SIZEWELL “B” POWER STATION Major Incident Plan · Male Firefighter 5mSv 20mSv 100mSv Note: 6...

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REVIEWED BY

AUTHORISED BY

NEXT REVIEW October 2013

SIZEWELL “B” POWER STATION

Major Incident Plan

Sizewell B Major Incident Response Plan v2 29 October 2012

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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

The contents of this plan are to be accessible to the public and to staff, unless an exemption under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 has been identified.

This plan contains information:

Please insert an “x” if relevant and provide reasons for the selection

That is personal data

Provided in confidence

Intended for future publication

Related to criminal proceedings

That might prejudice law enforcement

That might prejudice ongoing external audit investigations

That could prejudice the conduct of public affairs X

That could endanger an individual’s health and safety X

That is subject to legal privilege

That is commercially confidential

That may not be disclosed by law

Please indicate opposite any exemptions you are claiming. Remember that some exemptions can be overridden if it is in the public interest to disclose – as decided by the FOI Coordinator. Exemptions normally apply for a limited time and the information may be released once the exemption lapses.

Other: Please describe


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SIZEWELL B POWER STATION MAJOR INCIDENT PLAN

1. Contents

Page No.

1 Contents 3

2 Distribution List 4

3 Record of Amendments and Exercises 5

4 Glossary 6

5 Information 7

6 Operational Response planning objectives 16

7 Risk Assessment 16

8 Response resources 17

9 Communications 24

10 Plan Administration 24

11 Human Rights 25

12 Protective Marking 25

Appendix 1 Guidance/Action Cards 26

Appendix 2 Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ) 32

Appendix 3 Business Continuity 33


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SIZEWELL B POWER STATION MAJOR INCIDENT PLAN 3. Record of Amendments and Exercises

Amendment No Exercise Details

Date Amended by Comments/Changes

Plan created Amended Amended

June 2011 Oct 2011 July 2012

Minor changes PDA changes Combined Fire Control (was SFRS Control) Commander (was Manager) Removal of EDBA Alerting Chain Distribution


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4. Glossary of Terms ERT Sizewell Emergency Response Team

DPZ Detailed Planning Zone

RCA Radiological Controlled Area

BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion

BTP British Transport Police

CHEMET Chemical Meteorological Support (toxic or hazardous chemicals)

COMAH Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999

EA Environment Agency

EEAST East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust

EPO Emergency Planning Officer

FCP Forward Control Point (Bronze)

HMEPO Hazardous Materials Environmental Protection Officer

FSA Food Standards Agency

HSE Health and Safety Executive

JEPU Joint Emergency Planning Unit

JRLO Joint Regional Liaison Officer (British Army)

MAPP Major Accident Prevention Policy

PHQ Police Headquarters

PIZ Public Information Zone

RVP Rendezvous Point

SCC Suffolk County Council

SCG Strategic Coordinating Group

SFRS Suffolk Fire and Rescue Service

Strat CC Strategic Coordination Centre – Gold Command

SVOG Suffolk Voluntary Organisation Group

REPPIR Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001

ACP Access Control Point

ECC Emergency Control centre

RPA Radiation Protection Adviser

EHP Emergency Health Physicist

HPA Health Protection Agency

ONR Office for Nuclear Regulation

TCG Tactical Coordinating Group


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SIZEWELL B POWER STATION

MAJOR INCIDENT PLAN 5. Information

In the event of an emergency, refer straight to Guidance Cards. 5.1

5.2 Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information Regulations 2001) (REPPIR) 5.2.1 REPPIR establishes a framework of emergency preparedness measures to ensure that

members of the public are:

• Properly informed and prepared, in advance, about what to do in the unlikely event of a radiation emergency occurring; and

• Provided with information if a radiation emergency actually occurs. 5.2.2 A "radiation emergency" is an event that is likely to result in a member of the public receiving

an effective dose of 5 mSv during the year immediately following the emergency. 5.2.3 REPPIR places legal duties on operators of premises where work with ionizing radiation is

carried out; e.g. licensed nuclear sites, hospitals, universities, ports, airports, factories, people who transport radioactive substances through a public place (but not those using standard forms of transport such as road, rail, inland waterway, sea, air, or through a pipeline), all local authorities, not just those who have REPPIR operators within their boundaries, and the employers of people who intervene in a radiation emergency, such as the emergency services.

5.2.4 Each authority that has a responsibility to respond to incidents at Sizewell B forms part of the

Sizewell Emergency Planning Consultative Committee (EPCC). Each organisation has its own individual response plan. Suffolk County Council, in consultation with the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), EDF Energy, Suffolk Coastal District Council, Suffolk Constabulary and Suffolk Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS), has drawn up an ‘off-site’ emergency plan, the relevant aspects of which are incorporated into this plan.


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5.2.5 A copy of this plan is held in the Strat CC Room 1 (GOLD) at Suffolk Police Headquarters, Martlesham Heath and is available from all locations as detailed in the distribution lists on page 4 of this document.

5.2.6 Sizewell B is a Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) Nuclear Power Station, operated by EDF. It

complies with the REPPIR regulations and is subject to the conditions of the Office of Nuclear Regulation (Formerly the Nuclear Industries Inspectorate (NII)).

5.2.7 Sizewell B Nuclear Power Station is situated on the coast of Suffolk (grid reference TM 4763)

2.4 Km east of Leiston with its population of 5500. Main access is through a gatehouse (security lodge), staffed 24/7, located on the main road to both Sizewell A and B sites.

5.3 Differentiation Between Site Incident and Off-Site Nuclear Emergency 5.3.1 The operator’s plans specify either a ‘Site Incident’ or an ‘Off-site Nuclear Emergency’,

depending on the nature of the event. 5.4 Site Incident 5.4.1 A Site Incident is defined as “A hazardous condition which is confined in its effect to within the

boundary of the site security fence”. 5.4.2 A Site Incident does not call for the full implementation of the Operator’s Emergency Plan, or,

necessarily, the alerting of the emergency services. The possibility of a Site Incident developing into an Off-site Nuclear Emergency would be continuously assessed by power station emergency response staff.

