Shareholder Lawsuit re Xerox-ACS Deal

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    shareholders will receive a total of $18.60 per share in cash plus 4.935 Xerox stock for each ACS

    share they own.

    3. As described below, both the value to ACS shareholders contemplated in the

    Merger and the process by which Defendants propose to consummate the Merger are

    fundamentally unfair to Plaintiffs and the other public shareholders of the Company.

    Defendants conduct constitutes a breach of the Individual Defendants fiduciary duties owed to

    ACSs public shareholders, and a violation of applicable legal standards governing Defendants

    conduct.

    4. For these reasons and as set forth in detail herein, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin

    Defendants from approving the Merger or, in the event the Merger is consummated, recover

    damages resulting from Defendants violations of their fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith,

    due care, and full and fair disclosure.

    PARTIES

    5. Plaintiff currently holds shares of common stock of ACS and has held such shares

    since prior to the wrongs complained of herein.

    6. ACS, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business at 2828 North

    Haskell Avenue, Dallas, Texas 75204, is a provider of business process outsourcing and

    information technology services to commercial and government clients. For the fiscal year

    ending June 30, 2009, total revenues rose to $6.5 billion. The Companys stock is traded on the

    New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) under the symbol ACS.

    7. Defendant Darwin Deason (Deason), one of the Companys founders, has

    served as Chairman of the Companys Board of Directors (the Board) since its formation in

    1988. Deason also served as the Companys Chief Executive Officer (CEO) from 1988 until

    February 1999. Deason controls 43.6% of the total voting power of the Company as a result of

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    his ownership of 2.99% of the total shares of Class A Common stock and 100% of Class B

    Common stock. In connection with the Merger, Deason entered into a Voting Agreement, dated

    as of September 27, 2009 (the Voting Agreement), with Xerox, pursuant to which, among

    other things, he agreed to vote his shares in favor of the adoption of the Merger and against any

    takeover bid by a third party.

    8. Defendant Lynn Blodgett (Blodgett) has served as a Director of ACS since

    September 2005. Blodgett also serves as the Companys President and CEO. Prior to assuming

    his current responsibilities, he served as the Companys Executive Vice President and Chief

    Operating Officer. Blodgett joined ACS upon the 1996 acquisition of Unibase, a company he

    co-founded with his brother.

    9. Defendant Kurt R. Krauss (Krauss) has served as a Director of ACS since

    November 2007. Krauss was a partner with Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH). He also served on

    BAHs Board of Directors and Executive Committee and the Board of Loudeye Corporation

    alongside defendant Frank Varasano

    10. Defendant Paul E. Sullivan (Sullivan) has served as a Director of ACS since

    February 2008.

    11. Defendant Frank Varasano (Varasano) has served as a Director of ACS since

    November 2007. Prior to that, Varasano held several senior management positions during his

    26-year tenure at BAH, including Senior Vice President of BAHs Engineering and

    Manufacturing practice. He also served on BAHs Board of Directors and Executive Committee

    along with defendant Krauss. Varasano also served as a director of Loudeye Corporation with

    defendant Krauss.

    12. Defendant Robert Allan Druskin (Druskin) has served as a Director of ACS

    since March 2008.

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    13. Defendant Ted B. Miller, Jr., (Miller) has served as a Director of ACS since

    November 2007.

    14. Defendants Deason, Blodgett, Krauss, Sullivan, Varasano, Druskin, and Miller

    are sometimes referred to herein as the Individual Defendants.

    15. Defendant Xerox is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business

    located at 45 Clover Avenue, Norwalk, Connecticut 06856. Xerox is the worlds leading

    document management technology and services enterprise, providing one of the document

    industrys broadest portfolio of color and black-and-white document processing systems and

    related supplies, as well as document management consulting and outsourcing services. Its stock

    is traded on the NYSE exchange under the symbol XRX.

    16. Defendant Boulder Acquisition Corp. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Xerox.

    17. Defendants Xerox and Boulder Acquisition Corp., are sometimes referred to

    herein as Xerox.

    THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS

    18. By reason of the Individual Defendants positions with the Company as officers

    and/or directors, said individuals are in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff and the other public

    shareholders of ACS and owe Plaintiff and the other members of the Class a duty of highest

    good faith, fair dealing, loyalty and full and candid disclosure.

    19. By virtue of their positions as directors and/or officers of ACS, the Individual

    Defendants, at all relevant times, had the power to control and influence, and did control and

    influence and cause ACS to engage in the practices complained of herein.

