Size Matters in Election Administration · election administration, as the jurisdictions vary...

SizeMattersinElectionAdministration

DavidC.Kimball

UniversityofMissouri‐[email protected]

BradyBaybeck

[email protected]

Draft Version 1.1

5/10/2012

PreparedfortheHAVAat10conference,MoritzCollegeofLaw,OhioStateUniversity

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MuchhaschangedintheadministrationofelectionsintheUnitedStatessincethepassageoftheHelpAmericanVoteAct(HAVA)in2002.Amongotherthings,HAVAledtonewvotingequipmentandstatewidevoterregistrationdatabasesformuchofthecountryanditrequirednewproceduresforprovisionalvoting.Stateandlocalelectionofficialshadtoadapttothelaw’smandates.

ThedecentralizednatureoftheAmericanfederalsystemmeansthatmostelectionproceduresaremanagedbyrelativelyautonomouscountyormunicipalofficials.Whatislessappreciatedisthatdecentralizationisassociatedwithtremendousdisparitiesinlocalelectionadministration,asthejurisdictionsvarydramaticallyintermsofthesizeofthevotingpopulationtheyserve.Localadministrationissoskewedthatlessthan5percentofthelocalelectionofficialsintheUnitedStatesserveroughlytwo‐thirdsofthevotersinanationalelection.Despiteholdinggeneralelectionsonthesameday,heavilypopulatedandsparselypopulatedlocaljurisdictionsshareverylittleincommonwhenitcomestoadministeringelections,andthishasconsequences.

SinceHAVAwasacompromise,itofferedsomethingforbothpoliticalparties.However,thisdidnotdiminishdisputesoverelectionlaws.Ifanything,HAVAspawnedmorepartisanconflictandmorescrutinyoftheelectioninfrastructureintheUnitedStates.Someofthatscrutinyshedslightonthedrasticvariationinthesizeoflocaljurisdictionsthatadministerelections,whichhasimportantandunderappreciatedconsequencesforelectionadministrationandreform.Theinteractionoflocalautonomyandsizedisparitiesleadstorealdifferencesinhowelectionsareadministered‐intheexperiencesvotershave,inthepersonnelmanagingelections,andintheadoptionanduseofinnovativepractices.

ThepassageofHAVA,andthereactiontoitfromstateandlocalelectionofficials,hasexacerbatedthesedifferences.DespitesomemeasurableimprovementsinelectionadministrationthatcanbeattributedtoHAVA,thelawhaslikelyhardenedoppositiontofurtherelectionreformsamongofficialsinthemorenumeroussmallandmedium‐sizedlocaljurisdictions.ThisispartlyduetotheincreasedcostandcomplexityofelectionadministrationthatlocalitiesmustnowabsorbasaresultofHAVA.Itisalsobecause,afterHAVA,localjurisdictionsmustcomplywithstateandfederalmandatesforsituationsthatoccurrelativelyinfrequentlyinsmalljurisdictions.Manynewfangledmethodsofcastingaballot,suchasprovisionalvotingandabsenteevoting,occurdisproportionatelyinarelativelysmallnumberofdenselypopulatedurbanandsuburbanjurisdictions.Thepartisan‐drivenlawsuitsthathaveemergedoverthesevotingproceduresarelikelyalsoconcentratedinlargejurisdictions.

Finally,thedemandforinnovationinelectionadministrationislargelyconfinedtoofficialsinthemostpopulouslocaljurisdictionsintheUnitedStates.Yet,inmanystatesthepolicyrecommendationsofthoselocalofficialsmaybedrownedoutbythemorenumerous

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officialsinotherjurisdictionswhoservevastlysmallervotingpopulations.Asaresult,policychangesthatmighthelplargejurisdictionscontendwithavast,mobileandrapidlygrowingpopulationofeligiblevotersareunlikelytobeadopted.

1. TheMagnitudeoftheSizeDisparity

WeidentifyallofthelocaljurisdictionsthatadministerelectionsintheUnitedStates,producingalistof10,499localities.Weidentifythesejurisdictionsbyfocusingontheunitswithresponsibilityforhiring,training,andmonitoringpollworkers.1Theselocalitiesvarysubstantiallyintermsofthenumberofvoterstheyserveandthusthenumberofpollworkerstheyneedtohire.Themedianjurisdictionservedslightlymorethan1,000votersinthe2008presidentialelection.HalfofthelocalelectionjurisdictionsintheUnitedStatesaresmalltownsorcountieswithveryfewelectionstaff.Atthesametime,roughlytwo‐thirdsofthevotersinthe2008electionwereservedbyjust457largejurisdictions(4%ofthejurisdictions).Putdifferently,96percentofthelocaljurisdictionsservedjustone‐thirdofthevotersin2008.Wearecertainlynottheonlyonestoobservethedramaticdisparityinthesizeoflocaljurisdictions(GronkeandStewart2008,8).Asweshowbelow,theelectionadministrationexperienceisvastlydifferentinthesetwotypesofjurisdictions.

[Figure1abouthere]

Tosimplifysomeoftheanalysesthatfollow,wedividetheuniverseoflocaljurisdictionsintothreesizecategories:small(servinglessthan1,000voters),medium(servingbetween1,000and50,000voters),andlargejurisdictions(servingmorethan50,000voters).Wechose1,000votersasonedividinglinebecausejurisdictionswithfewerthan1,000votersaregenerallysmalltownsthathavenomorethanacoupleofpollingplacesandahandfulofpollworkers.Weexpectthesejurisdictionstohaveadifferentelectionadministrationexperiencethanlargerjurisdictions.Inaddition,roughlyhalfofthejurisdictionsservedlessthan1,000votersinrecentpresidentialelections,sothisservesasanaturalbreakinthedata.Wechose50,000votersastheotherdividinglinebecausejurisdictionsservingmorethan50,000voterstendtobeindenselypopulatedmetropolitanareaswithalargecentralcity.Thus,thelargestjurisdictionshavedifferentinfrastructureandtransportationnetworksthanthemedium‐sizedjurisdictions,whicharemostlyruralandexurbancounties.Thesedimensionscharacterizewhatwedefineassmall,medium,andlargejurisdictionsinavarietyofanalysesbelow.ThesmallestjurisdictionsareprimarilyintheupperMidwestandNewEngland,withasmallernumberinthePlains.Largejurisdictions

1Electionadministrationisshared,tosomedegree,betweencountyandmunicipalofficialsinthreestates(Michigan,Minnesota,andWisconsin).Ourtotalof10,499localjurisdictionsincludesmunicipalitiesinthosethreestates.Ifoneinsteadcountsthecountyastherelevantlocaljurisdictiononthosethreestates(e.g.,KimballandKropf2006;U.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission2011)thatyieldsroughly4,600localjurisdictionsadministeringelectionsintheUnitedStates.WeusebothdatasetsbelowandshowthatusingeithermethodproducesasimilarskeweddistributionofelectionresponsibilitiesintheUnitedStates.

