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SHOULD MILITARY UNIFORMS CARRYTHE UNION LABEL?Jonathan Lipow a , Yosef Mealem b & Yossef Tobol ca Oberlin College , USAb Academic College of Tel Aviv‐Yafo , Israelc Ariel University Center , IsraelPublished online: 17 Dec 2008.

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Defence and Peace Economics, 2009Vol. 20(1), February, pp. 11–19

ISSN 1024-2694 print: ISSN 1476-8267 online © 2009 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/10242690801962262

SHOULD MILITARY UNIFORMS CARRY THE UNION LABEL?

JONATHAN LIPOWa,†, YOSEF MEALEMb AND YOSSEF TOBOLc

aOberlin College, USA; bAcademic College of Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel; cAriel University Center, Israel

Taylor and FrancisGDPE_A_296392.sgm (Received 22 October 2007; in final form 22 December 2007)

10.1080/10242690801962262Defence and Peace Economics1024-2694 (print)/1476-8267 (online)Original Article2008Taylor & Francis0000000002008JonathanLipowjonathan.lipow@oberlin.eduIt is widely believed that the unionization of military labor leads to reduced discipline and lower combat capability.Case studies of the performance of existing military unions, however, generally suggest that unionization has a benignimpact on the performance of the armed forces. In this paper, we offer a theoretical economic analysis of the likelyimpact of military unionization on volunteer militaries. Our analysis suggests that military unionization will unam-biguously lead to larger, but less disciplined, armed forces, leaving the overall impact of unionization on defense capa-bility ambiguous. Military unionization, however, will clearly enhance social welfare.

Keywords: Unionization; Military manpower; Efficient bargaining

JEL Codes: H56; J45; J51

INTRODUCTION

Concurrent with the conversion of US armed forces to an ‘All Volunteer Force’ (AVF) backin the 1970s, there was a surge of American interest in the idea of military unionization. Muchof the debate that developed around the idea of organized military labor took place within theUnited States’ military, as illustrated by a prolific body of papers on the subject, written bystudents at America’s various command and staff colleges. Examples include Creel (1978),Easum (1982), Fagan (1977), Farrington (1976), Griesser (1972), Hagan (1975), Kramer(1977), Moskos (1977), Sime (1977), and Stites (1993). Most, though not all, of these papersexpress skepticism towards the idea of unionization. This is consistent with a 1977 survey ofattitudes towards unionization (Manley et al., 1977) in the US Air Force that found little popu-lar support for the idea.

While America’s soldiers were (and are) skeptical with regard to unionization, Americanlawmakers can only be described as intensely hostile. As a result of Public Law 95-610, legis-lation passed in November 1978, any effort to unionize the military was made a criminal offense.Soldiers who join labor unions are subject to five years of imprisonment. Civilian union orga-nizers who solicit soldiers to join unions may also be imprisoned for up to five years.1

†Corresponding author. Economics Department, Rice Hall 231, Oberlin College, OH 44074, USA.E-mail: jonathan.lipow@oberlin.edu

1 See US Code: Title 10, Subtitle A, Part II, S 996.

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12 J. LIPOW ET AL.

American hostility to military unionization was underpinned by the belief that it woulderode discipline and respect for the chain of command. Given the low morale of the USmilitary circa 1978, this was a serious and legitimate concern. Reinforcing Americananxiety were the high profile antics of a now defunct Dutch conscripts’ union, theVVDM. For example, in one annual VVDM labor action, ‘on national greeting days, thesoldiers saluted everything they met in their barracks, not only fellow soldiers, but alsostreetlights, free roaming chickens – whatever took their fancy.’2 Worse still, elements ofthe VVDM leadership were clearly associated with radical left-wing political movementsand were known advocates of conscientious objection.3 Clearly, the Americans hadenough trouble rebuilding their military as it was, and could not tolerate this kind ofshenanigans.

