Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs. Republic of the Philippines

October 22, 2007 537 SCRA 473Ponente: Justice Corona

Facts: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male." He further alleged that he is a male transsexual. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2in Bangkok, Thailand. Petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. An order setting the case for initial hearing. On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4in favor of petitioner. On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7rendered a decisionin favor of the Republic. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.

Issues:(Issue in the RTC and CA) sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.Whether or not a persons first name be change because of sex reassignment?Whether or not entries in the B.C. be change on the basis of equity?

Held: Where the RTC affirms the petition filed by the herein petitioner, through the OSG, the republic appealed the case in the Court of Appeals, whereby the decision was set aside because there is no law that provides for the change of first name because of a sex reassignment. The SC rules out that the petition lacks merit where it was denied. The SC held that a persons first name cannot be change because of sex reassignment and RA 9048 deliberately expounded on how a name can be change and sex reassignment is not one of them.

Furthermore, the SC held No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment. It is but clear to state that a persons status is determined at birth and not by reassignment. "Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent unionbetween a man and a woman.37One of its essential requisites is thelegal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioners petition were to be granted.

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION vs. CITY OF MANILAG.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009

FACTS:

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Limsignedinto law andordinanceentitled AnOrdinanceProhibiting Short-timeAdmission, Short-timeAdmissionRates, and Wash-up Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila.

On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/ortemporary restraining order(TRO) with the RTC of Manila and prayed that theOrdinancebe declared invalid and unconstitutional.

On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta.Mesa Tourist Development Corporation filed a motion to intervene, which was granted by the RTC. MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff which was also granted by the RTC.

On January 14, 1993, the RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing theOrdinance.

On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring theOrdinancenull and void.

The City then filed a petition for review on certiorari with theSupreme Court. However, theSupreme Courtreferred the same to theCourt of Appeals. The City asserted that theOrdinanceis a valid exercise of police power pursuant toLocal governmentcode and the Revised Manila charter. Operators of drive-inhotels and motelsargued that theordinanceis unconstitutional since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.

TheCourt of Appealsreversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of theOrdinance.

ISSUE:WON theordinanceis unconstitutional

HELD: Yes.

For anordinanceto be a legitimate exercise of police power,

(1) It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.

(2) It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work.

(3) A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held inMorfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected.

It cannot be denied that theprimary animus behind theordinanceis the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments have gained notoriety as venue of prostitution, adultery and fornications in Manila since they provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers. Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied thatlegitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consentingsingleadults which is constitutionally protected will be curtailed as well.

We cannot discount other legitimate activities which theOrdinancewould proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.

TheOrdinancemakes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of theOrdinanceshowsit makes no classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.

The behavior which theOrdinanceseeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that theOrdinancecan easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.

We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However wellintentioned theOrdinancemay be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons.TheOrdinanceneedlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. TheOrdinancerashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect.

The apparent goal of theOrdinanceis to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and the like. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends does not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. However well-intentioned theOrdinancemay be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. TheOrdinanceneedlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricts the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification.