Shapiro-Fair the Roots of Militancy

7/23/2019 Shapiro-Fair the Roots of Militancy

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Democratic Values and Support for Militancy:Evidence from a National Survey of Pakistan

C. Christine FairGeorgetown University

Neil Malhotra

University of Pennsylvania

Jacob N. ShapiroPrinceton University

February 8 !"##



Abstract

$ long tra%ition of research into political culture argues that greater support for core liberal

%e&ocratic values lea%s to a re'ection of %estructive political activities an% re%uce% support for

violent politics. Policy&a(ers have long %rawn on this line of en)uiry arguing that *e+porting,

%e&ocracy can re%uce violent political activity such as terroris&. Unfortunately there have been few

%irect tests of the hypothesis that &ass-level support for %e&ocratic values correlates with the

re'ection of violence. e con%uct such a test in Pa(istan a country that is both a significant source

of &ilitancy an% one whose citi/ens suffer &assively fro& terroris&. e %esigne% con%ucte% an%

analy/e% an original 0"""-person provincially-representative survey an% fin% that strong supporters

of %e&ocratic values are actually more supportive of &ilitant groups focuse% outsi%e of Pa(istan than

Pa(istanis less favorable towar%s liberal %e&ocracy. Consistent with the principle of azadi this result

is %riven by those who believe that Musli& rights an% sovereignty are being violate% in 1ash&ir.

2ur results both challenge the conventional wis%o& that has for&e% the basis of public policy as

well as contribute to theoretical %ebates on the influence of civic culture on political stability an%

violence.



$ long tra%ition of research into political culture has suggeste% that greater support for core

liberal %e&ocratic values lea%s to a re'ection of %estructive political activities an% pro%uces a wi%e

range of benefits fro& resistance to autocratic coups to greater econo&ic growth 3e.g. $l&on% an%

4erba #5067 Powell #58!7 untington #5897 :alton #5597 Gibson #55;7 <raube !""87 1irwin an%

Cho !""57 Persson an% <abbelini !""5=. Scholars have posite% nu&erous &echanis&s that &ay

un%erlie this posite% relationship. For e+a&ple &ass support for %e&ocratic values coul% in%uce

citi/ens to peacefully wor( within their political syste& an% engage in collective action to re'ect

uprisings an% preserve civil society. >n the case of Pa(istan in%ivi%uals co&&itte% to core liberal

values &ay re'ect the vision offere% by >sla&ist &ilitants who see( to enforce their 3often styli/e%=

version of Shari?a law through violence.

2stensibly %rawing fro& this line of argu&entation a &a'or tenet of U.S. foreign policy

un%er the @ush a%&inistrationAan% one that still hol%s sway a&ong &any in the 2ba&a

a%&inistrationAis that *e+porting, %e&ocracy to regions of the worl% where it is absent &ay

re%uce support for violent political activity such as terroris& 3see e.g. National Security Council

!""0 a&i% an% @roo(e !"#"=. hat has been &issing fro& this %iscussion is in%ivi%ual-level %ata

assessing whether %e&ocratic values relate to support for violent political organi/ations.

$ thoughtful reflection upon the clai&s &a%e by &any &ilitant groups over the last fifty

years an% on the nature of co&petition between govern&ents an% &ilitant groups in &any

regions suggests that theories about the palliative role of %e&ocratic values nee% to ta(e careful

consi%eration of political conte+t. Since at least the $&erican Bevolution there has been no shortage

of political &ove&ents that have rallie% their followers to (ill an% ris( %eath in the na&e of free%o&

%e&ocratic representation an% other liberal %e&ocratic values. >n South $sia an% the Mi%%le ast

to%ay &any &ilitant groups clai& to be %efen%ing free%o& fighting for self-representation an%

&obili/ing against what they perceive to be corrupt govern&ents. Moreover the populations fro&

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which these varie% &ilitant groups %raw support appear to believe these clai&s. $ccor%ingly

support for liberal %e&ocratic values &ay actually be positively correlate% with support for &ilitancy

an% &ay be particularly %epen%ent on people?s reactions to the political environ&ent. Unfortunately

there e+ists scant evi%ence to test this con'ecture.

>n this paper we e&pirically test the hypothesis that support for core %e&ocratic values is

associate% with a re'ection of violent politics. e e+a&ine Pa(istan a country that is both a

significant source of &ilitancy an% one whose citi/ens suffer &assively fro& terroris&. e %esigne%

con%ucte% an% analy/e% an original 0"""-person survey that is representative of a%ults in each of

Pa(istan?s four &ain provincesD Pun'ab Sin%h 1hyber-Pa(htun(wa 31P1= an% @alochistan. 2ur

survey is the first to &easure affect towar%s a range of specific &ilitant organi/ations in one country

the first to &easure respon%ents? beliefs? about the i&portance of core %e&ocratic values an% the

first to be representative of rural an% urban regions for each province of Pa(istan.

Most i&portantly we apply a novel &easure&ent strategy to &itigate ite& non-response an%

social %esirability bias which have plague% previous surveys %ue to the sensitive nature of &ilitancy

in the region. #

2ur *n%orse&ent +peri&ent, 3%etaile% below= overco&es these issues. $s

%escribe% in &ore %etail below we &easure %ifferences in support for various policies unrelate% to

&ilitancy between two e+peri&ental groupsAthose tol% only about the policy an% those tol% a

&ilitant organi/ation supports the policy. <he %ifference between the two con%itions reveals how

&uch policy support increases or %ecreases as a conse)uence of being associate% with a &ilitant

group an% therefore is an in%irect &easure of support for the group. Unli(e a %irect &easure

however non-response an% social %esirability are less pro&inent since respon%ents are reacting to

the policy an% not to the group itself. @y as(ing respon%ents about &ultiple policy issues an%

1 or( that suffers fro& these issues inclu%es Shapiro an% Fair 3!"#"=7 Fair Ba&say an% 1ull 3!""8=7 orl%Pub lic2pinion.org 3February !""5=7 the Pew Global $tti tu%es Surveys 3!""! !""9 !""E !""0 !"";an% !""8=7 an% orl%Public2pinion.org 3July !""5=.

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ran%o&i/ing the pairing of issue with group we can i%entify both average attitu%es towar%s

&ilitancy across groups as well as support for in%ivi%ual groups in ways that are unli(ely to be biase%

by the %etails of any specific policy.

Using this approach we fin% that support for a set of liberal %e&ocratic valuesAproperty

rights free speech in%epen%ent courts the ability of citi/ens to elect representatives a separation of

civilian an% &ilitary power an% free%o& of asse&blyAincreases support for &ilitancy. Moving

across the range of this in%e+ &easuring support for these values is associate% with a 9-E percentage

point increase in support for &ilitant groups that have engage% in violent political activity both

within an% outsi%e of Pa(istan. Consistent with the principle of azadi 3free%o& or self-%eter&ination

in Ur%u= this result is %riven by those who believe that Musli& rights an% sovereignty are being

violate% in 1ash&ir an% in $fghanistan. >n other wor%s supporters of %e&ocratic rights are &ore

li(ely to favor &ilitant groups if they believe that those &ilitants are fighting against foreign forces

that are %enying Musli&s their rights.

<he re&ain%er of the paper is organi/e% as follows. <he first section provi%es a brief

bac(groun% on &ilitant groups in Pa(istan an% the political clai&s they &a(e. Ne+t we provi%e a

theoretical basis for our e+pecte% hypotheses centere% aroun% the concept of azadi. e then

%escribe our survey in %etail inclu%ing how we &easure the core %epen%ent an% in%epen%ent

variables. Subse)uently we present our &etho%s of analysis. e conclu%e by presenting the results

an% %iscussing their i&plications for the stu%y of political violence as well as for foreign policy.

Militancy in Pakistan

Pa(istan has e&ploye% >sla&ist &ilitancy in >n%ia an% $fghanistan as a tool of foreign policy

since #59; 3the year Pa(istan beca&e in%epen%ent= an% this continues to %ate 3Swa&i !"";77

ussain !""E Ja&al !""5=. Many of these groups have also con%ucte% attac(s on Pa(istani soil

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both against the state an% against civilians they oppose on political or religious groun%s. <he &ilitant

lan%scape in Pa(istan to%ay is populate% by groups that vary in their sectarian co&&it&ents

targeting choices theatre of operations ethnicity of operatives an% political ob'ectives. <o

un%erstan% how views on %e&ocracy &ight relate to popular support for these groups a nuance%

picture of Pa(istani &ilitant organi/ations is in or%er. <his section therefore outlines the &a'or

groups as(e% about in our survey.

Militants Figting in !asmir

<here are several organi/ations Pa(istanis group un%er the title of *1ash&iri tan/ee&s,

31ash&iri groups=. Jaish-e-Moha&&a% 3JM= ar(at-ul-$nsarar(at-ul-Mu'ahi%een 3U$UM=

an% their splinter groups have tra%itionally focuse% upon 1ash&ir an% while they recruit within

Pa(istan proper their recruit&ent &aterials suggest a 1ash&ir-oriente% &ission. >n recent years JM

has beco&e inti&ately involve% with the Pa(istan <aliban an% has provi%e% suici%e attac(ers for

assaults on Pa(istani targets an% international targets within Pa(istan. $ separate set of groups

operating in 1ash&ir inclu%es i/bol Mu'ahi%een al @a%r an% relate% factions. <hese groups

pri&arily recruit 1ash&iris an% generally have re&aine% focuse% on securing autono&y or

in%epen%ence for 1ash&ir. <hey have not been involve% with the Pa(istan <aliban an% have not

targete% the Pa(istani state or international targets within Pa(istan.