While the Americans rejected unionization outright, Europe – with the notable exception ofthe UK – has taken a more tolerant approach and unionization is widespread.4 For example,34 different military unions and labor associations from 22 countries are affiliated withEuromil, the umbrella organization for Europe’s military unions, and a total of 500,000soldiers are represented by its constituent organizations.5

The experience of the VVDM (and its even more radical competitor, the BVD) notwith-standing, the overall European experience with unionization seems to have been quite positive.For example, a study of Ireland’s recently unionized armed forces (Callaghan, 2006a) foundthat ‘commanders have learned that representation facilitates a better understanding of the pointof view of other ranks and increases officers’ ability to recognize problems in the making. Inreturn, soldiers’ suspicions of management motives have declined.’6 Interestingly, one of themain accomplishments of the ‘Representative Association for Commissioned Officers’(RACO) was its successful lobbying against planned cutbacks in manpower – hardly the typeof ‘labor action’ that should worry defense hawks.7

A similar study by the same author of Germany’s well-established military unions(Callaghan, 2006b) reports that military unions have been at the forefront in pushing forreforms that have enhanced Germany’s military capabilities. For example, lobbying and polit-ical pressure applied by the unions played an important role in the decision, made in 2000, toaccept female volunteers into the Bundswehr.8

As for Denmark, which has a long tradition of military unionization, Sorenson (2006)writes that ‘on the bottom line, it could be said that trade unions contribute positively to mili-tary efficiency and no one in Denmark wants to see their demise – not even their employers.’9

Furthermore, there is no evidence that unionization has eroded Denmark’s fighting spirit:‘Denmark is now one of Europe’s most willing countries to deploy her armed forces abroadin multi-national military operations.’10

Given Europe’s experience, it may be sensible to reconsider American opposition to union-ization. Before any policies or laws are changed, however, a much more rigorous analysis ofunionization’s impact on the military is required. To date, the only scholarly researchconducted on military labor organizations has been sociological case studies such as thosecited above. Economists seem to have ignored the subject.

2 Moelker (2006: 185).3 Teitler (1976: 520).4 See Bartle (2006) for a good discussion of Great Britain’s hostility to military unionization.5 Interested readers should visit Euromil’s website at www.euromil.com.6 Callaghan (2006a: 127).7 Callaghan (2006a: 128).8 Callaghan (2006b: 172).9 Sorenson (2006: 210).10 Sorenson (2006: 199).

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MILITARY UNIONS 13

The objective of this paper is to offer what is, to the best of our knowledge, the first theo-retical economic analysis of the likely impact of military unionization on social welfare andcombat capability. The core analytical methods applied are more or less standard. We assumethat the government’s objective is the maximization of social welfare, that the union’s objec-tive is the maximization of welfare for its members, and that any labor agreement would bethe product of ‘efficient bargaining’, an extremely popular approach to the modeling of collec-tive bargaining that assumes that such agreements will result in Pareto efficient agreements.11

This paper has four sections. In the next section, we determine the number of soldiers thatthe government would recruit in the absence of unionization, as well as the discipline level thatthe government would choose for the armed forces. We argue that under what we believe arereasonable conditions, the government will recruit too small an army relative to the social opti-mum, and will also set too high a level of discipline relative to the level that would maximizeaggregate social welfare. In the third section, we then show that if the soldiers recruited in thesecond section establish a union, any Pareto efficient labor agreement between that union andthe government will result in an increase in the size of the armed forces, even if the union’sonly objective is to enhance the welfare of its original members. In the final section, weconclude the paper and highlight some of its implications for public policy.

THE MODEL

Consider the problem facing a government that must raise an army. It must recruit troopsfrom a limited pool of young people that are both: (i) sufficiently intellectually talented, phys-ically healthy, and emotionally mature to be able to serve as soldiers; and (ii) willing to do soif the wage and conditions that the government offers to secure their services are sufficientlyattractive.

When a suitable recruit joins the army, they earn the wage, w, that is offered by the govern-ment. The new recruit enjoys a level of utility dictated by this wage as well as the total numberof serving troops, q, and the level of discipline imposed on soldiers, e. Let v(w, q, e) be a poten-tial recruit’s willingness to accept employment as a soldier (that is, the dollar value to the indi-vidual of serving with a pay level of w in an army of size q and discipline level e). Since thevalue of money is equal to itself, vw equals one.

