Smart Defence and Pooling & Sharing - How to Survive Austerity

ANTONÍN NOVOTNÝ Department of Career Education

University of Defence Kounicova 65, 662 10 Brno

CZECH REPUBLIC antonin.novotny@unob.cz

Abstract: Over the past years defence spending by NATO´s and EU´s member nations has significantly shrunk. While the world is changing, essential mission will remain the same: to ensure that the Alliance and EU remain an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values. Security is about military capabilities that allows governments to defend their populations against new threats and possibly to engage in crisis management. How to survive austerity, minimise impact of cuts and ensure effectiveness of the Alliance and EU? By Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing capabilities. Ensuring greater security for less money, by working together, with more flexibility. Crisis makes cooperation between nations no longer a choice. It is a necessity. NATO´s and EU´s role is to set the strategic direction, to identify possible areas of cooperation. There are three ways: to pool and share capabilities, to set the right priorities and to better coordinate efforts. Smart Defence in NATO and Pooling & Sharing in EU, represent a new culture of cooperation. It is the chance how to invest enough to prepare for the future.

Key-Words: Smart Defence; Strategy; Military Strategy; Pooling and Sharing; capability sharing.

1 Introduction

“Security is not an optional extra – even in times of

austerity. It’s not a luxury – it’s a vital necessity.

Because security problems don’t wait while we

come to terms with our economic difficulties.

……We may not be able to spend more, but we

certainly can spend smarter by spending together –

and that is what we must do. In the current

economic climate, the need for cooperation is

clearer than ever. [1].

2 Formulation of problem As Libya and other NATO campaigns have demonstrated time and again, Europe relies too much on the U.S. to pick up the slack in key enablers required for alliance operations, such as air-to-air refuelling, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance. This is mainly the result of reduced defence investments by NATO members since the end of the Cold War and the lack of political will to use military capability when and where it is needed. Since 2008, the 16 European members of NATO have reduced their military spending. Reductions in many NATO countries have exceeded 10 percent. [2] How to survive austerity, minimise impact of cuts and ensure

effectiveness of the Alliance and EU? How to ensure greater security for less money?

3 Pooling and Sharing NATO and EU

3.1 What is Smart Defence The term „Smart Defence“ started to use publicly NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the beginning of 2011, giving several speeches in which he endorsed the development of multinational cooperation, economic planning and regional approaches to build improved Alliance capabilities. NATO's smart defence initiative is a new approach which seeks to better align the collective requirements and national priorities of Member States. Instead of pursuing purely national solutions, Allies have decided that where it is efficient and cost-effective, they will seek out more multinational solutions, including for acquisition, training and logistic support. Smart Defence is obviously nothing new. Concerns about shortfalls in NATO military capabilities have been expressed regularly over time by numerous political and military actors, often suggesting the development of „pooling and sharing“ to eliminate the persistent gap within the Alliance between requirements and capabilities. „Pooling“ military forces and assets from various countries to create strengthened operational capabilities, and „sharing“ significant amounts of military goods and services have already been promoted in the past. In this perspective, Smart

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Defence thus appears as little more than a new attempt to implement an old idea. First list of Smart Defence projects has been formalized in May 2012 in Chicago. Today there are around 150 projects or proposals, including 24 which are being implemented right now. And the momentum will continue. There is expecting ten more in the coming months. In this perspective, it was stated that Smart Defence actually represents “a changed outlook, the opportunity for renewed culture of cooperation is given new prominence as an effective and efficient option for developing critical capabilities.”

NATO agreed projects:

� Multinational Logistics Partnership – Mine

Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)

Vehicle Maintenance

� Multinational Logistics Partnership –

Helicopter Maintenance

� Deployable Contract Specialist Group

� Immersive Training Environments

� Centres of Excellence as Hubs of E&IT

� CIS E-Learning Training Centres Network

� Individual Training and Education

Programme (ITEP)

� Pooling Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA)

� Remote Controlled Vehicles for Route

Clearance Operations

� Multinational Joint Headquarter Ulm

� Female Leaders in Security and Defence: A

Roadmap to Turn Potential into

Capabilities

� Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG HQ)

capability from NATO Force Structure

(NFS) Commitments

� Pooling & Sharing Multinational Medical

Treatment Facilities (Role 2)