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areconcentratedinthemajormetropolitancentersoftheUnitedStates.Figure1showsthedistributionoflocaljurisdictionsbysizebasedonthe2008election,withtheoverwhelmingmajorityinthesmallandmedium‐sizedcategories.Almosthalfofthelocaljurisdictionsareinthesmallcategory,withalmostasmanyinthemedium‐sizedcategory.Bycomparison,veryfewlocaljurisdictionsservelargevotingpopulations.

Toillustratethispoint,Figure2showsthenumberofvotersservedbyeachtypeofjurisdictioninthe2008generalelection.MostvotersintheUnitedStates(almosttwo‐thirdsofthem)areservedbylargejurisdictions.Smalllocalities,whilecomprisingalmosthalfoftheelectionjurisdictionsintheUnitedStates,onlyservedabitmorethanonepercentofvotersin2008.Examininggrowthinthevotingmarketisinstructiveaswell.Voterturnoutincreasedbyroughlyninemillionvotersbetweenthe2004and2008presidentialelections.Aboutsevenmillionofthoseadditionalvoterscameinlargejurisdictions,whiletwomillionofthegrowthinturnoutoccurredinmedium‐sizedjurisdictions.Turnoutdidnotincrease(infactitdecreasedslightly)insmalljurisdictions.Thus,thereisamassivedisparityinAmericanelectionadministration:asmallnumberoflocaljurisdictionsbearmostoftheresponsibilityforregisteringvotersandholdingelections,andtheirshareoftheburdenisincreasing.

[Figure2abouthere]

2. JurisdictionSizeandBasicDimensionsofElectionAdministration

Someofourevidencecomesfromanationalsurveyoflocalelectionofficialsconductedinearly2009andfromasurveyofstateelectionofficialsconductedinthesummerof2009.Forthesurveyoflocalofficials,wecreatedastratifiedsamplebasedonthethreejurisdictionsizecategories(small,mediumandlarge)describedabove.Toensurerepresentationofthelargestjurisdictionsalljurisdictionswithover50,000votersinthe2004generalelectionwereincludedinthesamplingframe.Werandomlysampled2,000medium‐sizedjurisdictionsand500smalljurisdictions.Alltold,oursampleframewas2,919jurisdictions.

Foreachjurisdictioninthesamplingframe,wesentthesurveytothetopelectionofficial(usuallyanelectedcountyortownclerk,oranappointedelectiondirector).Thepreferredmodewasviaawebsurvey.However,notalljurisdictionshadanemailaddress–somejurisdictionshadonlypostalmailcontacts.Thus,somelocalofficialswerecontactedbyemailtorespondtoanonlinesurveyinstrumentwhileotherofficialsweresentapapersurveyinthemail.Alltold,795surveys(27%)weresentviamail,2,104(72%)viaemail,andfor20wecouldnotobtainanycontactinformationandthereforenotypeofinstrumentwassent.Thevastmajorityofpapersurveyssentbymailwenttosmallandmedium‐sizedjurisdictions.

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Theemailsurveyincludedtworeminderstonon‐respondents.Themailsurveyincludedonefollow‐upmailingtonon‐respondents.Wereceived900surveysfromlocalelectionofficials,aresponserateof30.8%.Theresponserateforsmalljurisdictions(26%)issomewhatlowerthantheresponserateformedium(31%)andlargejurisdictions(37%).Theresponseratewasthesame(31%)forsurveyscompletedbymailandthosecompletedontheInternet.Forthestatesurvey,wesentquestionnairestoall50stateelectionofficials(usuallyaSecretaryofState)andreceivedresponsesfrom33officials.

[Table1abouthere]

Thesurveyoflocalofficialsincludedsomequestionsthatcanbeusedtodescribethemagnitudeoftheirelectionadministrationresponsibilities.InTable1wecomparethemedianjurisdictionineachsizecategoryonseveralmeasuresofelectionadministration.Thedataindicatethatthebasicdimensionsofelectionadministrationareverydifferentinlargeversussmalljurisdictions.Thetypicalsmalljurisdictionhasonepollingplace,ahandfulofpollworkers,andonestaffperson(thelocalofficial)whooverseespollingplaceoperations.Thus,inasmalljurisdictionthelocalofficialcanspendElectionDayatthelonepollingplaceandsuperviseallinteractionsbetweenvotersandpollworkers.

Atypicalmedium‐sizedjurisdictionin2008issomewhatlarger,withfivepollingplaces,40pollworkersandanadditionalstaffpersontocoordinatepollingplaceoperations.Thescaleofelectionadministrationinmedium‐sizedjurisdictionsisstillsmallenoughthatthelocalofficialcanobservethevotingexperienceateachpollingplaceonElectionDay.Electionadministrationgrowsbyatleastanorderofmagnitudewhenmovingtolargejurisdictions.Regardlessofthemetricused(pollingplaces,pollworkers,budgets)largejurisdictionsareatleast50timesbiggerthansmalljurisdictionsandroughly20timesbiggerthanmedium‐sizedjurisdictions.2Asaresult,itisimpossibleforthelocalofficialinalargejurisdictiontovisiteverypollingplaceonElectionDay.Electionofficialsinlargejurisdictionsmustdelegatemanyimportantdutiestootherstaff.

[Table2abouthere]

Weexaminesimilarmeasuresfromthe2010ElectionAdministrationandVotingSurveyinTable2andfindapproximatelythesamepatterns.Althoughvoterturnoutwaslowerinthemidtermelectionof2010,thescaleofelectionadministrationincreasesdramaticallyforlargejurisdictions.Table2alsoindicatesthatthenumberofprecinctsissubstantiallybiggerthanthenumberofpollingplacesinlargejurisdictionsbutnotinsmallerjurisdictions.Thus,thepracticeoflocatingmultipleprecinctsatthesamepollingplaceislargelyconfinedtolargejurisdictions.Asweshowbelow,thishasanimpactonthe

2Wefindverysimilarpatternswhencomparingjurisdictionsofdifferentsizesusingdataforthesameelectionfromthe2008ElectionAdministrationandVotingSurvey.

