Shelby D. Hunt For Reason and Realism in Marketingsdh.ba.ttu.edu/JM92 - For Reason and...

Shelby D. Hunt

For Reason and Realismin Marketing

The author responds to the comments by Peter and by Zinkhan and Hirschheim on his 1990 JM article,"Truth in Marketing Theory and Research."

We know too little to be dogmatists and too much tobe skeptics.

—Pascal

IN "Truth" (1990), I (1) showed how "relativistictruth" in marketing's early crisis literature was

grounded in Kuhn's (1962) seeming adoption of bothreality and conceptual framework relativism, (2) re-ported that when Kuhn recognized that these relativ-isms implied nihilism and solipsism, he revised hisconceptualization of incommensurability to the pointwhere it was nonproblematic for objectivity in sci-ence, (3) evaluated critical relativism's "argument fromthe falsity of realism" that truth should be abandonedand found it to be incoherent, that is, it made no sense,(4) proposed that philosophies abandoning the goal oftruth must ultimately choose between incoherence andirrelevance, and reported how Laudan (1982) feltcompelled to claim that science had "falsified" Cre-ationism (even though he argues that "determinationsof truth and falsity" are "irrelevant" to science), (5)located the origins of relativism's incoherence in the"philosophers' fallacy of high redefinition," (6) eval-

Shelby D. Hunt is the Paul Whitfield Horn Professor of Marketing, TexasTech University. The author acknowledges the assistance of Kay Palan,Texas Tech University, in the preparation of the manuscript.

uated critical relativism's "argument from utopian-ism" by showing how it both suffered from "highredefinition" and confused the tangible, realizable ob-jectives of societal institutions with their regulativeideals or mission, and (7) discussed the fundamentaltenets and implications of a philosophy of science,scientific realism, that retains truth as an overridingobjective, mission, or regulative ideal of theory andresearch.

Zinkhan and Hirschheim (ZH) and Peter provideinteresting commentaries on "Truth," finding both areasof agreement and points of concern. I am pleased torespond to their expressed concerns, beginning withthose of Zinkhan and Hirschheim.

Zinkhan and Hirschheim's"Concerns"

In their first paragraph (and also in the sixth), ZH at-tempt to summarize "Truth" by quoting me as saying,"Truth is essential in science." Unfortunately, thissentence appears nowhere in my article. Instead, onthe page they cite, I state, "Trust is essential in sci-ence (indeed, in all disciplines) because scientificknowledge is a shared form of knowledge; it is sharedwith its clients" (p. 12). After this inauspicious har-binger, ZH discuss their two major concerns with"Truth." First, they contend that scientific realism, at

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least as described in "Truth," is "unsatisfactory" be-cause "[tjhe realist ontological position, in the socialdomain, is untenable" (p. 82). ZH's second concern"is his reification of terms" (p. 82). Because I use theterm "entity" to refer to a "host of abstractions," in-cluding "racist beliefs" and "totalitarian political re-gimes," I must fail to recognize that these terms' "on-tological 'existence' is very different from that ofsomething much less abstract, such as tables or chairs"(p. 82). They then allude to a recent debate in theJournal of Macromarketing (Dholakia 1988; Hunt1989b; Levin 1991; Monieson 1988, 1989) that con-cerned, among other things, "reification" and contendthat my analysis there, as in "Truth," was "based ona misconception of the notion of reification" (p. 82).Therefore, they conclude: "Hunt's focusing on truth,believing it has an independent existence of its own,and his reification error must cast doubt on the call toadopt his version of scientific realism" (p. 82). Draw-ing on the realism of Manicas and Sekord (1983) andthe "transcendental realism" of Bhaskar (1979), theythen proceed to offer "a different version of realism,a version not described by Hunt and one we feel ismore appropriate for describing marketing phenom-ena" (p. 84).

On ZH's AlternativeThe best place to start is the transcendental realismthey suggest is "different," "an altemative view.""Truth" stated: "The approach here is not to advocateany particular version of scientific realism, but to ex-amine the fundamental, unifying beliefs underlyingall versions of scientific realism and explore the rolethat truth plays in them" (p. 8). These fundamentaltenets were labeled "classical realism," "fallibilisticrealism," "critical realism," and "inductive realism."Therefore, because "Truth" does not offer "a version"of realism, the version ZH offer cannot be character-ized as "an altemative view." Indeed, the transcen-dental realism of Bhaskar was specifically cited in"Truth" and the realism of Manicas is discussed inmy "Positivism and Paradigm Dominance" (1991b).Moreover, the realism of Manicas and Bhaskar is to-tally consistent with the four tenets identified in"Truth," for they both, most importantly, reject Hu-mean skepticism (see Bhaskar 1979, p. 159; Manicas1987, p. 10). ZH's own discussion shows the consis-tency. For example, "there is a world that exists in-dependently of cognizing experience" (p. 86) is pre-cisely the thesis of classical realism. The claim that"the goal of science is to build sophisticated models,using rational criteria, to represent the world," whenjoined with "theories . . . may be wrong" (p. 86) par-allel's "Truth's" fallibilistic realism: "the job of sci-ence is to develop genuine knowledge about the world,even though such knowledge will never be known with

certainty" (Hunt 1990, p. 9). Finally, consistent with"Truth," ZH discuss the importance of unobservable,intangible "relevant entities," such as "memory" and"desire," that have "structure and properties," as wellas "causal powers," and which "exist and operate inthe world" (p. 86). It should come as no surprise thatZH's version of scientific realism is consistent withthe discussion in "Truth." After all, that is why Icharacterized the four tenets as "fundamental" to sci-entific realism.

Though ZH's version of scientific realism is non-problematic for me, it does pose a significant problemfor them. Recall that ZH's first concem with "Truth"is: "The realist ontological position, in the social do-main, is untenable" (p. 82). What is the realist on-tological position? Manicas (1987, p. 9-10), the real-ist philosopher on whom ZH base their version ofscientific realism, states: "A philosophy (of science)[is] positivist if it holds that a scientific explanationmust eschew appeal to what is in principle beyondexperience . . . by contrast, a realist holds that a validscientific explanation can appeal to the in principlenon-observable." It is the appeal to the existence ofunobservable, intangible entities in the "social do-main" that ZH's realism claims will have "causalpowers." For example, ZH use the Blair and Zinkhan(1984) study as a prototypical example of applyingtheir realism to health care marketing and claim that"desire was the generative mechanism producing ad-herence" (p. 86). As Manicas and Bhaskar point out,using concepts such as "desire" in scientific expla-nation is precisely what distinguishes the ontology ofscientific realism from that of logical positivism. ZHcan maintain, like the logical positivists in the pastand relativists (see Anderson 1989, p. 14) in the pres-ent, that "the realist ontological position, in the socialdomain, is untenable." Altematively, they can main-tain that scientific realism, whether the realism ofManicas et al. or some other version, is "more ap-propriate for describing marketing phenomena" (p. 84).However, they cannot coherently maintain both po-sitions simultaneously. Failing a test for coherence isnot just some philosophical technicality, as ZH imply.Incoherent arguments make no sense, and "makingsense" is a fundamental desideratum of academic dis-course.