<he &ost pro&inent of 1ash&iri tan/ee& is ash(ar-e-<aiba 3e<= which has operate% in

>n%ian-a%&inistere% 1ash&ir for &uch of the #55"s 3$bou Hahab !"";=. e< con%ucte% its first

attac( outsi%e of 1ash&ir in !""" an% in recent years has attac(e% international targets in >n%iaAthe

Nove&ber !""8 Mu&bai hotel attac(s are the &ost pro&inent e+a&pleAas well as U.S. an% allie%

forces fighting in $fghanistan 3Fair !"#"=. e< has not targete% the Pa(istani state nor has it

pursue% western targets within Pa(istan.

Afgan "aliban

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$s is well (nown the <aliban govern&ent achieve% %o&inance over &ost of $fghanistan in

#550 with Pa(istani assistance 3Bubin !""!=. <he Septe&ber ## !""# terrorist attac(s &a%e it

i&possible for >sla&aba% to continue supporting the <aliban 3Musharraf !""0= an% when the Unite%

States-le% coalition route% the <aliban in late-!""# &any fle% to Pa(istan?s tribal areas to regroup. >n

!""E the $fghan <aliban launche% a renewe% insurgent ca&paign run by lea%ership shuras in Iuetta

Peshawar an% 1arachi 3evin !""5=. <he $fghan <aliban %espite consi%erable organi/ational

changes since !""# re&ain focuse% on ousting foreign forces ai%ing wor(ers an% other foreign

civilians fro& $fghanistan overthrowing the 1ar/ai regi&e an% restoring their role in governing

$fghanistan 3Giusto//i !""5=.

Pakistan "aliban

Since !""9 a cluster of &ilitant groups whose activists %escribe the&selves as *Pa(istani

<aliban, have %evelope% in Pa(istan.! hile we were unable to &easure support for these groups

%ue to the high level of political sensitivity surroun%ing the& when our survey was fiel%e%

un%erstan%ing the %ifferences between the& an% the $fghan <aliban is i&portant for interpreting

our results 3Fair !"##=.

<he goals of the &ilitants groupe% by Pa(istanis as the *Pa(istan <aliban, are focuse% on

un%er&ining the Pa(istani state in select areas an% establishing their own parallel governance

structures organi/e% aroun% co&&an%ers? particular un%erstan%ing of Shari?a. $t the ti&e our

survey was in the fiel% these groups ha% con%ucte% few operations outsi%e of attac(ing police forces

in the F$<$ an% parts of the 1hyber Pa(tun(hwa 31P1 for&erly the Northwest Frontier Province

2 <he Pa(istan <aliban beca&e pro&inent in early !""0 as local &ilitias establishe% &icro-e&irates in largeswathes of Pa(istan?s Pashtun areas. Popular characteri/ation of all Pa(istan <aliban as being part of the <ehree(-e-<aliban Pa(istan 3<<P= are incorrect the ter& &ost accurately refers to a loose group of local&ilitias espousing a particular view of shari?a law. <he so-calle% <alibani/ation of the tribal areas began inNorth an% South a/iristan but )uic(ly sprea% to parts of the other tribal agencies. @eginning in !"";local <aliban also e&erge% in parts of 1P1 3previously (nown as Northwest Frontier Province orNFP=.<he Pa(istan ar&y has engage% in various operations to conten% with these &ilitant groups 3Jonesan% Fair !"#"=.

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or NFP=. <his unfortunately change% in subse)uent &onths as <<P-affiliate% &ilitants con%ucte%

attac(s across Pa(istan (illing thousan%s in response to govern&ent offensives against the&.

Al #a$ida

<he &ost i&portant &ilitant group operating in Pa(istan to estern policy &a(ers an% politicians is

al-Ia?i%a the group responsible for the Septe&ber ## !""# attac(s. For&er @ritish Pri&e Minister

Gor%on @rown su&&e% up these concerns when he reporte% that *three )uarters of the &ost

serious plots investigate% by the @ritish authorities have lin(s to al Ia?i%a in Pa(istan., 3Coates an%

Page !""8=. >&portant al Ia?i%a lea%ers re&ain in the F$<$ an% &any al Ia?i%a operativesA$bu

Hubai%ah 1hali% Shei(h Moha&&a% an% othersAhave been arreste% in Pa(istani cities. $l-Ia?i%a

operatives in Pa(istan have targete% the Pa(istani state an% e+ecute% terrorist plots targeting the

est an% its allies. <he July ; !""E bo&bings in on%on have been lin(e% to al-Ia?i%a in Pa(istan

for e+a&ple as have at least five foile% plots since !""9 3Jones an% Fair !"#"=. 6

Sectarian "an%eems

Pa(istan is also ho&e to a nu&ber of &ilitant groups see(ing to a%vance a sectarian agen%a.

<hese firqavarana tanzeems inclu%e the anti-Shia ash(ar-e-Jhangvi 3eJ= an% Sipah-e-Sahaba Pa(istan

3SSP=.9 <he Sunni sectarian groups grew to pro&inence in the #58"s an% are now a well-establishe%

part of Pa(istan?s political lan%scape 3Nasr !"""a=. >n the past Shia sectarian groups targete% Sunni

Musli&s although these groups have largely %isappeare%.

<he anti-Shia groups all clai& to be fighting for a Sunni :eoban%i Pa(istan by purging the

country of Shias who& they view as apostates.E <heir actions typically ta(e the for& of attac(s on

3 Many Pa(istanis are %ubious about the e+istence of al-Ia?i%a pe r se . $ll focus group participants in ourpre-testing however un%erstoo% what we were referring to when we e+plaine% that al-Ia?i%a was *2sa&abin a%en?s &ilitia.,4 Many of these groups have been proscribe% nu&erous ti&es only to re-e&erge. Many now operate un%ernew na&es. e use the na&es which are li(ely to be &ost fa&iliar to rea%ers.5 hile an e+act accounting of Shia in Pa(istan is i&possible because the Pa(istani census is not fiel%e% inareas where Shia are populous 3e.g. the Northern $reas= they are believe% to co&prise !" percent of thepopulation 3C>$ !""5=.

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Shi?ite &os)ues an% co&&unity gatherings an% they have perio%ically attac(e% Christian an%

$h&e%iya targets as well. >n reality a great %eal of the anti-Shia violence is &otivate% by class issues

an% urbani/ation. <he large lan%-hol%ing fa&ilies in Pa(istan have historically been Shia an% have

not treate% their tenant far&ers well. <hus a class agen%a has been e+ecute% through a narrative of

apostasy 3Nasr !"""b7 Ha&an #588=.

&onse'uences of Militant Violence in Pakistan

Militant violence has long been a fact of life in Pa(istan. Since the earliest years of the state

there have been ethno-nationalist insurgencies ongoing in @alochistan Sin%h an% 1P1 so&e of

which continue to this %ay at low levels.0 Sectarian tan/ee&s 3e.g. eJ an% SSP= which were involve%

in the anti-Soviet Jiha% an% which are now assisting the $fghan an% Pa(istani <aliban have been

con%ucting attac(s since #5;5 in (ey %istricts an% cities in Southern Pun'ab as well as in the &a'or

provincial capitals 3e.g. Iuetta ahore Peshawar an% 1arachi=. >n the last five years these groups

an% so&e of the 1ash&ir tan/ee&s 3i.e. Jaish-e-Moha&&a%= have been targeting Pa(istani security

forces civilian govern&ent figures an% civilian targets in F$<$ an% a%'acent territories un%er the

u&brella of the Pa(istan <aliban. <hey have con%ucte% attac(s throughout 1P1 3especially

Peshawar an% its environs= an% hit >sla&aba% ahore an% 1arachi 3Gul !""57 Jones an% Fair !"#"=.

>n the year before our survey was fiel%e% there ##9!5 people (ille% or in'ure% in terrorist attac(s in

1P1 6;88 in @alochistan 99!9 in Pun'ab an% #;5# in Sin%h.;

"eoretical (vervie): "e &oncept of A%adi

Un%erstan%ing the concept of azadi which &any >sla&ist &ilitant groups clai& to be

fighting for is critical for &a(ing sense of the politics of &ilitancy in Pa(istan. oosely translate%

6 $ successful ethno-nationalist insurgency in @engali-%o&inate% ast Pa(istan le% to the creation of@angla%esh after the #5;# >n%o-Pa(istan war7 $uthor calculations base% on %ata fro& the National Counter <erroris& Center?s orl%wi%e >nci%ent <rac(ing Syste&.

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azadi refers to the co&bination of free%o& an% self-%eter&ination at the level of a polity 3e.g.

especially $fghans or 1ash&iris=. <he concept is re%olent of but not iso&orphic with what we

&ight ter& *%e&ocracy., Azadi fun%a&entally conveys a sense that politics shoul% be organi/e% by

an% answerable to the groups see(ing free%o& rather than by the govern&ent or &ilitary forces 3be

they foreign or %o&estic= that control these populations by force. $ssessing how azadi has been

use% over the years to 'ustify &ilitants? actions suggests several testable hypotheses about the

relationship between support for %e&ocratic values an% support for &ilitant groups in the Pa(istani

conte+t.