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distributionofprovisionalballots.Finally,thereisalsosomeevidenceinbothtablesofeconomiesofscale,withlargerjurisdictionsabletoservemorevotersperpollingplacethansmallerjurisdictions.Thismayresultinlowerelectionadministrationcostsonapervoterbasisinlargejurisdictions(seeHill2011).

Thebasicdimensionsmeasuredbythenumberofvoters,pollworkersandstaffonlybegintoexploretheassociationbetweenjurisdictionsizeandthetaskfacingelectionofficials.Largemetropolitanjurisdictionsshareotherfeaturesthatmakeelectionadministrationdifferentandmorechallenging.

3. JurisdictionSize,ElectoralActivityandDemographics

Inadditiontothevolumeofvoterstheymustserveingeneralelections,heavilypopulatedlocaljurisdictionsreceiveadisproportionateshareofcampaign‐relatedactivityinnationalandstatewideelections.Toparaphraseafrequentlyusedexpression,campaignsgohuntingwherethevotesare.Forexample,presidentialcampaignappearancesoccuroverwhelminglyinheavilypopulatedlocations(Althaus,Nardulli,andShaw2002,58;ChenandReeves2011,544).Theninemostvisitedcountiesinthe2008presidentialcampaignarealllargejurisdictionsbyourdefinition(ChenandReeves2011,540).Asonestudysummarizesthedata:

“Candidatevisitsareinmanywaysanurbanphenomenon,withasmallnumberofespeciallypopulatedurbanandsuburbancountiesattractingarelativelylargenumberofappearancesinanyyear.Incontrast,thevastmajorityofcountiesarelocatedinruralareas,andthesetypicallyreceiveverylittleattentionfromthecampaigns”(Althaus,Nardulli,andShaw2002,58).

Wesuspectthatotherformsofcampaigncommunication,suchastelevisionadvertising,arealsotargetedtowardthemostdenselypopulatedmediamarkets.Itisalsopossiblethatcoverageofpoliticalcampaignsintraditionalmediaoutletsisheavierinlargejurisdictions.

Inadditiontoreceivingalopsidedshareofcampaigncommunication,metropolitanregionswithapopulouscentralcitytendtodevelopknowledgecommunitiesthatattractadisproportionateshareofwealth,highlyeducatedpeople,andeconomicactivity(Shaw1997;Florida2008).Thus,denselypopulatedmetropolitanareasalsoserveasthedonorbaseforbothmajorpoliticalpartiesintheUnitedStates(Gimpel,LeeandKaminski2006).Finally,largejurisdictionstendtoproducemoreprofessionalpartyorganizationsthatserveasincubatorsforpoliticalambition.Asaresult,Gimpelandcolleagues(2011)observethatcandidatesforstatewideofficedisproportionatelyemergefromthemostdenselypopulatedcountiesintheUnitedStates.

[Figure3abouthere]

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Thenetresultofthesefindingsisthatelectionofficialsinlargejurisdictionsarelikelytoserveamoremotivatedandchargedelectorateingeneralelections.Perhapsonesymptomofthispatternisthatresidualvoteratesinpresidentialelectionstendtobesubstantiallyhigherinlesspopulatedruraljurisdictions.Figure3providesboxplotsofresidualvoteratesinthe2008presidentialelection.Thetopandbottomofeachboxindicatesthe75thand25thpercentileobservationsrespectively,whilethehorizontallineinsidetheboxdenotesthemediancase.Ashasbeenobservedinpreviouselections(AnsolabehereandStewart2005,383;Stewart2006,167),residualvotesaremuchlesscommoninlargejurisdictions.Theresidualvotefrequencyinthemediansmalljurisdictionisroughlytwiceasmuchasinthemedianlargejurisdiction.TheadoptionofnewvotingtechnologyspurredbyHAVAhassubstantiallyreducedthefrequencyofresidualvotesinpresidentialelections,particularlyinareaswithhighconcentrationsoflow‐incomeresidentsandracialandethnicminorities(Stewart2006;KropfandKimball2012).Asaresult,HAVAhassucceededinreducingtheresidualvoterateinlargejurisdictions,butnotsomuchinsmallerjurisdictions.ThemobilizinginfluenceofBarackObama’scampaigninlargejurisdictionmayaccountforsome,butcertainlynotall,ofthisempiricalpattern.AsStewart(2006,167‐168)notes,thestrongrelationshipbetweenjurisdictionsizeandresidualvotes,whichpersistsaftertheadoptionofnewvotingtechnology,deservesanexplanation.

[Figures4and5abouthere]

Asimpliedabove,denselypopulatedjurisdictionstendtohaveadifferentdemographicprofilethansmallerjurisdictions.Weexaminedatafromthe2000censustocharacterizethepopulationoflocaljurisdictionsinthe2004election.AsFigures4and5indicate,largejurisdictionstendtohaveamuchhighershareofnon‐whiteandLatinoresidentsthansmallerjurisdictions.3Largerjurisdictionsalsotendtohaveayoungerpopulation.Perhapsreflectingthecosmopolitancharacteroftheirsurroundings,electionofficialsinlargejurisdictionsareyounger,moreeducated,andmoreprofessionallyconnectedthantheircounterpartsinsmallerjurisdictions(Kimballetal.2010).

Furthermore,largejurisdictionshaveamoremobilepopulation.AsFigure6shows,largejurisdictionstendtohaveasmallerpercentageofresidentswhohavenotmovedinthepastfiveyears.MorerecentdatafromtheAmericanCommunitySurveyindicatethatmobilitymaybemorepronouncedinlargejurisdictions(BenetskyandKoerber2012).Withmorecampaignactivityandamoremobilepopulation,largejurisdictionstendtoproduceagreatershareofvoterregistrationthanexpectedgiventhesizeoftheirpopulation.Accordingtothe2008ElectionAdministrationandVotingSurvey,over77percentofthe

3Thecensuscodesraceandethnicityseparatelysothenon‐whitepercentagesinFigure4donotincludeLatinos.

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voterregistrationsreceivedinthe2008electioncyclecameinlargejurisdictions.4Amoremobilepopulationalsomakesregisteredvotersmoredifficulttotrackandproducesadisproportionateshareofproblematicvoterregistrationsinlargejurisdictions.Thesamedataindicatethatofthe19.7millionregisteredvotersontheinactivelistin2008,over80percent(nearly16million)residedinlargejurisdictions.