5.5 Off-Site Nuclear Emergency

5.5.1 An Off-Site Nuclear Emergency is defined as “A hazardous condition which results, or is likely to result, in the need to consider urgent countermeasures to protect the public outside the site security fence from a radiological hazard”.

5.5.2 The declaration of an Off-site Nuclear Emergency identifies when mitigating action may be required to prevent a radiation emergency occurring or that a ‘radiation emergency (as defined by REPPIR) has begun.

5.6 Trigger Point for Activation 5.6.1 The operator will make the initial declaration of a Site Incident or an Off-site Nuclear

Emergency, by invoking the notification procedures detailed in the station emergency plan. The decision to declare a major multi agency incident will be taken when the incident fulfils the requirements of SOP 6.3 Major Incidents. This is taken directly from Home Office document “Dealing with Disaster” which states: “any emergency that requires the implementation of special arrangements by one or more of the emergency services, the NHS or the local authority for:

• The initial treatment, rescues and transport of a large number of casualties. • The involvement, either directly or indirectly of a large number of people. • The handling of a large number of enquiries likely to be generated both from the public and

the news media, usually to the Police. • The need for the large scale combined resources of the emergency services. • The mobilisation and organisation of the emergency services and supporting organisations:

e.g. local authority for the threat of death, serious injury or homelessness to a large number of people.


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5.7 Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ) 5.7.1 The DEPZ is the area in which detailed emergency planning takes place. The DEPZ extends

for a radius of 2.4 km from the reactor building. 5.7.2 The worst foreseeable design-basis fault for the Sizewell B reactor is, in the simplest terms, a

breach in the primary cooling system with associated nuclear fuel cladding failures, leading to gaseous and particulate radioactive substances being released beyond the site boundary into the surrounding environment.

5.7.3 A detailed map of the DEPZ, showing 30-degree sectors around the power station site, with

concentric rings at 0.8 km, 1.6 kms and 2.4 km is available in Appendix 2. 5.8 Protection of Fire and Rescue Service Personnel 5.8.1 The most likely radioactive material to be released will be radioactive Iodine 131. This is a

volatile material and if an escape occurs it will enter the atmosphere and drift as a plume of gas. The Health Protection Agency (HPA) has issued Potassium Iodate tablets to SFRS. These tablets are held at Leiston Fire Station for issue to crews in the event of a radioactive incident and are kept in date via re-issues from the HPA. Tablets will be issued and taken by all staff in the affected area. Tablets are held in quantities at the following locations in addition to at the power station main gate:

• Leiston Fire Station 100 tablets • Leiston Police Station 200 tablets • Strategic Co ordination Gold 12,000 tablets NHS Suffolk will provide staff to give advice on the issue and taking of these Potassium Iodate tablets. The tablets can significantly reduce the amount of radioactive iodine that can be absorbed by the body (reducing radiation dose) by flooding the thyroid gland with non-radioactive iodine thus preventing the harmful radioactive Iodine in the atmosphere from being absorbed by the body.

5.8.2 In accordance with SOP 5.10, the limits of radiation exposure are set to ensure the safety of all

Fire and Rescue personnel. 5.8.3 The Ionising Radiation Regulations are made under the Health and Safety at Work Act. They

place a duty upon the employer (i.e. Suffolk Fire and Rescue Service) to put in place systems to ensure that its employees are protected from excessive exposure to radiation. The maximum annual dose to all radiation workers (male and female) is 20 mSv. Firefighters attending a radiation incident fall under the definition of a radiation worker. There is an additional limit on females of reproductive capacity of 13 mSv in any three month period. Notwithstanding the above, Suffolk Fire and Rescue Service sets dose limits for the protection of personnel as detailed below.

Female firefighters must not attend an off site nuclear emergency at Sizewell. Male Firefighter dose / exposure limits (see table below)


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Recommended Dose Constraint at Incident

Maximum annual Dose constraint

Maximum Dose in an Emergency at Nuclear

site *

Male Firefighter 5mSv 20mSv 100mSv

Note: 6 mSv dose is the trigger for a Formal incident investigation (1/3 of 20mSv)

* Emergency Exposure (Informed Volunteer)

Under Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPIR) it is permissible to disapply the Ionising Radiation Regulations 99 dose limits at a Nuclear Site or at an incident involving transport by rail, if in doing so it might be possible to save life or maintain critical infrastructure. In these instances it may be possible for an Informed Volunteer to be exposed to a dose of up to 100mSv2. Authorisation to use informed volunteers must be given to the Incident Commander by an appropriately trained Fire and Rescue Service Officer, normally a Hazardous Material and Environmental Protection Officer (HMEPO) who will:

• Carry out a dynamic risk assessment in conjunction with the Emergency Health Physicist (and SFRS Radiation Protection Adviser) in accordance with relevant guidance; and

• Fully brief the Informed Volunteers in line with guidance below

Informed Volunteer

An informed volunteer in terms of the application of REPPIR, is a radiation worker who has agreed to receive an emergency exposure, above the limits imposed by the Ionising Radiation Regulations. To be considered an Informed Volunteer a Firefighter should have received:

• appropriate training in the field of radiation protection • suitable and sufficient information and instruction for them to know the risks to health

created by exposure to ionising radiation and the precautions which should be taken (See table below detailing physiological deterministic effects of exposure to ionising radiation).

• a briefing on the risk control measures associated with the specific emergency tasks in question.

Note: Informed volunteers should be asked to confirm their agreement to potentially receive an emergency exposure at this briefing.

