SINGAPORE AS A RENAISSANCE CITY:

SEARCH FOR A VISION

(PART I)

By

Lee Weng Choy

T Sasitharan

Arun Mahizhnan

Institute of Policy Studies

July 1998

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

CHAPTER 1: THE IDEA 2

CHAPTER 2: LESSONS OF RENAISSANCE 4

CHAPTER 3: CURRENT CULTURAL LANDSCAPE 9

CHAPTER 4: FUTURE SCENARIOS 13

CHAPTER 5: POLICY PATHWAYS 20

APPENDIX 25

1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Ministry of Information and the Arts (MITA) commissioned the Institute of Policy

Studies (IPS) to study the concept of a Renaissance City as a metaphor for Singapore’s future

development as a culturally vibrant city. This concept paper begins by examining some key

developments of the European Renaissance and the lessons they hold for Singapore. While

the historic Renaissance cities were not liberal democracies in themselves, it is clear that

those who contributed to and participated in the cultural awakening that the Renaissance

brought about were curious and liberal spirits living in an intellectually open environment.

But they were the elite of the society. In a modern and tiny city-state like Singapore, culture

can neither be confined to the elite nor could it flourish in a conformist and controlled

environment. If Singapore were to truly transform itself into a future Renaissance City, it

needs to shed old assumptions and practices that treated culture as secondary to and separable

from the economy. It needs to replace them with a comprehensive and coherent cultural

policy in much the same way as it approached economic development. It also has to

recognise that culture and economy are interconnected. Given that Singapore itself has

chosen an open economic system and an open communication system as the path to the

future, and given the current world trends, chances are that state dominance will wane, civil

society will rise and information technologies will be liberating. Based on these projections,

two positive cultural development scenarios are probable: i) a syncretic model in which the

end-state will be a unique Singapore culture, developed from the syncretic selection of what

is best from many different cultures; ii) a multicultural model in which the existing

indigenous cultures are strengthened and promoted to exist separately but in symbiotic

relationship with each other. Yet other scenarios are also plausible but they tend to negate

the Singapore spirit. In either of the positive scenarios, the centrality and totality of culture in

society is an imperative. Cultural policy in such an environment should have certain

unalterable core values, should be enabling in spirit and should look to civil society as a

partner in its implementation. The two different scenarios demand specific policy frameworks

which must address key factors such as language, education, media, institutional development

and state support.

2

CHAPTER ONE

THE IDEA

Imaging Singapore

Singapore has been imagined as one kind of city or another over the years. Long before it

became a “modern city,” Singapore has been labelled the “Emporium of the East,” thanks to

its entrepot trade. When Singapore became part of Malaysia in 1963, it was to be the “New

York” of Malaysia, while Kuala Lumpur would continue to play the role of capital

“Washington D.C.” Two years later when Singapore seceded from Malaysia, some hoped

Singapore would become the “New York” not just of Malaysia but of the East as a whole

because of Singapore’s aspirations to become the leading financial centre of the region. Some

others felt Singapore should turn itself into the “Geneva of the East,” hosting many

international organisations like the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation, the World

Health Organisation, the International Red Cross or the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

whose Secretariat has in fact been established in Singapore. Yet others have expressed the

hope that Singapore would become the “Boston of the East” by upgrading its tertiary

educational institutions into Harvard- and Massachusetts Institute of Technology-like

universities. Those involved in the information technologies do, of course, want Singapore to

become the “Silicon Valley of the East.” Going beyond a city-oriented vision, and stopping

just short of saying “Switzerland of the East,” the government itself has declared that

Singapore should set its sights on matching the living standards of Switzerland.

It is, perhaps, noteworthy here that some non-Singaporeans not particularly charitable

towards our situation have branded Singapore as the “Third China” (after China and Taiwan)

because of the majority Chinese population, or as the “Israel of the East” because of its

location as a Chinese-dominant island in a Malay-dominant sea.

Thus, Singapore has been, both willingly and unwillingly, a subject of imagined identities,

each reflecting particular aspirations or biases.

Singapore as a Renaissance City

It is in the long line of aspirational imaginations that we now hear of Singapore as a

“Renaissance City” or the “Venice of the East.” But, no one has quite defined what kind of

city that would really be. The term ‘Renaissance,’ of course, has historical connotations and

is generally understood to mean a revival – more literally, rebirth – of a glorious past when

arts and letters and science flourished with the support of an intellectually rich and curious

community. The term “Renaissance man” used to refer to persons who were highly skilled in

several professions; today, in our age of specialisation, it connotes a person who, while being

very good at his/her own profession, is deemed to be culturally sophisticated as well.

Likewise, a modern Renaissance City usually conjures up the image of a city that, while well

functioning, is also culturally vibrant. These meanings, however, are neither an accurate

reflection of the historical process of the Renaissance nor are they instructive guidelines for

cultural development.

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What is, perhaps, most instructive from the examples of imagined identities above, in the

context of this study, is the realisation that most of those identities are facile, fragile and

ultimately self-limiting. To illustrate: even if our two universities ever became world-class

universities, they will no more make Singapore the “Boston of the East” than our Chinese

majority will make Singapore the “Israel of the East.” Likewise, a collection of well-

equipped theatres and concert halls filled with an itinerant flow of world-class acts from

abroad will not, by themselves, make Singapore a Renaissance City. It is this realisation that

is the starting point of this concept paper.

The Ministry of Information and the Arts (MITA), as the ministry responsible for the cultural

development of Singapore, wanted to acquire a better understanding of the implications of the

term “Renaissance City” and what it would really entail if Singapore were to be transformed

into such a city. It commissioned the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) in February 1998 to

conduct a study of the idea of Singapore as a Renaissance City. The study has been divided

into two phases: the first, to explore the idea of the Renaissance City and, if possible, to

develop a vision of Singapore as a Renaissance City; and the second, to develop a specific

action agenda if indeed the idea of Singapore as a Renaissance City proved viable. This

division into two phases is based on the understanding that concrete policy initiatives must be

preceded by a clear and thorough conceptual framework. This paper represents the first phase

of the study project.

Research Process

The authors of this report first conducted two focus group discussions in order to gain a better

grasp of the contours of the whole project and to clarify some basic issues relating to the idea

of the Renaissance and how it might apply to Singapore. The members of the two focus

groups comprised some of the leading Singapore thinkers on the subject of culture, and the

authors owe much to their clarifications and contributions. The authors are particularly

indebted to Kwok Kian Woon and Kuo Pao Kun.

This paper is the culmination of the deliberations of the focus groups, a survey of the relevant

literature and the thinking of the three authors.

The paper will first focus on the lessons of history, particularly those of the European

Renaissance that is the original inspiration of this idea. Second, it will look at the current

cultural landscape of Singapore that will be the foundation for the future. Third, it will set out

the probable scenarios for future cultural developments. Finally, it will indicate some

pathways to policy formulations.