� Pooling of Deployable Air Activation

Modules (DAAM)

� Jet Aircraft upgrade to be NATO Universal

Armaments Interface (NUAI) Compliant

� Theatre Opening Capability

� Multinational Logistics Partnership – Fuel

handling

� Multinational Aviation Training Centre

(MATC)

� Dismantling, Demilitarization and Disposal

(D3) of Military Equipment

� Multinational Munitions Life - Cycle

Management

� Multinational Military Flight Crew

Training

� Counter IED – Biometrics

� Establishment of Multinational Geospatioal

Support Group (GSG)

� Multinational Cyber Defence Capability

Development (MNCD2) [3]

From three pillars of Smart Defence already identified by Allied Command Transformation (ACT) – cooperation, prioritization, and specialization is the one component that must be considered the most challenging - at least from a military view point. It is the revitalized proposal of specialization. The idea of specialization was introduced as early as the 1990s, but has ever since lived a relatively quiet life in the Alliance. When specializing almost any initiative will create considerable consequences for those who engage in it. While economically attractive, specialization is at the same time the most complicated of the Smart Defence initiatives, seen both from a practical and from a political perspective. Some would call it idealistically brilliant, others practically unrealistic. Specialization means that NATO member states specialize permanently – in peace and war – in specific military capabilities, meaning that they will be the main, or in some cases the sole, providers of these in any future scenario. In a specialized NATO structure, the Alliance will as a whole possess the same capabilities as up to now but a number of these, instead of being divided between more or less Allies, will be concentrated among only a few nations. Any degree of specialization, limited or widespread, will directly affect a number of parameters vital to the member states involved and will trigger consideration regarding the challenges to be overcome. These parameters are:

• Strategic flexibility;

• Political freedom to act;

• Specific criteria to invoke for a specialized

capabilities structure;

• The defence industry;

• Other international organizations;

• Training and education of personnel. [4]

Specializing within the Alliance sounds economically attractive. However, while specialization actually could have – but never did – become a solution for NATO during the fixed and predictable Article 5 scenarios of the Cold War, it seems much more challenging to fit it in with today´s unpredictable security environment, shifting coalitions and non-Article 5 commitments. By

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specialization will Allies risk the following consequences :

- Significant reduction of their long-term

strategic flexibility;

- Even greater transfer of their political

freedom to act into the hands of their states;

- Inability to continue providing higly visible

(„sexy“) capabilies to NATO´s

international missions;

- Suffering of their defence industries;

- Loss of their ability to join non-NATO

operations, led for instance by the UN or

the EU;

- Loss of their ability to prepare officers with

proper qualifications to function in an

operational environment in NATO´s various

headquarters – thus leaving it to only the

big member states to man the posts

concerned in a qualified way. [4]

One of the most promising solutions in Smart Defence is cross-border collaboration. By aligning the use of their fixed military infrastructure, sharing facilities and services, or buying and maintaining next generation of weapons together, countries can maintain capabilities which would otherwise by threatened by budget cuts. Examples of this are the Franco-British Defence Agreement, Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO - Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) or Visegrad Group cooperation (V4 - Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic).

As a key part of Smart Defence the Chicago Summit also formally has approved the Secretary General’s Connected Forces Initiative. According to the Secretary General, the Connected Forces Initiative will complement Smart Defence by “mobilizing all of NATO’s resources so we strengthen our ability to

work together in a truly connected way.“ [5]

The Connected Forces Initiative has three parts:

1. Training and education. This part focuses on getting more value for the Alliance from national education facilities;

2. Increased exercises. NATO training has been reduced over the years due to the high operational tempo of NATO forces, which have been deployed in Afghanistan and other locations. As these operational commitments decrease, the number of training events should increase;

3. Better use of technology. The initiative will use technology to improve interoperability among NATO partners.

The Initiative is aimed make it possible to achieve the goal of NATO Forces 2020: modern, tightly connected forces which are equipped, trained, exercised and commanded so that they can operate, together and with partners, in any environment. Indeed, the ultimate goal of the Connected Forces Initiative is to maintain and enhance the level of combat effectiveness that NATO have reached through a decade of continuous operations.

