Shapin Latour

7/23/2019 Shapin Latour

1/19

Review: Following Scientists AroundAuthor(s): Steven ShapinReviewed work(s):

Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society by BrunoLatour

Source: Social Studies of Science, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Aug., 1988), pp. 533-550Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/285237

Accessed: 22/12/2009 10:56

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2/19

ESSAY

REVIEW

Following

Scientists

Around

Steven

Shapin

Bruno

Latour,

Science

in Action: How to Follow

Scientists and

Engi-

neers

throughSociety

(Milton

Keynes,

Bucks.:

Open University

Press;

Cambridge,

MA:

Harvard

University

Press,

1987),

274

pp.,

?25,

?9.95

pbk.

ISBN 0-335-15357-7

(6-9

pbk).

Bruno Latour has

been

following

scientists

around for

years.

Now

he

wants us to follow him

following

them

around. He offers

studentsof

science

and

technology

a

detailed

map

that

will

allow

us to follow him

easily.

He

defines the

nature,

scope

and terms of

the

exercise;

he

even

inventsa name- 'technoscience' for its objectof study.Inunmistak-

ably

French fashion

he

gives

us

'rules of

method' and

'principles',

numberedand

ordered. No one

following

Latour

is meant to

get

lost

or

to

stray

off the

line of

march.

Stragglers

will

have no

excuses.

There

has

never been a

programme

or

research n

the social

studies of

science

that

has been

presented

in

such a

systematic

and

integratedway.

This

is

no

mere

supplement

o our

existing nterpretative

epertoires,

no

piece-

meal

compilation

of

case-studies. It is

not meant to

be

slotted into

the

relativist or the 'social constructivist'agendas,whose research,in any

case,

is said to

be

fundamentally

misconceived.

This is

offered

as a new

programme

or

empirical

and theoretical

work that

has

the

capacity

to

keep

us

occupied

nto the

foreseeable uture.

Latour'sbook

will

receive,

and

it

deserves to

receive,

the

closest and most

widespread

attention.

Indeed,

the

general

perspective

developed by

Latour

and his

colleagues

in

Paris is

already

being,

to

use Latour's

language,

'black-boxed'

into

a

matter-of-fact

resource for

research in

the social

studies

of

science.1

The

study

of

technoscience

under

Latour's

eadership

promises

to be

great

fun. He is

clearly

enjoying

himself

immensely.

He writes with

Social

Studies of

Science

(SAGE,

London,

Newbury

Park,

Beverly

Hills

and

New

Delhi),

Vol.

18

(1988),

533-50


3/19

Social Studies

of

Science

panache,

charm and infectious

wit.2 This

is

one

of

the funniest

books

in

a

discipline

which is well-endowed with

funny-men. (Much

of

the

book's residual

Franglais

has

got

to be

intentional )

The hilarious and

well-judged

caricatureof the

history

of

ideas tradition

(132-36)

alone

is

worth the

purchase

price.

If

many

of us

are

going

to be victims

of

the Latourian

war

against

existing

tendencies

in

the social studies

of

science,

we

may

as

well

die

laughing.

Ave

Bruno,

morituri

e salutant.

The

Technoscientific

War

The

military

(Machiavellian,

Hobbesian,

Nietzschean)

metaphor

s,

of

course,

Latour's trade

mark,

and it is

basic

to his

understanding

of

scientific

and

technological activity.3

Technoscience

is

war conducted

by

muchthe

same

means. Its

object

s domination nd ts methods nvolve

the mobilization

of

allies,

their

multiplication

and

their

drilling,

their

strategic

and forceful

juxtaposition

o the

enemy.

This

agonistic

model

has,

beyond

doubt,

picked

out and stressed features of

science

and

technology which other perspectives have missed or systematically

undervalued.

To those raised

on

the functionalist diom

which insisted

upon

the

harmonious

solidarity

of

the scientific

community,

Latour's

'red-in-tooth-and-claw'

ociology

will

come as

a

violent shock.

Indeed,

his

whole

enterprise

s

little more than the

systematic

working-through

of

the

military metaphor,

and,

ultimately,

its

designation

as a literal

depiction

of science and

technology.

The basic elements

of

Latour'saccount

may

be

reasonably

well

known

from his previouswritings.4Science andtechnologyare informedby a

Drang

an Macht.

Its actors

work out their

mpulses

o

grow,

to

transform

themselves

from 'micro-actors'

o 'macro-actors'.

This

they

do

vampire

fashion:

by subduing

thers,

by

insinuating

hemselves

nto others'

bodies

and

by

turning

hem

into

agents

of their

own volition. Successful

cientific

and

technological

enterprises

are

manifestations

of the

triumph

of

the

will.

The

laboratory

s not a

peaceful

retreat

rom

political

and economic

struggles

that

rage

outside.

It

is a

great

battlefield

upon

which

most

combatantsare

slaughtered

and

from

which

only

the

strong

walk

away.

Waris

usually

understoodas a meansto an end:in itself it yields nothing

but

corpses

and

heroes,

and it

has

rarely

been

justified

as

worthy

in its

own

right.

Science

and

technology,

however,

are

productive.

They

produce

facts and

machines,

and

these constitute

their

justifications.

What are

the means

of technoscientific

war and

how do

they produce

these

goods?

If

scientists

and

engineers

are

trying

to

impose

their

will

534


4/19

Essay

Review:

Shapin:

Following

Scientists Around

upon

others,

let us

imagine

an actor

who

resists and

let us follow

him

as he

attempts

o maintain

his resistance.

If he resists

a

simple

scientific

assertion about a matter of

fact,

he can be shown a

textual

display

of

allies that vouch for the

claim,

and

that he will have

to

confront

should

he

not submit.

Initially,

we are still

in

a

paper

world

and the allies

take

the form of

cited authorities: 'if

you

don't believe

me,

take a look

at

all the other

scientists

who

support

me'.

Rhetoric,

then,

is the

general-

issue

weapon

of scientific

armies,

and Latour's

account is

founded

on

a

rhetorical

nalysis

of scientific

activity.

Scientific actsare

made

hrough

rhetorical

manoeuvring

with

grammatical

modalities':

positive

modalities

makingstatementshard,

negative

modalities

making

them soft. When

the statements

become hard

enough,

they may

be

inserted into

other

statements

without modificationor

justification:they

are

facts, and,

as

such,

they

can

be made

into

allies

for

further

claims to

facticity.

The

fate of a statement s not

determined

by

its

contentor its

structure,

nor

by

the

individual who first

made

it,

nor

by

the

context

in

which

it was

initially

made.

Fact-making

is a

collective

business

and it is

extended

in

time. Statements

can

only

become facts if

they

are

noticed

and used without modificationby others. Moreover, the status of any

statement

cannot be

guaranteed

against

the

fact-destroying

activity

of

others,

in

other

places,

at

other times.

'The

status of

a

statement

depends

on

later

statements'

(27).

