Shia of Saudi Arabia

8/13/2019 Shia of Saudi Arabia

1/19

British Society for Middle Eastern Studies

The Shia of Saudi Arabia: A Minority in Search of Cultural AuthenticityAuthor(s): Madawi al-RasheedReviewed work(s):Source: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (May, 1998), pp. 121-138Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/195850.

Accessed: 10/09/2012 16:42

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Taylor & Francis, Ltd.andBritish Society for Middle Eastern Studiesare collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,

preserve and extend access toBritish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancishttp://www.jstor.org/stable/195850?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/195850?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancis


2/19

British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (1998), 25(1), 121-138

h e h i a o a u d i A r a b i aMinor i ty n S e a r c h o ul tura luthenticity

MADAWI AL-RASHEED*

ABSTRACTThis articlefocuses on the transformation f Saudi ShiCa esistancefrom one which centred on military confrontationin the 1980s to one whichinvokes searching for cultural authenticity (al-asala al-shiciyya) in the 1990s.Todaythe struggleof the Shica or equal statusamong the Sunnimajoritydrawsattentionto the attemptsof ShiCantellectualsto write their own regionalhistory.Shicaintellectualsand oppositionleaders deconstructofficial representationsofthemselves and provide alternative historical narratives which anchor theircommunity n Saudi history and society, thus dismissing suggestions that theyare a non-indigenouscommunity.This article examines Shicahistorical narra-tives in an attemptto understandthe transformationn their struggle againstdiscrimination n Saudi Arabia.IntroductionThe transformation f Saudi Shicaoppositionfrom militaryconfrontationn the1980s to the quest for culturalauthenticity n the 1990s has not attracted heattentionof scholars.The sparseliteratureon this communitytends to concen-trate on the open and violent confrontations n the early 1980s.1 Such overt*Lecturer n Social Anthropology,Dept of Theology and Religious Studies, King's College, University ofLondon, London,UK. This article drawson a joint researchprojectconductedby the author and LoulouwaAl-Rasheed.This involved interviewingShi'a opposition leaders in London in 1992-1993. InterviewswereconductedwithHamzaal Hasanand 'Abdul AmirMusa,two active leadersof the opposition.An earlierversionof this article was presented n a Workshopon Minorities n the Middle Eastorganizedby the CarstenNiebuhrInstitute or Near EasternStudies,Universityof Copenhagen n 1996. I thankthe contributors o the workshopfor theircomments.Also I thank heanonymousBJMESrefereesfor theirconstructive riticismandsuggestions,some of which have been addressed n this article.1Researchon the SaudiShi'a remainsvery limited. In the 1980s, a numberof referencesto their mobilizationwere included in some books and articles on Saudi Arabia. See W. Quandt,Saudi Arabia in the 1980's(Washington,DC: BrookingsInstitution,1981);J. Buchan,'SecularandReligious Opposition n SaudiArabia',in T. Niblock (ed.), State, Societyand Economy n Saudi Arabia (London:CroomHelm, 1982), pp. 106-124;J. Bill, 'Islam,Politics,andShi'ism in the Gulf,' MiddleEastInsight,3 (1980);J. Goldberg, The Shi'i Minority

in SaudiArabia,' n J. Cole andN. Keddie(eds), Shiismand Social Protest (New York:Yale UniversityPress,1986), pp.230-246; J.Kostiner, Shi'i Unrest n theGulf,' in M. Kramered.),Shi'ism,Resistanceand Revolution(Colorado:Westview Press, 1987), pp. 173-186. The Shi'a are also mentionedin researchon Saudi-Iranianrelations;see I. Leverrier, L'ArabieSaoudite,Le Pelerinageet L'Iran,'Cahiers d'Etudessur La MediterraneeOrientaleset Le MondeTurco-Iranien, 2 (1996), pp. 111-147; and Y. Richard,L'lslam Chi'ite CroyancesetIdeologies (Paris:Fayard,1991).1353-0194/98/010121-18 ? 1998 BritishSociety for MiddleEasternStudies


3/19

MADAWI AL-RASHEEDconfrontationsare no longerthe mainstrategyof the Shi'a opposition.There hasbeen a shift towardsmore subtle forms of resistance,led by Shi'a intellectualsand oppositionleaders who assertwhat they call al-asdla al-shiliyya, (culturalauthenticity).In this article,I consider the searchfor culturalauthenticityas amechanism for asserting the group's identity by drawing on cultural andhistoricalelements. This assertionhas come to replacedirect confrontationswiththe regime, thus allowing resistance to take place at the level of culturalcontestation.While the relationshipbetween the Saudi Shi'a and the Sunni majorityhasalways been characterizedby violence and conflict,2the greatestconfrontationwith the Saudigovernment ook place after the success of the Islamicrevolutionin Iran.In 1979, the Shi'a took to the streetsduringthe cashura to mournthedeathof theirmartyrs,HasanandHussein,a practiceforbiddenby the state andconfined to the privatesphereof Shi'a homes since 1913. The state dispatched20,000 National Guardsoldiersto dispersethe mourners.3n the following year(1980) the Saudi Shi'a organizeda largedemonstration nd a series of strikesinQatif to celebrate the firstanniversaryof the returnof Imam Khomeini to Iran.This became an occasion to voice their discontentover their status as secondclass citizens in Saudi Arabia. Demonstrationswere repressedby the Saudiauthoritiesand the NationalGuard, eadingto a numberof deathsin the region.The Shi'aremember he events as intif.dat al-min.taqa l-sharqiyya(theuprisingof the EasternProvince),4a symbol of the repressionwhich the communityhadhistorically been subjected to. The Organizationof Islamic Revolution (Mu-naz.zamat l-thawraal-islamiyya),a clandestineShi'a organizationrepresentingthe community in the Eastern Province, began to take shape as the politicaloutlet for the groupfollowing the spontaneousevents of 1979-1980. Member-ship of the Organizationwas drawn from students n the Universityof Mineralsand Petroleum (Dammam) and workers at the oil company, ARAMCO. TheOrganizationbegan broadcastingfrom Iranianradio stations in an attempttoreachthe communityin Saudi Arabia,and an informationoffice was opened inTehranto co-ordinatepolitical activities.5While the Organizationdenies thepatronageof Iran, t is proudof the fact thatit has become a focal pointfor otherShicain the Gulf (mainly in Kuwait,Bahrainand the United ArabEmirates).Itinsists that theiroppositionis an indigenousresponseto political conditions inSaudiArabia,although t is clear that the supportof Iranand its adoptionof themovementplayed a crucialrole in the intensificationof conflict with the Saudigovernment n the early 1980s.2 Referencesto the tension between the Wahhabisandthe Shi'a in the eighteenthandnineteenthcenturiesarefoundin C. Doughty,Travels n ArabiaDeserta,2 vols. (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1979);G. A.Wallin, 'Narrativeof a Journey rom Cairoto MedinaandMecca, by Suez, Araba,Tawila,al-Jauf,Jublae,HailandNegd in 1845,' Journalof theRoyal GeographicalSociety,1854,243, pp. 115-201; W. C. Palgrave,Personal