    20. Each of the Individual Defendants is required to act in good faith, in the best

    interests of the Companys shareholders and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as

    would be expected of an ordinarily prudent person. In a situation where the directors of a

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    publicly traded company undertake a transaction that may result in a change in corporate control,

    the directors must take all steps reasonably required to maximize the value shareholders will

    receive rather than use a change of control to benefit themselves, and to disclose all material

    information concerning the proposed change of control to enable the shareholders to make an

    informed voting decision. To diligently comply with this duty, the directors of a corporation

    may not take any action that:

    (a) adversely affects the value provided to the corporations shareholders;

    (b) contractually prohibits them from complying with or carrying out their

    fiduciary duties;

    (c) discourages or inhibits alternative offers to purchase control of the

    corporation or its assets; or

    (d) will otherwise adversely affect their duty to search for and secure the best

    value reasonably available under the circumstances for the corporations shareholders.

    21. Plaintiff alleges herein that the Individual Defendants, separately and together, in

    connection with the Merger, violated duties owed to Plaintiff and the other public shareholders

    of ACS, including their duties of loyalty, good faith and independence, insofar as they engaged

    in self-dealing and obtained for themselves personal benefits, including personal financial

    benefits, not shared equally by Plaintiff or the public shareholders of ACS common stock (the

    Class).

    CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

    22. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 23, individually

    and on behalf of the Class. The Class specifically excludes Defendants herein, and any person,

    firm, trust, corporation or other entity related to, or affiliated with, any of the Defendants.

    23. This action is properly maintainable as a class action.

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    24. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of

    August 20, 2009, ACS had in excess of 91 million shares of Class A common stock and 6.5

    million shares of Class B common stock outstanding. Members of the Class are scattered

    throughout the United States and are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before

    this Court.

    25. Questions of law and fact exist that are common to the Class, including, among

    others:

    (a) whether the Individual Defendants have fulfilled and are capable of

    fulfilling their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and the Class;

    (b) whether the Individual Defendants have engaged and continue to engage

    in a scheme to benefit themselves at the expense of ACS shareholders in violation of their

    fiduciary duties;

    (c) whether the Individual Defendants are acting in furtherance of their own

    self interest to the detriment of the Class;

    (d) whether Defendants have disclosed and will disclose all material facts in

    connection with the Merger; and

    (e) whether Plaintiff and the other members of the Class will be irreparably

    damaged if Defendants are not enjoined from continuing the conduct described herein.

    26. Plaintiff is committed to prosecuting this action and has retained competent

    counsel experienced in litigation of this nature. Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of the

    other members of the Class and Plaintiff has the same interests as the other members of the

    Class. Accordingly, Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class and will fairly and

    adequately protect the interests of the Class.

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    27. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would

    create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the

    Class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants, or adjudications

    with respect to individual members of the Class which would, as a practical matter, be

    dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially

    impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.

    28. Preliminary and final injunctive relief on behalf of the Class as a whole is entirely

    appropriate because Defendants have acted, or refused to act, on grounds generally applicable

    and causing injury to the Class.

    SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS

    A. Background

    29. Originally founded in 1988 as Affiliated Computer Systems, Inc, the Company

    started out as a financial data processing company designed to capitalize on a developing new

    trend to outsource information processing requirements to third parties. Such outsourcing

    allowed businesses to focus on core operations, respond to rapidly changing technologies and

    reduce data processing expenses.

    30. Under the helm of its founder, defendant Deason, ACS pursued an aggressive

    growth through acquisition strategy. In one of its first acquisitions, ACS acquired the data

    processing and electronic funds transfer operations of First Texas Gibraltar expanding into more

    and diverse services offered. ACS further diversified and expanded out of banking services

    when it signed a 10-year data processing outsourcing contract with Southland Corp.

    31. In its first two years alone, acquisitions accounted for an estimated 70 percent of

    the Companys growth. Revenue in its first fiscal year ending June 30, 1989, was $74 million.

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    One year later, revenue for 1990 doubled to nearly $150 million. By 1993, ACSs revenues

    nearly double again to $271 million.

    32. On September 27, 1994, ACS went public as Affiliated Computer Services, Inc.,

    offering 2.3 million shares of stock on the NASDAQ at $16 per share.