Presumably,

though

without

explicit

acknowledgement,

Latour is

here

affiliating

himself

with

a version

of

philosophical

initism

familiar from

the

work of

Hesse

and

Barnes:

concept

application

s

open-ended

and

revisable;

nothing

in

the

nature

of

reality

and

nothing

about

past

usage

determines how

terms

are

employed.5

Statements

are

endemicallyvulnerable o users' decisions:

do

users

take

any

notice?

do

they

modify

the

statements?

reject

them?

incorporate

hem in

other

statements?

The

recalcitrant

eaderhas now

been shown

the

forces

arrayed

against

his

resistance,

and,

therefore,

the

price

to

be

paid

should he

continue

to

deny

the

truth of

what is

asserted. As he

persists

in

his

resistance,

the

debate

becomesat

once

more

'technical'

and

more

'social'.

It

becomes

technical

because

the

doubter has to

be shown

in

the

text

what

claims

(and

who)

he

must

also

doubt if

he

wants to

doubt

this

one.

It

becomes

more social because allies are

being

mobilized and enemies are

being

isolated. In

general,

the

technical

appearance

of

scientific

literature

consists,

Latour

says,

in

nothing

but

its

social

character,

its

display

of

phalanxes

of

armed

allies

making

t

pointless

to

resist. 'If

being

isolated,

besieged,

and left

without

allies

and

supporters

s not

a

social

act,

then

nothing

s. ...

This

literature

s so

hard o

read

and

analyse

not

because t

535


5/19

Social Studies

of

Science

escapes

from

all normal social

links,

but because

it

is more social

than

so-callednormalsocial ties' (62). Latour husmajesticallysweeps aside

one

of

the

major

obstacles

blocking

he

progress

of

the

sociologists'

army:

the dualistic

opposition

between what

is

'scientific'

or

'technical'

and

what is 'social'.

The scientific

literature

displays

the cost of

doubting,

but

doubt,

as

Latour

recognizes,

may

still be

persisted

with.

The

show

of the instru-

ments

of torture

may

not be

enough

for

the committed

heretic;

they may

have

to be

applied

o his

flesh. The doubter

may

resist

all mere rhetorical

tricks;

he

may

want

to follow the scientist into the actual

place

where

the work is done: the

laboratory.

He

may

want to see the

reality

that

is said to

'lie behind'

the text. What

he

sees there raises

the cost

of

resistance

still further.

If

you

don't

believe the

representations

roduced

by

your antagonist,

you

will

ultimately

have to learn

to make them

yourself.

More than

that,

you

will be

obliged

to build

your

own instru-

ments

and to

gather

them

into one

place.

You

will,

that

is

to

say,

have

to secure

the resources

to construct a

'counter-laboratory'.

At

each

stage

of

doubt,

the

cost

of resistance

s increased. It

becomes

botheconomicallyandmorallyharder o continuerefusingone's assent.

On the

one

hand,

you

will have

to build

your

own

laboratory

o

contest

the

claims;

on

the

other,

you

will

have

to

impugn

the

competence

or

good

faith

of those

you

choose

to disbelieve.

The

financial

cost

is

impossible

o

bear;

he

social cost

is

alienation.

Latour's

haggy-dog

tory

comes

to a

pragmatic

nd.

More,

and

more

powerful,

allies are

mobilized

and

juxtaposed

to

the

forces

of doubt.

In

principle,

doubt

may

be con-

tinued

indefinitely;

in

practice,

doubters

give up.

The

laboratory

acts

on resisters ike a Romanphalanxactedondisorganized arbarianabble:

The

layman

s awed

by

the

laboratory et-up,

and

rightly

so.

There

are not

many

places

under

he

sun

where

so

many

and such

hardresources

are

gathered

n so

great

numbers,

sedimented

in so

many layers,

capitalised

on such a

large

scale...

[C]onfronted

by

laboratories

we

are

simply

and

literally impressed.

We are left

without

power

. .to

dispute

the

spokesmen's

authority.

(93)

Disciplining

and

Persuading

The collective natureof

fact-making

and

machine-makingprecipitates

an

apparent

aradox.

You

want to

make

yourself

great,

to secure

author-

ship

for

your

own creation.

But

to do so

you

need

a

multitude

of

allies.

How

to enlist

their

assistance

and,

at the same

time,

to

ensure

hat

hey

do

not

modify

the

claim

or the

device

out

of all

recognition?

You

have

both

to

'enrol'

and

to 'control'.

One

way

to

enrol

others

is

straightforward:

536


6/19

Essay

Review:

Shapin: Following

Scientists

Around

you

can cater

for

potential

allies'

'explicit

interests'. You

shape

your

claim or your machineso that otherswill immediatelybelieve it or buy

it.

However,

if

you

do this

you

will

not

grow great

yourself;

your

authority

will

not be enhanced

or

even

recognized;

you

will

merely

help

others to

grow.

You can

always get

allies to march

n

the direction

they

already

want

to

go,

but that is

unlikely

to do

you

much

good.

So

what

you

must do

is

to translate their interests nto

your

preferred

course

of

action,

to

get

them 'to

follow

us rather hanthe other

way

around'

111).

There are

many

strategies

that

may

be used to

effect this translation.

You

can,

for

example,

tell

people

that their

goals

are unrealizable

as

presently

conceived,

that

they

can attain hem if

only they

make a short

detour from the

route

of

march

they

are

on

already.

Scientists who

tell

industry

and the

military

that

they

can

only

get

useful outcomes if

they

make a

detour into basic research are

trying

to

achieve this

type

of

translation.

Still,

there are limits to translations hat

depend

upon

others'

explicit

interests. Better to outflank the

explicit purposes

of

potential

allies. You can

give people's objectives

different

interpretations

han

is

customary; you

can invent new

objectives

and

try

to sell them to

a

group;you can try to create a new groupwith characteristicsyou have

custom-tailored;

you

can tell a

group

that the detour

you

propose

isn't

very

long,

all

the time

keeping

them

moving

in

your

preferred

direction.

Best of

all

you

can make

yourself

indispensable

o

allies.

Indeed,

this

is

a

description

f

the state

of

affairs hatexists when

you

have

succeeded.

You

no

longer

have to

sell

your product,

because

your

goods

have

become

simply necessary

for an

array

of

allies to

achieve their

purposes.

Your

product

s then a

black-box. The

thermometer

s,

for

example,

used

by

laymenand scientistsfor a wide rangeof purposes;no one has to display

and

justify

the

physical

principles

underlying

ts use

in

order to

get

on

with the

job

of

taking

a

reading;

such

readings

must

be taken in

order

for

any

numberof

other

tasks to be

realized;

and

any

attempt

o

dispute

the

legitimacy

of

thermometricmeasures of

physical

reality

will

be

strenuously

opposed

by

almost

all the

world.

