Slide 1 U.S. Submarine Force Way Ahead. Slide 2 Submarine Force Situational Awareness Reduced DoD...

U.S. Submarine Force Way AheadU.S. Submarine Force Way Ahead

Submarine Force Situational Awareness

• Reduced DoD budget• Little or no growth in shipbuilding account• Diverging trends

– Increasing requirements and responsibilities– Diminishing resources

• Seamless leadership focus required• Embark on a unifying effort

Integrated Undersea Warfare

• Submarines are asymmetric weapons• Stealth is a force multiplier• ASW is hard and getting harder

– Submarines are the optimum ASW platform

• Anti-Access/Area Denial must be defeated– Submarine's unique access increasingly valuable to

the Joint Force

• Adapt/leverage new payloads and sensors

Why Submarines in WWII

Requisites:A National imperative

- World War II Inadequacy of other platforms- Battle Force – Much of the Pacific Fleet is “Out of Action”Value added by distinctive submarine characteristics- Stealth, speed, endurance, and the right weaponAbility to step up to critical new roles- From “Fleet Scouts” to Anti-Surface Ship Warfare “Hunter-Killers”R&D contributions with mission-enabling capabilities- Continuous welds, Sonar, Radar, Mark 14 Torpedo IssuesA strategy built around the submarine– “Strangulation of Japan” → Capital Ships, Merchants, Tankers

Submarines (1.6% of the Navy) Sunk 54.6% of all Japanese Ships Sunk During the War

Why Submarines in the Cold War

Requisites: A National imperative

- Cold War – Contain CommunismInadequacy of other platforms- ISR, DeterrenceValue added by distinctive submarine characteristics- Stealth, speed, enduranceAbility to step up to critical new roles- From “Hunter-Killers” to “ISR, Strategic ASW and Strategic Deterrence”R&D contributions with mission-enabling capabilities- Nuclear Power, Acoustic Quieting, Sonar, Ballistic Missiles, MK-48 torpedoA strategy built around the submarine– “Control the Seas – Resupply Europe”

1965

First Controlled NuclearChain Reaction First Fleet Ballistic

Missile“Underway on

Nuclear Power"41 For Freedom

Construction Complete

1947

19551942

1940 1950 1960 1970

Why Submarines Now and in the Future

Requisites:A National imperative

- Rise of Global challenges to U.S. Supremacy- Counter A2/AD Peer, IW, Regional Conflict, Sea Control, Piracy…

Inadequacy of other platforms- Only submarines have assured access in A2AD environmentsValue added by distinctive submarine characteristics- Stealth, speed, endurance, modular payloads, COTs electronicsAbility to step up to critical new roles

- Strike, SOF Support, SEAD, Information Operations- Prompt Strike

R&D contributions with mission-enabling capabilities- Photonics Mast, Unmanned Systems Integration, Ship Automation- Unmanned systems integration (UAVs, UUVs, DNS)

A strategy built around the submarine- Sea Control / Sea Denial / Assured Access- Air/Sea Battle

Emerging Concepts Requiring Additional Development

Platforms

• The U.S. Submarine Force consists of:– 42 Los Angeles class attack submarines (SSN)– 3 Seawolf class attack submarines– 9 Virginia class attack submarines – 4 Ohio class Guided Missile Submarines (SSGN)– 14 Ohio class Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN)

SSN Force

• Current Requirements (2005 Assessment)– 10 SSNs providing Forward Presence (FP)– Able to surge 35 SSNs: includes war plan support– Need 48 SSNs to surge 35 and keep 10 for FP– Fewer ships - greater risk

• Current Allocation– SSNs assigned missions only they can perform– Mission categories: critical, high priority, priority, routine– CJCS allocation of 10 just meets critical missions

• Future Outlook– A2/AD– Prompt Strike

SSGN Force

Homeport Maintenance

Tra

nsit

SO

F C

ert

15 Months

Tur

nove

r/

Mai

nten

ance

Tra

nsit

Tur

nove

r/

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nten

ance

Tur

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ance

10 ½ Months Theater Presence70% Operational Availability

4 Ships each capable of carrying:• 154 TLAM (105 typical loadout)• 2 Dry Deck Shelters • 66 SOF for > 60 Days

2-3 ships always in theater

Bangor WA

Kings Bay GA

Guam

Diego Garcia

SSGN Mission:High Volume Precision Strike & High Volume SOF SupportAble to Perform Many Other SSN Missions

SSBN Force

• 14 OHIO class SSBNs

• 100% of survivable warheads

• 54% of operational warheads

– 70% under NEW START

• 19% of strategic budget

• 3900 SSBN patrols since 1960

1000 Ohio class SSBN Patrols

135 Consecutive Successes

• TRIDENT(D-5) on OHIO 2042• Survivable Leg of TRIAD• Significant hedge capability

Virginia Class SSN Program

• Current Plan: 30 Ship Class– Block I: 1998 - 4 ships

• All delivered

– Block II: 2003 - 6 ships • 4 delivered, 2 under construction

– Block III: 2008 - 8 ships• 2 ships per year in 2011

• Acquisition Program– $93B (TY) Procurement Program– APB assumes 30 hulls

Virginia Class Improvement Focus

Cost Reduction Strategy• Perform on the Backlog• Design For Affordability• Acquisition Strategy