    33. At the time it went public, ACSs principal line of business was providing ATM

    services to banks. By mid-1996 ACS claimed to have more than 5,000 ATMs deployed. The

    Company also provided a range of information processing services, including data processing

    services for retailers, wholesale distributors, hospitals, and transportation companies.

    34. In 1996, ACS acquired Unibase Technologies Inc, founded by defendant Blodgett

    and his family. The acquisition expanded ACSs capabilities in the business-process outsourcing

    (BPO) services market and created a service segment dedicated to delivering business process

    solutions.

    35. In 1997 and 1998 ACS made two major acquisitions that gave it a strong presence

    serving state and local governments, including, respectively, the acquisition of Computer Data

    Systems of Rockville, Maryland, a major systems integrator for federal agencies for $373 million

    and BRC Holdings Inc., which specialized in providing automated record-keeping services to

    state and local governments.

    36. For fiscal 1999, ACS reported revenue ballooned to $1.64 billion. Approximately

    one-third of the Companys revenue came from government clients.

    37. In light of the dramatic rise of revenues in revenues for BPO services, in 2000

    ACS established a new division for BPO. The new BPO division consolidated a variety of

    outsourcing services, such as processing insurance claims, a task that was accomplished in part

    by 3,000 employees working in Guatemala and Mexico. ACS estimated that BPO would account

    for $950 million in fiscal 2000, or about half of the Companys revenue. The BPO division also

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    signed a $56 million contract with Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae)

    to support the governments mortgage-backed securities program over a three-year period. These

    services include data analysis and systems administration, maintenance, and enhancement

    services of Ginnie Maes proprietary systems and applications software.

    38. Since its inception in 1988, ACS had completed more than 50 acquisitions

    through the end of fiscal 2000. This aggressive growth strategy also resulted in a dramatic

    increase in revenues and net income. For fiscal 2000 ACS reported revenue of $1.96 billion and

    net income of $109.3 million.

    39. In 2002, the Company was named, for the second year in a row, as one of the

    most promising BPO companies by Forbes Magazine. Forbes noted that ACS was a leader in the

    business-to-business BPO market and was truly positioned as a tier one player. The magazine

    called ACS the outsourcer to watch and said the company is a fast-growing up-and-comer.

    According to Forbes, as corporate tech spending stalled that year, many companies suffered

    sagging revenues and stock prices. Despite the reduction in spending, there remained bright

    spots in the technology sector in areas such as BPO services, and niche offerings such as

    customer relationship management and supply chain management, areas vital for corporate cost

    reduction, increased quality and greater productivity. This was illustrated when the Company

    reported revenue of $3.79 billion and net income of $306.8 million for fiscal 2003.

    40. During fiscal year 2006 the Board of Directors authorized a modified Dutch

    Auction tender offer (the Tender Offer) to purchase up to 55.5 million shares of the

    Companys Class A common stock. That Tender Offer was completed in March 2006 and

    7.4 million shares of Class A common stock were purchased in the Tender Offer. In connection

    with the Tender Offer, defendant Deason entered into a voting agreement with the Company

    dated February 9, 2006 in which he agreed to limit his ability to cause the additional voting

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    power he would hold as a result of the Tender Offer to affect the outcome of any matter

    submitted to the vote of the stockholders of the Company after consummation of the Tender

    Offer.

    41. On December 7, 2007, the Board of the Directors approved an amendment of the

    voting agreement, to provide that Deasons voting power with respect to 1,989,864 shares of

    Class A common stock and 6,599,372 shares of Class B common stock held by him as of

    December 7, 2007, would not exceed 45% as a result of share repurchases by the Company

    pursuant to the Companys share repurchase program.

    42. Most recently, the Company has once again performed well under the current

    economic climate. For example, on April 30, 2009, the Company reported strong earnings

    results for the Third Quarter and Nine Months Ended March 31, 2009 that beat analysts'

    expectations as the Company signed new contracts at a record pace. For the quarter, the

    Company reported sales of $1.61 billion, up from $1.54 billion in the same period last year and

    net profit of $93.2 million, or 95 cents per share, from $82.6 million, or 85 cents per share, a year

    ago. Excluding certain charges, earnings per share came in at $1. Analysts had been expecting

    a profit of 93 cents per share. For the nine months, the Company reported net income of

    $252,396,000 or $2.58 earnings per share diluted, pretax profit of $407,988,000 on revenues of

    $4,826,953,000 against net income of $230,378,000 or $2.32 earnings per share diluted, pretax

    profit of $351,565,000 on revenues of $4,546,895,000 against a year ago. Commenting on the

    results, defendant Blodgett stated:

    [O]ur business demonstrated remarkable performance in the current economicclimate. We signed a record level of new business, we grew revenues and profit,and generated the highest level of adjusted earnings per share in history. Theseresults can be attributed to diverse client base, hard working employees andresilient business model which continues to perform at a very high level.