Summary of whole body dose and deterministic physiological effect

Dose Effect Comments 5 Sieverts (5,000 mSv, or 5,000,000 μSv)

Probable lethal dose Very dependent on rate of delivery and health of individual

3 Sieverts (3,000 mSv or 3,000,000 μSv)

Erythema (skin reddening) May not appear for several days

3 Sieverts Depilation (Hair loss) Temporary between 3 and 7


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(3,000 mSv or 3,000,000 μSv) Sv; permanent above 7 Sv 1 Sievert (1,000 mSv, or 1,000,000 μSv)

Threshold for radiation sickness

Dependent upon other factors e.g. health, rate of delivery, skin type etc

700 mSv (700,000 μSv)

Threshold for temporary sterility

Can be permanent at higher doses in excess of 3 Sv

100 mSv (100,000 μSv)

Chromosomal changes in blood cells detectable. Small increase in existing cancer risk

Minimum dose at which any physical changes can be detected. No noticeable effects by the person receiving the dose

5 mSv (5000 μSv)

Very small increase in overall cancer risk

No immediate observable effects

NOTE: This table is designed to give a general awareness of the order of magnitude required for various effects to be observed and should only be regarded as a very approximate guide. In practice there are likely to be many other factors which would influence the response to various levels of dose.

The REPPIR also require that employers of informed volunteers:

• provide equipment that is necessary to restrict the exposure of informed volunteers to radiation

• identify, and appropriately train, managers/officers who are authorised, in the event of a radiation emergency, to permit informed volunteers to be subject to an emergency exposure

• make arrangements for medical surveillance by an appropriate doctor or employed medical adviser to be carried out without delay, in the event of a radiation emergency

• make arrangements with an approved dosimetry service for the assessment of doses during emergency exposures, and for the separate recording of such doses in dose records. Further information and the names of approved dosimetry service approved under REPPIR can be found on the Health and Safety Executive’s website.

• ensure that no employee under 18 year of age, no trainee under 18 years of age and no female who is pregnant or breast feeding is subject to an emergency exposure.

Female Firefighters Due to the operational implications of the different dose rates for male and female personnel, and the fact that pregnancy lowers the occupational dose limit to 1 mSv during the period of pregnancy, female firefighters are not to be exposed to ionising radiation at operational incidents; as a consequence they must not attend Off Site Nuclear Emergencies. As such Female Firefighters will also not be committed to any place where radiation is suspected however female Firefighters are permitted to attend all incidents and exercises where exposure to radioactive contamination or ionising radiation is assessed as unlikely as no known release has occurred or expert advice confirms this to be the case. Following an incident, arrangements will be made to establish the total dose registered on issued film badges and Electronic Personal Dosimeters for each individual and this will be recorded in accordance with Radiation SOP 5.8.4 Dose Constraints: The regulations stipulate that, where appropriate to do so at the planning

stage, dose constraints are used to restrict exposure to radiation as far as is reasonably practicable. This dose constraint will usually be significantly lower than the legal dose limits.


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Incident Commanders should consider any operations not involving a situation that immediately threatens life where they may wish to impose a dose constraint below the legal annual limit. This could possibly be the case at a protracted Incident.

5.8.5 It is recommended that a maximum dose constraint of 5 mSv per incident is introduced at

operational incidents. The reasons for this level of constraint are:

• It corresponds to the alarm setting on the Electronic Personal Dosemeters, supplied through the Fire and Rescue Service National Resilience Project, which would naturally prompt staff to leave the Hazard Zone.

• It is in line with dose reference levels used by the ambulance service. • If a firefighter were to receive a dose in excess of one third of any formal dose limit (i.e. 1/3

of 20 mSv), the employer must conduct an investigation into the circumstances. This would equate to approximately 6 mSv for a whole body dose as measured by an EPD and by using 5 mSv as the dose constraint level this should avoid exceeding this reporting threshold.

5.8.6 ‘As Low As Reasonably Practicable’ (ALARP): At all times, it is not simply sufficient to avoid

exceeding dose constraints or dose limits; Suffolk Fire and Rescue Service must take active measures to ensure that all doses received are ‘As Low As Reasonably Practicable’ (ALARP). Dose limits are not aspirational; they are the last line of defence. In practical terms this means that if a task can be carried out in more than one way and one method is likely to result in lower radiation doses, this method must be used if reasonably practicable.

5.8.7 At any incident at Sizewell B involving radiation, liaison should be established with the

Occupational Health Department (and SFRS RPA if exposure is likely) at the earliest practicable stage of a radiation incident to ensure that proper consideration is given to Health, Safety and Welfare issues. This liaison should be established by HMEPO on behalf of IC.

5.8.8. The Sizewell Medical and Safety Department produced a report entitled "Protection of Fire

and Rescue Service Personnel Responding to a Radiological Incident at a Sizewell Site". Some relevant points from this report are reproduced below for the guidance of the Incident Commander and personnel.

5.8.8 The report was produced specifically to address the concerns of the Fire and Rescue Service

regarding the protection of their personnel responding to a radiological incident at a Sizewell site. In particular, consideration is given to whether there is a need to pre-issue protective clothing, dosimeter or dose rate survey equipment to the Fire and Rescue Service in order to ensure there is adequate protection of their staff prior to arrival at the site.

5.8.9 The protection of emergency services workers off site in an emergency situation has been

addressed in some detail in a number of documents. In general, these have focused on the potential hazards to the Police who potentially could be spending significant time in the affected area, assisting with countermeasures to protect the public. The nature and scale of hazard to Fire and Rescue Service personnel is however, comparable; the main difference being that Fire and Rescue Service personnel will not normally be working in the affected area off site, but may be traveling through it to reach the site. Any prolonged incident will also have significant business continuity issues for SFRS in terms of maintaining statutory service delivery in any area affected by radioactive contamination. (See Appendix 3).