A true first goal for Smart Defence would be to better coordinate the work of the Alliance with the modest but real role of the EU, while respecting the independence and respective roles of the two organizations. NATO should also take into account the views of the European Allies who seek to preserve a coherent defence capability and a technological and industrial base. „NATO and the EU share common values and strategic interests.

The EU is a uniqe and essential partner for NATO.“ [6] 3.2 Obstacles and limitations to Smart

Defence

In spite of the promising aspects of Smart Defence, there are also limitations and obstacles to the level of multinational integration it is possible to achieve.

• For Smart Defence to work, NATO members must be willing to give up certain capabilities so that the alliance can collectively fund and maintain them. However, this creates the risk that a shared capability will not be available or authorized for use when another member state needs it.

• Some nations, as for most Allies, have certain national tasks and responsibilities that must be handled on a national basis. Therefore, shared units in the force structure are currently not on their agenda. The same goes for specialization in critical capabilities. Some nations have decided to maintain a full spectrum of basic military capabilities in order to remain capable to deal with vital national requirements. This should however not be in the way of

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significant multinational cooperation in capability development.

• Another danger would be if nations start looking to Smart Defence as a convenient way to avoid providing their fair share and reasonable burden of national assets to the Alliance. Smart Defence only makes sense if it brings new capabilities to the Alliance, or contributes to maintain capabilities that otherwise could not have been sustained. Smart Defence is no substitute for commitment to Defence.

• Neither should Smart Defence come in the way of fair burden sharing. It would be very harmful if NATO Capability Goals left by one nation as a result of defence cuts are simply shifted to other nations – under the pretext of specialization and Smart Defence. Fair burden sharing should still be a primary objective of the NATO Defence Planning Process.

3.3 What is Pooling and Sharing Pooling and sharing (P&S) is also an old concept. It appears in the 2003 European security strategy and both the EU and NATO have agencies dedicated to identifying joint projects. The term Pooling and Sharing describes various forms of defence cooperation. Sharing – one or more countries provide their partners with capability or equipment (such as airlift) or undertake a task for another country. If this occurs on a permanent basis, the partners can cut this capability – and save on costs. For example, NATO states take turns to police the Baltic airspace so that the Baltic countries can save the cost of having their own air forces. Pooling – here too, national capabilities are provided to other countries. A special multinational structure is set up to pool these contributions and coordinate their deployment. The European Air Transport Command is one such example. Pooling can occur in the development, procurement or subsequent operation of shared equipment. This enables countries to either obtain a higher number of units or to co-acquire a capability that a state could not supply alone for cost reasons. Examples of joint procurement and operation include AWACS aircraft and NATO’s command structures. Bilateral and multilateral P&S initiatives are experiencing a renaissance among the EU states since 2010. The most important initiatives are the Franco-British Defence Treaties, the cooperation between the Visegrad states (the Visegrad Four), the

Weimar Triangle (Germany, France and Poland) and the Ghent Initiative. Only this last initiative, in which all EU states are involved, is really new. At the Ghent summit in September 2010 EU defence ministers agreed to draw up an inventory of projects where they could pool and share their military capabilities. The EDA was tasked to identify the most urgent area and the initial identified area of priority cooperation was endorsed by the EDA’s Steering Board, comprising EU defence ministers, in November 2011. It comprises:

� Helicopter training

� Maritime surveillance

� European Satellite Communication

Procurement Cell

� Medical field hospitals

� Air-to-air refuelling

� Future military satellite communications

� Intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance

� Pilot training

� European transport hubs

� Smart munitions

� Naval logistics and training .[7]

Three topics are consistently ignored: role specialisation, the arms industry and additional investments. Role specialisation takes place if a state gives up certain capabilities and concentrates only on a few others. Many European states refuse to do so as they are afraid of mutual dependence. Nevertheless, such role specialisation is already taking place – but it is involuntary, uncoordinated and has major consequences for the capability of all partners. In the medium term, P&S can help to dismantle superfluous and costly industrial structures when identical material is procured. However, this process must be steered in order to avoid a specialisation by default that has already occurred with capabilities and to ensure that vital and rare industrial skills are not lost. While P&S can halt the deterioration of existing capabilities, countries can only share what they have. Gaps that are found all over Europe, for example in reconnaissance, can only be filled by extra investments. NATO’s operations in Libya in 2011 showed just how large these gaps are. So far, these initiatives have been disparate, with the aims and number of participants varying widely. Apart from some positive developments such as air-to-air refuelling, the results have not been