[Figure6abouthere]

Finally,largemetropolitanjurisdictionslikelycontainmanymoresub‐governments(suchasmunicipalities,schooldistrictsandothertaxingdistricts)thansmallerjurisdictions.Thesesub‐governmentshavetheirownelectionstoselectpublicofficials,raisetaxes,passbondissuesorchangeotherpolicies.Thismakesforalongerballot,moreprecinctsandmoreballotstylesingeneralelections,anditmakesformoreoff‐cycleelectionsinlargejurisdictions.Allofthesefeaturesoflocalgovernmentfurthercomplicatethetaskofplanningandholdingelectionsinlargejurisdictions.Insum,thenatureoflocalgovernment,demographicsandcampaignactivityproduceaddedchallengesforelectionofficialsinlargejurisdictions.Asaresult,theseofficialsaretheonesmostlikelytosupporttheneedforinnovationinelectionadministration.

4. JurisdictionSizeandDemandforInnovation

Electionofficialsinlargejurisdictionsareawareofthemorechallengingadministrativetaskstheyface.Wefirstexaminedemandforinnovationinoursurveyoflocalelectionofficialsdescribedabove.Thesurveyincludedninequestionsaboutpotentialdifficultiestheymayfaceinhiringpollworkers(suchasstaffingtherecruitmentprocess,findingenoughpollworkers,orfindingskilledpollworkers).Electionofficialsratedeachrecruitmentchallengeonascalefrom1(“notatalldifficult”)to4(“verydifficult”).Wecreateascalebyaveragingresponsestoeachoftheninequestions.5Figure7providesaboxplotofscalescoresforofficialsineachsizecategory.Asthegraphindicates,largejurisdictionsreportsubstantiallymoredifficultyinpollworkermanagementthansmallerjurisdictions.

[Figure7abouthere]

Inresponsetothesechallenges,electionofficialsinlargejurisdictionsengageinaslewofactivitiestorecruit,train,evaluate,andcompensatepollworkersthatarelargelydeemedunnecessaryandtendnottobeutilizedinsmalljurisdictions(Kimballetal.2010).Inaddition,officialsinlargejurisdictionsaremoresupportiveofreformsthatmighthelp

4Itispossiblethatthehighrateofregistrationactivityin2008wasduetotheuniquenatureoftheObamacampaignforpresident.Toaddressthatpossibility,weplanacomparableanalysisofregistrationdatafromthe2010electionwhenEACmakesthemavailablefromthe2010EAVS.5Thereliabilityofthescaleforchallengesinpollworkermanagement(Cronbach’sα)is.85.

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themcopewiththechallengingvotingpopulationtheymustserve.Forexample,officialsinlargejurisdictionsaremoresupportiveofmorestaffandresourcesforpollworkerrecruiting(Kimballetal.2010).Oursurveyoflocalofficialsincludedfourquestionsabouttheirsupportfornewvotingmethods(votecenters,earlyvoting,votingbymail,andInternetvoting)thatmayhelpthemmanagethecrushofvoterswhowouldotherwiseappearentirelyonElectionDay.Electionofficialsratedeachpolicyonascalefrom1(“StronglyOppose”)to5(“StronglyFavor”)with3servingastheneutralpoint.Wecreateascalebyaveragingresponsestoeachofthefourpolicyquestionsandwegraphtheresultsinaboxplot(seeFigure8).6Asthefigureshows,officialsinlargejurisdictionsareprimarilyonthesidefavoringthesenewvotingmethods,whileofficialsinsmalljurisdictionsaremostlyonthesideopposingthesenewvotingmethods.

[Figure8abouthere]

Asanotherexample,HAVA’sprovisionalvotingrequirementsserveasasafetyvalveforjurisdictionsdealingwithrapidandlarge‐scalechangestotheirregisteredvoterlist.Thus,itisnosurprisethatofficialsinlargejurisdictionshavemuchmorefavorableattitudestowardsprovisionalvotingthanelectionofficialsinsmalljurisdictions(Kropf,Vercellotti,andKimball2010).Thedemandforinnovationmeansthatelectionofficialsinlargejurisdictionsaremorelikelytosupportreforms,suchasHAVA,thatareintendedtohelppeoplevote.

Thecorollaryisthatofficialsinsmallerjurisdictionstendtoopposereformproposalsandtheytendtobeunhappywithnewelectionlaws.SurveysoflocalelectionofficialsobservesomehostilitytowardHAVA(e.g.,MoynihanandSilva2008)buttheyhavenotexaminedwhetherthehostilityiscomingprimarilyfromsmalljurisdictions.Anothersurveyoflocalofficialsincludedanopen‐endedquestionabouthowHAVAwasworkingintheirjurisdiction.Officialsfromsmalljurisdictionsweremuchmorelikelytooffercomments(andparticularlycriticalcomments)aboutHAVA.ManyofthenegativecommentsfocusedontheincreasedcostsoftheHAVAmandatesandtheirunhappinesswiththefederalgovernmenttellingthemhowtorunelections(KropfandKimball2012).HAVAhaslikelypolarizedattitudestowardelectionreformamonglocalofficialsbasedonthesizeoftheirjurisdiction.

5. JurisdictionSizeandInnovationinElectionAdministration

Sincetheneedforinnovationinelectionadministrationisdisproportionatelyfeltamonglargejurisdictions,weexpectthatmostinnovationinlocalelectionadministrationoccursinlargejurisdictions.Totestthishypothesis,weexaminedatafromtheElectionAssistanceCommission’sElectionAdministrationandVotingSurvey(EAVS).Thesurveyasksstate

6Thereliabilityofthescalefornewvotingmethods(Cronbach’sα)is.65.

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andlocaljurisdictionstoreportthenumberofballotscastinmajorelectionsinseveralcategories.Thus,thesurveymeasuresthefrequencyofvotingmethods(includingprovisionalvoting,absenteevoting,UOCAVAandearlyvoting)thatarealternativestothetraditionofcastingaregularballotatapollingplaceonElectionDay.WeanalyzeEAVSdatafromthe2008and2010electionstodeterminetheproportionofeachballottypecastinthethreejurisdictionsizecategories(seeTables3and4).

[Tables3and4abouthere]

TheEAVSdataindicatethatballotscastbyalternativemethodsoccurdisproportionatelyinlargejurisdictions.Forexample,eventhoughroughly70percentoftotalballotsandballotscastonElectionDayareproducedinlargejurisdictions,over90percentofprovisionalballotsandover80percentofabsenteeandUOCAVAballotsappearinlargejurisdictions.Inparticular,partiallyacceptedprovisionalballots(almost120,000in2008)andundeliverableabsenteeballots(over220,000in2008)occuralmostentirelyinlargejurisdictions.Meanwhile,mostformsofprovisionalandabsenteeballotsoccuratneardeminimislevelsinsmalljurisdictions.AmongthealternativeballotingmethodsinTables3and4,onlyearlyvotesarecastinroughproportiontotheoverallnumberofvotersineachtypeofjurisdiction.