5.8.10 Nature and Scale of Hazard following a release of radioactive material to the atmosphere;

there are 4 potential pathways by which it can pose a hazard to individuals:- 1. Ingestion of radioactive material deposited on foodstuffs or transferred into the food

chain (e.g. in milk).


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2. Inhalation of radioactive material in the plume. 3. Direct external radiation from activity deposited on the ground or on the individual. 4. Direct external radiation from the plume of material as it passes overhead.

5.8.11 Implications for the Fire and Rescue Service in the event of a Nuclear Emergency would be for

fire fighting and assisting with rescue on the site, only in those circumstances would crews be sent directly to the site. To reach the site, it is possible the crews will need to pass through the plume. The fire appliance will prevent any direct deposition of contamination onto the crews and will provide some minimal shielding from the external gamma dose rate. Given the low dose from the external gamma route even if the crews spend one hour in the open, 500 m from the site, the likely external dose is very small and far below annual dose limits.

5.8.12 Due to the number and varied nature of dangerous materials stored on the site, reference

MUST always be made at an early stage to the Site Representative present to ascertain the exact nature and extent of the hazards involved. MSDS for all on site products are available from the site representatives.

5.8.13 If the vehicle's windows are closed and the ventilation shut off there is a potential for some

reduction in the inhalation dose. Assuming no such reduction and, pessimistically, that the plume centre line is directly in line with the station approach road, lung doses to fire crews in transit would not exceed a few mSv. With thyroid dose predominating, prompt issue of Potassium Iodate tablets can significantly reduce this dose pathway; for example, issue within the first hour will reduce the thyroid dose by over 90%, to negligible values.

5.8.14 Direct measurement of the potential dose due to inhalation is not possible; this must be

assessed on the analysis of air samples. Radiation dose rate survey meters will only measure one component (external) of dose; the precise ratio of internal to external dose will vary at different points in the plume and may also vary with time if the isotopic composition of the release changes. Thus, survey meters would only measure a component of dose.

5.8.15 There is no action for the fire crews to take in response to a reading on such an instrument

and no purpose therefore in providing one. It is conceivable that, if fire crews did have a survey meter, which registered above background, they would stop and request further guidance thus increasing their inhalation dose compared to proceeding directly to the site.

Note: inhalation dose is highly dependent upon isotopic composition of the plume. For

example plumes which are predominantly iodine could give rise to a thyroid dose if countermeasures were not implemented, but if the predominant isotope were noble gases then the inhalation dose would be negligible as the body does not metabolise noble gases.

5.8.16 The report considers the hazards to Fire and Rescue Service personnel with particular

reference to any need to pre-issue survey meters, dosimeters or protective clothing. It concludes that even in the event of an extremely serious accident many times worse than the Reference Accident, such equipment is unnecessary off site and in some circumstances its use could be to the detriment rather than benefit of the crews.

5.8.17 Dust containing beta particles can cause radiation "burns" where they come into contact with

bare skin. This may be particularly noticeable around cuffs and collars. Burns are highly unlikely. It would need extremely high dose-rate particles in contact with the skin for some time before this became a problem.


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5.8.18 The kind of particles capable of causing this would have to have come from the reactor and be particles of fuel or corrosion products in the case of SZB. The vast majority of contamination found at stations does not contain this kind of particle. The wearing of Gas Tight Suits, leaving no part of the body exposed may provide protection against such dust particles.

5.8.19 Gamma rays and neutrons are particularly penetrating and hence, there is no clothing

which gives effective protection. Some protection can be achieved by TIME, DISTANCE AND SHIELDING. Monitoring by trained personnel with suitable equipment can, however, reduce exposure to such radiation to within the acceptable levels.

5.8.20 In the event of an emergency evacuation of Fire and Rescue Service personnel and other

emergency services, personnel should be evacuated to either the appropriate ACP or the marshalling point.

5.9 Radiation Risks 5.9.1 All incidents involving radiation risks will be dealt with in accordance with SOP 5.10.

Personnel who are actually physically exposed to Hazardous Materials must complete forms; HAZ 1 Initial Record of Exposure to Hazardous Materials, and Form HAZ 2 Permanent Record of Exposure to Hazardous Materials.

5.9.2 The main risk to Fire and Rescue Service crews from radiation comes from exposure to

radioactive substances carried in a gaseous discharge plume, which has been released from the reactor. This release of gaseous and particulate radioactive substances is likely to be a result of a breach in the primary cooling system.

5.9.3 A range of elemental radioactive substances may be released from such a breach in a reactor.

A radioactive substance of particular concern is Iodine-131, which may be discharged as a gas in the plume. This substance can be readily absorbed by the human body (and other living species) and concentrates in the thyroid, resulting in radiation doses to the individual. Other radioactive substances will be present in the plume and exposure will result in additional radiation doses.

5.9.4 Various levels of contaminated radioactive waste are present on the site. The risks presented

to Fire and Rescue Service crews from these substances are significant and expert advice must always be sought from the on site chemical/radiation protection advisors.

5.9.5 When considering fire fighting options, crews must always consider the effects of the

extinguishing medium upon the radioactive substance. For example the application of large quantities of water on a substance has the potential to spread the contamination. The Station Health Physics/Emergency Health Physicist shall be responsible for ensuring adequate advice to fire fighting teams and site personnel. Early notification and liaison with EA is important.

5.9.6 For fires involving nuclear fuel, the Monex dry powder dispensers and extinguishers should be

used in preference to other powders. If possible, all SZB stocks of Monex dry powders should be used before reverting to Fire and Rescue Service extinguishers. The powder should be applied in such a way as to completely cover the fuel and prevent the spread of contamination.

5.10 Chemical Risks 5.10.1 All incidents involving chemical risks will be dealt with in accordance with SOP 5.3.


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5.10.2 The site transports, stores and uses a vast range of chemicals. On site chemist/emergency chemists are available to provide advice in the event of an incident involving a chemical release. The chemist is available through requests from the main security lodge, ACP, ECC and the details regarding quantities and contingency plans are given in SZB Non-Nuclear Emergency Handbook. The main bulk chemicals found on Site are:

• Ammonia Solution (34% solution in 4 tanks, 2 x 43.5m3 and 2 x 4.7m3) • Carbon Dioxide (1 tank, 6 te) • Fuel/Lubricating Oil (several storage tanks around plant) • Hydrazine (35% Solution, supply tank 1.7 te) • Hydrochloric Acid • Hydrogen (2 bottle banks of 3300 m3 and 2 x 1500m3) • Nitric Acid (1 x 1.5m x 1.5m tank). • Nitrogen (4 x 61.65 m storage tanks) • Sodium Hydroxide (46% solution 3x 135m tanks) • Sulphuric Acid (3 x 125m tanks) • Sodium Nitrate (25 litre drums)

5.10.3 The quantities and type of chemical stored on site will vary greatly and DRA processes should

consider this. Early involvement of HMEPO will assist the IC with a hazmat risk assessment and tactical guidance.

5.10.4 A leakage or spillage of chemicals without fire should be contained within the holding tanks

built into the site but could create a hazard by the emission of a cloud of toxic gas beyond the site boundary and/or water course pollution. This could cause a longer lasting and more complex incident.

5.10.5 Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE). A rapid release of flammable / irritant / toxic material from a

tank or pipeline can give rise to a large gas cloud that could spread over a wide area. If this gas cloud ignites, a rapid flame spreads throughout the entire cloud volume, resulting in a blast effect which may create further operational issues.

5.10.6 Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE). If a drum / vessel containing flammable

material is exposed to sustained intense heat, it may suddenly rupture, causing blast damage and propelling parts of the vessel considerable distances.

5.11 On Site Resources 5.11.1 Fire plans for the whole site are held in the Gatehouse, ACP, ECC, Fire Station and the MCR.

These are detailed floor by floor fire plans showing all fixed fire fighting equipment, compartmentation and escape routes within the site. Each area of the site has a fire risk assessment which identifies all the high risks on the site. These risk assessments are linked to the plans. Details of the high risks can be obtained on request from the ACP. The current resources on site that can be utilised by SFRS are:

• MONEX DP Extinguishers. • Protection and emergency equipment, including wind speed, and wind direction indicators. • Emergency Response Team including Rapid Response Vehicle and fire-fighting equipment. • Medical Centre. • Site First Aiders. • On Site Security 24/7. • Emergency Incident Management Support (On call after hours).


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6. Operational Response planning objectives

• To affect the rescue of all persons trapped by fire or in wreckage or debris. • To deal with any casualties. • To extinguish all fires and to undertake measures to prevent further fires. • To mitigate emergencies caused by released hazardous materials (eg fuels, chemicals and

other contaminants) in order to contain the situation allowing recovery operations by site specialists.

• To identify, set up and manage the inner cordon (with exception of confirmed terrorist incidents) and be responsible for the safety and welfare of all persons within the inner cordon.

• To establish the pre-arranged RVP location in conjunction with the other emergency services.

• To work closely with Sizewell B site staff and Emergency Response Teams to protect the surrounding risks which adjoin the site and prevent deterioration of the situation.

• To ensure sufficient water supplies in the event of a fire incident to enable the incident to be brought to a satisfactory conclusion.

• To mitigate and limit damage to the environment as far as reasonably practicable in the event of fire and/or spillage.

• To provide further Fire and Rescue Service assistance to the recovery process as required and authorised by Gold Commander.

• To notify all relevant authorities and agencies efficiently and effectively. • To deal with enquiries from the media through Multi Agency ‘Communicating in a Crisis’

plan arrangements in accordance with SCG. 7. Risk Assessment 7.1 See Fire Ground Order 6.3 – Major Incidents. A dynamic risk assessment, in conjunction with

Suffolk Constabulary, will be required in response to the particular circumstances prevailing at each activation of this plan.

7.2 In the event of a leakage of material refer to Fire Ground Order 5.3. (Chemical Incidents) and

seek advice from HMEPO. 7.3 Any incident involving release of radioactive materials should adhere to guidance contained

within SOP 5.10 Radiation Incidents.


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8 Response resources


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8.1 Raising the Alarm 8.1.1 Responsibility for activating the off site alarm (audible on site warning siren) will rest with the

Duty Shift Manager in the Main Control Room (MCR adjacent to the ACP). The alarm will be in the form of a siren, capable of warning all premises within the PIZ.

8.1.2 The Duty Shift Manager in the Main Control Room will also initiate the Rapid Reach notification

to the emergency services. In accordance with the Suffolk Resilience Forum Off Site emergency plan for Sizewell power stations, the Fire and Rescue Service will receive more detailed incident information from the police, gained from their acknowledgement call back to the Main Control Room. This information will be used to confirm the correct PDA.

8.1.3 All buildings have automatic fire alarms systems linked directly to the MCR. The system

operates via either automatic detection systems, or via manual break glass call points. 8.1.4 Stage One: Operates building evacuation alarms resulting in local area evacuation and roll call. 8.1.5 Stage Two: Operated by MCR, to sound total site evacuation alarm, resulting in all areas

evacuating to remote locations on site perimeter with a subsequent roll call. 8.2 Forward Control Points 8.2.1 The initial location of the Company and SFRS Forward Control Point (FCP1) will depend upon

the nature and extent of the incident.

8.2.3 The first FDS at the scene will attend the designated Company and SFRS Forward Control

Point, as above, becoming the Incident Commander and ensuring the appropriate Incident Commander Guidance Card is fully implemented.