If

you

achieve this

kind

of

success,

you

(your

statement,

apparatus,

place

of

work)

will

have

become an

'obligatory

point

of

passage'

(120-21,

132, 141,

150-51,

156,

162).6

Having

enrolled

your

allies,

you

must now make surethat

they

keep

in

line,

particularly

hat

they

don't transform

your

creation so

that it

is

no

longer

recognizable

s

yours.

The

thing

must

spread,

but it

must

spread

as

'the

same'

thing

that

you

produced

at

the

start of

the

process.

You

control

your

enrolled

allies

and make

them

predictable

by

building up

a

network

of

elements

around

he

thing

in

question, linking

'the fate

of

537


7/19

Social

Studies

of

Science

the

claim with so

many

assembled elements

that

it

resists all

trials

to

break it

apart' (122). Here, too, matters become highly 'technical'.

Pasteur nterestedfarmers

n

his anthrax

vaccine,

but

he was in

danger

of

losing

their

interest

f he

could

not

get

the

bacilli

to

behave

themselves

properly.

He

had

to

make

the

behaviour

f boththe bacilli

andthe

farmers

predictable.

This

involved 'technicalities'

ike

finding

precisely

the

right

temperature

t

which to culturethe

germs

so that the

farmers

could and

would

use the vaccine

reliably.

You

must,

in

Latour's

usage,

construct

a

'machine'

in which

the

assembledelements are tied to one anotherand

act

as

a whole.

'When such cohesion

is obtained

we at last have a black

box'

(131).

Once

you

have done

that,

no one can

tamper

with

any

one

component

without

eroding

the

functioning

of

the entire machine.

'Dis-

sent has been

made unthinkable'

(133).

The

strength

of

the

Roman

phalanx

did

not

arisefromthe numbers

t contained

butfrom ts

disciplined

coordination.

Actor-Networks

Latour's 'networks'

are

heterogeneous

n their

composition.

They

con-

tain entities

we

are accustomed

to

call

'things'

as well

as

those

we

are used

to

designate

as

'people'.

Anything

can

be an

'actant'

or

an

'actor'

in technoscientific

networks.Latour's

erosionof the

conventional

boundaries

eparating

politics

from science

is

predicated

upon

the

insis-

tence that

objects

and

non-human ntities

as well

as

people

are

political

beings.

Things

belong

to

the

study

of

political

order as

much

as

human

agents. Thus, Pasteur's network

contained

both

bacilli and

farmers;

George

Eastman's

ncluded

photographic

mulsion

and an

invented

group

of

camera

users;

Robert

Boyle's

tied

together

an

air-pump,

n

operational

vacuum,

moderate

Anglican

clerics

and

political

theorists.

The

ingenuity

of the

scientist

or

engineer

-

that

which defines

his

identity

-

is

his

ability

'to include

n

the

same

repertoire

of

ploys

human

and

non-human

resources'

125).

Latour

egards

t as a

great

mistake

o decide

n

advance

what

alliances

are

composed

of:

whether

their

elements

are human

or

non-human,

whether

they

are

subjective

or

objective.

We have

only

to

ask whether an associationis strongeror weakerthan another.Tech-

nology

and science are

the activities

that

build

strong

alliances

out

of

heterogeneous

components.

They

are,

Latour

says,

'so

muchthe

same

phenomenon

that

I was

right

to use

the same

term

black-box...to

designate

their

outcome'

(131).

This,

then,

is the definition

of

'techno-

science',

the

thing

Latour's

enterprise

aims

to

understand.

538


8/19

Essay

Review:

Shapin:

Following

Scientists

Around

An

importantconsequence

flows from this for our

perception

of

the

boundaries between 'science' and 'society', and for our view of the

proper

scope

of

'sociology'.

Because the networks

which confront

us

are

composed

of both human and non-human

elements,

we never

see

'science'

and

'society' separately,

only

stronger

and weaker

associations.

'Scientific' work

is also 'social'

work, or,

as

it

might

be

put,

solutions

to the

problem

of

knowledge

are solutions o the

problem

of social

order.

'Society'

is

constructedand stabilized at the same time that 'facts'

and

'machines'

are

constructed.

From

this observation Latour draws

both

optimistic

and

pessimistic

conclusions for the

scope

of

sociological

accounting

in the

study

of technoscience. On the one

hand,

sociology

can

go

anywhere:

there is

nothing

in

science

and

technology,

however

technical and

esoteric,

which is

beyond

the

sociologist's proper

ambit.

On

the

other,

the resources

the

sociologist

can use to

say

intelligible

things

about

science and

technology

are

drastically

curtailed.

Because

the order of

society

is the outcome of

settled

controversies,

Latour

will

not allow us to

invoke

'society'

(or

'social

factors')

'to

explain

how and

why

a

controversy

has been settled'

(144).

Since 'actornetworks' areheterogeneous,they mayextendanywhere

in

nature or in

society. They

may

reach from

the virus

to

Versailles;

indeed,

the

virologist

must

enlist allies

in

the

corridors

of

power

in

order

to do his

work

and

to

createhis

objects.

Latour

tudieswhat s

customarily

called the

'professionalization'

of

science

in

terms of

the enrolmentof

allies in

society

and the translation f

their

nterests.The

professionaliza-

tion of

science

is to be

understood

as the

constitutionof the

laboratory

as an

'obligatorypoint

of

passage'.

Thus,

Latourfollows

the work

that

precipitates herecognizedboundariesdividing 'science' from 'society'

and

'politics',

while

denying

those boundaries

any analytic

legitimacy.

He

gives

a new

twist to our

understanding

of

'science

policy'

and

of

the

basis of

the

'purity'

of

'pure

science'.

Laboratory

work

becomes

more

and more

'technical'

just

in

order to

enrol

and

discipline

allies,

including politicians

and

industrialists. Its

apparent

ndependence

s,

consequently,

precisely

the

resultof

the

political

work

done

in

enrolling

these

allies.

'Those

who are

really

doing

science are

not

all

at the

bench;

on

the

contrary,

there are

people

at the

bench

because

many

more are

doing

the science elsewhere'

(162).

So much for the

boundary

between

the

'internal'

and

the

'external'.

Latour

is

one of

the

very

few

students of

modern

science and

tech-

nology

who

recognizes

the

fundamental

mportance

of

the

links which

bind

these

activities to

the

military.

This

is not

because he

adopts

any

readily

discernible

anti-militaristic

tance

(Latour's

position appears

o

539


9/19

Social Studies

of

Science

be

somewhere between even-handedand above it

all),

but

because

he

wants to

follow

technoscientificactor-networkswherever

they go.

The

military

s

a natural

ally

for

scientists

wanting

o recruitand controlallies

simply

because the

military

has abundant

experience

in

'enrolling,

disciplining, drilling

and

keeping

in line'. If

you

can

sell to

the

military,

you

can

buy

into their networks.More

fundamentally,

echnoscienceand

the

military

have the same

problem:

that

of

winning.

The

similarity

between 'the

proof

race and

the armsrace'

is,

in

the

end,

not a

metaphor.

