Smart Grid:Smart Grid: Overview of Relevant Overview of Relevant EMC/Electromagnetic Environment, Spectrum, and EMC/Electromagnetic Environment, Spectrum, and

Security Issues and Standards Development ActivitiesSecurity Issues and Standards Development Activities

Andrew L. Drozd, iNCE & IEEE FellowAndrew L. Drozd, iNCE & IEEE FellowEMC Society Standards Development Committee ChairEMC Society Standards Development Committee ChairANDRO Computational Solutions, LLC President/CEOANDRO Computational Solutions, LLC President/CEO

Smart Grid EMC WorkshopSmart Grid EMC WorkshopSanta Clara, CASanta Clara, CA

27 May 201027 May 2010

ANDRO

Outline

• This presentation will cover the key aspects of the Smart Grid "systems of systems" concept design, specifically:– Relevant EMC/electromagnetic (EM) environments for Smart Grid

operation

– Efforts by the IEEE EMC Society and its Standards Development Committee (SDCom) in cooperation with the IEEE P2030 Working Group and in collaboration with industry to define the scope and application of standards to address integrated EM effects

– Illustrations of spectrum sensing and network (cyber) security strategies and potential risks that must be addressed early on in the design cycle.

• Goal: raise awareness of the key EM environment issues and potential impacts in support of an international rollout of the Smart Grid system.

Unique Challenges

• Smart Grid:– A confluence of power and energy, communications, IT, EMC, reliability and

cyber security technologies.• Two things make electricity unique and a challenge for Smart Grid:

– Lack of flow control (Grid Management and control transformation is needed – i.e., communications!)

– Electricity storage requirements (static or dynamic storage and load optimization/power electronics – efficiency!)

– Change either of these and the grid delivery system will be transformed!• NIST specifications

– Prioritization and application• IEEE P2030 Working Group

– Development of guidelines for future Smart Grid technologies and interoperability.

Systems of Systems Interoperability

Smart Grid System Interoperability

Power

Comm IT

Power

Comm IT

Power

Comm IT

Power

Comm IT

Smart Grid Device Interoperability

Source : Xcel and GridPoint

Grid Modernization

• A smart grid has the following characteristics: – Self-healing (fault tolerant)– Active participation by consumers in demand response– Operates resiliently against physical / cyber attack– High power quality– Accommodates all generation and storage options– Enables new applications– Operates efficiently.

• The most important aspect of the modern grid:– Seamlessly integrate many types of generation and storage

systems with a simplified interconnection process.

Grid Modernization

Today’s Electricity …

Power park

Hydrogen Storage

Industrial DG

Tomorrow’s Choices …

Combined Heat and Power

Fuel Cell

e -

e -

Wind Farms

Rooftop Photovoltaics

Remote Loads

Load as a resource

SMES

Smart Substation

Fuel Cell

Multi-Phase Program

• NIST developed a three-phase plan to accelerate the identification of standards and the establishment of testing & certification procedures.

• In Phase 1 establish a high-level reference model for the Smart Grid:– Nearly 80 existing standards identified to support Smart Grid

development– 14 high-priority gaps identified, including cyber security– Documented action plans with aggressive timelines by which

designated Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) are tasked to fill these gaps.

– More than 20 EMC-related standards identified (TF-3 External Standards Committee)

Smart Grid Principle

• Smart Grid technologies better identify and respond to man-made or natural disruptions:– Real-time information enables grid operators to isolate affected areas and redirect

power flows around damaged facilities.– One of the most important issues is resistance to attack

• Achieved through “smart monitoring” of power grids• The basis of control and management of smart grids is to avoid or mitigate the system-

wide disruptions like blackouts.

• The project is bringing together and attempting to harmonize a number of disparate engineering disciplines, namely:– The markets of power and energy distribution– Radio frequency (RF) communications– Information technology (IT)– Cyber security– Reliability– Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)– Spectrum management.