8.2.4 If an off site emergency or Major/Multi agency incident has not been declared an early Dynamic

Risk Assessment decision will needed to determine whether a Major/Multi Agency Incident needs to be declared. If so, Combined Fire Control must be informed and this plan will be implemented in its entirety, with the first attending FDS acting as Incident Commander until Tactical Coordination Group is set up and functioning.

8.2.5

8.2.6 A Multi-Agency Silver (Tactical Coordinating Group) will be established in accordance with

strategic direction and plan guidance. This will be remote from the Power station location. 8.2.7 Access routes during an ‘emergency’ will be dictated by the prevailing weather conditions at the

time of the incident. This will be confirmed by combined fire control.


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8.3 Command and Control 8.3.1 In order to achieve a combined and coordinated response to a major emergency, the actions of

SFRS must be integrated with those of Local Authorities and other agencies. This must be achieved through the implementation of command and control principles as outlined in the Suffolk Resilience Forum “Generic Emergency Response and Recovery Plan” and “Off Site Emergency Plan for Sizewell Nuclear Power Stations” in which SFRS will play a pivotal role.

8.4 Principal Control Centres 8.4.1 The Main Control Room (MCR) will initiate the first appropriate response to the emergency.

The MCR is the operational heart of the site. It is where all the mechanical and electrical control suites are situated and where all the technical control takes place. As a situation develops the Emergency Control Centre (ECC) will be set-up.

8.4.2

8.4.4 The principal control centres that will be established are detailed below. 8.4.5 Station Emergency Control Centre (ECC):

• Established at Power Station, or if untenable, at Sizewell A. Sizewell A will also set up their ECC, in support of Sizewell B.

• There is a separate (one on each site) ECC for Stations A and B which are available on a 24-hour standby basis.

• Normal staffing also includes Assistant Controllers and appropriate Emergency Centre support staff to carry out plotting, communications and radio operation.

• Spaces are provided in ECC for SFRS officers, who have direct contact with Combined Control. In normal circumstances the DAC should attend here in first instance to gain oversight of the incident and then review/confirm ICS structure and officer deployment.

8.5 Central Emergency Support Centre (CESC) 8.5.1 Established as Nuclear central support office in Barnwood, Gloucestershire to support the

ECC and the StratCC functions. 8.6 Strategic Coordination Centre (Strat CC) 8.6.1 The Strat CC is the Strategic Coordination Centre and this is where the Strategic Coordinating

Group meet (Multi Agency Gold Command). It is located at Police Headquarters, Martlesham and enables relevant senior executives who are empowered to make executive decisions with respect to their organisations’ resources, to work together under the chair of the lead agency (the default chair is Suffolk Police) to develop joint operational policies and strategies.


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8.7 Strat CC Supporting Cells include: 8.7.1 Media Coordination Cell

• In conjunction with other members of the Media Coordination Centre, at the beginning of the incident and at regular and appropriate times thereafter, provide advice to the public on the radiation hazard and, in particular, to vulnerable groups.

• As advised by the operator or subsequently by the Strat CC, coordinate the implementation of protective countermeasures and check that those advised have taken the necessary action.

• Certain countermeasures will be initiated automatically at the earliest opportunity. These include advice to DEPZ residents and businesses to take doses of pre-distributed Potassium Iodate tablets, shelter and evacuation of vulnerable persons from the DEPZ. The former will be initiated by automated voice messaging from the Nuclear Operator and the latter will be a multi-agency evacuation led by the Police. The Police should also confirm with the Operator that the former has been initiated.

8.7.2 Scientific, Technical and Advice Cell (STAC) 8.7.2.1Scientific and technical advice during any incident will be provided in a coordinated manner

through the establishment of a Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC). This process will bring together scientific and technical expertise from a range of agencies and allow the establishment of an agreed advisory input to the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) process. SFRS HMEPO may be required to attend STAC and reference should be made to the SRF STAC Plan.

8.7.2.2Separate arrangements exist for the provision of scientific and technical advice during a

nuclear emergency at Sizewell Power Station. A Government Technical Advisor would be appointed to advise the Police GOLD Commander. However, it is envisaged that the Government Technical Advisor would take a lead role within the STAC and would use wider advice to create a common input to the SCG.

8.7.2.3The function of the STAC is to:

• Provide the advisory function at the StratCC for the protection of public health and be responsible for advising the SCG on appropriate radiation dosage levels to limit exposure to people off-site.

• Establish the information base needed to evaluate the long-term public health and environmental consequences of the incident.

• In the recovery phase of the emergency arrangements, take the responsibility for coordinating more detailed assessments of any immediate public health and/or environmental impacts.

8.8 Logistics Cell 8.8.1 The multi-agency Logistics Cell coordinates the procurement, storage and distribution of

emergency supplies during a major multi agency incident, the setting up of any contracts to fulfil these tasks and the sourcing of any materials and equipment.


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8.8.2 Off-Site Nuclear Emergency Briefing Room: 8.8.3 Established at the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) London, for the briefing

of Cabinet Ministers. 8.9 Tactical Considerations 8.9.1 The site is provided with sufficient hard standing areas to allow fire appliances to be positioned

to enable access to most buildings. A selection of operational guidance cards for the advice of sector officers is available in this plan.

8.9.2 All tank farms and areas containing chemical and highly flammable risks are clearly marked in

the site plans. When flammable liquids or vapours escape from tanks, vessels or lines, all available means should be used for limiting their spread and preventing their ignition.

8.9.3 Isolation of product valves in conjunction with a site engineer is a priority. All sources of

ignition must be removed. If this is not possible, a foam blanket should be considered to prevent ignition of un-ignited leakage or spills. Any decision to use foam must be balanced with the likely impact upon the environment and the Environment Agency must be informed. Gas monitoring equipment should be used to carefully measure the surrounding areas, including any drains or low lying areas, to minimise the build up of flammable vapours. These are available from SFRS CV’s or on site engineers on request from their stores. Site operations personnel are qualified to operate these items.