4

CHAPTER TWO

LESSONS OF RENAISSANCE

Concept of Renaissance

The concept of a medieval period, a “Dark Ages,” which separated the classical period of

Europe from its revival was not prevalent during the Middle Ages itself, but came into

currency only afterwards, in the Renaissance period (14th – 16th centuries). Likewise, the

term “Renaissance” does not come into currency until much later, in the 19th century. The

“Renaissance,” as it is commonly understood today – as marking an historical break from the

Middle Ages, as a period of great cultural and social movements, with an emphasis on the

idea of revival or rebirth and on the philosophies of Naturalism, Humanism, etc. – is very

much a construction of 18th century Rationalism and 19th century Liberalism and

Romanticism.

The history of the concept of the “Renaissance” is illustrative of how the present day writes

or rewrites the past for its purposes. Eighteenth century Rationalism conceived the

Renaissance as a period of individualism and struggle for freedom, and argued for a

connection between cultural advance and socio-political liberty. In the 19th century, Jacob

Burckhardt, in opposition to certain romantic conceptions of the Renaissance, argued that

Naturalism was one of the period’s most crucial features. Naturalism is a philosophy which

privileges the direct observation of nature as the path to knowledge (as opposed to doctrine –

mainly religious – being the basis of truth).

Since the 20th century, historians have tended to seek continuities rather than stress breaks,

and the Renaissance has been discussed as having more in common with the Middle Ages

and as being part of a gradual development rather than as a revolutionary period. Twentieth

century historians argue that the idea of “revival” or “rebirth” was not new to medieval

Europe, but that what was different about the Renaissance was that “revival” or “rebirth”

successfully became a battle-cry for a widespread reform movement. Also, the ideas of

“individualism” and “personality” were not alien to the Middle Ages, and Naturalism was not

entirely the invention of Renaissance art and thought. It is just that these ideas became a more

conscious programme during the Renaissance.

The initial driving force for the cultural flourishing of the European Renaissance was the

passion in Italy for classical books. Combined with the new technology of print, this passion

spurred a widespread if not entirely mass cultural awakening in Italy and the rest of Europe.

But this passion for books was a passion for knowledge: it was about cultural literacy – a

fluency in and understanding of certain ideas – and not just about the development of new

technologies which disseminate information.

Implications for Singapore

The “Renaissance” has often been about re-inventing the past in a constructive way for the

present. The desire for a “Singapore Renaissance” is perhaps no different in this regard. To

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use contemporary management parlance, such a “Renaissance” is about re-institutionalising

some of the “best practices” of the past.

What is interesting in the case of a “Singapore Renaissance,” is that it is unclear whether

what is being re-invented is only Singapore’s Asian past, or its Western past as well. The

latter process would indeed be a legitimate move, as Singapore could lay claim to the legacy

of Western modernity as much as it claims to be developing a distinctly Asian modernity.

Moreover, it is a particularly Singaporean thing to do – eclectic appropriation from elsewhere

and assimilation into one’s own.

Moreover, for all of Singapore’s ambitions to be an information hub, what has not been

consistently expressed is a desire for Singapore to become highly culturally literate.

Singapore has so far only focused on information, not knowledge. If Singapore is to use the

“Renaissance” as a model, the lesson is that cultural literacy is what makes a society

culturally vibrant, and not just cultural information.

Renaissance and Romanticism

Nineteenth-century Romanticism projected onto the Renaissance an image of society being

dominated by the arts and artists. In reality, the individualism and aestheticism of the

Renaissance was not as prevalent as the Romantics imagined and neither were these

characteristics totally absent from late medieval society. And just as characteristic of the

Renaissance was a business-like, matter-of-fact and unromantic sensibility.

Romanticism itself had both reactionary and progressive dimensions. The development and

spread of Humanism, and the rise of a collective desire for freedom, liberty and individuality

was progressive. What was reactionary was the separation of the “emotional” from “reason”

and the “rational.” In the romantic imagination, the arts became both a privileged activity in

society, but also a separate one. Romanticism privileged an emotional – almost irrational –

idea of the arts, individuality, freedom and idealism.

What is remarkable is that today a similarly romantic notion of the arts prevails: the arts are

seen as a separate and emotional or romantic activity, and not part of the rational business of

society. Indeed, the separation of what constitutes the business of society from the emotional

dimension of life has become so extreme that even Humanism, as well as other forms of

idealism, are often seen as separate from economic and pragmatic realities.

Implications for Singapore

Singapore’s pragmatism can be seen as anti-romantic, in the sense that the emotional aspects

of life are seen as secondary, to be subordinated to practical reason and imperatives.

However, what Singapore’s pragmatism shares with Romanticism is that both presume the

separation of the emotional from the practical and rational. The logic is the same, even if the

agenda is different. A more progressive view would see that the emotional and the humanistic

cannot be categorically separated from the rational and the economic. What is at stake in the

desire for a “Singapore Renaissance” is that the Singapore state should find a way to manage

the idealistic and emotional energies of society on the one hand, and the rational and

economic energies on the other – not as separate categories, but as inextricably connected.

6

Renaissance and Civil Society

Unlike most of Europe which was feudal, Italy was exceptional in that most of the territory

was divided into cities. The socio-economic structure of the city – their open, mobile,

dynamic, diverse and dense society – played a central role in the Renaissance. The words

“civilised” and “political” derive from the Roman and Greek names for “city-state”: civitas

and polis. That these Italians lived in cities rather than in a feudal society, was an enabling

condition for their strong sense of campanilismo, which literally means “patriotism.”

“Patriotism” is perhaps not the best translation, as the practice of campanilismo had more to

do with citizens contributing to their cities in terms of public architecture projects, arts

patronage and the like. Whereas patriotism implies loyalty to one’s country in opposition to

other countries, and has connotations of xenophobia, chauvinism or isolationism. Perhaps a

better translation for campanilismo is “civic consciousness.” These Italian cities certainly had

a very active civil society – albeit one largely confined to the upper classes – and their

citizens had a strong sense of belonging and stake-holding in their cities.

While one should not idealise the Italian cities of the Renaissance as being especially

democratic, republican and humanist, nevertheless, these developments are crucial, and gave

rise to the more mature Liberalism, Republicanism and Humanism of later centuries.

Implications for Singapore

Though Singapore began its post-colonial life with the aspirations of a democratic socialist

nation, its traumatic separation from an ill-fated marriage with Malaysia and its economic and

material objectives seem to have paved the way for a state-dominated society. In such a

society, notions of liberty and individuality have become circumscribed and tempered by

notions of “community over self,” “consensus over contention” and “pragmatism over

idealism.” The challenge now is to find a new equilibrium between a more self-aware and

more demanding civil society and a self-assured and paternalistic state. A modern and vibrant

civil society needs an unencumbered public space that can be both a bridge and a buffer

between the state and the individual.