Narrativeof a Year'sJourney hroughCentraland EasternArabia(1862-1863), 2 vols (London:MacmillanandCo., 1865);andJ. Philby,SaudiArabia(London:Benn, 1955).For a quicksummaryof the events of this period,see Goldberg,'The Shi'i Minority'.3 Goldberg,'The Shi'i Minority', pp. 240-241.4 Hamza al-Hasanreferred o the event of 1979 in this manner n his book and duringthe interviewsession.5 Personal nterviewwith Hamzaal-Hasan,January1993.122


4/19

THE SHI'A OF SAUDI ARABIAAfter the confrontationsof 1979-1980, the Saudi state realized that a prag-matic approach o the Shi'a problemwould be more beneficial. Officialsvisiting

the region immediately after these events openly recognized the social andeconomicprivationof the communityandpromisedto improvethe educational,health and economic infrastructuref Shi'a towns.6An assessment of the Shi'a opposition in the 1990s shows that economicdevelopmentin the region did not immediately succeed in pacifying the Shi'aand winning their allegiance. Economic development did appeal to the tra-ditional Shi'a leadership,who were satisfied with the promises of the state.However,they did not succeed in pacifyingthe young Shi'a activists,who wereinfluencedby the risingtide of political Islam in the Middle East, and looked toIran for inspiration.7Young Shi'a activists, who were behind the riots of1979-1980 opted for exile, where they established their headquarterso chal-lenge the state.This articleinvestigatesthe shift in Shi'a tactics by examining Shi'a journal-istic and historical narratives n which their culturalauthenticity s established.Three sources are used. First,the monthly magazineal-JazTra l-'Arabiyya TheArabianPeninsula),8published by the Shi'a opposition in London until 1993,was one of the most systematic publicationsof this opposition.It incorporatedthe views of the oppositionand differed from other sourcesowing to the qualityof its content and its regular appearanceover three years. Second, Hamzaal-Hasan's two volumes on the historyof the Saudi Shi'a are consulted becausethey representthe most recent version of Shi'a historiography,writtenby anhistorian and political activist.9His historical account is a unique attempttorepresent he community's past and presentfrom the perspectiveof an insider.Although these sources were officially outside the reach of the Saudi Shi'abecause of the ban on opposition literature,they worried the governmentsufficientlythat when the oppositionreconciledwith the stateearlyin the 1990s,one of the state's conditions was that the magazinecease publicationand whatthe state regards as 'hostile literature'be suspended.?1However, it remainsdifficult to assess whether the magazineand al-Hasan's narrativeshave reacheda wide public in Saudi Arabia. One can speculatethat such literaturedid attractthe attentionof not only the SaudiShi'a but also otherSaudicitizens, given thegovernment'sconcern about their appearance.They were widely available inbookshops and newsagents in London and Arab countries such as Syria andLebanon.Third,a number of interviews were conducted with Shi'a oppositionleadersduring their exile in London. These interviews provided an opportunitytodiscuss the content of the opposition's publicationsand clarify their position6

Goldberg,'The Shi'i Minority',p. 243.7 Personal nterview with Hamzaal-Hasan,1993.8 Al-JazTra l-'Arabiyya(1991-1993), 1-31 (London).9 Hamza al-Hasan,al-Shl'a ft al-Mamlakaal-'Arabiyyaal-Sa'udiyya,2 vols (Mu'assasatal-Baqi li-Ihya'al-Turath,1993).10Personal nterview with AbdulAmirMusa,January1993.123


5/19

MADAWI AL-RASHEED

regardingurgentpolitical matters.I will arguethat the apparentabsenceof openconflict with the state at presentdoes not indicate the pacificationof the Shi'acommunity.While violence remainsan option,in the 1990s the Shi'ahave so farappearedto express their opposition as a cultural contestationreflectingtheirconcern as a minority in Saudi Arabia.Resistance to domination by powerless groups takes various forms andaggression may not be the only feasible option. Scott, the political scientist,discusses alternative forms of resistance in situations whereby open con-frontationresults in high casualties,which powerless groups cannot tolerate.1One such option is the articulationof what Scott calls the 'hiddentranscripts'.In these 'hidden transcripts',the subordinategroups usually articulate ideaswhich 'reverse' and 'negate' those generatedby the dominant group. Theyconsist of speeches, gestures,rituals and practicesoften taking place off-stagebeyond direct observationby power holders. They also include narrativesanddiscourseschallengingpowerrelationsof domination.Scott shows how 'hiddentranscripts' may not remain 'hidden' as they erupt into the public realm.He arguesthat 'momentsof challengeandopendefiancetypically provokeeithera swift strokeof repressionor, if unanswered,often lead to furtherwords andacts of daring'.12 'Breaking the silence', that is, the eruption of the hiddendiscourse into the public sphere,is a moment which generatesits own politicalelectricity,not only for the individual whose discourseentersthe public sphere,but also for the collectivity, the subordinategroup that shares this discourse.13The subjective power of this moment is compoundedby a collective sense ofsatisfaction.Scott's importantanalysisof the resistance of subordinate roupshas attractedthe attentionof those anthropologistswho have traditionallypreoccupiedthem-selves with investigating ocal responsesto domination.Althoughhis conceptof'hiddentranscripts'has been criticized andrevised,'4his generalline of reason-ing seems to providean analyticalframework or the interpretation f the shiftin Shi'a resistance.Shi'a narrativesabout their authenticityand their historicaland social place in Saudi society can be regarded as 'hidden transcripts',increasinglyfinding their way into the public sphere.Although Shi'a publica-tions are banned in Saudi Arabia (they are usually published in other Arabcountriesand Europe, mainly in London),they have reachedclandestinemem-bers of the community n Saudi Arabia andabroad.These publicationsarticulatean alternativehistoricalnarrative o that which is propagatedby Saudi officialdiscourse.The latter has condemned the Shi'a because of theirreligiousbeliefsand practices, which do not conform to Wahhabism, the official religiousideology of the state. Shi'anarratives,herefore,reverse these representations f11J.Scott,Dominationand theArtsofResistanceHiddenTranscriptsNew Haven:YaleUniversityPress,1990).12 Ibid., p. 19.13 Ibid., p. 206.14S. Gall, 'LanguageandtheArts of Resistance',CulturalAnthropology,1995, 10(3),pp.407-424 andD. Kulick,'Causinga Commotion:PublicScandalas ResistanceamongBrazilianTransgendered rostitutes,'AnthropologyToday, 12(3) (1996), pp. 3-7.124


