and integrating hard and soft power
instruments, particularly in the same operating theater. Some elements of this approach are
already occurring in the conduct of ongoing counterinsurgency, nation building, and
counterterrorism operations tasks that depend critically but only partially on hard power.8
In an attempt to defeat Al-Qaedas efforts to win over the people, Colonel Tiens
battalion used a variety of effective nation-building operations to improve the life of the average
Iraqi and to demonstrate that the United States Governments ideals of good governance, lawful
civil society, and economic prosperity provided a better choice for the Iraqi people than what Al-
Qaeda was offering them. He will showcase the efforts of several Soldiers and officers in his
battalion in two very distinct regions of Iraq: Tal Afar in Nineveh Province; and Ramadi in Al
Anbar Province. He will use these two Iraqi cities as case studies to show not only what the
United States Government can do, but also to show what must change to fully apply all levers of
the United States Government. Perhaps most importantly though, the response to his battalions
use of Smart Power from local government officials and the everyday man on the street, were -
as the Smart Power Commission hoped - welcomed by Iraqi societys moderate factions.
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Colonel Tien concludes that while the United States military helped fill the vacuum
created by the lack of on-the-ground qualified United States Governmental
development/assistance experts, there are many reforms within the United States Government
that it should undertake immediately to include: increased staffing to the embedded Provincial
Reconstruction Teams; initial staffing and funding of the Civilian Reserve Corps; increased
staffing and support to the Active Response Corps; as well as initiating and supporting more
bottom-up economic reform especially through microfinance programs.
Clearly from the three authors experiences and recommendations, this is not an easy
struggle to win, but it is a struggle we must win. Harvard Professor Dr. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. said,
To win the war on terrorism, the United States will have to show as much skill in the future in
wielding its soft power as it has shown in the past in wielding its hard power.9
As officers who have led battalion-level organizations in Operation Iraqi Freedom and
Operation Enduring Freedom, we realize that victorys final element resides within sources of
power other than the military. Particularly, it will come from what the United States
Government is uniquely able to offer in the way of international leadership, democratic and
moral principles, values, ideas, and hope. Prior to examining the three officers treatment of
smart power in their strategic, operational, and tactical contexts, it is useful to possess a more
concrete understanding of smart power is and how it fits within warfares evolution.
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Chapter 2 - Smart Power and its Role in Fourth Generation Warfare
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establishthe kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.
Carl von Clausewitz, On War
The world expects the United States to behave like a great power in its relationships with
other nations. Its prudent leadership is expected and is essential to ensure peace and prosperity
for most nations within the international community. This international leadership responsibility
means that its national posture must reflect the confidence and the strength as well as the hope
embodied in its national values and its founding principles. This is not Pollyannaish wishful
thinking; nor an argument for triumphalism or belligerence, but neither should the United States
Government leave any doubt that other nations or organizations can violate its interests, security,
and rights as a nation without consequences. This approach will not cause other nations to love
the United States, but a policy of consistency and fairness will promote dignity and generate
respect dignity and respect is the mortar that binds enduring relationships and sustains the
strong alliances necessary to defeat international terrorism.
Duncan MacInnes, Principal Deputy Coordinator for the Bureau of International
Information Programs in the U. S. State Department, made the following statement about the
importance of national values during testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and
Capabilities:
During the Cold War, we fought a traditional enemy in the USSR and our tools included traditional public diplomacy tools such as educational exchanges, publications, and mainstream media. These tools are still very effective at winning hearts and minds, but are not sufficient by themselves. Our themes to win the war of ideas against communism stressed our core values our dedication to liberty, democracy, freedom of speech and religion, and free markets and our opposition to intellectual coercion, and political and economic oppression. These principles remain relevant and powerful today, but we need to continue to develop new tactics to counter an elusive and decentralized non-
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state foe [that] uses the Internet and new technologies to spread its ideology of violence.10
Why not start the process with a grand strategy properly constructed to win the decisive
moral - battle? A Smart Power grand strategy will provide a blueprint that will enable American
values on the ground to attract moderate populations to our side while it provides the security to
build capable governance. According to Joseph S. Nye, Jr. of Harvard University, Soft Power
is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or paymentsWhen
our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced.11 He adds
that soft power uses a different type of currency to engender cooperation an attraction to
shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values."12 A
nations soft power attraction - rests on three resources:13
1. Culture.
2. Political values.
3. Foreign policy.
Contrarily, hard power coercion - uses base human elements as its medium; fear and
self-interest:
1. Force, threat of force.
2. Economic sanctions.
3. Payments.
These all provide hard power its employment. While military application of coercive
power is often necessary to achieve a certain level of security, to succeed in fourth generation
warfare, the United States should temper its effects by blending hard power with other
attractive elements of national power as part of a comprehensive Smart Power grand strategy.
In the recent Center for Strategic and International Studies Commission report on Smart
Power, Joseph Nye and Ambassador Richard Armitage state,
Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft powerToday, victory depends on attracting foreign populations to our side and helping them to build capable, democratic states.14
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This means the United States must invest in the global good by providing things that
other nations cannot get without United States leadership. This strategy includes five critical
areas:15
1. Developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve
American objectives drawing on both hard and soft power.