What led ZH to believe that their own realism'sontology was untenable? They cite Berger andLuckmann (1967) and Sayers (1987) as support fortheir claim that the "realist ontological position" re-quires the "certainty" of an "absolute viewpoint," ora "god's-eye or no-eye view." However, ZH are twicewrong. First, the realist ontological position does notrequire "certainty." Indeed, as discussed in "Truth,"it specifically adopts fallibilism. Neither realism, norscience, nor tmth requires the certainty of a god's-eye

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view. Only when truth (with a small "t") is turnedinto TRUTH by the philosophers' fallacy of high re-definition or other means does truth imply the cer-tainty of a god's-eye view. TRUTH is neither arguedfor nor implied by my work.

Second, Sayers (1987), whom ZH cite for au-thority (following Anderson 1988a, p. 136), was noteven discussing the realist ontological position. Whatwas Sayers discussing? Because Wittgenstein "seemedto advocate . . . what has been called cultural relativ-ism . . . an often despised thesis . . . and justifiablyso" (p. 134), Sayers was examining whether Witt-genstein's views also support the relativist "equiva-lence postulate" (p. 135) of Barnes and Bloor (1982,p. 27-28): "For the relativist there is no sense at-tached to the idea that some standards are really ra-tional as distinct from merely accepted as such. . . .Hence the relativist conclusion that they are to be ex-plained in the same way." Sayers argues that Witt-genstein, in fact, "does not grant equal status to otherbelief systems—he does not accept the equivalencepostulate of the strong thesis" (p. 142). Wittgenstein'sviews actually imply that there is no need for a "god's-eye view," because "the lack of some ultimate stan-dard of rationality . . . is a mere bogeyman" (p. 142).Sayers (p. 145) closed with:

That we exempt some beliefs from doubt, that weground our other beliefs on these, that we use themas the context in which we argue or disagree on othermatters, and that they are products of a particular so-cial environment which varies from group to group,is no reason to adopt relativism or seek to overcomeit [by a futile search for god's-eye view]. This is thelesson to be leamed from Wittgenstein.

In short, Sayers' work parallels my own argument:The absence of TRUTH (a god's-eye view) consti-tutes a "bogeyman" and no grounds for rejecting re-alism, adopting relativism, or abandoning truth. ThoughZH embrace the very "bogeyman" that Sayers (andWittgenstein) warn against, marketing need not.

On Reification

As a second concern, ZH contend that I engage inreification and that my discussion in the Monieson etal. debate was based on a "misconception of the no-tion of reification" (p. 82). Unfortunately, ZH reportneither what the Monieson et al. debate was about norwhat my role was. Briefiy, Monieson (1988, p. 7)maintained that marketing was dominated by a "pos-itivistic social science" that leads to "reification." Mycomment's (1989b) objective was to raise the crisisliterature's debate over "positivism" to a more his-torically informed level. Therefore, citing Phillips(1987), I pointed out that "there is no term in the cri-sis literature more abused than 'positivism'" (p. 7). Ithen presented a ruthlessly brief history of logical pos-

itivism and discussed the two "lessons" the positivistsdrew from the 1920's Newtonian mechanics/quantummechanics debate: "(1) All theories should be inter-preted instrumentally, rather than realistically, and (2)science should adhere strictly to Hume's views withresp)ect to induction and the problem of 'unobserva-bles' " (p. 8). Therefore, the positivists maintained thatscience should restrict itself to observable things andtheir properties. Furthermore, I contended: "To reifya concept means to treat it as real, that is, such unob-servable concepts as 'racism,' 'love,' 'attitudes,' and'intentions' are treated as having a real existence, muchlike 'apples,' 'people,' 'spaceships,' and 'stars.'" (p.7). Therefore, reification implies the error of treatingunobservable, intangible concepts as though they wereconcepts referring to observable, tangible "things."On the grounds that the ontology of the positivists wasrestricted to physical things and their properties, I thenargued that any discipline that was "dominated bypositivism" could not possibly engage in "reification"and: "If reification is marketing's problem, positivismis not the cause" (p. 9). I concluded with a plea for"a return to reasoned debate" in the hope of "span-ning the gulf" that currently divides marketing schol-ars (p. 9).

Monieson (1989) replied that my article was a"diatribe" (p. 11), resulting from my "ignorance" (p.12), and stated: "To reify does not mean 'to treat asor to make real.' Rather, to reify means to mimic, topresent a distorted image of the real" (p. 13). He thendiscussed reification and the "fallacy of misplacedconcreteness" and concluded: "Indeed, positivism cancause reification, and so I believe it has in macro-marketing" (p. 14).

Levin (1991, p. 57), a philosopher of science, thenattempted "to sort out the strands in the realism de-bate" by noting that "reification" has two distinct usagesin contemporary literature. First, in the philosophy ofscience: "Reify normally means 'to postulate as an en-tity' or, since its connotations are generally negative,'to postulate as an entity/a//aciows/y.' " After pointingout that "reification is thus a mistake by definition,just as miscalculation is," Levin concluded: "As Huntnotes, however, the logical positivists sought to elim-inate unobservable objects from science. . . . Hadthey succeeded, they would have shown belief in suchentities to be a semantic illusion, that is, a product ofreification."

Levin then discussed the Marxist and neo-Marxist"critical theorists'" sense of reification (p. 58, 59):"The error of representing the results of human socialactivity, as fixed features of the universe." In this sense,"the reifications of bourgeois ideology support thedominant economic arrangement." Because "Monie-son in fact offers little positive guidance as to what

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he means by 'reification,'" Levin searched for clues.On the grounds that Monieson's article was filled with"Marxist terms of art," such as "dialectical thinking,""critique," and "a critical mode, dialectically in-duced," and the fact that Monieson links reificationwith the neo-Marxist concern over "commoditiza-tion," Levin concluded: "Monieson is in fact usingreify as do Marxists and the neo-Marxist 'critical the-orists'," and addressed positivism and the Marxist useof reification: "Whether or not positivism contributedto reification in its Marxist sense—which seemsdoubtful, if only because many positivists were so-cialists in their political moments—this sense has lit-tle to do with any position taken by positivists in thephilosophy of science."