6/19

THE SHI'A OF SAUDI ARABIAthemselves and articulate their history in a way that aims to correct what theycall 'the misrepresentation of their community, religion and history'. 1 Examin-ing Shi'a narratives allows us to investigate how this minority resists byarticulating an alternative discourse, whose main objective is to create a spacefor themselves in a society which so far has deprived them of religious andpolitical rights, social recognition and economic prosperity. The narratives oftheir historians and intellectuals resemble what Scott calls 'cooked declarations'.According to him, these are:

more likely to be nuanced and elaborate because they arise under circumstances inwhich there is a good deal of off-stage freedom among subordinate groups, allowingthem to share a rich and deep hidden transcript.In a sense, the hidden transcriptof suchsubordinate groups is already a product of mutual communication that already has aquasi-public existence.6

The exile of Shi'a opposition intellectuals allows the production of 'cookeddeclarations' on the pages of a press beyond the control of the Saudi govern-ment. The mobilizing capacity of these declarations cannot be underestimatedbecause in Scott's words 'at the level of political beliefs, anger, and dreams theyare a social explosion'.17

Shi'a Opposition Discourse: 'Return to Ibn Khaldun'The monthly magazine al-Jazfra al-'Arabiyyawas perhaps one of the mostconsistent publications containing the discourse of the Organization of theIslamic Revolution, which since 1992 has been known as al-haraka al-islahiyya(The Reform Movement). It represented the views of the movement's leadership.While the magazine systematically exposed the physical and symbolic violenceof the Saudi state against members of the Shi'a community (by reproducing thereports of international human rights agencies), its exiled London-based editorialboard tried to combine their direct attacks on the regime with quasi-academicdiscourse. In its search for credibility, the magazine contained leading articles bydistinguished Shi'a writers and activists, including among others, Abdullahal-Hasan, Tawfiq al-Sheikh, Abdul al Amir Musa, and Hamza al-Hasan.One interesting and recurrent theme developed by the editorial board(founders and active members of The Reform Movement), was reference to thetheories of Ibn Khaldun, the fourteenth century north African scholar. In hisanalysis of Muslim politics, Ibn Khaldun emphasized the segmentary nature oftribal and nomadic societies, which in his opinion were responsible for thecyclical pattern of dynastic rise and fall.18 Ibn Khaldun condemned the15Personal interview with Hamzaal-Hasan,1993.16 Scott, Domination,p. 216.17Ibid., p. 227.18 IbnKhaldun,TheMuqqadimah.AnIntroductionoHistory, rans.F. Rosenthal,N. J. Dawood(eds) (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1967).

125


7/19

MADAWI AL-RASHEED'bedouins' for their alleged continuous raids on the centres of civilization (theoases and cities of the region). He held them responsiblefor the instability ofdynasticrule.However,he highlightedthe crucialrole of theirmilitaryskills andmore importantlytheir kinship solidarity, 'asabiyya, which if combined withreligious zeal, tend to create favourablegroundfor the foundationof dynasties.In brief,he characterizedMuslim politics as a succession of dynasties,foundedby bedouin chiefs, who combine their tribal solidaritywith religious zeal toestablish centralizedpolities with a lifespannot exceeding three or four genera-tions. As bedouins establish theirpower and authorityover the oases, they tendto become lax, thus losing the purityof desert society. They eventuallybecomecorruptas they indulge themselves in the luxuriesof sedentary ife. This resultsin the disintegration f theirpolitical powerunderpressure rom a new andfresh'asabiyya.Ibn Khaldun'sdescriptionof the bedouins oscillates between admirationandcondemnation.He praisesthe social cohesion of the bedouins and theirmilitarymight. These two qualities allow the bedouins to play the role of foundersofdynasties. However, these same qualities, in his opinion, predisposed thebedouinsto destroycivilization.Ibn Khaldun's mages of the bedouinsappealtosome contributors o al-Jazrraal-'Arabiyyaas they providea framework or theanalysisof modernSaudihistoryand the rise of the Wahhabimovement,whichso far condemned the Shi'a and depicted them as ahl al-bida' (innovators).Above all, Ibn Khaldun'semphasison the importanceof the alliance betweenreligionandbedouincasabiyyaas a foundation or dynasticruleseems to explainthe establishmentof the Saudi state. Moreover the conceptof 'asabiyyais usedto analyse the dominationof the Najdi elite over othergroupsin modern SaudiArabia.In a leaderarticle,Abdullahal-Hasancriticizes theregimefor promoting ribal'asabiyya and for promoting regionalism and sectarianism at the expense ofdeveloping a unifying national and religious identity in the country.Above all,he emphasizes the cultural,political and religious dominationof Najd and itsSaudi-Wahhabiallies over the rest of the Arabian Peninsula, including theEasternProvince,the Hijaz andAsir.19 n his view, a Najdi identity,(al-hawiyyaal-najdiyya)did not crystallize until the rise of the Wahhabi movement in theeighteenth century. Until that date, the 'Najdis' consisted of bedouin tribeswhose internal cohesion compensatedfor lack of overarching dentity. Whilebedouinsresentedand despised the city dwellers of the oases and cities of theHijazandthe Easternprovince,the latterreciprocatedandregarded he bedouinsas 'uncivilized', 'poor'and 'in a stateof savagery'.This line of argument learlyreiterates he famous Ibn Khaldunianmodel anduncriticallyadoptsits premises.Abdullahal Hasan concludesthat the Wahhabimovement transformed he Najdibedouins andgave thema unitywhichtheyused as a weaponagainstother tribalgroupsand city dwellers, in areassurroundingNajd. This was laterperpetuatedby consistent Saudi policies to marginalize importantregional identitiesin the19Al-Jazrraal-'Arabiyya,16 (1992), pp. 12-18.126