They

are,

for

Latour,

the

same sort

of

activity:

'technoscience is

part

of a

war

machine and should

be

studied as

such'

(172).

The remainderof Latour'sbook uses actor-network

heory

to recon-

ceptualize

a series of

problems

usually

assigned

o the

domains

of macro-

sociology, anthropology

nd

longue

duree

historiography.

For

example,

he dissolves

the

categories

'belief and

'knowledge',

'rationality'

and

'irrationality',

nto the

geometry

and

dynamics

of

intersections

between

different

actor-networks.

The

'GreatDivide' between

rational

and irra-

tional

cannot

refer

to what

is believed and

how

inferences

are

made,

since the

accusations

can

always,

as

a matter of

principle,

be

turned

around 188-95). Instead, hedesignationsproperlyreferto appearances

generated

as

the

result of

certain

kinds

of

contact

between

members

of

different

networks.

The Great Divide

is

a

summary

of how matters

outside

scientific

networks

appear

when looked at

from within.

In

turn,

it

is a

function

of

the

transits

raced

by

technoscientific

ravellers

rossing

a series

of

other cultures

with the intention

of

coming

back and

telling

stories.

The

cultures

thus

transitted

by

'these

peculiar

travellers

sent

away

in

order

to

come

back

are

going

to

appear

by comparison

"local",

"closed", "stable", "culturallydetermined"' 211).

We

get

the

impres-

sion that

rules

of

logic

have

been

broken,

but we are

only seeing

the

result

of certain

kinds

of

dynamic

interaction

between networks

of

different

'scale'.

From

what

sources

do such differences

in

scale arise?

In what

do the

differences

between

great

and

small,

strong

and

weak,

consist?

Latour

deals

with

these

questions

through

a

study

of

imperialism.

He wants

to

identify

the

bases

of domination

which

imperialism

shares

with

techno-

science.

Ultimately,

the

power

to

dominate

consists

in the differential

possession

of

knowledge.7

One

group

can get the edge on another f it

can

more

effectively

gather

and

distribute

elevant

knowledge.

The

sailor

who is

seeing

a

dangerous

eef

for the

second

ime

is

more

knowledgeable

than

one

who

is

seeing

it

for the

first

time.

Forewarned

s

forearmed.

How

is

it

possible

for those

who

have

not

yet physically

gone

out

to

the reef

to have

seen

it

already?

How

can

you

act

at

a

distance?

The

540


10/19

Essay

Review:

Shapin:

Following

Scientists Around

answer is

straightforward:

ou

bring

the reef home

and show

it

about.

Of

course,

there

are certainpracticalproblemsassociatedwithshipping

distant

objects

like reefs back

home,

so what

you

do

is to

manipulate

the scale of the

thing

in

question

so that it is more

easily portable

and

so

that he

largest

number

of

people

at home can havethe same

experience

of it. In

Latour's

erminology,

you

achieve

this

by

creating

scaled-down

'immutable

mobiles',

entities hatretain heir

shape

while

beingmultiplied

indefinitely

nd

combined

n

an indefinitenumberof

ways:

charts, ables,

maps,

logs, plans,

lists.

Latour nds wherehe

begins:

n

a

paper

world. The basis of

domination

is the accumulation n certain 'centres of calculation'of mountainsof

inscribed

paper.

This

paper

world is

what allows its

manipulators

o

dominatethe

real

world. The

objects

of

technoscience,

no

matter

what

their

size,

'all end

up

at such a scale that a few

men

or

women

can

dominate hem

by

sight;

at one

point

or

another,

they

all take

the

shape

of

a flat surfaceof

paper

..;

they

all

help

to reversethe balanceof

forces

between

those who master

and those who

are

mastered';

'it

is

simply

a

question

of

scale'

(255, 227).

Technoscience s

truly

a

paper

war.

Paper

is at once the battlefieldand the ultimateweapon.

Interesting

Sociology

C'est la

guerre,

mais

est-ce

que

c

'est

magnifique

There is so

much here

that is

instantly

appealing:

the

account of

enrolment

processes,

the

'energy-cost'

theory

of

scientific

assent,

the

study

of

institutionalization

in

terms of

obligatorypoints

of

passage and funnelledinterests, and,

not

least,

the

parallels

Latour

points

out

between the

objects

of

science

and the

objects

of

technology.

Picking

elements out of

Latour's book

and

intercalating

hem into

existing

traditions

in

the

social

studies

of

science

could

keep

us

gainfully

occupied

for

years.

This is

what

may

ultimately

happen

to

Latour's

work,

but

this is

clearly

not

what Latour

wants o

happen.

He wants o

enrol

us and

keep

us in

line;

he

doesn't

want

us

to

modify

the

elements

out of

all

recognition,

and he

doesn't

want

us to

enrol

him.

It

is

only

right,

therefore,

to

assess

the

schema as a

whole, and as Latourhas

proffered

it to us. Whatare the

goals

of the

social

studies of

science as

Latour

conceives

them? How

do these

relate

to

our

existing goals?

What

resources is

he

offering

us that

can

help

us

achieve

our

goals?

It is

possible

that

some

readers of

a

nervous

disposition

may

feel

uneasy

about

Latour's

dare-devil

theorizing, squeamish

about

his

book's

541


11/19

Social

Studies

of

Science

over-weening

ambition

and

the

cosmic

scope

of

his schemata.This would

be

wrong:

we

need

many

more workers

in

our field who

cast their nets

as

widely

as

Latour;

we

need to

go

back to

the

goals

of the

1930s

when

workers like

Zilsel,

Borkenau,

Grossmann,

Fleck,

Bernal,

Hessen,

Mannheim,

and

Sorokin

all

sought

o

say things

about

science and

society

that nterested

people

outwith

he

narrow

confines

of

an academic

discip-

line.

No,

Latour's readers

would

be

better advised to

worry

about

his

modesty,

reticence

and

self-denial,

all

the more so since

the ambition

is

apparent

while the restraint s not.

What,

according

to

Latour,

will

we be

doing

if

we elect to follow him? His

answers

may

strike some

workers in the field as

disappointing.

All these resources have been

mobilized and

arrayed

or the

sake

of

a

'tiny

breathing pace'

for 'those

who want to

study

independently

he

extensions

of

all these networks'

(257).8

This

is

not the

Ring of

the

Niebelungen

after

all;

it is

just

a

shaggy-dog

story

of

epic

proportions.

Latour reckons that we need a

respite

from

causal

explanations

of

science and

technology.

It makes no difference whether the causal

items

are,

as

it

is

usually put, 'cognitive',

'natural'or 'social':

all

such

explanatory nterprisesarefundamentallymisconceived. Yet it is never

made

clear what sort

of

enterprise

we are

being

invited

to

put

in

the

place

of

explanation.

Presumably,

it is

some version

of

verstehende

or hermeneutic

sociology, though

one feels entitled

to a much

more

systematic

confrontation

with this issue

than Latour

actually

provides.