Inthe2008electiontherewereover820,000rejectedabsenteeballotsandover500,000rejectedorpartiallyrejectedprovisionalballotsinlargejurisdictions.Giventheheightenedracialandethnicdiversityinlargejurisdictions,thesenumbersmayraiseconcernsaboutthedisparateimpactofabsenteeandprovisionalvotingintheUnitedStates.Furthermore,sinceHAVA’svotingtechnologyrequirementshavesignificantlyreducedthefrequencyofresidualvotes,provisionalandabsenteeballotsnowoutnumberresidualballotsinnationalelections(KropfandKimball2012,113‐114).Legalandpartisandisputesoverelectionadministrationandballotrecountsarenowmorelikelytofocusonthedispositionofabsenteeandprovisionalballotsratherthanresidualvotes.Thiswillfurthertheimportanceofjurisdictionsizeaselectionlitigationshouldbeconcentratedevenmoreinlargelocaljurisdictions.

OneadditionalmeasureprovidedbytheEAVSdataasksabouttheuseofelectronicpollbookstosigninvoters,updatevoterhistory,andlookuppollingplaces.In2008and2010,roughlyone‐thirdoflargejurisdictionsreportedusingelectronicpollbookswhile16percentofmedium‐sizedjurisdictionsandjust3percentofsmalljurisdictionsusedelectronicpollbooks.7Itseemsobviousthatjurisdictionsservinglargenumbersofvoters

7Electronicpollbookshavebeenadoptedstatewideinsomestates(suchasGeorgia,Maryland,andUtah).Wefindasimilarrelationshipbetweenjurisdictionsizeandtheuseofelectronicpollbookswhenthesestatesareexcludedfromtheanalysis.

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aremorelikelytoturntowardmoremoderntechnologicalmethodsofkeepingtrackofwhoisregistered.

InnovationinelectionadministrationcancomeinmanyotherformsthatarenotmeasuredbytheEAVSorothersurveys.Wecreateafinalindicatorofinnovationbyexaminingorganizationsandassociationsthatworkdirectlywithlocalelectionofficials.WeexaminedbestpracticesmanualsandotherreportsproducedbyEAC,Pew,andElectionCenterandcodedeachinstanceinwhichinnovationinlocalelectionadministrationwasrecognized(thesourcesforthisanalysisarelistedintheappendix).Alltold,werecorded315casesofrecognizedinnovation:94percentcitedlargejurisdictions,6percentcitedamedium‐sizedjurisdiction,andnonementionedasmalljurisdiction.ThissuggeststhatElectionCenterandbestpracticesguidesbasicallyprovideawayforofficialsfromlargejurisdictionstocommunicatewitheachotheraboutinnovativeadministrativepractices.Nevertheless,withinnovationsconcentratedheavilyinlargejurisdictions,thereisyetanotherreasontoexpectthatpartisanandlegaldisputesoverelectionadministrationalsotendtooccurinlargejurisdictions.

6. JurisdictionSizeandPartisanship

Thereareseveralreasonstoexpectthatpartisandisputesoverelectionlawsandadministrationtendtofocusonlargelocaljurisdictions.Ifcampaignsorlitigatorswanttohavethegreatestimpactonelectionoutcomes,thentheywilltargetjurisdictionswiththemostvoters.Amoremobilepopulationinlargejurisdictionsalsoincreasesconflictovervoterregistrationstatusandprovisionalandabsenteeballots.Finally,asLewis(2011)notes,largecitiestendtohavemorecompetitiveelections(eitherintra‐partyorinter‐party)andmoreactivepartyorganizations,additionalingredientsforelectionlawdisputes.

Oneconsequenceofthepartisanandlegalfocusonlargejurisdictionsrelatestopolarizedattitudestowardelectionreformpolicies.Republicanstendtopreferpolicies(suchasphotoidentificationrequirements)thatprotectagainstvoterfraudbutmayincreasebarrierstovoterparticipation,whileDemocratstendtopreferpolicies(suchasElectionDayregistration)thatimproveaccesstothefranchisebutmayincreaseopportunitiesforfraud(Hasen2012;KimballandKropf2012).Sincethesedisputestendtobefocusedonlargejurisdictions,wedonotexpectpolarizedpreferencesoverthesepoliciestotrickledowntoofficialsinsmallerjurisdictions.

MostlocalelectionofficialsintheUnitedStatesareaffiliatedwithoneofthetwomajorpoliticalparties,andmanyarechosenfortheirpositioninpartisanelections(KimballandKropf2006).Oursurveysofstateandlocalelectionofficialsincludedtwoquestionsaboutanti‐fraudpolicies(photoIDandno‐match,novotelaws)andtwoquestionsaboutpoliciestoincreaseaccess(ElectionDayregistrationanduniversalregistration).Eachpolicywas

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evaluatedonascalefrom1(“Stronglyoppose”)to5(“Stronglyfavor”).Wecreatedananti‐fraudscalebyaveragingresponsestotworelevantpolicyitems,andwecreatedanincreasedaccessscaleinasimilarfashion.

[Figure9abouthere]

Weplotaveragesupportforanti‐fraudpoliciesamongstateandlocalofficialsinFigure9.Wefindthatpartisandifferencesinpolicypreferencesamongelectionofficialsareevidentamongofficialsatthestatelevelandinlargejurisdictions,butnotinsmallormedium‐sizedjurisdictions.Amongofficialsservingstatesandlargelocaljurisdictions,amajorityofDemocratsopposeanti‐fraudpoliciesandamajorityofRepublicanssupportanti‐fraudpolicies.Thesepartisandifferencesarestatisticallysignificant.Amongofficialsinsmallandmedium‐sizedjurisdictionsthepartisandifferencesaresmallerandstatisticallyinsignificant.Inparticular,Democraticofficialsinlargerjurisdictionsaremoreopposedtoanti‐fraudpoliciesthantheirfellowpartisansinsmallerjurisdictions.Whenexaminingpoliciestoeaseaccesstovoterregistration,wefindalsofindthatpartisandifferencesamongelectionofficialsonlyexistforthoseservingstatesandlargejurisdictions,withRepublicanofficialsmoreopposedtothosepolicies.Giventhatelectionofficialsinlargejurisdictionstendtointernalizepartypositionsonvoteraccessandvoterintegrityissuescanonlyaddtothecontentiousnatureofelectionlawandadministrationdisputesthattakeplaceundertheirwatch.