Azadi literally &eans free%o& in Ur%u 3as well as in%i :ari Persian Pashto a&ong other

relate% languages= with e+plicit reference to political self-%eter&ination of a specific group of

people. :uring the perio% of @ritish coloni/ation azadi referre% to free%o& fro& @ritish

occupation an% an assertion of >n%ian self-rule where *>n%ian, reference% the in%igenous population

within the territorial %o&inion of the @ritish Ba'. $fter partition of the sub-continent into >n%ia an%

Pa(istan in #59; the concept of azadi has been use% by a variety of separatist groups to assert sub-

national autono&y an%or free%o& in both post-partition >n%ia an% Pa(istan. For this paper the (ey

e+pression of sub-national *a/a%i, is that relating to the %ispute% territory of 1ash&ir.

2ne of the principal &eans for the Pa(istani state in this %ispute has been using >sla&ist

&ilitants as pro+ies to con%uct attac(s in >n%ian 1ash&ir an% elsewhere 3Fair !"##=. <he &obili/ing

narrative for these groups has been attaining azadi or free%o& for Musli& 1ash&iris living un%er

>n%ian 3e.g. *in%u,= oppression.8 2f course azadi in &ost of this constructe% %iscourse i&plies

8 <his is an oversi&plification of course. Besi%ents of the %ispute% area of Ja&&u an% 1ash&ir un%er>n%ian control inclu%e in%us Musli&s Si(hs an% @u%hists a&ong others. Since violence there erupte% inthe late #58"s there has been consi%erable ethnic cleansing with in%us &oving out of the valley of1ash&ir to Ja&&u along with Si(hs. @u%%hists have ten%e% to be in the eh-a%a(h area an% re&ain so.Currently the %ispute is &ost intense over the valley of 1ash&ir which is %o&inate% by Musli&s. <hePa(istani clai&s that >n%ia is a *in%u, state is also %eeply proble&atic because >n%ia is technically a%e&ocratic state that while not secular in the $&erican sense a%heres to a notion of religious e)uality.Nonetheless %ue to the prepon%erance of in%us in the security forces this facile an% pole&iccharacteri/ation of *in%u, oppression is sustainable for &any Pa(istanis.

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that if given the choice >n%ia?s 1ash&iris woul% 'oin Musli& Pa(istan to free the&selves fro&

in%u %o&ination.5 Beflective of this %iscourse Pa(istan-a%&inistere% 1ash&ir is calle% *$/a%#"

1ash&ir, 3Free 1ash&ir= while that un%er >n%ia?s a%&inistration is calle% *Ma)bu/a 1ash&ir, 3or

2ccupie% 1ash&ir=.

1ash&iri azadi is crucially i&portant in Pa(istani %o&estic politics an% society. Pa(istan?s

te+tboo(s rehearse the ele&ental unfairness of the partition which %eprive% Pa(istan of 1ash&ir.

Pa(istan?s &e%ia on a %aily basis report on the >n%ian state?s abuses an% other &issteps in 1ash&ir.

Pa(istan?s civilian an% &ilitary lea%ers ali(e refer to the &ilitant groups which clai& to fight on

behalf of 1ash&ir?s free%o& as *free%o& fighters, rather than terrorists. 2n February E Pa(istan

celebrates 1ash&ir :ay with %e&onstrations in $/a% 1ash&ir an% elsewhere to show soli%arity

with 1ash&iris living un%er >n%ian *occupation., Pa(istanis %riving to $/a% 1ash&ir %o so on the

*Srinagar ighway, na&e% for the capital of Ma)bu/a 1ash&ir. Pa(istan?s cities are strewn with

public co&&e&orations an% &e&oriali/ations of 1ash&ir an% &any of Pa(istan?s lea%ership 3e.g.

the Sharifs of the Pa(istan Musli& eague= are 1ash&iri. Many pro%ucts such as coo(ing oil are

sol% an% &ar(ete% un%er the bran% na&e *1ash&ir., Pa(istan?s various tan/ee&s operating in

1ash&ir an% the rest of >n%ia %o so un%er the state% ai&s of *freeing, >n%ia?s Musli&s fro& in%u

hege&ony an% allowing the& to 'oin Pa(istan 3Fair !"##=.

<he notion of azadi also applies to $fghanistan in Pa(istani %iscourse albeit in a &uch less

intense fashion. >n the #58"s *&u'ahi%een, were &obili/e% to free the $fghans fro& the secular

Soviet occupation. <hroughout the #55"s Pa(istan continue% to 'ustify its involve&ent an% that of

its so-calle% *&u'ahi%een, pro+ies in $fghanistan by arguing that it was *liberating, $fghanistan

fro& vicious warlor%s en'oying the support of >n%ia Bussia an% >ran a&ong others 3Bashi% !"""=.

9 Becent polling results publishe% the Chatha& ouse fin%s evi%ence that in fact 1ash&iris on both si%esof the 2C prefer in%epen%ence fro& both >n%ia an% Pa(istan 3@ran%noc( !"#"=. owever few Pa(istanisbelieve this to be the case 3orl%Public2pinion !""8=.10 Azadi is the noun relate% to the a%'ective azad .

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ith the U.S. invasion in !""# Pa(istanis have again viewe% $fghanistan as occupie% an% the

$fghan <aliban as a legiti&ate group fighting jihad for the azadi of $fghans. ence concepts of

%e&ocracy self-%eter&ination an% violent uprising are intertwine% in Pa(istani culture.

<his history suggests two testable hypothesesD

ypothesis # 3#=D Pakistanis more supportive of liberal democratic principles consistent with azadi

should be more supportive of militant groups operating from Pakistan.

ypothesis ! 3!=D The relationship posited by H should be strongest among Pakistanis whose beliefs

about !uslims in "ashmir and #ndia$s presence in the region map strongly onto the azadi narrative .

"e Survey

2ur survey was %esigne% to achieve three goals. First we wante% to survey a representative

sa&ple of the Pa(istani population inclu%ing rural an% urban areas in each of Pa(istan?s four &ain

provinces. Secon% we sought to &easure attitu%es towar%s specific &ilitant organi/ations in a way

that &ini&i/e% ite& non-response on sensitive )uestions which ha% plague% previous surveys in

Pa(istan.##

<hir% we wante% to &itigate social %esirability bias in &easuring affect towar%s &ilitants

our (ey %epen%ent variable. $s is well (nown respon%ents in &any survey settings anticipate the

views of the enu&erator an% thus answer in ways to please or see& high-status to the enu&erator

31rosnic( #5557 Marlowe an% Crowne #509 p. #"5=. <hese ten%encies &ay be e+acerbate% on

sensitive issues where fear an% the %esire to avoi% e&barrass&ent co&e into play. >n Pa(istan

respon%ents can often %eter&ine significant infor&ation about class ethnicity an% sectarian

orientation base% on the na&e an% accent of the enu&erators. <his &a(es social %esirability

concerns even stronger for surveys stu%ying the politics of &ilitancy in Pa(istan as respon%ents &ay

11 Surveys in Pa(istan which as( %irectly about affect towar%s &ilitant groups obtain %on?t (nownoopinion rates in the range of 9" 3<error Free <o&orrow !""87 Pew !""5=. Surveys which in%irectly&easure affect by as(ing whether groups *operating in Pa(istan are a proble&, 3>B> !""5= or pose *athreat to the vital interests of Pa(istan, 3P2 !""5= still obtain ite& non-response rates as high as 6#percent.

#"



be wary to signal pro-&ilitant views to high-status enu&erators.

or(ing with our Pa(istani partners Socio-cono&ic :evelop&ent Consultants 3S:C2=

we %rew a ran%o& sa&ple of 0""" a%ult Pa(istani &en an% wo&en fro& the four *nor&al,

provinces of the country which are governe% by Pa(istan?s #5;6 constitutionD Pun'ab Sin%h 1P1

an% @alochistan using the Pa(istan Fe%eral @ureau of Statistics sa&ple fra&e. <he respon%ents were

selecte% ran%o&ly within E"" pri&ary sa&pling units 3PSU= 66! in rural areas an% #08 in urban ones

3following the ruralurban brea(%own in the Pa(istan census=. e substantially oversa&ple% in the

s&aller provinces 3@alochistan an% 1P1= to ensure we coul% generate vali% esti&ates in these

sparsely populate% provinces. e calculate% post-stratification survey weights base% on population

figures fro& the #558 census the &ost recent one available. Following proce%ures outline% by ee

an% Forthofer 3!""0= all analyses reporte% below were weighte% an% clustere% to account for survey

%esign effects.

<he face-to-face )uestionnaire was fiel%e% by si+ &i+e%-gen%er tea&s between $pril !#

!""5 an% May !E !""5. <he overall response rate was over 5" percent which rivals the e+tre&ely

high response rates achieve% by the Unite% States Census @ureau. 2nline $ppen%i+ $ reports the

sa&ple %e&ographics. Full )uestion wor%ings are provi%e% in 2nline $ppen%i+ @. $ll variables

%escribe% below were co%e% to lie between " an% # so that we can easily interpret a regression

coefficient as representing a β change in the %epen%ent variable associate% with &oving fro& the

lowest possible value to the highest possible value of the in%epen%ent variable.

e pre-teste% the )uestionnaire to resi%ents of >sla&aba% Peshawar an% Bawalpin%i

between March !" an% !0 !""5 in or%er to assess the functioning of the ite&s an% e+peri&ents.