Instead,

a

matter of such fundamental

mportance

s

largely

dealt

with

by

putting

n

place

a

practical anguage

which

eschews

the

word

'why'

in favour of

the word 'how'.

We 'follow' scientists

around;

we 'enter'

their

laboratories;

we 'watch' them

at

work;

we 'understand'

he nature

of science and

technology.

But we don't

'explain'

why they

make the

choices

they

do,

why

the controversies

we observe come

to

be closed

and

why

they

are settled

as

they

are.9

Such

explanation,

t is

suggested,

s

misguided

on two

grounds.

Latour

first

observes that

the closure

of controversies

generates

new controver-

sies.

'We could review

all the

opinions

offered

to

explain

why

an

open

controversy

closes,

but

we

will

always

stumble

on

a

new

controversy

dealing

with

how and

why

it closed.

We

will have to

learn

to live with

two contradictory oices talkingatonce...'(13). It is hard o understand

how Latour

makes

the move

from

the

undeniable

observation

hat there

are different

members'

accounts

of

controversy

losure

to the

conclusion

that

the

analyst

cannot

or must

not

explain

such

closure.

(Gilbert

and

Mulkay

do

indeed

make this

move,

but Latour

has

not

noticeably

allied

himself

with their

programme

of 'discourse

analysis'.)10

542


12/19

Essay Review:

Shapin: Following

Scientists

Around

More

fundamentally,

Latour

argues

that

we cannot

explain why

controversies

close because

the

alleged

cause

is not independentof the

effect

to

be

explained.

We cannot

give

a realist

explanation

because

the

'settlement

of a

controversy

s the cause

of Nature's

representation';

nd

we

are barred from

sociological

explanations

because the

closure of

a

controversy

s

also 'the cause of

Society's

stability'

(258).

Explanation

of

science and

technology

n termsof 'social

factors',

andthe

programme

dedicated o

showing

the 'social construction

f science

and

technology',

are

banned because

they

are

said

to

rest

upon

an

illegitimate

dualism

between science

and

society.

Analysts

who use

groups

endowedwith interests n

order

o

explain

how an

idea

spreads,

a

theory

is

accepted,

or a

machine

rejected,

are

not

aware

[sic]

that the

very

groups,

the

very

interests that

they

use as causes in

their

explanations

are the

consequence

of an

artificial

xtraction nd

purification

f

a

handfulof links from

these

ideas,

theories

or

machines.

(141)

This

is a

serious

charge,

even

putting

to

one side

the

unfortunate

diagnosis

of

other

analysts'

tates

of

'awareness'. t is

the

basis

of

Latour's

attack

upon

'relativists'

and

'social

constructivists'and

the

warrant or

the

heroic

self-denial he

imposes upon

his

own

accounts.

Are

Latour's

criticisms

well-aimed and

well-informed?Has he

adequately

character-

ized

the nature

and

statusof

the

sociological

explanations

he

criticizes?12

If

he has

not,

has he

imposed

unnecessary

onstraints

pon

his own

work?

Interests

and

other 'social

factors',

Latour

says,

cannot be

used as

causal

items

because

they

are the

consequences

of

negotiation

and the

effects of

the

settlementof

disputes.

He

uses his

accountof

the

transla-

tion

of

interests

through

talk

and

negotiation

as

proof

of

this.

Latour

is hereevidentlyequating nterestswithaccounts of interests:as verbal

manoeuvring

proceeds

and

produces

its

effects on

interest-talk,so,

it

is

assumed,

interests

hemselves are

transformed.

They

are

thus too

soft

to

act as

causal or

explanatory

resources.

But,

as

interest-theorists

ike

Barnes

have

repeatedly

explained,

their

'work

refers

to

interests,

not

to

agents'

accounts of

interests,

and the

two

cannot

be

assumed to

be

the

same,

any

more

than

cream-cakes

and

accounts of

cream-cakescan

be

assumed

to

be

the

same.

With

cream-cakes

there is

a

chance

of

satisfying hunger

-

with accounts of cream-cakesthere is not'.13

Interests,

Goals

and

Skills

'Interests'

properly

point

to

the

fundamentally

oal-oriented

and

instru-

mental

characterof

scientific

work,

and to

the

contingencies

by

which

543


13/19

Social

Studies

of

Science

particulargoals

are constituted.

If

Latour is to show the illicitness

of

interest-explanations,e shouldsystematically idhis work of theorizing

about he

goal-directedness

f

technoscience.

In

practice

he

does

no such

thing.

This book

is

firmly,

and

potentially

fruitfully,

rooted

in a view

of technoscientific

work as

goal-directed,

as,

indeed,

was his earlier

Laboratory Life.

It

is, however,

remarkable that Latour is

now

so

reluctant o

acknowledge

this

orientation,

and even

implicitly

to

deny

it. In

Chapter

of

the

present

book the items that

ndicate

he

instrumental

character

f

scientists'

and

technologists'

work

are

referred

o as

'goals'.

Curiously, nothing

s said about what

'goals'

are,

for Latour ntroduces

theterm as a

way

of

defining

and

showing

the

dependence

of 'interests'.

He notes the

etymological

derivation

of

'interests'

from 'inter-esse'

(that

is,

'what

ie[s]

in

betweenactorsand their

goals'),

and thus

distinguishes

between interests

(which

he

treats

as

negotiated hrough

alk)

and

goals

(which

are

generally,

if

not

invariably,

spoken

of

as

given)

(108-10).14

Latour

has,

to

all

appearances,

banned nterests

by treating

hem

as the

same

as

interest-accounts,

hile

re-introducing

he instrumental

haracter

of technoscientific

work

by

the

back

door,

in the form

of

'goals'.

Latour hereforestill maintainsa fundamentally, f implicitly, instru-

mentalistorientation.

This is

not

to be criticized.

It is the

major

resource

thatallows

him to make

sense

of scientists'and

engineers'

behaviour,and,

for want

of

a more

politic

word,

to

'explain'

what informstheir

trainsof

discursive

and

manipulative

work.

They

are

maximizing

animals.

In

Laboratory

Life,

Latour

and

Woolgar

asked

'WhatMotivatesScientists?'.

They

happily

and

systematically

answered

the

question

by

invoking

the

notion hat

scientists,

as

they

followed

their

career

rajectories,

acquired

a

range

of 'investments'

whose

value

hey

tried o

protect

and

enhance.

These

investments

ncluded

ommitments

o the

credibility

f

past

achievements,

socially

acquired

expertise,

and

familiarity

with

traditions

of instrumen-

tation.

Such

investments

were

invoked

as

explanatory

responses

to

questions

ike 'What

drives scientists

o... write

papers,

construct

bjects,

and

occupy

different

positions?

What makes

a

scientist...

choose

this

or

that

method,

this

or

that

data...

?'15In other

words,

'investments'

were

offered

as

explanations

of

scientists'

decisions

and

judgements

in

relation

to the

possibilities

presented

to them.