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    43. In an interview, as reported by the Dallas Morning News (April 30, 2009),

    defendant Blodgett reiterated: To me, the future is very bright, . . . We're very, very bullish.

    44. Furthermore, on the April 30, 2009, third quarter fiscal year 2009 earnings

    conference call, defendant Blodgett stated:

    I am very proud of ACS and our performance this quarter. At a time when mostcompanies are seeing a slowdown in new business opportunities, we posted thehighest booking quarter in our history at $342 million of annual recurringrevenue. In an environment where our peer group showed revenue declines ofmid-single digits, we grew 5%, excluding divestitures. Our adjusted marginsincreased to 11.3%; and finally, we posted the highest adjusted EPS in our historyat $1.00.

    45. Similarly, on August 6, 2009, ACS announced record results for the Fourth

    Quarter and Full Year Ended June 30, 2009. Fourth quarter fiscal year 2009 revenues of $1.70

    billion, represented a 6% increase, compared to the prior year quarter Fourth quarter new

    business signings were the second highest in the Companys history and totaled $271 million of

    annual recurring revenue with an estimated total contract value of $1.2 billion. Total contract

    value of all signings, including new business signings, renewals and non-recurring revenue, was

    $2.2 billion for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2009. Adjusted net income was $97.1 million or

    $0.99 per diluted share against $93.1 million or $0.95 per diluted share for the same period a

    year ago. Net cash provided by operating activities was $426 million against $267 million for the

    same period a year ago. Free cash flow was $326 million against $177 million for the same

    period a year ago.

    46. For the full year, the Company reported operating income of $686 million, pretax

    profit of $554.23 million and net income of $345 million or $3.57 per diluted share on revenues

    of $6,523.16 million against operating income of $645.1 million, pretax profit of $496.2 million

    and net income of $329.01 million or $3.32 per diluted share on revenues of $6,160.6 million for

    the same period a year ago.

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    52. In connection with the execution of the Merger Agreement, defendant Deason,

    owner of 43.6% of the outstanding voting power of ACS as of September 28, 2009, entered into

    a voting agreement, dated as of September 27, 2009 (the Voting Agreement), with Xerox,

    pursuant to which, among other things, Deason agreed to vote his shares in favor of the adoption

    of the Merger Agreement and against any takeover bid by a third party. The Voting Agreement

    is subject to limitations if the ACS board of directors changes its recommendation with respect to

    the Merger.

    53. Pursuant to the Merger Agreement, at the effective time of the Merger, each

    outstanding share of ACSs Class A common stock, other than shares owned by Xerox, Merger

    Sub, or ACS and other than those shares with respect to which appraisal rights are properly

    exercised and not withdrawn will be cancelled and converted into the right to receive a

    combination of (i) 4.935 shares of common stock of Xerox and (ii) $18.60 in cash, without

    interest.

    54. Additionally each outstanding share of Class B common stock of ACS (of which

    defendant Deason owns 100%), will be converted into the right to receive (i) 4.935 shares of

    Common Stock, (ii) $18.60 in cash, without interest and (iii) a fraction of a share of a new series

    of convertible preferred stock to be issued by Xerox and designated as Series A Convertible

    Perpetual Preferred Stock (Convertible Preferred Stock) equal to (x) 300,000 divided by (y)

    the number of shares of Class B common stock of ACS issued and outstanding as of the effective

    time of the merger. The Convertible Preferred Stock is anticipated to carry an annual cumulative

    dividend of 8%. Additionally, each share of Convertible Preferred Stock may be converted at

    any time, at the option of the holder, into 89.8876 shares of Common Stock (which reflects an

    initial conversion price of approximately $11.125 per share of Common Stock, which is a 25%

    premium over $8.90, which was the average closing price of the Common Stock over the 7-

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    trading day period ended on September 14, 2009), subject to customary anti-dilution

    adjustments. On or after the fifth anniversary of the issue date, Xerox will have the right, at its

    option, to cause, under certain circumstances, any or all of the Convertible Preferred Stock to be

    converted into shares of Common Stock at the then applicable conversion rate.