8/19

THE SHI'A OF SAUDI ARABIA

Hijaz where a more established traditionof sedentarizationand civility hadexisted and in al Hasa,especially amongthe agriculturalShi'apopulation.In hisopinion, a geographicalschism between al-ddkhil (the interior,i.e. Najd) andal-sahil (the coastal areas) was transformed nto a political and social schismwherebythe Najdi populationand its ruling religio-politicalelite enforcedtheirdominationover the rest of the countrythanksto the powerof Wahhabidogma.Again Ibn Khaldun's emphasis on the crucial role of religious ideology isreiteratedhere.The legacy of Ibn Khaldunpermeatesother articles in the magazine.Tawfiqal Sheikh asserts a pattern n modern Saudi history whereby the rise of Saudihegemony was accompaniedby a deliberateattemptto destroyal-madfna(thecity) not only physicallybut socially andculturally,especially in the Hijaz.20Hestates that 'the fall of Jiddah o the bedouin forces of King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saudin January1926 represents he unofficialcollapse of civility and the triumphofthe bedouinway of life, which became the dominant orce between the Red Seaand the ArabianGulf'.21 While acknowledgingthatIbn Saudwas not a bedouin(his ancestors had been settled firstin Deraiyyaand laterin Riyadh),he assertsthat the bedouin social organizationand ethos were too strong to subdue. Hearguesthat Ibn Saud's failureto attract he allegianceof city dwellers led to hisreliance on al-badiya (the bedouins) for the consolidation of his rule. Thisresulted in the triumphof the 'bedouin/tribalmodel of social and politicalrelations', which was transformedinto a state ideology insensitive to theidentities of cities and their culturalheritage.One of the consequencesof thistriumph,in al Sheikh's view, was the marginalizationof al muthaqqaf,theintellectual,a productof city life. Al Sheikh observes that this marginalizationwas severe not only in the Hijazbut also in al Hasa,bothof which hadimportantintellectualtraditions.According to al Sheikh, the consolidation of the Saudistate in the thirties led to the reductionof intellectual activities because of theflightof intellectualsto other countriesor their retreatand isolationin their owncities. It is clear that al Sheikh's analysisof the alleged dwindlingof intellectuallife in Saudi Arabia mmediatelyafter the establishmentof the state is attributedto the triumphof the bedouins-who were considereda menace to civilizationin Ibn Khaldun'sthesis.While intellectuals are regardedas the first victims to have fallen after thetriumphof the 'bedouins',other articles hold the success of the bedouin ethosresponsible for the absence of an influential political elite in Saudi Arabia.Accordingto al Sheikh,reasonsfor this includethe dominationof tribal deologyand the failureof Ibn Saud to transform he social and political organizationofhis bedouinentourage.In his view, such organizationdependson the leadershipof the tribalsheikh,za'im al-qabila and excludes other centres of authority.Heasserts that 'Ibn Saud enforced bedouinleadershipand never gave his advisorsand ministers any real power to enable them to rise above their role as20Ibid., 18 (1992), pp. 10-14.21 Ibid., p. 11.

127


9/19


10/19

THE SHI'A OF SAUDI ARABIAthe traditionaleconomic and social interdependenceby utter dependency onNajd and its populationwhich began to occupy an unequal position vis-a-visother areas and local communities'.25The rhetoricof this argumentcentres onthe concepts of taba'iyya, saytara, and ilhaq, (subordination,hegemony, andannexation)all pointingto the political and social inequalitybetween Najd andthe rest of the country.The text concludesby highlightingthe potentialthreatofdivision (al-taqsTm)which is believed to follow such inequality.The solution inthe author'sview lies in a genuine attemptby theruling groupto introducewiderpolitical participationwhich takes into accountregional interests,culturalandreligious specificity,and local political andeconomicaspirations.Moreover,thiswould involve the revival of mujtama' al-madaniyya(civil society) which ismost conducive to the developmentof urban culture and intellectualpursuits.Accordingto the same source, 'Najdization'has undermined he urbanityof theHijaz and al Hasa in favour of the Najdi bedouin solidarity.However,there remainsthe problemof accounting or the rise of the Wahhabimovementand its consequencesfor the Shi'a community.Some of the articlesin al-JazLra l-'Arabiyyadirectlycriticizedthe Wahhabireligiousestablishment,in particularhe head of the Wahhabi'ulamd',Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ibn Baz. Thecriticism revolved aroundthe rigid interpretations f Wahhabism, ts refusal toadaptto modern echnologicaland social changeandits resistanceto new ijtihdd(interpretations).As the Shi'a clergy andtheirspecificversion of Islamrepresentan areatotally rejectedby Wahhabism, he magazinealso endeavoured o refutestereotypical mages of the communitywhich the Saudi-Wahhabiestablishmenthad been promotingto discreditShicsm.The pictureof the 'Blind Sheikh' hasbecome the caricature o representIbn Baz, the spokesmanof official Islam, onthe pages of the magazine.It is worthnotingthatboththe magazineandthe editorialboardbehindit triedto build bridgeswith anotherIslamistmovementin the country-that criticizingthe regimefrom withinthe Wahhabiestablishment.Since the Gulf War in 1991the so-called salafiyyun, a dissident group of young Wahhabi 'ulamd' anduniversitystudentshave been very active in reachingthe Saudipublic throughfaxes, petitions, cassettes and Friday sermons.26Their main criticism of thegovernmentoriginatedwith its use of foreign troops to defend the 'land ofIslam'. Their demands revolve aroundreform and return to the doctrines ofWahhabismandthe rejectionof the corruptionof the rulinggroup.While someof the demands of the Wahhabi salafiyyuncorrespondto those of the ShiCacommunityand its representatives, wide gulf still separates he two oppositiongroups. The Shi'a community is still considered to be made up of 'kuffdr'(infidels)and 'mubdi'un' innovators)by boththe officialWahhabiestablishmentand the dissidentgroupwithin it. The historyof propagandaagainstShi'sm and25Ibid, pp. 24-30.26 For furtherdetails on the Wahhabidissidents,see H. Dekmejian,'The Rise of Political Islamismin SaudiArabia,'TheMiddleEast Journal,48(4) (1994), pp. 628-643; andM. Abir,SaudiArabia Government,Societyand the Gulf Crisis (London:Routledge, 1993). For an analysisof the Islamistdiscourse,see M. Al-Rasheed,'Saudi Arabia'sIslamic Opposition,'CurrentHistory,95(597) (1996), pp. 16-22.