Several %esign %ecisions ca&e about as a result of what we learne% %uring pretesting.

Measuring Support for *slamist Militant (rgani%ations: "e Endorsement E+periment

##



$s(ing respon%ents %irectly whether they support &ilitant organi/ations has nu&erous

proble&s in places suffering fro& political violence. First an% perhaps &ost i&portantly it is unsafe

for enu&erators an% respon%ents to %iscuss such issues. Secon% ite& non-response rates to such

sensitive )uestions are often )uite high given that respon%ents fear that provi%ing the *wrong,

answer will threaten their own an% their fa&ily?s safety. e therefore use an en%orse&ent

e+peri&ent to &easure support for specific >sla&ist &ilitant organi/ations.#!

<he e+peri&ent involves assessing support for various real policies which are relatively well

(nown but about which Pa(istanis %o not have strong feelings 3as we learne% %uring pretesting= an%

wor(s as followsD

- Bespon%ents are ran%o&ly assigne% to treat&ent or control groups 3one-half of the sa&ple

is assigne% to each group=.

- Bespon%ents in the control group were as(e% their level of support for four policies which

is &easure% on a five-point scale reco%e% to lie between " an% # for the analysis.

- Bespon%ents in the treat&ent group are as(e% i%entical )uestions but then are tol% that one

of four groups &entione% in the first section supports the policy in )uestion. hich group is

associate% with each of the four policies is ran%o&i/e% within the treat&ent group.

- <he %ifference in &eans between treat&ent an% control groups provi%es a &easure of affect

towar%s the groups since the only %ifference between the treat&ent an% control con%itions

is the group en%orse&ent.

Figure # provi%es a sa&ple )uestion showing the treat&ent an% control )uestions an% illustrates the

ran%o&i/ation proce%ure in visual for&. 2nline $ppen%i+ @ %escribes all )uestions &easuring

support. 2nline $ppen%i+ C presents ran%o&i/ation chec(s showing balance on observables

between treat&ent an% control groups.

12 <his approach buil%s on the techni)ue intro%uce% in upia an% McCubbins 3#558=.

#!



<he a%vantage of this approach is that the &ilitant organi/ation is not the pri&ary ob'ect of

evaluation7 the policy is. e e+pecte% respon%ents to be &ore willing to share their opinions on

uncontroversial policies rather than controversial groups. owever by e&be%%ing en%orse&ents

within the )uestions we are able to in%irectly ascertain support for &ilitant organi/ations. @ecause

we ran%o&i/e both assign&ent to the group en%orse&ent an% the pairing of issues with groups any

%ifference in policy support can be attribute% solely to the group.

e use% this &etho% to &easure support for four groupsD the 1ash&iri tan/ee&s the

$fghan <aliban al-Ia?i%a an% the sectarian tan/ee&s.#6 <his re)uire% as(ing about four policy

issuesD polio vaccinations refor&ing the frontier cri&es regulation 3the legal co%e governing the

F$<$= re%efining the :uran% line 3the bor%er separating Pa(istan fro& $fghanistan= an% re)uiring

&a%rassas to teach &ath an% science. @y ran%o&i/ing which group is associate% with which policy

a&ong the treat&ent group we control for or%er effects an% ran%o&i/e the pairing of issue with

group. <his allows us to i%entify effects for &ultiple groups that are unli(ely to be biase% by the

%etails of any specific policy.

For an en%orse&ent e+peri&ent of this type to wor( the policies nee% to have two

characteristics. First they nee% to be ones about which respon%ents %o not have overly strong prior

opinions so that a group?s en%orse&ent &ight affect their evaluation of the policy. <his proce%ure

woul% not wor( in the U.S. for e+a&ple if one as(e% about banning abortion for which prior

attitu%es are strong. Secon% the policies have to be at least so&ewhat fa&iliar to respon%ents since

the group en%orse&ent has to be &eaningful an% salient. For e+a&ple in the U.S. one coul% not

as( about an obscure &ining regulation since respon%ents &ay not provi%e &eaningful responses

13 e %i% not e&ploy this &etho% to assess support for the Pa(istani <aliban. ithin our bu%get for thesurvey we coul% only interview 0""" respon%ents 3twice as large as any other e+tent survey of Pa(istanipublic opinion=. <his &eant we coul% only stu%y four groups 3i.e. %ivi%e the sa&ple into four cells= whilegetting reasonable precision at the provincial level. Given this constraint we o&itte% an en%orse&ente+peri&ent on the Pa(istan <aliban becauseD 3#= at the ti&e the survey was %esigne% the group was not aspro&inent as it has since beco&e7 an% 3!= there were safety concerns for enu&erators as &entione% above.

#6



an% en%orse&ents &ay have li&ite% i&pacts. hile the policies we stu%ie% &ay see& high valence

to professional stu%ents of politics they %o not appear to be so for &ost Pa(istanis. :uring pre-

testing we foun% that &ost respon%ents (new about all four issues but %i% not have strong opinions

on the&. 2ur enu&erators li(ewise felt these issues woul% be ones respon%ents woul% (now

so&ething about but at the sa&e ti&e not have e+tre&ely rigi% positions a telling fact since our

enu&erators were all professionals averaging 9.0 years of e+perience.

<here is e&pirical evi%ence in the survey that attests to the vali%ity of the policies as well.

Figure ! shows the %istribution of attitu%es of policies in the control group. >&portantly it is single

pea(e% on all but one issue i&plying respon%ents %o not have highly-polari/e% attitu%es as they

woul% for so&ething li(e abortion in the Unite% States. <he variance in responses to these policies

in the control group was fairly large ranging fro& .58 3polio vaccinations= to #.!8 3re%efining the

:uran% line= on a five-point scale suggesting potential &alleability. For co&parison purposes the

#58; General Social Survey 3GSS= as(e% whether respon%ents agree% that *<he govern&ent shoul%

provi%e a %ecent stan%ar% of living for the une&ploye%, on a five-point scale. <he variance in

responses in the GSS was appro+i&ately .0E;.

<his approach una&biguously %rove %own ite& non-response. 2ur survey pose% a nu&ber

of %irect )uestions 3i.e. without an en%orse&ent e+peri&ent= such as *hat is the effect group K?s

actions on their causeL, Non-response on these ite&s range% fro& !! for al-Ia?i%a to 0 for the

1ash&ir <an/ee&. >te& non-response on the en%orse&ent e+peri&ent )uestions by contrast

range% fro& a high of ;.0 for al-Ia?i%a en%orsing Frontier Cri&es Begulation refor& to a &eager

".0 for the sectarian tan/ee&s en%orsing polio vaccinations. hile this approach is not perfect the

low ite& non-response rate in our survey provi%es prima facie evi%ence that this techni)ue re%uce%

respon%ents? concerns about reporting sensitive infor&ation.#9 <hat the en%orse&ent e+peri&ent

14 Co&pare% to other surveys the contrast between %irect )uestions an% this approach is even star(er. <heP>P$ !""; survey of urban Pa(istanis for e+a&ple ha% a :1NB rate of aroun% !" percent on &ost of

#9



%rives %own ite& non-response is not necessarily evi%ence that it also a&eliorates social %esirability

bias. Nonetheless one woul% nee% to tell a fairly contorte% story to e+plain why a techni)ue that

%rives %own ite& non-response so %ra&atically woul% fail to a%%ress social %esirability biases that

ste&s fro& respon%ents? concerns about how enu&erators will react to their answers.

<o construct our %epen%ent variable of support for &ilitancy we &easure the average

support the respon%ent reports for the four policies. Becall that one of the four &ilitant groups was

ran%o&ly assigne% to be associate% with each policy in the treat&ent group. @elow we leverage

ran%o& assign&ent into treat&ent 3en%orse&ent= an% control to &easure %ifferential support for

&ilitancyAas pro+ie% by support for the policies. <he &ain %epen%ent variable therefore was a

twenty-point scale reco%e% to lie between " 3no support for all four policies= to # 3a great %eal of

support for all four policies=. >n the control group the policy scale ha% a &ean value of .;5 3s.%. .

#E=. $s %escribe% below we also e+a&ine% support for each of the groups in%ivi%ually.

Measuring Support for Democratic Values

e &easure% support for si+ core features of liberal %e&ocratic societies using )uestions which

%raw on the wi%ely-use% Free%o& in the orl% 3F>= survey 3Free%o& ouse !"##=.

%ree &peech . *ow i&portant is it that in%ivi%uals be able to e+press their political views even

though other people &ay not agree with the&L, 3Free%o& of +pression an% @eliefs &o%ule=

#ndependent 'ourts . *ow i&portant is it for you to live in a country where the %ecisions of the

courts are in%epen%ent fro& influence by political an% &ilitary authoritiesL, 3Bule of aw &o%ule=

the )uestions but for )uestions about the activities of Pa(istan-base% &ilitant groups the :1NB rate wasso&eti&es in e+cess of E" percent. hen P>P$ as(e% %ifferent sa&ples of Pa(istanis *ow %o you feelabout al Iae%aL, in !""; !""8 an% !""5 :1NB rates were 08 percent 9; percent an% #6 percentrespectively. hen Pa(istanis were as(e% who perpetrate% the 5## attac(s :1NB rates were 06 percentan% ;! percent in !""; an% !""8 respectively 3Fair et al. !""8=. <he Pew Global $ttitu%es Surveyencountere% si&ilar proble&s when they as(e% 3pre%o&inantly urban= Pa(istanis whether they have *a veryfavorable so&ewhat favorable so&ewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion, of al Ia?i%a. >n !""8an% !""5 the :1NB rates were 9# percent an% 6" percent respectively. hen the sa&e )uestion waspose% about the <aliban in !""8 an% !""5 the :1NB rates were 9" percent an% !" percent respectively3Pew !""5=.