    55. The Merger Agreement also provides that, upon termination under specified

    circumstances, the Company would be required to pay Xerox a termination fee of up to $194

    million.

    56. In connection with the announcement of the Merger, defendant Deason stated:

    When ACS was founded, we had a vision of becoming a best-in-class company by working harder than our competitors. More than 20 years and 74,000employees later, as the world's top BPO company, we have now found a partnerto help us reach even greater heights, . . . This is a tremendous outcome for ourshareholders driven by the commitment of a strong management team andincredibly dedicated employees. At closing, I will become one of the combinedcompany's largest individual shareholders, and I intend to remain a long-terminvestor because I could not be more optimistic about the future of the combinedcompany.

    57. Moreover, Ursula M. Burns, Xeroxs CEO stated:

    By combining Xerox's strengths in document technology with ACS's expertise inmanaging and automating work processes, we're creating a new class of solution provider, . . . A game-changer for Xerox, acquiring ACS helps us expand ourbusiness and benefit from stronger revenue and earnings growth.

    Xerox becomes a $22 billion global company, of which $17 billion is recurringrevenue - a significant boost to our profitable annuity stream, . . . The revenue wegenerate from services will triple from $3.5 billion in 2008 to an estimated $10billion next year.

    58. The consideration offered to ACSs public stockholders in the Merger is unfair

    and grossly inadequate because, among other things, the intrinsic value of ACSs common stock

    is materially in excess of the amount offered for those securities in the proposed acquisition

    given the Companys prospects for future growth and earnings.

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    59. According to a research note by Credit Swiss on September 28, 2009, Xeroxs

    $6.4 billion offer for ACS values the Company at 14x current year 2010 Earnings Per Share

    (EPS) estimates of $4.51. By comparison, Dell, Inc. is paying a 68% premium, or about 30x

    EPS for Perot Systems Corporation. Moreover, Hewlett-Packard Companys acquisition of

    Electronic Data Systems Corporation last year was valued at 16x EPS.

    60. On September 28, 2009, Bloombergreported that the Merger will help [Xerox]

    expand into a market Xerox values at about $150 billion and gives [Xerox] a foothold in

    managing administrative operations for multiple arms of the U.S. government. Moreover,

    according to analyst firm NelsonHall, the BPO market is forecast to hit $450 billion by 2012.

    61. Although the Individual Defendants are duty-bound to protect the interests of

    ACS shareholders by obtaining the maximum value reasonably available in any sale or merger of

    the Company, Defendants entered into the Merger at a woefully inadequate price. Despite the

    insufficient consideration offered in the Merger, certain of the Individual Defendants and certain

    executive officers of ACS stand to receive lucrative payments upon consummation of the

    Merger, including the automatic vesting and triggering of cash payments associated with stock

    options and restricted stock, as well as change-in-control payments.

    62. While the Individual Defendants were negotiating the Merger, they also arranged

    for the continued employment of certain defendants and executives of ACS with Xerox.

    63. Specifically ACS, which will operate as an independent organization and initially

    will be branded ACS, a Xerox Company, will be led by defendant Blodgett who will report to

    Ursula Burns, Xeroxs CEO.

    64. Additionally, on September 27, 2009, ACS and Xerox entered into Senior

    Executive Agreements (the Executive Agreements) with defendant Blodgett, Tom Burlin

    (ACSs Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer), John Rexford (ACSs Executive

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    Vice President for Corporate Development), Kevin Kyser (ACSs Executive Vice President and

    Chief Financial Officer) and Tom Blodgett (ACSs chief operating officer of ACSs commercial

    operations and brother of defendant Blodgett). The Executive Agreements provide that the

    executive officers listed above will be eligible to receive aggregate retention payments generally

    equal to the payments each executive officer would have otherwise been entitled to receive

    immediately upon the effective time of the Merger under his prior change of control agreement

    with ACS (or in the case of defendant Blodgett, under his prior employment agreement with

    ACS).

    65. These retention payments equal $5,013,300, $3,104,100, $2,664,354, $2,224,605

    and $2,835,129, respectively (plus, in each case, an amount equal to a pro-rata portion of the

    target annual bonuses based upon the percentage of the fiscal year which expires as of the date

    of the Merger), 30% of which will be paid upon the second anniversary of the effective time of

    the Merger and 70% of which will be paid upon the third anniversary of the effective time of the

    Merger (except for Mr. Kysers payments, which will be paid in three equal installments on each

    of the first three anniversaries of the effective time of the Merger), subject to the executive

    officers continued employment on such dates.