The preceding explication helps us to understandMonieson's reference to my "ignorance" and my workas a "diatribe": He was arguing from a Marxist viewof reification and I from a philosophy of science per-spective. It also sheds light on ZH's charge that I"misuse" reification. Before further addressing ZH'sallegation, perhaps a marketing example of genuine(philosophy of science, that is) reification would helpclarify why reification is to be avoided. Anderson(1988b, p. 404), after arguing that we have no "cri-terion for absolute truth"—TRUTH—and thereforeshould abandon "truth," asks: "Indeed, how wouldwe know truth even if we held it in our hands?" An-derson's query is undoubtedly meant to be taken asjust colorful rhetoric. Nevertheless, his reification oftruth graphically illustrates the conceptual danger oftreating an unobservable, intangible concept, such astruth, as though it referred to an observable, tangibleobject, such as an apple: by wrongly leading us tobelieve that truth could be held in our hands, it leadsus to inquire, absurdly, how we could recognize itwith our eyes. Genuine reification, when committed,is a serious conceptual error.

In "Truth" I discuss many unobservable, intan-gible marketing concepts (e.g., "attitudes," "inten-tions," and "market segments") and provide one ex-ample from sociology ("racist beliefs") and one frompolitical science ("totalitarian political regimes"). Be-cause ZH ignore all my marketing examples and focusonly on "racist beliefs," so will I.

Does "Truth" reify in either the philosophy of sci-ence or Marxist sense? First, though I use "racist be-liefs" as an example, I do not postulate that "racistbeliefs" exist. As any careful reading of "Truth" willshow, I present the criterion that scientific realismcontends can justify any discipline's treating as realsuch concepts as "racist beliefs," that is, the extentto which theories incorporating any particular conceptare successful. Therefore, because "Truth" does not"postulate entities," it could not "postulate entitiesfallaciously." Second, it is false to state that "Truth"

does not recognize that concepts such as "racist be-liefs" are more abstract than "tables" and "chairs,"'for I stated: "Most of the entities postulated in thephysical and biological theories are, at least in prin-ciple, 'tangible,' whereas many, but not all, of theentities postulated by theories in marketing and thesocial sciences are 'intangible' or 'unobservable inprinciple.' The reason for the qualifying phrase 'butnot all' is that people occupy central positions in mostsocial science theories and people are, to say the least,'tangible'" (p. 11).

Third, providing criteria for believing that "racistbeliefs" are real in no way implies, as ZH allege, thattheories involving abstract concepts must be "re-searched using orthodox (traditional) methods." As-suming that ZH mean by "orthodox" such proceduresas experiments and surveys, nowhere in "Truth" issuch a position taken, implied, or meant to be im-plied. Fourth, if a sociologist did investigate "racistbeliefs" by using an experiment or survey, why wouldsuch an investigation necessarily be "contrived, arti-ficial, and illusory"? Indeed, "racist beliefs" seemsno more abstract than "desire," which was postulatedas the "generative mechanism" in the Blair and Zink-han (1984) study used by ZH as exemplary of the way"the kinds of explanations offered by scientific real-ism seem to match rather well with tlie problems en-countered in practical marketing research" (p. 12). If"desire" can be a generative mechanism, why can't"racist beliefs" also be such a mechanism? If Blairand Zinkhan's use of an experimental design with"desire" is exemplary, why is it necessarily the casethat a sociologist's experiment with "racist beliefs"will be "contrived, artificial, and illusory"? As thepreceding discussion clearly shows, the charge that"Truth" reifies, in the philosophy of science sense, isutterly without foundation.

Does "Truth" reify in the Marxist sense, that is,make "the error of representing the results of humansocial activity as fixed features of the universe" (Levin1991, p. 58)? Throughout the various social sciencecrisis literatures, critics treat contemporary social sci-entists as "backward country bumpkins" (Calder andTybout 1989, p. 203) and accuse them of naively be-lieving in a social reality that is "immutable," a termappearing time and again in ZH's comment. Else-where I evaluated the "immutable social reality" charge(Hunt 1989a, p. 186):

Consider Ozanne and Hudson's (1989) claim that afundamental premise of practitioners of contempo-rary social science is that an "inunutable social real-ity" (p. 2) exists, a "single unchangeable reality" (p.2). "Immutable" is a very strong word implying thatsocial reality is totally unchanging. Can anyone se-riously claim that all practitioners of contemporarysocial science believe that social reality (for example,the relationships among attitudes, intentions, and be-


haviors of consumers) is totally unchanging? Is thisnot a caricature of contemporary social science?

ZH now admonish marketers that the world is "in aconstant state of flux" (p. 83) and is "exceedinglycomplex," with differences "across cultures" and many"fast-changing Western cultural trends" (p. 83). Whydo ZH feel the need even to tell us, let alone arguefor, these commonplaces? Because, they contend,"Truth" implies "there is an immutable truth that sci-entists can study" (p. 83). However, there is nothingin "Truth" that even suggests, let alone implies, thathizarre assertion.

Nowhere does my work speak of "truth" as an en-tity for study. While "Truth" claims that "the worldexists independently of its being perceived" and there-fore "there really is something 'out there' to theorizeabout" (p. 9), nowhere do I assert, imply, or evensuggest that truth is "out there," let alone an immut-able truth. ZH's interpretation of "Truth" goes be-yond that of caricature, for caricatures bear at leastsome resemblance to their referents. ZH actually pres-ent, in Peter's terms, a "socially constructed reality"completely of their own making, a "created reality"—that is, a total fabrication. Moreover, ZH's sociallyconstructed reality is itself a reification. They reify"truth" by considering it to be an object "out there"that one "can study" because it has an "independentexistence" (p. 86). But, because the social construc-tion of reality is theirs, so is the reification of thatreality. Truly, "Truth" has completely disappeared intheir comment.

In conclusion, ZH's advocacy of realism is com-mendable. However, they (I) err when they claim thattheir version of scientific realism is inconsistent withthe discussion in "Truth," (2) err when they claim thatthe realist ontology requires a god's-eye view, (3) notonly err when they claim that the "realist ontologicalposition, in the social domain, is untenable" in thefirst part of their article, but are incoherent when theygo on to advocate the scientific realism of Manicas etal. in the second half, (4) not only err when they claimI "misuse" reification, but fail to provide any evi-dence that "Truth" engaged in reification in either ofits two senses, and (5) err when they reify truth. I turnnow to the comment by Peter.

Peter's Relativism/ConstructionismPeter contends that, though there are similarities be-tween scientific realism and the relativistic-construc-tionist view, they diverge on the nature of reality, thenature of truth, and the value of the concept of in-commensurability. I begin with a supposed point ofagreement—the "rejecting" of positivism.

On Positivism

Peter (p. 77) indicates that both scientific realism andrelativism "reject" logical positivism, logical empir-icism, and falsificationism. However, "reject" isprobably much too strong a term to be used to de-scribe the scientific realist position. Agreeing withscientific realism, all three of the "isms" Peter citeswere sympathetic to science, sought to understand it,did not fear mathematics and statistics, and valuedclarity of exposition, logic, and rigorous analysis.However, disagreeing with these "isms," realists be-lieve that (1) Humean skepticism should be rejected,(2) most of the actual practice of science is realistic,not positivistic, (3) scientific theories, whenever pos-sible, should be interpreted realistically rather than in-strumentally, (4) "causality" does and should play animportant role in science, and (5) claims to knowledgedo not require incorrigible, infallible, or certain foun-dations.