129


11/19

MADAWI AL-RASHEEDthe theological differences that exist between the two branches are difficult toreconcile. This makes any serious co-operationbetween members of the twooppositionsalmost inconceivable at present.This description of the main themes developed in al-Jazfra al-'Arabiyyademonstrates hatthey rely on a specific interpretation f Saudihistory, politicsand society. This interpretationdraws heavily on Ibn Khaldunianconcepts,specificallyhis descriptionof bedouinsociety. His views seem to correspond othe Shi'a's political agenda,which remainscritical of Saudihegemony.From theShi'a perspective, the so-called bedouin style of governmentresulted in themarginalization f important egions andgroups, includingthe Shi'a while at thesame time failing to establish a modern nationalidentityin which they can beincorporatedas equal citizens. In their view, equality for the Shi'a involvesabove all recognitionof their culturalandreligious heritage.The search for thisrecognition seems to underlie the historiographyof their intellectuals. Thefollowing section demonstrates hatShi'a discoursegoes beyondthe demandforpolitical rights as it tries to establish an authenticcultural,historicaland socialspace for the communityin Saudi society.A Minority in Search of Cultural AuthenticityTodaythe Shi'a oppositioncalls for democracyandpluralism,havingabandonedtheir previous discourse on Islamic revolution,militant action and extremism.Their main focus is no longer 'the tyrannicalaspects of the Saudi regime'.Instead,the leadership nvokes the discourse of humanrightsand the respectofreligious and culturaldiversityin the country.This has been accompaniedby anemphasis on the centralityof al-asala al-shl'iyya (Shi'a culturalauthenticity).Al-asala comes from the Arabic asl meaning root or origin. In recent Shi'ahistorical narratives,asala incorporatesnot only historical roots, but alsohawiyya,identity.When Shi'a intellectualstalk about theirasala, they invoke anauthentic dentity rooted in Arab culture and history.Hamza al-Hasan's historical narrative s permeatedby references to al-asalaal-shl'iyya. In fact, the purpose of the narrative s to prove this asala usinghistorical evidence including local oral narratives,oral and written literature,Arab and Europeansources and archival data. His narrativestresses from thevery beginningthe objectivesof its author-namely to prove the Arab identityof the Shi'a,a counterclaim to Saudi-Wahhabipropagandawhichportrays hemas a Persian satellite in the Arabian Peninsula. Al-Hasan declares that thishistorical study of his own community aims first to introduce the authentichistory,culture andidentityof the SaudiShi'a, which in his opinionareomittedfrom Saudi narratives as if 'they do not exist', and second to highlight thediscrimination o which the Shi'a are subjectedunder Saudi rule, described aspromotingsectarian divisions among the populationof the country.27In his search for authenticityand a respectableand equal status for the Shi'a27 Al-Hasan, al-Shla, I, pp. 7-10.130


12/19

THE SHIA OF SAUDI ARABIAwithin Saudi Arabia, al Hasan criticises official historical representations ofthemselves, which have dominated the teaching of history in the country. Helaments the absence of the Shi'a from Saudi official history textbooks, which aretaught in their local schools and also elsewhere in the country. He resents thefact that if ever they are mentioned, they are depicted as examples of ahl al-bida''innovators' who deviate from true Islam. This absence from history and theirmisrepresentation have given rise to his attempt to rewrite their own regionalhistory, especially that of the al Hasa, where the majority of the Shi'a communitylive. As official narratives deny the Shi'a a position in history, he constructscounter-historical narratives whereby they are reintroduced into history as activeagents with a separate, but not totally alien, regional identity.In the first volume, the opening chapter entitled 'The Shi'a of Saudi Arabia:identity, history, and people' forcibly argues that the Shi'a are 'true Muslims'.Al Hasan invokes the badw-hadar divide to demonstrate that their faith andpractices are authentic and in line with mainstream Islam. He claims that whilethe religiosity of the nomads has always been 'doubted' by Saudi-Wahhabidiscourse, the Shi'a have a history of sedentary existence and agricultural labour,both believed to be suitable conditions for practising Islam and observing itsobligations and rituals.Al Hasan's work presents the origins of the Shi'a community as dating backto the times of the Prophet Muhammad. He lists the major Shi'a families inal-Hasa, Qatif and the Hijaz, while acknowledging the fact that Shi'a tribalorigins cannot be easily traced because the community had been settled in towns,oases and cities longer than the rest of the population of Saudi Arabia.Sedentarization was accompanied by the weakening of tribal allegiances andmarked genealogies. This combined with the fact that Shi'a Islam constituted themain bond uniting these sedentary communities led to the dissolution of tribalidentities, which are now replaced by allegiance to Shiism. Al-Hasan'sjustification for the absence of extended tribal genealogies among the Shi'a isimportant in a country where tribal identities are still crucial in determiningpeople's status, and access to resources and power. However, he clearly statesthat the absence of tribal genealogies among the Shi'a should not lead todoubting their 'Arabness'. In his opinion, the Shi'a are 'Arab in origin. Theybelong to two branches: one branch originated from the ancient Arab tribes inthe pre-Islamic period such as 'Abd Qais, Bakr, and Way'l. Another branchconsisted of the bedouin tribes who settled in the Eastern Province after theyadopted Shi'ism'.28 He later concludes that Arab and foreign sources agree thatthe Shi'a of the al Hasa and Qatif have Arab origin and that they are the initialinhabitants of the land since ancient times'.29 In his opinion this should refutewhat he calls 'rumours' to discredit the Shi'a by claiming that they are notArabs.Further evidence is given to establish the indigenous identity of the Shi'a. Al-28 Ibid., p. 27.29 Ibid., p. 28.