#E



%reedom of Assembly . *ow i&portant is it that in%ivi%uals be able to &eet with others to wor( on

political issuesL, 3$ssociational an% 2rgani/ational Bights &o%ule=

(eing )overned by *lected +epresentatives . *ow i&portant is it for you to live in a country that is

governe% by representatives electe% by the peopleL, 3Functioning of Govern&ent &o%ule=

Property +ights . *ow i&portant is it that in%ivi%ual property rights be secureL <his &eans the

state cannot ta(e away their things without proper court procee%ings., 3Personal $utono&y an%

>n%ivi%ual Bights &o%ule=

Having 'ivilian 'ontrol over the !ilitary . *<he #5;6 Constitution of Pa(istan says civilians shoul%

control the &ilitary. <his &eans the &ilitary cannot ta(e action without or%ers fro& civilian lea%ers.

>n your opinion how &uch control shoul% civilians have over the &ilitaryL, 3Functioning of

Govern&ent &o%ule=

<he first five ite&s were &easure% on a five-point scale 3*e+tre&ely i&portant, *very

i&portant, *&o%erately i&portant, *slightly i&portant, *not i&portant at all,=. <he civilian

control ite& was &easure% on a %ifferent five-point scale 3*co&plete control, *a lot of control, *a

&o%erate a&ount of control, *a little control, *no control at all,=.

$s shown in <able # about half of respon%ents select the &ost-%e&ocratic response

3*e+tre&ely i&portant, or *co&plete control,= an% very few select response options in the botto&

categories e+pressing little support for %e&ocracy. $ccor%ingly we bifurcate respon%ents into two

groupsAthose selecting the highest response category an% all others. e also esti&ate%

specifications in which responses were treate% as continuous &easures an% we obtaine% si&ilar

results. >n a%%ition we construct a scale in which we average the si+ ite&s together to re%uce

&easure&ent error. Cronbach?s alpha for the si+ ite&s was .;E suggesting a high level of scale

reliability. <he %e&ocratic support in%e+ ha% a &ean of .98 3s.%. .66=.

<o test ypothesis ! we also nee%e% to &easure respon%ents? beliefs about the status of

#0



Musli&s living in 1ash&ir. <o %o so we constructe% a three-point scale &easuring perceptions that

Musli&s are being oppresse% in 1ash&ir base% on two binary in%icators. #E <he first )uestion as(e%

respon%ents *ow well %oes >n%ia protect the rights of its Musli& citi/ens in 1ash&irL, 3response

optionsD *e+tre&ely well, *so&ewhat well, *neither well nor poorly, *so&ewhat poorly,

*e+tre&ely poorly.,#0 Bespon%ents answering *e+tre&ely well, an% *so&ewhat well, were co%e% as

" an% all others were co%e% as #. <he secon% )uestion as(e% respon%ents *<hin(ing about the

political preferences of Musli&s in occupie% 1ash&ir please tell us which state&ent you agree with

the &ost, 3response optionsD *>n occupie% 1ash&ir the &a'ority of Musli&s want to be part of

>n%ia, *>n occupie% 1ash&ir the &a'ority of Musli&s want an in%epen%ent state, *>n occupie%

1ash&ir the &a'ority of Musli&s want to be part of Pa(istan,=. Bespon%ents answering that

Musli&s want to be part of >n%ia were co%e% as " an% all others were co%e% as #.

&ontrol Variables

e a%%itionally &easure% several control variables which we inclu%e in our &o%els both

a%%itively an% &ultiplicativelyD gen%er &arital status age access to the >nternet ability to rea%

write an% %o &ath e%ucation level inco&e an% sectarian affiliation 3SunniShia=. <hese variables

have all been cite% as potential correlates of support for violent politics inclu%ingD age 3Bussel an%

Miller #5;;= &arriage 3@errebi !"";= &e%ia access 3@ell #5;87 :owling !""0= e%ucation 3@ec(er

#508= inco&e 3Muller #58E= an% religion 3Juergens&eyer !""6=. e also controlle% for various

attitu%inal &easures inclu%ing views on the U.S. govern&ent?s influence on the worl% views on the

U.S. govern&ent?s influence on Pa(istan an% belief that Shari?a law is about physical punish&ent.

15 e also e+a&ine% the con%itional effects of these two variables in isolation an% obtaine% si&ilar resultsto using the average% &easure.16 Prior to as(ing this )uestion we ran%o&ly presente% so&e respon%ents with infor&ation about therelative strength of the >n%ian an% Pa(istani &ilitaries. <his &anipulation ha% no significant or substantialeffect of responses to this )uestion.

#;



e hypothesi/e that negative views of the U.S. an% belief in the corporal punish&ent aspects of

Shari?a shoul% be positively relate% to &ilitancy. Finally in the regression &o%els we also inclu%e

province fi+e% effects.

Metods of Analysis

<o test ypothesis # we esti&ate the following 2S regression &o%elD

P i α β T i β , - i β 3 T i O - i = i ε i 3#=

where P i is a continuous variable representing support for the four target policies T i is a %u&&y

variable representing assign&ent to the group en%orse&ent group - i is a continuous variable

ranging fro& support for /ero %e&ocratic values 3"= to support for all si+ values 3#= i is a vector of

region fi+e% effects an% ε i is a nor&ally-%istribute% error ter&. β represents our &easure of support

for &ilitancyAthe change in support for the policy %ue to the group en%orse&entAa&ong

respon%ents who score lowest on the %e&ocracy in%e+. β , represents the effect of %e&ocratic values

on support for policies a&ong respon%ents in the control group. β β represents support for

&ilitancy a&ong respon%ents who are the strongest supporters of %e&ocracy. ence the (ey

para&eter of interest is β fro& which we can %erive the &arginal effect of support for %e&ocracy

on support for &ilitancy 3following @ra&bor et al. !""E=.

Note that the %ifference in variances across policies suggests that so&e &ay e+hibit greater

treat&ent effects than others because prior attitu%es are less well-for&e%. e therefore use the

variance of the responses in the control group to pro+y looseness of pre-treat&ent attitu%es an%

account for its influence by weighting each policy response by this variance. ence we place greater

weight on policies where the survey responses lea% us to e+pect a greater li(elihoo% that attitu%es

#8



will be shifte% in response to the en%orse&ents.#;

<o test the robustness of our results we also esti&ate a series of &ore-saturate% &o%els the

&ost co&ple+ of which is represente% by e)uation 3!=D

P i α β T i β , - i β 3 T i O - i = i +i λ%i ξT i +i ψT i %i ε i 3!=

where +i represents a vector of %e&ographic control variables an% %i represents a vector of attitu%inal

control variables. Note that e)uation 3!= inclu%es not only the &ain effects of these controls on

support for the policy but also the interactive effects with the treat&ent %u&&y.

<o test ypothesis ! we esti&ate an analogous set of &o%elsD

P i α β T i β , - i β " i β " i β /3 T i O - i = β 0 3 T i O " i = β 1 3 - i O " i = β 2 3 T i O - i O " i = i ε i 36=

P i α β T i β , - i β " i β /3 T i O - i = β 0 3 T i O " i = β 1 3 - i O " i = β 2 3 T i O - i O " i =

i +i λ

%i ξT i +i ψT i %i ε i 39=

where " i represents respon%ents? beliefs about the state of Musli&s in 1ash&ir. $s &entione% in the

section entitle% *Meaning Support for :e&ocratic 4alues, it is &easure% using the in%e+ base% on

three )uestions about each groups? goals. >nterpreting these &o%els is co&ple+7 we follow

proce%ures lai% out by @ra&bor et al. 3!""E=. <he &ain para&eter of interest is represente% by β 2

which allows us to test whether the %e&ocracy-&ilitancy relationship i&plie% by # is significantly

stronger a&ongst respon%ents high on the *1ash&ir beliefs, in%e+ than a&ong those lower on the

in%e+.

,esults

Consistent with ypothesis # we fin% that support for %e&ocratic values increases support

17 <he results are substantively si&ilar without this weighting an% so we report weighte% resultsthroughout as we believe they &ore accurately capture the i&pact of cues on attitu%es. <he weight vector

) for the four policies 3vaccination plan FCB refor&s :uran% line curriculu& refor&= wasD 3.586 #.#E#.!8 #.#8= &eaning that the weight for the control group was the average of these four in%ivi%ual weights3#.#E=. <he post-stratification weight was &ultiplie% by ) to pro%uce the overall sa&pling weight.

#5



for &ilitancy across all groups. >n the first colu&n of <able ! we present the esti&ates fro& the

si&ple &o%el %escribe% in e)uation 3#=. Controlling for provincial %ifferences in support we fin%

that a&ong those scoring /ero on the %e&ocracy scale the group en%orse&ent actually %ecreases

support for the policies by about !.8 percentage points 3 β -."!8 p ."# two-taile%=. owever

a&ong the strongest supporters of %e&ocracy we esti&ate the treat&ent effect of the en%orse&ents

to be positive !.6 percentage points 3 β 3β ."!6 p ."9=. <herefore the overall effect of

%e&ocracy on support for &ilitancy is 9.E percentage points 3 β ."9E p ."#=. >n Figure 6 we plot

the &arginal effect of support for %e&ocracy along with the associate% 5E confi%ence interval.