2. Attracting foreign populations toward American objectives and helping them
build capable democratic states.
3. Complementing U.S. military and economic might with greater investments in
soft power enablers such as:
a. Alliances, partnerships, and institutions.
b. Global development.
c. Public diplomacy.
d. Economic integration.
e. Technology and innovation.
4. Provide the things that foreign populations and their governments want but cannot
get without American leadership.
5. Defeating the terrorists narrative that the United States is weak-willed and hard-
hearted.
If the United States complements its military and economic might with a greater
emphasis on soft power, it can begin to construct a grand strategy framework it needs to tackle
the emerging challenges presented by international terrorism:
1. Small, adaptable, networked, transnational, non-state actors versus large, inflexible,
bureaucratic, international nation-states.
2. No purely military solution.
3. Purely military solution is desired by terrorist organizations.
4. Use of terrorist attacks as a legitimate form of warfare combined with globalization of
martyrdom.
5. Use of the ungoverned information environment to deliver existential moral message
that transcends nation-state loyalties.
Re-gaining the moral advantage in the Long War requires adopting a moral basis for the
United States grand strategy. It needs a grand strategy that regulates the United States
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Governments actions in warfare to ensure they remain consistent with its espoused values and
principles. History demonstrates that unilateral military action tends to produce a backlash in
domestic and international opinion. Americas pre-eminent grand strategist Colonel John Boyd
U.S. Air Force (ret) recommended adopting a unifying vision as a moral basis for any grand
strategy to avoid unintended consequences of what others may view as an aggressive foreign
policy.
Colonel Boyd highlights that its Declaration of Independence and Constitution present
this vision for the United States. Using these documents as its foundation leaves the principal
challenge to United States grand strategy to advocating the ideals embodied in them, while it
demonstrates respect for the culture and achievements of its allies, potential adversaries, and the
populations of actual adversaries. Boyd suggested a straight-forward, three-part approach:16
1. With respect to the United States:
a. Live up to its ideals.
b. Eliminate flaws in the system.
c. Emphasize cultural traditions, experiences, and unfolding events that
build-up harmony and trust.
2. With respect to its adversaries:
a. Publicize their [terrorists] harsh statements and threats to highlight that
their [the terrorists] survival is always at risk.
b. Reveal mismatches between their [terrorists] professed ideals and how
their government [terrorists] actually acts [act].
c. Acquaint their [foreign] population[s] with its [terrorists] philosophy and
way of life to show that the mismatches of their government [message and
actions] do not accord with any social value based on either the value or
the dignity of the individual or on the security and the well being of
society as a whole.
3. With respect to uncommitted and potential adversaries:
a. Show respect for their culture.
b. Bear them no harm.
c. Reward harmony with common causes.
10
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d. Demonstrate that it will not tolerate nor support those ideas and intentions
that work against its culture and fitness to cope.
Boyds approach assumed a relationship between nation-states in an international
community. We can modify this with respect to its adversaries to apply to terrorists with equal
relevance. Information and associated information systems are essential to integrate these
activities into a comprehensive strategic communications plan to defeat the enemy. Although
intended to work against other nation-states, this moral basis for grand strategy will also limit the
support for terrorist adversaries. Its success depends upon the United States ability to uphold its
moral element and to use the information environment to connect words and deeds and to deliver
its important messages.
A Smart Power grand strategy is best applied to fourth generation warfare because
neither offers purely military solutions for success. This means that other elements of national
power diplomatic, information, and economic must combine to support or in many cases -
lead military actions. Unlike the three previous generations of warfare, fourth generation
warfare is not a result of a revolution within the military.17 It is a political, social, and moral
revolution: a crisis of nation-state legitimacy. On one side its participants seek to destroy the
nation-state, on the other side they want to preserve or restore the nation-state.
Properly applied fourth generation warfare uses the moral element to collapse one side
internally rather than emphasizing the physical destruction of its military forces or wartime
resources. While previous generations were two-sided conflicts between nation-states, fourth
generation warfare is often a many-sided struggle where many different entities enter the fray.
Strategic targets include:
1. International and domestic support for the war.
2. Hearts and minds of local populations.
3. All networks available in the information environment.
Tactical strengths include:
1. Local language capabilities.
2. Public diplomacy skills.
3. Information collection and dissemination capabilities.
4. Micro-economics enabling capabilities.
5. Willingness to conduct dismounted patrolling combined with civil affairs skills.
11
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6. Proficiency employing precision munitions combined with close combat fighting
skills.
7. Sharp instincts tied to a beat cop mentality.
8. Sturdy professionalism.
9. Self-discipline.
10. A solid moral compass and a virtue ethic.
Fourth generation warfares asymmetric nature places high importance on correctly identifying
the enemys center of gravity in the Long War it resides within the hearts and minds of
foreign and domestic populations. The advent of the Information Age and technology that
ensures a globally-connected world means this center of gravity resides within the information
environment. This makes strategic communications the ability to influence attitudes,
perceptions, and behaviors a critical capability to ensure this center of gravity becomes a
significant source of strength for the United States and not its enemies.