    66. In addition, with respect to stock options to purchase ACS common stock granted

    to each of the executive officers in August 2009 (which will be converted into stock options to

    purchase Xerox common stock pursuant to the Merger Agreement), each executive officer

    agreed to waive accelerated vesting of such stock options, and they will instead vest according to

    their regular vesting schedule, subject to accelerated vesting upon the achievement of certain

    performance goals. Additionally, the Executive Agreements provide for an initial grant of

    performance shares with respect to Xerox common stock. The target value of the performance

    shares will equal each executive officers annual rate of base salary, and the performance shares

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    will vest upon the third anniversary of the effective time of the Merger, subject to achieving

    specified performance goals. In addition, the vesting of the August 2009 stock options will fully

    accelerate, and the vesting of the performance shares will accelerate on a prorated basis based

    upon actual performance, in the event the executive officer is terminated without cause or for

    good reason, or due to death or disability (with full vesting of the performance shares at target

    in the event of death). The Executive Agreements also provide for health and welfare benefits

    during continued employment through the end of 2012 (and continued coverage through the third

    anniversary of the Merger in the event of termination without cause or for good reason prior to

    the third anniversary of the Merger), participation in Xeroxs equity incentive plans during

    continued employment, outplacement services for 1 year in the event of termination without

    cause or for good reason prior to the third anniversary of the Merger, continued directors and

    officers liability insurance until the fifth anniversary of the Merger and a golden parachute

    excise tax gross-up payment, which each executive officer is already entitled to receive pursuant

    to his employment agreement or change of control agreement with ACS.

    67. Additionally, ACS, Xerox and defendant Deason entered into a Separation

    Agreement (the Separation Agreement). The Separation Agreement provides that upon

    consummation of the Merger, Deason will resign as Chairman of ACS. The Separation

    Agreement further provides that until May 18, 2014, Deason will receive base salary and annual

    bonus continuation payments, at his current annual rate of base salary ($1,017,437) and at his

    current target annual bonus ($2,543,591.20), health and welfare benefits (subject to earlier

    cessation of such health and welfare benefits if Deason becomes employed by a new employer in

    certain circumstances), home office support and, subject to certain limitations, his current

    perquisites and fringe benefits. In addition, Deason will be entitled to continued Directors and

    Officers liability insurance through May 18, 2014 (and throughout the period of any applicable

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    statute of limitation), additional service and age credits through May 18, 2004 for purposes of

    determining eligibility under the Companys post-retirement welfare benefits, to be reimbursed

    for any incremental taxation he incurs on such entitlements by virtue of no longer being an

    employee, and to tax gross up payments for any golden parachute excise taxes incurred by him

    pursuant to Section 4999 of the Internal Revenue Code. The Separation Agreement generally

    preserves Deasons rights under his current Amended and Restated Employment Agreement with

    the Company, dated December 7, 2007 and amended as of December 30, 2008 (the Deason

    Employment Agreement). Also, pursuant to the Deason Employment Agreement, Deason

    became entitled to a change of control payment upon the approval of the Merger by the Board of

    Directors of ACS.

    68. Under the employment agreement, Deason will be entitled to a payment if:

    (i) ACS undergoes a consolidation or merger in which ACS is not the surviving company or in

    which ACSs common stock is converted into cash, securities or other property such that holders

    of ACS common stock do not have the same proportionate ownership of the surviving

    companys common stock as they held of ACS common stock prior to the merger or

    consolidation; (ii) ACS sells, leases or transfers all or substantially all of the Companys assets to

    a company in which ACS owns less than 80% of the outstanding voting securities; (iii) ACS

    adopts or implements a plan or proposal for ACSs liquidation; (iv) a person or entity (other than

    one or more trusts established by ACS for the benefit of the Companys employees) becomes the

    beneficial owner of 20% or more of ACS outstanding common stock; or (v) during any period of

    24 consecutive months there is a turnover of a majority of the Board of Directors.