What surprises many people is that relativism ac-cepts many positivist positions. For example, like thepositivists, relativists embrace Humean skepticism (seeAnderson 1983, p. 19; 1989, p. 11) and interpret sci-entific theories instrumentally. Furthermore, the pos-itivists adopted "foundationalism," the view that allclaims to knowledge must have infallible foundations,and believed it was a problem to be worked on and,hopefully, solved. Relativists embrace this very samedoctrine, but their embracing it leads them to con-clude—incoherence notwithstanding—that becauseTRUTH is impossible, either truth should be aban-doned (Anderson 1988b) or "relativistic truth" shouldbe accepted (Peter and Olson 1983).

The response of scientific realism to the absenceof incorrigible foundations for science is to adopt fal-libilism, the position that the theories, foundations,and method of science are all fallible—that is, sciencemay be wrong. However, "may be wrong on any-thing" does not imply "are wrong on everything." Sometheories are better than others at describing, explain-ing, and predicting the extemal world. Hence, sometheories are very likely to be false and others are morelikely to be true, approximately true, or closer to thetruth. By giving grounds for believing that we reallydo know more about, for example, the causes of in-fectious diseases now than we did before the rise ofscience in the sixteenth century, scientific realism deniesthe nihilism of "are wrong on everything" (for wemight, just might, "be right on something").

If Peter's relativism forbids explaining the successof science on the grounds that we genuinely know morethan we did 400 years ago, how can it escape the chargeof nihilism? Peter proposes: "It is the usefulness ofthe theories that accounts for the success of scienceover the last four hundred years" (p. 14, italics added).


However, this is rhetorical sleight-of-hand. To "ac-count for" implies answering why science has beensuccessful. Because science can successfully explainand predict phenomena, it is useful. However, thisusefulness is clearly a consequence of science's suc-cess, not its antecedent. Therefore, contra Peter, use-fulness cannot "account for" science's success. Be-cause of its ontological and epistemological premises,no version of relativism yet propounded can make theadmitted success of science in explaining and pre-dicting phenomena anything other than a "miracle."Peter's relativism is no exception.

On Paradigm Incommensurability

Peter defmes paradigm incommensurability as "the ideathat the choices between competing paradigms are notmade purely on the basis of formal logic and empir-ical data" (p. 76). His idiosyncratic definition, by us-ing the words "are not," rather than "cannot," eitherrewrites or ignores the entire history of the incom-mensurability debate. Briefiy, Kuhn and Feyerabend(KF) originally maintained that certain limitations ofhuman perception and language—referred to as "par-adigm incommensurability"—made it impossible forchoices between rival paradigms to be made on thebasis of human reasoning and empirical evidence.Consider their example of Ptolemy and Copernicus;there was something (both in Galileo's time and now)about human perception and language that absolutelyprevented a rational adjudication between whether thesun revolved around the earth (the "paradigm" ofPtolemy) or the earth revolved around the sun (the"paradigm" of Copernicus). Thus, paradigm incom-mensurability was postulated to thwart all efforts toadjudicate rival scientific claims objectively, and pro-vided KF's (and now Peter's) justification for "rela-tivistic truth"—truth cannot be "properly inferred"outside the context of a paradigm and its respectivetheories.

When asked for the meaning of "incommensura-bility," KF offered three interpretations: (1) the mean-ing/variance view that scientific terms change mean-ing between paradigms, a view critiqued by Shapere(1964), Scheffler (1967), and Kordig (1971), (2) theradical translation view that in some meaningful waythe terms in one paradigm cannot be translated intothe language of its rivals, a view critiqued by Kitcher(1978), Moberg (1979), and Levin (1979), and (3) theincomparability view that rival paradigms cannot bemeaningfully compared, a view critiqued by Schef-fler, Shapere, and Kordig, as well as Laudan (1976)and Putnam (1981). By the end of the debate, Kuhn's(1978) most prominent scholarly work had abandonednot only "incommensurability," but even "para-digm." Moreover, Feyerabend (1987, p. 81) had con-

ceded that incommensurability posed no problem forscience.

How does Peter characterize the incommensura-bility debate? He asserts that persons who critiquedthe concept had committed the philosophers' fallacyof high redefinition and that their analyses were "likely"motivated by their personal status being "threatened,"because any "such acceptance [of incommensurabil-ity] drastically reduces the importance of philosophyof science in society" (p. 77). However, Peter offersno evidence that Scheffler et al. subjected "incom-mensurability" to high redefinition, and for good rea-son—no such process took place. In fact, Scheffleret al. constantly asked Kuhn and Feyerabend for theirmeaning of the concept. Moreover, Peter offers noevidence for his assertion that Scheffler et al. weremotivated by incommensurability's supposed threat totheir discipline's importance. Indeed, Peter's accu-sation amounts to no more than an ad hominem ar-gument. As even an outsider (Levin 1991) has noted,marketing's crisis literature often seems to degenerateto the last refuge of debate—name-calling and adhominem. ("Last refuge," because afterward disputesare settled by means other than debate.) Irrespectiveof the personal motivations of Scheffler et al., theirarguments, being public, can be evaluated on theirmerits. That, Peter does not do.

As previously discussed, the debate centered onthe charge by KF that, because of incommensurabil-ity, science cannot make objective choices amongcompeting knowledge claims. When Peter substitutes"are not purely made" for "cannot be made," a pro-cess called "low redefinition" in philosophy, he com-pletely undercuts any claim that "paradigm incom-mensurability" justifies his "relativistic truth," for (ashe acknowledges) relativistic truth claims that truth"cannot be properly inferred" (p. 14, italics added).If KF had simply claimed, as now with Peter's lowredefinition, that frequently scientists do not choosefrom among rival claims on objective bases, the de-bate probably would not have occurred at all.

Problems of "low redefinition" also plague Peter'suse of the term "relativism." Both "incommensura-bility" and "relativism" are terms that marketing andthe social sciences have borrowed from the technicalvocabulary of philosophy. Now, if it were true thatparadigms are incommensurable (in the philosophy ofscience sense), then this, indeed, would imply rela-tivism. Specifically, it would imply conceptual frame-work relativism: "(1) knowledge or knowledge claimsare relative to conceptual frameworks (theories, par-adigms, world views, or Weltanschauungen) and (2)knowledge or knowledge claims cannot be evaluatedobjectively, impartially, or nonarbitrarily across suchcompeting conceptual frameworks" (Hunt 1990, p. 3).However, when Peter states, "The history of science


indicates that there are occasions when researchers shiftbeliefs from one view to another for reasons other thanformal logic and empirical data," and then refers tothis view as "relativistic" (p. 76), he misleads all readersunaware that "relativism" as a philosophical term im-plies something much, much stronger than his low re-definition characterization. Unlike "high redefini-tion," "low redefinition" is not a fallacy. However,one consequence of marketing going the low redefi-nition route with "relativism" would be that we loseour ability to communicate effectively with knowl-edgeable persons outside marketing—we would be-come linguistically "encapsulated." Do we want this?