Confir&ing the &o%el esti&ates a&ong low supporters of %e&ocracy the treat&ent effect of the

en%orse&ent cues is negative. owever strong supports of %e&ocracy are &ore supportive of the

policies as a result of the en%orse&ents.

QF>GUB 6 $@2U< BR

ow big is this effect in substantive ter&sL >n the control group support for %e&ocratic

values increases support for the govern&ent policies 3as one woul% e+pect= by about #!.! percentage

points as in%icate% by the para&eter esti&ate of β , . ence our %ifference-in-%ifference esti&ate

represents about 6; of this &ain effect an% is therefore substantively &eaningful. $nother way to

assess the effect si/e is to co&pare it to the effect of inco&eAan e+pecte%ly strong pre%ictorAon

support for the policies. Unsurprisingly going fro& the botto& inco&e group to the top inco&e

group %ecreases support for these social services by 0.9 percentage points. ence the %ifference-in-

%ifference esti&ate 3 β = represents ;" of the &ain inco&e effect.

<his fin%ing is highly robust. >n colu&n two of <able ! we present esti&ates fro& a

regression specification inclu%ing %e&ographic controls along with a %u&&y variable for

respon%ents who %i% not answer the inco&e )uestion. >n colu&n three we listwise %elete cases for

!"



which we %o not have a vali% inco&e response. >n colu&n four we inclu%e attitu%inal controls in

the &o%el. Finally in colu&n five we esti&ate the &o%el represente% by e)uation 3!= which

inclu%es all the &ain an% interactive effects. 2ur esti&ate of β is highly stable across all

specifications representing between 6.;-9.E percent of the range of the %epen%ent variable.

Consistent with ypothesis ! we fin% that the positive %e&ocracy-&ilitancy relationship

shown in Figure ! is %riven by those who feel that the groups are fighting for %e&ocratic values. e

present esti&ates fro& e)uation 36= in the first colu&n of <able 6. <he para&eter esti&ate of β 2 is

positive an% statistically significant 3 β 2 .#!; p ."8= in%icating that the effect of %e&ocracy on

&ilitancy increases by #!.; as we &ove fro& belief that Musli&s are not being &istreate% in

1ash&ir an% %esire to live un%er >n%ian control 3 " i "= to belief that Musli&s are %isenfranchise%

3 " i #=. Figure 9 illustrates these results. Note that the slope of the relationship between %e&ocracy

an% &ilitancy is essentially flat a&ong those low on the 1ash&ir in%e+ 3 " i #= an% beco&es

positive an% steep as the value of the in%e+ increases to #. $s shown in colu&ns 3!=-3E= of <able 6

this result only beco&es stronger as a%%itional variables are a%%e% to the &o%el an% the overall

esti&ate of β 2 is stable.

Finally we analy/e% the results separately for each &ilitant group an% each %e&ocratic value.

$s shown in <able 9 the esti&ate of β fro& e)uation 3#= is positive an% significant for all four

groups. $ shown in <able E the esti&ate of β is correctly signe% for all si+ co&ponents of the

%e&ocracy in%e+ with the strongest relationship being for four particular in%icatorsAproperty

rights in%epen%ent courts electe% representatives an% free%o& of asse&bly.

Discussion

<o better un%erstan% the politics of &ilitancy in Pa(istan an% to she% light on larger theories

!#



about the relationship between %e&ocratic values an% support for violent political organi/ations we

%esigne% an% con%ucte% a 0"""-person nationally an% provincially representative survey of Pa(istani

a%ults &easuring affect towar%s four specific &ilitant organi/ations. e applie% a novel

&easure&ent strategy to &itigate social %esirability bias an% ite& non-response given the sensitive

nature of &ilitancy in the region. 2ur en%orse&ent e+peri&ent overco&es several issues that have

plague% past efforts to use surveys to stu%y the politics of &ilitancy.

Using this innovative approach we fin% that support for a set of core liberal %e&ocratic

values correlates with higher support for &ilitant groups. <his fin%ing contravenes the conventional

wis%o& which un%erlies recent U.S. policy approaches to Pa(istan in particular an% the Musli&

orl% in general. e &easure support for %e&ocratic values using an in%e+ that aggregates support

for si+ (ey valuesD property rights free speech in%epen%ent courts being rule% by electe%

representatives civilian control of the &ilitary an% free%o& of asse&bly. Moving fro& the lowest

value on this in%e+ to the top is associate% with a 9-E percentage point increase in support for

&ilitant groups.

<his result &ay see& pu//ling but it &a(es sense in the particular conte+t of Pa(istan where

&ilitant groups 3an% their a%vocates in govern&ent= have long 'ustifie% their actions as %efen%ing

azadi a concept that loosely translates as free%o& an% self-%eter&ination. e fin% e+actly what one

woul% e+pect if this history were %riving our results7 the %e&ocracy-&ilitancy relationship is

strongest a&ong respon%ents whose beliefs about 1ash&ir are consistent with the azadi narrative

an% who believe the groups are fighting for 'ustice %e&ocracy an% to protect Musli&s.

Moving beyon% Pa(istan our larger theoretical contribution is to %e&onstrate that the

relationships between in%ivi%ual values on the one han% an% attitu%es towar%s political

organi/ations on the other %epen%s strongly on beliefs about the political conte+t. $ccor%ingly

there is no si&ple &apping between personal attitu%es that see& nor&atively attractive such as a

!!



belief in in%ivi%ual liberty an% re'ection of nor&atively unappealing &etho%s of political

contestation. >n Pa(istan for e+a&ple so&e &ilitant groups? rhetoric 'ustifying fighting for azadi has

been so wi%ely accepte% that it is e+actly those who believe &ost %eeply in %e&ocratic values that

were &ost supportive of violent groups.

<he policy i&plications of this research are star(. hether %e&ocratic values are a force for

peace or for conflict %epen%s on the how people un%erstan% the political conte+t. <hose see(ing to

pro&ote pacific %ispute resolution an% or%erly politics in Pa(istan an% elsewhere therefore nee% to

&ove beyon% efforts to %elegiti&i/e violence in a nor&ative sense to efforts to convince potential

supporters that it is a counterpro%uctive &etho%. >n less fraught political real&s a%vocates shoul%

consi%er that it &ay be easier to convince people that the facts of the worl% i&ply %ifferent political

behavior than it is to change their un%erlying attitu%es.

Finally this paper suggests so&e new lines of in)uiry for stu%ents of both violent politics

an% political behavior. For those stu%ying violent politics the paper highlights the potential

i&portance of learning about how beliefs about the strategic environ&ent interact with %eeply-

seate% attitu%es to generate support for specific &ilitant organi/ations. Future stu%ies can potentially

&anipulate beliefs about the strategic i&pact of the groups? actions an% &easure resulting changes in

support for &ilitancy. For those stu%ying political behavior the paper shows clearly that beliefs

about the political environ&ent interact with long-stan%ing beliefs to generate attitu%es towar%s

specific actors. <his &eans one cannot loo( solely at what is going on insi%e peoples? hea%s but also

how those attitu%es interact with political structures organi/ations an% institutions.

!6



"able -: Distribution of Democratic Values Variables

lecte% Bepresentatives Property Bights+tre&ely >&portant 95.; +tre&ely >&portant 0;.# 4ery >&portant !5.8 4ery >&portant #8."

Mo%erately >&portant #9.! Mo%erately >&portant 5.0Slightly >&portant 9." Slightly >&portant 6.5Not >&portant at $ll !.9 Not >&portant at $ll #.9N E85# N E5#9

>n%epen%ent Courts CivilianMilitary Separation+tre&ely >&portant E9.5 +tre&ely >&portant 65.0 4ery >&portant !E.5 4ery >&portant #;.0Mo%erately >&portant #9.9 Mo%erately >&portant !E.;Slightly >&portant 6.! Slightly >&portant #".;Not >&portant at $ll #.0 Not >&portant at $ll 0.9N E88E N E;;"

Free Speech Free%o& of $sse&bly

+tre&ely >&portant 98.# +tre&ely >&portant E6.E 4ery >&portant 66.6 4ery >&portant !5.0Mo%erately >&portant #6.E Mo%erately >&portant #!.;Slightly >&portant 9.# Slightly >&portant 6.0Not >&portant at $ll #." Not >&portant at $ll .0N E88; N E856NoteD :ata weighte% an% a%'uste% for sa&pling %esign.

!9



"able .: Support for Democratic Values Predicts Support for Militancy

3#= 3!= 36= 39= 3E=

β#D Group Cue -."!8

3."";=-."!8

3."";=-."!8

3.""0=-."!0

3.""0=-."9E

3."!0=

β!D Support for :e&ocratic 4alues .#!!

3."#0=."58

3."#9=."50

3."#E=."56

3."#9=."5!

3."#9=

β6D Group Cue + Support for :e&ocratic 4alues

."9E

3."#!=."9!