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satisfactory or adequate to meet the scale of the challenges involved. Moreover, these activities often do not serve the goal of maintaining joint European military capability, but rather seek to achieve national targets. As a result, the debate is limited to a few military capabilities. Some initiatives even duplicate or block each other. For example, the Franco-British Defence Treaty duplicates a mine-clearing project by the European Defence Agency (EDA).

3.4 Obstacles and limitations to Pooling and

Sharing P&S is not a panacea. However, it is a necessary pillar to save future European defence. Accompanying measures are needed to shape current role specialisations and additional investments in the acquisition of the required capabilities in a way that allows states to maintain Europe’s defence capability. P&S can only help to provide solutions if states are willing to rethink the precedence of political sovereignty over military effectiveness and economic efficiency. In concrete terms, this means that they must ask three questions as regards future P&S projects:

• A) Under what conditions do they trust a cooperation partner and to what extent can they curtail their wish to make unilateral decisions in the interests of the defence needs of others?

• B) Is the cooperation effective in military terms?

• C) Does it enable for savings? In addition, states must establish a joint framework for the counterproductively wide range of current cooperation projects in order to focus on the political, military and economic value added of P&S initiatives. This should include the following measures:

• Set up a permanent European Council on

defence affairs. Europe needs to decide about the shape of its future defence capabilities and about the industrial basis that builds and backs this capability. As it is likely that Europeans will cooperate more often on multilateral military activities in the next 20 years, the current national reforms, plans and P&S projects should primarily safeguard joint operations. Hence, the aim should be to have efficient

European armed forces rather than to give preference to national plans, as has been the case so far. These priorities can only be set by heads of state and government in a resolution that commits their defence, foreign and finance ministers to concrete aims. The success achieved should be checked every year.

• Draw up a joint capability chart as the

basis for role specialisation and

cooperation. A European capability chart could be drawn up on the basis of the priorities set by the heads of state. This chart will provide information about how capabilities can be sensibly built up or scaled down. Along with preventive consultation, the chart could enable Europe to avoid further drastic cutbacks. Specialization would be oriented in a direction diametrically opposite to the existing duplication of defence industry products. If only a few countries were supposed to possess the same capabilities, then the variety of weapons systems would shrink and consequently some industries would inevitably be left behind – or have to try a re-orient their production towards other areas, military or civilian. Whether this would be technically and economically do able is difficult to predict. And which should those industries be? Which countries would be supposed to volunteer for laying down or changing their national defence industries, and which should enjoy the privilege of keeping theirs?

• Overcome distrust. There are two ways of dealing with a lack of trust: states could either sign legally binding agreements on the provision of capabilities, as is the case in the Franco-British Defence Treaty. Moreover, they could compensate for the possibility of a partner’s non-participation with redundancy in their military capabilities. For example, the decision of a state to withdraw its airplanes from a mission must not lead to a collapse in European air transport capability. Partners that withdraw from an operation could undertake to use their aircraft to carry out routine duties in compensation, thus relieving those who want to deploy their airplanes in the operation of such tasks.

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• Use price tags. Anyone wanting to save money first needs to know how much he is spending. For the most part, it is not possible to prove the savings that have been attributed to P&S. It is also difficult to provide figures for the costs of non-cooperation. Every task undertaken in or by Europe’s armed forces therefore needs to have a price tag. It is not easy to calculate prices – then again, it is not impossible. NATO has already presented a list of savings made through P&S projects.

3.5 Smart Defence and Pooling & Sharing

NATO’s relations with the European Union go back twenty years: the 1992 Maastricht Treaty was the first EU treaty to mention NATO. Today, at a time of financial crisis and reductions in defence budgets, it is more important that ever for the two organizations to strengthen cooperation, spend more intelligently, and improve the complementarity of their defence capabilities in order to meet common security challenges.

„Pooling and sharing is an old concept : it

appears in the 2003 European security stategy

and both the EU and NATO have agencies

dedicated to identifying joint projects (the EDA

and the Allied Command Transformation, ACT,

respectively). [8] The Alliance and the EU are two of the most important institutions in the world with complementary skills and assets. While the NATO-EU partnership has yet to fulfil its strategic potential much progress has been made, over the past twenty years, in developing a framework for close cooperation. “The financial crisis is one more reason why we should strive for greater cooperation

between the European Union and NATO. The

benefit is clear. If we work together, then both our

institutions can emerge stronger from these times of

economic difficulty,” explained NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, addressing the chairmen of parliamentary committees on foreign affairs from across the EU in April 2012.[9]

High Representative Catherine Ashton has also stressed the need for continuing cooperation in this area. “The EU relationship with NATO is essential. The breadth of EU instruments can be usefully

combined with the depth of NATO’s role on defence.

The two organizations must continue to reinforce

each other’s work. The Libya crisis again showed

the clear need for this,” she said at the annual conference of the European Defence Agency in January 2012. “On capabilities in particular,

whether labeled Pooling & Sharing or Smart

Defence, we have achieved an unprecedented level

of cooperation.” [10]

NATO and EU staffs are closely coordinating this work to avoid overlaps between the “smart defence” and the “pooling and sharing” initiatives. A core problem is that NATO´s European budgets and forces are scattered among twenty-six sovereign countries, and they cannot be easily be combined for either strategic planning or actual operations. The strategic challenge facing NATO and its European members is therefore to gain greater military and operational mileage from these sizable resources by making better use of them. A better-prepared, more usable NATO and European military posture is well within the range of resource feasibility if greater multilateral collaboration can be achieved. In these terms, Smart Defence and Pooling & Sharing could really bring added value to NATO and EU. But there are also problems and national governments do have another simple option – simply not to cooperate maintaining their respective individual spheres of sovereignty, even if severely weakened. Paradoxically, many governments would rather have autonomous and useless militaries than integrated and capable ones. But what are the reasons for the national governments’ reluctance to cooperate and their desire to preserve their sovereignty? Four main obstacles are:

• Trust deficit – a paramount political constraint for Pooling & Sharing is the considerable trust and shared sense of identity which are necessary when security issues are on the table. To be successful, Smart Defence and P&S must therefore invest in trust-building and tailor its project so as to take into account the shared sense of identity countries might have.

• Level of Ambition – more than the geography or size if the countries involved (which are, admittedly, important variables), what really determines defence and security policies is the national Level of Ambition. This is the major factor when military capabilities are being shared and a delicate balance is required to achieve a

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successful Smart Defence and P&S policy. Three Level of Ambition can be identified :

A) The ambition to maintain full –spectrum forces and be a global independent military actor

B) The ambition to enhance sustainable deployability of armed forces in distant theatres for a limited period for time and within multilateral stability operations

C) The ambition to develop niche capabilities and work towards role specialisation.

• NATO/EU partnership – since 21 out of 28 NATO Allies are also EU members, and declining defence budgets are concentrated primarily in Europe, Smart Defence can hardly ignore the political role played by the EU in promotion of Pooling & Sharing initiatives. Indeed, the EU is strongly promoting its own “pooling and sharing” policy and has recently welcomed its members states´ commitments to specific concrete projects facilitated by the work of the European Defence Agency.

• Role specialization – another challenging element. Role specialisation remains substantially different in its dynamics from other initiatives of this kind like burden sharing, pooling of assets, standardization, or closer cooperation. The primary question is thus what degree of specialisation Smart Defence and P&S is likely to promote : a „flexible“ approach or more „rigid“ one? Naturally, a specialised Alliance (EU) capabilities structure would require a high degree of cohesion to guarantee that a full spectrum of capabilities is always available regardless of the participation of willing nations in any future combined task force. Creating such cohesion therefore appears to be a major political challenge which NATO and EU need to address, and must ultimately be a crucial element in achieving effective Smart Defence or P&S policy.