On Relativism and Tolerance of MultipleViews

Peter argues that marketing should accept incommen-surability (and, thus, relativism) because it "encour-ages the development of multiple views" (p. 77). Pe-ter's desire to encourage multiple views is laudable,echoing the "critical pluralism" I advocate in "Posi-tivism and Paradigm Dominance" (1991). But, Petermust advocate pluralism despite his relativism, notbecause of it. Even relativist philosophers acknowl-edge that relativism's acceptance can neither encour-age nor discourage the acceptance of "multiple views."Such encouraging or discouraging requires adopting aparticular point of view—that is, multiple views aregood—and such a judgment is precisely what relativ-ism forbids. For example, Harrison (1982), a self-de-scribed relativist philosopher (p. 232), explores whetherrelativism can imply the enlightened acceptance ofothers' views: "Is a belief in relativism a reason forbeing tolerant?" (p. 241). He argues "no" (p. 240-241) on the grounds that relativism's starting point(i.e., the belief that the absence of an absolute stan-dard, a god's-eye view, defeats all efforts to evaluaterival systems of beliefs impartially) implies "one moralsystem [of belief] is as good as another." Therefore,there is simply no way to argue for "an advocacy oftolerance," indeed, "any proposition about appropri-ate levels of tolerance," because no relativist, ai arelativist, "can make a moral judgment." Harrison ac-knowledges that whether "relativists tend to be moreliberal or more tolerant than nonrelativists" is un-known. However, if they are in fact more tolerant itis not because of their acceptance of relativism, butdespite it. Similarly, Rachels (1986, p. 17-18), anonrelativist philosopher, explores whether the accep-tance of relativism leads to an "enlightened" view-point:

Suppose a society waged war on its neighbors for thepurpose of taking slaves. Or suppose a society wasviolently anti-Senrdtic and its leaders set out to de-stroy the Jews. Cultural relativism would preclude usfrom saying that either of these practices was wrong.

We would not even be able to say that a society tol-erant of Jews is better than the anti-Semitic society,for that would imply some sort of transcultural stan-dard of comparison. The failure to condemn thesepractices does not seem "enlightened"; on the con-trary, slavery and anti-Semitism seem wrong wher-ever they occur. Nevertheless, if we took cultural rel-ativism seriously, we would have to admit that thesesocial practices also are immune from criticism [ital-ics added].

Note that Rachels raises the issue of whether per-sons advocating relativism are to be taken "seri-ously." He thus implies that many supposed relativistssimply engage in provocative rhetoric for its own sake.In my judgment, the least we owe those who claimto be relativists and who encourage its acceptance isthe courtesy of taking their writings "seriously." Todo otherwise is both condescending and patronizing.Therefore, if a serious advocate of "relativistic truth"were asked, "Is it true that the earth revolves aroundthe sun?", the only possible reply would be, "Youmust first tell me if you accept the paradigm (or the-ory) of Ptolemy or Copernicus," because: "Truth is asubjective evaluation that cannot be properly inferredoutside the context provided by the theory" (p. 14).Taken "seriously," relativism degenerates to nihilism;it cannot do otherwise.

On Reality

Peter contrasts the relativist view of reality with whathe calls the "realist view" (p. 73). However, becausehis discussion of the "realist view" is similar to ZH'smisperception of it, I can be brief. Peter maintainsthat science must "know with certainty what truly isthe real world" (p. 73) in order to justify the assertionthat any knowledge claim in science "truly representsreality" (p. 73). As discussed previously, scientificrealism rejects the nihilistic view that all claims toknowledge must be grounded on "certainty" or a"god's-eye view." Indeed, scientific realism is falli-bilistic and claims that "the long term success of ascientific theory gives reason to believe that some-thing like the entities and structure postulated by thetheory actually exists" (Hunt 1990, p. 9). Rejectingnihilism hardly seems like a "fallacy," as Peter (p.73) alleges.

Whereas scientific realism contends that the worldexists independently of its being perceived, Peter statesthat "the relativistic view has no problem with thepossibility of an extemal world that is independent ofthe scientist" (p. 73). Readers might wonder why thequalifier "possibility" is used. Elsewhere (p. 78) Peterurges marketers to research such problems as "starv-ing Third World people, the delivery of a reasonablestandard of living to the poor and homeless, the mis-use of drugs, and the spread of AIDS," so why does


he imply that it is only a "possibility" that Third Worldpeople, the poor and homeless, drugs, and AIDS exist"independent of the scientist"? Peter confidentlyspeculates on Scheffier et al.'s motivations in the in-commensurability debate, so why is it only a "pos-sibility" that Scheffier et al. actually have motivationsindependent of Peter?

Peter suggests that "the difference in the relativ-istic perspective is that no interpretation ofthat worldcan be made independently of human sensations, per-ceptions, information processing, feelings, and ac-tions" (p. 74). However, this does not constitute, asPeter alleges, a "difference." Peter is simply incorrectthat scientific realism "fails" to "recognize that hu-man sensations and perceptions are part of science."Indeed, realists are well aware that scientists are hu-man and that their knowledge claims about the worldare influenced by sensations, perceptions, and so forth.Furthermore, it is incorrect that realism cannot "ac-count for their role in the development of scientificknowledge." (In the next section, I briefiy present amodel of how it does so.)

Peter continues (see his Figure 2) by discussingthe scientist's world view, research paradigm, andmental interpretation of reality, and how these factorsproduce a "public construction of reality," which ap-parently refers to all knowledge claims that sciencemakes. However, Peter asserts, "the recognition thatmeanings [of the words in any construction of reality]are socially and culturally determined [e.g., Englishdiffers from Chinese] does not equate relativism withnihilism, solipsism, or incoherence, as charged by Hunt(1990)" (p. 75). Here, without benefit of a direct quo-tation or even a page number from "Truth," it is im-possible to understand what would lead Peter to makethis accusation. I showed how relativism leads to ni-hilism, solipsism, and incoherence by specific argu-ments in "Truth." None of those arguments relied onthe notion that "meanings are socially and culturallydetermined."