It is also useful to note here the distinctions between a city that is part of a state, such as

Venice of old, and a city that is in itself a state, such as present-day Singapore. The dynamics

of the two kinds of cities are so very different that it would be unwise to draw ready lessons

from one for the other. Frequent comparisons have been made between Singapore on the one

hand and New York, London, Paris or some such city on the other, differentiating their

cultural richness and dynamism. Such comparisons are sometimes ill-conceived and

unhelpful. The circumstances of the tiny island city-state of Singapore demand a “national”

effort in almost every major undertaking in the country – be it in education, employment, arts

development, water rationing, traffic control. The lack of an urban-rural divide, the absence

of an internal hinterland, and the small population base also make it exceedingly difficult for

Singapore to embrace the examples of the above mentioned cities. However, this is not to

suggest that we are in a no-hope situation. Some of the seeming adversities may indeed turn

out to be our virtues. For example, the absence of our own hinterland propelled us to look

well beyond our borders to the region and the world for economic resources. Similarly, our

own lack of cultural resources could make us more open to and more welcoming of external

riches without the prejudices of a more endowed and more entrenched society.

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Renaissance and Liberalisation

Too much has been made of Renaissance citizens living in liberty and equality – these ideals

were retroactively projected on the Renaissance by the 18th and 19th century Enlightenment

and liberal imaginations. The revival of the Greek discourse of democracy during the

Renaissance, while taken on in earnestness, did not revolutionise society, and the revival of

these discourses should also be seen in terms of propaganda and political rhetoric.

The Renaissance was not as widespread and influential a social movement as it has been

imagined by those in the 19th and 20th centuries. The cultural flourishing was largely

confined to social upper-classes. What had a deeper and wider impact on society was the

Protestant Reformation, for instance, which changed the structure of religion and state. The

political shape of Europe was more affected by the Reformation, and yet in the 20th century

lay imagination, it is the “Renaissance” which is more remembered. Both the Renaissance

and the Reformation raised the social status of commerce, though again the former takes the

credit in the thought of the 19th and 20th centuries.

Implications for Singapore

Liberals who wish to argue that in order for Singapore to experience its own cultural

flourishing, then like the Renaissance, it must experience a liberalisation of politics and

society. But it will find that history – as opposed to the romantic conception of that period –

is no ally to their argument. One would be hard-pressed to argue that the essential condition

of the Renaissance’s cultural awakening was the liberal governments of the Italian cities, and

that liberty and equality were experienced by most individuals. History is full of examples of

how a libertine, and even liberal, cultural elite thrived amidst a less than democratic political

regime. The Renaissance was a situation where basically only an elite (which includes the

notion of an elite-centred civil society) was relatively open and supportive of artistic

development and experimentation rather than the society as a whole.

But the central liberal premises cannot be dismissed either: that a culturally vibrant society is

also a liberal one, and that the idea of the individual is essential to a liberal society. If one

were to look at Europe from the Renaissance to the present, then these liberal premises find

considerable support from history.

What is critically important to realise is that the social function of art and entertainment has

changed since the Renaissance; they are no longer the privileged province of the elite, but a

shared domain of both the elite and the mass audience. Thus, for the masses to participate in

culture production and consumption, the same degree of individual autonomy that the elite

enjoyed must now be extended to the masses. If the conception of a Renaissance City were to

be realised, especially in a small city-state like Singapore, it is essential that citizens are

empowered to exercise individual autonomy. For in this autonomy lies the kernel of cultural

creation. So if one cannot argue that the Renaissance proves that a liberal state is a necessary

condition for a culturally vibrant society, using the Renaissance to argue that a less than open

state can have a culturally vibrant society, will also be unsustainable. What is instructive to

recognise is that in thinking about the Renaissance as a model or metaphor for cultural

development in Singapore, one cannot ignore all the other developments that have changed

modern society since then.

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Summary

In drawing lessons from the Renaissance for contemporary Singapore, we believe that the

point is not to focus on drawing detailed comparisons between modern-day Singapore and the

city-states of Renaissance Italy. That, we feel, would be an inappropriate “use” of history.

Rather, we have sought to identify certain features of how subsequent periods have

conceptualised the Renaissance as well as to identify certain features of the Renaissance

itself, and to explore how these features have relevance for Singapore today.

The concept of the “Renaissance” came about in hindsight, and therefore, the “Renaissance”

has been, since the beginning, used as a model of sorts for later periods. In this regard,

Singapore is acting like 19th century Europe. Also like 19th century Europe, Singapore has

inherited the romantic idea that the arts and culture are a separate domain from the rational

and economic. However, we would recommend against perpetuating this separation, and

argue instead that Singapore must envision a society where creative and emotional energies

are synergistically connected with rational and pragmatic imperatives. One lesson of the

Renaissance which we feel is strongly relevant to Singapore is that an active civil society

makes for a culturally vibrant city. And while Liberalism may not exactly have been the

prevailing ethos of the Renaissance, but more a projection of the 19th century European

imagination, we believe that the Renaissance cannot, on the other hand, be used as a model of

a culturally vibrant society that is not liberal. The liberal premises still hold true: that a

culturally vibrant society is a liberal one, and that the cornerstone of a liberal society is its

fundamental respect for the individual.

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CHAPTER THREE

CURRENT CULTURAL LANDSCAPE

The purview of the Ministry of Information and the Arts’ (MITA) covers, officially, only the

cultural and information aspects of public life. Thus its approach to the “Singapore as a

Renaissance City” project could be confined, understandably, to just the cultural dimensions

of the city life. However, in exploring the vision for a future city that is both a city and a

state, we need to look at a much broader canvass that includes politics, economics and the

society as a whole. Thus our visioning exercise includes aspects that may not officially come

under MITA, but could nevertheless have an impact on the future Singapore. However, we

have tried to anchor ourselves to the cultural dimension in this exercise, as much as possible.

Old Assumptions

First, we would like to examine some of the assumptions that have governed the official

approach to cultural development in Singapore.

The dire circumstances of the birth of Singapore as an independent nation – being one of the

rare states upon which independence was thrust – have long conditioned the way we look at

life in Singapore. The government, for its part, made no secret of its belief that economics

dominated all else – politics, personal freedoms, culture. The right to work, the right to feed

and the right to material well-being subordinated most other rights of the citizenry. In such a

conception of life and living, it was possible to compartmentalise culture, politics and

economics, to detach each from the other, and to try to contain them in discreet spheres of

public policy and administration. Even more importantly, the official approach tried not only

to separate but also to sequence them – economics first, then culture and then politics. It was

explained that people without jobs and income will not be able to enjoy the music and the

dance, much less make music or do dance. And even when people finally got their share of

economics and their dose of culture, it was felt that they were not mature enough for politics.

A young nation with a fragile society would not be strong enough, it was argued, for the

thrust and parry of contentious politics. Then there was the matter of us being Asians.

Whether in economics, politics or culture, we are thought to be different from the West, and

that the ways of Asian Capitalism, Asian Democracy and Asian Values do not – and should

not – parallel the ways of the West.

