Shouting into the Wind: Examining the Structural Weakness of Developing Countries in the Global...
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![Page 1: Shouting into the Wind: Examining the Structural Weakness of Developing Countries in the Global Trading Order Michael Smith Department of Political Science,](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062516/56649d365503460f94a0daae/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Shouting into the Wind: Examining the Structural Weakness of Developing
Countries in the Global Trading Order
Michael SmithDepartment of Political Science, Columbia University
[email protected] Conference, November 15, 2008
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LDCs and the WTO: Newfound Voice
Seattle Ministerial, 1999: Dozens of unmet LDC demands leads to mass exodus
Doha: Well organized and coherent expression of LDC interest in negotiations
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Research Question
Is this new voice indicative of a greater power in the GATT/WTO regime?
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LDCs and the WTO: Newfound Power?
Democratization leads to a new interest in free trade (Milner and Kubota)
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LDCs and the WTO: Newfound Power?
Democratization leads to a new interest in free trade (Milner and Kubota)
Efficiency rationale: International regimes allow states to overcome domestic barriers to free trade (neoliberal institutionalists)
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LDCs and the WTO: Newfound Power?
Round DatesNumber of Member
Countries
Geneva 1947 23
Annecy 1949 33
Torquay 1950 34
Geneva 1956 22
Dillon 1961 45
Kennedy 1962-7 48
Tokyo 1973-9 99
Uruguay 1981-94 117
Doha 2001-pres. 147
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LDCs and the WTO: Newfound Power?
Democratization leads to a new interest in free trade (Milner and Kubota)
Efficiency rationale: International regimes allow states to overcome domestic barriers to free trade (neoliberal institutionalists)
New coalitional bargaining strategies allow LDCs to effectively press their demands in WTO negotiations (Narlikar and Tussie)
![Page 8: Shouting into the Wind: Examining the Structural Weakness of Developing Countries in the Global Trading Order Michael Smith Department of Political Science,](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062516/56649d365503460f94a0daae/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
But…
New coalitional bargaining strategies made possible by institutional changes in GATT/WTO that allow for trade-related coalitions
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But…
New coalitional bargaining strategies made possible by institutional changes in GATT/WTO that allow for trade-related coalitions
If structural change in the GATT/WTO empowered the global south, why did this structural change occur in the first place?
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But…
New coalitional bargaining strategies made possible by institutional changes in GATT/WTO that allow for trade-related coalitions
If structural change in the GATT/WTO empowered the global south, why did this structural change occur in the first place?
Analysis of evolving GATT/WTO regime requires a role for power
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But…
New coalitional bargaining strategies made possible by institutional changes in GATT/WTO that allow for trade-related coalitions
If structural change in the GATT/WTO empowered the global south, why did this structural change occur in the first place?
Analysis of evolving GATT/WTO regime requires a role for power
Expression of voice by developing countries doesn’t correspond theoretically or empirically to increased power
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Bringing Power Back In
Gruber’s ‘go-it-alone’ power: dominant powers seeking efficiency gains from international cooperation can change status quo in system through creation of self-serving agreements and compel other states to join
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Bringing Power Back In
Gruber’s ‘go-it-alone’ power: dominant powers seeking efficiency gains from international cooperation can change status quo in system through creation of self-serving agreements and compel other states to join
Extended to GATT/WTO example: core coalition of dominant cooperating states can exercise structural power. A kind of ‘go-it-together’ power
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Bringing Power Back In
Gruber’s ‘go-it-alone’ power: dominant powers seeking efficiency gains from international cooperation can change status quo in system through creation of self-serving agreements and compel other states to join
Extended to GATT/WTO example: core coalition of dominant cooperating states can exercise structural power. A kind of ‘go-it-together’ power
When agreement is reached between dominant powers, developing countries feel compelled to join
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Expressions of Power
Structural: Draws in Outliers
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Expressions of Power
Structural: Draws in Outliers
Rule Setting: Defining Institutions
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Expressions of Power
Structural: Draws in Outliers
Rule Setting: Defining Institutions
Agenda Setting: Content of Votes and Declarations
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Expressions of Power
Structural: Draws in Outliers
Rule Setting: Defining Institutions
Agenda Setting: Content of Votes and Declarations
Exit: But Fruitless
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Hypotheses: When Agreement?
Core Coalition
?
Structural Power
Rule Setting Power
Agenda-Setting Power Agreemen
t
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No No No Yes (though ineffectual)
No
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Expectations
Small-n agreements driven by efficiency concerns
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Expectations
Small-n agreements driven by efficiency concerns
For an agreement to grow it must be between states with large structural power
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Expectations
Small-n agreements driven by efficiency concerns
For an agreement to grow it must be between states with large structural power
Where a core coalition exists, GATT/WTO rules will be changed as needed
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Expectations
Small-n agreements driven by efficiency concerns
For an agreement to grow it must be between states with large structural power
Where a core coalition exists, GATT/WTO rules will be changed as needed
Agenda setting may coexist with any form of coalition but only leads to agreement when forwarded by core coalition
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Evidence
GATT/WTO negotiations considered as four cases:1. Havana to the Kennedy Round2. Tokyo Round3. Uruguay Round4. Doha Development Round
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Havana to Kennedy
GATT founded as UK-US-France coalition
More development-friendly ITO rejected
Substantive agreements represent northern interest: agriculture kept off the table
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Tokyo Round
US/EC division over agricultural liberalization stalls progress until US concedes agricultural products as special goods
Developing world makes fails to gain desired removal of safeguards proposal despite agreement with US: EC achieves maintenance of selective safeguards
Global South largely avoids signing agreements; agitate in alternative but ineffective UNCTAD
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Uruguay Round
Developing countries compelled to return to negotiations despite prior exit
US/EC dispute over agriculture stall negotiations; resolved when US threat of retaliatory tariffs compels EC to accede
New institutional framework of WTO meets blueprint of Dunkel Draft – a US and EC drafted document
Passage of round as single undertaking: for South, take it or leave it
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Doha Development Round
Seattle 1999: Enduring US-EU-Japan disagreements over accelerating agricultural liberalization in addition to North/South arguments over discussing Uruguay’s implementation. Walkout.
Cancun : G-22 forms, fight for lowered agricultural subsidies and Northern market access. Maintain coherence until re-introduction of Singapore issues forces an impasse; again, walkout.
Geneva July 2008: Inclusion of China, India and Brazil in writing draft text. Breakdown over efforts by China and India to protect farmers
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Conclusions and Questions
Voice does not mean power: in trade rounds, the existence of a core coalition is required for progress.
How do changes in the international economy affect this?
Does inclusion of China, India and Brazil in Green Room talks indicate a change in the core coalition?