7. JurisdictionSizeandElectionReform

Becauseoftheskeweddistributionofthesizeoflocaljurisdictions,wesuspectthatelectionreformdebatesinmanystatesaredominatedbyelectionofficialsfromsmallandmedium‐sizedjurisdictions,eventhoughtheyservearelativelysmallshareofvoters.Forexample,Missourihas116localjurisdictionsthatadministerelections.OnlytenofthelocaljurisdictionsinMissouriarelargebyourclassification,buttheyservemorethanhalfofthestate’svotersinnationalelections.OfficialsinthelargestjurisdictionshavebeenpressingforlegislationtoallowearlyvotingandtoeliminateFebruaryelections(acost‐savingmeasureforlargejurisdictions).However,accordingtostafffromthelargejurisdictionsinMissouri,theyhavebeenunsuccessfulbecauseelectionofficialsinsmallercountiesareopposedandhavemoreinfluenceinthestatecapitol.Inaddition,someMissourilegislatorsareformercountyclerksinruralpartsofthestate,whichfurtherstrengthensthehandofofficialsfromsmalljurisdictionsinlegislativedebates.

Asanotherexample,arecentstudyoftheimpactofproposedelectionreformsinColoradowasbasedonasurveyofcountyclerks(CucitiandWallis2011).ThesurveyincludedquestionsaboutpoliciessuchasmovingtheregistrationdeadlineclosertoElectionDay,votingbymail,andwhethertomailballotstovotersontheinactivelist.Eventhoughlargecountiesserveover80percentofthestate’svoters,theyareoutnumberedbysmaller

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countiesbya5‐to‐1ratio.IntheColoradopolicyanalysiseachcountyclerkwasgivenequalweight,whichhastheeffectofgivingvotersinsmallcountiesmoreinfluencethanvotersinlargecounties.Applyingsuchaunitruleinlegislatingwouldleadtopoliciesthatareopposedbyofficialswhoservethevastmajorityofthestate’svoters.

Inhowmanystatesmightelectionofficialsservinglargejurisdictionsbeatadisadvantagebeforepolicymakers?Weanswerthisbyexaminingtheratiooflargejurisdictionstosmallandmedium‐sizedjurisdictionsineachstate(seeTable5).8Stateswherelargejurisdictionsareoutnumberedbyaratioof10‐to‐1ormorearecodedasruraldominantstates.DependingonhowsizeisevaluatedinthethreeupperMidwesternstates,thereare15to18statesinthiscategory.Stateswithlessthana10‐to‐1ratiobutmorethana2‐1ratioarelabeledruraladvantagestates(17to20states).Therearesixstateswherelargejurisdictionsareatroughparitywithsmallerjurisdictions.Finally,intwourbanadvantagestates(HawaiiandNewJersey)largejurisdictionsoutnumbersmallerjurisdictionsbya2‐to‐1marginormore.

[Table5abouthere]

LegalandpoliticalconflictbetweendenselypopulatedurbanareasandlesspopulatedruralareasarenothingnewintheUnitedStates(Key1964;AnsolabehereandSnyder2008;Gross2010;GimpelandKarnes2006).Observerstendtolocatetheseconflictsaroundissuesinvolvingculturalvalues,thedistributionofgovernmentbenefits,andelectoralsupportforthetwomajorparties.Electionadministrationshouldbeaddedtothislist.Inmoststates,electionofficialsservingheavilypopulatedjurisdictionsfindthemselvesatanumericaldisadvantagewhencompetingwithotherlocalofficialstoinfluencepolicymakers.

8. ImplicationsofJurisdictionSize

Denselypopulatedlocaljurisdictionsaresubstantiallydifferentthansmallerjurisdictionsinjustabouteverymeasurableindicatorofelectionadministration.Thisisduenotonlytothesizeofthevotingpopulationtheyserve,butalsothenatureofthevotingpopulationandpoliticalcampaignsintheirareas.HAVAappearstohaveacceleratedsomeofthesedifferencesinelectionadministration.Inaddition,HAVAhaspolarizedsupportforelectionreformamonglocalelectionofficialsalongthesizedimension.

Thereareseveralimplicationsofthesefindings,forresearchers,policymakers,andthelegalandreformcommunities.Ontheresearchfront,studiesoflocalpracticesandtheviewsoflocalelectionofficialsshouldbeawareoftheimportanceofjurisdictionsize.Whenexaminingasampleoflocaljurisdictionsitwouldbewisetousearesearchdesignthat 8ThetableleavesoutDelaware(whichhasonlylargelocaljurisdictions)andConnecticut,Maine,NewHampshire,andWyoming(whichhavenolargejurisdictions).

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stratifieslocaljurisdictionsbythesizeoftheelectorate.Inaddition,researchersusingthelocaljurisdictionastheunitofanalysistoexaminevotingbehavioroutputs(suchasturnout)ofelectionadministrationshouldconsiderweightingthedatabythesizeoftheelectorate,whichhastheeffectofcountingeachvoterequally(e.g.,Stewart2006;KropfandKimball2012).

Onthepolicyfront,policymakersshouldbeawareofhowmanyvotersalocalelectionofficialserveswhenconsideringthatofficial’sopinionaboutreformproposals.Legislatorsprobablywillnotrespondwelltotestimonyfromanurbanelectionofficialwhoclaimsthathisopinionsshouldcountonehundredtimesmorethantheviewsoftheruralcountyclerkwhowilltestifyafterhim.However,policymakersshouldappreciatethatlocalofficialswhoservemostvotersinastatehaveaddedexpertiseaboutthevotingexperiencefacingmostvotersinthatstate.Furthermore,thelawmakersshouldconsiderwhethercurrentlawsmandateuniformityinelectionadministrationattheexpenseofcommonsense.AsDougChapin(2012)recentlyargues,electionlawsshouldprovidemoreflexibilitytoallowlargejurisdictionstopursuesomeinnovations(suchasInternetvoterregistrationorelectionconsolidation)thatsmallerjurisdictionsmaynotwantorneed.Becauseofthepotentoppositiontoreformfromsmallandmedium‐sizedjurisdictions,thisapproachmayallowlargejurisdictionstogoitaloneinareaswheretheywanttomodernizeelectionadministration.Afinalapproachtothesizedisparityinelectionadministrationwouldbeforthelargejurisdictionstofindcommoncausethroughtheirownadvocacyorganization.Whilelargejurisdictionsmaybeatadisadvantagewithintheirrespectivestates,theymayfindsympatheticearsinCongressiftheyweretospeakwitha(somewhat)unifiedvoiceontheseimportantissues.

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References

Althaus,ScottL.,PeterF.Nardulli,andDaronR.Shaw.2002.“CandidateAppearancesinPresidentialElections,1972‐2000.”PoliticalCommunication19:49‐72.