8.9.4 Both SFRS and Sizewell B Fire Teams both now use 300 bar Breathing Apparatus sets. 8.10 Water Supplies 8.10.1 Fire hydrants are provided on a 200 mm ring main, supplied by two 23,000 litre reservoirs

situated on either side of the Fixed Fire Fighting Pump house. All hydrants are indicated by a standard hydrant plate with a black 'H' on a yellow background. Each hydrant bears a unique identification number. The hydrant ring main normally stands full of water and un-pressurised. Hydrants are located on the ring main in positions not less than 15 m, or more than 30 m, from the station building and spaced not more than 45 m apart. At each hydrant point there is an equipment cabinet containing hose lengths and branches.

8.10.2 Two diesel powered pumps of 230 m3/h capacity are situated within the Fixed Fire Fighting

Pump House and provide a working pressure of at least 5 Bar. The pumps can be started remotely from the Main Control Room (MCR), or locally by the operation of a break-glass switch situated in the control box for each pump. Once started, the pumps can only be stopped at the local control panels.

8.10.3 The hydrant ring main also includes pumping in points, which can be used to direct alternate

sources of water to the hydrants in order to provide an unlimited amount of water, if required. 8.10.4 Pumping-in points are located adjacent to the Fixed Fire Fighting Pump House, and on the

south east and north west corners of the Cooling Water Pump House. Pumps will be able to transfer water from the fire fighting reservoirs or CW culvert to charge the hydrant ring main. Take off points are provided adjacent to each of the reservoirs for this purpose.


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8.11 Fixed Installations

Fire Fighting Dry Risers 8.11.1 Landing valves are provided at all levels within most plant buildings (with the exception of

ground level), including the roof level. At each landing valve there is an equipment box containing two lengths of hose and a branch. Landing valves are colour coded to assist in locating correct inlet valves associated with each landing valve. Each is of 150 mm diameter and provided in the following site buildings:

• Control Building and Auxiliary Building adjacent to the main east door, four separate systems cover the north and south halves of both the Control Building and Auxiliary Building. See fire risk assessment drawings (Available from Gatehouse, ACP, MCR, ECC and fire station).

• Fuel Building; adjacent to the north door. • Auxiliary Shutdown Building; adjacent to the main east door. • Mechanical Annexe; three separate systems cover the east, central and west shear towers,

with inlet points adjacent to the entrances to the east and west shear towers and on the north west corner of the building for the central shear tower.

8.11.2 The hydrant ring main contains dry riser charger points consisting of a four way valve outlet in

the following locations:

• On Road 8 adjacent to the east shear tower. • On Road 8 adjacent to the main entrance to the Control Building. • On Road 4 adjacent to the Fuel Building. • On Road 7 adjacent to the main entrance to Auxiliary Shutdown Building.

8.12 Fire Suppression Equipment Water Supplies 8.12.1 The pumping plant, situated in the Fixed Fire Fighting Pump House, comprises two diesel

powered pumps. Water is supplied from the east and west water reservoirs. Each pump has its own controls for automatic and manual starting and remote indication that the pumps are running is provided in the Main Control Room.

8.12.2 During normal operating conditions, the fire fighting trunk main pipe work is maintained at a

standing pressure of 14.5 Bar. A fire fighting pressure tank of 45 m3 capacity contains 15 m3 of water and maintains the pressure and provides initial water feed while the engines start. Pressure switches sense a falling pressure due to water demand and initiate the engine starts in sequence, as the demand for water increases. Once started, the pumps can only be stopped manually by holding the fuel cut off facility in the off position until the engine comes to rest.

8.13 Fixed Suppression Systems 8.13.1 Fixed suppression systems provided throughout the site fall into the following categories:

• Fire Sprinkler systems (Some automatic and some pre-action type) covering different equipment, risk areas and buildings across the station site. Some require manual operation by Main Control Room;

• Water Spray systems protecting various plant and equipment (automatic and manual); and • Internal hose reels are located such that hose streams can reach all parts of the station.


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Hose reels, in all areas except the Radwaste Building, are operated by running out the hose reel which automatically turns on the water. Hose reels in the Radwaste Building are manually operated. Hose reels inside the Containment Building are normally dry. Break glass push button stations are provided to alarm the Main Control Room and the Control Room Operator can open the containment isolation valve to charge the hose reels.

8.14 Foam Systems 8.14.1 Foam/water solution sprinklers supply the Auxiliary Boiler fuel oil tanks and the essential diesel

generator bulk fuel oil tanks are fitted with low level feed pipe, which is extended to beyond the tanks surrounding bund wall and terminates in a hose connection. Water is fed from the site hydrant system via a foam induction trolley, into the feed pipe hose connection.

8.14.2 In the diesel storage tanks, mobile trailers are parked next to the tanks. The water/foam

solution is injected directly into the base of the tank from where it will rise to form a fire quenching/fire resistant blanket. This system is in addition to the tanks external water deluge system.

8.14.3 Foam/water solution sprinklers supply the Auxiliary Boiler fuel oil tanks and the Essential Diesel

Generator bulk fuel oil tanks are fitted with low level feed pipe, which is extended to beyond the tanks surrounding bund wall and terminates in a hose connection. Water is fed from the site hydrant system via a foam induction trolley, into the feed pipe hose connection.

8.14.4 The site can offer 8,000 litres of FFFP and AFFF foam compound stored in 1000 litre

Intermediate Bulk Containers or bulk tanks located in strategic locations. Movement is by forklift truck which is available 24/7.

8.15 Open Water Supplies 8.15.1 Sizewell B is situated by the sea. Cooling water extracted from the sea is returned via an open

surge tank adjacent to the cooling water pump house indicated on the site plan. Pumping from the surge tank would be difficult.