It is a pity that this explicit line was apparentlyabandoned without

significant

comment)

by

its authors.

Even

though

it

seems

to be

ruled

out

by

Latour's

(and

Woolgar's)

present

programmatic

tatements,

his

approach

has

enormous

potential.

It

may,

indeed,

be

the

most

profitable

way

forward

for

sociological

explanations

of

scientific

action

and

of the

closure

of scientific

controversies.

Consider

Latour's

present

account

544


14/19

Essay

Review:

Shapin:

Following

Scientists

Around

of

technoscientific

controversy

and

its

settlement.At each

stage

of

the

disbeliever's trajectory,the energy cost of his resistanceis raised. In

Latour's

story

it

simply

becomes

harderand harder

or

resistanceto

be

offered. The

resources hat

are

arrayed

against

he dissenterare

various:

they

include

rhetoric,

more

rhetoric,

new

objects,

bigger

laboratories

and more

expensive

nstruments,

more

allies,

more

powerful

allies,

more

disciplined

allies,

morecohesive networks

of

allies,

the rhetoric

of

trans-

lation,

and,

finally,

the

combination

of

these

in

'the

long heterogeneous

list

of

resourcesand allies that scientists

[gather]

o

make dissent

impos-

sible'

(103).

While it becomes

more

costly

and awkward o

resist,

Latour

is at

pains

to assureus thathe has not offered

anything

ike a

principled

explanation

of

why

controversies

close. How can

he,

since,

in

his

opinion,

all

potential

explanatory

resources are too

soft to do the

job?

Interests

can be talked

away;

reality

and

society

are

themselves mere

precipitates

of

technoscientific

controversy,

the

results of

further alk.

The

in-principle

problem

of

what settles

controversy

is

simply put

to

one side

in

favourof a

list of the

elements which

figure

in

its

resolution.

On the one

side we have

all the resources

arrayed

o

makethe dissenter

submit or to enlist his disciplinedparticipation;on the other we have

Latour's

undamental

scription

o the

technoscientific

ctorof maximiz-

ing

behaviour

and the

ability

to

calculate

likely

consequences

of his

behaviour.

What

informs his

decision to

resist or

submit,

to

join

this

or

that

network? f

we

are to

give

an

explanatory

esponse

o

this

question

we

need

something

which

is not

simply

the

result of a

controversy

being

settled,

something

which is not

simply

to

be talked

away

or

around.The

laboratory

ethnographer

hould not

have far to look

for

something

of

thatsort. When

he enters

he

laboratory

what

else

shouldhe

see but

scien-

tists at work?

They

are,

as Latour

nsists,

producing

'traces',

but

they

produce

them

through

routines

of

work.

Work is

of

many

kinds:

it

may

be

discursive

(rhetorical,

representational)

nd it

may

be

manipulative.

The

ability

o

accomplish

work of

certain

kinds

s

acquired

hrough

rains

of

socialization,

and,

once

acquired,

constitutes

a

major

'investment'

to

be

protected

and

maximized.

An

attack

upon

the

validity

of

a

work-product

a

scientific

fact or

theory,

a line of

enquiry,

a

research

programme)

s

importantly

n

attack

upon the legitimacy and value of the work-abilities that make it. The

scientist

whose

skills

are of no

value is

literally

unemployed,

and

he will

fight

to

defend

the

value of

his

skills

as

fiercely

as

any

miner,

compositor

or

machinist

fighting

the

'rationalizations'

of

Thatcherism.

Moreover,

skills,

competences

and

routines

which

entrain

work-abilities,

are not

vulnerable

o

'work-talk'

or

'skill-talk'.

Given a

community

f

competent

545


15/19

Social

Studies

of

Science

users,

there

is no

way

to talk

your way

into

possession

of the

relevant

skill. You either

have the

ability

to

speakFrench or you don't; to ride

a

bicycle;

to build a

working

TEA-laser;

to

make

a

souffle;

to

culture

Drosophila

cells;

to

perform

Monte

Carlo

computer

imulations;

o write

a

scientific

paper

in

the form

acceptable

to

Nature.'6

There is

a

peculiar

ophthalmological

onditionthat

appears

preferen-

tially

to

afflict

the

intellectualclasses.

They

can

see the

product

of

work,

but

the work itself

seems

to be

invisible. This condition

takes its

toll

even when the work concerned s

intellectualwork

and

the

products

are

ideas. The effect

of

this

optical

distortion an

be a

contrastbetween

paper-

workand

proper-work,

anassimilationof talk to

thought,

andanundue

prominence given

to

that

which

is,

or

can

be,

verbalized. Of

course,

discursive

competences

are skills

as

much as

manipulative ompetences,

and

iterary

kills are as

much

nvolvedas

manipulative

kills in the labour

processes

which

makescientific

goods.

But,

for all Latour's

mphasisupon

'following'

scientists nto

their

places

of

work,

his book contains

remark-

ably

little

on the work world

of

technoscience.

Compared,

or

example,

to

Michael

Lynch's

recent

accountof scientific

'shop

work',

Latour's

book

gives the impression that scientists' day-to-daywork consists almost

entirely

of

rhetorical,

representational

nd

literary

practices.'7

doubt

if

the

word 'skill'

ever

appears

n this

book, and,

even

if I

noddedand

missed

one

or

more

usages,

there

is

certainlynothing

here that ndicates

serious

interest

in

the

extended

and

energy-consuming

processes

of

training

by

which

scientists

acquire

heir nstrumentalnd

otherskills. Yet

the

'inscrip-

tions' and 'traces'

hat

constitute cientific

goods

are

undeniably

roduced

by

routines

of

manipulative

ndother

workthat

represent,

s it

were,

scien-

tists'

capital.

Calculative

echnoscientific

actors,

such

as

those

who

figure

in Latour's

account,

are

therefore

quite

able

to

weigh

in the balance

the

courses

of

action

offered

o them

and

he

investments

hey

have

acquired

n

their

skills and

competences.

One

should

say

that

hey

have an

'interest'

n

those

skills and

work-routines,

an

'interest'

n

encouraging

or

enlisting

n

courses

of

action

which

promise

to

give

scope

and

value to their

skills

and

routines.

Given a

basically

calculative

model

of

the

actor

(which,

indeed,

Latour

hares

withthe

sociologists

he

criticizes),

interests'

eem

quite

hard

and

durable

enough

to

figure

in

a

job

of

explanatory

work.18

Dualism

and

Discourse

The

constraints

which Latour

places

on

himself and

his

programme

rise

from the same

source

as

his valuable

contributions

o the

discipline.

Both

546


16/19

Essay

Review:

Shapin:

Following

Scientists

Around

stem

from his

opposition

to

conventionally given

dualisms that

have

bedevilledthe social studiesof science and allied enterprises.His book

is

structured

around a

systematic

assault

on the

legitimacy

of a

range

of

dualisms,

including

those that

uxtapose

the social

and the

scientific,

the

subjective

and the

objective,

the

outside

and the

inside

of

science,

the irrationaland

the

rational,

belief and

knowledge,

the social and the

natural ciences.