Integrated Disciplines

Photovoltaic systems

Central GeneratingStation

Step-Up Transformer

DistributionSubstation

ReceivingStation

DistributionSubstation

DistributionSubstation

Commercial

Industrial Commercial

Gas Turbine

DieselEngine

Cogeneration

CogenerationTurbine

Fuel cell

Micro-turbine

Wind Power

Residential

Storage

1.Power System Infrastructure

Control Center

Operators,Planners & Engineers

2. Communications and Information Infrastructure

NIST Framework

*Baseline standards identified – along with consideration of extensions and gaps (e.g., IEEE 1547 Standard for Interconnecting Distributed Resources

with Electric Power Systems) and IEEE P2030 Smart Grid interoperability standards development identified in NIST report.

Cognitive Sensors/Networks

• Spectrum Sensing: Detection of white-spaces

– Multi-dimensional (beyond frequency)

• Spectrum Management:

– Capturing the best available spectrum to meet user requirements

– Providing fair scheduling among coexisting CRs.

• Spectrum Mobility: Maintaining smooth handoffs while transitioning from one TH cell to another.

Space

Frequency

Others…

Distributed Spectrum Sensing

• Spectrum Sensing, i.e., detect the spectrum holes:– Hidden Terminal Problem: What if the primary user’s signal deteriorates at the

secondary receiver’s end?

– Solution: Collaborative (or) Distributed Spectrum Sensing

• Incorporating spatial diversity to mitigate hidden-terminal effects.• Distributed Detection/Estimation/Classification of primary users’

transmissions and their parameters.

Security Issues in Distributed Networks

PHY Layer Software Control Implementation provides flexibility in

the security design (spectrum-mutability) based on intrusion

detection schemes.

Cognitive Sensor

FCC: Design in such a way so that the primary user’s network does not have to make major changes in their designs.

1. Byzantine Attacks – Spectrum Sensing Data Falsifiers

• False local data from some malicious sensors (Byzantines) causing the fusion center (FC) to make a wrong decision

• An imposter who sends signals that have same features as that of a primary user.

– Causes the sensor to make wrong spectrum sensing decision

Security Threats

Focus on Spectrum Sensing…

2. Primary User Emulation Attacks (PUEAs)

3. Eavesdropping

• Eavesdropper present in the channel

4. Jamming

• A jammer trying to degrade one or more communication links.

• More interesting problem is when jammer also eavesdrops to enhance its attack.

S1

S2

Sn

FC

u1

u2

un

X1

X2

Xn

S1

S2

Sn

FC

u1

u2

un

X1

X2

Xn

Security Threats

Focus on Spectrum Sensing…

Need for Standards

• Priorities for Standardization – NIST is focusing on standards needed to address the priorities identified in

the FERC Policy Statement plus four additional utility stakeholder items:

• Demand Response and Consumer Energy Efficiency

• Wide Area Situational Awareness

• Electric Storage

• Electric Transportation

• Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI)

• Distribution Grid Management

• Cyber Security

• Network Communications

• IEEE P2030 Smart Grid Development Guidelines meant to address these stakeholder requirements (keyword: interoperability).

Interoperability Standards (EMC)

NIST Framework & Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards, Release 1.0 (D)

Additional Requirements

• Resist attack to man-made or natural disruptions– Real-time information enables grid operators to isolate affected areas and

redirect power flows around damaged facilities.– Smart monitoring of power grids to avoid or mitigate the system-wide

disruptions like blackouts.– Traditional monitoring is based on weighted least square (WLS) which is

very weak and prone to fail when gross errors (including topology errors, measurement errors or parameter errors) are present.

– New technology of state monitor is needed to achieve the goals of the smart grids.

• Cyber attack– Protect industrial supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)

systems and secure their interfaces to the power grid.

• High-quality power– Assuring more stable power provided by smart grid technologies will

reduce downtime and prevent such high losses.

EMC for Smart Grid

EMC is an important factor for consideration in standards relating to the Smart Grid, including the work on IEEE P2030. For the Smart Grid to function properly and coexist with other electrical and electronic systems, it must be designed with due consideration for electromagnetic emissions from the grid and for immunity to various electromagnetic phenomena near or from the grid. EMC must be addressed effectively if the Smart Grid is to achieve its potential and provide its benefits when deployed.

Haddam Neck, CT 1997Halon gas release caused by a camera flash.

Interoperability Means EMC

• The situation:

– IEEE – EMC Society believes that for the Smart Grid to achieve its potential it must be reliable, secure and fault-tolerant.

