Route Discovery in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks Based on Security -Ad-hoc networks

Guided byMr.K.John Singh,

M.Tech(Ph.D)

Presented by R.P.Shyni Vinse II - M.Tech (IT)

Abstract

Collections of mobile devices with restricted broadcast range.

No fixed infrastructure Communication achieved by

relaying data along appropriate routes.

Proposed Enhanced EndairA algorithm

Existing System

Source Routing Protocol(SRP) On-demand source routing protocol captures the basic features of reactive

routing Upstream route from T to S is authenticated

by the target, the downstream route is not

Disadvantages: - request from S to T is not authenticated.

- divert routes

Ariadne

On demand routing protocol Based on DSR Shares the Key to all the intermediate

nodes for authenticationDisadvantage: -leads to Hidden channel attack

EndairA

Address the Hidden channel attack the route replies of intermediate

nodes are protected.Disadvantage: -leads to hidden channel attack

Hidden channel attack in EndairA:

Consider a sequence of nodes (S,A,X,B,Y,D,T) X,Y->faulty nodes When the node A receives msgS,T,rreq=(rreq,S,T,id) When the first faulty node X receives msgS,T,rreq=(rreq,S,T,id,A)

When the node B receives msgS,T,rreq=(rreq,S,T,id,A,X) When the second faulty node Y receives msgS,T,rreq=(rreq,S,T,id,A,X,B)

it drops node B from the listing and transmits

msgS,T,rreq=(rreq,S,T,id,A,X,Y)

Proposed System

Enhanced EndairA Address the Hidden channel attack the route replies of intermediate

nodes are protected.

A route request from S to T is of the form

msgS,T,rreq=(rreq,S,T,id,X1,…………Xj)

A route reply from T to S is of the form msgS,T,rrep=(rrep,S,T,id,X1…….Xp,sigT.......sigXj

)

target verifies: there’s no repeating ID in the node list last node in the node list is a neighbor

each intermediate node verifies: its own ID is in the node list there’s no repeating ID in the node list next and previous nodes in the node

list are neighbors all signatures are valid

source verifies: there’s no repeating ID in the node list first node in the node list is a neighbor all signatures are valid

How to prevent hidden channel attack

Each neighbor nodes(real nodes only)sendback an acknowledgement to the source

Modules

Node setup Route Discovery

Node Setup

Communication

Identify the possible paths

Identify the best route

Verify the path

Possible secured path

Secure path

Number of Possible and Secured Paths using endiarA and E-endiarA Algorithms

Number of NodesPaths Identified by endairA Paths Identified by E-endairA

Possible paths Secured paths Possible paths Secured paths

10(7+3)

3 1 2 2

15(11+4)

6 4 4 4

20(15+5)

8 5 6 6

25(18+7)

14 9 10 10

30(20+10)

16 10 10 10

35(24+11)

16 10 11 11

40(26+14)

19 12 13 13

45(28+17)

23 13 13 13

50(31+19)

26 14 14 14

Possible and Secured paths identified by endiarA Algorithm

endairA

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

0 10 20 30

No of P aths

No

of N

od

es

P os s ible P aths

S ec ured P aths

Possible and Secured paths identified by the proposed E-endiarA algorithm

E -endairA

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

0 5 10 15

No of P aths

No

of N

odes

P os s ible P aths

S ec ured P aths

Conclusion

Used to identify secure path Prevents hidden channel attack

References

[1] Mike Burmester, “On the Security of Route Discovery in MANETs”, IEEE Transactions on mobile computing,vol.8,no. 9,sep 2009.

[2] D. Johnson and D. Maltz, “Dynamic Source Routing in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks,” Mobile Computing, T. Imielinski and H. Korth, eds., Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.

[3] P. Papadimitratos and Z. Haas, “Secure Routing for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,” Proc. SCS Comm. Networks and Distributed Systems Modeling and Simulation Conf. (CNDS ’02), 2002.

[4] M.G. Zapata, “Secure Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing,” Mobile Computing and Comm. Rev., vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 106-107, 2002.

[5] K. Sanzgiri, B. Dahill, B.N. Levine, C. Shields, and E.M. Belding-Royer, “A Secure Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks,”Proc. IEEE Int’l Conf. Network Protocols (ICNP ’02), pp. 78-89, 2002.

[6] Y.-C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. Johnson, “Ariadne: A Secure On-Demand Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks,” Proc. ACM MobiCom, 2002.

Reference [7] Y.-C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. Johnson, “Packet Leashes: A

Defense against Wormhole Attacks in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks,” Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, pp. 1976-1986, 2003

[8] M. Burmester, T. van Le, and M. Weir, “Tracing Byzantine Faults in Ad Hoc Networks,” Proc. Conf. Computer, Network and Information Security 2003, pp. 43-46, 2003.

[9] Y.-C. Hu, D.B. Johnson, and A. Perrig, “SEAD: Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing for Mobile Wireless Ad Hoc Networks,” Ad Hoc Networks, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 175-192, 2003.

[10] L. Buttya´n and I. Vajda, “Towards Provable Security for Ad Hoc Routing Protocols,” Proc. ACM Workshop Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks (SASN ’04), 2004.

[11] G. _ Acs, L. Buttya´n, and I. Vajda, “Provably Secure On-Demand Source Routing in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,” IEEE Trans.Mobile Computing, vol. 5, no. 11, pp. 1533-1546, Nov. 2006.

THANK YOU!!!