4 Conclusion

NATO needs to continuously transform in order to muster sufficient deployable, professional, flexible, usable and sustainable expeditionary forces for its international commitments. In times of economic crisis and shrinking defence budgets, meeting the force requirements – qualitatively and quantitatively – for NATO´s ongoing and future operations will become even more challenging than to date. The way ahead is through further transformation – including Smart Defence. At the Chicago Summit in May 2012 NATO heads of states and government approved a concrete package of multinational projects, including for better protection of NATO forces, better surveillance and better training. These projects should deliver improved operational effectiveness, economies of scale, and closer connections between NATO forces. They will also provide experience for more such Smart Defence projects in the long term. But the Smart Defence initiative risks allowing European countries to believe that they can do more with less, when in actuality they will be doing less with less. The language describing Smart Defence may read well in a summit declaration, but until real money is invested and delivers real capabilities to the modern-day battlefield, it will be meaningless to the men and women on the front lines. To work, Smart Defence requires real military capability and real money. No clever nomenclature can evade this problem.

The same situation is in EU. The main challenge for EU members is to link pooling and sharing as a European initiative with the national defence planning processes. EU Defence Ministers at the last meeting in September 2012 discussed the issue of pooling and sharing in support of developing military capabilities. Ministers also welcomed the European Defence Agency’s proposal to develop a voluntary code of conduct on pooling and sharing, and emphasized the need to make this process more systematic and sustainable in the long run. “EDA will continue to drive Pooling & Sharing forward as

a pragmatic, flexible and cost-effective model, and

avoiding bureaucratisation. The Code of Conduct

will facilitate cooperation, and make Pooling &

Sharing sustainable now and in the future". [11]

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It is time to act.

References:

[1] Rasmussen, Fogh, Anders, September 30, 2011, Towards NATO’s Chicago Summit, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_78600.htm

[2] News release, Military Balance 2012, International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 7, 2012, http://www.iiss.org/publications/military-balance/the-military-balance-2012/press-statement/

[3] Smart Defence projects and proposals

11sep2012, Extraction from SD Projects and Proposals Database, North Atlantic Treaty Organization HQ, September, 2012.

[4] Henius, Jakob – MacDonald, Leone, Jacopo, March 2012, Smart Defense: A critical Appraisal. NDC Rome. http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/series.php?icode=2

[5] Rasmussen, Fogh, Anders. February 4, 2012. Remarks. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-AD1FADE5-491706F7/natolive/opinions_84197.htm

[6] News release, May 20, 2012, Chicago Summit Declaration, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Chicago, p 4 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease

[7] Mulin, Jon, Pooling and Sharing is an art not a science, Issue May – July 2012, European Defence Matters on 21 May 2012, pp. 12-14, ISSN 1977-5059.

[8] Valášek, Tomáš, Surviving austerity : The case for a new approach to EU military

collaboration, April 2011, 1. London : Centre for European Reform, ISBN9781901229981 http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/rp_981-141.pdf

[9] Video record. April 23, 2012. Committee on Foreign Affairs EU. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/video?event=20120423-1430-COMMITTEE-AFET

[10] EDA Annual conference, January 31, 2012. http://edaannualconference.blogspot.cz/

[11] France-Arnould, Claude. EDA Chief of Executive, EU Ministers of Defence meeting, September 2012.

http://www.eda.europa.eu/News/12-10-02/Ministers_of_Defence_welcome_EDA_s_Pooling_Sharing

Other sources:

[12] Ingebrigtsen, Roger. Smart Defence – the Norwegian perspective. Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies Seminar, April 24, 2012, Oslo, Norway. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/whats-new/Speeches-and-articles/Speeches-and-articles-by-other-apolitica/Speeches-and-articles-by-State-Secretary-Roger-Ingebrigtsen/2012/smart-defence--the-norwegian-perspective.html?id=679432

[13] Valášek, Tomáš, Edited, May 2, 2012, Towards a smarter V4: How to improve defence

collaboration among the Czech Republic,

Hungary, Poland and Slovakia: DAV4 Expert

Group Report. http://www.ata-sac.org/globsec2012/uploads/DAV4%20Final%20web.pdf

[14] Mölling, Christian. Pooling and Sharing in the EU and NATO. European Defence Needs

Political Commitment rather than Technocratic

Solutions. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Policy-Briefs/Detail/?id=144569

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