– If the Smart Grid is less reliable, less secure or less resistant to faults than the existing grid, is it ready for deployment?

– EMC is the ability of equipment to withstand its EM environment while not causing disturbances.

– These EM disturbances from or to the power grid have caused degradation, outages, shutdowns and system failures.

– EMC is required for grid components / controls to operate or interoperate reliably.

Southern Illinois 9/25/01Relaying shutdown caused by a radio.

Broad Categories of EMC Events

Indian Point, New York 3/23/08Cooling shutdown caused by a camera.

• Common events (ESD, fast transients, power line disturbances)• RF Interference from various emitters/transmitters• Coexistence of various wireless devices• High-level EM disturbances

– Naturally-occurring lightning surges or geomagnetic storms– Intentional EMI (terrorist acts) or High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse

(HEMP)

Smart Grid should be immune to these events, or if that immunity fails, fault-tolerant so failures don’t lead to system disruption. Signals should not interfere with others. (control of emissions).

Commonly Occurring EMC Events

• Unintended emissions can cause harmful interference.

• Limits on emissions are critical for interoperability.

• Emissions limits & methods exist and should be used.

• Immunity to EM phenomena must be demonstrated.

• Variety of environments:

– Information Technology Equipment to IEC/CISPR 24

– Substation equipment to IEC 60255-26, 61000-6-5, IEEE 1613

– Wireless devices to various IEEE / IEC Standards.

• Inadequate immunity to interference causes failures.

• EM phenomena that can cause upset:– Electrostatic discharge (from humans or furniture)– Electrical Fast Transients (from switching operations)– Lightning strike (surge, both unipolar and oscillatory)– Radiated RF energy– Conducted RF energy– Power-frequency magnetic fields– Dips & Interruptions.

• Robustness must be demonstrated like never before.• Field failures indicate need for immunity test criteria.

Commonly Occurring EMC Events

Wireless Transmitter EMI

• Wireless transmitters induce RF currents.

• May be fixed in frequency, power & location.

• May be mobile in all three relative to the grid.

• Power levels range from 5W to 1500W.

• Various modulation schemes used.

• Environment simulated by testing variables:– Frequency range

– Power levels

– Modulation

– Criteria for Acceptance.

Coexistence with Wireless Devices

• Co-related issue arising from use of wireless devices.

• Wireless devices can cause and receive interference.

• Coexistence with other devices & incumbents needed.

• Interoperability won’t happen unless this is addressed.

• EMC planning, analysis & research prevents failures.

High-Level EM Disturbances

HEMP

Geomagnetic Storms

IEMI

EMC Concerns

• The EM phenomena identified here causes problems:– Momentary, self-correcting malfunctions

– Localized network failure

– Large-scale interruptions.

• Naturally generated, grid-caused & man-made.

• Unintentionally or intentionally generated interference.

• Results are the same:– Grid doesn’t function as intended

– Grid can’t interoperate if it can’t stay operating.

• EMC Standards need to be referenced in P2030.

Referenced Standards

EMC Standards:

ANSI C63.4 (Emission Measurements)IEEE C37.90.1 (Relay and electric power apparatus surge withstand capability)IEEE C37.90.2 (Relay system withstand capability to radiated EM interference from transceivers)IEEE C37.90.3 (ESD measurements of protective relays) IEEE 1613 (Requirements for Communications Networking Devices Installed in Electric Power Substations)IEEE 473 (EM site survey)IEEE 139 (In-situ measurement of Industrial, Scientific and Medical equipment)IEEE 1560 (RFI filter capability measurement)IEEE 1597.2 (EM computer modeling applications)IEC/CISPR 22 (ITE emissions) and CISPR 24 (ITE immunity)IEC 61326-x series (Electrical Equipment for Measurement, Control and Laboratory use—EMC) IEC 60255-25 (Relay and protection equipment measurements—EMC Emissions)IEC 60255-26 (Relays and protection equipment measurements—EMC Immunity)IEC 61000-6-5 (Immunity for power station and substation environments—EMC)IEC 61000-4-2 (ESD measurements)IEC 61000-4-3 (Radiated immunity measurements)IEC 61000-4-4 (Fast transient/bursts measurements)IEC 61000-4-5 (Surge measurements)IEC 61000-4-6 (Conducted immunity measurements)IEC 61000-4-8 (Magnetic field immunity measurements)IEC 61000-4-11 (Voltage dips/variation immunity measurements)IEC 60439-1 (Cable distribution cabinets for power distribution networks)IEC 60870-2-1(Telecontrol equipment power supply and EMC)