We assume that vq is greater than zero, while vqq is less than zero. Our assumption thatvq > 0 reflects the idea that soldiers prefer to serve in larger and stronger armies. There are anumber of reasons for this. One argument is based on the attrition models articulated inLancaster (1916) and still widely used in the modeling of military conflicts. In Lancaster’smodel, the probability of a combatant being killed or wounded, which clearly represents aform of disutility, declines as the size of the force she belongs to increases. A similar, butless mechanistic, argument is that larger armies tend to prevail on the battlefield, and thatnothing produces more disutility for soldiers than being on the losing side of a conflict(besides being killed). Empirical studies, such as Rotte and Schmidt (2003), support thisargument: ‘our estimation results indicate that numerical superiority has retained its crucialrole for battlefield performance throughout history.’12 Another related argument is thatlarger armies are more likely to deter enemies in the first place, so that service in a suffi-ciently powerful military force may involve little or no actual combat. Finally, soldiers whoserve in larger armies are likely to enjoy a slower tempo of operations. For example, the USmilitary’s current need to deploy troops to Iraq for 15 month tours has been made necessary

11 For an excellent review of the efficient bargaining literature, see Kaufman (2002).12 Rotte and Schmidt (2003: 175).

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14 J. LIPOW ET AL.

by the small size of America’s armed forces. There is no doubt that soldiers and their fami-lies would be happier if American troops spent more time ‘stateside’.

Next, we assume that ve < 0 and vee < 0. Later in the paper, we will also assume that militarypower rises with the value of e. It is, of course, possible for discipline levels to be set so lowthat soldiers would be better off under stricter conditions or for discipline to be so absurdlydraconian that the public would be better defended if standards were relaxed. Neither of thesepossibilities, however, is Pareto efficient, so we are in effect assuming that observed values ofe will always be in a Pareto efficient range, where a change in discipline benefits one party buthurts the other.

Now, in the interest of simplicity and tractability, let us assume that each potential recruithas a reservation level of income, θ, and that the value of θ is distributed uniformly between0 and 1 for the population of potential recruits. The value of θ is dictated by the potentialrecruit’s suitability for civilian employment, and hence also defines the recruit’s type. As aresult of these assumptions, the supply curve for military labor will be upward sloping. All elseequal, the government will have to raise wages if it wants to increase the size of the army. Webelieve this makes sense since the military, while not a labor monopsonist, is a very largeemployer of young people. We will assume that there is nothing dangerous or distasteful aboutcivilian work, hence:

for all values of θ.Each potential recruit has two alternatives – she can join the army or she can join the private

sector and receive θ. She will join the army if her resulting level of utility is greater than orequal to the level she would have enjoyed in the private sector. Hence, for a given wage w anddiscipline level e, any potential recruit who would enjoy greater utility as a soldier than as acivilian will join the army:

Since θ is uniformly distributed, the resultant number of recruits, q = q(w, e) will equal .Substituting for q in equation (2) we find that in equilibrium:

From differentiation of both sides of this identity with respect to w we see how the size of thearmy will change as wages increase:

From differentiation of both sides of this identity with respect to e we see how the size of thearmy will change as discipline increases:

Note that must be positive and must be negative, since for all values of v less than orequal to one, v q must be less than one, since marginal utility cannot exceed total utility, whileequation (1) assures that all observed values of v will always be less than or equal to one.

v q e( , , ) ( )θ θ< 1

v w q e( , , ) ( )≥ θ 2

θθ

v w q w e e q w e( , ( , ), ) ( , ) ( )≡ 3

θw ww

q

qv

v ( )= =

−>

10 4a

θe ee

q

qv

v ( )= =

−<

10 4b

θw θe

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MILITARY UNIONS 15

Now, let us consider the behavior of the government in the absence of unionization. We willassume that the government’s objective is to maximize social welfare, SW, and that the policyparameters available to the government are to set the wage offered to, and discipline levelrequired of, recruits. Let B equal the benefits that the public enjoys as a result of the army’smilitary power. We will assume that B is a function of q and e. We further assume that Bq > 0while Bqq < 0 and that Be > 0 while Bee < 0. Note that the values of θ associated with eachrecruit do not affect B. In effect, we are assuming that all recruits contribute equally to militarypower, regardless of their type.13

Let C equal the social cost of paying the wage bill, wq(w, e), required to fund the army.Since paying soldiers $1 must cost at least $1 to the public, and in addition there will inevitablybe dead weight losses associated with non-lump sum taxation, we assume that Cwq > 1 whileCwq,wq > 0.