In spite of this change the Ancient Greek historian Thucydides conclusions about
warfares nature in his treatise The Peloponnesian War remain constant. Warfare is still driven
by the interaction of power, interests, and passions and states still act out of fear, honor, and self-
interest. Furthermore, although fourth generation warfare may have turned Clausewitz theory of
Trinitarian warfare and wars conduct on its head, his ideas about its governance remain
constant.18 It is still dominated by uncertainty, chance, danger, and physical effort. So, while
some elements of warfare remain constant throughout history its conduct changes. Since 1648
and the Peace of Westphalia, its conduct changed in response to corresponding political,
economic, social, and technological developments in society as a whole. Today, success means
adapting to or better yet anticipating changes in wars conduct. In the Long War, success
means winning the decisive battle which resides in fourth generation warfares moral element.
A true Smart Power grand strategy requires a strategic overhaul of the United States
Government from its current Cold War hierarchy to align resources to meet these new
challenges. The most important change for a successful strategy will require interdependence
among and within governmental agencies. This interdependence is particularly critical between
and within the stove-piped and institutional cultures that represent the elements of United States
national power diplomatic, information, military and economic. A true smart power strategy
requires a highly flexible, inter-agency command system that can coordinate across multiple
12
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national agencies and address international issues with results-oriented solutions. This
requirement will successfully abandon the ineffective, inter-operability, spirit of cooperation
mindset that undermines joint and inter-agency operations and negates some of the United
States success its current conflict. Most importantly it will drive organization, training, and
funding to focus more on results and less on effort from the strategic to the tactical level in the
Long War. A smart power strategy more focused on results and less on effort, process, and
procedure is better suited for a new generation of warfare against a highly adaptive and results-
oriented enemy.
13
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Chapter 3 - The Moral Advantage in Fourth Generation Warfare: Smart Power, Strategic
Communications, and Winning the Decisive Battle in the Long War
When I was a young officer, I was taught that if you have air superiority, land superiority and sea superiority, you win. Well, in Vietnam we had air superiority, land superiority and sea superiority, but we lost. So I realized there is something more to it. Colonel John Boyd, USAF (Ret)
During the second half of the last century modern warfare stirred with corresponding
political, economic, social, and technological developments - evolving from an industrial-based
to an information-based activity. This evolutionary process produced sharp changes in the way
the United States opponents conduct war in this century. The latest shift - fourth generation
warfare - is both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas. It is a fight against non-state actors and
their murderous ideology. The United States Governments current approach to this emerging
generation of warfare lacks a proper grand strategy and places too much emphasis on the
enemys physical destruction. While killing committed opponents remains an important result in
warfare, the decisive battle in fourth generation warfare is the moral element, not the physical
element, and the hearts and minds of foreign and domestic populations is the center of gravity.
In an information age, the hearts and minds reside in the information environment - a collection
of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, circulate, or act on information.
So far, fourth generation warfare has defied an operational construct. Therefore, success
in warfares Generation-X means the United States Government must win the decisive battle at
the strategic and tactical levels of war while it re-defines warfares operational art. It must do
this by bridging the gap between theory and practice adopting a grand strategy founded on the
moral element that employs smarter organized, integrated, and trained civilian and military
forces. It must build forces that possess the capability to blend hard and soft power creating
smart power. Effective strategic communications - the ability to influence attitudes, behaviors
and perceptions of foreign and domestic populations - can then seize the initiative in the
information environment to exploit inconsistencies in its enemys messages and actions.
Effective strategic communications combined with actions that incorporate all elements of
14
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national power will create an informed combination of the United States Governments coercive
and attractive powers that morally undermines its enemys purposes and eliminates their causes.
21st Century warfares rapidly changing conduct is further complicated by amorphous
opponents like al Qaeda - who transfer their primary allegiance away from their nation-state.
With an enormous bureaucracy and a highly centralized structure designed to defeat the military
forces of other nation-states, this makes it difficult for the United States military alone to subdue
non-state actors that conduct illegal warfare through terrorism. Abut Ubeid Al-Qurashi,
writing in 2002 to encourage al Qaeda members in Afghanistan after the U.S. launched
Operation Enduring Freedom demonstrates that this fact is not lost on Americas enemies:
Fourth Generation Wars haveproven the superiority of the weaker powerThis forecast did not arise in a vacuumfourth-generation wars have already occurred andthe superiority of the theoretically weaker party has already been proven; in many instances, nation-states have been defeated by stateless nations[America] is baffled by fourth-generation warfare19
The United States Government is struggling in its efforts to defeat radical Islamist
ideology because, in Iraq and elsewhere, it is in the midst of a fourth generation conflict that it is
trying to win with second and third generation military strategy and tactics. This difficulty is
further enhanced by a failure of other elements of U.S. national power diplomatic, information,
and economic to capitalize on tactical successes to generate lasting strategic results. This
chapter will use a case study to explain how a better understanding of warfares new demands
must drive a willingness to adopt a grand strategy using the smart power concept to adapt to
them. Specifically it will demonstrate how this understanding, in turn, will compel the United
States Government to focus more on strategic communicationsmoving it into Colonel Boyds
war with something more to it.