It is not the intention of this paper to judge the rightness or otherwise of the past assumptions

but to recognise the underlying philosophy that conditioned official thinking and approaches

to culture in Singapore.

The upshot of this philosophy was that culture came to be viewed by people as well as the

government as a secondary activity – almost hobbyist in nature – and not as part of the core

of their being. A corollary of this development is that attributes such as creativity, innovation,

passion, and aesthetic sense have all become disenfranchised from ordinary life and

ensconced in the extraordinary life of the artist, the entertainer or the eccentric. But, new

trends around the world, many of which have entrenched or will come to entrench themselves

10

in Singapore, are challenging these old assumptions.

New Trends

Since the 1980s, four major trends have begun to manifest themselves in Singapore.

First, the internationalisation of the economy. The world economy is becoming increasingly

globalised and Singapore has become part of that process. The Singapore government had in

fact embraced this trend with vigour and alacrity long before it became commonplace. Of

course, Singapore had little other choice, but still it was a thoughtful and conscientious

decision. Both our domestic and external economies are dominated by foreign companies, but

by invitation. Our own companies are spreading beyond Singapore because we need to

expand our markets and production bases. We now have one of the most open economies of

the world and we are one of the most vocal advocates of the virtues of the open economy.

Second, the adoption of information technology (IT) as part of our national DNA. IT is both

shrinking and opening up the world. Country after country is adopting IT as the basic

infrastructure of business, government and community life. In plugging into the IT world and

taking advantage of its numerous benefits, Singapore is even more advanced than most

advanced nations. The government’s own vision is to make Singapore an “Intelligent Island.”

By 2000, it would be among the most wired and most connected cities or states in the world.

Again, the Singapore government has embraced IT with a religious zeal, as with

globalisation, because we have little choice in the matter. An open economic system demands

an open communication system.

Third, the shift to the information economy. A trend that can be observed in Singapore as

well as elsewhere is the inexorable shift to the third wave economy – the information

economy. The information economy will thrive more on brain than on brawn, more on

information networks than on assembly lines, more on judgements than on certitudes. What

this trend foretells is the emphasis that will shift from motor skills and cognitive skills to

analytical and creative skills. Just as technical skills were a core competency in the industrial

economy, creative skills will become a core competency in the information economy.

Fourth, the tension that is arising between two contradictory currents of culture. The

globalisation of the economy and of the information networks has made the global village a

virtual reality. And the global village is acquiring a common culture or at least commonalties

shared by cultures across the globe. But at the same time, there is a resurgence of local

cultures or at least singularities that distinguish one culture from another. There is even

speculation that with the rise of China as a superpower and India as a major power, with

Japan remaining a major power, and the rest of Asia gaining in economic wealth (despite the

current downturn), it is not inconceivable that Asia could offer a dominant ideology or value

system that is different from those of the West. It is not clear at present whether cultures will

fuse or clash or maintain a dynamic equilibrium among themselves. But it is clear that

Singapore will not be a determinant of any trend, only a follower – because of our extremely

small size.

In addition to the above four trends which have a global context, there are other trends that

are more specific to Singapore.

First, in the area of political management, there is a marked transformation in the needs of the

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citizenry and the way the government is trying to cope with it. In the simpler times of widely

shared poverty and hardship, it was easier for the state to define what the national needs were

and respond accordingly. Since the majority of the population shared those same sentiments,

there was a large collectivity and uniformity of support for the government programmes. But

that has changed now. Increasingly, “national needs” are becoming differentiated and more

narrowly defined. Both the hierarchy of needs as well as the disparity of needs pose a strong

challenge to existing conceptions and programmes to meet those needs. A good example can

be found in the housing needs of Singaporeans. The template of the housing programmes of

the 1960s no longer suffices. The government has been under constant pressure to meet much

more differentiated demands and the public response to its solutions has not been as

consensual as in the past. The same trend is observable in demands for, say, freedoms in the

media, the arts and in politics. Such differentiated demands of the citizenry are likely to lead

to more privatisation of interests and less government control over choices and preferences.

Second, one of the key components of any democratic system – the civil society – has largely

been dormant in Singapore in the past several decades. But there are strong stirrings in this

area now. In the Singapore context, an active and constructive civil society is likely to

emerge in the future, but with expectations of greater participation in governance as well as a

willingness to contribute to community life. A vibrant civil society usually leads to a less

predictable environment and a more contested public discourse. Though the outcomes need

not necessarily be negative or destructive, the competing interests of civil society actors will

necessarily create tensions and conflicts which will make for a more complex environment

than that of the past.

Third, foreign capital has played the dominant role in Singapore’s economic development

through the presence of multinational corporations (MNCs). As an open economy and as an

international business hub, this trend is most likely to continue. The foreign capital brings

with it foreigners at very high levels of management and decision-making. Their presence

and their intellectual and “leisure” demands will have an influence on how the “quality of

life” in Singapore is shaped.

In addition to the presence of the foreign, high-level managerial class, there is also the

presence of a very large number of low-level foreign workers in Singapore. Today, almost

one in three working adults is a foreigner. In total, they make up nearly 15% of the

population. On an island of just 650 square kilometres, such a dense presence will affect the

way we conceive of and practise “local” culture.

New Assumptions

The foregoing observation of new trends leads us to make some new assumptions in order to

develop a set of possible scenarios for the future. These assumptions are, of course, moot but,

in the main, they flow naturally from the above mentioned trends.

First, the state’s power over its citizens will weaken because of the open economy, the open

communication system and the growth of civil society.

Second, the state will become more of a facilitator and less of a controller, more of a

supporter and less of an initiator in many aspects of public life, especially in the cultural

arena. Where it cannot control, the state may prefer civic initiatives and self-support, for few

will enjoy responsibility without power.

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Third, Singapore’s civil society will become much more dynamic and plural than it is today

by virtue of the openness of the society to external influences and because of the education

and affluence that economic success has brought about. As civic interests cannot be

reconciled except through dialogue, consultation and consensus, public discourses will be

varied and contested.

Fourth, culture will become an integrated element rather than a separate dimension of life in

Singapore. Because of the economic need for self-thinking and creativity in a large

proportion of the population, artistic development and activities (which are the manifestation

of culture) will gain wide acceptance and support.

Fifth, cultural development will be more organic. Unlike industrialisation and technological

skills, culture and the arts cannot be imported or borrowed. Also, unlike the economy, culture

cannot be globalised. Like politics, culture is local and needs to be indigenously rooted and

nurtured.

Sixth, cultural development will be multifaceted though uneven. Because the state will retreat

from its dominant position, the initiatives and support for growth will emanate from a variety

of sources, leading to more natural but variegated developments. Communities that are well

endowed and inclined towards cultural development will allocate more resources to that

development, while others will lag behind. Another major force in the cultural scene will be

the private sector. Thus, culture will be commercialised and the market will have a major

impact on what kinds of cultural activities flourish or flounder.