In all cases

we are instructed

not

to

assume

the

validity

of

the dualist divides

and not

to

use

their

components

as

interpretative

resources.

Instead,

we are

to

seek

an

understanding

of the

processes

through

which the

analytically

nvalid

dualismsare

constituted.Our

data,

Latour

says,

shouldnotbe

composed

of discreteentities calledhumans,

non-humans,

machines,

facts,

science

and

society.

It should be made

up

of

stronger

and weaker

heterogeneous

associations

(127, 240).

This

is

a world

in

which

anything

and

anybody

can be an actantor an

actor,

where we

may

elliptically

speak

of texts but

not

people

as

having

inde-

pendent

interests,

where all differences

are differences

of

scale.

It is the world of the seamless

web,

a world

in which

everything

is

connected to

everything

else,

in

which even

the discrete existence

of

things and the categorizationof processes cannot be used to interpret

or

to

explain

the

actions

of those who are said to

produce

them.

There

is muchto

be said

in

favour

of

monistic

mpulses

and the close

inspection

of

seams,

but

there

is little

to

be

said from within a seamless web.

Ultimately,

those that

truly

inhabit the seamless web can

say

nothing

intelligible

about ts

nature,

even,

if

they

are

consistent,

hat t

is

seamless

and that it

is a web.

And,

after

all,

natural cientists do not inhabitsuch

a

world.

They

happily

alk about

causes

and

effects,

they

seek

to

explain

how

and

why

one

thing brought

about another

thing, they distinguish

between

human

beings

and rocks.

If

we

want

to

understand he nature

of

technoscience,

and

if we

follow scientists aroundto

do

so,

we will

notice with

what

facility

hey engage,

for

example,

n

causal

explanations.

Why

shouldwe

who seek to

understand

what

scientists

do

deny

ourselves

the same

discursive

practices hey

use? We

may

well

wish

to be

'indepen-

dent'

of

scientists,

but

why

should we

impose

constraints

on

ourselves

that

scientistsdo not

observe?In another

context Bruno

Latourhas

said,

'No

amount

of

method can

make

one

text less

of a

fiction

than another

one. In consequence, we are perfectly free to use any style, any data,

any

effect,

any

composition

that

we

(the

authors

of

a written

ext)

deem

adapted

to

the audience.'19

Quite

right.

Latour'swork

gives

students f

science and

technologymajor

resources

to

extend

their

interpretative

rojects.

We

should

be

enormously

grateful

for

these

resources and we

should

put

them to

work

as soon as

possible.

547


17/19

548

Social

Studies

of

Science

At the same time he has

told us that we must

use these

resourcesin the

service

of

a

scholarly enterprise

which

seems

radicallyrestricted

com-

pared

to

many

of

those with which

we are

familiar. Latourhas not

yet

given

us

a

convincing argument

hat this new

enterprise

s

an

advance

rather

than

a retreat.

*

NOTES

1. For

example,

John Law

(ed.),

Power,

Action and

Belief:

A New

Sociology

of

Knowledge

?,

Sociological

Review

Monograph,

No. 32

(London:

Routledge

&

Kegan

Paul,

1986),

esp.

1-19, 196-280;

Michel

Gallon,

Law

andArie

Rip

(eds),

Mapping

he

Dynamics

of

Science and

Technology:

Sociology

of

Science in the Real World

London:

Macmillan,

1986).

This

latter

ext is a collection of

essays inspiredby

Latour's

work. The

Glossary

of

Latourian

erminology

xvi-xvii)

should

be

consulted

by

readers

of Science n

Action,

which

would

havebenefited

rom

suchan

aid. In a

personal

ommunication

ritten fter

his Review

was

edited,

Bruno Latour

has told me

that

the

term 'technoscience'

s not

his invention.

It

derives,

instead,

from

the

work of

Heidegger.

2.

Unfortunately,

he

proof-reading

and the

editing

do

a

disservice

to

the

quality

of

the

writing.

The book is marred

by

hundreds f errors

great

and

small,

fromnumerous

pelling

mistakes

to

major

typesetting

and

editing

blunders

that make

it difficult

to recover the

sense

of

diagrams

(193-94)

and entire

pages

of text

(15-16).

3.

See,

especially,

172-73

of

this book

and

Latour,

Les

microbes:

guerre etpaix,

suivi

de irreductions

(Paris:

A.

M.

M6tailie,

1984).

4.

Apart

romthe well-known

LaboratoryLife:

TheSocial Construction

f

Scientific

Facts

(Beverly

Hills,

CA:

Sage,

1979) [with

Steve

Woolgar],

Latour's

writings

of

special

relevance

in this

connection nclude:

'Give

Me

a

Laboratory

nd

I

Will

Raise

the

World',

in KarinD.

Knorr-Cetina

nd

Michael

Mulkay

eds),

ScienceObserved:

Perspectives

n the

Social

Study

of

Science

(London:

Sage,

1983),

141-70;

'Unscrewing

the

Big

Leviathan,

or

How Actors

Macrostructure

eality

andHow

SociologistsHelp

ThemDo

So',

inKnorr-CetinandAaron

Cicourel

eds),

Advances

n

Social

Theory

nd

Methodology:

Toward

n

Integration

f

Micro

and

Macro

Sociologies

(London:

Routledge

&

Kegan

Paul,

1981),

227-303

[with

Michel

Callon];

'Visualization

and

Cognition:

Thinking

with

Eyes

and

Hands',

Knowledge

and

Society:

Studies

n the

Sociology of

Culture

Past and

Present,

Vol.

6

(1986),

1-40;

and

Les

microbes,

op.

cit.

note 3.

5.

Mary

B.

Hesse,

TheStructure

of

Scientific

Inference

(London:

Macmillan,

1974);

Barry

Barnes,

T. S.

Kuhn and Social Science

(London:

Macmillan,

1982),

Chapter

2.

6.

This

important

otion

possibly

derives

most

directly

rom

Bourdieu;

ee,

for

example,

his

interpretation

f

the

symbolic

meaning

of the domestic

threshold:

P.

Bourdieu,

'The

BerberHouse', in MaryDouglas(ed.), RulesandMeanings:TheAnthropologyf Everyday

Knowledge

(Harmondsworth,

Middx:

Penguin,

1973),

98-110,

on 109.

7.

Latour

actually

wants

o

'get

rid of all

categories

ike

those

of

power

[and]

knowledge'.

It is unclear

what

new

terminology

he

prefers,

though

one

can

speculate

hathe

is

gesturing

towards Foucauldian

notions

such as

the

'power-knowledge'

uncture:

Michel

Foucault,

ed. Colin

Gordon,

Power-Knowledge:

elected

Interviews

and

Other

Writings,

1972-1977

(Brighton,

Sussex:

Harvester

Press, 1980).