Connecting Words and Deeds: 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines in Habbaniyah, Iraq 2006-2007
The side that knows when to fight and when not will take the victory. There are roadways not to be traveled, armies not to be attacked, walled cities not to be assaulted.
Sun Tsu The world doesnt fear a new idea. It can pigeonhole any idea. But it cant pigeonhole a new experience. D. H. Lawrence, The White Peacock
15
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Given the generational shift in warfare the question we should ask ourselves is what can
be done? I opened the previous chapter with a quote from Carl von Clausewitz stressing the
importance of judgment in statesmen and military commanders to establish the kind of war they
are fighting. Aristotles observation on reasoning that a small mistake at the beginning becomes
a big one at the ends holds true in warfare as well. The failure of second generation strategy and
tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan provide ample support to this statement.
The first step to success in the current generation of conflict is to evaluate the strategic,
operational, and tactical requirements accordingly. We must acknowledge that this generation of
warfare like other elements in the modern world - exists within the information environment.
This makes information a significant source of strength for the side that uses it best. Also, we
must understand that a fourth generation adversarys goal is the destruction of the nation-state.
Therefore, removing all the elements of a nation-states national powerlike the United States
did in Iraqonly works in the enemys favor.
The next step is to understand and draw lessons from the relatively few cases throughout
history where nation-state sponsored military forces succeeded in preserving or restoring another
nation- states security, governance, and economic integration. In his book, The Changing Face
of War, Martin van Creveld demonstrates that most wars since 1945 have been conflicts where
insurgents have won meaning of course that most nation-state restoration projects failed in
their efforts. However, this does not mean that counter-insurgent forces need to resign
themselves to failure. It does mean that we should throw overboard 99 percent of the
literature on counterinsurgency, counter-guerrilla, counterterrorism, and the like. Since most of
it has been written by the loosing side, it is of little value.20 Harvard Professor Kalev Sepps
Military Review article, Best Practices in Counterinsurgency and Australian Army Lieutenant
Colonel David Kilcullens research paper Twenty-eight Articles are two examples of valuable
and comprehensive fourth generation warfare research.
16
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Successful Emphasis on intelligence Focus on population, their needs, and
security Secure areas established and expanded Insurgents isolated from population Single authority Effective, pervasive psychological
operations Amnesty and rehabilitation for
insurgents Police in lead; military supporting Police force expanded, diversified Conventional military forces re-oriented
for counterinsurgency Special Forces, advisors embedded with
indigenous forces Insurgent sanctuaries denied
Unsuccessful Primacy of military direction Priority to kill-capture enemy vice
engaging population Battalion-size operations as the norm Military units concentrated on large
bases for protection Special Forces focused on raiding Advisor effort a low priority in
personnel assignment Building, training indigenous army in
image of selves Peacetime government processes Open borders, airspace, coastlines
Table 1 Successful and Unsuccessful Practices21
Professor Sepp undertook a study of fifty-three 20th Century insurgencies to draw lessons
from successes and failures in this common type of conflict. His lessons, outlined in Table 1,
provide successful and unsuccessful practices drawn from his research.22 These practices
directly apply to battalion-level operations in a fourth generation environment and present some
useful principles for fourth generation warfare at its tactical level. His successful efforts draw on
a combination of both hard and soft power whereas his unsuccessful efforts draw heavily on hard
power and military direction. Since tactical efforts cannot succeed on their own results, their
ultimate value rests in their link to strategic objectives. Clearly, successful efforts relied on a
blending of coercive and attractive power; whereas unsuccessful efforts primarily focused on
hard power and an insurgent forces physical destruction.
17
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Twenty-Eight Articles
Article 1 Know your Turf Article 2 Diagnose the Problem Article 3 Organize for Intelligence Article 4 Travel light and harden Logistics Article 5 - Organize for Interagency Operations Article 6 Find a Political/Cultural Advisor Article 7 Train the Squad leaders and trust
Them Article 8 Rank is Nothing Talent is
Everything Article 9 Have a game plan Article 10 Be There Article 11 Avoid Knee-Jerk Responses to
First Impressions Article 12 Prepare for Handover from Day
One Article 13 Build Trusted Networks Article 14 Start Easy Article 15 Seek Early Victories Article 16 Practice Deterrent Patrolling Article 17 Be Prepared for Setbacks Article 18 Remember the Global Audience Article 19 Engage the Women; Beware the
Children
Article 20 Take Stock Regularly Article 21 Exploit a Single Narrative Article 22 Local Forces should Mirror
the Enemy Not Us Article 23 Practice Armed Civil
Affairs Article 24 Small is Beautiful Article 25 Fight the Enemys Strategy
Not his Forces Article 26 Build your own Solution
Only Attack the enemy When he Gets in the Way
Article 27 Keep Your Extraction Plan Secret
Article 28 Whatever Else Your DoKeep the initiative
Table 2 Twenty-Eight Articles23
Lieutenant Colonel Kilcullen linked various counterinsurgency theories with tactical
fundamentals, techniques, and procedures familiar to many military personnel. His twenty-eight
articles, listed in Table 2, provide some tactical fundamentals drawn from his professional study
of counterinsurgency and personal experience in these fourth generation environments
throughout his career as an officer in the Australian Army. These articles directly apply to
company-level operations in a fourth generation environment. They provide some useful
principles for fourth generation warfare at the tactical level and also recognize the value of
combining hard and soft power for success. The key role assumed
by the information environment is highlighted in Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 11, 13, 18, 19, 21, 23, and