131


13/19

MADAWI AL-RASHEEDHasan dismisses the claim that because the Shi'a's dialect resembles Iraqidialect, one should conclude thatthey originated n Iraq.30This resemblance sinterpretedas a function of the theological and religious links that the SaudiShi'a had maintainedwith the Iraqicentresof religious learning.He points outthat 'as most Shi'a 'ulamd'studyin the religious centres of Iraq,their dialect isbound to resemble that of their teachers'.31 Their dialect in his opinionremainsfamiliar to the rest of the populationof the ArabianPeninsula. He asks thequestion:'how can a bedouin assess the dialect of the Shi'a on the basis of whichwe conclude thatthey are of mixed or foreignorigin?'From this explorationofthe question of origin and dialect, al-Hasan stresses that the Shi'a are anindigenous groupwell rooted in the ArabianPeninsula,a claim counteringthatof the state, which has continued to propagate hat the Shi'a have their originsin neighbouringcountries,mainly Iraqand Iran.Al-Hasan also addressesthe lack of official census data on the basis of whichone can reach an accurateestimateof the size of the Shi'a community.He arguesthat the size of the Shi'a populationis a political issue ratherthan a merestatistical concern. In his opinion, the reluctanceof the Saudi governmenttoprovide an accurate estimate of its population is a reflection of its generalinsecurity.This is particularlyrelevant to the Shi'a given the fact that theirregion is the primary area for oil in the country. Therefore, it is in thegovernment's interest to underestimate heir number and reduce them to thestatus of an insignificant minority.After a survey of many Western and Arabsources,he estimates a communityof 2.5 million, thus representing12.5-25%of the total population;32t is worth noting here that this figure exceeds mostavailable estimates.The rest of al-Hasan's first volume is a detailedanalysisof the history of thecommunitybetween 1871 and 1913, highlightingthe variousSaudi attemptstosubjugatethe Shi'a and the discriminationwhich resultedfrom their incorpora-tion in the first and second Saudi dynasties. At the same time, his accountcelebratesthe intellectualdevelopments,mainlyin literatureandtheology whichflourishedamongthe Shi'a at thattime: a reiterationof the theme developedonthe pages of al-Jaziraal-'Arabiyyawhich associatessedentary ife with intellec-tual activity.Here it seems thatal-asala al-shPiyyais not only anchored n thecommunity's ancient Arab roots but is also sustainedby their contribution oturath 'heritage'. Al-Hasan argues that 'under Ottoman influence in the lastdecades of the nineteenth century, religious freedom prevailed. This allowedShi'a intellectuals and theologians to study and produce importantreligioustreatiseandinterpretations'.33e praisesthe Turksfor not imposingtheir Hanafi30 Ibid., p. 31.31 Ibid, p.31..32

It is difficult o give an accurate stimateof thesize of the Shi'acommunity.Goldbergargues hatone stumblesacrossfiguresrangingfrom the most reserved,275,000-400,000, to the most optimistic,500,000. He considersthe Shi'a to represent6% of the Saudipopulation.See Goldberg,'The Shi'i Minority',p. 230. This figure maynot include the Shi'a of the Hijaz.In this region,al Khoei estimatesthat32,000 Shi'a live in Madinaand Wadial-Fara.See Y. al Khoei, 'The Shi'a of Medina,'Dialogue (July 1996), pp. 4-5.33 Al-Hasan, al-Shfa, p. 227.132


14/19


religiousinterpretationsn the populationof the EasternProvince and contraststhis situation with the restrictions that the Wahhabisintroduced as they suc-ceeded the Ottomansin the area. The Turks are also praisedfor establishingschools in the region as early as 1900. A numerationof Shi'a intellectuals andliterary figures follows to establish evidence for the intellectual, literary andreligious heritageof the community.One of the most interestingaccountsin al-Hasan'swork is his reinterpretationof the incorporationof the al Hasa region in the Saudi realm at the beginningof the twentiethcentury.He deals with this theme in a chapter,entitled 'Thecritical moment ... before the occupation1912-1913'. The title is significantasit is a clear declaration of how he understands he incorporationof the Shi'aterritory nto the modernSaudi state.While official narrativesdescribe this as afunction of a 'unification'process, al-Hasan'scounter-narrativeabels it as the'occupation'of 1913. Al-Hasan dismisses the Saudi justification,describedinIbn Saud's words as 'a restorationof my ancestor'shistoricalrights over thisterritory',by showing that in the nineteenthcentury Saudi hegemony over alHasa lasted only for 31 years and was disrupted by various local revolts.Accordingto al-Hasan,Ibn Saud's 'ancestralclaim' does not representa soundargument.Similarly,Saudi claims thatthey entered al Hasa on the basis of localcomplaintswhich invited themto rescue the population rom Turkishrule echoesthe well-established official story which depicts Saudi unification as rescuinglocal communities from the pervasive state of 'moral, social and politicaldegeneration',an argumentwhich is used in relationnot only to al Hasa,but alsoto all regions which, in subsequentyears, became partof Saudi Arabia.34Al Hasan's second volume deals with the consequencesof the Saudi 'occu-pation' of the EasternProvince. Here the narrative ocuses on how this resultedin enforcing tai'ifiyyasectarianism',which has guidedthe Saudiregime's policytowardsthe Shi'a since 1913. He arguesthat Wahhabidogma depictedthe Shi'aas a .ta'ifa sect, outside the realm of Islam. This was adoptedby the Saudis andwas translated nto variousforms of discrimination.For example,he lists casestherebythe Shi'a were excluded fromemployment n educational nstitutionsandthe army.He also pointsto how they are excluded fromhigh ranking obs withinthe oil company,ARAMCO.The appropriation f Shi'a land by various Saudiprinces is interpretedas deprivingthe Shi'a of their territoryand threateningtheirlivelihood.Discriminationalso includesthe ban on buildingShi'a mosquesand centres of religious learning.35The narrativeis full of cases of namedindividuals who have been discriminatedagainston the basis of their Shi'ism,thus addinga personaldimension to this historicalaccount. Shi'a individualsaredepictedas people whose life under Saudi rule is a continuousstruggle.They arevictims of Wahhabiprejudiceand its Saudienforcement.However,the narrativealso portrays he Shi'a as peoplewho resist.Theyhave not remainedsilent in theface of discrimination.Their resistance has manifesteditself in various ways34Ibid., p. 227.35Ibid., II, pp. 286-369.

133


15/19

MADAWI AL-RASHEED

rangingfrom letters to princes, petitions to local governors,and open confron-tation with the government throughdemonstrationsand revolts.The narrativeoutlines the history of Shi'a militaryresistancein the EasternProvince and Saudi violence against it. Imprisonment, orture,terminationofemployment,and exile are described as daily occurrencesin the lives of theShi'a. However, in this account,the threatenedShi'a individual and communityemerge as both victims and survivors. Continuous oppression results in thesolidificationof their identityand the crystallisationof their demand for equalstatus as an authentic indigenous group. What has been maintained is their asala,on the basis of which they deserve recognition.Al-Hasan also deals with the relationshipbetween the Shi'a opposition andother opposition groupsin SaudiArabia. While al-JazTra l-'Arabiyya ncludedreferences to the development of the salafiyyunas mentioned earlier in thisarticle,al-Hasan'sbook offers a directcritiqueof it. He arguesthat 'theyremainnarrow n theirfocus andradicalin their world view which does not accommo-date that of the Shi'a. The salafiyyunclaim monopolyover the truthandhave atendencyto impose their views on others'.36 n his opinion, the Shi'a and thisopposition differ in their interpretationof political, religious and intellectualfreedoms.Accordingto him, 'the Shi'a insist on generalfreedoms to be grantedto communities such as theirs whereas the salafiyyun'sdemandfor increasedfreedoms in the country is not generalised to include those of the Shi'a'.37