Summary

It is most unlikely that the current cultural landscape of Singapore will remain unchanged.

Both internal and external forces are already affecting the economic, political and social

arrangements and institutions that have lasted for more than three decades. Culture cannot

remain impervious to those changes. Some of the salient trends of the future will see the

diminution of state power and control, the rise of civil society and the emergence of a more

variegated but integrated cultural environment. However, these trends do not foretell

precisely what the future will really be. We can only speculate on probable future scenarios,

some of which are set out in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER FOUR

FUTURE SCENARIOS

The Scenarios

We can perhaps imagine Singapore as a “Renaissance City” 50 or even 25 years in the future.

The actualisation of such an imagined city would be the result of policies and directives that

are put in place today. The implementation of these policies is conceivable within several

contexts in which different cultural paradigms, with distinctly different parameters and

markers, may hold sway.

The cultural contexts, scenarios or “end-states” that will ultimately emerge in Singapore

would be the function of a historical process of cultural and social development unfolding

along five broad trajectories:

The Fundamentalist

The Laissez-faire

The Cosmopolitan

The Multicultural

* Strong Multiculturalism

* Weak Multiculturalism

The Syncretic

The five trajectories are distinguishable in at least two ways. First, and somewhat

simplistically, they are distinguishable to the extent to which distinct and different cultural

end-states are realisable from each. In this respect, the Syncretic, the Multicultural and the

Cosmopolitan scenarios are one set of trajectories with end-states sharing several common

features; while the Laissez-Faire and the Fundamentalist scenarios are another set of

trajectories. Second, the scenarios are distinguishable to the extent to which each is disposed

to permit intervention, modulation and management of the processes and transformations

involved in the realisation of their respective end-states.

This of course presumes that both the state and the people (as individuals or as part of the

civil society), would have specific and different roles within each trajectory in the realisation

of the end-states. It goes without saying that no authority on earth can force cultural change

down the people’s throat. Cultural change against the people’s will is not just impracticable,

it is, given our understanding of the term “culture,” logically impossible.

The Fundamentalist

This trajectory of cultural development assumes that the state is the sole actor driving the

process in a specific, predetermined direction, with or without the co-operation of the people

or the civil society. For example, the state’s objective could be to develop a Chinese country,

with a Chinese dominant culture and with Mandarin as the main language. To this end, the

state provides the vision, the policies, the funding and formalises a structure. This form of

14

cultural development would be a non-starter in many parts of the world. But Singapore is

small enough and has a population compliant enough for such a project to be at least

contemplated. However, even if the end-state of a Chinese country with a Chinese dominant

culture is achieved, it is highly improbable that such an entity would survive very long in the

geo-political circumstances in which Singapore is ineluctably located.

The Fundamentalist trajectory will have to cope with a maximally open economic and

communications system, while concurrently maintaining a closed, highly controlled and

tightly regulated political system. This too would be untenable over the long term.

The Laissez-Faire

The Laissez-faire trajectory is unique by virtue of the fact that its end-state is indeterminate

or ambiguous. This is a trajectory of cultural development where the state provides nothing –

no funding, no vision, no policy and no formalised structures for development. It leaves

cultural development entirely in the hands of the people or the civil society. Therefore the

end-state which is finally developed is essentially in the hands of the people. The state merely

plays the role of a referee, enforcing law and order, sustaining economic development and

ensuring defence and security. It has no stake at all in cultural development.

Given the general lack of cultural awareness among Singaporeans and the evident lack of

critical and constructive public discourse, the prognosis for this trajectory of development is

not good. However, considering the rate and complexity of cultural change today, and the

significance of cultural development for the well-being of society at large, it would be

irrational to persist in the Laissez-faire approach. The risks are too high and it is a gamble

Singapore can ill-afford.

The Cosmopolitan

The term “Cosmopolitan” is being used here in a manner quite different from its common

usage. The Cosmopolitan trajectory will neither develop a variety of “world culture” nor a

culture displaying attributes that transcend any single national boundary and belongs instead

to the world as a whole.

As it is envisaged here Cosmopolitanism is a tack of cultural development that may also arise

from Singapore persisting with its current practice of multiracialism i.e. without a coherent or

rational vision of cultural development. But with two other important variables coming into

the equation, namely:

i) that the state will continue to attract an increasing number of foreign

professionals and workers to work here;

ii) that there will be an increasing number of highly qualified, professional

Singaporeans who will leave Singapore to work and live elsewhere.

Given these social and demographic conditions, a particular kind of weak multiculturalism

could emerge wherein the idea of a “native” Singaporean would simply be redundant. The

Singapore population would consist of a large number of people in perpetual transit –

everyone would be on their way somewhere else. This is of course the spectre of “Hotel

Singapore,” a career pit-stop for the highly-trained, highly-paid, highly-mobile, trans-national

15

employee of the future, and the low wage coolie who is willing to do the tough, dirty, menial

labour that the people in “Hotel Singapore” are no longer willing to do. There is no place in

this equation for sentiments like a “sense of belonging”, an idea of “home” or for putting

down “roots.”

The more skilled, educated and productive the person, the more likely he or she will be

imbued with a clinical pragmatism driven by the engine of the market. This will be the age of

the Singaporean Diaspora, people mobile enough to heed the call of the highest international

bidder. Communal peace and harmony will prevail; it must, in order to continuously attract

international investments and facilitate business. But, as with a weak form of

multiculturalism, social and cultural integration will be shallow and superficial. There will of

course be sufficient cultural understanding and interaction to facilitate business and daily

living, but there will be no need for a deeper understanding of cultural differences and

certainly no need to forge a cultural identity.

Singaporean Cosmopolitanism may be maintained indefinitely, so long as the state is able to

sustain a sufficient level of economic growth and wealth distribution. Indeed, it would be fair

to say that this variety of cosmopolitanism is actually fair-weather cultural garnishing,

sprinkled upon a viable economic vision.

The Multicultural

Another highly probable trajectory of cultural development in Singapore could result in the

Multicultural end-state. The processes of cultural development and socialisation involved in

the realisation of multiculturalism or syncretism are very similar. What sets them apart in fact

is the vision that is actually adopted at the beginning of the process. The vision driving the

Syncretic model would be to arrive specifically at a viable cultural paradigm which consists

of heterogeneous elements but is nonetheless fused in a manner in which its very coming

together, its internal consistency and its sustainability over the long term is unmistakably and

uniquely Singaporean. The Multicultural vision has no ambitions of finally arriving at a new

and unique Singaporean culture. The aim in this case is to arrive at an end-state where

different ethnic communities will preserve and practise distinct ethnic cultures but live in

peace and harmony, mutually recognising and respecting their differences.