25. Out of 28 articles, eleven - or 44 percent - involve effects in the information environment.
18
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Its hard to imagine a successful outcome without effective strategic communication - along with
the plans, resources, and capabilities to make it work.
Used as a case study for tactical analysis, the Marine Corps infantry battalion I led from
January 2006 to June 2007 adopted the successful principles and the twenty-eight articles
outlined by Sepp and Kilcullen to form our concept of operations for our deployment to Iraq in
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. We also drew lessons from other units deployments to
Anbar Province through the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS) and the Center for
Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and incorporated these into our pre-deployment training plans.
Our goal was to identify best practices and adapt these into the current situation for the area of
Iraq where we were planning to operate.
We deployed to Iraqs Al Anbar Province in June 2006 and were assigned responsibility
for the area between East Ramadi and West Fallujah along 36 kilometers of the Fallujah-Ramadi
Road. We remained there until we departed in February 2007. The region locally known as
Habbaniyah - included about 45,000 Iraqi citizens and was mostly rural with some small villages
and one urban area Khalidayah - with about 25,000 Iraqi citizens. The rest lived in or near
smaller villages spread throughout our assigned area.
In Iraq, we entered a fourth generation environment. We were a second generation
organization that was well-prepared for the physical confrontation, but were only partly prepared
for the decisive moral engagement. We lacked: sufficient foreign language capabilities;
cultivated public diplomacy skills; sufficient information analysis capabilities; micro-economics
capabilities; and a results-oriented civil affairs capability. We recognized the change in wars
conduct before we deployed to Iraq andalthough we acknowledged we would lack some of the
unique skills required for successdeveloped a concept for operating that ultimately enabled us
to accomplish part of our mission. Figure 1 and figure 2 are the front and back of a pocket card
we developed to represent our vision for success.
We carried these cards as pocket items and used them in our pre-deployment training in
the United States and in our combat patrol briefings in Iraq to keep us focused on our mission
turning a stable, secure, environment - based upon the rule of law - over to an elected and
effective Iraqi government. Our overarching concept was to prepare ourselves for the next
battlefield. Over 50 percent of the battalions personnel completed at least one other deployment
to Iraq or Afghanistan. This top to our pillars was designed to promote learning within the unit
19
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Figure 1 Vision for Success Card (Front)
and avoid a this is how we did it last time mentality. Our goal was to become a learning
organization that placed value on initiative tempered by wisdom - and to avoid a reactive
approach to challenges from the enemy. Assisted by Sepp and Kilcullens research, we
understood that our actions must transmit a basic respect for individual rights and their collective
culture and traditions as well as a concern for the dignity of individual Iraqi citizens. We
understood that legitimate, honest, well-trained, and robust indigenous police forces that
supported good governance were the keys to success. Therefore, put an Iraqi capability on it
was our first and main pillar -- supporting the Iraqi military and Iraqi police and developing
governance through civil affairs activities- became our main effort. This meant that our best
personnel - including our operations officer, best company commander, and key enlisted
leadership who were not replaced - went to augment the three Military Transition Teams that
supported the 1st Iraqi Army Divisions Third Brigade and the Police Training Team located at
20
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Camp Habbaniyah. As the Battalions main effort, our civil affairs officer accompanied me on
patrols every day until he was wounded by an enemy sniper and medically evacuated from Iraq
(like the rest of our wounded, he was not replaced).
The absence of effective Iraqi Police Forces and any form of governance in our assigned
area meant that we needed to work closely with the Iraqi Army units stationed with us to provide
security along with other basic needs like water and electricity. We also needed to help local
citizens create legitimate governance that connected them to the Provincial capital in Ramadi.
Our goal was to create a stable secure environment for the Iraqi people.
This meant we practiced armed civil affairs while we marginalized the enemy forces
operating in our area. We fought the enemys strategynot his forces by responding with
precise and devastating force when attacked; capturing those who were about to attack us; and
maintaining the initiative through a robust strategic communications effort. We sought to
morally undermine the enemy, convince them to stop fighting, and become part of a peaceful
resolution to the local situation. Those who would not defect or surrender, were either captured
or killed in combined operations with the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, and a group of unarmed
concerned local citizens (formed in November 2006) that called themselves Thawar al Anbar
(Anbar Revolutionary Fighters).