Referenced Standards

HEMP Standards:

IEC 61000-1-3 (Effects of High-Altitude EMP (HEMP) on Civil Equipment and Systems-EMC)IEC 61000-2-9 (Description of HEMP Environment - Radiated Disturbance, Basic EMC Publication)IEC 61000-2-10 (Description of HEMP Environment - Conducted Disturbance – Basic EMC Publication)IEC 61000-2-11 (Classification of HEMP Environments - EMC) IEC 61000-4-25 (HEMP Immunity Test Methods for Equipment and Systems - EMC) IEC 61000-4-32 (HEMP Simulator Compendium - EMC) IEC 61000-4-35 (HPEM Simulator Compendium - EMC) IEC 61000-5-6 (Mitigation of External EM Influences - EMC) IEC 61000-5-8 (HEMP Protection Methods for the Distributed Infrastructure - EMC) IEC 61000-6-6 (HEMP Immunity for Indoor Equipment – EMC Generic Standards)

IEMI Standards:

IEC 61000-1-5 (High Power Electromagnetic (HPEM) Effects on Civil Systems - EMC) IEC 61000-2-13 (High-Power Electromagnetic (HPEM) Environments - Radiated and Conducted EMC) IEC 61000-4-33 (Measurement Methods for High-Power Transient Parameters – T&M Techniques)IEC 61000-4-35 (HPEM Simulator Compendium - EMC)

IEEE P2030 Draft Guide for Smart Grid Interoperability of Energy Technology and Information Technology

Operation With the Electric Power System (EPS), and End-Use Applications and Loads

(PAR Approved March 19, 2009Under IEEE SCC 21)

Project P2030

Smart Grid Interoperability Standards Project ― Unifies Power, Communications,

IT & “ilities”Communication Technologies {exchange processes

for information}

Information Technologies

{data, facts, and knowledge}

Power and Energy Technologies

[electric power system, end use applications and loads]

EMCSafetyCyber

.

.

.

P2030 Goals

• Provides guidelines in understanding and defining Smart Grid interoperability of the EPS with end-use applications and loads.

• Focus on integration of energy technology and information and communications technology.

• Achieve seamless operation for electric generation, delivery, and end-use benefits to permit two way power flow with communication and control.

• Address interconnection and intra-facing frameworks and strategies with design definitions.

• Perform study of EMC and other “ilities”.

• Expand knowledge in grid architectural designs and operation to promote a more reliable and flexible electric power system.

P2030 Standard Development

• P2030 Working Group (WG):– Task Force 1 – Power & Energy– Task Force 2 - IT– Task Force 3 - Communications

• External Standards Committee (where EMC enters the picture)

• Divide interfaces according to protocol stack:– TF3 addresses OSI layers 1-4 – TF2 addresses OSI layers 4-7

• TF1, TF2, and TF3 should standardize on a single architecture framework or combination of architecture frameworks

• It may not be possible to have a single P2030 TF3 Smart Grid Reference Architecture (may end up being a family of architectures).

• Recommended to leverage DoD Architectural Framework (DODAF) for development of reference architecture artifacts

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Department_of_Defense_Architecture_Framework

Summary

• We have modeling, simulation and testing technologies.

• Costs increase and reliability suffers without EMC.

• Power, IT and Comm for Smart Grid is multidisciplinary– Synergy of expertise must be applied

– EMC designed in early to reduce costs, increase effectiveness

– EMC discipline includes dynamic & adaptive spectrum mgmt.

• IEEE EMC Society is the leading source of expertise.

• Design & validation testing minimize EMC problems.

• Smart Grid devices need “hardening” to interference.

• Please contact Andy Drozd: adrozd@androcs.com

Acknowledgements

We wish to thank the members of the IEEE EMC Society SDCom along with Jerry Ramie and Brian Cramer for their insights, technical contributions

and support of the P2030 activities as they pertain to assuring EMC, power quality and

interoperability of the Smart Grid concept design.