Peter continues by stating that the labels we useto identify objects "are not the objects themselves"though they "are easily confused with the phenomenathey are intended to represent" and contends that themeanings of "apples," "trees," "star," and "planet"depend on "theory." Therefore: "In sum, there is notheory-independent way to know what an object is or,indeed, whether it is an object" (p. 75). Though it istrue that words, the labels we use to refer to objects,are not themselves the objects we intend to represent,Peter presents no evidence of any such confusion in"Truth." Furthermore, though the meanings of wordsoften depend significantly on context and sometimesthe context might legitimately be referred to as a "the-ory," it is a non sequitur that "there is no theory-in-dependent way to know what an object is or, indeed.

whether it is an object." First, it is incorrect that ac-curate human recognition (perception) of all objectsdepends on language. We may safely assume (be-cause we are here) that our ancestors, long before thedevelopment of language, recognized lions, tigers, andbears as (dangerous) objects. Second, when humanbeings started communicating with each other throughthe use of language, their use of "lions," "tigers," and"bears" to refer to lions, tigers, and bears requirednothing that might be properly referred to as a "the-ory." Third, even if we (sloppily and inexcusably) ex-tend the word "theory" to mean "a consensus as tothe use of terms in a language community," lions, ti-gers, and bears would be unchanged and still danger-ous even if we were to label them (for example) "bun-nies," "fawns," and "kittens." In conclusion, contraPeter, even in the absence of "theory" we can rec-ognize many objects as objects and know what theyare. Equally important, "labels" and "theory" neithercreate genuine objects nor change their characteris-tics. Why does Peter feel the need to deny the pre-ceding? As we shall see, one possible reason was hintedat when he admitted that the world extemal to the re-searcher is only a "possibility."

When Peter redefined paradigm "incommensura-bility," he seemed to be abandoning relativism. Now(p. 77), however, he is ready to defend his relativism/constructionism vigorously. An example helps to un-derstand his argument in the context of marketing re-search (though Peter "argues in the abstract"). Sup-pose a marketer wants to test two genuinely rivalexplanatory theories, that is, two theories having con-fiicting knowledge claims. Suppose further that boththeories entail the concept "intentions to buy," whichis measured on a scale from 1 (definitely will not pur-chase) to 10 (definitely will purchase). After beingasked to mark the box that "best describes your be-liefs," a subject puts a checkmark in the ninth box.What does this mean? Does "9" relate, refer, or cor-respond to anything extemal to the researcher? Forexample, does "9" in the "intentions to buy" box (fal-libly) give us any information about a consumer's realintentions to buy?

How does Peter's relativism "account for" the "9"?Peter states, "Similarly, empirical data are not equiv-alent to uninterpreted reality" (p. 75). Now, no onewould deny that "9" is not the same as the reality towhich it is intended to relate or refer—the subject'sgenuine intentions to buy. In short, we all agree withPeter that "they are not the phenomena themselves"(p. 75). However, Peter continues, because one needs"an interpretation to guide measure development," then"the meaning of data derived from measures also de-pends entirely on the interpretations scientists give tothem conceming what was measured, how well, andfrom what theoretical perspective" (p. 75). We shouldnote carefully his words, "depends entirely." Subse-


quently in the same paragraph he states that empiricaldata are "entirely dependent on theory" and that"without a theory, empirical data are merely num-bers." In the next paragraph he states that data "arein no sense equivalent to uninterpreted reality."

Why does Peter say "depends entirely" and not"depends"? Why does he say "merely numbers" andnot just "numbers"? Why does he say that data are"in no sense equivalent," rather than "are not equiv-alent"? Three possibilities are apparent. First, if heonly meant "the same as," his view reduces to a banaltriviality. Just as no physician believes that "106" ona fever thermometer is the same as a child's high fe-ver, it would be the height of condescension for Peterto claim that his fellow marketers are so silly or con-fused as to believe that "9" is the same as a high in-tention to buy. Second, he cannot mean that, just as"106" on a fever thermometer is associated with, isan indicant of, or corresponds to a child's high fever,the "9" (if our measurement theory is good, like thatunderlying a fever thermometer) is associated with, isan indicant of, or corresponds to a consumer's inten-tions to buy. In short, he cannot mean that the greaterthe subject's intentions to buy, the higher the numberon our scale. Why "cannot"? Because this view is therealist view being argued against, an example of thevery correspondence theory of truth implied to be a"fairytale" by Peter and Olson (1983, p. 122) and re-ferred to as "naive" by ZH (p. 81). For example, thistheory implies that "the subject checked box 9" is trueif the subject checked box 9. Moreover, it (naively?)assumes that (1) the world exists unperceived, (2) thepurpose of language is communication, and (3) com-munication about the world—including "theories"—may be successful or unsuccessful.

There appears to be only one interpretation left—and I regret to report it. Peter must mean that themeaning of empirical data (e.g., "9") comes only fromthe researcher's theory and not at all from any "un-interpreted reality." For example, the meaning of "9,"its infonnation value, has nothing to do, can havenothing to do, with whatever prompted the subject tocheck "9." Because Peter does not restrict his dis-cussion to just social sciences—indeed, he contendsthat his view reflects that of modem physics (Peterand Olson 1983, p. 120)—the "106" on a fever ther-mometer is just a "created reality" and has nothing,can have nothing, to do with a child's fever (what hecalls "uninterpreted reality" and realists call "the worldexternal to the researcher"). The preceding appears tobe the only nontrivial explanation available of Peter'suse of "entirely" with respect to interpretations of data,his use of "merely" with respect to numbers, and hisuse of "in no sense equivalent" with respect to theexternal world. In short, though Peter admits on page73 the "possibility" of an external world that is in-

dependent of the scientist, by page 75 even this re-mote chance has vanished. Similarly, what Peter calls"uninterpreted reality" in Figure 1 and shows by meansof an arrow as affecting or influencing the process ofscience is now erased. Otherwise, Peter would statethat the meaning of the data derived from measuresdepends in part on the researcher's theory and in parton something external to the theory (e.g., the sub-jects). Why does Peter do this? Because relativism/constructionism requires it.

If Peter acknowledged that the meaning of datawas influenced by both scientists' theories and a worldexternal to their theories, then he would have to ac-knowledge that it is at least possible for scientists'theories, as I put it in "Truth" (p. 3), to "touch base"with some reality external to the theorist. Acknowl-edging that theories can "touch base" with some ex-ternal reality would then imply that some theories mightaccomplish this task better, more accurately, morefaithfully, more genuinely, than others. However, theimplication would be that it is at least possible, justpossible, that some of our theories may be false, andothers may be true, or approximately true, or closerto the truth than others—and that, of course, relativ-ism denies. Therefore, as "Truth" disappeared in ZH'scomment, the external world vanishes in Peter's rel-ativism/constructionism. All philosophies based onthe idealist view that the external world does not existunperceived degenerate into nihilism. And Peter's rel-ativism, as acknowledged by Olson (1982, p. 14),embraces idealism.