The first pillar highlighted the importance of mentoring and coaching as well as training
and operating with indigenous forces while doing no harm to noncombatants and the local
infrastructure. The key to success was building a stable and secure environment that was
ensured by legitimate, indigenous, security forces. This understanding eliminated some of the
stigma that our forces carried as invaders and occupiers in Iraq. Our concentration on the Iraqi
Army and Iraqi Police forces maintained our focus on the moral element critical to success in a
fourth generation environment.
The second pillar acknowledged the necessity to fight the enemy. The fourth generation
environment meant we would face an enemy that hides among the local population. So we
adopted an instinct-based mentality common among street-fighters or hunters. A large part of
the moral element was convincing the local population that we could protect them from the
terrorists. Our superior combat power meant that the enemy would avoid prolonged battles with
us. Therefore, when we were attacked, we needed to win this 10-second street fight by relying
on three Principles of War: security, surprise, and unity of command. We used a guardian
21
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angel concept that drove our planning to avoid making uncovered moves on the battlefield and
forced us to examine the second and third order effects of killing and destroying the enemy a
collateral damage assessment. Often, avoiding collateral damage or de-escalating violence
became more important than killing the enemy. We tempered our desire to fight the enemy with
tactical patience using intelligence to fight him on ground that we chose. This acknowledged
fourth generation warfares unique environment where success is moral and often counter-
intuitive because it is primarily about persuading and convincing the moderate populations that
you can protect them and that you have their best interests in mind - killing and destroying the
extremists is often secondary to these primary concerns.
Figure 2 Vision for Success Card (Back)
The third pillar recognized that the goal of our enemy was to destroy the creation of a
stable and secure nation-state in Iraq and supported our goal to restore the rule of law and
22
-
legitimate governance. Our national values of freedom, justice, and respect for human dignity
served as a foundation for our actions and provided a framework for fighting an amoral enemy.
We saw the information environment as the center of gravity as we struggled to deliver our
message and undermine that of the enemy. Over a period of several months of trial and error,
effective information operations (actually strategic communications) enabled us to compete in
the decisive battle for the moral element -- collapsing the enemy internally rather than exclusive
focus on physically destroying his forces.
The back of the card we used to outline our vision for success (Figure 2) directly
addressed the moral element in the fourth generation conflict we expected to encounter in Iraq.
These ideas formed the essence of our strategic communications efforts. Applying Colonel John
Boyds idea of adopting a unifying vision as a moral basis to avoid unintended consequences of
what others may view as aggressive behavior, we locally applied his idea of grand strategy. We
looked at behavior with respect to ourselves; with respect to our adversaries; and with respect to
the uncommitted and/or potential adversaries.
We examined the types of people we would see in Iraq - from their perspective. We
thought they would see themselves as either insurgent - against the Iraqi government and
coalition forces; indifferent neither for nor against either side; or innocent caught somewhere
in the middle with no means to protect themselves from either side and unable or unwilling to
leave the area. We hoped to win the hearts and minds of the last two types with tactical
actions that convinced them that we could protect them and strategic communications that
persuaded them that we had their best interests in mind.
We thought they would view us in three ways:
1. How we treat them.
2. How we protect them.
3. How we compensate them.
Without going to deeply into cultural anthropology, we tried to treat them in a way that
was consistent with their culture as we understood it. We relied heavily on Raphael Patais
book, The Arab Mind as reference for our conclusions. We thought the Iraqi people placed high
value on humility and a sense of personal honor and pride. We addressed this by resolving to
treat the indifferent and the innocent with dignity and respect and adopting restraint in the use of
force whenever these types of people where involved in a given situation.
23
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For ourselves we adopted an ethic a process that leads to a moral outcome - that
emphasized conduct based upon Aristotles classical virtues of character - prudence, courage,
temperance, and justice. For us, justice meant truthfulness; temperance meant restraint; courage
meant fortitude; and prudence meant wisdom. Our Battalion Chaplain, U.S. Navy Lieutenant
John Anderson, was instrumental in developing these concepts and worked closely with me and
the units various commanders and senior enlisted personnel to deliver them to the men. We also
borrowed heavily from James Toners excellent book on this subject, Morals under the Gun:
The Cardinal Virtues, Military Ethics, and American Society, to create a pamphlet on Virtue
Ethics for the battalions leadership to use as a reference to train themselves and the men.
Military ethical and moral training should focus on developing moral behavior in its non-
commissioned officers and commissioned officers through a practical understanding and
Figure 4 Virtue Ethics Card (Back)
Figure 3 Virtue Ethics Card (Front)
application of virtue ethics. Character development based upon personal integrity augmented
with simple pocket cards like the one identified in figure 3 and figure 4 were sufficient to insert
virtue into their daily training routine. Treating others with dignity and respect, following the
Golden Rule, and a willingness to learn about other cultures goes further toward overcoming
cultural boundaries than any amount of cultural sensitivity training.