18/19

Essay

Review:

Shapin:

Following

Scientists

Around

8. The thrustof the crucial

word

'independently'

s not

explained

here

nor in a similar

usage

earlier

(17).

Presumably,

this refers

to

Latour's well-known

advocacy

of

the

'outsider's'

perspective,

hough

his

reading

s

apparently

t odds with his

repeated

nsistence

that we 'follow'

scientists

as 'the

best

of

all

guides'

(21).

An outsider

may

indeed

be

'independent',

but he will find himself unable

to 'follow' scientists

very

far.

Moreover,

Latour

vigorously argues

the

apparently

elativistcase that

udgements

of

the

validity

and

efficacy

of

claims

can

never be

'independent'

of

particular

networks

(247-50).

9. For

elegant arguments

n favour of

explanatory

ocial science and its

compatibility

with

verstehen,

see John

Law

and Peter

Lodge,

Science

for

Social

Scientists

(London:

Macmillan,

1984),

Chapter

22. For Law's current

position

see,

for

example,

Law,

'Power/Knowledge

and

the Dissolution

of the

Sociology

of

Knowledge',

in Law

(ed.),

op.

cit. note

1, 1-19;

Michel

Callon,

John

Law and Arie

Rip,

'How to

Study

the Force

of

Science',

in

Callon,

Law and

Rip

(eds),

op.

cit.

note

1,

3-15.

10. See

G.

Nigel

Gilbertand Michael

Mulkay, Opening

Pandora's Box: A

Sociological

Analysis of

Scientists'Discourse

(Cambridge:Cambridge

University

Press,

1984).

There

is no

reference to Gilbert and

Mulkay's

work

in

Latour's book.

11. It

is

unlikely

thatrelativists

n

the social studies

of

science

will

recognize

themselves

from Latour's

caricature

(195-97).

In

his account relativists seek

only

to establish the

rational

equivalence

of

alternative

views;

they

should be

left to

'their

professional

duties

as

defence

lawyers'.

In

fact,

a number

of

relativistshave

sought

to

explain

why

in

specific

settings

certainmoves

are

not

counted

rational,

egitimate

or

permissible.

See,

for

example,

H.

M.

Collins,

'An

Empirical

Relativist

Programme

n

the

Sociology

of Scientific Know-

ledge',

in

Knorr-Cetina&

Mulkay

(eds),

op.

cit. note

4,

85-113. It is one

of

the

major

ironies

of

contemporary cholarship

hatso

manypeople

have taken o

saying

that

relativism

and social

constructivismare 'fashionable'at

just

the

point

when

all but

a

few

relativists

have

jumped ship.

12.

One

must,

for

all

that,

welcome

any

pressure

that

urges analysts

further o

refine,

define,

justify

and

reflect

upon

their

explanatory

resources.

If

there is

misunderstanding,

by

no

meansall the blameneed

be laid at Latour'sdoor.

'Interest-explanation',

or

example,

does

indeed merit further

ustification,

and,

for

that

reason,

one wishes that Latourhad

made

the bases of his

criticisms more

explicit.

13.

Barry

Barnes,

'On the

"Hows" and

"Whys"

of Cultural

Change',

Social

Studies

of

Science,

Vol.

11

(1981),

481-98,

on

492;

see also

Barnes,

Scientific

Knowledge

and

Sociological

Theory

(London:

Routledge

&

Kegan

Paul,

1974),

Chapter

4.

14.

There s

the further

ategory

which Latourcalls

'explicit

interests'and

which

seems

to

describe

actors' state of

knowledge

of

their

(so-to-speak)

real interests

(108,

113-14).

But

Latour's

discussionof

goals

and

interests

s

ambiguoushroughout.

or

example,

having

described

the

flexibility

of interests

with

respect

to

interpretative

alk,

he then

says

that

while

interests

'are

elastic',

'there is a

point

where

they

break

or

spring

back'

(112-13).

And

even

his

'goals',

which he

usually

invokes

as the

inelastic

purposes

of

actors,

are,

elsewhere,

said to be

liable to

displacement

by

others'

interpretative

work or invented

for

actors

by

others

(e.g.,

108, 114-15).

15. Latour&

Woolgar, op.

cit. note 4,

Chapter

5,

esp.

189-91.

16.

See,

for

example,

H.

M.

Collins,

Changing

Order:

Replication

and Induction n

Scientific

Practice

(London:

Sage,

1985),

Chapter

3.

17.

Michael

Lynch,

Art and

Artifact

n

Laboratory

Science:

A

Studyof Shop

Work nd

Shop

Talk n a

Research

Laboratory London:

Routledge

&

Kegan

Paul,

1985);

and see

Latour's

critical

review: 'Will

the Last

Person o Leave

the

Social

Studies

of

Science Please

Turn

on

the

Tape-Recorder?',

Social Studies of

Science,

Vol.

16

(1986),

541-48.

549


19/19

Social Studies

of

Science

18. For research

pointing

to

the

explanatory

work to be done

by

the

categories

of

skill

and

competence,

see,

for

example,

Peter

Galison,

'Bubble-Chambersnd

the

Experimental

Workplace,'

in

Peter Achinstein

and

Owen

Hannaway

(eds),

Observation,

Experiment,

and

Hypothesis

n Modem

Physical

Science

(Cambridge,

MA: MIT

Press,

1985),

309-73;

Galison,

How

Experiments

End

(Chicago,

IL: The

University

of

Chicago

Press,

1987);

Andrew

Pickering,

Constructing

Quarks:

A

Sociological History

of

Particle

Physics

(Edinburgh:

University

of

EdinburghPress/Chicago,

L: The

University

of

Chicago

Press,

1984);

Pickering,

'The Role of Interests in

High-Energy Physics:

The

Choice

between

Charm and

Colour',

in

Karin D. Knorr et al.

(eds),

The

Social Process

of Scientific

Investigation.

Sociology of

the

Sciences,

Volume

IV,

1980

(Dordrecht:

Reidel,

1981),

107-38;

Pickering,

'Forms of Life:

Science,

Contingency

and

Harry

Collins',

British

Journalfor

the

Historyof

Science,

Vol. 20

(1987),

213-21,

on 220-21. I have

discussed

empirical

tudies

of

'professional

ested interests'

n

'History

of Scienceand Its

Sociological

Reconstructions',

History of

Science,

Vol. 20

(1982),

157-211,

esp.

164-69.

19.

Latour,

op.

cit.

note

17,

548.

Steven

Shapin

has been

a lecturer

in

the

Science Studies

Unit since 1972.

He has

published

extensively

in the

history

and

sociology

of

science,

and

is

currently

working

on a

book

assessing

the bases of

credibility

in

seventeenth-century

science.

Author's

address:

Science Studies

Unit,

University

of

Edinburgh,

34

Buccleuch

Place,

Edinburgh

EH8

9JT,

Scotland,

UK.

550

Shapin Latour

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