The Future of Nuclear Power:Renewal or Re-run?

David LochbaumDirector, Nuclear Safety Project

February 25, 2008

Slide 2

Reactor design issues:

Undetected design errors

21st century threats

New design problems

New design solutions

New reactor licensing

Nuclear’s past (really passed or just paused?)

Agenda(Not Hidden)

UCS’s recent report concluded that NRC’s regulations are generally adequate. The safety bar is okay – too many reactors too often are doing the limbo below it.

Background:Nuclear Safety Limbo

NRC’s Double Standard

Examples (very abridged list): PWR containment sumps (GSI-191), Thermo-Lag and Hemyc fire barriers, uncontrolled and unmonitored leaks of contaminated water

Old Reactor Designs,Bad Reactor Designs

In May 1996, the NRC reported that the Millstone nuclear plant had long been operating outside of their design bases.

Follow-up NRC inspections and efforts documented that Millstone was not alone.

Old Reactor Designs,Bad Reactor Designs

The NRC documented that hundreds of design errors in “new plants” were not detected until after the reactors had operated for years and years.

Why did the design reviews, pre-operational testing, and subsequent surveillance tests and inspections ALL fail to detect these hundreds of design errors?

Old Reactor Designs,Bad Reactor Designs

How were they detected?

Fewer than half were reported found due to intentional, active looking. Luck seems to play a big role.

Old Reactor Designs,Bad Reactor Designs

Lest anyone think that the “design errors” merely involved green paint vice red paint, Licensee Event Reports (LERs) are submitted for issues above a safety significance threshold and accident sequence precursors are an even higher threshold.

Old Reactor Designs,Bad Reactor Designs

Old Reactor Designs,Bad Reactor Designs

If new nuclear power reactors are built and operated in the US, the design review, pre-operational testing, and post-licensing surveillance testing and inspection processes must produce the following outcomes:

1) Significantly fewer design errors detected AFTER the reactors commence operation

2) Significantly shorter residence periods for undetected design errors.

Fewer undetected design errors and shorter “hiding” times translate into safer, more economical nuclear energy.

21st Century Threats,18th Century Defenses

Following the 9/11 tragedy, the NRC undertook what it termed a “top to bottom” review of security for nuclear power reactors. Shortfalls identified by that review were addressed by Order and revised regulations.

Curiously, a review triggered by terrorists using suicide aircraft attacks resulted in Orders and regulations which assume a zero percent chance of aircraft attack. Like Paul Revere and the Minute Men, nuclear power reactors only defend against attacks by land and by sea.

21st Century Threats,18th Century Defenses

21st Century Threats,18th Century Defenses

Nearly 25 years ago, the NRC chartered an industry panel to examine design changes that would make nuclear power reactors less vulnerable to sabotage.

The panel identified many feasible design changes – none of which have been incorporated into “advanced” reactor designs like the AP-600, AP-1000, ABWR, etc.

To the extent practical and feasible, nuclear power reactors built in the 21st century must be designed against 21st century, not 18th century, threats.

New Reactor Designs,Bad Reactor Designs?

AP-1000: To save money, vendor cut way back on concrete and steel. The result is a ratio of containment volume to thermal power below that of today’s PWRs, thereby increasing the risk of containment over-pressurization and failure in event of a severe accident.

PBMR: To save even more money, vendor replaced containment structure with less-robust “confinement” structure that will protect the public from an accident unless there is an accident.

New Reactor Designs,Bad Reactor Designs?

Generation IV: While the Gen IV reactor designs remain largely conceptual, these concepts rely on two shaky foundation supports – (1) need for uninvented, super-resistance materials, and (2) fuel reprocessing and fast breeder reactors.

New Reactor Designs,Good Reactor Designs?

The EPR design appears to be the safest and most secure design among the new reactor designs.

New Reactor Designs,Good Reactor Designs?

The EPR design is resistant to aircraft hazards.

New Reactor Designs,Good Reactor Designs?

Even the spent fuel pool is resistant to aircraft hazards.

New Reactor Designs,Good Reactor Designs

If another nuclear power reactor is built in the US, it must be protected from aircraft hazards to the maximum extent by design features and to the minimum extent by compensatory measures by workers (i.e., fire hose brigades).

New Reactor Licensing

Slide 20

The “old” reactor licensing process featured two steps:

1) NRC issuance of a construction permit based upon review of preliminary design information

2) NRC issuance of an operating license based upon review of final design information

The “new” reactor licensing process features a single step – NRC’s authorization to build and then operate the reactor.

New Reactor Licensing

Slide 21

The “old” reactor licensing process featured information on a specific reactor design to be constructed at a specific site.

The “new” reactor licensing process is bifurcated:

• The NRC certifies a new reactor design without any clue where that reactor might be constructed and operated.

• The NRC approves a site for a nuclear reactor without any clue of which specific design might be constructed.

New Reactor Licensing

Slide 22

“One-step” reactor licensing is at best misleading and at worst an outright lie.

By splitting the new reactor licensing process into two separate and distinct parts, the NRC essentially – and we believe intentionally – eliminated meaningful public participation. Who is going to intervene in the certification process for a reactor that may or may not be built in their backyard? Who can intervene in the site permitting process for an unspecified reactor? No one. By design.

Public Participation

“No evidence has been found to support industry statements that citizen opposition and regulatory changes have been the primary causes for rising costs, and construction delays.”

US House Committee on Government Operations

Nuclear Numbers

Nuclear reactors ordered 253

Construction permits issued 175

Operating licenses issued 130

Operating licenses ended 26

Sources: NEI & NRC

Nuclear Numbers

45 of the reactors issued construction permits by the NRC (AEC) were not completed.

At least not as nuclear reactors. The Midland and Zimmer plants were completed as fossil-fueled generators.

Walking a Nuclear Tightrope

Slide 26

Full report and the 51 year-plus reactor outage case studies available at: http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/nuclear_safety/unlearned-lessons-from.html

Walking a Nuclear Tightrope: Unlearned Lessons from Year-plus Reactor Outages released by UCS on September 18, 2006.

41 of the nuclear power reactors licensed by the NRC (AEC) experienced year-plus outages to restore safety levels – 10 reactors did it twice!

Industry Participation

“To the contrary, FPC [Federal Power Corporation] statistics show that mismanagement is more of a determinant than regulatory changes and citizen opposition.”

US House Committee on Government Operations

Mismanagement was a problem during construction.

Mismanagement was a problem during operation.

Mismanagement will be a challenge during construction and operation of new reactors – time will tell whether that challenge will be successfully met.