3."##=."96

3."##=."6;

3."##=

."9#

3."#6=

Constant .;9;

3."##=.899

3."!!=.896

3."!!=.8#"

3."!5=.8#5

3."6#=

B ! .#9 .!9 .!6 .!E .!EN E6E8 E6E8 E#86 E!96 E!96

Begion Fi+e% ffects T T T T T :e&ographic Controls N T T T T >nco&e istwise :elete% N T N N

$ttitu%inal Controls N N N T T Group Cue-:e&ographics >nteractions N N N N T Group Cue-$ttitu%inal >nteraction N N N N T

p."#7 p."E7 p.#" 3two-taile%=NoteD 2S regressions pre%icting support for policies. :ata weighte% an% a%'uste% for sa&pling %esign. :e&ographic controlsinclu%eD gen%er &artial status age access to >nternet possession of cellular phone ability to rea% ability to write ability toperfor& arith&etic for&al e%ucation level inco&e an% religion sect. $ttitu%inal controls inclu%e two &easures of attitu%estowar% Unite% States an% view of Shari?a law.

!E



"able /: 0eliefs about Muslims in !asmir Moderate te Democracy1Militancy ,elationsip

3#= 3!= 36= 39= 3E=

β#D Group Cue ."##3."6"=

."#53."!5=

."!83."!5=

."#53."6"=

-.""!3."6;=

β!D Support for :e&ocratic 4alues .#86

3."98=.#;#

3."96=.#;#

3."90=.#09

3."9!=.#0E

3."9!=

β6D Perception of Musli&s in 1ash&ir ."8!

3."!6=."0;

3."!!=.";0

3."!!=."E5

3."!!=."E8

3."!6=


-."863."05=

-.#"63."09=

-."583."08=

-.#"#3."0E=

-."553."0E=

βED Group Cue + Perception of Musli&s in1ash&ir

-."9!3."66=

-."983."6!=

-."E8

3."6#=-."9E3."6!=

-."653."66=

β0D Support for :e&ocratic 4alues +Perception of Musli&s in 1ash&ir

-."0;3."E"=

-.";53."99=

-."8"

3."9;=-.";9

3."96=-.";0

3."96=

β;D Group Cue + Support for :e&ocratic

4alues + Perception of Musli&s in 1ash&ir

.#!;

3.";!=

.#99

3."0;=

.#9#

3.";#=

.#65

3."0;=

.#65

3."08=Constant .0;E

3."!6=.;8;

3."6#=.;;8

3."6!=.;00

3."60=.;;E

3."6;=

B ! .#0 .!E .!E .!0 .!0N E";; E";; 9566 E""! E""!

Begion Fi+e% ffects T T T T T :e&ographic Controls N T T T T >nco&e istwise :elete% N T N N

$ttitu%inal Controls N N N T T Group Cue-:e&ographics >nteractions N N N N T Group Cue-$ttitu%inal >nteraction N N N N T

p."#7 p."E7 p.#" 3two-taile%=NoteD 2S regressions pre%icting support for policies. :ata weighte% an% a%'uste% for sa&pling %esign. :e&ographiccontrols inclu%eD &artial status age access to >nternet possession of cellular phone ability to rea% ability to write ability toperfor& arith&etic for&al e%ucation level inco&e an% religion sect. $ttitu%inal controls inclu%e two &easures of attitu%estowar% Unite% States an% view of Shari?a law.

!0



"able 2: Support for Democratic Values Predicts Support for Four Militant 3roups

1ash&eer <an/ee&

$fghan <aliban $l Iae%a

Sectarian <an/ee&

β#D Group Cue -."69

3.""5=-."6;

3.""5=-."!9

3.""8=-."!#

3.""8=

β!D Support for :e&ocratic 4alues ."5#

3."#9=."50

3."#9=."59

3."#9=."59

3."#9=


."9E

3."#E=."96

3."#0=."!5

3."#9=."!E

3."#E=

Constant .8#E

3."6#=.8"#

3."66=.8"9

3."6!=.8!!

3."66=

B ! .#0 .#9 .#E .#EN E!96 E!96 E!96 E!96

p."#7 p."E7 p.#" 3two-taile%=NoteD 2S regressions pre%icting support for policies. :ata weighte% an% a%'uste% for sa&pling %esign.Begression &o%els inclu%e region fi+e% effects %e&ographic controls an% attitu%inal controls. :e&ographic

controls inclu%eD gen%er &artial status age access to >nternet possession of cellular phone ability to rea%ability to write ability to perfor& arith&etic for&al e%ucation level inco&e an% religion sect. $ttitu%inalcontrols inclu%e two &easures of attitu%es towar% Unite% States an% view of Shari?a law.

!;



"able 4: Support for Si+ Democratic Values Predicts Support for Militancy

PropertyBights

FreeSpeech

>n%ep.Courts

lecte%Beps.

CivilMil.Separation

Free%o& $sse&bly

β#D Group Cue -."#0

3.""0=-.""83.""E=

-."!!

3.""E=-."#0

3.""E=-."##

3.""E=-."#;

3.""E=

β!D Support for :e&ocratic 4alues ."96

3.""8=."!8

3.""8=."!9

3.""8=."9#

3.""5=."0#

3.""8=."#5

3.""5=

β6D Group Cue + Support for:e&ocratic 4alues

."#6

3.""8=.""6

3.""8=."!8

3.""8=."#8

3.""8=.""8

3."";=."!"

3.""8=

Constant .8#5

3."!5=.86E

3."!8=.866

3."!5=.860

3."!8=.8#9

3."!5=.865

3."!5=

B ! .!! .!# .!! .!! .!9 .!#N E!96 E!96 E!96 E!96 E!96 E!96

p."#7 p."E7 p.#" 3two-taile%=NoteD 2S regressions pre%icting support for policies. :ata weighte% an% a%'uste% for sa&pling %esign. Begression &o%els inclu%e regionfi+e% effects %e&ographic controls an% attitu%inal controls. :e&ographic controls inclu%eD gen%er &artial status age access to >nternet

possession of cellular phone ability to rea% ability to write ability to perfor& arith&etic for&al e%ucation level inco&e an% religion sect. $ttitu%inal controls inclu%e two &easures of attitu%es towar% Unite% States an% view of Shari?a law.

!8



Figure -: *llustration of "e Endorsement E+periment

&ontrol

QP2>CT :SCB>P<>2NR. ow &uch %o you support such a planL

"reatment

QP2>CT :SCB>P<>2NR. QGB2UP N$MR have voice% support for this progra&. ow&uch %o you support such a planL

,andomi%ation Procedure

!5



Figure .: Distribution of Support for Policies in &ontrol 3roup

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Vaccinations FCR Reforms Peace Jirga Curriculum Reform

Not at all A Little A o!erate Amount A Lot A "reat #eal

6"



0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

- 0 . 0

4

- 0 . 0

2

0 . 0

0

0 . 0

2

0 . 0

4

Figure 3: Support for Militancy by

Support for Democratic Values


T r e

a t m e n t E f f e c t o f G r o u p C u e

6#



Figure 2: Moderating Effect of Vie)s of Muslims in !asmir on Democracy1Militancy ,elationsip

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

- 0 . 1

0

- 0 . 0

5

0 . 0

0

0 . 0

5

0 . 1

0

(a) Low on Kashmir n!e"


T r e a t m e n t E f f e c t o f G r o u p C u e

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

- 0 . 1

0

- 0 . 0

5

0 . 0

0

0 . 0

5

0 . 1

0

(b) #igh on Kashmir n!e"


T r e a t m e n t E f f e c t o f G r o u p C u e

6!



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Appendi+ to 5Democratic Values and Support for Militancy: Evidence from a NationalSurvey of Pakistan6

(nline Appendi+ A: Sample Demograpics

Gen%er Marital Status

Male E6.# Marrie% ;;.8Fe&ale 90.5 Not Marrie% !!.!

UrbanBural 2nline StatusUrban 6!.E 2nline ;.#Bural 0;.E Not 2nline 5!.6

Province 2wn CellphonePun'ab EE.0 Tes 9;.0Sin%h !9.6 No E!.9NFP #6.5@alochistan 0.6 $bility to Bea%

Tes ;".5Beligious Sect No !5.#

Sunni 50.#Shi?ite 6.5 $bility to rite

Tes 05.; $ge No 6".6#8-!9 !!.5!E-!5 #8.; $bility to :o Math6"-65 !5.# Tes ;0."9"-95 #;.E No !9."E"-E5 ;.80" 9.#

4iews on U .S. govern&ent?s influence on worl%%ucation +tre&ely positive #.6>lliterate 6!.! So&ewhat positive 0."

Pri&ary #6.# Neither positive nor negative 8.;Mi%%le #9.5 So&ewhat negative !".5Matriculant #5.6 +tre&ely negative 06.#>nter&e%iate #!.6Gra%uate 0.9 4iews on U .S. govern&ent?s influence on Pa(. Professional #.5 +tre&ely positive #.9

So&ewhat positive 0."Monthly >nco&e Neither positive nor negative 5.8ess than 6""" P1B #!.6 So&ewhat negative #8.!6"""-#"""" P1B E6.5 +tre&ely negative 09.E#"""#-#E""" P1B !!.5#E""#-!E""" P1B 8.8 @elieve that Shari?a law is about physical punish&entMore than !E""" P1B !.! Tes EE."

No 9E."