The government’s social welfare problem can be expressed as:

The social welfare function represented by equation (5) specifically ignores any benefits orcosts accruing to soldiers as a result of their service. It is, of course, debatable whether politicalleaders ignore the welfare impact of their decisions on soldiers, but there are a number ofreasons why we believe this may be the case. First, there are clearly situations where soldiers– particularly combat soldiers – have been drawn from relatively disenfranchised groups.There are also, even today, foreign ‘mercenary’ units such as the British Gurkhas or the FrenchForeign Legion.

Of far more importance, however, is that governments that ignore the welfare impact oftheir military decisions on soldiers enjoy major strategic advantages over those that take amore ‘holistic’ approach to defense planning. The use of force always involves considerabledisutility for participants. Governments that are inclined to ignore that disutility are more diffi-cult to deter and their threats of military force are more credible. Hence, it can be argued thatunder reasonable conditions, governments ought to ignore the welfare of soldiers whenmaking military planning decisions.

Let (w*, e*) be the wage and discipline pair that maximizes equation (5), and let θ* equalthe resultant number of recruits. Then (w*, e*) are the values of w and e that would solve:

and

Now, let us identify the global social optimum, a calculation that incorporates both SW as wellas the costs and benefits that accrue to soldiers from military service. The equation for globalsocial welfare, GSW, is given by:

where the last term on the right-hand side represents the economic rents enjoyed by militarypersonnel. The derivatives of GSW with respect to w and e are given by:

13 Relaxation of this assumption does not materially alter the results established in this paper.

max ( , ), ( , ) ( ) ,wrt w e

SW B q w e e C wq w e= ( ) − ( ) 5

B q C wq qq w wq w ( ) ( )− × + = 0 6

B q B C wqq e e wq e ( )+ − × = 0 7

GSW B q w e e C wq w e v w q w e eq w e

( , ), ( , ) , ( , ), ( )( , )

= ( ) − ( ) + ( ) −[ ]∫ θ θ0

8d

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16 J. LIPOW ET AL.

Next, let us evaluate the value of equation (9) and (10) at (w*, e*). By definition, equals

zero at (w*, e*). The value of v(w, q(w, e), e) – q(w, e) also equals zero at (w*, e*), since equa-tion (2) assures that the values of both v and q are θ* for the marginal recruit. The remaining

term of the expression in equation (9), , must be positive, since vw, vq, and

qw are all positive, and the remaining term of the expression in equation (10),

, must be negative, since ve and qe are negative while vq is positive.

Hence, we conclude that the government will set, relative to the global social optimum, toolow a wage and too high a discipline level for military recruits, and that as a result, the armywill be too small to maximize global social welfare. This is clearly inefficient. To be sure, thisresult depends on the assumption we make regarding the specification of the government’sobjective function. If the government’s objective function is given by equation (8), rather thanequation (5), then the government’s optimization decision must, by definition, maximizeglobal social welfare.

UNIONIZATION

Now, consider a situation in which the θ * soldiers recruited by the government organizethemselves into a labor union. We will assume that the union’s sole objective is to enhance thewelfare of its existing members. We will also assume that the labor union will be ‘weak’, inthe sense that it can only exert a small marginal influence on government decisions regardingwages and discipline.

There are a number of justifications underpinning our assumption that military unions willgenerally be weak. First, the most potent weapon available to unions is the threat of strikes,yet most European military unions are explicitly forbidden to call work stoppages, and noneof those that theoretically have the right to strike have ever dared even to threaten to do so.Second, any military union is likely to face high membership turnover. Most union memberswill only belong to the union for several years, following which – as civilians – they will findthemselves benefiting if the government, rather than the union, prevails in any labor confron-tation. Hence, any military union is unlikely to be characterized by a high degree of laborsolidarity.