The spirit and tenor of the Multicultural paradigm will not be significantly different from the

ethnically determined, inherited cultures that each of the communities brings to the equation

at the start. Apart from the differences in the visions which drive them, the Multicultural and

the Syncretic models share structural and constitutional similarities. Indeed it is quite possible

that they may inter-penetrate. Each may be analogously compared to different styles and

techniques of painting: Abstraction and Collage. If the Syncretic paradigm could be likened

to a complex, studied abstract composition, then the Multicultural paradigm is best seen as a

kind of collage – “The coupling of two [or more] realities, irreconcilable in appearance, upon

a plane which apparently does not suit them … .”i

The Multicultural paradigm is a mosaic of elements; a pastiche of distinct and separable

ethnic and communal identities interacting and living together. It is very likely that a

spectrum of multicultural end-states may emerge as a result of this trajectory of cultural

development. How well the multicultural mosaic coheres and how strong the integrated

whole is, would vary according to whether the end-state achieved is Multiculturalism of the

“strong” or “weak” variety.

16

Strong Multiculturalism

If the process of cultural development in Singapore is managed and modulated in accordance

to principles derived in part, for example, from those of the avowed multicultural policies of

Australia and Canada, and if the state enables the people to be an equal partner in the process

of cultural development, then it is very likely that a variety of strong multiculturalism will

eventually emerge here. Singapore, however, should take cognisance of only the principles of

the Australian and Canadian models of multiculturalism and not their practice and

implementation. Singapore must determine and evolve its own multicultural praxis.

Multiculturalism should be conceived as a systematic and comprehensive response to cultural

and ethnic diversity, with educational, linguistic, economic and social components and

specific institutional mechanisms.ii

The principles of the Australian, and Canadian models of multiculturalism [constitute]…

“an extensive effort to cope democratically with diversity, developed in the

very short time-span of two decades… this policy is founded on a civic and

contractual definition of citizenship, rather than on ethnic and cultural

communitarianism, a feature which is crucial for avoiding conflicts and

reconciling diversity with societal cohesion. This means that while ethnic and

cultural specificities are respected (our emphasis), they are to be subsumed

under the Constitution, the democratic system, the use of a national language

(two in the case of Canada) and certain norms, such as individual rights, social

equity and gender equality, which prevail in the country.”iii

The coherence and integrity of the end-state that might arise from this process of cultural

development is attributable principally to the strong bonding or “enmeshment” of the distinct

and different parts within the texture of the whole.

“The claim that a single historical story can do justice to the histories which

diverse persons residing in a place have lived has given way to a vision of

history as a tapestry of interrelated stories, stories to be told from a variety of

perspectives. What makes any given story a story of a place [of Singapore, the

United States or South Africa] is precisely its integration (our emphasis) into

the fabric of all of the other stories.”iv

One difference between strong multiculturalism and weak multiculturalism is the difference

in the level or the extent of “enmeshment” achieved in a society. Ultimately though, strong

multiculturalism is only possible in societies which are able to accord equal rights, liberties

and opportunities to all people and communities, while at the same time recognising and

respecting their particular and different cultural demands and needs.

“Multicultural societies and communities that stand for the freedom and

equality of all people rest upon mutual respect for reasonable intellectual,

political, and cultural differences. Mutual respect requires a widespread

willingness and ability to articulate our disagreements, to defend them before

people with whom we disagree, to discern the difference between respectable

and disrespectable disagreement, and to be open to changing our own minds

when faced with well-reasoned criticism. The moral promise of multiracialism

depends on the exercise of these deliberative virtues.”v

17

The role of the state and the people in realising strong multiculturalism is fundamentally no

different than in the realisation of syncretism; i.e. it must be based on a strong mutually

supportive partnership between the state and civil society.

Weak Multiculturalism

This is the end-state which would arise if the multicultural programme is implemented

without sufficient thought and a cohesive and rational vision. Weak multiculturalism could

well be the result, for instance, of Singapore persisting with its current practice of

multiracialism; or it may be the outcome of the state adopting a laissez-faire attitude in the

development of multiculturalism here, either by not intervening to direct the process or by

doing so minimally.

Presently, Singapore’s cultural policy is neither sufficiently coherent nor comprehensive.

Indeed, because the state still perceives culture as a discreet and separate dimension of human

activity, one which is decidedly less important than economics or politics, its approach to

cultural planning and management has tended to be ad-hoc and unsustainable over the long

term. In a nutshell, there is no organising principle, no over-arching vision which could tie

together disparate aspects of Singapore’s cultural scene, such as arts education, development

of local artistic talent, censorship regulation and licensing guidelines, and drive it forward in

an efficient and co-ordinated way.

This variety of multiculturalism will also consist of discreet and different ethnically

determined cultures mirroring the current ethnic composition of the population. But unlike

strong multiculturalism, it would be characterised by attenuated social cohesion and

integration. Cultural formations would be superficial and, ultimately, transient and

ephemeral. The social mores that will prevail would be more or less an extension of the

multiracial practices that are already in place now. While there may well be mutual toleration

among the different communities, there will also be no real understanding or respect of the

particular cultural differences of each. Critical discussion and cross-communication between

different communities will be non-existent and inter-cultural understanding and exchange

would be manifested at the most superficial levels. This is because there would be no

pressing social or cultural need for deep dialogue and communication; significant

disagreements would be swept under the carpet in the interests of maintaining harmony. As a

result people from different ethnic groups will live together without overt conflict, but their

interactions with and understanding of each other will be shallow. Expressions of racial and

communal integration and cohesion will be little more than tokenisms, more rhetoric than

substance.

The Syncretic

Given the political, social and cultural conditions that are already in place today, and the

vectors of global change that are discernible, perhaps the most likely trajectory of cultural

development in Singapore would result in an end-state characterised by a syncretic culture.

Of the five trajectories being considered, the Syncretic is the only one which holds out the

promise of an end-state from which a unique and cohesive Singapore culture may develop. In

the fullness of time, this new Singapore culture will derive but be distinguishable from the

four inherited, ethnically determined cultures that are already present here.

Syncretism is a particular kind of blending – it is the blending of both harmonious and

18

inharmonious elements. One possible variety of syncretism in Singapore, for instance, could

produce a blending of the elements that presently fall on either side of the so-called “Asian

and Western Values” divide. The syncretic is a complex, multifarious and highly fluid

cultural paradigm, one which is not adequately described by the casual glibness associated

with the notion “East-West fusion.” It is certainly neither as logical nor as systematic as the

Hegelian notion of a “synthesis” – i.e. a third state in the dialectic process, arising from two

opposites, within which the irrational is eliminated and the rational preserved.