NoteD N0""" for all variables e+cept &onthly inco&e 3NE;;5= views on U.S. govern&ent?s influence on worl% 3NE8E5=an% views on U.S. govern&ent?s influence on Pa(istani politics 3NE8;9=. :ata weighte% an% a%'uste% for sa&pling %esign.

i



(nline Appendi+ 0: #uestion 7ordings

Policies for Endorsement E+periment

<he orl% ealth 2rgani/ations recently announce% a plan to intro%uce% universal Polio vaccination acrossPa(istan. ow &uch %o you support such a planL

A great deal A lot A moderate amount A little 5ot at all

<he newly-electe% national govern&ent has propose% refor&ing the Frontier Cri&es Begulation an% &a(ingtribal areas e)ual to other provinces of the country. ow &uch %o you support such a planLA great deal A lot A moderate amount A little

5ot at all

Govern&ents of Pa(istan an% $fghanistan have e+plore% using peace 'irgas to resolve their %isputes fore+a&ple the location of the boun%ary Q:uran% lineSarha%R. ow &uch %o you support such a planLA great deal A lot A moderate amount A little 5ot at all

>n recent years the govern&ent of Pa(istan has propose% curriculu& refor& for &a%aris to &ini&i/esectarian %iscor%. ow &uch %o you support such a planLA great deal A lot A moderate amount A little 5ot at all

&omponents of !asmir *nde+

$ccor%ing to the non-govern&ental organi/ation u&an Bights atch >n%ian forces in 1ash&ir areresponsible for arbitrary %etention torture an% custo%ial (illings of 1ash&iri Musli&s. ow well %oes >n%iaprotect the rights of its Musli& citi/ens in 1ash&irL*Etremely well &omewhat well

5either well nor poorly &omewhat poorly *Etremely poorly

ow well %oes >n%ia protect the rights of its Musli& citi/ensL*Etremely well &omewhat well 5either well nor poorly &omewhat poorly

ii



*Etremely poorly

$ccor%ing to the non-govern&ental organi/ation u&an Bights atch the >n%ian constitution provi%es forfree%o& of religion for its Musli& citi/ens an% the National Govern&ent generally respecte% this right in thelast few years. ow well %oes >n%ia protect the rights of its Musli& citi/ens in 1ash&irL*Etremely well

&omewhat well 5either well nor poorly &omewhat poorly *Etremely poorly

<hin(ing about the political preferences of Musli&s in occupie% 1ash&ir please tell us which state&ent youagree with the &ostD#n occupied "ashmir the majority of !uslims want to be part of #ndia.#n occupied "ashmir the majority of !uslims want an independent state.#n occupied "ashmir the majority of !uslims want to be part of Pakistan.

,eligious Seriousness

>f a chil% in your house were to stu%y haf/-e-Iuran or na/ira what (in% of &a%rassa or school woul% youli(e the& to atten%L;amaate#slami Ahlehadith -eobandi (arlevi &hi$ite Ahlesunnat

:o you atten% %ars-e-IuranLes5o

ow &any ti&es %o you go to %ars-e-Iuran per wee( on averageL

8iadism

So&e people say 'iha% is a personal struggle for righteousness. 2thers say 'iha% is protecting the Musli&U&&ah through war. hat %o you thin(L;ihad is solely a personal struggle for righteousness.;ihad is both a personal struggle for righteousness and protecting the !uslim @mmah through war.;ihad is solely protecting the !uslim @mmah through war.

So&e people say only a Musli& stategovern&ent can use &ilitary force to protect a Musli& country or

U&&ah in the na&e of 'iha%. 2thers say in%ivi%uals an% non-state organi/ations can use &ilitary force in thena&e of 'iha%. hat %o you thin(L?nly statesIgovernments should use military force in the name of jihad.(oth statesIgovernments and individuals should use military force in the name of jihad.?nly individuals should use military force in the name of jihad.5either can use military force in the name of jihad.

Democratic Values

iii



ow i&portant is it for you to live in a country that is governe% by representatives electe% by the peopleL*Etremely important 9ery important !oderately important &lightly important 5ot important at all

ow i&portant is it for you to live in a country where the %ecisions of the courts are in%epen%ent fro&influence by political an% &ilitary authoritiesL*Etremely important 9ery important !oderately important &lightly important 5ot important at all

ow i&portant is it that in%ivi%uals be able to e+press their political views even though other people &aynot agree with the&L*Etremely important

9ery important !oderately important &lightly important 5ot important at all

ow i&portant is it that in%ivi%uals be able to &eet with others to wor( on political issuesL*Etremely important 9ery important !oderately important &lightly important 5ot important at all

ow i&portant is it that in%ivi%ual property rights be secureL <his &eans the state cannot ta(e away theirthings without proper court procee%ingsL*Etremely important 9ery important !oderately important &lightly important 5ot important at all

<he #5;6 Constitution of Pa(istan says civilians shoul% control the &ilitary. <his &eans the &ilitary cannotta(e action without or%ers fro& civilian lea%ers. >n your opinion how &uch control shoul% civilians haveover the &ilitaryL'omplete control A lot of control

A moderate amount of control A little control 5o control at all

<ell us if you agree with this opinionD a Shari?a govern&ent &eans a govern&ent that uses physicalpunish&ents 3stoning cutting off han%s whipping= to &a(e sure people obey the law.Agree -isagree

iv



Attitudes to)ard Pakistan "aliban9 Afgan "aliban9 and te :nited States 3overnment

e?re now going to as( you about a nu&ber of %ifferent groups. For each group please answer to the best ofyour ability. <he first group is *Pa(istani &ilitant groups fighting in 1ash&ir, hat %o you thin( is the group?s ob'ectivesL Please tell us all that apply.;ustice

-emocracy Protecting muslims +idding the !uslim umma of people who have moved away from their religion %reeing ?ccupied "ashmir

hich govern&ent ha% a &ore legiti&ate clai& to ruling $fghanistanD the current 1ar/ai govern&ent or thefor&er <aliban govern&entLThe current "arzai government The former Taliban government

hich govern&ent perfor&e% betterD the current 1ar/ai govern&ent or the for&er <aliban govern&entLThe current "arzai government

The former Taliban government

ere are two state&ents people &a(e about the $fghan <aliban. Please tell us which you agree with &oreDThe Afghan Taliban are trying to liberate Afghanistan from the @nited &tates and other foreign powers.The Afghan Taliban are rebelling against the government of Afghanistan.

:o you thin( the Unite% States is occupying $fghanistanLes 5o

Negative Vie)s of :nited States

Please tell us about the U.S. govern&ent?s influence on the worl% if it isD e+tre&ely positive so&ewhatpositive neither positive nor negative so&ewhat negative or e+tre&ely negativeL*Etremely positive &omewhat positive 5either positive nor negative &omewhat negative *Etremely negative

Please tell us about the U.S. govern&ent?s influence on Pa(istan?s politics if it isD e+tre&ely positiveso&ewhat positive neither positive nor negative so&ewhat negative or e+tre&ely negativeL*Etremely positive &omewhat positive 5either positive nor negative

&omewhat negative *Etremely negative

Demograpics

$re you &arrie%Les 5o

v



$re you Sunni or Shi?iteL&unni &hi$ite 5on!uslim J6+#TT*5 #5 ( #5T*+9#*6*+ #% 5?5!@&=#!K

hat is your age in yearsL

hat was the highest class you co&plete%LPrimary !iddle !atriculant #ntermediate <%.AI%.&c>)raduate <(.AI(.&c.>Professionals <!.&.'.8 !.A.8 Ph.-. or other professional degree>#lliterate

hat is the appro+i&ate &onthly inco&e in your househol%L=ess than BBB rupees

BBB to B8BBB rupees B8BB to 08BBB rupees 08BB to ,08BBB rupees !ore than ,08BBB rupees

:o you ever go online to access the >nternet %o web site browsing or to sen% an% receive e&ailLes 5o

:o you have a personal cell phoneLes 5o

Bea% in any language with un%erstan%ingLes 5o#f yes8 what language7

Can you write in any language &ore than signing your na&eLes 5o#f yes8 what language7

Can you solve si&ple &ath 3a%%ition subtraction= proble&sL i(e #" plus ; or 6" %ivi%e% by ELes

5o5ot sure

Se+D!ale %emale

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(nline Appendi+ &: ,andomi%ation &ecks

Control <reat&entGen%erMale E6.# E6.#Fe&ale 90.5 90.5

% D p.55

UrbanBuralUrban 6!.0 6!.6Bural 0;.9 0;.;% D p.;8

ProvincePun'ab EE.8 EE.6Sin%h !9.9 !9.#NFP #6.E #9.6@alochistan 0.6 0.!% D p.;!

Beligious SectSunni 50.6 50."Shi?ite 6.; 9."% D p.E#

$ge#8-!9 !6.! !!.E!E-!5 #5.6 #8.!6"-65 !8.! !5.59"-95 #;.E #;.9E"-E5 ;.5 ;.00" 6.5 9.6

% D p.06

%ucation>lliterate 6!.9 6#.5Pri&ary #6.; #!.0Mi%%le #6.8 #E.5Matriculant #5.0 #5.">nter&e%iate #!.8 ##.5Gra%uate 0.# 0.;Professional #.; !.#% D p.!#

Monthly >nco&e

ess than 6""" P1B 5.; 5.06"""-#"""" P1B EE.8 E6.0#"""#-#E""" P1B !6.5 !9.;#E""#-!E""" P1B 8.8 5.8More than !E""" P1B #.8 !.!% D p.6#NoteD N0""" for all variables e+cept &onthly inco&e

Shapiro-Fair the Roots of Militancy

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Transcript of Shapiro-Fair the Roots of Militancy