Examplesof these differencesare drawnfrom the various opinions of activistsand 'ulamd' who are associated with the Wahhabisalafiyyanandhave not beensympathetic o the Shi'a, such as Juhayman, he leaderof the 1979 siege of theMecca Mosque, Sheikh Salmanal'Awdah,outspoken young Wahhabireligiousscholar whose anti-governmentpreachingduringthe Gulf Crisis of 1991 led tohis imprisonment,and Safar al Hawli, Dean of Islamic Studies at Umm al QuraUniversity in Mecca whose critical treatiseof the governmentalso led to hisimprisonment.These anti-government ulama'share a consensus regardingtheShi'a. They continue to describe them as rawcfid 'rejectionists', 'allies ofKhomenei and Iran', and kuffdr 'infidels'. He concludes that 'our salafiyyunbrothers must pay attentionto the religious and social diversity of the Saudipopulation. Co-operationwith them at the present is not possible before theyadoptthe principleof mutualrespectand above all the respectof the opinionofthose who do not agree with them'.38Al-Hasan's criticismof the salafiyyin confirmsthe observationthatsince theearly 1990s the Shi'a oppositionhas been tryingto distance itself from radical-ism by adopting the rhetoric of pluralism, diversity, dialogue, and mutualrespect.Both al-Hasan'shistoricalnarrativeand al-Jazrraal-'Arabiyyaseem toprojectan image of the Shi'a as a communitysearching or a politicaland socialposition in Saudi Arabia founded on respect of their culturaluniquenessas a36 Ibid., p. 402.37Ibid., p. 402.38 Ibid., p. 410.134


16/19


minority.To arguelike Goldbergthatthe Shi'a of Saudi Arabiahave abandonedtheir confrontational ttitude o the Saudiregime as they shifted their revolution-arydiscourse and demandsto one which concentrateson concrete economic andsocial demandsdoes not fully describethe situationamongthe Saudi Shi'a in the1990s.39It is true that no serious confrontationwith the state has taken placesince 1980-a fact which Goldbergregardsas an evidence to supporthis claimthat the Shi'a have been successfully pacifiedby the state.However,this articlehas shown that the contestation has moved away from overt riots, demonstra-tions, andviolence to one which is fought at the cultural evel. Shi'a oppositionpublicationsand intellectualactivity,discussed above, demonstrate hat dealingwith Shi'a socio-economicproblemscannot alone fully pacify the community.While development projects may bring about tangible amelioration in lifeconditions, a serious change in attitudes towards this minority remains aprecondition or theirintegrationnto Saudisociety as citizens with equal rights.As long as Wahhabidogma continues to be propagatedby the radical inter-pretersof Islam (an activitywhich so far has not been fully curbedor controlledby the state), the Shi'a will remain sceptical about the long-term benefits ofregularor haphazard tate economic handouts.While Shi'a intellectuals remainactive in the rigorous productionof counter-culturallaims, motivatedby theirsearchfor asala, it cannotbe said thatthis problem,which has worriedthe statesince its creationand the discoveryof oil in the heartof the Shi'ahomeland,hasbeen resolved.The starting point of Shi'a intellectual activity is the deconstructionof thewell-establishedofficial vision of society and history,which has so far negatedthe authenticity of the Shi'a as an indigenous Muslim community. Shi'ahistoriography hallengesthis official vision as partof their resistance.The Shi'ahave taken the lead in making their own history. Al-Hasan's two volumesrepresent an experiment in applying historical research and methodology topolitical ends. The author nforms his readerthat his work is a reaction to the'discourseof misrepresentation'.As such it is a counter-narrative,nformedbyboth the historical record of outsiders,found in archives and in Western andArab literature,and the oral testimony of the communityitself. As a Shi'a, hehas access to the Shi'a oral tradition.In this narrative, he past, the origins, thedialect,the suffering,the survival andthe resistanceof the Shi'a merge to forman identity, which privileges the voices of those who had been silenced. Thesearch for culturalauthenticityis a fixation that permeates the text at everyjuncture.Responses to the ShiftShi'a oppositiondiscourse shifted froman insistenceon the un-Islamicnatureofthe Saudi regime to one which increasinglystresses the need for democratiza-tion. Accordingto Shi'a spokesman,Tawfiqal-Sheikh,this means 'a redistribu-39J. Goldberg,'The Shi'i Minority', passim.

135


17/19

MADAWI AL-RASHEEDtion of economic and political power among the differentregions which makeup the country'.40The exiled Shi'a leadershipmoved from total rejectionof theregime duringthe time when the movement was 'revolutionary'(i.e. immedi-ately afterthe events of the early 1980s)-to a call for dialogue with the state.In the 1990s, the leadershiphas calledfor gradualchangeandreformrather hanrevolution.The changein Shi'a oppositiondiscoursehas been welcomed by the state. Thelatterrespondedby invitingthe exiled opposition leadership o come back to thecountry. The initiator of dialogue with the Shi'a exiled opposition was thepresentSaudiambassador o LondonGhazi al-Guseibi.41Accordingto the Shi'aopposition, since al-Guseibi's appointment n London, he has been trying tobuild channelsof communicationwith their leadership.In September1993, hisefforts succeeded in containingthe opposition and the return of some of itsleading figures to Saudi Arabia. The invitation was accompaniedby furtherpromises for investmentin the EasternProvince,the creation of new economicopportunitiesand a generalrelaxationof the rules governingtheirpresencesuchas the ban on building Shi'a Mosques and the celebration and excessivemourningduringspecial Shi'a religious festivals and rituals.42The governmentpromisedthe release of some Shi'a political prisonersand issued passportstothose in exile in order to enable them to return o Saudi Arabia.The invitationwas dependenton the leadership'scommitment o terminating he publicationoftheir magazine, al-Jazira al-'Arabiyya. The London based Shi'a oppositionacceptedthe invitation and sent representativeso Saudi Arabia to continuetheprocess of negotiation with the government.Other members remain in exilebecause of the mistrust which has been nourished over the years between theoppositionand the state. From the opposition'sperspective,the reconciliation sinterpretedas a success; now that the state has been forced to open channelsofcommunicationwith them.However,fromthe state's pointof view, this was thefirst move in the direction of encapsulatingan oppositionat a crucial momentwhen the Wahhabi establishmenthas generated ts own oppositionto the state.The Shi'a leadership,however, continues to propagatethe idea that the publi-cation of their magazineis 'suspended'ratherthanpermanently erminated.The shift in Shi'a tactics and its welcome by the governmentneed to beunderstoodwithin the changingpolitical context of Saudi Arabiain the 1990s.This new political context has influenced both the Shi'a opposition and thepolicies of the governmenttowardsthem. Two main interrelated actors havebeen crucial: first the Gulf War and its political ramificationsand second therising influence of the Wahhabi dissident movement during the war, both ofwhich createdunprecedentedupheavals n a countryconsideredone of the moststable regions in the Middle East by outside observers. Until the early 1990s,political unrest in SaudiArabia was not comparable o thatexperienced n, say,40 TheIndependent,3 March 1992.41 Interview with Hamza al Hasan and Abdul Amir Musa, 1993.42 Details of thereconciliationare n L. Al-Rasheed,'L'OppositionChiite en ArabieSaoudite,'UnpublishedMAdissertation,Ecole d'EtudesPolitiques,Paris, 1994.136