The military labor union has three possible strategies – it may demand a higher wage for itscurrent members; it may demand alleviation of the harsh discipline imposed on existingsoldiers; or it may demand an increase in the size of the army. If it demands a larger army, thegovernment will have to recruit more troops, something that both the government and theunion understand can only be achieved by raising wages and/or reducing the discipline level.

The ultimate agreement that emerges between the government and the union will be theresult of some unspecified bargaining process. As mentioned above, however, it is widely

dGSW

dw

dSW

dwv v q v w q w e e q w e qw q w

q w e

w= + +[ ] + ( ) −[ ]∫ , ( , ), ( , ) ( )( , )

0

9dθ

dGSW

de

dSW

dev v q v w q w e e q w e qe q e

q w e

e= + +[ ] + ( ) −[ ]∫ , ( , ), ( , ) ( )( , )

0

10dθ

d

d

SW

w

v v qw q w

q w e

+[ ]∫ dθ0

( , )

v v qe q e

q w e

+[ ]∫ dθ0

( , )

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MILITARY UNIONS 17

believed that collective bargaining agreements are generally Pareto efficient. Based on this,we now show that any Pareto efficient outcome to the bargaining process involving a smallenhancement of the welfare of soldiers – the type of small enhancement likely to be gained bya weak union – requires that the union demand and receive an increase in the number ofsoldiers recruited relative to θ* rather than an outright increase in pay or reduction in disci-pline. In order to demonstrate this point, we now show that, when evaluated at θ*, the welfareof serving soldiers can be enhanced at a lower cost to the public by adding an additional recruitthan by raising the wage of, or reducing the discipline level required of, existing soldiers.

Let equal the increase in social welfare enjoyed by existing troops if the wage is raisedby the dw′ required to recruit one additional soldier. Then is given by:

Let equal the increase in social welfare enjoyed by existing troops if the disciplinedecreases by the de′ required to recruit one additional soldier. Then is given by:

Now, let dw′ be the wage increase required to increase the utility of existing union membersby if there is no increase in the size of the army. Then dw′ solves:

Similarly, let de′ be the reduction in discipline required to increase the utility of existing unionmembers by if there is no increase in the size of the army. Then de′ solves:

Clearly, the union is indifferent between equations (11) and (13), and indifferent betweenequations (12) and (14). Pareto optimality, therefore, implies that if it is less expensive to thepublic to finance situations (11) or (12) relative to situations (13) and (14) respectively, thenthe most efficient approach is to increase the size of the military.

Let represent the welfare change accruing to the public if the wage is raised by dw′.

Then, will be:

Let represent the welfare change accruing to the public if discipline decreases by de′.

Then, will be:

PWw'

PWw'

PW v w w q w w e ew

q w w e

' * ' * ' * *

( , )

, ( , ), ( )

* '

= + +( ) −[ ]+

∫ d d d

d

θ θ0

11

PWe'

PWe'

PW v w q w e e e ee

q w e e

' * * * ' * '

( , )

, ( , ), ( )

* * '

= − −( ) −[ ]−

∫ d d d

d

θ θ0

12

PWe'

PW v w w q w e ew

q w e

' * " * * *

( , )

, ( , ), ( )

* *

= +( ) −[ ]∫ d dθ θ0

13

PWe'

PW v w q w e e ee

q w e

' * * * * "

( , )

, ( , ), ( )

* *

= −( ) −[ ]∫ d dθ θ0

14

LSWw'

LSWw'

LSW B q C wq q ww q w wq w' '

* ( ) ( )= − +[ ]d 15

LSWe'

LSWe'

LSW B q B C wq ee q e e wq e' ' ( ) ( )*= + −[ ] −d 16

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18 J. LIPOW ET AL.

Evaluated at (w*, e*), equations (6) and (7) assure that the value of equations (15) and (16)

will be zero. Now, let be the welfare change accruing to the public if the wage is raisedby dw″ while no additional soldiers are recruited:

Let be the welfare change accruing to the public if discipline decreases by de″ whileno additional soldiers are recruited:

Clearly, and are negative, while and equal zero. Hence, any suffi-ciently small Pareto efficient transfer of welfare from the public to existing soldiers requiresthat the union and the government agree to expand the army beyond the level that the govern-ment would have chosen in the absence of unionization. This expansion could be achieved byraising wages and/or lowering the level of discipline in the military. The government wouldbe indifferent between the two alternatives as both equations (15) and (16) equal zero whenevaluated at w* and e*.