    69. The benefit to be received by Deason upon a change of control event includes a

    lump sum payment, equal to:

    (a) the number of years (including partial years) remaining under his employmentagreement times the sum of (i) his per annum base salary at the time of the change

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    of control, plus (ii) the greater of (x) his bonus for the immediately precedingfiscal year or (y) the average of his bonus for the immediately preceding twofiscal years, plus (b) his target bonus for the then-current fiscal year, pro rated toreflect the number of days the executive was employed by us in that fiscal year.Among other things, the employment agreement also provides that we will, (a) for

    up to three years following Deasons termination of employment, continue to(i) provide insurance (medical, dental, life insurance, disability and accidentaldeath and dismemberment) benefits to the executive at the highest level ofcoverage provided to Deason prior to the change of control until the executivesecures employment that provides replacement insurance and (ii) provideinsurance benefits to the executive to the extent any new insurance the executivereceives from a subsequent employer does not cover a pre-existing condition, and(b) provide outplacement counseling assistance and (c) maintain directors andofficers liability insurance on behalf of the executive, at the level in effectimmediately prior to the change of control, for the three (3) year period followingthe change of control, and throughout the period of any applicable statute of

    limitations. Under the employment agreement, we will also pay accrued butunpaid compensation and deferred compensation upon termination ofemployment. Also, when determining Deasons eligibility for post-retirement benefits under any welfare benefit plan, he will be credited with three years of participation and age credit. Deason will also become vested in the benefitsprovided under any Company retirement or successor plan.

    70. In the Companys Proxy Statement, Schedule 14A, filed on April 14, 2009, it was

    estimated that the Change of Control benefits, including: (i) the estimated amounts of cash

    compensation and the estimated value of non cash benefits per the terms of the employment and

    change of control agreements, as well as the Supplemental Executive Retirement Agreement for

    Deason; (ii) the estimated excise tax amounts based on the cash and non cash benefits and the

    values attributable to the accelerated vesting of stock options under Rev. Proc. 2003-68; and

    (iii) the vesting of unvested stock options, assuming a change of control on June 30, 2008 (and

    the closing price of $53.49 for the Class A shares on that date), payable at June 30, 2008,

    amounted to $43,803,934.

    71. In addition to the Change of control payments, on September 29, 2009, the Wall

    Street Journalreported that defendant Deason will net approximately $800 million in a mix of

    cash and Xerox stock, citing a person familiar with the matter. According to the article:

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    [Deason] will receive about $167 million in cash and Xerox stock for his Class Aand B shares. There is also a special sweetener of $300 million in convertible preferred Xerox stock for his Class B ACS shares. (Deasons Class B sharesessentially give him voting control over the company). In addition, Deasonreceives 44 million in Xerox common stock, which today is worth about $325

    million . . .

    72. Moreover, defendant Deason has structured the Merger to obtain a premium over

    and above what the public shareholders of ACS will receive, despite agreeing to limit his voting

    power to 45%. On September 29, 2009, theNY Times reported:

    Mr. Deason, who owns 6.6 million class B shares with 10 votes each, will receivean additional $300 million in Xerox convertible preferred. This works out to $45per class B share and an additional $32 a share for all of Mr. Deasons holdings

    above the class A price.

    In comparison, the public shareholders are receiving $63.11 a share. Note that allof these prices came at the time of the announcement. Xeroxs shares declined 14percent on Monday, lowering these amounts.

    This is still approximately a 50 percent premium for Mr. Deason over the publicshareholders, a premium paid to a man who was a buyer two and a half years ago,albeit at a slightly lower price.

    Such dual-class differential payments are not common and often heavilycriticized. The most recent one I can remember is Constellation Brandsacquisition of the Robert Mondavi Corporation in 2004. In Delaware, though,they are allowed as a premium paid for control. But in this case, Mr. Deason doesnot have true control since he is limited by an agreement with the company to a45 percent ownership or voting stake.

    73. Under the circumstances, however, the Individual Defendants are obligated to

    explore all alternatives to maximize shareholder value.

    74. Moreover, the Merger suffers from serious conflicts of interests. The press

    release announcing the Merger notes that Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (Citigroup) served as

    one of the financial advisors to ACS. Citigroup, however, has a close working relationship with

    Xerox that compromises its independence as adviser to ACS. In 2007, it was reported that

    Citigroup served as one of the Joint Bookrunning Managers and several other participating

    underwriters in connection with Xerox Corporation's registered offering of $1.1 billion of senior

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    notes. In 2008, it was reported that Citigroup served as one of the underwriters in connection

    with Xerox's registered offering of $1.4 billion of senior notes comprised of $400,000,000 5.65%

    Senior Notes due 2013 and $1,000,000,000 6.35% Senior Notes due 2018. In 2009, it was

    reported that Citigroup served as one the underwriters in connection with Xeroxs registered

    offering of $750,000,000 of 8.25% senior notes due 2014.