On Human Sensations, Perception, andObjectivityPeter (correctly) maintains that "an adequate philos-ophy of science must not only recognize that humansensations and perceptions are part of science, but alsoaccount for their role in the development of scientiflcknowledge" and then complains that "Hunt's inter-pretation of scientific realism fails to do so" (p. 74).Though I did not discuss human sensations and per-ceptions, it is incorrect to state that "scientiflc realismfails to do so." Before showing how scientiflc realism"accounts for" human sensations and perceptions, weshould keep in mind that it is Peter's relativism that"fails to do so." If "perception" implies the interpre-tation of sensations, Peter's relativism justifles "truthis a subjective evaluation" (p. 76) by taking sensa-tions out of science completely and replacing percep-tion with pure interpretation. If the outside world in-fluenced the knowledge claims of science, through"sensations" or other means, it would be at least pos-sible for the truth of a knowledge claim to be objec-tive rather than subjective. However, Peter does raisean issue that should be addressed. Because the dataused for testing theories depend on both measurement

For Reason and Realism in iVIarketing / 9 7

FIGURE 1The Scientific Realist View of Sensations, Perception, and Empirical Testing^

Radiation

Objects(Distal Stimuli)

Sensations(Proximal Stimuli)

Percepts(Observations)

PerceptualMechanisms

NaturalLanguage

Experiences Objects Training LanguageCommunity

Hypotheses

Measures or Data(Epistemlcally Significant

Observations)

MeasurementTheories

Explanatory Theories

Confirmations

Disconfimiations

°An interpretation drawn from the works of Fodor (1984, 1988), Greenwood (1990), Scheffler (1982, 1986), and Shapere (1982).

theory and sensations from the extemal world, doesthis not imply that data are "theory laden" and "truthis a subjective evaluation?" No, it does not; here iswhy.

Addressing the role of human sensations and per-ception in science (without destroying science's ob-jectivity) has occupied numerous philosophers of sci-ence over the last few decades. To date, we know thatKuhn's (1962) belief that the psychology of percep-tion prevents objectivity in science resulted from hismisreading the implications of research in the psy-chology of perception (Fodor 1984, 1988). Likewise,the argument that objectivity is impossible in sciencebecause, in philosophy of science terms, "all epistem-ically significant observations are theory-laden" (Brown1977) has also been refuted by Greenwood (1990) andShapere (1982, 1985). What has not been done, to myknowledge, is to put the arguments together into onecomprehensive model of empirical testing. Figure 1is my interpretation of the current scientific realist viewof sensations, perception, and empirical testing, and,though space limitations preclude a complete expli-cation, a brief synopsis is possible.

Consider our preceding example of a marketertesting two genuinely rival explanatory theories, eachinvolving "intentions to buy." Focusing on the rightside of Figure 1, hypotheses would be explored in thecontext of a particular test procedure (e.g., an exper-iment) requiring data from measures of consumers'"intentions to buy." Depending on whether the ex-periment confirmed or disconfirmed the hypotheses,the test would provide inductive support for the truthor falsity of the explanatory theories being tested. Most

important for our discussion is the process that gen-erates the data (the left side of Figure 1).

Because subjects are asked to put a checkmark inthe box on the questionnaire that "best describes" theirbeliefs on a scale from 1 to 10, the questionnaireswith checkmarks in various boxes constitute what arelabeled "objects" on the far left side of the model.The model proposes that, when radiation within thevisible spectrum is refiected from a questionnaire("distal stimuli" in psychology of perception terms),the result for the researcher is the proximal stimulusof a retinal image, or "sensations." The researcher'sperceptual mechanisms must then (1) perceptuallydiscriminate between proximal stimuli from the en-vironment (e.g., the proximal stimuli resulting fromlight refiected from such disparate distal stimuli asquestionnaires versus newspapers), (2) perceptuallyrecognize patterns of proximal stimuli associated withdistal objects ("this pattern results from light refiectedfrom a questionnaire with checkmarks and that froma newspaper"), and (3) label the recognized patterns("my natural language community calls these patternsof proximal stimuli 'questionnaires with checkmarks'and those 'newspapers'").

Though the basic ability to process proximal stim-uli is universally inborn to (healthy) humans, expe-rience and training play major roles in their devel-opment. We leam to recognize questionnaires andnewspapers by experiencing, in the particular worldwe inhabit, questionnaires and newspapers (or rep-resentations thereof). Furthermore, we are trained bymembers of our language community to label pattemsof proximal stimuli. Therefore, what Figure 1 calls


"percepts" (e.g., "the checkmark is in the ninth box")results from the researcher's sensations being in-formed by perceptual mechanisms and labeled by theuse of natural language. However, percepts do notconstitute "data." Rather, percepts become data onlyafter they have been informed by the researcher'smeasurement theories. For example, á person check-ing the ninth box is theorized to have a higher inten-tion to purchase than one checking the second box.Only after percepts are interpreted by measurementtheories does the researcher have what philosophersrefer to as "epistemically significant observations" andwe call "data." Scientific realism maintains that theempirical testing process adumbrated in Figure 1 canbe objective, but that such objectivity can also becompromised.

How can the objectivity of the process be com-promised? Before addressing this question, it is im-portant to understand the failure of Kuhn et al. (andcontemporary relativists) to recognize exactly what isrequired for empirical testing to be objective. As con-vincingly argued by Shapere (1982, 1985), what isrequired for objectivity is not data that are neutral toall theories (i.e., a god's-eye view); what is requiredis data that are neutral to the particular explanatorytheories being evaluated. Just as truth is not precon-ditioned on knowing TRUTH, objectivity does not re-quire OBJECTIVITY. In our example, the measure-ment theories that inform the researcher's percepts (e.g.,"the checkmark is in the ninth box) to yield data (e.g.,"the subject has high intentions to buy") must not biasthe test for or against one explanatory theory over itsrival. As Greenwood (1990) points out, though somemeasurement theories in some cases of empirical test-ing do prejudge the veracity of one theory over itsrival, it is patently not the case that all measurementtheories in all cases of empirical testing do prejudgeall issues. Thus, "theory informity" or "theory-lad-enness" does not necessarily compromise objectivity.Indeed, good measurement theory, or "theory inform-ity," enables science to be objective. For example,the theory underlying the development of the micro-scope enables us to see small objects better and, hence,objectively choose from among rival theories.

Objectivity could also be threatened if the explan-atory theories to be tested "contaminated" percepts bybiasing the researcher's perceptual mechanisms ornatural language. Recent work in the philosophy ofscience (Fodor 1984, 1988; Gilman 1991) indicatesthat such "contamination" does not take place, but adiscussion of that literature exceeds the scope of thisarticle (see Hunt 1992).

The scientific realist view, as depicted in Figure1, specifically "accounts for" the role of human sen-sations and perception in the conduct of science anddoes so without "assuming away" the external world.

Moreover, the scientific realist view clarifies what isrequired for objectivity in science and demonstrateshow such objectivity is, at least in principle, possible.In short, scientific practice can be objective and, thus,can produce objective knowledge.

On TRUTH and truth

Scientific realism distinguishes between truth andTRUTH—that is, between "this proposition is true"and "I know with certainty this proposition is true."In like manner, it distinguishes between "science isobjective" and "science has the objectivity of a god's-eye view"—that is, "objectivity and OBJECTIV-ITY." Peter sees no distinction between "to know"and "to know with certainty," because "[s]urely, 'toclaim that the world is as the proposition says it is'appears to suggest that the world is unequivocally orcertainly as the proposition says it is" (p. 75). (Withunintended irony, we should note that Peter begins hisassertion with "surely.") Peter is justified in seekingmore information on the epistemological differencesbetween "truth" and "TRUTH." It is now time to doso.