"… the cost of them has got to come down ... it's got to be about $2 billion a

ship.” ADM Michael G. Mullen

Sept 2005

0

2,500

5,000

7,500

10,000

12,500

15,000

Unit Cost Reduced by 4.9M Hours

To Date

Unit Cost Reduced by 4.9M Hours

To Date

>40% Labor Reduction

>40% Labor Reduction

# of

Rec

urrin

g M

anho

urs

xK

SSN803 Unit 30Unit 7Unit 1

Block III Bow Redesign

SSGN MAC

Benefits• Parts Reduction – 50K reduced to 29K• Pumps and Valves Further Reduced• Hull Penetrations – 136 reduced to 64• Life of Ship Components added to the design• Concept to Reality in 18 Months• $800M Total Program Acquisition Savings

First Bow Payload Tubes

2010 Nuclear Posture Review

• Retained the TRIAD and implies future retention

• SSBN most survivable leg of TRIAD

• No viable near- or mid-term threat to U.S. SSBNs

• Requires continuous at-sea presence in both oceans

• Keeps 14 SSBNs in the near-term

• Expect to maintain 20 operational tubes per SSBN by 2015

OHIO class Replacement Program

• Milestone A Achieved on 10 Jan 2011• Initiated Technology Development Phase• Target Average ship cost (2-12) = 4.9B (FY10$)• Target Average ship annual O&S = 110M (FY10$)

• Common Missile Compartment• Electric Drive Propulsion• 16 Missile Tubes• Maximize commonality with VCS

Submarine Industrial Base

• Situation– Two private construction yards

• Electric Boat• Newport News Shipbuilding

• Issues– Shrinking supplier base– 75% (by $) sole-source suppliers– 75% of suppliers are small businesses– Need 2500 designers to sustain a

submarine design capability

Undersea Payload Capacity

Flat Fish Study 1999

New Ship Options Are Unaffordable

DARPA Future Sub Study 2003

New SSGN 20XX Towed Payload Module

Multi-Mission Module Study 2002Towed Payload Module Study 1998

Virginia Hull Plugs

0

50

100

150

200

250

2009 2014 2019 2024 2029 2034 2039 2044 2049 2054 2059

Pay

loa

d V

olu

me

(ft^

3)

Th

ou

sa

nd

s

688

SSGN

VIRGINIA*

* Assumes 30 Ship Virginia Class @ 2/year

Starting 2011

66% Reduction in Payload Capacity From 2024-2030

Payload Capacity Will Decline, As TheValue of Undersea Delivery Increases

Plan of Record

2

1

3

4

2

1

3

4

Fiscal Constraints

Shortfall ofSSNs

UninterruptedStrategic

Deterrence

SufficientPayloadVolume

OHIO Replacement SSBN

New SSN

VIVII

III

48 48

39

46

(10)

(18) (27) (37)

(12)

(27) (34)

SS

Ns

SS

GN

sS

SB

Ns

Submarine Force Campaign Design

• Force wholeness and integrity– Maintenance/modernization/training Ao

• Operations and warfighting today– Safe/secure/effective operations

• Operations and warfighting tomorrow– Force structure/payload volume/payloads

Integrated Undersea Strategy

OHIO Replacement Performance and

Schedule

SSN Force Structure Shortfall

Undersea Payload Volume after SSGN

Retirement

Keep OHIO Replacement top priority

Add two lowest cost SSNs with best impact

Add VIRGINIA payload module to 20 SSNs

Evolutionary payload enhancements with high return

Issues Actions

Undersea Payload Capability Gaps

SSN Force Procurement Changes

Add 2 Cost-Efficient Hulls

Delay New SSN Start

Virginia Payload Module

• 40 Tomahawk / TACMS• 8-12 Prompt strike weapons• Battle management center• Inboard SOF storage• Targeting Block V ships

VPM Restores Payload Capacity

VPM added to Blocks V, VI and VII restores most of the payload capacity and distributes it across more hulls

Block V

Block VI

Block VII

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

Tota

l #

of L

aunc

hers

Fiscal Year

SSGNs

SSN Torpedo Tubes

SSNs (12 Vertical Launch Tubes)SSNs (2 Large Bow Tubes)

1272 Launchers

Stretch SSN Capacity(4 VPM)

Modular, Flexible Payload Plan

2 Large Bow Payload Tubes12 Missile Stows

Reconfigurable Torpedo Room24 Torpedoes or;21” Unmanned Systems or;Distributed Networked Systems or; DecoysSpecial Operations Force Berthing

Virginia Payload Module (per tube)3 Prompt Strike Weapons or;7 Cruise Missiles or;7 Torpedoes or;14 Miniature Air Launched Decoys or:1 Large UUV

Advance Dry-Deck ShelterSwimmer Delivery VehiclesCombat Rubber Raiding RaftsLarge Unmanned Undersea Vehicles

Summary

• Challenges are clear - plan is in place• Submarine Force leadership is focused

and unified• VCS program is DoD role model• ORP execution is key

Slide 1 U.S. Submarine Force Way Ahead. Slide 2 Submarine Force Situational Awareness Reduced DoD...

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Transcript of Slide 1 U.S. Submarine Force Way Ahead. Slide 2 Submarine Force Situational Awareness Reduced DoD...