    75. Moreover, Anne M. Mulcahy, Xeroxs current chairman and CEO is a board

    director of Citigroup.

    76. The value offered to Xeroxs public shareholders in the Merger is inadequate

    when considering both the monetary value of the Xerox common stock they will receive as well

    as the fact that ACS is poised to achieve significant growth in the near future.

    77. The Merger comes at a time when the Companys stock price is undervalued but

    its prospects for growth and increased revenue are substantially increasing as the economic

    recession is ending. ACS insiders are well aware of the Companys intrinsic value and that ACS

    shares are significantly undervalued. Xerox recognized ACSs solid performance and potential

    for growth and determined to capitalize on the recent downturn in the Companys stock price at

    the expense of ACSs public shareholders. Xerox is seeking to engage in a transaction that

    secures an opportunity to benefit from the Companys growth, while the Companys

    shareholders are provided inadequate consideration without the benefit of a full and fair

    transaction process.

    FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

    Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duties Against the Individual Defendants

    78. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each allegation set forth herein.

    79. The Individual Defendants have violated fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, candor

    and good faith owed to public shareholders of ACS and certain of them have acted to put their

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    personal interests ahead of the interests of ACS shareholders or acquiesced in those actions by

    fellow directors or executive officers.

    80. By the acts, transactions and courses of conduct alleged herein, defendants,

    individually and acting as a part of a common plan, are attempting to unfairly deprive plaintiff

    and other members of the Class of the true value of their investment in ACS.

    81. As demonstrated by the allegations above, the Individual Defendants failed to

    exercise the care required, and breached their duties of loyalty, good faith, candor and

    independence owed to the shareholders of ACS because, among other reasons, they failed to take

    steps to maximize the value of ACS to its public shareholders, by, among other things, failing to

    adequately consider potential acquirers, instead favoring their own, or their fellow directors or

    executive officers, interests to secure all possible benefits with a friendly suitor, rather than

    protect the best interests of ACSs shareholders.

    82. The Individual Defendants dominate and control the business and corporate

    affairs of ACS, and are in possession of private corporate information concerning ACSs assets,

    business and future prospects. Thus, there exists an imbalance and disparity of knowledge and

    economic power between them and the public shareholders of ACS which makes it inherently

    unfair for them to benefit their own interests to the exclusion of maximizing shareholder value.

    83. By reason of the foregoing acts, practices and course of conduct, the defendants

    have failed to exercise ordinary care and diligence in the exercise of their fiduciary obligations

    toward plaintiff and the other members of the Class.

    84. As a result of the actions of defendants, plaintiff and the Class will suffer

    irreparable injury in that they have not and will not receive their fair portion of the value of

    ACSs assets and businesses and have been and will be prevented from obtaining a fair price for

    their common stock.

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    85. Defendants are engaging in self-dealing, are not acting in good faith toward

    plaintiff and the other members of the Class, and have breached and are breaching their fiduciary

    duties to the members of the Class. Unless defendants are enjoined by the Court, they will

    continue to breach their fiduciary duties owed to plaintiff and the members of the Class, all to the

    irreparable harm of the members of the Class.

    86. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Only

    through the exercise of this Courts equitable powers can plaintiff and the Class be fully

    protected from the immediate and irreparable injury which defendants actions threaten to inflict.

    SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

    On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class

    Against Xerox for Aiding and Abetting the

    Individual Defendants Breach of Fiduciary Duty

    87. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation

    contained above, as though fully set forth herein.

    88. Xerox has acted and is acting with knowledge of, or with reckless disregard to,

    the fact that the Individual Defendants are in breach of their fiduciary duties to ACSs public

    shareholders, and has participated in such breaches of fiduciary duties.

    89. Xerox knowingly aided and abetted the Individual Defendants wrongdoing

    alleged herein. In so doing, Xerox rendered substantial assistance in order to effectuate the

    Individual Defendants plan to consummate the Merger in breach of their fiduciary duties.

    90. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.

    PRAYER FOR RELIEF

    WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands injunctive relief in its favor and in favor of the Class

    and against Defendants as follows:

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