Since the government’s initial social welfare optimization resulted in too small an armyas well as excessive discipline, a weak union’s existence clearly would enhance socialwelfare. As for combat capability, it is clear that the impact of a weak labor union is ambig-uous. On the one hand, the reduction in discipline would lower fighting capability, while onthe other, a larger army is also a more capable one. We suspect, however, that in practiceunionization of the military would not only enhance social welfare, but national security aswell. The reason for this is that it seems much easier to adjust wages than to alter disciplin-ary standards.

Armies are notoriously conservative organizations, and it is unlikely that any political deci-sion to alter the service conditions of soldiers would translate into any meaningful near-termchange in the military’s corporate culture. After all, we are talking about changing the workingrelationships at the individual level in organizations with hundreds of thousands of workers.Hence, the likely ‘line of least resistance’ for a government that needs to recruit more soldierswould be simply to raise wages. If that is the case, then the presence of a military union unam-biguously would lead to a stronger military.14

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, a theoretical case can be made that strongly suggests that unionization of avolunteer military is likely to enhance social welfare and possibly even combat capability.Given this theoretical analysis, as well as the working experience of military unions in othercountries as recounted in the case studies cited above, it is clear that, from a purelyeconomic perspective, currently non-unionized volunteer armies such as those of the UnitedStates and Great Britain should give serious thought to the introduction of representative

14 This prediction is consistent with empirical research on the impact of unionization on police and fire depart-ments, paramilitary organizations that superficially resemble militaries. For example, in the most recent study ofunionization of public safety personnel, Trejo (1991) found no reduction in discipline, but reports on p. 170 that ‘allelse equal, fully unionized police forces are about 12% larger that non-union forces, while unionization appears toincrease the size of fire department by 37%’.

LSWw"

LSW C wq w e q w e ww wq" * * * *( , ) ( , ) ( )= − ( )[ ]d " 17

LSWe"

LSW B q w e e e B q w e e ee e e" * * * * "( , ), ( ) ( , ), ( )= [ ] − = − [ ]d d" 18

LSWw" LSWe

" LSWw" LSWe

'

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MILITARY UNIONS 19

labor organizations into their armed forces. As a start, American laws that outlaw efforts toorganize military unions should be reconsidered.

Of course politicians, not economists, set government policy, and there are some well-defined political obstacles to military unionization in the US and the UK. The first is statusquo bias – the inevitable resistance to tinkering with critical institutions that may not be work-ing perfectly, but are functioning ‘well enough’. Advocates of military unionization wouldalso have to contend with the negative perception of unions in general in the US and the UK.For Great Britain in particular, the historic association of the organized labor movement withleft-wing politics could prove an obstacle.

Finally, while we believe that the welfare benefits of unionization outweigh its costs, thosebenefits are enjoyed by a small group, while the majority of the public remains better off inthe absence of unionization. Hence, from a median voter perspective, unionization would bea political ‘loser’. Of course, most political economists believe that small but well-definedinterest groups enjoy distinct lobbying advantages relative to the diffuse interests of the publicat large, but it is not clear that, in the absence of a union, soldiers could organize any mean-ingful political lobby. As a result of all these factors, military unionization – although econom-ically justified – will likely remain a political non-starter in the US and the UK for theforeseeable future.

References

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Callaghan, J. (2006a) Unions in the Irish defense forces: from struggle for representation to mutually beneficial coop-eration. In Military Unionism in the Post-War Era: A Future Reality, edited by R. Bartle and L. Heinecken.London: Routledge.

Callaghan, J. (2006b) Unions and the German armed forces: the citizen in uniform. In Military Unionism in thePost-War Era: A Future Reality, edited by R. Bartle and L. Heinecken. London: Routledge.

Creel, J. (1978) Collective action in the armed forces. Unpublished manuscript. Monterrey, CA: Naval Post GraduateSchool.

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