Certain human actions are preceded and caused by what Thomas Jefferson called
operations of the mind. Fourth generation warfares requirement for successful counter-
insurgent forces to disburse into small tactical units across a wide area means creating identities
in inter-group leadership is crucial for success. The strategic corporal must understand and
24
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execute
s
d.
ral
d the innocent or indifferent noncombatants that stemmed from
three so
rtue
nstead
he
ess. This
approac ed
o; and for what we use. This principle is fully articulated in Mao Tse-Tungs
classic book on revolutionary guerrilla warfare, On Guerrilla Warfare, in his three rules and
eight rem
actions are subject to command.
e the house.
the commanders intent with initiative and an understanding of how the big picture
applies to individual actions.
Visible behavior often springs from invisible traits generally attributed to a person
moral compass. Harvard Professor Lawrence Kohlberg does an excellent job of demonstrating
that moral behavior is not automatic in humans. It is learned and often requires enforced
learning to make it habit -part of individual character in humans below the age of 20 years ol
The majority of my battalion was below this threshold. Our goal was to develop ingrained mo
habits to guard against the corrupting influence of power - what Professor Joseph Nye calls
the dangers of ego-centered intuitionism24 We hoped to use this to build on a general
sense of moral obligation towar
urces: a sense of conscience; obligatory individual rules of common morality; and our
professional code of ethics.25
We felt it was not too much to hope that enforced behavior patterns can alter the moral
attributes of an individuals character. Free-play exercises laced with ethical challenges that are
part of tactical decision-making and mission accomplishment create an environment where vi
and ethics become part of individual leadership placing a focus on combat effectiveness i
of combat readiness. We used these cards during our deployment to Iraq in 2006 and 2007.
They were carried as pocket items throughout the battalion and used during combat patrol
briefings to reinforce these virtues and remind everyone their importance for our success. T
expected end-state was to develop intuitions to help leaders make appropriate decisions in a
complex environment where the moral element played a decisive role in our succ
h enhanced our ability to engage the local Iraqi population because our actions increas
our moral effect standing in stark contrast to the immoral effect of the enemy.
Finally, we thought they would view us in how we compensate them for what we do;
what we dont d
arks:
Rules: 1. All2. Do not steal from the people. 3. Be neither selfish nor unjust.
Remarks: 1. Replace the door when you leav
25
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2. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.
. Replace what you break.
r
d
initiative and destroy their
will to
e
by operating
covertl
65
a
cceeded
Iraqi governments control where
it rema
3. Be courteous. 4. Be honest in your transactions. 5. Return what you borrow. 67. Do not bathe in the presence of women. 8. Do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest. 26
We viewed the enemy as an opponent in warfare. In a fourth generation environment this
meant we need to positively identify them first. Since our ethic our approach to achieving a
moral outcome in specific situations was based upon a virtue of justice, we went to the just wa
traditions jus in bello concepts of discrimination and restraint. These concepts complimente
the published Rules of Engagement (ROE) that focused on legal not moral outcomes on the
battlefield based upon the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Our focus was on disrupting or
neutralizing not destroying the enemy in an attempt to gain the
fight. We measured our effectiveness in terms of numbers of enemy who defected,
surrendered, or were captured, or killed in that order of priority.
The entire concept relied upon excellent intelligence (specifically human intelligence)
that enabled us to gain the initiative over our Arabic-speaking, unprincipled, unrestrained, and
amorphous enemy. An important and frustrating fact about fourth generation warfare is that th
enemy does not identify itself by wearing uniforms, but uses advantages afforded
y and blending in with the civilian population as a weapon. This becomes particularly
challenging for us - a conventional force with a different culture and language.
It is only intelligence collected by people who are as familiar with the environment as the
enemy hiding in it that is useful. The ability to speak the local language is as important as
fighting skills. Unfortunately, with slightly more than a dozen interpreters for an average of
patrols per day (most of these were dismounted patrols) we were ill-equipped for this task. It is
tribute to the virtue and resourcefulness of my men that in spite of the immense language
barrier they were able to play a key role in developing an Iraqi Police force and operate on a
daily basis with Iraqi security forces in our area. Ultimately, by December 2006, we su
in transitioning almost 70 percent of our assigned area to the
ins to date. Effective strategic communications are a critical requirement in an
environment where the moral element is the decisive battle.
26
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Second generation military organizations are poorly suited for this human resource-
oriented form of information gathering activity. The intelligence resources that did exist were
usually consolidated one or two levels above the battalion in tactical fusion cells and seldom
provided quality intelligence in a timely manner. Our battalion had seven trained i
personnel for a task force that ranged from 1200-1700 personnel (two officers and five enlisted
personnel). These seven personnel supported a task force operating from 15 patrol bases and
combat outposts that were spread over 300 square kilometers. Effective strategic
communications requires a
ntelligence
n ability to quickly analyze information and pre-empt or counter the
enemy
enemy center of gravity.
We gained success through the courage, in
within the battalion. As the battalions engageme
as
ith
we
process
ood
combined with an effective communication strategy that unapologetically explained why our
s messages. An intelligence capability at the company-level is essential to maintain the
initiative in battle for the moral element and to eliminate the information environment as an
itiative, intellect, and team work that resided
nt efforts continued in our area, we built a wide
network of information sources that enhanced
our local intelligence. However, this activity
took several months to produce results and w
constantly hampered by a shortage of skilled
intelligence analysts and interpreters.27 W
no other ability within the battalion to speak
Arabic, patrols were often reduced to using
pictures and other pointy-talky cards to
communicate with the locals. Information
collected was analyzed at the battalion-level or
higher. This meant delays in action whileCombined operations overcame language barriers and increased security
ed information into intelligence. More interpreters or, better yet, a genuine attempt to
teach Arabic to a small portion of the battalions Marines and Sailors would have provided a
critical capability to allow us to gain the initiative in our strategic communications efforts.
A human intelligence collection capability is not enough to win in this environment.
Winning means that sturdy professionalism and self-discipline, economic development, and g
governance, must augment and support accurate and timely intelligence. These activities
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second pillar often dominated our actions. A solid moral compass and an application of the
Golden Rule will overcome cultural barriers. The key for us was to avoid the sharp shift from
killing to kindness.28 that arises from impatience and poor discipline and makes one appear
hard-hearted on one extreme and weak-willed on the other.
As Michael Walzer points out in his book Arguing about War, our measure of success
was entirely relative. We looked for a decline in attacks and in their scope; the moral collapse in
our enemies; the appearance of informers and defectors from their ranks; the appearance of
opportunists to our side; silence from the enemys supporters; and a growing sense of safety
among ordinary Iraqis.29 Over time, our tactical operating concept enabled us to de-escalate
violent confrontations, increased our ability to apply the principles of discrimination and
restraint, and provided the local Iraqis with the hope essential to win the decisive moral battle in
a fourth generation war. This fact makes smart power --
developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool
kit that draws on both hard and soft power -- useful in a
fourth generation environment because often success
depend l
serve, or
on
d
he
their own
light
ents
s as much on ethically and morally attracting loca
populations and helping them to create, pre
restore security and capable governance as it does
killing the enemy.
Winning hearts and minds is about security an
calculated self-interest. Winning hearts is about
persuading people that the United States military can protect them without destroying their
value systems and cultures. It must in fact have genuine respect for their value systems and
cultures to win their passive or active support. This means military forces must enter into t
fray with an understanding of how local value systems and cultural norms interact with
values and culture. Friction will exist when a non-traditional culture interacts with a traditional
culture. They key to success in finding common ground and building upon that foundation
through engagement. This engagement must have a moral basis and our actions must high
ethical conduct. Winning minds is about convincing people that the United States Governm
success is equivalent to their success. Conversely, the United States Government must also
believe that a foreign populations concept of success is equivalent to its success. Strategic
Engagement is the foundation. Local Mayor accompanied by Iraqi Police, LtCol Desgrosseilliers and an interpreter meet with local citizens in front of a medical clinic in Modiq, Iraq
28
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communications that presents a coherent grand strategy directly linked to tactical actions is
essential to deliver this message. International and domestic media outlets play a critical role in
this process as well. The center of gravity in this war is the information environment. The
nited States Government must improve its strategic communications if it expects to match its
ability in the battle of arms.
Regain
U
potential in a battle of ideas with its cap
ing the Information Initiative
More than four centuries ago, Niccolo Machiavelli advised princes in Italy that it was more important to be feared than to be loved. But in todays world, it is best to be b
oth. Winning hearts and minds has always been important, but it is
te to the stormy present. The
ur case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall
ptions of the
three m tions
iet
h
arts and minds
ment.
even more so in an information age. Information is power, and modern information technology is spreading information more widely than ever before in history. Joseph S. Nye Jr.
The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequaoccasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As oourselves, and then we shall save our country. Abraham Lincoln, 1862
The way to eliminate a center of gravity in warfare is to attack it indirectly. The United
States Government must do this by winning the battle for the moral element on the ground and
by capturing this success with effective strategic communications. It should adopt a strategic
communications plan that focuses on influencing attitudes, behaviors, and perce
ajor groups outlined in a smart power grand strategy: its own population, the popula
of its allies and potential enemies, and the populations of its current enemies.
As the distinguished British historian Michael Howard astutely notes that a serious
campaign against terrorists and insurgents requires secrecy, intelligence, political prudence, qu
ruthlessness, covert actions that remain secret, and above all infinite patience. Howards
requirements are all lost in a media-stoked tumult for immediate results.30 Fighting fourt
generation enemies is unlike other wars because it is fundamentally a battle for he
at home and abroad. Today, much of this battle occurs in the information environ
Winning this battle means the United States Government must organize strategic
communications in the same way that it does with intelligence enabling strategic
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communications to drive operations. Howard also points out that nation-states can eliminate
terrorist threats only if public opinion - at home and abroad supports their government in
regarding terrorists as criminals rather than heroes.31 This is not a call for a propaganda
but a genuine, systematic effort to use the information environment to undermine the messages
and actions of Americas enemies with cold hard facts - truth. This means changing
machine,
its
organiz
nks
ry
ke
s its
,
ation to eliminate information stovepipes without creating additional bureaucracy. This
will enable it to fight the battle of ideas with efficiency, initiative, and imagination.
Since 19