Ansolabehere,Stephen,andJamesM.SnyderJr.2008.TheEndofInequality.NewYork:Norton.

Ansolabehere,Stephen,andCharlesStewartIII.2005.“ResidualVotesAttributabletoTechnology.”JournalofPolitics67:365‐389.

Benetsky,Megan,andKinKoerber.2012.“2005‐2009AmericanCommunitySurveyCounty‐to‐CountyMigrationFiles.”WorkingPaperNo.2012‐06.Washington,DC:U.S.CensusBureau,March2012.

Chapin,Doug.2012.“ArizonaElectionConsolidationBillDividesCounties.”ProgramforExcellenceinElectionAdministration(http://blog.lib.umn.edu/cspg/electionacademy/2012/05/arizona_election_consolidation.php,accessedMay3,2012).

Chen,LanheeJ.,andAndrewReeves.2011.“TurningOuttheBaseorAppealingtothePeriphery?AnAnalysisofCounty‐LevelCandidateAppearancesinthe2008PresidentialCampaign.”AmericanPoliticsResearch39”534‐556.

Cuciti,PeggyandAllanWallis.2011.ChangingtheWayColoradoVotes:AStudyofSelectedReforms.BuechnerInstituteofGovernance,UniversityofColorado,Denver.February.

Florida,Richard.2008.Who’sYourCity?NewYork:BasicBooks.

Gimpel,JamesG.,andKimberlyA.Karnes.2006.“TheRuralSideoftheUrban‐RuralGap.”PS:PoliticalScienceandPolitics39:467‐472.

Gimpel,JamesG.,FrancesE.Lee,andJoshuaKaminski.2006.“ThePoliticalGeographyofCampaignContributionsinAmericanPolitics.”JournalofPolitics68”626‐639.

Gimpel,JamesG.,FrancesE.Lee,andRebeccaU.Thorpe.2011.“TheWellspringsofCandidateEmergence:GeographicOriginsofStatewideCandidaciesintheUnitedStates.”PoliticalGeography30:25‐37.

Gronke,Paul,andCharlesStewartIII.2008.“BasicPrinciplesofDataCollection.”InDataforDemocracy.Washington,DC:PewCenterontheStates.

Gross,CassieA.2010.HometownInfluence:TheImpactofGeographyonStatewideCandidateSuccess.Unpublishedmanuscript:UniversityofMissouri‐St.Louis.

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Hasen,RichardL.2012.TheVotingWars:FromFlorida2000totheNextElectionMeltdown.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.

Hill,SarahA.2011.“ElectionAdministrationFinanceinCaliforniaCounties.”AmericanReviewofPublicAdministration1‐23.

Kimball,DavidC.,andBradyBaybeck.2012.“Technocrats,Partisans,andInnovationinLocalElectionAdministration.”PaperpresentedattheannualmeetingoftheMidwestPoliticalScienceAssociation,Chicago.

Kimball,DavidC.,BradyBaybeck,JenniferCollins‐Foley,ConnieSchmidt,andCheréMaxwell.2010.SurveyofPollWorkerTrainingPracticesbyLocalElectionOfficials.UniversityofMissouri‐St.Louis,February2010.

Kimball,DavidC.,MarthaKropfandLindsayBattles.2006.“HelpingAmericaVote?ElectionAdministration,Partisanship,andProvisionalVotinginthe2004Election.”ElectionLawJournal5:447‐461.

Kimball,DavidC.,andMarthaKropf.2006.“TheStreet‐LevelBureaucratsofElections:SelectionMethodsforLocalElectionOfficials.”ReviewofPolicyResearch23:1257‐1268.

Kropf,Martha,andDavidC.Kimball.2012.HelpingAmericaVote:TheLimitsofElectionReform.NewYork:Routledge.

Kropf,Martha,TimVercellotti,andDavidC.Kimball.2010.“RepresentativeBureaucracyandPartisanship:TheImplementationofElectionLaw.”Unpublishedmanuscript,UniversityofNorthCarolina‐Charlotte.

Lewis,PaulG.2011.“SizeandLocalDemocracy:ScaleEffectsinCityPolitics.”PS:PoliticalScience&Politics44:107‐109.

Moynihan,DonaldP.,andCarolL.Silva.2008.“TheAdministratorsofDemocracy:AResearchNoteonLocalElectionOfficials.”PublicAdministrationReview68:816‐827.

Shaw,W.1997.“TheSpatialConcentrationofAffluenceintheUnitedstates.GeographicalReview87:546‐553.

Stewart,Charles,III.2006.“ResidualVoteinthe2004Election.”ElectionLawJournal5:158‐169.

U.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission.2011.2010ElectionAdministrationandVotingSurvey.Washington,DC,December2011.

U.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission.2009.2008ElectionAdministrationandVotingSurvey.Washington,DC,November2009.

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Appendix

SourcesforCasesofRecognizedInnovationinLocalElectionAdministration

TheElectionCenter.2011.“2011ProfessionalPracticesProgram,”SanAntonio,TX(http://www.electioncenter.org/publications.html,accessedMarch28,2012).

TheElectionCenter.2010.“2010ProfessionalPracticesProgram,”Orlando,FL(http://www.electioncenter.org/publications.html,accessedMarch28,2012).

TheElectionCenter.2009.“2009ProfessionalPracticesProgram,”SanDiego,CA(http://www.electioncenter.org/publications.html,accessedMarch28,2012).

TheElectionCenter.2008.“2008ProfessionalPracticesProgram,”Dallas,TX(http://www.electioncenter.org/publications.html,accessedMarch28,2012).

TheElectionCenter.2007.“2007ProfessionalPracticesProgram,”NewOrleans,LA(http://www.electioncenter.org/publications.html,accessedMarch28,2012).

TheElectionCenter.2006.“2006ProfessionalPracticesProgram,”Chicago,IL(http://www.electioncenter.org/publications.html,accessedMarch28,2012).

TheElectionCenter.2005.“2005ProfessionalPracticesProgram,”BeverlyHills,CA(http://www.electioncenter.org/publications.html,accessedMarch28,2012).

TheElectionCenter.2003.“2003ProfessionalPracticesProgram,”BalHarbour,FL(http://www.electioncenter.org/publications.html,accessedMarch28,2012).

Kimball,DavidC.,BradyBaybeck,JenniferCollins‐Foley,ConnieSchmidt,andCheréMaxwell.2010.SurveyofPollWorkerTrainingPracticesbyLocalElectionOfficials.UniversityofMissouri‐St.Louis,February2010.