Social attributes, customs, values and other cultural markers could be so mixed and

amalgamated in the syncretic that the result is an interlaced, heterogeneous, polyphonic

matrix in which Singaporean communities could be located. Despite the lack of uniformity

or homogeneity, syncretism is an end-state which is consistent and viable by itself. Ethnically

determined cultural distinctiveness, as it exists now, will mutate, and the individual’s cultural

identity will increasingly be formed via dialogues between the Self and “the Other” which is

constituted of many faces and voices. Social cohesion or integration will be constructed or

invented, and it would be a dynamic and fluid state based upon the common understandings

of cultural differences and shared experiences of a lived past. In this malleable and

amorphous state the privilege attributable to “natural culture,” “natural language,” “roots,”

“traditional culture” and “authentic heritage” would wither away into either insignificance or

meaninglessness.

“In a world with too many voices speaking all at once, a world where

syncretism and parodic invention are becoming the rule not exception, an

urban multinational world of institutional transience – where American clothes

made in Korea are worn by young people in Russia, where everyone’s “roots”

are to some degree cut – in such a world it becomes increasingly difficult to

attach human identity and meaning to a coherent “culture” or “language.”vi

Both the state and the people, either as individuals or as part of a civil society, have a vital

role to play in the achievement of the syncretic. Only a strong, mutually supportive,

partnership between the state and the civil society would result in syncretism. This

partnership must be an equal and dialogical relationship in which the state formalises the

structures, the policies and the funding for the realisation of syncretism; namely, it provides

the vision and the rules of engagement, while the civil society works through the actual

process of establishing and legitimising the cultural paradigm. The programme to realise

syncretism would almost certainly fail if the state attempts to direct and determine the process

of cultural development through an autocratic and top-down manner of management.

Summary

Clearly, taking into consideration the need for sustainable national growth in the future, the

available options for cultural development in Singapore are limited. The Laissez-faire and

Fundamentalist scenarios, for instance, are merely limits for conceptualisations. Even if they

were realisable, they would be untenable in practice over the long term.

Weak Multiculturalism and Cosmopolitanism are certainly realisable scenarios which could

be sustained over the long term. And, whether we like it or not, they would be the scenarios

most likely to be realised if cultural policy planning continues on its current tack. It is our

opinion, however, that both Weak Multiculturalism and Cosmopolitanism are far from the

ideal cultural end-states we should be aspiring for as a nation. It is no exaggeration to say that

19

both scenarios undersell the aspirations of Singaporeans for themselves and their nation.

Therefore the only viable options available, in terms of sustainability and desirability, are the

Syncretic and Strong Multiculturalism scenarios. The structure and constitution of these

scenarios would enable the people of Singapore to develop strong emotional moorings to the

nation and foster identities that would nurture the potential of the individual to his or her

fullest capacity. These scenarios would also permit the state to engage the power of the

imagination inherent in the depth and diversity of our inherited cultures.

Singapore’s national development in the next century, conceived socially, economically or

politically, would be incomplete without factoring in culture. Cultural development planning

can no longer be ignored and both Syncretism and Strong Multiculturalism would give it the

focus and centrality it deserves in national policy making.

Both scenarios would materialise if and only if the state and the people, work in tandem as

partners; and if there is a clear, coherent and comprehensive cultural policy in place.

The substance of this policy will be the subject of the next chapter.

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CHAPTER FIVE

POLICY PATHWAYS

Need for Comprehensive and Coherent Cultural Policy

After considering the scenarios, it is clear that a “vision” is crucial and central if Singapore is

to become a culturally vibrant society. The corollary of the centrality of vision is that it must

find articulation in a comprehensive and coherent cultural policy.

As we have been arguing throughout the paper, Singapore must re-conceptualise the

relationship between what it has termed “culture” and the “economy.” We believe that the

world today puts a much higher premium on creative- and knowledge-intensive societies, and

in such societies, “culture” and the “economy” cannot be treated as mutually exclusive

categories, or as minimally related but must be seen as interconnected at many levels. If

Singapore is to effectively re-conceptualise this relationship between “culture” and the

“economy” and if Singapore is to become a leading creative- and knowledge-intensive

society, then a comprehensive and coherent cultural policy is as essential as the

comprehensive and coherent economic policy that we have had for decades.

Projecting the status quo in Singapore today into the future, the most likely outcomes are the

Cosmopolitan scenario or a weak variant of the Multiculturalism scenario. Such outcomes are

surely less desirable than the Syncretic scenario or a strong variant of the Multiculturalism

scenario. We anticipate this result because at present there does not exist a comprehensive

and coherent cultural policy that can support the evolution of the latter set of scenarios.

A comparison between the existing cultural policy with the economic policy clearly shows

that in the latter case, the reach and depth of thinking and planning concerning the economy

is of a different order altogether. And the results of the country’s economic policy are plain to

see.

Elements of Comprehensive and Coherent Cultural Policy

A comprehensive and coherent cultural policy should be:

i) National in scope. It cannot just be aimed at certain segments of society, but must

include the entire nation. Just as the country’s economic or educational policy are national

in scope, so should be its cultural policy. A crucial indicator that a policy is national in

scope is that it involves:

ii) Inter-ministerial planning and action. Again to use existing economic policy as a

paradigm, one can see how economic policy demands the coordination of the ministries

of Trade and Industry, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Education, Environment, Information

and the Arts, and so on. This inter-ministerial planning and action is necessary in the case

of culture as it is with the economy, because of its:

21

iii) Totality and centrality. Economic policy rightly conceives of the economy as affecting

not just a limited area of social life, but as playing a central role in and as affecting the

totality of society. As has been explained earlier, in the knowledge economy of the future

wherein creativity and innovation will enjoy a high premium, the majority of the small

population base of Singapore would have to be culturally adept and creative. This is in

addition to the fact that culture is no longer the privileged province of the elite but the

common domain of the masses. Given such centrality of purpose, cultural policies should

have some:

iv) Core values. Core values are the anchors of the policy-making process. While policy

may be modified from time to time to respond to environmental changes, the fundamental

objective of the policy and the values integral to that objective should remain unaltered

over time. Thus, in the 1960s, the government declared that the ultimate objective of

Singapore’s cultural policy was the creation of a Singapore culture and a unique and

common Singaporean identity for all citizens. Extraordinarily, the government changed

course in the mid-1980s, now aiming for hyphenated identities in an ill-defined multi-

cultural environment. This change of course raised questions about Singapore’s

commitment to both multiculturalism and a Singaporean culture. The anxiety now is

whether the government will stay the course this time around.

However, in cultural development as in economic development, the government is not the

sole executor of policy – it is the people who ultimately put policy into practice. As such, the

government should bear in mind two specific modes of operation in cultural policy

implementation:

v) Enabling mode. State intervention into the areas of “culture” – defined in the broadest

sense – cannot be simply top-down, because one cannot import or impose a culture, it

must grow from the ground. The state must put into place systems that guide and

empower various individuals and sectors of society so that these agents can generate

“culture” locally. What should ideally happen is a retreat of state control of local

knowledge but at the same time an extension of state support for it. Too often cultural

development in Singapore turns to foreign expertise or talent; but in the case of cultural

development – unlike in economic development – the priority should be local

practitioner, expertise and talent.

vi) Partnership mode. There are three constituents in cultural partnership: the state, civil

society (which includes the individual) and the market. The role of the state and the

market are well understood in Singapore. Cultural policy must now recognise and respect

the agency of individuals and civil society in terms of how they articulate social ideals

and values. Moreover, a sound conceptual framework of cultural policy alone is not

enough to make this partnership work. If a system offers support without adequate

sensitivity to the needs and interests as articulated by civil society, then the system

becomes effectively impotent. Again, it is instructive to recall how the government is

highly responsive to the market with regard to economic policy development.