8.16 On site miscellaneous equipment 8.16.1 Additional equipment available includes:

• 1 ground monitor. • Gas monitors. • Intrinsically safe radios. • Spill absorbent granules. • River protection boom. • River pollution kits. • 3 Monex 50 kg dry powder portable extinguisher units for use in the fuel building.

8.17 Environmental Considerations 8.17.1 The two main causes for concern with regard to serious environmental impact would be:

• Fire water or foam run off leaving the site and entering the water courses. • Toxic smoke plume and products of combustion.


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8.17.2 The site is built upon a sealed concrete base and all water would be maintained on site in drainage systems but advice should be obtained from EA by HMEPO for environmental containment strategies.

9 Communications 9.1 With the functionality of Airwave technology, direct interoperable voice communications (IVC)

at the scene with other emergency services/responding agencies should be possible although some buildings construction will restrict Airwave use internally. Suffolk Constabulary (Airwave Support) at PHQ holds a number of spare handsets called IBIS sets. IBIS handsets can be issued to SFRS and other emergency services for use in a major incident, allowing direct communications between the various attending emergency services. Crews must be made aware of the fact that the Airwave radios are not intrinsically safe. SFRS SOP 6.5 details procedures for IVC use.

9.2 Radio transmissions via Combined Control may involve brief delays in information being

passed back whilst they talk to the respective blue light services control rooms directly. Consideration must also be given to the following:

• The suspension of all radio transmissions until it is confirmed that the atmosphere is safe. • Using intrinsically safe handheld radio’s in order to retain direct communications. • In exceptional circumstances, it may be necessary to suspend radio transmissions and to

communicate verbally, using personnel as runners. 9.3 Under no circumstances should any FRS personnel within a hazard area leave any mobile

phone or other communicative device switched on, until it is confirmed safe to do so by the Incident Commander.

10 Administration 10.1 This plan will be reviewed annually between SFRS, Combined Fire Control, our Emergency

Service partners, Sizewell B, EDF, and Suffolk County Council Joint Emergency Planning Unit. The Resilience Officer will keep a record of any review process and this will be kept for audit purposes. SFRS Resilience Officer should be notified of any circumstances that may necessitate amendment of this plan.

10.2 The Resilience Officer should ensure that all staff are aware of the contents of this plan and

ensure that it is accessible to all crews electronically via CSV laptops, on the M drive, through MDT systems when available and in paper format in line with the distribution list at the front of this document.

10.3 This plan is exercised annually in order to test the efficacy of the Multi-Agency Off-Site Plan. 10.4 Suffolk Fire and Rescue Service are full participants in the Suffolk Resilience Forum training

and exercise schedule. 10.5 Finances may be recovered against a Major Incident. Records of assets and quantities of

consumables, foam etc must be maintained in order to justify future financial settlements. 10.6 Greater detail regarding Sizewell B procedures can be found in the Suffolk Resilience Forum

off-site emergency plan and owner’s on-site plan.


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10.7 Detailed plans of the site are available from the operators, EDF and copies are held in the FCP (Bronze), on Control Vehicle laptops and on the M drive.

11 Human Rights 11.1 This plan supports the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and has been

constructed with reference to its principles, namely legality, legitimacy, proportionality, necessity and accountability.

12 Protective Marking 12.1 This plan has been produced on the above basis and will be reviewed in accordance with the

procedures detailed in Administration above in order to ensure the best quality service delivery to the public. However, the contents provide a comprehensive overview of the SFRS response to such an incident and would allow unauthorised persons to plan a course of action that could potentially place the public and responding emergency service personnel at risk. Therefore, it is protectively marked as PROTECT and should not be released into the public domain.

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Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ) The following map is reproduced from the Suffolk Resilience Forum Offsite Response Plan. It provides guidance for additional warnings or evacuation if the hazard area spreads through a toxic smoke plume, flammable gas escape or for some other reason. It identifies the sectors that would be evacuated and also identifies the areas that are covered in the pre planning stages. These areas receive information from the power station that covers what to do in the event of an incident and they are the areas that would be warned in the event of an incident.

((((((((2.4km

1.6km

0.8km

0 0.5 1

miles

1A

2A

3A3B

2B

1B

1C

2C

3C

3D2D

1D

1E2E

3E

3F

2F

1F1G

2G

3G 3H

2H

1H

N

M

L

K

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. Suffolk County Council Licence No. 100023395 2009

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Business Continuity There will be a need to provide Fire and Rescue provision in the event of any period of wide scale radioactive contamination of the DEPZ and surrounding areas. Each fire station will have individual Business Continuity plans and these should be referred to for guidance on maintaining individual station availability. A number of considerations have been listed below to assist Crisis Management Team with maintaining reasonable statutory service delivery during any medium or long term wide scale radioactive contamination incident.

• Liaise with Health Protection Agency (HPA) via STAC (or directly as contracted RPA for SFRS) and establish the nature of hazards to health and levels of radiation dose in any off site plume or contaminated areas to inform operational precautions required for emergency response in the affected areas.

• Very early consideration of relocating appliances and/or personnel to predetermined or specifically assigned locations to facilitate continued use of the equipment and resource.

• Consider reviewing PDAs to minimise exposure of personnel.

• Consider recording of radiation doses received, using EPDs, to personnel and appliances working in an area affected by any off site plume containing radioactive material.

• Where hazards to health from off site plume are significant this is likely to have affected SFRS On Call crews and their families in the areas affected. On call personnel welfare and availability should be reviewed in the surrounding areas and consideration will need to be given to provision of a wholetime standby or alternative On Call capability in a suitable and safe nearby location.

SIZEWELL “B” POWER STATION Major Incident Plan · Male Firefighter 5mSv 20mSv 100mSv Note: 6...

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Transcript of SIZEWELL “B” POWER STATION Major Incident Plan · Male Firefighter 5mSv 20mSv 100mSv Note: 6...