PewCenterontheStates.2008.DataforDemocracy.Washington,DC.

U.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission.2012.FluContingencyPlans.Washington,DC.

U.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission.2007.AGuidebookforRecruitingCollegePollWorkers.Washington,DC,July2007.

U.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission.2007.EffectiveDesignsfortheAdministrationofFederalElections.Washington,DC,June2007.

U.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission.2007.SuccessfulPracticesforPollWorkerRecruitment,Training,andRetention.Washington,DC,July2007.

U.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission.2004.BestPracticesToolkit.Washington,DC.

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Figure1NumberofLocalElectionJurisdictionsbySizeofJurisdiction

2008GeneralElection

51494893

457

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

Nu

mb

er o

f Ju

risd

ictio

ns

Small Medium Large

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Figure2NumberofVotersbySizeofJurisdiction

2008GeneralElection

1.8 million

43 million

88 million

0

20,000,000

40,000,000

60,000,000

80,000,000

Nu

mb

er o

f V

ote

rs

Small Medium Large

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Figure3ResidualVoteRatebySizeofJurisdiction

2008PresidentialElection

0

1

2

3

4

Re

sidu

al V

ote

Ra

te,

200

8

Small Medium Largeexcludes outside values

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Figure4Non‐WhiteShareofPopulationbySizeofJurisdiction

Demographicdataarefromthe2000census.

0

20

40

60N

on-

wh

ite P

erce

nt

of P

opu

latio

n


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Figure5LatinoShareofPopulationbySizeofJurisdiction


0

5

10

15

20

Latin

o P

erc

ent

of

Pop

ula

tion


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Figure6ResidentialStabilitybySizeofJurisdiction


60

70

80

90

100P

erc

ent

who

ha

ve n

ot

mo

ved

in 5

yea

rs


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Figure7ChallengeswithPollWorkersbySizeofJurisdiction

2008GeneralElection

1

2

3

4

Ch

alle

nges

with

Pol

l Wor

kers


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Figure8SupportforNewVotingMethodsbySizeofJurisdiction

1

2

3

4

5

Su

ppor

t fo

r N

ew

Vot

ing

Met

hod

s


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Figure9SupportforAnti‐FraudPoliciesbySizeofJurisdiction

SquaresrepresentRepublicanofficials.CirclesrepresentDemocraticofficials.

1

2

3

4

5S

upp

ort

for

An

ti-F

rau

d P

olic

ies

Small Medium Large StateJurisdiction Size

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Table1TheShapeofPollingPlaceOperationsbySizeofJurisdiction

2008GeneralElection

JurisdictionSize

Small Medium Large

PollingPlaces 1 5 94

PollWorkers 5 40 753

Staffdedicatedtopollworkers

1 2 5

Ballotscast 427 4900 112,621

Budgetforpollworkeroperationsin2008

$225 $1,000 $45,000

Votersperpollingplace 427 980 1,198

Source:Kimballetal.(2010)

Figuresinthetablerepresentthemedianjurisdictionineachsizecategory.

Table2TheShapeofPollingPlaceOperationsbySizeofJurisdiction

2010GeneralElection

JurisdictionSize

Small Medium Large

PollingPlaces 1 11 84

Precincts 1 13 119

PollWorkers 7 60 600

Ballotscast 365 5,392 71,312

Votersperpollingplace 365 490 849

Figuresinthetablerepresentthemedianjurisdictionineachsizecategory.

Source:U.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission(2011)

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Table3ShareofBallotbySizeofJurisdiction

2008GeneralElection

JurisdictionSize

Small Medium Large

Totalballotscast 0.3% 29.8% 69.9%

ElectionDayballots 0.3% 30.0% 69.7%

Provisionalballotscast 0.02% 10.4% 89.6%

Provisionalballotsrejected 0.02% 15.3% 84.7%

Provisionalspartlyaccepted 0.02% 3.0% 97.0%

Provisionalscountedinfull 0.02% 9.1% 90.9%

Domesticabsenteessent 0.2% 23.0% 76.8%

Undeliverableabsentees 0.03% 5.6% 94.4%

Domesticabsenteesreturned 0.3% 22.9% 76.9%

Spoiled/replacedabsentees 0.1% 10.9% 89.0%

Domesticabsenteesrejected 0.04% 19.9% 80.1%

Domesticabsenteescounted 0.2% 22.1% 77.7%

UOCAVAballots 0.1% 17.4% 82.5%

Earlyvotingballots 0.04% 27.2% 72.7%

Figuresinthetablerepresenttheshareofballotsoccurringineachsizecategory.Source:U.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission(2009)

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Table4ShareofBallotbySizeofJurisdiction

2010GeneralElection

JurisdictionSize

Small Medium Large

Totalballotscast 0.3% 29.8% 70.0%

ElectionDayballots 0.3% 31.4% 68.3%

Provisionalballotscast 0.02% 8.9% 91.1%

Provisionalballotsrejected 0.03% 13.1% 86.9%

Provisionalspartlyaccepted none 2.0% 98.0%

Provisionalscountedinfull 0.01% 8.7% 91.3%

Domesticabsenteessent 0.2% 17.3% 82.6%

Undeliverableabsentees 0.01% 9.4% 90.6%

Domesticabsenteesreturned 0.2% 19.6% 80.3%

Spoiled/replacedabsentees 0.1% 13.2% 86.7%

Domesticabsenteesrejected 0.1% 18.0% 81.9%

Domesticabsenteescounted 0.2% 19.4% 80.4%

UOCAVAballots 0.4% 19.8% 79.8%

Earlyvotingballots 0.07% 28.7% 71.2%

Figuresinthetablerepresenttheshareofballotsoccurringineachsizecategory.Source:U.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission(2011)

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Table5RepresentationofLargeJurisdictionsinAmericanStates

SmallJurisdictions

DominateAdvantageforSmall

Jurisdictions

RoughParityAdvantagefor

LargeJurisdictionsArkansasIowaIdahoKansasKentucky

MassachusettsMichigan(muni)Minnesota(muni)

MissouriMississippiMontana

NorthDakotaNebraskaOklahoma

RhodeIslandSouthDakota

Wisconsin(muni)WestVirginia

AlabamaColoradoGeorgiaIllinoisIndianaLouisiana

Michigan(counties)Minnesota(counties)

NevadaNewMexicoNorthCarolina

OhioOregon

SouthCarolinaTennesseeTexasUtah

VirginiaWashington

Wisconsin(counties)

ArizonaCaliforniaFloridaMarylandNewYork

Pennsylvania

HawaiiNewJersey

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