Cultural Policy Frameworks

As discussed earlier, there are two viable cultural development scenario options available to

Singapore: Syncretism, which aims at the end-state of a Singaporean culture, and Strong

Multiculturalism, which continues with and strengthens plurality. Both scenarios require a

22

state and civil society much more informed of and sensitive to cultural production and

consumption. Cultural policy frameworks to foster such developments would impact on many

aspects of Singapore society. While the second part of the study is intended to go into the

details of a policy blueprint or action agenda, we sketch out here some policy frameworks for

the two scenarios. Some of the recommendations below would apply exclusively to just one

scenario while others could well apply to both.

(Note: In using the terms “national language” or “official language” below, we do not

necessarily mean Malay or English respectively. It is deliberately silent on that point.)

Policy Framework for a Syncretic Singapore

i) Language Use

Establish and promote one national and official language in Singapore.

There should be no mandatory second language education and people should be free

to choose any language for study.

ii) National Translation Facility

Establish a state-funded national translation agency.

Ensure translation of all culturally significant Singaporean texts into the

national/official language.

iii) National Education

Primary to Secondary Level:

Establish and promote a national education canon derived from the four main

Singapore cultures, with exposure to other major cultures of the world.

National education should emphasise the need to evolve a unique and common

Singaporean culture in addition to social cohesion and national unity.

Incorporate such education as part of the core curricula in schools.

Tertiary Level:

Establish a Singapore Studies Department in the University.

Make a national education programme compulsory for all undergraduate levels.

iv) Media

Engage the media as a partner in cultural development and cultural discourse.

Establish terrestrial and cable television channels, radio stations and websites to

promote cultural and artistic programmes in the national language.

Establish journals, publications and websites for the dissemination of critical,

intellectual and cultural discourse.

v) National and Non-denominational Institutions

Foster the development of national and non-denominational institutions that cut across

barriers of ethnicity, language and culture.

vi) State Support

Support and develop only national initiatives.

Encourage greater institutional autonomy both in principle and practice.

23

vii) Artist Development

Make artist development a priority, as much as infrastructure development.

Promote local and original artistic productions as a priority.

Select individuals and institutions for special developmental support (à la Singapore

MNCs).

Establish an on-going review of artistic censorship policy and practice.

Encourage diversity in media, presentation, content and form of artistic expression.

Policy Framework for a Strong Multicultural Singapore

i) Language Use

Encourage use of one language as lingua franca.

Establish the mother tongue or a “local” language as a mandatory second language.

Encourage both official and private use of these languages.

ii) National Translation Facility

Establish a state-funded national translation agency.

Ensure translation of all culturally significant Singaporean texts into all four official

languages.

iii) National Education

Primary to Secondary Level:

Establish and promote a national education canon derived from the four main

Singapore cultures.

Make available ethnic-, language- and culture-specific curricula choices in schools.

Establish multicultural arts education as part of the core curricula in schools.

Tertiary Level:

Encourage research on ethnic-, language- and culture-specific basis.

Make a core multicultural programme compulsory for all undergraduate levels.

iv) Media

Engage the media as a partner in cultural development and cultural discourse.

Establish terrestrial and cable television channels, radio stations and websites to

promote cultural and artistic programmes in the four official languages.

Establish journals, publications and websites in the four official languages for the

dissemination of critical, intellectual and cultural discourse.

v) National and Denominational Institutions

Foster the development of national and denominational institutions that encourage

both pluralism and national cohesion.

Establish institutions and mechanism for cross-cultural communication.

vi) State Support

Support diverse ethnic, communal and cultural initiatives as well as national efforts.

Encourage greater institutional autonomy both in principle and practice.

vii) Artist Development

Make artist development a priority, as much as infrastructure development.

24

Promote local and original artistic productions in all four official languages.

Select individuals and institutions for special developmental support (à la Singapore

MNCs).

Establish an on-going review of artistic censorship policy and practice.

Encourage diversity in media, presentation, content and form of artistic expression.

The recommendations above are indicative of the policy requirements to realise either the

Syncretic or Strong Multiculturalism scenarios. Part II of this project will provide the action

agenda, a fuller exposition of the policy initiatives to be undertaken according to the final

cultural “vision” for Singapore.

Before we close, we wish to address one specific question that has been asked of us: should

the government itself use the label “Singapore, a Renaissance City?” Our recommendation is

not to do so. Let others call Singapore a Renaissance City if it ever comes to that. Third party

endorsement is much more credible than self-praise.

25

APPENDIX

PARTICIPANTS IN FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

1. Mr S CHANDRAMOHAN

Broadcaster

2. Ms CHANG Li Lin

Doctoral student

3. Mr K C CHEW

Publisher

4. Mr Francis CHONG

Doctoral student

5. Dr Derek da CUNHA

Writer & Research Scholar

6. Mr Cherian GEORGE

Journalist

7. Prof S GOPINATHAN

Educationist

8. Prof KOH Tai Ann

Scholar in language and culture

9. Prof KWA Chong Guan

Scholar in history and heritage

10. Dr LAI Ah Eng

Scholar in ethnic relations

11. Mr LAI Chee Kien

Architect

12. Mr KUO Pao Kun

Playwright

13. Prof KWOK Kian Woon

Scholar in sociology and culture

14. Prof K P MOHANAN

Scholar in language and literature

26

15. Dr OOI Giok Ling

Scholar in cities and urban studies

16. Ms Julie SABARATNAM

Expert in Information Technology

17. Dr Sharon SIDDIQUE

Scholar in sociology

18. Dr YACCOB Ibrahim

Scholar in systems engineering

19. Dr YAP Mui Teng

Scholar in demography

i Ernst, Max. What Is The Mechanism Of Collage?

ii Multiculturalism: A Policy Response to Diversity, Paper prepared on the occasion of the

1995 Global Cultural Diversity Conference, ( 26-28 April 1995) and MOST (Management Of Social

Transformations) Pacific Sub-Regional Consultation, (28-29 April 1995), both in Sydney, Australia.

iii Ibid.

iv Herwitz, Daniel. Modern Indian Art, Modern Philosophy, Modern Cultural Identity. International

Symposium 1996. Internet.

v Gutman, Amy. 1994. Multiculturalism. Charles Taylor ed. By Amy Gutman; Princeton University Press. p.

24.

vi Clifford, James. 1988. The Predicament of Culture. Harvard, Harvard University Press. p. 95.