18/19


Egypt or Algeria. With the exception of the seizure of the Mecca Mosque in1979 and Shi'a riots in the EasternProvincein the early 1980s, seriousviolenceand political unresthave not been regularoccurrencesin Saudi Arabia.43TheGulf War and the failure of the Saudi governmentto resolve the conflict withIraq peacefully, exposed the precariousnessof this apparent stability. Newoppositionforces began to take shape.These originatedmainly from within theWahhabiestablishmentand became identifiedas the new Islamists,thusbringingSaudi Arabia n line with the risingtide of political Islam in the region. 'Ulamd'petitions,criticalFridaysermonsby young preachersanddemonstrationsollow-ing the arrestof some activistswere events which accompanied he progressofthe military campaigns in the Eastern Province against Saddam Hussein.44Negotiationswith the Shi'a came at a crucial momentwhen theirregion was toreceive thousands of foreign troops, invited by the governmentto defend the'land of Islam' despite serious objectionsfrom some members of the religiousestablishment.45The negotiations were to demonstrate the good will of thegovernmentand its intention to deal with discriminationagainst this minoritywhose territoryhad become the seat of a majorinternational onflict. The Shi'aopposition capitalized on governmentinsecurityduringthe war. It altered itsimage by distancing itself from extremismand elicited a favourableresponsefrom the state.The reconciliationwith the Shi'a can also be interpretedas a pre-emptivestrike by the governmentto prevent the possibility of the Shi'a oppositionjoining forces with the Wahhabi dissident, even if this remained a remotepossibility given the wide political and religious differences between the twooppositions.46Both the Shi'a oppositionand the Wahhabidissidents were unableto entertain any pragmatic alliance which would have overcome their widedifferences. From the Shi'a perspective, any scores gained by the so-calledneo-Wahhabimovement would be detrimentalto the survival of the Shi'a inSaudi Arabia because their 'ulamd' and activists seemed to continue thepropagandawar against them. Al-JazTraal-'Arabiyya'scoverage of the risinginfluenceof this oppositionandal-Hasan's direct criticism of it highlightedShi'afears and apprehension egarding he new dissidents.However, the government43 Onthe events nMecca,see A. alYassiniAl-D[nwaal-DawlafifalMamlakaal-'Arabiyya l Sa'udiyya London:Dar al Saqi 1987).44 On the activities of the Wahhabidissidents,see M. Al-Rasheed,'SaudiArabia'sIslamicOpposition'and M.Abir, Saudi Arabia Government,Society and the Gulf Crisis (London:Routledge, 1993).45Forexample,Sheikh Salmanal-Awdah,a young Wahhabireligiousscholarrefusedto sanctionthe invitationof foreigntroopsin his Fridaysermons.He argued hat it is un-Islamic o fightan evil with the aid of a greaterevil (WahhabiOppositionCassette).The same opinionwas reiteratedby Sheikh Safar al Hawli in his treatise oSheikh IbnBaz, entitled,Kashfal-GhammaCanulamd'al-umma TheUnveiling of the 'Ulamd'sDistress) (Daral-Hikma,1991). For a detailed discussion of the Wahhabi 'ulamd'sreaction o the invitationof foreign troops,see M. Al-Rasheed,'La couronneet le turban.L'EtatSaoudiena la recherched'une nouvelle legitimitdapreslaguerreduGolf,' in B. Qudmani-DarwishndM.Chartouni-Dubarryeds)Les EtatsArabesFace a la ContestationIslamiste(Paris:ArmandColin, 1997), pp. 71-97.46 The Shi'a oppositiondraws on the various atawd, 'religiousopinions', issued by members of the Wahhabidissident movementregarding he status of the Shi'a; these Fatawdsare referred o and criticized in Hamza alHasan'sbook. See al Hasan, al-Shi'a, p. 410.

137


19/19

MADAWI AL-RASHEEDcould not rule out any overtures between the Shi'a and at least the moderatebranches of the Wahhabi dissident movement. So far the containment of theShi'a oppositionhas lessened the government'sfears and allowed it to direct allits attention to the Wahhabi challenge. The Shi'a opposition abandoned itspreviousrevolutionary hetoric and adoptedsubtle forms of resistancefoughtatthe level of culture.This is a transitionperiodwhichbeganin 1993, andit is tooearly to predictwhether the Shi'a will be satisfiedin the long term.It remainsto be seen whether the positionof the Shi'a as equal citizens will be establishedwithoutmajor restructuring f Saudi politics and widening of political partici-pationin the country.47 ntil then,their ournalisticnarrativesandhistoriographyrepresentlatent resistance against persistent domination. Their 'hidden tran-scripts' may prove to be more efficientweaponsagainsttheirdiscriminationhanovert aggression,the cost of which remainsintolerablyhigh for the community.

47It is perhapsprematureo assess the implicationsof therecentreforms ntroducedby thegovernmentaftertheGulfWar,especiallythe implementation f majlisal-shura 'ConsultativeCouncil' on the Shi'a community.SofartheWahhabidissidentmovementhas notbeen silencedby these reforms.The appointment f a Shi'a memberto the council was considereda sign of goodwill by the Shi'aopposition.On theimplicationsof thegovernment'srecentreforms,see R. AbaNamay,'ConstitutionalReforms:A Systemizationof SaudiPolitics',Journalof SouthAsian and MiddleEasternStudies,XVI(3) (Spring,1993),pp.43-88, andA. Cordesman,SaudiArabiaGuardingthe Desert Kingdom(Boulder:Westview Press, 1997), pp. 19-27.138

Shia of Saudi Arabia

Documents

Transcript of Shia of Saudi Arabia