Table 1 displays a continuum of perspectives ontruth, a label for the epistemological position under-lying the perspective, and a series of exemplars. Forexample, dogmatism claims to have found TRUTH.Dogmatists not only know that truth is findable, butthey have found the one and only truth, unequivo-cally, certainly, or surely, and their TRUTH is not tobe questioned. In the philosophy science, both vulgarabsolutism and scientism are exemplars, where theformer refers to a set of beliefs and a set of principlesfor generating beliefs based on a unique privilegedframework that produces incorrigible truth (Siegel 1987,p. 162) and the latter refers to "the unwarranted idol-ization of science as the sole authority of truth andsource of knowledge" (Angelis 1981, p. 251). Ex-emplars of dogmatism in political philosophy includeNazism and Marxism.

At the extreme left of Table 1, we fmd the TRUTHof dogmatic skepticism. "Skepticism" comes from theGreek skeptesthai, meaning "to examine" or "to lookcarefully about" and the Greek skeptikos, meaning"thoughtful" and "curious." Therefore, skepticism canbe a healthy attitude of suspending belief, pendingthoughtful, reflective, examination. However, dog-matic skepticism claims to have incorrigibly, cer-tainly, surely found the one and only TRUTH—thatis, there is no truth to be found. Both academic skep-ticism, the belief that "there is but one thing one canknow, namely that one can know nothing else" (Wat-kins 1984, p. 3), and solipsistic skepticism, the po-sition that all one can know is "(a) that one exists and(b) that one is having certain ideas" (Angelis 1981,.


TABLE 1The Truth Continuum

Dogmatic Skepticism(TRUTH)

Academic skepticismSolipsistic skepticismRelativismIdealismSubjectivismConstructionismDeconstructionismNeo-MarxismCritical theory

HumeanSkepticism

(truth)

Logical positivismLogical empiricismCritical rationalismFalsificationismInstrumentalism

Faiiibiiism(truth)

Scientific realismCritical realismCritical pluralismNaturalism

Dogmatism(TRUTHS

Vulgar absolutismScientismFundamentalismTheocracyMarxismNazismFascism

p. 262), are philosophy of science examples of dog-matic skepticism.

It seems that marketing versions of relativism haveembraced academic and solipsistic skepticism and theirone TRUTH—that is, nothing is knowable (becauseof incommensurability, etc). Curiously, however,throughout marketing's crisis literature we find suchassertions as "objectivity is impossible," "scientistsdon't discover anything about the world," "intellec-tualization in marketing is inexorable, " "the results ofresearch based on hypothetico-deductive method areillusory," "reality is all mental and perceptual," andso on. Unlike the knowledge claims found in tradi-tional marketing research (where, quite properly, cau-tions of the "don't overgeneralize" variety abound),crisis literature claims are customarily put forth withbold certitude, great emphasis, and total lack ofequivocation. As Calder and Tybout (1989, p. 203)question, how can crisis literature writers know suchclaims? If the absence of a "god's-eye view" suppos-edly defeats all efforts to know even highly qualifiedstochastic propositions or tendency laws in traditionalmarketing research, what unique privileged positionjustifies the certitude embodied in the crisis litera-ture's sweeping generalizations? The answer is, ofcourse, that there can be none—the crisis literature isbest described as dogmatic skepticism.

Between the extremes in Table 1 lies the accep-tance of "truth" by persons embracing Humean skep-ticism and fallibilism. In the philosophy of science,both the logical positivists and logical empiricists em-braced Humean skepticism, whereas scientific realistsreject it. Though science can exist within a positivistframework (as the "Copenhagen" interpretation ofquantum mechanics and behaviorist psychology at-test), most scientific disciplines and their researchprograms require a much bolder ontology than posi-tivist "observables" (Levin 1991; Manicas 1987). In-deed, many science scholars (e.g.. Fay 1988) nowcontend that, positivist rhetoric notwithstanding, evenresearchers and research programs that claim to be

"positivist" are mostly realist. One reason is that theontology of scientific realism has heuristic value forgenerating new hypotheses and theories, whereas pos-itivism is heuristically impotent (Levin 1991). At anypoint in time, science can be interpreted in a positivistmanner but, to move forward, science seems to re-quire realism.

ConclusionPeter's conclusion (p. 77) returns to the issue of re-searchers' motivations by pejoratively speculating, "Infact, scientific realism may be attractive to many mar-keting researchers because it supports and reinforcescurrent research practices and prejudices rather thanencouraging change in the field." A common accu-sation throughout the social science crisis literature isthat scientific realism seeks to maintain the "preju-dices" of the "status quo." Realist philosophers needno defense from me, nor am I privy to their innermostmotivations. However, the motivations of some in thecrisis literature are in the public domain. For example,Feyerabend, who is probably the most commonly citedphilosopher of science in marketing's crisis literatureand who (in the spirit of tolerance?) refers to thosephilosophers who disagree with him as "ratiofas-cists," "illiterates," "academic rodents," "autistic in-tellectuals," and "professional incompetents" (1978,p. 183, 195, 209; 1982, p. 191; 1987, p. 315), quitecandidly discusses his agenda. For Feyerabend (1987,p. 297), science is a distinctly Western enterprise and"Western science has now infected the whole worldlike a contagious disease" and this infection has "causedenormous damage." Feyerabend (p. 5) identifies "twoideas that have often been used to make Western ex-pansion intellectually respectable—the idea of Reasonand the idea Objectivity." Therefore, just as criticalrelativism admonishes the abandonment of truth,Feyerabend maintains that Reason and Objectivity mustalso be abandoned, concluding his book with:"FAREWELL TO REASON" (p. 319). Similarly, in

100/Journal of Marketing, April 1992

marketing's crisis literature, Firat (1989, p. 96) dis-cusses his agenda. He contends that, because science"is a political institution" that has "become anti-changeand reactionary," it may be desirable to "erase theaccumulation of scientific knowledge."

Though I admire Feyerabend's and Firat's candor,consistency, and courage of convictions, I share nei-ther their beliefs about science as an institution northeir prescriptions for change. The realism that I ad-vocate neither defends the status quo in marketing be-cause it is the status quo nor proposes change for thesake of change. Indeed, the central lesson of this cen-

tury has been that revolutionary changes are not nec-essarily for the good. The realism I advocate defendsonly human reason, its use in academic discourse, itsapplication to evidence, and its potential for helpingus understand the world we inhabit. The twin pillarsof the university, at least as a Westem societal insti-tution, are the tolerance of altemative views and theconviction that all views must be subjected to an eval-uation that is civilly reasoned. Therefore, though allviews merit civil assessment, not all views are meri-torious when civilly assessed. So it is with the viewlabeled "relativism/constructionism. "

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